Some Aspects of Moral Theory in Kant and Habermas
The Incompatibility of Categorical and Intersubjective Validity.
2005
Overview
This paper intends to examine some aspects of the moral reasoning of Immanuel
Kant and Jurgen Habermas. The main purpose of the paper is to examine the
framework of moral reasoning established by Kant and compare it with the more
modern treatment of moral deliberation as expressed by Habermas. The purpose of
the first section is to introduce my understanding of Kant and the foundations used to
ground the categorical imperative and claims of categorical validity so that in the
second section I may compare this framework with Habermas’ principle of
universalization and claims of intersubjective validity. Kant’s categorical imperative
serves as part of the framework for modern cognitivist ethics despite what I perceive
to be the incompatibility of categorical and intersubjective validity claims.
Both Kant and Habermas attempt to identify and justify moral principles and norms
within moral discourse by searching for “moral” standards used to evaluate or
legitimize moral determinations. Both authors focus on the rational recognition of
“unavoidable” or “necessary” moral propositions that flow from the reasoning of
abstract universalism. Kant is very absolute in his categorical standard used to justify
moral principles, while Habermas’ criteria is more subjective and depends on the
creation of a domination free consensus and other rules inherent to moral discourse.
This paper intends to examine the framework of moral reasoning supported by these
authors in order to explore the historical progression of moral reasoning from
monological to dialogical justifications. A review of Kant’s basic building blocks should
add a historical dimension to the paper and reveal the origins of part of the
framework used today to support discourse ethics and consensus based rules of
argumentation.
The thesis begins with a description of the conceptual framework used by Kant to
describe and justify moral propositions with a particular focus on the relationship
between categorical and unconditional validity and the concept of duty and moral
obligation. The second part of the paper will attempt to outline Habermas’ theory of
communicative action and discourse ethics that serves to establish the modern
linguistic and social framework for the justification of norms within an intersubjective
context. The second section intends to work toward attributing innovations, pointing
to contradictions, comparing descriptions, and mapping transformations between the
moral reasoning of Kant and Habermas. After establishing the basic framework for
moral reasoning, the last part of the paper will attempt to compare and contrast the
elements of categorical validity and intersubjective validity as espoused by Kant and
Habermas in order to suggest that Kant’s conception of unconditional categorical
validity is incompatible with Habermas’ conception of intersubjective discursive
justification. This section will try to canvas the terrain of moral reasoning in the
absence of categorical assertions and end with a few ideas on the topic of moral
worth that I suggest may serve as a further basis of inquiry in light of the conclusions
reached.
Introduction
Kant’s thinking established the basic framework for moral reasoning that is still used
by modern cognitivist philosophers such as Jurgen Habermas who investigate moral
claims of validity within a discursive context. Historically, moral norms and principles
were viewed as elements of a rational “order of things” imbued with teleological
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value, or as part of an exemplary way of life leading to salvation. Immanuel Kant was
a fundamental influence in changing this perspective by bringing forward a reasoned
justification of morality. The skepticism of Kant to obtain certain knowledge of the
intelligible world, his rejection of religious dogma of the time, and the construction of
an impartial point of view formed a justification of morality founded on principles of
reason that were perceived by Kant to be objective without resorting to “faith” in a
divine creator. Kant’s categorical imperative is an expression of moral worth rooted
in egalitarian conceptions of reciprocity and equality - to treat human beings as ends
in themselves and never as means only. He seeks to identify moral principles on
grounds equally valid for everyone in an objective determination of a fictional realm
of ends. Habermas shares Kant’s goal of establishing the framework necessary to
justify moral obligations but differs as to the means to construct it. Habermas
grounds the justification of moral norms in the outcomes of a consensual discourse
that observe presuppositions of communicative action operating as pragmatic rules
of argumentation. He reformulates Kant’s moral system within a dialogical context.
Habermas’ transformation of Kant’s categorical imperative into the principle of
universalization serves as a key concept in the identification and justification of moral
propositions. Kant relies on the validity of an objective or absolute “fact” of reason
infallibly determined by the logic of unconditional demands. Habermas relies on a
mature consideration of the interests of all concerned within a process of public
argumentation. The transition from a unilateral monological justification of moral
principles to a dialogical consequential analysis constrained by discourse ethics
reflects a modern understanding that recognizes the need for participation and
agreement in the construction and validity of moral propositions. The principle of
universalization sets out to examine the potential for norms to be universally
accepted on the basis of an analysis of what constitutes acceptable consequences
from the perspective of each participant. The principle links moral validity to the
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potential of a norm to be acceptable to everyone. This innovation links the validity of
norms to the assent of informed participants and requires rules of argumentation
that provide for unlimited participation, symmetrical rights of assertion, good faith
participation and domination-free argumentation within a public norm setting
discourse.
Cognitive ethics is rooted in the framework that Kant established for moral
philosophy. Habermas and other cognitive philosophers typically incorporate some
aspects of Kant’s reasoning that seem inconsistent with conceptions of
intersubjective validity. Both Kant and Habermas rely on reasoning that makes a
distinction between conditional and unconditional motives and hypothetical and
categorical validity. The use of unconditional motives and categorical validity was a
necessity for Kant’s conception of moral worth because he could find no alternative
grounding for “moral” action after he refused to admit the use of conditional interests
in universal reasoning. Habermas’ conception of intersubjective validity insists on the
mature consideration of the pragmatic interests and ethical value-orientations of all
concerned, a process that I argue is inconsistent with claims of unconditional
demands and categorical forms of validity as defined by Kant.
Within an intersubjective context, the claim to incorporate unconditional motives and
categorical validity is unnecessary and difficult to maintain, unless such claims
signify something less than what Kant intended. The categorical imperative
demonstrates a method of moral reasoning that relies on categorical assertions that
fail to disclose any reasoned justification for their acceptance beyond their capacity
for universal application without contradiction. Kant’s approach tried to avoid
hypothetical forms of reasoning tied to the conditional interests of deliberating
subjects in order to establish a category of moral propositions freed of instrumental
necessity. Although Kant attempted to avoid the use of conditional interests in moral
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reasoning, I do not think he succeeds and the construction of moral reasoning within
such a framework is unobtainable. The reasoning of the categorical imperative does
not transcend conditional interests but rather merely rejects limited interests in
favour of universal “interests” allegedly shared by everyone. In other words, abstract
moral universalism attempts to prevent the use of selfish motives following from a
limited set of immediate conditional interests but it does not avoid the use of
conditional “interests” altogether. A better explanation of moral reasoning, as
provided by Habermas, would acknowledge conditional interests and focus on those
universally shared by everyone.
Kant’s use of categorical validity is insufficient to explain the best way to determine
which interests are universally valid. Kant claimed that everyone already knows what
is moral and he left this determination up to individual moral agents. Once this
assumption is questioned, moral propositions require a reasoned justification within a
pubic discourse. This process of justification inevitably attaches conditional interests
based on an empirical analysis of consequences to any proposition moral or
otherwise, whether shared by everyone or not. Even if one does not accept the idea
that the categorical imperative discloses the use of conditional interests, albeit
universal conditional interests, such claims are even stronger within an
intersubjective context. Unlike the categorical imperative, the principle of
universalization is rooted in the equal consideration of the conditional interests of
everyone. Moral norms accepted within an intersubjective context have little else to
explain acceptance other than a motivation linked to conditional interests. The
inevitable reliance on conditional interests to motivate consensus suggests that
Kant’s goal of unconditional validity is an illusion. Unconditional motives appear to be
credible in an abstract monological process because they remain unchallenged.
Within an intersubjective procedure the process of giving reasons cannot avoid the
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disclosure of conditional interests rooted permanently in pragmatic and ethical
context.
Habermas recognizes that conditional interests are part and parcel of a transition to
intersubjective validity but he argues he can offset the problems created by such a
transition and retain claims of categorical validity for moral propositions by relying on
the constraints of a moral point of view that considers the interests and value-
orientations of everyone. Habermas proposes that an ideal role exchange that limits
itself to consideration of generalizable and universal interests can transcend
conditional motives in a context-independent manner. This line of reasoning is not
very persuasive and can be contrasted with the observation that the principle of
universalization itself discloses a standard of self-interest insofar as it is designed to
reject norms that contain unacceptable costs to all concerned. It does not appear
likely that models of normative rightness can transcend motivations linked to
conditional interests, at best it can equalize them or promote the interests of others.
If modern moral discourse requires reasoned justification of norms that are
inescapably attached to conditional motivations, then the only valuable conception of
moral worth to remain true to Kant’s basic insight is the idea of a person motivated
to protect the interests of others in the absence of any personal benefit. However,
this conception of moral worth is incompatible with the idea of limiting normative
rightness to norms that disclose common interests shared by everyone unless
arguably, everyone has a shared interest in altruistic behaviour that protects the
interests of others. All other categories of shared interests would disclose a
conditional interest. If this argument is acceptable then unconditional demands are
incompatible with an interest based analysis or they do not exist and moral reasoning
is left with the need to redefine moral worth as something other than “unconditional”
moral action.
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Both Kant and Habermas claim to rely on categorical validity in order to avoid
hypothetical forms of reasoning that disclose instrumental reasoning. However,
discourse ethics ties the validity of substantive norms to rational conditions of
argumentation that take the form of unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions.
Habermas, like other supporters of cognitivist ethics, claims such rules are
unavoidable and necessary. I will attempt to argue that the procedural norms of
discourse ethics are the result of a dilemma of a choice rather than necessity and
that once this choice is made instrumental reasoning in moral deliberation is to be
embraced rather than avoided. The agreement to adopt communicative
presuppositions as rules of argumentation demonstrates the prior acceptance of a
general end, an agreement to cooperate within a domination-free discourse, albeit
for good reasons. Insofar as this is acknowledged, the procedural rules of discourse
ethics are derivative of hypothetical instrumental necessity. Based on this
observation, if the rules of argumentation are rooted in hypothetical reasoning, the
norms established within such a framework are somewhat limited by the constraints
of this initial determination. In other words, the agreement to adopt procedural
norms limits the scope of acceptable substantive norms to those that fit within the
hypothetical framework established by the prior acceptance of a general end, i.e.
norms that fall outside this framework are not likely to be accepted. Categorical
validity, whether grounded in objective laws or a potential for universal acceptance,
must give way to a conception of intersubjective validity that is rooted in the prior
acceptance of a general end, which is suggested by Habermas as the desire to
resolve conflict by the force of the better argument rather than with violence.
Part I: Some Aspects of the Moral Reasoning of Immanuel Kant
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Introduction to Kant
Kant had four variations of the categorical imperative. His final formulation provides
that one should, “act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in
that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.” The principles of
abstract universalism established by the categorical imperative heralded the first
theoretical advance toward the impartial consideration of the interests of everyone.
Kant focused on the conditions of moral action and a few particular maxims in his
description of the structure of moral propositions in the Foundations of the
Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason. Kant’s approach is to
describe the theoretical limits of practical reason while recognizing the superiority of
moral principles contained in notions of mutual respect and equality. Kant argued
that the will binds itself to the dictates of reason because it recognizes the
foundations of morality in the universal form. Moral agents observe what Kant called
“laws of freedom” because practical reason guides the will to universal principles
rooted in reciprocity and equality.
Kant intended his critical examination of practical reason to lay the foundation for the
supreme principle of morality, the categorical imperative.1 The ground of obligation
represented in his moral law was to be constructed solely from a priori concepts free
from empirical explanations connected to the phenomenal world of
sense/appearance:
“…the ground of obligation here must not be sought in the nature of man or in the
circumstances in which he is placed, but sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure
reason, and that every other precept which rests on principles of mere experience,
even a precept which is in certain respects universal, so far as it leans in the least on
1 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969 pp.3-9.
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empirical grounds (perhaps only in regard to the motive involved), may be called a
practical rule but never a moral law.”2
Properly called a metaphysics of morals his investigations were based on a critique of
practical reason that set out the limits of the “faculty of reason” and recognized a
system of a priori knowledge consisting of concepts described as objective moral
laws existing within an intelligible order of things purged of empirical interests or
sensuous motivations. A pure practical philosophy, as opposed to an applied practical
philosophy, was the difference between being motivated by a good will or empirical
conditions. Kant claimed that the universal form was devoid of empirical interests
and could be used to construct moral duties and ground moral obligations binding on
all rational beings as dictated by the faculty of reason. According to Kant, the good
will, confronted by freedom, commanded by reason, and motivated by duty agrees to
self-legislate universal laws out of respect for the worth of the unconditional moral
“ought.”
Theoretical Framework of Kant’s Moral Theory
Practical Reason
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that reason operates as a function of the
mind in the construction and use of principles within the faculty of understanding.
According to Kant, the faculty of understanding organizes experience through formal
relations or categories. The understanding serves to produce a unity among
phenomena according to rules of perception that are permanent and exhaustive and
corresponded to the categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality or manner.
The “faculty of reason”, on the other hand, is considered to be more than an
2 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969 p.6.
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experience of phenomena according to the four categories. Reason is capable of
constructing ideas and ideals of unity without corresponding objects in the
phenomenal world. In the words of Kant, reason produces a “unity among the rules of
understanding, according to principles.”3 The faculty of reason, can be distinguished
from the faculty of understanding and is composed of concepts that provide
knowledge based on principles not necessarily connected to the experience of
phenomena.
The term “principle” can be used to express at least two different meanings in the
works of Kant. Principles may be viewed as general propositions or maxims that can
prescribe a course of action for a particular situation. Prescriptive principles serve to
establish corresponding duties and our actions may be based on, conform with, or
breach moral principles or duties. The term “principle” may also, however, indicate a
descriptive function. A principle may describe an event and provide an explanation of
a thing’s working. When Kant explores the limits of practical reason he is attempting
to describe the principle of morality and explain how the moral law works as an
example of practical reason in action. When Kant is engaged in the construction of a
metaphysics of morals, he additionally sets out to provide prescriptive principles of
moral action. The distinction between prescriptive and descriptive moral principles is
important to keep in mind as Kant’s theory alternates between descriptive and
prescriptive modes of moral action.
Kant divided philosophy and the knowledge of principles into three categories: logic,
physics and ethics.4 Logic sets out formal rational knowledge concerned with the
form of understanding and the universal rules of thinking. Physics and ethics, on the
other hand, consist of material rational knowledge related to definite physical objects
3 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. F. Max Muller (Anchor Books, NY) 1966. pp.225.4 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. p.3.
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and the laws to which they are subject, containing both empirical and rational
content. For Kant, philosophy is empirical if based on experience and pure if based on
a priori principles. The empirical portion of ethics is viewed as practical anthropology,
while the rational portion of ethics is conceived of as morality.5 Empirical judgments
differ from a priori judgments insofar as empirical judgments are descriptions of fact
based on experience. On a case by case basis, empirical judgments can be
generalized but remain limited to observations of what is, they cannot yield claims of
necessity or universality. A priori judgments, on the other hand, seek out necessary
connections rooted in concepts, the faculty of reason, or the faculty of
understanding. For Kant, to say that a triangle must have its interior angles equal to
two right angles or that every event must have a cause is to understand a necessary
connection between triangles and angles, cause and effect, not given by experience.
A priori judgments transcend knowledge based on empirical observation and contain
claims of necessity and universality in a manner precluded by empirical judgment. In
a sense, it is an idealized form of abstract thought.
The difference between theoretical and practical reason for Kant is the difference
between cognitions that express what “is” and cognitions that express what “ought”
to be. The theoretical use of reason deals with objects of cognition in the world of
appearance, while the practical use of reason is concerned with actions and grounds
that determine the will in the intelligible world.6 It is a distinction between two
different types of a priori judgments operating in human cognition. Scientific or
theoretical use of reason seeks to establish necessary and universal statements that
set out what “must” be the case, while the moral or practical use of reason seeks to
establish necessary and universal principles that set out what “ought” to be the case.
5 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969.see pp.3-4.6 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New Jersey) 1993. p.15.
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The a priori element of moral judgment is the condition of moral validity according to
Kant.
Instrumental reason is an example of practical reason that considers the necessity of
a relationship between cause and effect to produce an action or object. Kant’s
critique of practical reason is concerned with “the determining ground of the will”
either in bringing forth objects in the physical world corresponding to pre-existing
conceptions (instrumental action) or in the case of pure practical reason, acting on
moral principles of volition, or autonomous self-determination.7 Either way, practical
reason is a faculty that is used to guide people toward objects and the satisfaction of
needs through the application of principled action. Kant believed that the faculty of
reason served to satisfy our need to bring isolated judgments under general
principles corresponding to a uniform system of agreement or unity.
Laws of Nature and Laws of Freedom
Kant argues that, “everything in nature works according to laws.”8 He believed that
rational beings endowed with will have the capacity to act in accordance with laws
that are knowable a priori.9 Laws of nature are represented by the world of
appearance and are demonstrated by Newtonian mechanical principles while the
laws of freedom are represented by the intelligible world and consist of moral
principles. The laws of nature explain physical causality while the laws of freedom
explain the moral law according to which everything should or ought to happen, even
if it does not. Kant sees the world of sense appearance as a system of necessary
7 Ibid. p.15.8 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969.see p.33.9 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969.see pp.33-34.
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mechanical laws to which the will is subject, while the intelligible world is free of
mechanical necessity but subject to the autonomy of the will.10
A human agent is considered rational insofar as they are conscious of the fact that
the faculty of reason may be used to harmonize activities with the laws of nature and
the laws of freedom. The capacity of the will to conform to a conception of certain
laws, i.e. according to principles, is a necessary condition of what it means to be
rational.11 In other words, a rational agent is a person who recognizes the laws and
acts accordingly. Kant believes that practical reason is demonstrable to the extent
that the will is in harmony with the fulfillment of a practical purpose according to the
laws dictated by reason. For example, the practical laws of geometry and
mathematics are taken to demonstrate the necessary aspect of objective rules that
reason understands a priori as fundamental laws, such as a triangle has three angles
or two plus two is four. According to Kant, this understanding necessarily determines
the will of an agent through the recognition of the unconditional form of the law prior
to its application to any particular subject matter.12 If one understands, a priori,
through the use of reason that two plus two is four, they are bound to obey this
unconditional universal law when counting apples or oranges or whatever. By
analogy in moral theory, a rational agent may act on the basis of unconditional laws
known a priori through the use of pure reason not determined by an object of the
senses.
Phenomena and Noumena
10 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New Jersey) 1993. p.45.11 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. see pp. 34, 51.12 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New Jersey) 1993. p.26.
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In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes a distinction between the world of
phenomena, which provides a perspective of an empirical self subject to the
necessary laws of physical causation, and the world of noumena, which provides a
perspective of an intelligible self that is situated outside the world of physical
appearance subject to the laws of pure practical reason. The clear separation of pure
practical philosophy within the intelligible world free from empirical inducements
serves to clarify the motivational force of reason, conscious of itself, in opposition to
maxims of action mixed with incentives based on feelings or inclinations. For Kant, it
is the motivation of a moral action that provides its distinctly “moral” quality.
In the world of phenomena, Kant claims that agents must recognize themselves as
subject to the mechanical laws of nature expressed by laws of physical causality. For
example, the laws of physics are said to be necessary and objective explanations of
causality dealing with objects and motion within a framework of mechanical
determinism wherein all causes can be attributed to a prior physical state. In
opposition to the world of appearance, Kant constructs the intelligible world of
noumena to ground an explanation of freedom of the will. The noumenal world must
be assumed, according to Kant, because we are conscious that our will is free to act
as a source of causation in opposition to the mechanical laws of nature within an
intelligible order of things. The problem that Kant articulates at the end of the
Foundations, that human beings do not have knowledge of and cannot really
understand what remains after excluding physical determinations, limits the
knowledge that agents may have about the intelligible world.
Kant claims that knowledge of the phenomenal world, or world of appearance, is
gained through a positive intuition of sensual phenomena, the use of our senses. He
claims that knowledge of the noumenal world or intelligible self is not known to us
through our direct intuition in a positive fashion, but rather dialectically in a negative
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fashion. He claims that knowledge of the intelligible world signifies only a something
that remains when sensual causation as the determining ground of the will is
excluded. It is a negative thought of the world of sense or what remains when we
exclude empirical explanations of phenomena. Although the phenomenal and
noumenal worlds appear contradictory Kant recognizes that they must be thought of
as necessarily united in one and the same subject.13
Causality
The origins of the distinction between the world of appearance and the intelligible
world can be explained as the difference between two types of causality in Kant’s
thinking.14 The first type of causality is explained through the mechanical laws of
nature within the spatio-temporality of our experience where everything that takes
place presupposes a prior state and is explainable through a rule governed
connection to the laws of nature. The second type of causality is based on reason,
consciousness of freedom and a conception of rational logic that uses mental
representations to link concepts or events with necessary conclusions.
The first type of causality found within the world of appearance explains the
possibility of deducing necessary causes and effects in the phenomenal world. Kant
used the notion of the world of appearance as a theoretical vehicle to overcome the
skepticism of Hume who argued that mechanical cause and effect explanations were
merely linked by custom rather than necessity.15 Empiricism coupled with the
perspective of the world of appearance, was considered a method of obtaining
reliable knowledge of necessary laws or principles of causality relating to sense
13 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. see pp. 88, 86, 92, 198.14 Wolff, Robert Paul. The Autonomy of Reason. (Harper & Row NY) 1971. see pp.104-113.15 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New Jersey) 1993. p.55.
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phenomena that did not admit of any other kind of causality, i.e. logic or laws of
freedom. Empirical causality, for Kant, included internal sense perceptions and
desires caused by the world of appearance.
The second type of causality found in the thinking of Kant gives rise to his conception
of the world of noumena or things-in-themselves. It encompasses knowledge
achieved through concepts and the use of reason, rather than sensibility. Kant
constructs a notion of causality that is linked to practical reason modeled on the logic
used in establishing necessary connections between representations of premise and
conclusion, or subject and predicate. Modus ponens is an example of a hypothetical
model of reasoning that consists of “two judgments that are connected with each
other as ground and consequent,”16 in the form of “if p then q.” The consequent is
given as a condition of the ground. The validity of such reasoning relies on the
relation of the premise to the conclusion independent of whether the premise is true
or not. If the premise is true then the conclusion must also be true. For example, if all
bodies are composite then they are divisible. This proposition expresses a
problematic but a priori connection between the condition of being a composite body
and being divisible, a connection that is asserted to hold necessarily and independent
of empirical verification. Categorical judgments, on the other hand, express an
understanding of an essentially different logical function in the relation between a
premise and a conclusion, or in Kantian terms between a subject and a predicate. In
a categorical proposition the predicate is simply asserted of the subject directly or
immediately without conditions. For example, all bodies are divisible.
Kant also made a distinction between two different types of logical inferences,
between analytic and synthetic judgments. Analytical judgments assert an a priori
necessary connection between a premise and a conclusion where the given subject
16 Kant, Immanuel. Logic. Trans. Hartmann and Schwarz. (Dover Publications Inc., New York) 1974. p.111.
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contains within it the predicate that is made explicit. The logical connection between
two propositions was provided by a relation of identity between the subject and the
predicate implicitly contained within the original subject not requiring any further
reference to knowledge gained from experience. This type of judgment was
contrasted with synthetic judgments in the Critique of Pure Reason, “Either the
predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is covertly contained in this
concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in
connection with it.”17 Synthetic propositions require a “third” term to link the
predicate with the subject, a term that is not disclosed by the original subject.
Synthetic judgments may be empirical or a priori. In empirical synthetic judgments,
experience is the third term that connects the subject with the predicate. For
example, the concept of body is said to not include the predicate gravity, however
observations of experience may connect the predicate of gravity with the concept of
body in a synthetic judgment. A priori synthetic judgments pose a particular problem
for Kant because experience may not be the third term that connects a subject with a
predicate.
Kant undertakes a critique of practical reason to establish the possibility of a priori
synthetic practical propositions connected to noumena rather than phenomena. It is
this problem that occupies Kant in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and
the Critique of Practical Judgment. Although Kant restricts true knowledge to
knowledge of phenomena, he is forced to admit consciousness of noumena, which
cannot be known, but can be thought, as the source of a possible necessary and a
priori connection between synthetic practical propositions. Reason is deemed to be
the source of ideas in the form of noumena, such as conceptions of God, freedom,
and immortality, ideas for which no corresponding object or empirical proof can be
given. Kant is skeptical of gaining knowledge of causes beyond the phenomenal
17 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. F. Max Muller (Anchor Books, NY) 1966. p.7. A 6, B10.
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world although he establishes the basis of a second type of causality rooted in action
that is “conscious” of freedom of the will. As rational beings we recognize we are
partly determined by sensuous conditions and subject to the laws of causality, while
in practical matters, as a being-in-itself, we are conscious of determining causality
through an intelligible order of things.18 Consciousness of freedom became the third
term used to connect the subject of a will with the predicate of an action in a priori
synthetic practical propositions, an idea that was not demonstrable by experience
but constructed by reason through the use of the concept of noumena. Kant uses
consciousness of freedom to explain how reason itself can be the cause of moral
actions. This type of causality is based on a notion of practical reason coupled with
the presupposition that the will is free to determine actions in conformity to
principles independent of the world of sense and the laws of physics.
Kant reasons that the concept of causality itself, used to explain physical cause and
effect, is capable of grounding an analogous theoretical causality grounded in the
intelligible world. Although he is careful to deny any capacity to gain knowledge of
causality as noumena, he admits that it can be used in a practical manner as a
concept or mental representation to explain causation within moral action. From the
perspective of things-in-themselves, the concept of an empirically unconditioned
causality coupled with consciousness of freedom of the will serves to ground an
explanation of causa noumenon. “Even though I have no intuition which would
determine its objective theoretical reality, it nevertheless has a real application
exhibited in concreto in dispositions or maxims; that is, its practical reality can be
pointed out. All this is sufficient to justify the concept even with respect to
noumena.”19 Kant claims that knowledge of causality rooted in reason and freedom of
the will is speculative and cannot be explained according to physical laws, nor
18 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New Jersey) 1993. p.43.19 Ibid. p.58.
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demonstrated by way of empirical methods. Freedom is considered a mere idea, “the
objective reality of which can in no way be shown according to natural laws or in any
possible experience.”20 When confronted with an unknowable intelligible world
purged of material incentives an agent must assume the validity of the idea of
noumena based on rational “faith.” In other words, reason is compelled to assume
transcendent concepts of the intelligible world because we are conscious of more
than physical laws, but what this more is cannot be comprehended by reason
because we cannot provide any material condition as a reason for its necessity.21
Kant is very skeptical of demonstrating the existence of objects within the intelligible
world and of our capacity to know of what they consist, maintaining that our lack of
knowledge is the supreme limit of moral inquiry. Despite Kant’s skepticism of our
capacity to know anything about the intelligible world he constructs his theory of the
moral law on the foundation of pure reason anyway. He suggests that the use of pure
practical reason (as concerns freedom) leads us to recognize the absolute necessity
of unconditional laws of action that are categorically valid and binding on every
rational agent.
Kant’s Moral Theory
“… nothing can secure us against the complete abandonment of our ideas of duty
and preserve in us a well-founded respect for its law except the clear conviction that,
even if there never were actions springing from such pure sources, our concern is not
whether this or that was done but that reason of itself and independently of all
appearances commands what ought to be done. Our concern is with actions of which
perhaps the world has never had an example, with actions whose feasibility might be
20 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. see p.89.21 Ibid. see pp. 93, 94.
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seriously doubted by those who base everything on experience, and yet with actions
inexorably commanded by reason.”22
The justification of moral propositions in Kant’s moral theory is a matter of
determining the motivation or causes that determine the will to action. Kant’s moral
theory begins with the recognition that agents can understand the laws to which they
are subject from two different standpoints. The first standpoint is categorized under
the idea of heteronomy. Heteronomy explains the motivational force determining the
will governed by external impulse according to the dispositions of the individual
based on interests contingent on objects in the world. As such, according to Kant,
they are unfit to be apodictical practical moral commands.23 The second standpoint is
categorized under the idea of autonomy where an agent exists within an intelligible
world under laws grounded in the use of pure reason independent of sensuous
phenomena, although with the knowledge of still being subject to the laws of physical
causality. Kant’s moral theory is based on a particular construction of autonomy
where reason is viewed of as capable of determining the will free from foreign or
external causes,24 “The autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and
of the duties conforming to them; heteronomy of choice, on the other hand, not only
does not establish any obligation but is opposed to the principle of obligation and to
the morality of the will.”25 The self-legislation of moral commands purged of material
incentives is therefore the basis of all moral laws and necessary duties. If the law is
not self-legislated then it implies some other interest or compulsion to obedience
rather than a will acting free from the determining causes of the world of sense.
22 Ibid .p.28.23 Ibid. p.72. 24 Ibid. p.73.25 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New Jersey) 1993. p.33.
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Kant insists that the fundamental principles of morality must originate entirely a
priori from the use of reason and not spring from the inclinations of men. He suggests
that if there are commands they are based on grounds that are universal for
everyone. Objective categorical commands are universal and valid for every rational
being. Although people are bound to act only in accordance with their own will,
subject to their own legislation, Kant claims that the will has been designed by nature
to use reason and legislate universal laws. If an agent acts in accordance with pure
reason they legislate in the universal form because they recognized and respect the
ultimate moral law contained in the categorical imperative. So even though the will is
self-legislated, it must recognize moral law to be moral and respect that qua law.26
For Kant the derivation of the moral law from pure reason unmixed with empirical
inducements distinguishes between conditional motives based on material incentives
or personal feelings, and unconditional motives that bind abstract principles of the
will to the intent of every rational being. Toward this end, he carefully distinguishes
between a will that acts from principles of reason, and a will that acts from an
interest motivated by inclinations. He defined the practical motivation of reason as a
cause determining the will represented by the idea of an interest. To be morally
good, the will and its actions must be based on the renunciation of all interests. The
categorical imperative describes the principle by which the will purges itself of all
interests. In Kant’s own words,
“Whatever is derived from the particular natural situation of man as such, or from
certain feelings and propensities, or even from a particular tendency of human
reason which might not hold necessarily for the will of every rational being (if such a
tendency is possible), can give a maxim valid for us but not a law; that is, it can give
a subjective principle by which we might act only if we have the propensity and
26 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. see. pp.50, 58.
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inclination, but not an objective principle by which we would be directed to act even
if all our propensity, inclination, and natural tendency were opposed to it.”27
Good Will
It is by rejecting conditional interests that Kant forms the idea of an unconditional
good will. The good will is the foundation of morality for Kant because it strives to act
on the basis of maxims that accord with unconditional universal law independent of
materially conditioned maxims. A good will is considered the highest good and a
condition of every other good. The good will is be esteemed as good of itself without
regard to what it effects, accomplishes, or aims to achieve.28 It is judged as good
because the intention of the agent is free from material interests regardless of action
outcomes that may or may not be under the control of an agent. Kant claims that
morality and the categorical imperative are synthetic judgments that follow from an
analysis of the subject of an absolutely good will and the presupposition of freedom.
“Thus if freedom of the will is presupposed, morality together with its principle
follows from [an absolutely good will] by the mere analysis of its concept.”29
According to Kant, reason recognizes the good as practically necessary, not on
subjective grounds, but objectively on grounds valid for every rational being because
a good will acts from purely rational motives such as duty and respect for moral law.
An absolutely good will is one whose maxim can always include itself as a universal
law.30 It serves as a model for rational agents to follow, even though one may never
fully obtain the ideal condition.
27 Ibid. p.49.28 Ibid. p.15.29 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. p.74.30 Ibid. see. pp. 62-3, 74.
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Kant is opposed to philosophers who would claim that the highest duty is self-love.
He is careful to make clear that his conception of duty is not derived from empirical
sources and rejects claims based on conditional interests because they cannot be
universalized. Kant believes that any volition dependent on the faculty of desire could
be explained by reference to the empirical conditions for its satisfaction or motivation
and therefore could not be the foundation for a necessary and universal rule. He
claims that practical rules that rest on subjective conditions are incapable of deriving
universal rules for rational beings and without exception they revolve around the
principle of one’s own happiness. For Kant, subjective ends possess only conditional
worth in relation to the desire or material incentive that grounds them. Kant argues
that rational beings want to be free of conditional and transitory ends because they
lack absolute worth, a quality possessed by objective ends. Objective ends hold
necessarily for all rational beings and they include only those ends that determine
the will of itself by the mere form of the universal rule.31 Objective principles that
constrain the will operate as commands in the form of imperatives.32 Kant argues
that the universal form of the imperative binds the will through the use of reason
insofar as an agent is rational and submits to universal moral laws. An absolutely
good will is said to operate free from the constraints of objective laws because it is
already subjectively aligned with an objective conception of the good.
Realm of Ends
A rational being with good will who self-legislates duties and obeys universal laws,
subject to no will other than his own, belongs to an imaginary community of rational
beings sharing the same standard of judgment, which Kant calls a realm of ends. The
realm of ends is merely possible by analogy with a realm of nature, which is
31 Ibid. p.52 and Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New Jersey) 1993. p.19.32 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. p.34.
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demonstrative in the absolute laws of physical necessity. Kant proposes to use a
“realm of nature” as a practical idea for “bringing about that which is not actually
real but which can become real through our conduct.”33 He is careful to distinguish
this idea from a teleological position that claims reality for a theoretical proposition,
i.e. the kingdom of god. Each person who binds their will to reason is said to belong
to a potential or fictional realm of ends insofar as they have subordinated their will to
a universal objective perspective.34
According to Kant, if there is to be a supreme practical principle and a categorical
imperative for the will it must be in the form of an objective principle that is
necessarily an end for everyone because it is and end-in-itself. Only an objective
principle can be a universal practical law. Kant reasons that every rational agent
thinks of their own existence as an end-in-itself and not merely as a means to be
arbitrarily used by another person. Because rational nature exists as an end-in-itself,
such a proposition may serve as the ground of a supreme objective principle capable
of deriving all other laws of the pure will. The law takes the form of the categorical
imperative : “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of
another, always as an end and never as a means only.”35
Kant proposes this principle as the supreme limiting condition on freedom of action
for each person. In other words, beings who are ends-in-themselves are to be
respected and our actions toward others are to be limited by this respect. If agents
want to consider themselves as rational they must share in the kingdom of ends and
treat each other as rational beings who recognize the existence of rational agency as
an end-in-itself.36 In this manner Kant suggests that rational beings are not to be
acted upon as if they are subjective ends of another person because they recognize
33 Ibid. p.62 FN#17. 34 Ibid. see pp.59, 62 F.N.#17, 65-66.35 Ibid. see pp.52-54.36 Ibid. p.55.
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and respect actions that are objectively necessary. Therefore, all maxims of action
should consider the self and others as rational ends in themselves and should meet
the condition of being universally valid for every rational being.37 To treat rational
nature as an end-in-itself is to respect the idea of the dignity of humanity, as dictated
by reason, separated from material advantage of the legislator. A rational agent is
viewed by others as possessing moral worth to the degree that such an idea serves
as the absolute and inflexible guide for the agent’s will.38
Categorical Imperative
“…if I think of a categorical imperative, I know immediately what it contains. For
since the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxim
should accord with this law, while the law contains no condition to which it is
restricted, there is nothing remaining in it except the universality of law as such to
which the maxim of the action should conform; and in effect this conformity alone is
represented as necessary by the imperative.”39
The categorical imperative is grounded in the difference between subjective maxims
derived in reference to material conditions and the idea of conformity to an objective
moral law valid for everyone. According to Kant the categorical imperative excludes
reference to the material of the action and its intended result in an unconditional
manner. It is a law concerned with the form of universality and the principle of
autonomy purged of sensuous conditions. The categorical imperative to “act only
according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law” is seen as an objective unconditional law that is good-in-
itself and aims at no further ends. In general it is a formula for an impartial
37 Ibid. p.64.38 Ibid. p.65.39 Ibid. p.44.
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perspective used to guide our will in the exercise of rational autonomy. It is what
every rational actor “ought” to do. Because moral maxims are to be equally valid for
everyone, moral propositions are not to confer an advantage or disadvantage on any
particular group. The categorical imperative precludes any opportunity for a rational
agent to make an exception to favour themselves or their friends.
The resulting practical maxims of action are grounded in the use of the rule (law) and
the form of being universal.40 The test of a maxim is whether it could enter into a
possible universal legislation without contradiction. In this way a person considering
the acceptability of a course of action would look at the implications of everyone
acting under such a principle and determine whether they would find such a rule of
conduct acceptable and free of logical contradictions. In order to will that a maxim
should become a universal law, both the maxim and the will must remain free from
contradiction. Potential universal laws of action are to be tested by agents for any
contradictions because a universal law may not, by definition, conflict with itself. In
other words, agents test maxims relying on the universal form eliminating candidates
on the basis of contradiction in order to create a set of duties that conform to the
supreme principle.41 Practical actions are considered worthy in relation to the
exercise of autonomy that respects and submits itself to the categorical imperative.
Morality is therefore viewed as a relation between actions and the exercise of
autonomy in conformity with universal law or duty.42
Duty
Based on the idea that the pure practical reason of every person recognizes the
moral character of the categorical imperative, Kant constructs three propositions that
40 Ibid. p.55.41 Ibid. see p.48, 63.42 Ibid. p.66.
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explain duty to ground his conception of morality. The first proposition is that to have
moral worth an action must be done from duty. Duty is a practical unconditional
necessity of action that serves to constrain our will in opposition to subjective
causes.43 Duty is the condition of a pure will, good in itself acting from the necessity
of action derived from respect for the practical and universal law.44 In other words, a
good will excludes sensuous motives and recognizes a duty to act on the basis of
moral principles that are universal in form in opposition to principles that are
connected to particular objects. However, recognition of a duty does not
automatically mean that a person will act on that basis because subjective
inclinations may overpower our moral sense. For Kant, the more inclinations there
are against performing a duty and the fewer inclinations there are in favour of its
performance, the greater the opportunity to show the intrinsic worth of the
commanded action through obedience to reason.
The second proposition of morality for Kant is that an action performed from duty is
to be considered morally worthy in relation to the maxim by which it is determined
and not the purpose to be achieved.45 In other words, the moral worth of an action is
not to be derived from the expected effect or any principle motivated by an expected
result; to act from duty is to be motivated by unconditional reason, not desire or self-
love. The happiness of others, for example, might be an object of the will, but if it
were to be the determining ground of a maxim it would presuppose a natural
sympathy or disposition grounded in personal satisfaction, a conditional interest.
Kant is unwilling to accept this conditional connection as the determining ground of a
maxim because it would not coincide with his goal of legislating unconditional
universal law. Instead, Kant derives the acceptance of the principle to further the
43 Ibid. p.49 and Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New Jersey) 1993. p.33.44 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. p.23.45 Ibid. p.19.
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happiness of others from the universalization of the maxim of self-love. Kant argues
that the universal application of the maxim of self-love requires recognition of the
happiness of others. In such a case, the determining ground of the will is the
universal form of the law and not its particular content, it is therefore acceptable on
grounds that are equally valid for everyone.46 On this basis Kant claims it is not the
happiness of others, or any particular subjective condition, but the universal form of
the maxim, acceptable to each person, that is the determining ground of the will. It is
important for Kant to ground the concept of duty in maxims that reject desires such
as sympathy because moral laws are imperatives given by reason, whereas
inclinations are merely psychological propensities that cannot be commanded.
Kant claims that the third proposition of morality follows from the first two. Duty is
the necessity of an action performed from respect for the law.47 Rather than finding
worth in the expected result, Kant ascribes worth, and therefore respect, to the
ground of the will. He claims that conformity to the universal form of law is the only
principle of volition to remain after excluding consideration of inclination or desires,
the form of law is all that remains to motivate us to conform after discarding
empirical matter as a potential object of a maxim. “If all material of a law, i.e., every
object of the will considered as a ground of its determination, is taken from it,
nothing remains except the mere form of giving universal law.”48 What remains,
according to Kant, is the command that we not act in such a way that one could not
also will the maxim to be a universal law,49 or treat everyone the same.
46 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New Jersey) 1993. p.35.47 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. p.19.48 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Prentice-Hall Inc. New Jersey) 1993. p.26.49 Kant, Immanuel. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Ed. Robert Paul Wolff. Trans. Lewis White Beck (Macmillan Publishing Co.) 1969. p.21.
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Necessity and Obligation
To understand how Kant conceives of the necessity of moral action and the nature of
obligation represented by “duty” requires an understanding of the difference
between hypothetical and categorical judgments. Hypothetical propositions express
the practical necessity of action as a means to achieve a further end, for example
principles of skill or prudence. A categorical proposition, on the other hand, is seen as
objectively necessary, as good in itself, without regard to any other end or purpose.50
In both cases, reason acts as a cause to produce an action. The general idea is that a
rational agent recognizes a chain of inference, prior to experience, which connects
the idea of an end with an action that is necessary to achieve that end through the
use of reason. The action is therefore a product of the recognition of its apodeictic
necessity to achieve the selected end. Because practical reason is always concerned
with the actions of a person, the subject of a proposition is always a person, or more
particularly a will, and the predicate is always an action. The difference between a
hypothetical and a categorical practical proposition is the nature of the connection
between the will and the action, between the subject and the predicate. In the
hypothetical practical proposition the will is connected to the action through a
mediating inclination or desire of some kind, while in a categorical practical
proposition the will is connected to the action directly. Hypothetical practical
propositions hold that I ought to do something (as a means) if I desire a particular
consequence (as an end), which emphasizes the necessity of the means. In
categorical practical propositions, I ought to do an action for the sake of the end itself
without reference to a desire or inclination, which emphasizes the necessity of the
end and a corresponding obligation.
50 Ibid. p.36.
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29
The first type of necessity does not indicate any kind of obligation but merely asserts
that to achieve a desired end I ought also will the means. The “ought” in this sense is
non-moral and operates as an example of instrumental reason. For example, the
proposition I ought to repay the money I borrow if I want to retain good credit is a
hypothetical practical proposition that connects the act of repayment with the
condition of retaining good credit. The subject properly described as “the will affected
by a desire” is connected to the predicate “action” by the conditional desire. If the
subject of a proposition is “the will affected by the desire to retain good credit” then
the act of repayment is connected to the will a priori without any other justification or
further reference to experience because repayment is the means to good credit. The
second type of necessity indicates an obligation to do an action without linking the
action to a conditional desire. I ought to accomplish an end for the sake of the end
itself. The “ought” in this sense is a moral proposition. In categorical practical
judgments, the predicate and the subject, or the action and the will, are connected
directly without any reference to an existing desire or inclination. I ought to repay the
money I borrow. If this proposition is taken to be true then no other reasons or
references are required for its justification. The fact that an agent believes he
“ought” to do an action is sufficient to demonstrate the moral nature of the
proposition. If the proposition was acceptable from the point of view of everyone with
a good will without contradiction then that would be sufficient for meeting the test of
the categorical imperative. Kant provides the example of the shop-keeper who is
motivated to provide the correct change for the customer. If the shop-keeper is
motivated by the desire to protect his reputation then the act of giving the correct
change is said to be motivated by self-interest. If however, the shop-keeper acts
based on recognition of an unconditional duty to provide correct change then it can
be said that his will was morally good and the act was motivated by moral
considerations rather than self-interest. Kant reasons that categorical validity and
corresponding moral obligations are the result of seeking an end for the sake of that
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end. “I ought to repay the money I borrow” because I recognize the obligation or duty
as real or true without the need to motivate the action by a conditional interest such
as the desire to retain good credit. In other words, “I ought to repay the money I
borrow” because I recognize that everyone could agree and accept that everyone
should repay money they borrow. Kant argues that actions motivated by abstract
universalism possess objective moral worth because they are purged of motivations
of subjective self-interest, grounded in an understanding of a good will and respect
for the universal form of law. This form of reasoning relies on a prior recognition that
repaying the money is the right thing to do and an assumption that every rational
agent must agree, hence its universal validity. Conformity to the moral law is to act
from duty without appealing to an interest, desire, or inclination. It is to know the
difference between right and wrong without providing a material condition to justify
its observance. Kant views morality as a function of motivation that is constantly
opposed to our “lower” nature that seeks to act on the basis of subjective maxims
influenced by material conditions.
The necessity of action that Kant ascribes to moral propositions lies in the recognition
that every person would arrive at the same conclusion as concerns the necessary
action required to fulfill the duty whether motivated by a good will or not. Kant
assumes that given a true “ought” statement, anyone should be able to recognize
the necessity of the action to be done. Kant is not fundamentally concerned with the
detailed content of moral laws or the attempt to state what these objective laws are,
rather he assumes that we know what they are already or that we are capable of
recognizing them in the unconditional universal form. The a priori character of the
moral motive, that excludes experience, includes such duties as the duty not to
commit suicide, the duty not to make lying promises, the duty to develop our natural
talents, and the duty to help those in distress. Although there is no empirical
evidence available to establish the existence of the motive of duty, recognition that
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31
we categorically ought to do an action from an unconditional motive is the basis for
ascribing moral worth to the will.
Kant assures us that we know the difference between moral propositions commanded
by duty and conditional propositions motivated by happiness or self-interest because
of the categorical imperative. “To be sure, common human reason does not think of
it abstractly in such a universal form, but it always has it in view and uses it as the
standard of its judgments. It would be easy to show how common human reason,
with this compass, knows well how to distinguish what is good, what is bad, and what
is consistent or inconsistent with duty.”51 In other words, moral propositions are the
product of a self-evident supreme moral law known by rational agents whose
application leads to moral propositions that are categorically valid. Any attempt to
justify a moral duty beyond the categorical assertion undermines the unconditional
nature of the obligation. If we try to explain the moral obligation of a duty by
providing a condition for its observance we transform the categorical form of validity
into a hypothetical proposition and destroy the obligation that is at issue. This is
important because the position of this paper is to examine these ideas and assert
that actions that rely on categorical propositions within discursive forms of validation
fail to escape hypothetical forms of expression because they are tied to conditions of
acceptance rooted in a consequential analysis. Categorical propositions do however,
result in descriptions of conditions that are persuasive and capable of universal
acceptance because they are motivated by a desire to diminish the influence of
subjective self-interest represented by various collective groups that claim universal
forms of validity and the conditions of good will necessary for observance within a
generalized form of agreement but do not avoid the disclosure and motivation of all
conditional interests involved.
51 Ibid. p.23.
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Problems with the Categorical Imperative
Kant’s categorical imperative is both a description of moral action as well as a
method of determining moral principles capable of guiding action. As a description, it
is rooted in the idea that equal and reciprocal rules are intuitively used by moral
agents to discern the difference between moral and non-moral propositions. As a
method of determining moral propositions, it includes the assertion that the
categorical imperative, as the supreme moral law, provides a reliable and consistent
assessment of the moral worth of a principle regardless of the context. Kant argued
that the faculty of reason itself was able to prescribe the content of an imaginary
kingdom of ends based on respect for universal laws upheld by a good will that hold
necessarily and always. In practice, however, this claim is subject to some legitimate
criticism.
The first idea to approach a critique of Kant’s formulation is to understand that
applications of the categorical imperative do not always lead to identical moral
propositions or objective laws valid in each and every case. The process of various
people applying the standard of the categorical imperative can lead to error and/or
conflicting opinions and judgments attributable to diverse perspectives and
worldviews. Modern moral philosophers proclaim that reason cannot infallibly
determine “objective” moral facts and claims of this nature are open to criticisms of
moral tyranny. This understanding, incorporated into modern cognitive approaches
toward moral philosophy, suggests a need to reform the categorical imperative and
Kant’s approach to assessing moral validity. Jurgen Habermas makes use of the basic
intuitions captured by the categorical imperative and reformulates that standard in a
principle of universalization designed to operated within an intersubjective context
that recognizes the need for plurality, argumentation, and the giving of reasons as
part of any assessment of moral validity. The modern cognitive perspective attempts
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to describe a more realistic understanding of the functions of the mind and processes
of value determination provided by advances in the history and treatment of these
ideas. The modern version rejects the foundational idea that objective moral laws
equally valid for everyone can be infallibly determined through individual reflection
and adopts the position that moral norms within communities of people require
consensus of principled moral agents who discuss and debate propositions within a
discursive context. Kant’s monological approach to moral theory is transformed into a
discourse related to subjective or intersubjective principles and norms and their
moral justification. Such a transition incorporates the insight that consensus is a
more reliable indication of normative rightness. The process of argumentation entails
more than a single declaration of what is universally valid, it entails consulting others
and listening to grounds that diverse perspectives can bring to bear on the validity of
moral principles and norms that then compete for claims of primacy through
processes of generalization and legitimacy through the application of public
standards that respect rules of impartial discourse.
In Kant’s historical-cultural situation, the assumption that categorical claims are valid
is based on acceptance of the idea that everyone already knows the difference
between right and wrong. This perspective denies the existence of moral dissent and
is the product of a homogenized worldview unaware of the historicity and
contingency of conventional reasoning. In today’s context of democratic pluralism,
categorical validity is replaced by intersubjective validity that recognizes the need to
critically test existing and proposed norms through argumentation and the giving of
reasons by a community of participants in the determination of what is reliable or
“true.” This insight is the starting point for Habermas who proposes a theory of
argumentation that describes necessary rules of consensual communication designed
to undermine unilateral justifications that claim objectivity and promote public
debate. Under such a revision, strong claims of objectivity attached to the categorical
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imperative are replaced by weaker intersubjective claims that apply the standard of
universality within moral discursive arguments that retain Kant’s basic aim of
commanding reason to achieve universal acceptance, cooperation and equal
consideration for all people.
The second idea to approach a critique of Kant’s formulation is contained in the
proposition that moral reasoning transcends hypothetical forms of reasoning as well
as the form of necessity that accompanies the prior acceptance of an end. Kant
argued that the very giving of a reason for adopting a maxim undermined the
obligation of moral worth because it corrupted the motivation and changed
categorical validity into a hypothetical proposition. It can be suggested however, that
if moral propositions require a reasoned justification within discursive contexts, as
claimed by modern moral theory, moral agents may not be able to avoid hypothetical
forms for moral statements. The additional burden of discursive forms of justification
that judge moral worth indicate that universal standards for maxims result in
persuasive forms of logic that are decided by the force of the better argument rather
than recognition of de facto objective universal agreements. If this is true, the
process of moral reasoning in operation for participants may be, like Kant, no more
than the prior acceptance of pre-conditional ends that appear to be the subjective
choices of the philosopher for the promotion and advance of mutual respect and
notions of equality within a universal framework. Understood as generalized primary
standards, the resulting moral judgments are merely persuasive propositions that are
appealing to moral agents because they reject the notion of creating an advantage or
disadvantage for any particular group or person. The acceptance of the ideals of
respect and equality that operate as part of abstract universalism represent
justificatory hypothetical reasons to adopt universal moral determinations, the values
of which are presupposed as ends that serve to limit or define the characteristics of
all subsequent moral propositions. Although such a reification undermines Kant’s
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construction of moral obligation, it serves to clarify the process of moral reasoning
being advocated and helps to provide a reasoned justification for particular maxims
of action that aim to avoid contradiction within a universal process of reasoning and
be agreeable to most people under conditions of exercising a good will and
understanding the equal application of a law.
To further investigate this idea, Kant held that different motivations are tied to a
distinction between the form of a proposition and its content. He argued that reason
is persuaded to adopt the categorical imperative in part because it prefers the use of
the universal form purged of empirical or sensual content and conditions. What is of
interest here is whether it is possible to separate conditional interests from decisions
and actions. Kant’s conception of autonomy in conjunction with a good will attempts
to purge material subjective motives and interests allegedly leaving only the general
form of “the universal validity of maxims” as a cause capable of determining the will.
In contrast to hypothetical imperatives where actions are determined by the
necessity of satisfying a given condition, the categorical imperative is alleged to
contain no conditions. On this basis, Kant argues that the only remaining motivation
to adopt the categorical imperative is the general form of the universal law itself
valid for every person, a command that carries an implicit demand to conform to the
law.52 All other propositions are hypothetical in form.
If notions of mutual respect and equality that result from the application of the
categorical imperative demonstrate the possibility of unconditional propositions
grounded in recognition of noumena and purged of sensuous conditions through a
dialectical form of abstract reasoning then conditional interests are tied to tangible
goals and intangible sense perceptions or desires rooted within the world of
appearance. Kant attempts to achieve impartiality by relying on the universal form
52 Ibid. p.92.
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and grounds equally valid for everyone and excluding motivations that seek
subjective and exclusive benefits. From a motivational perspective, Kant’s distinction
between heteronomy and autonomy attempts to separate motives of self-interested
material bias, personal feelings, and desires on the one hand, and impartial reflection
grounded in respect for self-legislated universal laws equally valid for everyone on
the other. However, if one accepts that the categorical imperative is merely a
persuasive formulation of a moral standard that relies on the prior acceptance of
abstract universal principles it can be argued that Kant does not establish the use of
unconditional motives because the universal principles themselves operate as
conditions insofar as they recommend mutual respect and equality as the product of
moral reasoning. This conclusion is foreshadowed by Kant’s own speculation that our
capacity to conceive of an unconditional interest is beyond our ability and in all
events inconceivable.53 Kant’s attempt to establish unconditional motives is based on
a claim that moral agents could purge their will of conditional preferences. The only
example he could give was the categorical imperative.
The ground used to support the idea that practical reason and the will of a person
could be motivated by something other than a conditional interest was really nothing
more than Kant’s fondness for dialectal reasoning through exclusion. Kant uses a
similar approach to establish the idea that freedom can be demonstrated by
eliminating all empirical grounds of causation. Direct observation seems to support
the idea that self-determining causes operate beyond determinism, however the
same method of reasoning cannot establish the existence of unconditional motives.
To counter the idea of a pure unconditional motive all one has to do is suggest that
the categorical imperative is linked to the satisfaction of a desire or benefit, even if
that desire is to adopt an impartial perspective in the consideration of the collective
interests of others. From Kant’s own perspective, the desire to discover the content
53 Ibid. p.93.
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of pure practical reason and the prescription to use the universal form itself can be
viewed as the satisfaction of a desire to use a general and abstract law. The will to
apply a universal law serves to satisfy the desire to use the universal form.
A stronger claim would be to assert that all determining grounds of the will are
attached to conditional interests and that claims of universal form are merely a
special set of universal content. Given this argument all action and the will is viewed
as attached to conditional interests of some kind, whether universal or limited. What
is inconceivable is that action and the will should be considered free from conditional
interests. For Kant, to act from duty is to be motivated by an interest, even if that
interest is in being impartial. In such a case, the exercise of practical reason, always
aiming at moral action through the application of principled maxims, discloses and
promotes a conditional interest when it prefers to use the categorical imperative to
guide action. If this argument is accepted then the categorical imperative is just one
more conditional hypothetical imperative with the unusual condition of attempting to
purge itself of conditions (unsuccessfully) and the use of the idea of a universal law.
At best, the use of the term “unconditional” in Kant can be used to describe a
preference for abstract principles of mutual respect and equality. Kant believed that
moral actions should be judged without regard to empirical outcomes. It seems to me
that because practical reason is aimed at action, decisions to act will always lead to
empirical results or consequences attached to particular conditional interests,
providing an outcome that is advantageous for some and a barrier to others. In other
words, all reasoning that is used to support an action discloses some kind of
conditional interest represented by a specific outcome. Whether one is motivated by
empirical incentives or paradoxical abstract logic, the will is incapable of making a
decision without using some kind of standard or result that aligns with conditional
interests, in competition, and capable of being disclosed in the consequences of an
action, even if only in hindsight.
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Kant would argue that such a position would destroy the possibility of moral
propositions, however, the better view is that it discourages the idea that universal
laws or principles are the result of a separation of form and content between
unconditional and conditional interests in favour of the idea that a conditional desire
exists to consider the general interests of all parties without the influence of self-
interest. The distinction to be made is whether self-interest or a full consideration of
the interests of others is a more persuasive basis for moral justification in a
competition for conditional motivates that aim to achieve universal a priori
acceptance. The question for moral theory is not to ask whether unconditional
principles are possible, but what desires or interests are being satisfied by the
application of universal moral principles or maxims. By way of such an argument, the
dichotomy proposed between form and content collapses into a unity of desires or a
continuum of interests including an interest to purge all interests except commands
of universal moral acceptance. Rather than distinguishing between the form and
content of practical reasoning, Kant perhaps might have been satisfied with a less
ambitious goal to distinguish between desires of material advantage and self-interest
and the desire to achieve an impartial consideration of collective interests. This
would have preserved the attempt to prevent selfish empirical conditional interests
influencing the will in moral propositions without having to postulate the fiction of a
pure practical reason and an absolute moral standard. If one accepts the argument
that unconditional principles are impossible then the search for grounds equally valid
for everyone becomes a search for common interests shared by everyone. It is on
this basis that Habermas constructs his theory of discourse ethics.
It is the intention of this paper to follow the reasoning of Habermas with a view
toward understanding his conception of validity for moral principles and claims of
necessity that accompany cooperative discourse conditions as he transforms Kant’s
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categorical imperative from an objective law into a notion of universal agreement
that highlights the presuppositions of rational and cooperative communication. The
search for grounds equally valid for everyone becomes a search for shared interests
or a “common will” and the application of procedural discourse rules. Habermas, like
Kant, argues that it is possible for moral reasoning to transcend the influence of
conditional interests and establish a categorical form of moral obligation, a claim that
is at odds with the thesis of this paper. He argues that an unlimited communication
community that requires an ideal role taking exchange can preserve Kant’s purpose
of describing unconditional moral commands within an intersubjective context. The
author will argue that Habermas fails to escape from conditional and hypothetical
reasoning, just as Kant did, although he succeeds in demonstrating that some
reasons for ethical behaviour are better than others based on an appeal to common
interests and standards of universality that evaluate the acceptability of
consequences from the perspective of each participant engaged in an inclusive
dialogue. The thesis of this paper is to argue that the goal of establishing moral
obligations through support of categorical and unconditional propositions is flawed. If
unconditional validity cannot be achieved as I have suggested, then moral
obligations, as outlined by Kant and Habermas are reduced to a voluntary
undertaking morally binding only on those of good will who accept the moral
command.
Part II: Habermas’ Moral Theory: Communicative Ethics
Introduction to Habermas
Cognitive Perspective
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In the tradition of Immanuel Kant, cognitive philosophers such as Jurgen Habermas
investigate in what sense and in what way moral commands and moral norms are
justified.54 Habermas is able to articulate his moral theory by comparing, contrasting,
and selectively building on works that collectively exhaust the entire field of cognitive
philosophy and beyond. I have chosen to limit my investigation of cognitive
philosophy to his works because his theory incorporates a thorough explanation of
the elements involved in a cognitive approach. His approach is grounded in an
analysis of the conditions and content of discourse and can be considered to be a
response to natural law theories.
The interesting thing about the framework he establishes for the validity of moral
propositions is that it is valid in moral discourse as well as other norm setting
discourses. In Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action and The Inclusion of
the Other, Habermas argues in favour of adopting a theory of communicative action
and discourse ethics within a proceduralist view of legitimate state action. He is
concerned with the problem of political legitimacy. The presuppositions of
communicative action and practical discourse are used as standards to measure the
democratic nature of the modern legal system viewed as justified to the extent that
rules and procedures are in congruence with communicative principles. For the
purposes of this investigation however, I have limited my examination to the context
of moral theory and the manner in which substantive norms are justified through the
basic propositions of discursive validation.
In Habermas’ moral theory, discourse analysis is used to examine what kinds of
arguments or reasoning are acceptable to support moral decisions. For Habermas,
this approach begins with an examination of the cognitive content of moral
utterances in the context of everyday communicative action. His method is to map
54 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. p.57.
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pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action into rules of discourse that
operate as a warrant of normative rightness in the context of argumentation. For
Habermas only consideration of the conditions of communicative agreement, after
religion and metaphysics, can ground the justification of a morality of equal respect
and solidarisitic responsibility for everyone. “If the good is no longer laid down in a
transcendent manner, the only principle of the good seems to be consideration for
members of the community, whose membership in turn can no longer be limited, and
hence consideration for all others – which means consideration for their wishes and
interests.”55 In other words, discursive justification is grounded on the basic premise
of listening and engaging participants in a conversation guided by procedural rules
that allow for the equal consideration of the interests of everyone.
Underlying the shift in focus from Kant’s philosophy of consciousness to Habermas’
philosophy of language is a rejection of an ultimate justification of a transcendental
moral truth derived from the faculty of reason. In its place is an examination of the
workings of language, the operation of unavoidable pragmatic presuppositions within
a shared social context, and the recognition that normative claims may be fallible.
The objective “fact of pure reason” established by Kant to justify universal ought
statements is rejected and replaced by a dialogical approach that recognizes the
need for consensus on the validity of norms and principles within a public discourse.
Habermas’ transformation of Kant’s conception retains the basic foundation of
morality established by Kant with a modern emphasize on participation and
agreement. Discourse ethics is Habermas’ attempt to set out the rules of
argumentation that establish a procedural framework for the application and
justification of normative statements. His approach entails a discursive procedure
that provides participants with an actual, open, public forum for moral
argumentation. The modern cognitive framework rejects Kant’s solipsistic method of
55 Habermas, Jurgen. The Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.23.
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justification relying as it does on categorical “ought” assertions and individual
recognition of objective unconditional duties in favour of intersubjective agreements
reached through the dialogical act of open and domination-free argumentation.
I will begin my examination of the moral theory of Habermas by investigating his
theory of communicative action that sets out the manner in which expectations and
norms between people are established. Habermas believes, however, that moral
theory needs to do more than justify a pre-existing horizon of received “moral”
norms, it should attempt to set out the conditions of validity for an “impartial point of
view.” The construction of an impartial point of view is designed to support
participants engaged in an intersubjective process of normative justification. Kant’s
focus on a unilateral determination of unconditional moral principles is
recontextualized by Habermas within an intersubjective context of dialogue and
argumentation that retains a modified version of Kant’s categorical imperative,
known as the principle of universalization and includes other rules necessary for a
cooperative discourse in the search for the better argument. The principle of
universalization tries to deliver on the basic promise of equality and reciprocity in
Kant’s moral theory. However the transition to intersubjective validity involves more
than one individual ruling out maxims of action based on perceived contradictions
with the categorical imperative, it requires that actions and norms be capable of
reasoned justification through the giving of persuasive reasons in the context of
practical discourse. For Habermas, the justification of action in terms of valid norms
and the justification of norms in terms of principles worthy of recognition is a process
of clarification and communication that binds the will through the construction of
conviction grounded in an examination of the potential consequences of adopting a
norm from the perspective of each group affected. Habermas’ introduction of a
consequential analysis in moral theory can be contrasted with Kant’s attempt to
establish moral propositions independent of a consequential perspective. Upon this
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edifice, Habermas claims to be able to construct a moral point of view that operates
as something other than an instrumental use of reason.
Skepticism
Modern value skepticism rejects the idea that moral issues can be settled on the
basis of intersubjectively binding reasons. Skeptics argue that normative statements
cannot be justified like descriptive statements as true or false. On this basis, skeptics
claim that there is no moral order, moral objects or moral facts. By limiting reason to
a form of instrumental rationality, value skeptics base ethical conceptions on the
prior acceptance of a goal followed by a means-end analysis on how to attain the
desired outcome. Habermas is motivated to overcome value skepticism and
arguments that suggest morals and norms are based on nothing more than purely
subjective and relative emotional dispositions and attitudes, explainable as
preference-based empirical phenomena. Habermas attempts to construct an
alternative basis for the validity of moral norms to overcome skeptical claims that
moral judgments are motivated by rational self-interest or the satisfaction of feelings
justified in a purposive-rational manner. Habermas, like Kant, is trying to explain the
obligatory character of moral duties motivated by rational force alone. He claims that
classical empiricism cannot explain the obligatory force of moral norms in terms of
self-interested preferences just as they cannot explain the fact that actors motivated
by moral feelings argue about moral judgments with reasons. In other words,
Habermas proposes to ground the binding character of moral duties in the
recognition that moral feelings express attitudes that imply moral judgments
containing cognitive content.56 In such a fashion he argues against a limited
conception of practical reason that restricts it to operations of instrumental reason in
favour of a notion of practical reflection that accepts “epistemic” reasons within an
56 Habermas, Jurgen. The Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.16.
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intersubjective shared social world. Although his description of moral phenomena,
rooted in an anthropological study of moral reasoning in everyday life, demonstrates
the potential for reasoning to be grounded in something other than rational self-
interest, I suggest that his approach does not avoid the operation of a presupposed
value choice in the act of adopting discourse ethics and the search for the better
argument. I am not persuaded that the rules of moral reasoning are entirely free of
hypothetical necessity or the prior acceptance of a moral end. I intend to argue that
despite this limitation, cognitive philosophy is able to discredit the position that no
moral order can be found within moral reasoning.
Habermas asserts that to limit ethical reasoning to the preference based motives of a
rational chooser opens such a position to criticisms of moral relativity and
undermines the obligatory nature of moral expectations. He rejects social contract
theory because it is not able to disclose any kind of morally privileged position. “An
agreement among contracting partners motivated by interests can lead at best to an
externally imposed social regulation of conduct, but not to a binding, let alone
universalistic, conception of the common good.”57 Agreements between interested
parties cannot by themselves ground binding obligations because a self-interested
person could choose to exit from existing agreements whenever they might benefit
from such deviance. Similar to social contract theory, Habermas’ conception of
intersubjective validity is the best method available to justify normative agreements
that approach the ideal of universal acceptance and obligation while remaining aware
that such agreements may be subject to change over time. His approach
demonstrates that practical reason can overcome criticisms of moral relativity, or at
least establish that cooperative communication is a better method of constructing
and maintaining moral norms in comparison with strategic action. In the final
analysis, although Habermas is able to establish a privileged position for discourse
57 Ibid. p.23.
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ethics, I suggest his theory is subject to some internal limitations that require
rejection of the claim to be able to ground binding moral obligations on everyone
through the discursive validation of norms. Based on this understanding, if Kant’s
notion of moral worth is to retain any meaning in a modern context, it must be
reflected in the choice to be motivated by something other than self-interest, which
means to be motivated by the interests of others.
The Foundations of Modern Moral Reasoning
Communicative Action
Habermas begins his search for universal moral principles to ground the substance of
equal respect and solidaristic responsibility for everyone in the investigation of
everyday ethical insights as they relate to the spontaneous workings of practical
reason. Habermas claims that the study of a moral vocabulary and the need for
rational justification points toward a theory of argumentation that demonstrates a
level of communication rooted in the everyday. His theory of discourse ethics is
grounded in recognition of necessary presuppositions of communicative action.
Habermas proposes that moral phenomena are grasped in the first person
performative attitudes of communicative practices. Communicative action found in
everyday speech aims to coordinate future plans of action for participants by way of
sharing moral action and norms. It is based on the observation that participants in
argumentation coordinate their plans of action consensually. Habermas distinguishes
communicative action from strategic action that attempts to secure compliance or
cause a desired behaviour by influencing a person by way of threatened sanction or
promised reward.
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Communicative action is a type of discourse that adopts norms and attempts to
rationally motivate others through an offer to redeem a validity claim in the future.
Based on the observation that obligations arise between participants engaged in
argumentation by reaching an agreement on pragmatic situation-specific meanings
in everyday conversation, Habermas observes that a speaker incurs an obligation to
back up a claim so long as the agreed actions do not contradict other propositions
the actors accept as true at any given point.58 A speaker incurs an obligation to back
up a claim made during discourse based on acceptance by the hearer insofar as they
both intend to orient future action around the acceptance and non-contradiction of
the claim. When accepted, the offer of normative validity is the source of a bonding
effect between people and results in an expectation or obligation. These obligations
take the form of “moral norms” or customary practices, a unit of analysis that
displaces the focus that Kant placed on moral principles or laws. Moral norms or
customary practices provide consistent rules of behaviour and an accompanying
feeling of being obligated. Habermas claims that these generalized behavioural
expectations promote rule-governed interaction and equal and exceptionless
obligations on the group.59
Habermas links the normative validity of moral commands and norms of action to a
shared social world that forms a “universe of norms,” similar to Kant’s idea of a
kingdom of ends. He suggests that moral consciousness is grounded in the fact that
moral feelings are apparent in everyday life and accessible to us as first person
performative attitudes involved in, for example, the condemnation of a wrong or a
violation of underlying normative expectations held by individuals and members of a
social group. The moral validity of a norm is reflected in the feeling of being obligated
58 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. see. pp. 58, 59.59
? Habermas, Jurgen. The Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.55.
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and affective attitudes, such as resentment, that accompany noted transgressions of
established norms within a specific community. These norms must be continually
reestablished within legitimately ordered interpersonal relationships in order to exist.
They are, however, produced and maintained in society through individual conviction
and institutionalized sanction. The existence of a norm is demonstrative of an
existing convention to observe a norm but this fact does not indicate whether the
norm is worthy of recognition. The capacity of a norm to claim normative rightness
depends on more than mass acceptance, its redemption and validity is said to be a
product of the logic of practical discourse.60 Similar to Kant, Habermas suggests that
abstract universal principles are capable of establishing a “moral” realm within
human experience based on insight or the force of the better argument.
Intersubjective Validity
The disclosure of the conditions of communicative action demonstrate a desire to
construct a moral theory that is congruent with anthropological observations of how
moral feelings and reasons manifest themselves in everyday activity. For Habermas,
intersubjective validity is a product of communicative agreements that establish
consensus between people. Moral validity is a property of normative propositions that
have the potential to achieve a universal consensus within a process of
communication that reaches a shared understanding grounded in communicative
action. The rules of discourse ethics and the introduction of intersubjective validity
within modern frameworks of moral reasoning represent key features in the
transition from Kant to Habermas.
Habermas outlines three types of intersubjective claims to validity that can be made
about the world in the form of descriptive, normative, and personal statements.
60 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. p.62.
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Descriptive claims of truth refer to facts about the objective world, normative claims
of rightness refer to an interpersonally ordered shared social world, and personal
claims of truthfulness are said to refer to the subjective conditions of an individual.61
Claims of descriptive facts or shared social norms give rise to obligations that take
the form of an expectation to redeem a claim in the future through the provision of
acceptable reasons. Claims relating to subjective personal conditions disclose an
obligation to act in conformity with agreed claims. Such a schematic division
demonstrates Habermas’ desire to construct a distinct set of statements devoted to
moral issues that claim normative rightness and operate by condoning specific
actions and setting expectations within a moral community.
The use of intersubjective validity claims within moral theory are to be distinguished
from Kantian monological deductions that contain objective valid laws.
Intersubjective claims are based on pragmatic mutual recognition and acceptance
rather than claims of discovering immutable and timeless laws of freedom. Toward
this end, Habermas envisions a process of public argumentation where people
debate their own needs and wants in the course of determining social norms, but
because these positions are tied to cultural interpretations and intersubjectively
shared traditions, he argues, they must not be justified monologically. The shift from
practical reason to practical deliberation decontextualizes first person monological
determinations of moral principles and submits them to an intersubjective process of
argumentation and agreement. The existence of everyday normative conflicts linked
to disruptions of pre-existing factual normative agreements of consensus suggest
that practical-moral problems ought to be handled cooperatively rather than
monologically. Argumentation, viewed as a process of repairing a disrupted
consensus, operates either by restoring intersubjective recognition of a validity claim
61 Ibid. p.58.
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or recognizing a new claim in substitution for an old one.62 These agreements can
only be achieved within a cooperative and reflexive dialogical situation.
Intersubjectively binding agreements, according to Habermas, are based on reasons
rooted in psychological and emotional dispositions of moral feelings. In order to
overcome the position of value skeptics who claim that normative statements fail to
disclose “truth” conditions, Habermas asserts that personal emotional responses
generated by violations of an accepted norm act as analogous “truth” conditions
similar to the validation of descriptive statements based on observation of facts. He
claims that, “feelings seem to have a similar function for the moral justification of
action as sense perceptions have for the theoretical justification of facts.”63 Feelings
provide evidence of moral standards contained within normative statements just as
sense perceptions provide evidence of facts in descriptive sentences. The obligation
entailed by accepting a claim of normative rightness is a product of an implicit or
explicit intersubjective agreement and results in a corresponding feeling. The
obligation consists of an agreement between people to orient future action around
acceptance of the claim, the expectation to be able to provide good reasons for
accepting the claim, and an intention to not contradict the claim in the future.
Habermas puts the matter into the following notational form: “When we assert “p”
and thereby claim truth for “p” we accept the obligation to defend “p” in
argumentation – in full awareness of its fallibility – against all future objections.”64
The binding nature of the obligation is normative insofar as violations of existing
norms produce conflicts and feelings of resentment. Personal emotional responses,
such as resentment, demonstrate the existence of suprapersonal standards that are
capable of uniting within a normative consensus based on an intersubjective
agreement, but they do not address the issue of the worth of any accepted norm. It is
62 Ibid. p.67.63 Ibid. p.50.64 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.37.
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the persuasive nature of the reasons provided that serve to ground claims of worth
and normative rightness. For Kant, the categorical form of validity as represented by
the assertion that I ought to do this or that moral action because I recognize it as a
universal moral duty or end in itself (the categorical imperative) was sufficient to bind
the will to practical reason and accomplish this act of persuasion. For Habermas, a
different route must be constructed which is accomplished by grounding norms in an
impartial or “moral point of view.”
Ethical and Moral Contexts
Morality is depicted by Habermas as an aspect of public discourse that has emerged
from a preexisting unquestioned background of particular value configurations
belonging to collective and individual modes of life. Principled morality emerges from
this established lifeworld as a form of abstract reflexivity that includes the demand to
justify itself in public argumentation. For Habermas, the moral point of view develops
when an agent in the social world adopts the hypothetical attitude of a participant in
a dialogue who seeks to justify value choices beyond the context of an already
accepted ethical lifeworld. He claims that this development leads to a context-
independent moral standard that achieves impartial judgment. Within such a
framework moral development is viewed as a process of recognizing generalizable
interests that participants of a discourse all share in common.
Habermas is careful to distinguish between pragmatic questions, ethical questions,
and moral questions in argumentation relating to moral theory. The main advantage
of these distinctions is the separation between pragmatic, ethical and moral reasons,
each of which derive their meaning from a context-dependent, or in the case of moral
reasons, context-independent deliberative practice. Each sphere of deliberation
contains a different type of validity claim that sets out different criteria for what
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counts as rationally acceptable in the form of good reasons. Pragmatic questions
typically disclose individual interests of rational choice viewed from exclusively
purposive-rational perspectives, a form of instrumental rationality dependent on the
prior acceptance of some end. Ethical questions of self-clarification disclose
evaluations of the good or not misspent life determined in relation to identities and
value-orientations held by specific communities whose determinations operate as
primary grounds of “epistemic” truth, while moral questions are said to focus on the
equal interests of everyone and disclose a set well-ordered interpersonal relations
derived from the application of the principle of universalization in a discourse of
normative justification.
The ethical point of view sets the frame for value judgments and evaluative self-
understandings of identity developed within the context of a morally constituted
community. First person singular perspectives and first person plural perspectives
generate questions relating to how we understand ourselves as part of a community,
how we should orient our lives, or what is best for me (or us) in the long run all things
considered. Individuals who find themselves within a particular intersubjective shared
social life generally accept a shared ethos that has been “proved” in practice.65
Similar to the Piaget tradition of moral development, the first person perspective
developed within a limited socio-cultural horizon based on ego-centric interests
matures into consideration of the generalizable interests of others. Habermas claims
that attempts at norm justification within a shared ethos inevitably lead to abstract
and general principles that require more than a first person perspective of an
individual acting on the basis of personal preference. Following the development of
moral intuitions set out by Kohlberg’s theory of moral development,66 Habermas
claims that in the later stages of moral development, the introduction of a reflective
65 Ibid. p.26.66 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. p.127.
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hypothetical attitude transforms the unquestioned, habitual, and particular ethical
evaluations into questionable social conventions that need principled justification.
The procedure of norm-justification through discourse is a product of “the inevitable
moralization of a social world become problematic.”67 What appears to be
“objectively rational” or “objectively desirable” within an ethical lifeworld is
subsequently viewed from the hypothetical perspective as the intersubjective
recognition of value dependent on the free will and choice of individuals.
Habermas argues that practical deliberation is split between ethical evaluative
questions that result in various arrangements of particular conceptions of the good
life, related to the identity of groups and individuals, and moral questions relating to
justice which can be decided rationally on the basis of generalized and universal
interests. Questions of the good life involve rational evaluative self-clarification while
questions of justice incorporate the moral point of view and attempt to consider the
equal interests of everyone. Questions of the good life have the advantage of being
contextual and concrete, posed within the horizon of a particular social group that
exists within an accepted cultural identity. Questions of justice, on the other hand,
are said to be abstract and divorced of the context of a lifeworld relying on the
persuasive nature of better reasons for their existence. According to Habermas, the
selection of normative issues through deontological abstraction serves to divorce
hypothetical issues of justice from subjective preferences embodied in evaluative
statements. This procedure sorts through practical issues and selects only those that
are capable of generalization and rational debate.68 In this manner, moral questions
are dissociated from particular contexts and solutions are dissociated from subjective
motives, despite the recognition that moral solutions require contextual sensitivity in
application. What remains is the construction of a realm of practical discourse that is
67 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. p.165.68 Ibid. p.204.
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abstract, context-independent, and conscious of itself as engaged in a process of
argumentation. The issue of whether Habermas is able to achieve a context-
independent examination of moral issues will be examined further below.
Justification
Justification is often viewed as a deductive or inferential process where a conclusion
is derived from a premise, or something is derived from something else. People
sometimes think of justification in terms of a “proof” such as found in the domains of
mathematics, logic, or physics, which seek final justification. Forms of justification
typically involve grounds of validity that provide reasons, which if accepted, are the
basis of justification. According to Habermas, moral norms are valid if they “could win
the agreement of all concerned, on the condition that they jointly examine in
practical discourse, whether a corresponding practice is in the equal interest of all.”69
The claim of a moral norm to represent a practice in the equal interests of everyone
is not really capable of being proved in an empirical sense and should not be
confused with the validity of empirical claims. In the case of descriptive propositions
for example, validity relies on empirically testing an accurate correspondence
between a statement and an object in the world. The validity of descriptive
statements signifies the statement has been or could be tested by a community of
people to determine if the “truth” corresponds to the statement. Validity in the
context of normative rightness, however, cannot signify the potential for a statement
to be empirically tested for factual congruence but rather makes a weaker claim of
reliability based on the potential for a speaker to redeem the claim in discourse, or in
the case of moral norms through a consensus formed within a discursive context that
does not exclude relevant arguments and interests. Validity in this context
represents a contribution to the justification and acceptance of a claim to normative
69 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. pp.35-6.
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rightness. Reliability in the determination of moral norms is a product of acceptability
and impartial discourse conditions that provide the opportunity for affected parties to
contribute. Validity in both cases is a product of intersubjective agreement, one
based on the independent testing of empirical evidence, the other based on
accepting good reasons within impartial discourse conditions. At best, validity
represents a claim of reliability aimed at persuading people to adopt a particular
proposition as “true” within a particular context. In the case of normative claims,
assertions of a final justification are unlikely and philosophers who endorse
communicative ethics, such as Seyla Benhabib, prefer to emphasize the need for an
ongoing discourse to remain open to changing conditions and circumstance. In
general, validity is linked to the rationality of the procedure for attaining agreement
and the conditions required to sustain an ongoing practice of moral discourse. The
aim is to promote the better argument rather than arriving at a final determination of
“truth” because normative claims are fallible and any current consensus could be
displaced by a different consensus at some point in the future.
If rational agents must rely on the persuasive nature of reasons to convince
themselves of the worth of a moral proposition, then one of the primary issues for
moral reasoning is the context within which that decision takes place. Kant’s system
of reasoning assumes that individuals are capable of applying the principle of
universalization without the need for consultation or discussion with others, that
every person can recognize moral duty. Modern moral philosophers support ideas of
communicative ethics and disagree with Kant’s reliance on monological justification.
They prefer to test the moral worth of a norm within an ideal communicative
community. If moral norms result in equal and exceptionless obligations for
everyone, as Habermas claims, then moral norm justification should be tested by
more than one person or a single act of the imagination. Greater assurance of
reliability is created by a plurality of participants because each participant tests the
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acceptability of a moral norm from their own perspective. This decreases the
potential for fallible determinations of universal propositions in real discourse. Rather
than having one person determine the existence of a moral norm by using the
categorical imperative, everyone is invited to engage in argumentation that aims at
achieving a consensus about the acceptability of a moral proposition given conditions
that reject strategic forms of motivation and action. What is of worth in the
determination of a moral norm are cooperative discourse conditions rooted in
descriptions of everyday consensual communicative actions.
Overall, Habermas conceives of a three step process for normative justification.70
First, practical deliberation is regarded as the only resource for the establishment of
impartial judgment for moral questions captured by the formulation of the discourse
principle: “Only those norms can claim validity that could meet with the acceptance
of all concerned in practical discourse.” Second, the principle of universalization
provides a rule of argumentation that sets out how norms can be justified: “A norm is
valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance
for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be jointly accepted
by all concerned without coersion.” And third, the selection of norms within a practice
of justification must embody generalizable interests capable of commanding
universal agreement because they are common to everyone. Through this process,
normatively binding obligations that are generalizable to the point of being common
to everyone are justified through an inclusive dialogue that applies the principle of
universalization. The principle of universalization relies on the increased reliability of
multiple participants who speculate on the acceptability of a norm through an
analysis of the consequences for all concerned. The inclusion of all concerned
promotes a dialogue that forces participants to consider the interests of all
70 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. see pp.41-3.
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concerned within the context of a reciprocal ideal role exchange. A detailed analysis
of this process of justification follow.
Ideal Role Taking
Habermas conceives of the construction and use of an impartial “moral point of view”
as a product of an ideal role taking exercise that attempts to enlarge the interpretive
perspectives of individuals in the context of argumentation. A position of impartiality
is constructed on the basis of an ideally extended “we-perspective” from which all
may test in common a controversial norm. The moral point of view intends to compel
the universal exchange of roles based on the requirement that all affected parties
consider the position of all others and in particular the consequences of adopting the
norm from each perspective.71 Habermas claims that the institutionalization of
impartial discourse rules and the practice of joint deliberations may help to persuade
participants that moral norms are justified because they were determined within
impartial discourse conditions.
Habermas claims that the procedure of ideal role taking is linked with emotional
dispositions and attitudes like empathy and care for ones neighbour which are seen
as necessary emotional prerequisites for the cognitive operations expected of
participants in moral discourse.72 Maturity is the integration of cognitive operations
and emotional dispositions and attitudes in the process of justifying and applying
norms that overcome the ego-centric position in favour of consideration of the
interests of all concerned. Within such a view there is a connection between maturity
and the recognition that everyone has the right to participate in moral discourse and
be empowered by symmetrical rights of assertion. The imposition of an impartial
71 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. p.182.72 Ibid. p.182.
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perspective bolsters the credibility of obligations and norms established within such a
process. The use of an impartial perspective leading to an insightful will formation
requires more than equal treatment, it requires discursive agreements that depend
on participation, individual “yes” or “no” responses, an analysis of consequences,
and the overcoming of the egocentric perspective.
The Moral Point of View
Kant used practical reason to ground an impartial perspective to judge moral actions
and principles through the use of the categorical imperative, what Habermas calls
the “moral point of view.” A principle or norm of action was considered free from
subjective interests due to the generality and universality of the prescribed law that
regulated matters valid for each individual. Habermas makes a similar distinction. He
uses the abstract moral question of “what is in the equal interest of all” to overcome
criticisms of relativity inherent in context-bound ethical determinations of what is
best for me or us in the long run all things considered. The ethical perspective that
views norms as “justified in our context” becomes a claim from the moral point of
view to be “justified in every context.”73 Based on this reasoning, Habermas asserts
that issues of justice can be given priority over evaluative questions relating to the
good life because they embody shared interests. The good that is relevant from the
moral point of view is incorporated in an enlarged first person plural perspective of a
community that does not exclude anyone.74
Within such an expanded community, Habermas assumes that consensus on
underlying norms within a shared ethos is not possible, and so he focuses on
rebuilding a consensus on the basis of establishing an impartial point of view. He
assumes that the initial impulse to engage in deliberation and work out a shared
73 Ibid. p.37.74 Ibid. p.30.
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ethical self-understanding is doomed to fail in competitive conceptions of the good.
He proposes that it is possible to “proceed on the assumption that the participants do
not wish to resolve their conflicts through violence, or even compromise, but through
communication.”75 Habermas appears to claim that this assumption is neutral and
does not disclose the prior acceptance of an ethical value-choice. In the absence of a
substantive agreement on particular norms, Habermas proposes that each
participant may choose to rely on common interests found within the act of
cooperative communication which disclose shared presuppositions of reciprocal
recognition. He claims that agreements on the procedural form of argumentation are
easier to achieve than a consensus on particular substantive norms due to the
generalizability of the interests involved. “It stands to reason that people with
competing value orientations who take part in a process of argumentation will more
easily reach agreement on a common course of action if they can have recourse to
more abstract points of view that are neutral with respect to the content at issue.”76
The acceptability of discourse ethics is considered likely because the presuppositions
are necessary for rational argumentation. The rules reflect the common interests of
everyone engaged in cooperative argumentation. The rules themselves are not
justified but rather they are the product of identifying unavoidable presuppositions of
rational argumentation that all competent agents must use to participate in discourse
that aims at persuasion through the force of the better argument. According to
Habermas, agreements based on the rules of discourse ethics are the best method
for pluralistic societies to reach consensus over differences related to questions of
value and the good life.
Discourse Ethics: the Rules of Argumentation
75 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. see p.39.76 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. italics mine. p.75.
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“…we engage in argumentation with the intention of convincing one another of the
validity claims that proponents raise for their statements and are ready to defend
against opponents. The practice of argumentation sets in motion a cooperative
competition for the better argument where the orientation to the goal of a
communicatively reached agreement unites the participants from the outset.”77
Habermas’ theory of communicative action and discourse ethics attempts to
establish the preconditions for rational inquiry in the form of cooperative
(communicative) principles rather than arguing in favour of any particular
deliberative action, total vision, or unified system. The cooperative principles are
seen as procedural preconditions for the legitimization of moral norms that may
additionally be applied in legal and political contexts. Procedural norms claim validity
or reliability on the basis of representing unavoidable aspects of argumentation that
correspond to argumentative competencies that agents use when engaged in
dialogue. They are modeled on a pattern inherent in the use of language oriented
toward reaching mutual understandings.78 By relying on these rules, a full hearing of
the interests and value-orientations of everyone can be accomplished and moral
norms are constructed and justified on the basis of being accepted within this
reflective process. The rules are considered regulative ideas that discourse can strive
to approximate. They provide a structure for argumentation that takes the shape of
an idealized form of uncoerced reciprocity in the cooperative search for the better
argument on the part of a potentially unlimited communication community.
As a process of reaching a shared understanding, argumentation can formalize rule-
governed interaction designed to ensure that all concerned take part freely and
equally. Normative validity, and in a sense moral worth, is viewed as a product of the
potential of a norm to be accepted within a consensus that respects discourse ethics.
77 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. (italics original) pp.43-44.78 Ibid. p.163.
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It requires a reflective form of communication that seeks to establish moral norms for
well-ordered interpersonal relations motivated by the unforced force of the better
argument, “Participants in argumentation cannot avoid the presupposition that,
owing to certain characteristics that require formal description, the structure of their
communication rules out all external or internal coercion other than the force of the
better argument and thereby also neutralizes all motives other than that of the
cooperative search for truth.”79 Although the rules can be ignored, Habermas argues
that the act of entering into a good faith search for the truth presupposes the
speaker’s acceptance of general and unavoidable cooperative rules that operate at
the procedural level of his moral theory. The most important procedural standards
being,80
relevant contributions are not excluded,
all participants have an equal opportunity for contribution,
the participants do not lie,
and the communication is free from internal and external coercion in order
to ensure that contestable validity claims are motivated primarily by the
force of the better argument.
The rules of discourse ethics are viewed as inescapable universal preconditions
necessary to establish an ideal speech community that is free of repression and
argumentative inequality. The main presuppositions of rational argumentation
include the right to participate and the right of reciprocal assertion, but also, good
79 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. pp.88-9.80 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.44.
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faith communication, domination free communication, and the principle of
universalization. Within this set of rules for argumentation only the principle of
universalization is considered to be a “moral principle” that contributes to the logic of
practical discourse.81 These rules assist participants in reaching a shared
understanding on issues of normative rightness. As a collection of procedural rules,
they operate as metanorms in a discursive procedure that gives equal weight to the
interests and evaluative orientations of everybody. Habermas justifies the necessity
of a transition to a fully symmetrical and inclusive communicative relation with others
on the basis that participants in argumentation are already engaged in a cooperative
rational discourse that presupposes the use of such rules.82 “If there is no authority
for relations of moral recognition higher than the good will and insight of those who
come to a shared agreement concerning the rules that are to govern their living
together, then the standard for judging these rules must be derived exclusively from
the situation in which participants seek to convince one another of their beliefs and
proposals. By entering into a cooperative communicative practice, they already
tacitly accept the condition of symmetrical or equal consideration for everyone’s
interest.”83 The problem is, of course, what to do with those who choose not to
cooperate but prefer to use a strategic influence within an inclusive dialogue for their
exclusive benefit.
The rule of unlimited participation raises the issue of what to do with people who
refuse to adopt cooperative discourse rules and in particular those who refuse to be
motivated by anything other than self-interest. The evaluation of motives is the
source of Kant’s explanation of good will and moral worth. Habermas claims
categorical validity for norms established within the confines of discourse ethics,
which indicates that a norm would have to be determined free of contingent
81 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. pp.93.82 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. pp.40-41.83 Ibid. (Italics original)p.24.
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reasoning. He argues that an ideal discourse exchange forces participants to reject
egocentric positions that advocate one’s own interests in favour of considering the
interests of all concerned free of contingent motivations because participants are
constrained by the rules of discourse ethics: “A discursive agreement depends
simultaneously on the nonsubstitutable “yes” or “no” responses of each individual
and on overcoming the egocentric perspective, something that all participants are
constrained to do by an argumentative practice designed to produce agreement of
an epistemic kind.”84 Within the logic of this form of argumentation, moral validity
rests within a tension that requires participants respect individual “yes” or “no”
agreements and the need to constrain everyone to overcome an egocentric
perspective. Habermas’ conception of normative justification is grounded in a
speculative use of the imagination that considers the potential for a universal
consensus within a limited community of people who suspend strategic actions, a
utopian anticipation. The community is restricted to “rational” agents whose
rationality is defined by an agreement to adopt the rules pragmatically presupposed
in communicative action. However, a participant is either free to determine their own
mind without constraints or they are not. Strict adherence to the rule of unlimited
participation guarantees the inclusion of the self-interested perspective because
some people would refuse to operate from any other perspective and consider the
interests of everyone. They would prefer to limit consideration of interests to
particular in-groups while ignoring the interests of particular out-groups. Habermas
claims that normative justification can both respect individual opinions and require
everyone to abandon seeking personal advantages. These choices are, however,
somewhat mutually exclusive. For this idea to succeed, the choice would have to be
within an ideal process of moral reasoning, similar to Kant’s monological process, or
exclude real life participants who refuse to genuinely consider the interests of
everyone.
84 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.35.
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The construction of an ideal speech community, however, should not be confused
with factual real-life forums. Habermas sets out the ideal conditions of legitimacy for
discursive will-formation, a process structurally different from institutionally
regulated decision-making procedures and concrete forms of social organization. The
rules are anticipated counterfactually, not as absolute or real conditions, but as an
ideal form of communication and social interaction. This position can be contrasted
with real speech communities where discursive consensus formation occurs under
conditions of strategic self-assertion and exclusion. The rules of ideal discourse
conditions protect the right to participate and provide symmetrical rights of assertion
in order to limit the application of strategic rationality. Ideally, they act as a warrant
of rightness or fairness for further normative agreements. In the real world, the
validity of a consensus is to be viewed as credible if formed under conditions that
approach Habermas’ ideal speech community operating free of coercion and
deception. Habermas assumes that in the absence of coercion and deception nothing
could convince participants to accept a controversial norm except reasons that each
person finds acceptable.85 If argumentation occurs in bad faith, or it mimics
conditions of oppression in sexist or racist terms, the process of argumentation is
seen to have failed to achieve these basic cooperative agreements for all concerned.
Given this situation, it is possible to anticipate “yes” or “no” answers for people
subject to the application of a moral norm whether they participate or not, despite
the need for independent group advocacy and perspective sharing, and it would be
required to reject the “yes” or “no” contributions of those who refuse to act on the
basis of anything other than an ego-centric perspective not constrained by the
consideration of the interests of others in the context of claiming moral obligations
for other people.
85 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. see pp.44-5.
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Transcendental-Pragmatics
The procedural norms of discourse ethics do not rely on a process of moral
justification. They are established on the basis of being unavoidable argumentative
competencies required of deliberating agents engaged in moral argumentation. The
discourse principles are not moral duties and rights but rather argumentative duties
and rights. Within this context, argumentation is conceived as a special form of rule-
governed interaction that involves a reflective form of action oriented toward
reaching a shared understanding. Transcendental pragmatic claims assert that
discourse principles are not the result of social conventions or personal choice, nor
are they conclusions drawn from a deductive proof, rather they are unavoidable
presuppositions of reasoning that must be used if one intends to argue at all.
According to Habermas, “if one is to argue at all, there are no substitutes. The fact
that there are no alternatives to these rules of argumentation is what is being
proved; the rules themselves are not being justified.”86 The general idea is that public
argumentation makes use of normative rules, such as the inclusion of relevant
contributions and symmetrical rights of assertion, and these rules operate as
inescapable presuppositions of rational argumentation whose relevance cannot be
disputed without pragmatic self-contradiction. A pragmatic self-contradiction
identifies an inconsistency between the act of assertion and the asserted proposition.
For example, it is a contradiction to assert, “I am lying right now” or “I may exclude
relevant contributions in the context of a cooperative search for the better
argument.” The inconsistency between the act of assertion about the use of the rule
at the same time as the pragmatic observance of the rule undermines the claim
made in the assertion. The rules of discourse ethics are not justified in an ultimate
sense but merely shown to be unavoidable on the basis that any attempt to deny or
repudiate the “minimal logic” of the presupposition entails a mistake or performative
86 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. p.95. italics original.
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contradiction because to contest a presupposition requires its use and no other
alternatives are available.87 Habermas argues that there are no alternatives to the
rules because of their general nature, “Strictly speaking, arguments cannot be called
transcendental unless they deal with discourses, or the corresponding competences,
so general that it is impossible to replace them by functional equivalents…”88 From
this one may conclude that the presuppositions of cooperative discourse are
necessary and universal in order to establish a framework for argumentation that
aims at achieving a domination free consensus. The rules represent the
argumentative competencies of participants at the reflective hypothetical post-
conventional stage of moral reasoning.
Although open and fair procedural rules are an important part of a decision-making
process they do not act as an absolute warrant of impartiality as concerns the
disposition of participants in a real discourse. The exercise of ideal role taking may
improve understanding of the different consequences for different groups in the
adoption of a norm, but people often listen to and ignore submissions of dissenting
voices on a regular basis within democratic forums. They simply do not share the
same interests and do not agree. Habermas’ conception is open to the objection that
the process could be manipulated to produce outcomes that favour a dominant or
privileged group, or that attempts to implement discourse ethics by way of a formal
procedure could lead to arbitrary outcomes and terror. Although it may represent the
best method available for the determination of moral norms, it cannot prevent the
possibility of a factual consensus as a product of structural domination. Of course this
objection can be countered by providing a criteria for consensus, as Habermas has
done, that distinguishes between a “rational” consensus and irrational or fallacious
consensus. Can the consensus stand the test of ideal speech conditions? In the words
87 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. p.83 and 95.88 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. p.83.
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of Albrecht Wellmer, “to claim that a consensus is rational indeed means to assume
that it rests upon insight (upon the force of arguments) and not upon deception, self-
deception, manipulation, or internalized repression; nonetheless, we can never
achieve more than a factual consensus.”89 In other words, the rules of discourse
ethics represent necessary conditions for the validity of moral norms, are
hypothetical in nature, and are not sufficient to guarantee that individuals involved
will refrain from strategic action or that biased individuals or groups will not affect
the outcome.
The transcendental pragmatic argument is difficult to counter. However, even if
attempts to dispute the rules involve performative contradictions, claims of rule
neutrality and qualifications necessary to achieve conditions of moral obligation can
be questioned. Habermas claims that the rules are necessary and unavoidable
aspects of communicative practices however, they all share one thing in common.
They are the product of an agreement to search for mutual understandings within a
cooperative discourse. Habermas states, “the practice of argumentation sets in
motion a cooperative competition for the better argument where the orientation to
the goal of a communicatively reached agreement unites the participants from the
outset.”90 This prior agreement does not share the condition of being unavoidable in
the context of a dispute. Communication can be avoided if a person chooses to
promote a norm through the direct application of force or through other strategic
means. If successful, a party could effectively establish an outcome without
argumentation or acceptance of the better argument. Although obvious, this
demonstrates that the rules are only unavoidable in the context of cooperative forms
of argumentation. This suggests that the presuppositions of communicative action
are the result of the prior acceptance of an agreement to resolve differences through
89 Benhabib, Seyla & Dallmayr Fred. The Communicative Ethics Controversy. (M.I.T. Press, 3rd. 1995) 1990 p.293.90 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. (italics original) pp.43-44.
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the force of the better argument rather than through the direct application of force or
other strategic means. This prior agreement to resolve conflict through
argumentation and the force of the better argument establishes a general end or
purpose for argumentation that is by no means unavoidable within the larger context
of action in general. When a person adopts this general end the rules of discourse
become necessary and are hypothetical in form. For example, if one agrees to
resolve conflict through cooperative argumentation then excluding relevant
contributions results in a performative contradiction. If a person changes the goal of
communication and chooses to have someone believe something is true, whether it
is or not, then excluding relevant contributions would be “unavoidable” and
“necessary” given the hypothetical form of logic in operation. The acceptance of an
end of communication that requires the rules under the hypothetical condition of
necessity only adds credibility to the result, it does not guarantee moral obligation.
The decision to resolve disputes through communicative action limits claims of
normative rightness to the force of arguments that voluntarily use the rules of
discourse. The prior acceptance of a limiting condition or end in the resolution of
disputes manifests itself in the criteria set out in the principle of universalization, the
conditions of acceptability and the requirement of a domination free discourse. It is
also reflected in Habermas’ distinction between communicative action and strategic
action, between cooperation and manipulation. Habermas asserts that his arguments
rely on the assumption that participants want to resolve disputes through
argumentation rather than force. This assumption is synonymous with a prior
agreement to settle conflicts by the force of the better argument and to not opt out
of rational discussion by relying on the direct application of force, material incentives,
or sanctions. It should be apparent that if a participant opts for strategic action they
are in fact rejecting the rational end of argumentation, in effect suspending the rules
until such time as they agree to join the discourse in good faith. The fact that the
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rules are contingent on the prior acceptance of an end suggests that moral reasoning
and claims of obligations as set out by modern discourse theories are subservient to
hypothetical propositions such as: “If I agree to cooperate and resolve arguments
through the force of the better argument then I ought to obey the rules of discourse
ethics.” The hypothetical nature of this proposition demonstrates the qualification
that necessity is the result of the prior acceptance of the end of argumentation, i.e.,
the rules are unavoidable only if one has already decided to use them. Prior to that
decision they are not unavoidable, but merely a potential choice between strategic
actions and cooperative actions, between actions directed for success and actions
directed toward mutual understanding. The role of good will in making this decision
should not be overlooked and it is a bit of a puzzle how one should attempt to claim
categorical or moral validity for norms that are the result of hypothetical rules
motivated by the desire to resolve a dispute.
The prior decision to use the rules introduces a value choice that is not justifiable in
any absolute sense, but neither is the decision to resolve argumentation in a
cooperative manner arbitrary. The “force of the better argument” is a better method
of resolving disputes because it provides greater reliability for outcomes, is credible
as the best we have, or is capable of grounding an epistemic truth. Habermas
suggests that communicative action is the best way to convince someone of
something with some certainty while strategic action merely attempts to talk
someone into believing something is true and is not very reliable. He also suggests
that in the long run strategic action discredits participants and results in alienation
and solitude. Whether justifiable beyond pragmatic considerations or not, the
distinction demonstrates that discourse rules are not neutral or value-free but are
hypothetical deductions of a prior value-choice. This value-choice or value-premise is
demonstrated by the constraints imposed by discourse ethics, it prejudges the range
of variation for moral norms and limits dispute resolution to communicative practices.
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This value-choice is perhaps the primary distinction to be made. Whether you believe
these choices constrain moral norms to forms of non-violent, non-strategic
cooperation or not, the conclusion of this argument contradicts the position that the
rules of discourse are neutral insofar as they limit forms of dispute resolution within a
norm setting discourse. The fact that these procedural standards are logical
entailments of a consensus to cooperate highlights the relevance of arguments that
seek to convince participants that communicative forms of action are better than
strategic forms of action as an approach to conflict resolution. It hopefully establishes
that the general agreement to cooperate has a special place in moral reasoning
because that agreement operates as a necessary pre-condition for the justification of
other norms.
The Justification of Substantive Norms
The shift to an intersubjective context and the rules of argumentation result in the
determination of a “common will.” The formation of a common will results in binding
substantive norms that are linked to the rationality of the procedure and the capacity
of a norm to be universally accepted. The presuppositions of communicative action
act as rational criteria to establish ideal discourse conditions that rely on the “force of
the better argument” to further communicative goals. Substantive or moral norms
claim validity or reliability when a consensus is constructed through reciprocal
consideration of the consequences of adopting a norm for all affected parties. The
analysis of consequences can be contrasted with Kant’s approach that claims
conformity to unconditional motivations and categorical validity. Although an analysis
of consequences is introduced, Habermas maintains that conditional interests are
avoided in the motivation of acceptance of a norm when participants in public
argumentation apply the principle of universalization, itself the product of
hypothetical reasoning.
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Habermas observes that it is often impossible to reach a consensus on moral
questions due to a plurality of ultimate value orientations that ground divergent
perspectives. He asserts that it is “impossible to force agreement on theoretical and
moral-practical issues either by means of deduction or on the basis of empirical
evidence.”91 He points out that studies on the logic of moral argumentation end up
proposing a moral principle or rule of argumentation that acts as a bridging principle
between general hypotheses and particular observations helping to create a
consensus between divergent views. He claims that philosophers choose a moral
principle that is always a derivative of Kant’s basic insight represented by the
categorical imperative. However, under assumptions of social and ideological
pluralism, Habermas argues that application of Kant’s categorical imperative requires
a reformulation. What is needed is a transcendental consciousness or a universally
valid view of the world that considers the implications of adopting a norm from the
perspective of each individual. Impartiality is achieved through the involvement of a
plurality of participants in public argumentation who collectively attempt to persuade
and convince each other that adoption of a proposed norm is in the equal interest of
all or equally good for all concerned.92
The “moral point of view” as articulated by Habermas discourages Kant’s
monological approach to making moral judgments in favour of a public analysis that
focuses on the conditions of communication in order to ensure that all interested
parties test the acceptability of a norm through an analysis of consequences. Some
philosophers reject outright the possibility of consensus through a process of
argumentation and persuasion that relies on the weight of the better argument. In
the words of Richard Posner, “when the stakes are high, emotion engaged,
91 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983.(italics original) p.63.92 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. p.71.
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information sparse, criteria contested, and expertise untrustworthy – a pretty good
description of the democratic process – people do not simply yield to the weight of
the argument, especially argument derived from the abstractions of moral or political
theory.”93 One reason for divergent views over moral norms and their application is
that they conflict in the same manner as ethical evaluative differences that appeal to
separate worldviews for “epistemic” truth. The only difference is that rather than
contesting divergent views of particular interests rooted in consideration of questions
of what is good for me (or us), divergent views are contested over the generalized
interests of all concerned. Of interest is the observation that an assertion of a
generalizable interest, or what is in the “equal interests of all,” can contain a
contestable value claim leading to problems that are similar to those encountered in
the consideration of particular ethical interests. If this were not the case, Kant’s
method of moral justification would produce unanimous consensus through the
application of the categorical imperative. It is because such a task produces
disagreement that cognitive moral philosophers like Habermas are forced to admit
that any maxim of moral action is potentially fallible. A consensus grounded in an
ideal role exchange is the best method devised to overcome this problem but it
cannot achieve Kant’s claim to construct an objective “fact of reason” and settle,
once and for all, questions of normative rightness. The justification of the rules of
discourse ethics, including the principle of universalization, are a notable exception
to the problems of dissensus because they are based on common and unavoidable
interests that must be asserted if one is to engage in cooperative argumentation at
all.
The Principle of Universalization
93 Posner, R.A..The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory. (Harvard University Press, 1999) paperback ed. 2002. p.104.
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Within the moral sphere of deliberation, the principle of universalization provides the
conditions for the worth of a moral norm. The issue is whether everyone could will
that a contested norm should gain binding force under given conditions.94 The
principle of universalization excludes contested norms that could not meet with the
qualified assent of all who are or might be affected by it. The principle is considered a
necessary (presupposed) rule contained within the rational structures of
argumentation. Similar to Kant’s originating perspective, each participant is
considered a co-legislator of a norm. However, each co-legislator is asked to adopt
the moral point of view and consider whether a controversial norm is acceptable from
the point of view of each participant, “a law is valid in the moral sense when it could
be accepted by everybody from the perspective of each individual.”95 In other words,
each participant has to consider the contributions of others in a cooperative
discourse that strives to clarify a common interest in order to reach a communicative
agreement. Instead of binding others to maxims that each can will monologically
without contradiction to become a universal law, individuals must submit their
suggestion for a universal maxim to the scrutiny of others to see if everyone can
agree that such a maxim can be a universal norm. The difference for Habermas
involves incorporating the perspective of a participant who contributes to an
argument in opposition to adopting a point of view where the philosopher sees
himself as deriving an inevitable theoretical outcome. Such a reformulation
presupposes cooperative argumentation and reciprocal relations where each person
can defend their view and judge for themselves what is in his or her best interest,
while remaining open to criticism from others. On this basis Habermas reformulates
Kant’s categorical imperative in the principle of universalization: “(U) - A norm is valid
when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for
94 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. p.204.95 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.31.
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the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be jointly accepted by all
concerned without coersion.”96
The principle of universalization equates the validity of a moral norm with the
potential of a norm to be jointly accepted by all concerned. The use of “could be”
discloses an intention that moral reasoning should rely on a consideration of the
potential for universal acceptability rather than on the basis of actual acceptance.
Toward an analysis of acceptability, the first step is to select norms and principles of
action that represent generalizable or common interests of the participants. If a norm
is generalized to the point of representing a truly universal interest, it is more likely
to achieve a consensus. Habermas argues that “true impartiality pertains only to that
standpoint from which one can generalize precisely those norms that can count on
universal assent because they perceptibly embody an interest common to all
affected. It is these norms that deserve intersubjective recognition.”97 This
understanding is important because the selection of norms based on their
generalizability narrows the scope of moral reasoning into a search for interests that
we all share in common rather than establishing, as Kant attempted, a conceptual
standard from which one could derive rules for all forms of conduct.
The second step in assessing acceptability is to consider whether a norm could be
jointly accepted based on consideration of the foreseeable consequences for the
interests and value orientations of all concerned. What should be evident is that such
a formula introduces an analysis based on the assessment of pragmatic interests and
ethical values. This undermines Kant’s conception of moral worth because it
introduces the consideration of interests that may motivate the will and form the
basis of a claim of hypothetical necessity in the determination of a norm. The
96 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. italics original p.42.97 Habermas, Jurgen. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. (M.I.T. Press 1990) 1983. (italics added). p.65.
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principle of universalization can be contrasted with Kant’s reasoning where
consideration of interests is entirely avoided under the guise of categorical validity
and unconditional motives. The modern approach is necessary if one rejects the
possibility of unconditional motives and realizes that reasoning must incorporate
empirical interests represented in a consequential analysis in the determination of
what is morally right. The inclusion of an analysis of foreseeable consequences as a
condition of justification is an improvement on Kant’s formulation because it
highlights the potential for limited interests to result in costs to third parties. The
principle of universalization requires discourse and consultation with others in order
to determine if there are foreseeable costs to the interests and value-orientations of
participants in the observation of a norm, a process that Kant would consider not part
of the moral point of view as it introduces motivations attached to empirical interests
and material incentives. One advantage of this formulation is that it does not equate
equal treatment with equal outcomes and makes the search for consequences, which
may be different for particular groups, a priority. The disadvantage is that moral
norms must be uncontroversial to be accepted, consensus is based on the lowest
common denominator, or acceptance of the least offensive norms to the interests of
participants. Under such conditions, acceptability is a product of weighing the costs
involved to protect the interests represented by potential candidates for a norm.
The principle of universalization incorporates a standard of self-interest insofar as it
rejects norms based on an assessment of costs to the interests and value-
orientations of everyone. If the observance of a moral norm resulted in a harm or
created unacceptable advantage or disadvantage for a particular group it would be
rejected by at least some of the participants because of its impact on their self-
defined interests, unless the difference was acceptable, for example, on grounds of
accommodating a special need or compensating a historical injustice. There may be
some conceptual overlap between the idea of acceptable differences and the idea
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that a norm should not result in harm, but the main insight is that the condition
rejects harmful outcomes or disadvantages as defined by the participants
themselves. In the context of a universal consensus, even one participant could
reject a proposed norm on the basis of undue hardship in relation to their personal
interests or value-orientations and diminish the acceptability of a norm. This
indicates that the condition of acceptability incorporates a standard of self-interest in
the determination of norms that operates to reject unacceptable costs.
Although Habermas indicates that issues of application are separate from issues of
justification and require an additional competence of reflective prudence, the
construction of a conception of acceptability based on foreseeable consequences
links the acceptance of norms by participants with corresponding practices and
therefore incorporates issues of application. Issues of application are tied to the
principle of universalization insofar as participants must examine corresponding
practices in order to make an informed decision. Acceptance may therefore be
conditional on a particular expression or application of a norm. Identical interests that
result in identical consequences may be acceptable, however most norms will have
to consider the different costs to different groups and accommodations required to
compensate differences with different rules of application. According to Habermas,
this type of agreement cannot be avoided because, “moral universalism must not
take into account the aspect of equality – the fact that persons as such are equal to
all other persons – at the expense of the aspect of individuality – the fact that as
individuals they are at the same time absolutely different from all others. The equal
respect for everyone else demanded by a moral universalism sensitive to difference
thus takes the form of a nonleveling and nonappropriating inclusion of the other in
his otherness.”98 In the situation of a general or particular interest not shared by
everyone a balance must be achieved between protecting the interests of particular
98 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.40. italics original.
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groups that result in acceptable costs to others and protecting identical interests
common to everyone. Considerations of this nature are tied into Habermas’
conception of normative validity to the extent that they provide content to the search
for what is in the “equal” interests of everyone.
Moral norms and principles tested by the principle of universalization are transformed
into a binding normativity through the agreement of all concerned. The agreement of
all concerned recognizes or presupposes the fallibility of deliberating subjects who
convince one another of the worth of a moral norm and the freedom of self-
legislating subjects who agree to adopt the norm.99 The position is in contrast to any
conception that appeals to ultimate justifications that claim unerring knowledge not
subject to fallibility. Habermas claims that a system of internal controls, rooted in
self-government, is required to follow the convictions established by principled moral
judgments. He argues that the weak motivating force of moral reasons is a product of
the initial separation or decontextualization of moral issues from questions of the
good life, and should be supplemented by coercive positive law. Like Kant, Habermas
recognizes that we may agree on actions that are morally right but be inclined to act
otherwise anyway.
Part III: Some Aspects of Moral Reasoning in Habermas
Shared Interests
There are at least two different kinds of universal agreements contained within the
idea of “common” interests that form the domain of moral norms concerned with
establishing outcomes. Agreements based on the identification of identical interests,
shared in common, and universal agreements formed through recognition of a
99 Ibid. p.36.
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“common will.” These two conceptually distinct ideas involve the identification of
recognizable generalized interests that approach being universal on the basis of
sharing the same motivational condition or protecting diverse interests not
universally shared but common to a collective will bound to abstract principles of
practical reason. In the first case, consideration of what is equally good for all limits
norms to those that agree with specific identical conditional interests of everyone the
same. The second case unifies a common understanding based on recognition of
differences, wherein participants organize around a general interest to protect the
needs and interests of all people that are not the same. Moral reasoning in the
second case involves consideration of multiple interests held by some but not all
participants to a greater or lesser degree unified under abstract principles of
reciprocity and equality. In both cases, positive or negative conditional interests may
align with self-interest for at least some of the participants if not for all of them.
The first type of universal agreement is based on interests common to everyone
because they involve the identification of the same interest for everyone. This
creates a problem from the perspective of moral worth as articulated by Kant
because it is aligned in every case with the self-interest of every person. Each person
has an interest in the observation of a norm that protects the interest in question,
whether the norm takes the form of a positive personal entitlement or a negative
expectation relating to the behaviour of others. Kant considered the performance of
moral duties that were opposed to self-interest as opportunities to demonstrate the
greater moral worth of a duty. It is much more difficult to know when an action may
be motivated by duty or motivated by self-interest when both the duty and the
interest coincide in the same action. In fact, whenever an agreement to observe a
norm and a personal interest coincide or whenever an agreement provides a benefit
to the decision maker, it is easy to suspect the influence of self-interest on the will.
However, the moral aspect of deliberation as outlined by Habermas does not avoid
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motivations of a conditional nature, as Kant would have it, rather it embraces
conditional interests common to everyone. Abstract reflection and the process of
generalization may aid in the identification of shared interests, however, a contingent
interest in a proposition does not transcend its original context on the basis of an
agreement that we all share the same conditional interest in common. It is more
likely that unconditional motives remain unknowable in any particular manner and in
all events are incomprehensible because they do not correspond to a reasonable
explanation of the direct or indirect motivation.
The second type of interest involved by definition includes a motivation to protect the
interest of some participants that is not equally shared by all concerned. In this
situation, a “common will” forms despite the lack of identical interests. The abstract
consideration of shared interests in this situation compares various conditional and
contingent interests that remain factually linked to concrete motivational situations
for acceptance under particular discourse conditions. The act of comparison, and the
generalizable formulation may not be sufficient to claim transformation of the actual
nature and content of each individual contribution. Such a consensus may be based
on a combination of diverse general interests that do not share the same condition
under consideration because the interests at stake are not identical. The consensus
that can result is represented by an interest that intends to assist others, often
viewed as the protection of a minority interests not shared by everyone in the form of
a special accommodation for a particular group. According to Habermas, interests not
equally shared by everyone make it more difficult to reach a universal consensus. His
introduction of a moral point of view attempts to offset this problem by including an
examination of self-interest that denies norm candidacy if interests represented by
the norms are not general enough to pass conditions that support universal
agreements. Agreements based on a common will afford a greater opportunity to
demonstrate other than self-directed selfish decision-making and actions that meet
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Kant’s standard of moral worth, whether motivated by representations of direct or
indirect interest when the interest at stake does not disclose a benefit for the
participant. The person without a direct interest contributes to a consensus despite
not sharing a benefit in the construction of a norm. The motivation is other-directed
and is designed to help others or at least not harm others in a norm setting
discourse.
The determination of a “common will” that demonstrates an interest in assisting
others is more likely to involve an absence of self-interest for at least some
participants who do not share the interest at stake. Moral reasoning that attempts to
avoid harming the interests of others involves the recognition of contingent interests
and motivations that are either aligned with self-interest or a mature consideration of
the interests of others. Neither approach is free from motivations of subjective self-
interest for at least some of the participants. For example, in a large norm setting
discourse an agreement to assist people in distress may involve the consent of
individuals who do not require assistance themselves. In such a case, there is no
identical interest to motivate agreement, however, there may be a “common will” to
help those in need of assistance. Those who do not have an interest in assistance
may agree to adopt the norm because they believe it is the right thing to do, or
because they are dedicated to conditions of equality and reciprocity. The participants
in this situation collectively agree on a common will despite not sharing the same
conditional motivation because of an adherence to principled action and ideas that
govern diverse conditions. Although Kant would restrict moral worth to actions
motivated exclusively by duty (because it is the right thing to do) modern
participants who rely on a consequential analysis would prefer to have a reason
beyond a categorical assertion that this action is acceptable to those who possess a
good will, i.e. it does not harm the interests of other people.
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Motivations
Moral reasoning that attempts to avoid harming the interests of others is likely to
create the perception of an absence of self-interest because the principled behaviour
requires no action other than a refusal to accept a normative proposition. Claims of
normative rightness that remain may involve consideration of conditional interests
similar to the identification of common interests because discursive forms of moral
deliberation require an analysis of consequences and attached conditions. If a person
is motivated by self-interest, then action cannot properly be said to be moral. This
could be the case if the condition was motivated by the perception of prestige or
other material rewards. If a person is motivated to not accept norms that harm other-
directed interests because of a mature consideration of the interests of others, then
action reflects a lack of self-interest coupled to a disinterested perspective for norms
that support others because the person does not perceive self-interest to be at stake.
The acceptability of a norm under conditions of disinterest describes a weak
motivational category insofar as the participant does not put forward any effort to
support or deny a norm when the interests at stake are not vested against personal
self-interest. The motivation in this category can be criticized as not being intuitively
moral even though it would pass the standard of the principle of universalization
insofar as a person refuses to harm the interests of other people. Identical common
interests that represent motivations that are the same for everyone can also result in
a disinterested perspective that is different insofar as it represents positive interests
and conditions.
Moral action best demonstrated against personal self-interest, as Kant would have it,
may not meet the conditions of the principle of universalization. This motivation
results in the sacrifice of self-interest for the benefit of others. Such an interest is
properly described as altruistic. It fails to act on the basis of self-interest and prefers
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to act on the basis of promoting the interests of others. It is not the case that there
exists no interest in the motivation affecting the will, rather the person making the
determination has an interest in assisting other people within a special generalized
case of moral deliberation that results in the sacrifice of personal benefit to protect
the interests of others. The specific interest being protected belongs to a second
party. It can be noted that the interest represented by the desire to assist others has
the full potential of incorporating many if not all interests attached to other people if
one permitted moral norms that include the voluntarily sacrifice of self-benefit for
other people from the first person perspective. Such an interest willed without
contradiction or to the standards of the principle of universalization would include a
calculation to balance the interests of some with the interest of many and limit itself
to results that do not harm third parties, or in the formulation of Habermas, only
interests that could jointly be accepted by all concerned in a practical discourse.
Conditional Interests
As previously indicated, the two approaches toward universal agreement outlined
above present problems for moral reasoning associated with motivations. Both Kant
and Habermas claim that moral obligations are the product of emancipating the will
from conditional or contingent motivations and it this claim of an obligation that
requires examination. If unconditional motivations cannot be found to exist within
discursive forms of validation then claims of moral obligations are suspect and
alternative theoretical justifications are necessary to describe the actual process of
legitimate norm use and claims of “moral” universal validity. As set out by the
principle of universalization, self-interest is used to deny the acceptance of moral
norms. Therefore conditional interests are obviously linked to the process of
justification insofar as they are part of a motivation to reject norms or interests they
represent. From this perspective, the entire moral project can be viewed as the
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application of a few moral standards that test and reject incompatible conditional
interests and a description of what remains. When conditional interests are tested
and rejected there are no claims of normative rightness to contest on the basis of
unconditional motivations because the process does not result in a positive norm or
claims of universal validity. In a situation where personal self-interest is aligned with
the acceptance of a positive norm, its acceptance does not necessarily rely on a
motivation of rational self-interest if it is grounded in consideration of the subjective
interests of other people. According to modern moral theory, when shared interests
are aligned with self-interest, the process of considering the interests and value-
orientations of everyone and the selection of norms tested by a public discourse
nullifies, if you will, either at the individual level or at the level of a collective
decision, the self-interested motivation. The search for shared interests, however, is
open to the critique that self-interest remains the actual motivation because it is still
aligned with the resulting consensus. At issue in this process is whether a process of
consensus formation and claims of universal consensus of an interest “generalized”
to the point of being common is sufficient to achieve categorical validity on the basis
of being an unconditional demand not motivated by the consideration of a conditional
interest.
The argument to consider is whether practical universal consensus procedures that
produce outcomes based on shared interests can actually exclude self-interest and
contingent motivations and if not, whether alternatives of hypothetical reasoning are
sufficient to maintain claims of universal validity and moral worth given claims that
such norms exist and are shared universally in common. A plausible alternative
explanation of what operates within discursive forms of justification that claim moral
status beyond the assertion that it is possible to nullify the self-interested motivation
through the general consideration of the interests of everyone is the acceptance of
norms on the basis of a universal common interest. But not even this solution
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escapes the use of conditional interests, it merely generalizes the conditional interest
or motivation under consideration within a collective forum of universal acceptability
or advantage. The individual interest may avoid being disclosed through the process
of generalization, however, discursive forms of justification require participants to
provide a consequential analysis of the content of the agreement in each case. At
best, the demand to include conditions of impartial reflection on what is in the equal
interest of everyone avoids a motivation that aims to establish unequal advantages
or costs on different groups. The net effect is to maintain Kant’s basic intuition to
ground moral worth in the absence of self-interest, however, in the context of an
intersubjective process that theoretically does not exclude anyone, claims to
constrain participants to abandon self-interest are suspect, particularly if one
considers the freedom of self-legislating subjects. It further difficult to argue that
individual self-interest is entirely avoided when one additionally considers that any
shared norm by definition is aligned with self-interest, albeit an interest common to
everyone. Given the condition of an all-inclusive dialogue universal acceptance only
increases the likelihood of conditional interests being what motivates the acceptance
of a norm in anything other than an abstract theoretical process within a limited
version of an ideal role exchange.
This is not to claim however, that intersubjective forms of deliberation that rely on
the expression of conditional interests that operate to support or deny a claim of
universal validity do not disclose motivational reasons. If normative rightness is
viewed as a product of ideal discourse conditions and the potential for a universal
consensus then the search for shared interests within an intersubjective process may
provide grounds for consensus linked to consideration of consequences. A
consequential analysis, as set out by Habermas, incorporates the identification of a
motivation that is accepted because of a shared interest, or rejected because of
unacceptable costs for particular groups. In the case of denying acceptance, respect
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for the conditional interests of those who are burdened by resulting costs creates
non-consensus, while in the case of a shared common interest, what is acceptable is
the protection of a conditional interest, whether described in the hypothetical or
categorical form, as represented by specific or generalized proposed norms. It is
difficult to deny the role of conditional interests in the application of the principle of
universalization if it is acknowledged that the process of norm selection entirely
intends to rely on motivations of acceptance rooted in a consequential analysis of
conditions that conform to generalized interests that are shared by everyone or
denied because of unacceptable costs associated with other than universally
acceptable conditions.
In the case of a collective “will”, it is difficult to assign the description of a motivation
because motivations are normally the property of individuals. The motivation of a
collective decision does not have the same properties as an individual decision, at
best one could describe the various individual reasons or motivations of all individual
participants who support a collective decision in such a description. In the case of
individuals, moral theory is forced to argue that motivations of self-interest are
avoided if the process is designed to prevent unequal advantages or harms from
occurring to the interests and value-orientations of each participant. In this manner,
subjective or contingent interests that aim at a specific advantage or avoid a
particular cost not shared by everyone are discounted and what remains attempts to
represent universal interests shared in common by everyone. The result claims a
transcendent motivation that avoids self-interest because it is acceptable to a
theoretical universal collective rather than a limited interest group. This analysis only
denies personal motivation and ascribes to the resulting norm a motivation of an
unconditional nature because all members of the group are capable of achieving
consensus based on conditions that may or may not actually represent the factual
motivation of intersubjective claims. Kant explains this potential nonconforming
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correspondence to a collective result as an absence of good will, while Habermas
attributes this failing to the non-inclusion of discourse standards that create an
impartial perspective and adhere to principles of acceptance that level out harms to
other people. If Habermas did not argue in favour of subsequent claims of moral
obligation subject to a factual motivational analysis linked to Kant’s groundwork,
claims of normative rightness could be upheld on the basis of the standards he
advocates while failing, and properly so, the conditions necessary to ascribe moral
worth to participants within a collective decision. Such a framework minus claims of
obligation mirror Kant’s objective analysis of universal validity and the potential for
acceptance of “moral” propositions.
Categorical and Hypothetical Relations
Categorical forms of logic were presented by Kant as a distinction between
theoretical and practical claims of validity. For Kant, theoretical cognitions express
what “is” while practical cognitions express what “ought” to be in terms of
acceptability, given conditions of a good will. Empirical judgments represent what is
actually real and are different from practical judgments that correspond to moral
validity regardless of experience and are independent of the judgment and
perception of participants. The main transition from Kant’s explanation that includes
objective moral commands and the more modern approach of defining the criteria of
intersubjective acceptability is to argue the difference between theoretical
assumptions that moral propositions are found by the mind rather than made in the
mind of all rational agents. This distinction is sufficient to map the transition from
categorical forms of validity that contain objective claims of impartiality to
intersubjective forms of validity that contain claims of categorical status based on
something less than objective recognition. Claims of categorical validity and moral
obligation that reject claims of “objectivity” may, however, demonstrate incompatible
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theoretical claims within intersubjective forms of justification. The rest of this paper
will consider the possibility of such a position based on what I perceive to be the
failing of modern intersubjective moral reasoning to achieve claims of moral
obligation due to the unavoidable disclosure and use of pre-conditional and
conditional interests within abstract reasoning processes that claim validity based on
a consequential analysis designed to produce motivations of acceptability through
the application of criteria linked to hypothetical forms of reasoning. To argue the
reasonableness of such a claim, I would point out that rejection of claims of
objectivity may entail a transition that requires a theoretical shift from categorical
forms of reasoning to hypothetical forms of reasoning in every case, and that such an
observation may pre-exist within Kant’s own conception. In other words, discursive
forms of justification that use universal standards as criteria for acceptability may not
actually avoid the use of conditional interests as a motivation or an interest that
motivates the will, but rather they may incorporate conditional motivations at a
higher, more general level of abstraction and fail to meet categorical definitions of
validity.
For Kant, claims of necessity that correspond to ideas of pre-existing abstract
connections were considered objective because they were not dependent on
empirical grounds or observations and rooted in the same practical observation of
moral worth for every person. In this manner, Kant appears to construct the idea of a
moral principled domain with corresponding claims of moral necessity on nothing
more than the identification of pre-existing fixed abstract logical relationships of non-
empirical phenomena, such as a triangle must have its interior angles equal to two
right angles. The distinction between theoretical and practical operations of reason
allows Kant to express language that constructs the idea of a moral domain by
merely describing pre-existing fixed abstract connections based on an analogy to the
theoretical rules of geometry and mathematics within the faculty of practical reason.
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Kant argued that pure reason could identify objective rules that would clarify the
motivational force of reason by rejecting motives grounded in the world of sense, and
accepting motives grounded on pure intellection, and that these rules were pre-
understood as fundamental unconditional laws known independent of empirical
observation. In other words, the mind itself was able to construct relational
equivalencies and through the process of non-contradiction achieve substance over
what was common to all persons the same and accepted given the presence of good
will. Grounding moral frameworks within an observational layer of abstract logic
attached to motivational frames of mind may leave one wondering about the abstract
descriptive language constructed for this project on the basis of a correspondence as
noteworthy as the workings of a geometrical shape. A redefinition of factual
processes that include the simplification of the workings of motivation forces may
lead to a more accurate reflection of universal abstract validity claims.
Categorical propositions were only concerned with the inclusion of the universal form,
without logical contradictions, and without conditional motivations. Categorical
expression excluded reference to the subjective material condition of the action
resulting in something different than hypothetical relations because they failed to
disclose an intermediate condition in a relationship of premise and conclusion.
Categorical judgments claimed unconditional status and were recognized by a good
will in the form of a universal law that was impartial. If however, the focus of moral
rightness is on the criteria of acceptability rather than motivation, then self-
interested motivations would combine with a mature consideration of the interests of
others and form the basis of a universal consensus. The mix of heteronomous and
categorical conditions would appear to provide a greater potential for universal
consensus if found to be unavoidable in a pragmatic dialogical consensus framework
given the description of conditions of acceptance for normative reasoning without
claims of unconditional validity and moral obligation. This theoretical stance is
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rejected by Habermas, who argues that the inclusion of self-interest would fail to
achieve moral obligation and remain within the domain of argumentation that
supports rational self-interest as expressed by social contract theory. He advocates
for the selection process of generalization to narrow norm candidacy as a substitute
process in the context of a competition to reduce norm conflict and achieve moral
validity. The rules used to achieve validity are themselves the product of hypothetical
forms of necessity that claim moral obligation as the result of achieving universal
agreements. Kant rejects hypothetical forms of reasoning for moral propositions
altogether because of the relationship between subject and predicate. Hypothetical
forms disclose specific conditional examples, while categorical forms avoid
conditional references and claim universal validity by looking at all examples of
premise and conclusion to test for a universal truth condition without contradiction or
reference to hypothetical forms of reasoning. For Kant, reference to a hypothetical
condition that disclose specific examples are not objective and cannot form the basis
of a universal rule acceptable to everyone. The hypothetical form ruins the idea of an
unconditional good will not influenced by subjective conditions and is therefore
rejected because it references a concrete empirical condition.
To critique Kant based on his own reasoning, the difference between hypothetical
and categorical forms of logic within inert theoretical expressions are not the same if
the context is changed and they are viewed within a practical sphere of motivational
action. The difference between the heteronomous and autonomous will in Kant was
depicted as the difference between motivations attached to hypothetical conditions
and a categorical perspective of objectivity. An autonomous will that binds itself to
practical reason in favour of impartial motivations on the basis of reciprocity and
equality is grounded in abstract insight similar to the necessity of recognizing that
two right angles must equal the interior degrees of a triangle, while hypothetical
forms of reason are linked to heteronomous motivations that disclose a condition as
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part of a logical expression in the form of the end of an action or purpose. Forms of
motivation described by the idea of heteronomy intend to achieve a result through
consideration of the condition and include a motivation attached to the subjective
condition, while categorical propositions do not contain references to empirical
conditions as a basis of moral obligation. The proposition is understood without
purpose or reference to an end other than the performance of the action directly and
does not contain intermediate conditions. Kant argued that this avoids the logical
intention of a motivation given by an attachment to a condition on the part of a
participant who is considering an action. An analysis of motivation within categorical
forms of validity is open, however, to the criticism that although hypothetical
conditions are not disclosed by reference to a necessary instrumental connection of
action, that such conditions exist anyway, and are unavoidable, even if not disclosed,
given the possibility of the full expression of the categorical proposition and
subsequent logical entailments attached to intellectual preference for principles of
reciprocity and equality. Within the context of discursive forms of validation, moral
justifications cannot avoid the obligation to include conditional subjective disclosures
given the need to perform an impartial consequential analysis as set out by the
operation of the principle of universalization.
Moral Reasoning
Although there are many aspects of Kant’s reasoning that Habermas does not
incorporate, he adopts the theoretical distinction made by Kant between the
heteronomous and autonomous will to ground moral obligation. The exclusion of
references to the material conditions of an action and its intended result defines an
autonomous will in an unconditional manner and binds the will to practical reason so
that it may adopt maxims of action on the basis of insight. The exercise of rational
autonomy purged on contingent subjective motivations as a result of practical reason
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binds the will to an impartial perspective leading to obligations viewed as
unconditional demands that are categorically valid. Habermas claims that the
inclusion of a standard that compares pre-existing pragmatic interests and context-
dependent value-orientations of an ethical nature frees the will of heteronomy and
achieves a context-independent reflection on what is equally in the interests of
everyone. Heteronomy, however, may not be avoided, if subjective conditions
contained within a consequential analysis operate to influence the will or if limiting
conditions disclosed by the rules of norm candidacy presuppose the end of a
hypothetical relation that manifests itself in the conditions of acceptance for all
derivate moral propositions.
Given this approach to understanding intersubjective forms of validity, descriptions of
practical reason that avoid such a conclusion are necessary to maintain claims of
moral obligation. If discursive forms of obligation intend to include reference to
subjective conditions and discourse rules, moral reasoning needs to distinguish itself
from non-moral contextual situations that result in agreement but not moral
obligation. Models of contractual obligation in social contract theory avoid moral
obligations because they are motivated by conditional interests and selfish
considerations rather than universal abstract standards that reject contingent
interests. Negotiating a balance between conflicting rational interests that cannot be
universalized is a different motivational process distinct from agreements supported
by shared or common interests. Theories of moral obligation require an abstract and
mature consideration of the interests and value-orientations of all concerned to avoid
contradictions rooted in subjective motivations, self-love or individual interest-based
rationality. Self-love cannot be the foundation of a moral obligation because it is
linked to empirical conditions and motivated by the satisfaction of a desire rather
than conformity to abstract principles of universal non-contradiction or the adherence
to acceptability criteria linked to a moral standard of impartiality.
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Subjective Contexts
The moral point of view claims to avoid specific or particular values attached to pre-
existing ethical contexts in deference to context-independent motivations that are
without subjective preferences or motivations. Habermas argues that moral
reasoning is an exercise of abstract reflexivity not bound by specific contextual
origins. Ethical contexts involve evaluations of the good life in relation to identities
and value-orientations held by specific communities. Habermas claims unconditional
or categorical validity is achieved when motivations for the self-legislation of norms
and corresponding obligations are denied recourse to subjective contexts for
justification by way of conformity to the application of moral standards to avoid self-
interest and corresponding contingent motivations. The denial of subjective contexts
within the justificatory procedure of adopting norms is similar to Kant’s objective
approach that operates within ethical contexts. The difference between claiming
objectivity and denying subjectivity in moral theory creates a division between
propositions that remain within ethical first person considerations of moral worth
linked to the presence of good will and the denial of subjective conditions within
moral propositions through the application of intersubjective forms of impartiality
that consider the interests of all people. The differences, however, do not necessarily
transform the remaining motivation into a true example of unconditional categorical
validity, they merely act as a warrant of rightness for claims of a subjective nature.
The motivation may remain under the influence of acceptable subjective motivations
unless the standard operates as a motivation on the will. The inclusion of dialogical
standards of impartiality operate to aid in the comparison of competing
intersubjective claims in order to replace the idea of objective laws that are suspect
of fallible monological pronouncements of categorical validity often rooted at source
in ethical first person contextual situations. The standards actually displace reliance
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on a motivational analysis within moral theory so long as the result is controlled or
influenced by motivations of people who implement universal and impartial
standards under conditions of group discourse. Open to criticisms of moral
paternalism, the denial of subjective conditions substitutes personal, ethical or
pragmatic motivations with standards constructed by the cooperative subjective
motivations of other people who support abstract universalism.
Given an understanding of this overarching principled process, it can be argued that
generalized interests viewed may represent a link to an evaluative choice within an
ethical context, even if the value has multiple sources of origin and is generalizable
to the point of being a shared common interest in each specific case. The prior
acceptance of a presupposed end to resolve conflict through communicative action
and a review of the consequences of adopting a norm may limit moral reasoning to a
subjective context in every situation. Habermas claims that moral reasoning is a
context-independent process that avoids pre-existing pragmatic interests, which
ground self-interest, and context-dependent value-orientations of an ethical nature,
which ground contingent interests, “there seems to be no way around the
explanation of the moral point of view in terms of a procedure that claims to be
context-independent.”100 Determinations of moral rightness within this context,
however, may not avoid subjective evaluations that lead to hypothetical conditions
despite the introduction of the moral point of view. The moral context in this situation
is viewed as a special extension or higher order of pragmatic and ethical spheres of
deliberation within a concrete boundary to achieve the status description of being
universal in the abstract. This contextual category is merely the transcendent
application of ethical “epistemic” determinations that clarify what is worth striving
toward but it does not change the motivational contextual situation of maxims of
action and other propositions that cannot escape being viewed in the “concrete.” A
100 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.99.
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concrete interest is attached to a person with an actual history, identity, and
affective-emotional constitution.101
Theoretical assumptions of modern moral theory remain free of conditional
motivations and claim categorical validity on the basis of intersubjective forms of
validity that reference ethical contexts and contingent motivations. The decision to
avoid strategic actions and motivations may not avoid subjective contexts and claim
categorical validity if they cannot be separated from the decision of a subjective
precondition. These claims can be reassessed in the context of the question of
whether it is possible for moral reasoning to lose specific value-orientations within a
process of argumentation and generalization given a plurality of participants, the
existence of pre-conditional assumptions, and the obligation to examine logical
entailments and interests. According to Habermas, the acceptability of norms is a
product of abstract moral procedures that recognize the value of generalization. On
this topic, Habermas writes, “only generalizable value-orientations, which all
participants (and all those affected) can accept with good reasons as appropriate for
regulating the subject matter at hand, and which can thereby acquire binding
normative force, pass the threshold. An “interest” can be described as a “value-
orientation” when it is shared by other members of a community in similar situations.
Thus an interest only deserves consideration from the moral point of view once it is
stripped of its intrinsic relation to a first person perspective. Once it is translated into
an intersubjectively shared evaluative vocabulary, it is no longer tied to contingent
desires and preferences and can achieve, as a candidate for value-generalization in
moral justification, the epistemic status of an argument. What enters discourse as a
desire or preference survives the generalization test only under the description of a
101 Benhabib, Seyla. The Generalized and the Concrete Other : The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory in Kittay, E. and Meyers, D. (eds.), Women and Moral Theory. New Jersey : Rowan and Littlefield, 1987.p.164.
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value that appears to be generally acceptable to all participants as a basis for
regulating the relevant matter.”102
It cannot be denied that the process of generalization is useful to resolve conflicts
between various groups by identifying underlying shared universal interests,
however, the process of generalization acts to postpone expressions of consequential
interests that may motivate acceptance and observance of a norm and subsequently
fail to achieve categorical validity given that acceptability may, in every condition
under consideration, be limited to generalized interests that operate in subjective
contexts to avoid strategic action. Whether the moral point of view is actually part of
a context-independent procedure or actually just part of an context-dependent
approval process that seeks to increase potential acceptance of norms by
incorporating generalized subjective conditions that are the same for everyone is to
decide whether the idea of an ideal role exchange is capable of transcending
motivations linked to conditional being. It can be argued that such an illusion does
not transcend subjective contexts and conditional motivations because the
presupposed end of resolving conflict that is used to derive the hypothetical
necessity of the moral point of view operates to contradict the idea of a context-
independent process. The decision to accept the presupposed end to resolve conflict
through the force of the better argument rather than strategic forms of motivation is
itself demonstrative of a subjective value-choice to resolve conflicts of norm
competition through cooperative discourse rules and derivative propositions of rule
governed behaviour that require accounting for the interests of others, avoiding
negative outcomes, and criteria for norm selection.
The selection process of generalization operates in the same manner as a good will
to select norms that are capable of achieving universal approval. The selection
102 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. pp.81-82. italics original.
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process that includes generalization is a useful bridge for overcoming conflict based
on specific representations of subjective values, as espoused by Habermas, however,
the process of weighing the probability of universal consensus and the formal
introduction of understanding the acceptability of a consequential analysis would of
necessity include specific expressions of conditional interests leading to a further
hypothetical proposition insofar as acceptability is a product of limits that protect the
interests of others. The principle of universalization, itself the product of hypothetical
necessity and the logic of avoiding pragmatic performative contradictions, requires
an analysis of consequential conditions and interests. If the limits are properly
understood, every example of a generalized norm may fail to avoid hypothetical
forms of necessity and conditions of a pure motivation required by the autonomous
will of every individual as defined by Kant and supported by Habermas. The inclusion
of pre-conditional and subsequent conditional interests in moral reasoning could be
expected to motivate acceptance or non-acceptance of a norm within a hypothetical
framework of acceptability, a situation that would void categorical forms of
unconditional validity according to Kant.
It can be argued that the condition of a morally good will produced by the
renunciation all interests and actions motivated exclusively by recognition of a
universal duty shared and acceptable to all people is not the same proposition as the
deselection of negative consequences and the identification of remaining conditional
motivations of common interests, vetted by conditions of impartiality whether given
full consideration or not. Although the explication of criteria for intersubjective
acceptability may not reference claims of unconditional validity, being limited by the
operation of a previous hypothetical deduction, the omission to provide moral
judgment with a consequential analysis may be the only theoretical means to avoid
hypothetical forms of conditional reasoning. Actions based on not enough
information, or done from ignorance, or non-consideration of empirical motivations
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would appear to be suitable candidates for Kantian categorical validity but not qualify
under the modern rules of discourse ethics.
The secondary derivation of cooperative forms of behaviour that follow from the force
of hypothetical reason to avoid logical performative contradictions should not be
confused with the idea of a primary decision to resolve conflict or the means by
which to do so. The decision to avoid logical performative contradictions is the result
of pragmatic logic and a desire for performative competency or a desire to obey rules
of agreement, while the decision to resolve conflict within a process of norm selection
is a decision potentially rooted in the subjective value-orientations of particular
communities. What is claimed as a transcendental moral property, the context-
independent process of intersubjective moral reasoning, is really nothing more than
the expression of a primary ethical preference to avoid strategic action if one accepts
that resolving conflict through rule-governed interaction is a subjective context-
dependent process, albeit shared by most people.
Limits of the Moral Context
The operation of forming a consensus based on generalizable interests may not avoid
an evaluation or value-choice within a pragmatic or ethical concrete context despite
being generalized to the point of being less objectionable. This would involve
accepting that subjective common interests of others are conditional in form and
there is no other alternative ground of justification or motivation available after the
rejection of selfish motivations. Just because the generalizable test claims to avoid a
subjective motivation through the operation and denial of self-interest of the person
making the determination does not necessarily entail avoiding the insight that all
grounds of acceptability within an ideal role exchange may contain conditional
motives in relation to the consideration of the interests of others. Habermas states
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that hearing the interests and value-orientations of all concerned results in a context-
independent motivation that is not a preference but the result of reasoned conviction
and generalizable insight rather than a mature preference motivated by an analysis
of conditional interests. Habermas is forced to argue in favour of a context-
independent process in order to be able to ground claims of moral obligation and
categorical validity. To achieve this claim, contingent values are either not involved
in the motivation of an agreement or they do not retain their conditional status when
considered from an abstract perspective that considers the interests of all concerned
in a context-independent manner.
Habermas would prefer to distinguish between the determination of value within
ethical contexts and the determination of norms within a moral context and claim
that the construction of values and norms are distinct processes. It can be argued,
however, that the incorporation of discourse ethics within a norm setting discourse
relies on the inclusion of at least one ethical value choice insofar as cooperation is a
necessary precondition to achieve a reliable result expressed by reciprocal rules of
argumentation. The decision to adopt an ethical value choice as a precondition to the
determination of acceptable norms serves to limit the scope of moral reasoning. Such
a limit can be viewed as the inclusion of an ethical value within a framework that
claims value neutrality. The second observation of such a claim, as noted earlier, is
that despite the transition to a search for shared norms, the consideration of the
interests of everyone does not transcend subjective value determinations, it merely
generalizes subjective values in an attempt to compare them with the general values
of everyone in the hope of reaching a universal consensus. What remains of Kant’s
construction of the autonomous will is a claim to refrain from indulging in certain
motivations based on self-interest or personal preference. The application of the all-
inclusive context to moral reasoning may result in a method of privileging questions
of justice over questions of the good, however it does not support the claim to
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establish unconditional norms or principles. Rather it amounts to little more than
asking people to enlarge their ethical perspectives through consideration of the
generalizable and particular interests of others to the point of recognizing and acting
on either shared common interests or motivations linked to the recognizable and
exclusive interests of other people.
If norms based on shared interests cannot avoid being motivated by conditional or
contingent interests then they disclose necessary forms of hypothetical reasoning.
The hypothetical proposition is not transformed into a categorical proposition when
considered in the context of all rational agents. It is still based on conditional reasons
despite the idea that they apply to everyone. Hypothetical propositions take the
following form: I ought to do “x” if I want to achieve “y”. In the abstract context of
moral reasoning and normative justification the hypothetical proposition is: I ought to
accept norm “x” if I want achieve common interest “y” and everyone agrees that “y”
is equally good for everyone. “Y” within my argument is a common interest accepted
as a conditional reason for acting within the universal sphere of moral deliberation,
its standards as such, but without claims of unconditional validity or moral obligation.
Within this framework, a shared perspective and the identification of common
interests does not transcend the conditional nature of particular subjective interests,
it merely introduces the requirement that interests relied on must be disclosed and
that everyone agrees the interest could be common to everyone. The deliberative
practice restricts consideration of interests to those shared in common and rejects
conflicting interests that result in unacceptable inequality. At best, the moral point of
view defines a specialized universal subset of pragmatic and ethical evaluations
acceptable to everyone because they are shared by everyone.
Absence of Self-Interest
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To save what is left of the notion of an unconditional motivation is to search for
motivations that are not grounded in self-interest. The collective determination of
what is equally in the interests of everyone may avoid self-interest if it were based
exclusively on the desire to protect the common interests of others. Such an
approach avoids self-interest but it does not avoid the use of conditional interests
because representations of common interests are viewed from a consequential
perspective. The desire to protect the common interests of others would have to
exclude the interests of the person making the determination and accept the
conditional interests of others as the exclusive motivation for agreement. Kant
considered his impartial perspective to result in motivations attached to universal
obligations and benefits that were identical for each person without attachment to
conditional motivations or interests. Given the modern treatment of his claims, this
form of deliberative practice relies on the consideration of the equal interests of all
concerned and limits interests to those we all share, either equally, or collectively but
it does escape from the presence and use of conditional and contingent interests
within a motivational perspective. Impartiality viewed in this manner identifies a
limited set of subjective motivations purged of advantages or disadvantages for
particular groups and does not claim to establish unconditional demands or
categorical forms of validity.
The claim for the existence of unconditional motivations, not tied to any interests at
all, is rejected as incomprehensible. An interest represents a conditional reason for
acting. If one rejects Kant’s argument of categorical validity and requires a
conditional reason to understand consensus formation then justification of moral
reason will always be linked to the interests of someone and be in the hypothetical
form. In all cases, the will is determined either by an interest attached to the
decision-maker or an interest attached to someone else, or a mix of both. Without
going beyond this limit as a factual explanation of the potential for universal
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agreements, these two sets of interests exhaust the potential grounds for motivation
of an agreement that seeks to take into consideration the interests of everyone. If a
norm failed to represent the interests of someone, there would be no point in
constructing the norm, although I suppose a norm could be constructed in the total
absence of interests, only that no one would likely support it. In every case of
intersubjective agreement the will is either determined by personal interests, the
interests of others, or a mix of both, but not the total absence of conditional interests
altogether. This suggests that self-interest can be avoided in moral deliberation by
agreeing to support the interests of other people, however, because such a task still
represents motivations linked to conditional interests one cannot establish
categorical validity.
In summary, Kant and Habermas conceive of two different standards for moral action
rooted in practical reason or practical deliberation. Kant’s standard can be
summarized as a test that rules out maxims of action based on contradiction with the
categorical imperative. It amounts to a process of reasoning that asks, what if
everyone did that? You should not do this or that action because if everyone did it
would result in a performative contradiction. You should not give lying promises
because if everyone gave lying promises then contract law would break down, or you
should not give incorrect change because if everyone gave incorrect change then
commerce would break down. This standard makes an assumption that we already
know what is good, it is what everyone could will without contradiction. You should
respect your parents because if everyone respected their parents it would be good
and not result in unequal advantages. It creates a set of moral propositions that
provide equal obligations for everyone. Habermas on the other hand, uses a different
standard to determine moral conduct. His standard amounts to a do no harm
principle. You should not give incorrect change because it would harm the interest of
others. You should not give lying promises because it would induce contracts, which
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once breached, would harm others. This standard is accomplished through an
examination of the potential harms and a test of consent based on the assumption
that no one would agree to something that would harm their interests.
The main difference between the two standards is what I will call the high and low
watermark of morality, a positive versus a negative test. Kant established the highest
standard, it reaches for the best in people. We should support all actions that are
good. The only problem is that different people in different cultures hold different
opinions on what is good, on what everyone ought to do. Habermas’ standard tries to
deal with this objection, but as a result he has to water down the standard somewhat,
or use a negative test. It is not the case that we should support what is good because
our conception of what is good may be fallible, so instead we should at least not
harm others. This test creates a set of norms and corresponding obligations that are
the result of reasoned convictions established through discourse that at a minimum
do not harm the interests or value-orientations of others. The only problem is that
such a standard introduces a value choice insofar as it justifies the prior acceptance
of reciprocal rules of argumentation that include an ethical choice to resolve conflict
through argumentation and norms of equal application. These rules are a necessary
modification on moral reasoning because when one accepts a standard that rejects
harmful outcomes one must first be able to listen to others in order to determine
what the harms may be.
Intersubjective and Categorical Validity
If moral reasoning is the product of the consideration of contingent reasoning and
motivations linked to the subjective interests of the self or others, then claims of
achieving categorical validity or unconditional validity within an intersubjective
context must be reconsidered. Categorical validity, as established by Kant,
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presupposes the prior recognition of what is good which modern moral reasoning
explains as the acceptance of cooperative forms of norm recognition and resolution.
Kant posits that we already know what is moral and what is not and merely have to
cast it in a universal form to avoid conditional interests, test our beliefs, and establish
a universal obligation. He advocates that we ought to perform an action for the sake
of an action and not for a mediating inclination or desire, the action is motivated by
the end itself. Intersubjective forms of reasoning demonstrate a model of moral
reasoning that suggest the acceptance of a precondition that acts as a mediating
inclination or desire that may void categorical forms of validity. The invention of
considering the interests of everyone may not be sufficient to transcend subjective
contexts that consider the consequences of adopting norms and may fail achieve the
status of categorical validity within intersubjective processes as they remain linked to
preferences that set out conditions of acceptability despite aiming for the potential of
a universal consensus. Moral propositions cannot be a product of their potential for
intersubjective agreement, share categorical status, and disclose contingent reasons
within specific discourse conditions as a motivational influence on the will at the
same time. If such were the case, categorical validity claims would be the result of
consequential justification within intersubjective contextual agreements and result in
hypothetical forms of necessity and conditional motivation. The rules of justification
that operate on the basis of reciprocity and equality are not sufficient to ground
claims of moral obligation in an unconditional manner if consequential forms of
reasoning determine the result. Even if one accepts reciprocity and equality as the
justification for intersubjective validity then the reasons for adopting a norm will still
undermine claims of categorical validity, either through conditional motivations of
contingency or generalized interests that limit norms based on pre-existing
conditional interests, disclosed or not, within the decision to first operate on the basis
of intellectual ideas linked to subjective contexts that operate to resolve conflict in
the hypothetical form by rules inseparably linked to subsequent contingent
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grounding. In these circumstances, categorical validity and intersubjective forms of
reasoning are mutually exclusive claims.
If one agrees that moral reasoning cannot escape from motivations based on
subjective contingent interests, whether they are attached to the person making the
determination or someone else, then shared interests fail to ground moral
obligations. Habermas refers to this objection, “…insofar as an actor only has rational
motives for preferring moral to premoral conditions, he undermines the obligatory
nature of the moral expectations whose categorical validity he should recognize
under these conditions…the moral language loses the illocutionary force of
unconditional demands as soon as participation in the moral language game is made
dependent on the decision of a rational chooser.”103 In other words, the introduction
of hypothetical forms of reason in the transition from ego-centric justification of
norms to a mature consideration of the interests of others fail to establish moral
obligations and unconditional demands because they require an absence of self-
interest in the collective determination of a norm. The acceptance of premoral
conditions however, operate to limit norm acceptability within an inclusive dialogue
that include subjective conditions of self-interest and probably cannot establish
categorically validity and claims of moral obligation because they are linked to
hypothetical forms of agreement despite that the moral point of view claims to
escape subjective self-interest because it is rooted in the mature consideration of the
interests of others.
Moral Worth
Kant and Habermas place a great deal of emphasis on the motivation for adopting a
norm or principle because they link unconditional motivations with moral obligations.
103 Habermas, Jurgen. Inclusion of the Other. (M.I.T.) 1998. p.22.
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However, if intersubjective agreements fail to establish motives free of conditional
interests because generalizable forms disclose consequential or pre-existing
conditional interests shared by everyone, then an alternative conception of moral
obligation is necessary and a redefinition of moral worth has yet to be established.
Such a task is beyond the scope of the present inquiry that restricted itself to an
analysis of what is currently a popular conception of moral reasoning, however I will
venture to sketch out some alternative possibilities for a conception of moral
obligation and moral worth within a less ambitious framework.
Moral worth, in the Kantian sense, cannot really be attached to norms on the basis of
their potential for universal agreement because such an analysis cannot avoid
motivations linked to contingent interests as a basis for universal acceptance. The
interests are aligned with self-interest for at least some of the participants. What
remains of Kant’s assessment of moral worth is the idea that it applies to motivations
entirely purged of self-interest. The only clear example of an action motivated by an
absence of self-interest, (after rejecting an unconditional interest) is an action done
exclusively for the protection of the interests of others. Norms that are motivated to
protect the interests of a particular group that involve a cost to other groups provide
the greatest opportunity to demonstrate moral worth of an action on the basis of
selflessness but are the least likely to be accepted for that very reason. On this basis
moral worth is product of providing assistance to others without the expectation of a
personal benefit. This proposition relies on an ethical rather than moral context for
justification. The claim of moral worth is merely an intuition that describes a standard
of judgment that may be applied within particular ethical circumstances. Personally, I
am persuaded that such a proposition is not mistaken because the inclusion of a
consequential analysis is an advance toward a universal agreement that relies on a
difference between actions motivated by self-interest and actions motivated by
considering the needs and interests of others. In general terms, cooperative
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outcomes are better than competitive ones. When confronted with the choice to
normalize a generalizable interest that results in costs to some groups when given
particular expression, we can either attempt to equalize the interests of everyone
and obtain the same benefits and obligations or we can promote the interests of
others over our own interests. The only caveat to this simple description is that
promoting the interests of others still requires an analysis of the potential costs to
third parties in order to avoid establishing unacceptable advantages for others. This
approach suggests that the equalization of interests is not the sine qua non of
morality, it is the minimum standard. The highest moral standard is that of altruism.
Moral obligations can likely be attached to acts of altruism on the basis of duty and
consistency. If one agrees to adopt a norm then they undertake an obligation to be
consistent with that position. Once moral theory rejects the idea of objectively
necessary moral obligations, and accepts the idea that obligations exist only when
we agree to undertake them, what we are left with is the determination of value in
abstract and general contexts. The domain of morality loses some of its special
status as being an explanation of obligation and becomes merely a specialized
extension of ethical value determinations that contain integrity. What remains are
three distinct standards of judgment that may be applied in any particular case. The
motivations that are attached to these standards create distinctions between
claiming a value or interest for a particular group to which one belongs, claiming a
value or interest for all people, and claiming a value or interest for a particular group
to which one does not belong. These standards reflect different motivations that
determine the will to action and correspond roughly with stages of moral
development. The first category includes those who help themselves regardless of
the cost to others, the second category includes those who balance their personal
interests with what all may agree to be the identical interests of everyone and the
third category includes those who help others at a cost to themselves. The first
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standard is based on absolute self-interest where a particular group is motivated by
an advantage they do not want to share with others. The second standard is based
on acceptance of abstract equality or impartiality grounded in equal obligations and
benefits that do not result in the advantage of one group over another. The third
standard is altruistic where a particular group sacrifices personal self-interest to
protect the interests of others, such as in war-time. The idea of moral worth is linked
to a rejection of the first standard in favour of the other two, however protecting the
interests of others without the expectation of personal benefit is the only clear
example of an action containing moral worth on the basis of being totally purged of
self-interest.
The use of these three standards in moral deliberation and recognition of the need to
approximate universal acceptability in the collective determination of moral norms
undermines claims of absolute moral obligation. Such a position is unsatisfying to
those who would want to justify some sense of necessary obligation rooted in
something more than a free choice or arbitrary preference. I do not think, however,
that because obligations rest on choices, these choices do not disclose the existence
of moral order. The initial choice of promoting cooperative methods in the
determination of norms is a foundational choice. I do not see anything objectionable
in making this determination and following further with a deductive chain of
statements. The initial choice can be grounded in pragmatic insights that suggest
that cooperation and a mature consideration of the interests of others promotes
better outcomes for all participants. The initial choice may be based on a decision or
a commitment but such a decision is rational insofar as it promotes the well-being of
the collective.
In its most general form, moral worth is the acceptance of caring, which if applied in
a moral context means caring for everyone. However, the acceptance of the
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proposition does not result in binding moral obligations for everyone, it is an option.
The task of moral philosophy should be to persuade people to agree to adopt a moral
order that prefers to care, either because it can be justified on the basis of forming
better outcomes or because one already believes that caring is to be preferred. The
moral imperative is to communicate with others in order to promote good will and
harmony through the use and understanding of moral standards in particular
contexts and to reject selfish motives that lead to exclusive personal advantage.
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