1
Remodeling state security politics:
A realist-constructivist model on the power/identity nexus
Introduction Structural realism and the waning constructivist challenge
Despite facing an imposing array of critics over the years, Kenneth Waltz’s version of
structural realism (1979)1 is still widely regarded as the best theoretical starting point
when it comes to explaining the overall security behavior of states. Yet, Waltz’s struc-
tural realism, which places the concepts of power and anarchy at its theoretical core,
may be a neatly and parsimoniously formulated theoretical starting point, but it is not
really successful in actually being able to explain the overall patterns of state security
behavior, even less so the foreign policy behavior of specific states.2 Hence the decades-
long attempts by more or less sympathetic critics to develop, complement, revise, de-
construct or simply discard structural realism (see e.g. Keohane, 1986; Brown et al.,
1995; Frankel, 1996; Legro & Moravcsik, 1999; Wendt, 1999; Vasquez & Elman, 2003;
see also the special issue of International Relations 23, #2, 2009). Leaving aside the most
“negative” critics, who tend to confront Waltz from a meta-theoretical perspective (e.g.
Ashley, 1984; Walker, 1993), the more constructive, theory-engaging critics may be di-
vided into three main groups, realists, liberalist and mainstream constructivists, with
the former being the standard-bearers of “the friendly fire”. As this article aims to de-
velop a constructivist addition to the theoretical core of structural realism, I will ignore
the liberalists here and instead briefly review the main realist and constructivist Waltz-
critics in order to argue the case for a fundamental reformulation of structural realism.3
Broadly speaking, realists have sought to loosen Waltz’s tightly theorized systemic
model by introducing new systemic as well as unit level variables such as state inten-
tions (Walt, 1987), state perceptions (Wohlforth, 1993), systemic interaction capacity
(Buzan et al., 1993), geographical conditions (Mearsheimer, 2001), domestic constraints
(Schweller, 2006) and a republican ordering principle (Deudney, 2009). This intra-
realist debate has sparked off several new “realist schools”, among which especially the
“neo-classical” (Rose, 1998; Lobell et al., 2009) and “offensive” (Labs, 1997; Mearsheim-
er, 2001) realists have been vocal in their endeavors to supplement or revise the ex-
1 Waltz’s endeavor to formulate a scientific version of realism (Waltz, 1979) has been labeled both `neo-realism´ (Ashley, 1984) and `structural realism´ (Buzan et al., 1993). I prefer the latter term, as this article concerns itself with the structural elements of realism. For a recent interpretation of Waltz’s scientific aspirations see Ole Wæver (2009). 2 To be fair, Waltz only intends to explain the overall behavioral patterns (Waltz, 1996: 54-57). Still, Waltz is not even very successful in this respect, as convincingly demonstrated, among others, by William Wohl-forth and his colleagues (Wohlforth, 2007; see also Kaufman et al., 2007). Their comparative historical study of different multistate systems shows that the main explanatory hypothesis of structural realism – the balancing behavior of states – does not stand up to empirical scrutiny. For an early and less compre-hensive critique along the same lines see Paul Schroeder (1994). 3 Prominent liberalist critiques of Waltz include Keohane (1986),
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planatory logic of structural realism, while “defensive” realists (Glaser, 1995; Rendall,
2006) are more in tune with Waltz’s main tenets. Concurrently, there has been an ex-
tensive debate on the state of the realist paradigm – degenerate or progressive? – fol-
lowing the addition of new variables (auxiliary hypotheses) to structural realism
(Vasques & Elman, 2003).4 Perhaps the biggest challenge to Waltz’s version of structur-
al realism has come from the emergence and structural stability of American unipolarity,
in marked contrast to the expectations of Waltz himself (Waltz, 1993; see also Layne
1993). This development has generated not only a growing literature on unipolarity
(Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008; see World Politics 61, #1 for several contributions) but also
a thorough repudiation of the central behavioral hypothesis in Waltzian realism namely
that balancing strategies predominate in international politics (cf. above).5
Mainstream constructivists6 have also been wrestling with structural realism especially
in the nineties, where Alexander Wendt’s famous punch line “anarchy is what states
make of it” (Wendt, 1992: 391) triggered a wave of constructivism, which sought to
come to grips with the “logic of anarchy” and the prerogative of material power in in-
ternational relations. On the one hand, many constructivists were eager to explore the
“culture of national security”, that is, the normative, discursive, cultural and identity-
based unit level factors that shape the security behavior of states (see e.g. many of the
contributions in Katzenstein, ed, 1996; Hopf, 2002; Legro, 2005). On the other hand, and
more relevant for the present purposes, several constructivists analyzed the socializa-
tion of state security behavior at the systemic level, directly challenging the logic of
structural realism by introducing alternative explanatory variables. These include,
among others, the changing norms surrounding state sovereignty (Barkin & Cronin,
1994), the evolving moral purposes of different states systems (Reus-Smit, 1999) and
differing systemic cultures of anarchy (Wendt, 1999). Moreover, these constructivist
contributions were accompanied by a more general debate on the relationship between
mainstream constructivism and realism (rationalism) with some arguing for their fun-
damental incompatibility and others advocating some sort of theoretical division of la-
bor between more or less distinct modes of analysis (see Duffield et al. 1999; Farrell,
2002; Fearon & Wendt, 2002; Dessler & Owen, 2005). Still others, raised the possibility
of merging the two into a so-called realist-constructivist approach, for instance by incor-
porating key realist insights directly into a constructivist ontology (Barkin, 2003; see
also Sterling-Folker, 2002; and the forum in International Studies Review 6, #2, 2004).
4 Another important reaction to the dominance of structural realism within the realist paradigm has been the efforts to revive the “classical” generation of realists preceding Waltz (e.g. Deudney, 2009; Scheuer-man, 2010). 5 Whether balancing behavior towards the United States has indeed taken place in the post-Cold War era has in itself provoked a realist debate around the concept of “soft balancing” (e.g. Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005; Lieber & Alexander, 2005; Brooks & Wohlforth, 2005). 6 For a presentation and delineation of mainstream constructivism see next section. Unless directly speci-fied, the term constructivism is used here as a shorthand expression of mainstream constructivism.
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This article resumes the constructivist agenda of explicitly engaging structural realism
on its home turf, that is, systemic theorizing. Constructivist system-level theorizing
seemingly reached its climax with Alexander Wendt’s comprehensive critique of struc-
tural realism in Social Theory of International Politics (1999). With some partial excep-
tions,7 constructivists have subsequently put more efforts into debating the theoretical
universe of Wendt than into launching alternative systemic models that could vie with
or complement structural realism (see e.g. the forum in Review of International Studies,
26(1), 2000; Guzzini & Leander, 2006). Given that Wendt’s Social Theory far from ex-
hausts constructivism’s theory-building potential at the systemic level – one may even
argue that his constructivist theory met little enthusiasm among his fellow constructiv-
ists – this article seeks to redeem a theoretical project, which epitomized constructivism
during its heyday in the nineties. More specifically, I argue that the identity concept may
be theorized in a manner that provides a system-structural counterpart to Waltzian re-
alism and hence lays the foundation for integrating power and identity logics at the sys-
temic level in a novel way. Interestingly, identity already plays a central but largely un-
recognized and thus under-theorized role in many realist theories (e.g. Walt, 1987;
Schweller, 1994), making it all the more relevant to investigate the potential of explicitly
theorizing the linkage between power and identity.8
A new model for explaining state security behavior
My ambition in this article, however, is not only to demonstrate how power and identity
may be coupled theoretically in a simple, consistent and fruitful manner. It is also, more
importantly, to develop a theoretical model, which may explain the overall patterns of
state security behavior. To this end, power and identity are conceptualized as separate
systemic structures (the independent variables of the model), whose interplay gener-
ates specific main patterns of conflict (dependent variable) that fundamentally affects
the overall security behavior of states. As a condensed and formalized theoretical prop-
osition the basic argument in this article may be stated thus:
a systemic power structure (independent variable)
+ a systemic identity structure (independent variable)
= a structural variant of international society (aggregated independent variable)
⇨ a main pattern of conflict in the system (dependent variable)
⇨ overall state security behavior (theoretically inferred hypotheses)
Let me further specify the agenda and approach of this article. Firstly, the main focus is
on the identity concept; that is, on developing a identity-based structural logic, which
may complement structural realism. With respect to the power concept, the article
makes no independent contribution, as it relies on existing conceptualizations made by
structural realism. Secondly, the article does not intend to question or problematize the
7 Perhaps most notably David Rousseau (2006) and Ned Lebow (2008). 8 For a similar point see Rousseau (2006: 15; 17-38). There have been a few attempts to theorize the the-oretical nexus between power and identity (e.g. Buzan, 2004) – more on this below.
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traditional link between states and security politics. Rather, it deliberately adopts a con-
structivist version of state-centrism with the aim of devising a better theoretical model
for explaining the overall patterns of state security behavior. Thirdly, for lack of space
this is not the place to actually test the proposed model. Instead, the article is theoreti-
cally explorative and merely indicates empirically the explanatory merits of the model,
compared to existing realist (and constructivist) theories. Finally, this article is in-
formed by constructivism in the sense that the identity concept is regarded as a neces-
sary theoretical component in a state security context. In other words, it is claimed that
overall state security behavior is primarily driven by the construction of threats, which
are always a function of both power and identity. Yet, my approach may more accurate-
ly be described as realist-constructivism, partly because it unfolds a sort of quasi-
essentialist ontology centred on the state as the primary reference object for identity
dynamics, and partly because the reformulation of structural realism does not entail a
ritual rejection but rather a constructive revision of realism’s power-permeated concept
of structure.
Following this introduction, the article consists of three main sections. The first sets out
by briefly sketching the premises for developing a realist-constructivist theoretical
model. Subsequently, the bulk of the first section is dedicated to delineating the ontolog-
ical framework for the model, i.e. state-centric identity dynamics, and by advancing four
general hypotheses on state identity constitution the section seeks to flesh out an iden-
tity-based structural logic holding explanatory power over state security behavior. In
the next section, the theoretical model is presented in three stages. First, the section
focuses on the so-called “deep structure” of the international system with the aim of
identifying the deepest level of state-centric identity constitution, thereby creating a
theoretical counterpart to that of structural realism (anarchy, functional similarity).
Next, attention is directed at defining the independent variables of the model and in
particular at unfolding the explanatory logics of the identity-based variable, while rely-
ing on structural realism with respect to the power-based variable (polarity). Finally,
the section presents the dependent variable of the model, i.e. the ideal-typical systemic
patterns of conflict, in order to demonstrate how a given constellation of power and
identity structures produce a main pattern of conflict, which fundamentally affects state
security behavior. Based on this model, the third section generates a number of hypoth-
eses on state security behavior, which may be compared to those of structural realism.
For the sake of preliminary empirical illustration, these more or less competing hypoth-
eses are briefly being brought to bear on the overall patterns of state security behavior
in the post-Cold War era.
An identity-based structuralism Quasi-essentialism, state-centrism and realist-constructivism
Following other (especially American) mainstream constructivists, this article adopts a
rather pragmatic approach to meta-theoretical questions, toning down the distinction
between a positivist and reflectivist epistemology (Jepperson et al., 1996; Adler, 1997;
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Price & Reus-Smit, 1998; Hopf, 2001; Rousseau, 2006). In short, it means that main-
stream constructivists fully endorse the scientific aspiration of developing theoretical
frameworks for explaining some aspects or phenomena of international relations as
long as one recognizes the conditional and thus refutable status of all “positive” state-
ments (cf. Wendt, 1995: 75). Ontologically speaking, all constructivists study the inter-
subjective construction of meaning, but whereas “critical constructivists” typically ac-
centuate the inherent malleability, complexity and contingency of discursive represen-
tations (e.g. Kratochwil, 2000, Zehfuss, 2001; Fierke, 2007), mainstream constructivists
are more eager to identify the underlying constraints and bindings (innate, structural
and material) that tend to stabilize these discursive representations (e.g. Katzenstein,
1996: 4-5; Hall, 1999: ??; Rousseau, 2006: 8). Accordingly, many mainstream construc-
tivists subscribe to what may be labeled a quasi-essentialist ontology in the sense that
they heuristically objectify certain socially constituted phenomena and treat them as
relatively stable points of reference in order to study their causal or constitutive ef-
fects.9
Collective identities and especially large-scale ones such as state identities seem to lend
themselves to a quasi-essentialist approach in at least two respects. Firstly, as the par-
amount frame of reference for organizing political communities state identities have
become discursively stabilized to the point of reification, making state-centrism a natu-
ral starting point for most theoretical endeavors within IR. Secondly, it is argued that
the state is a referent object of ongoing irreducible identity dynamics that have im-
portant effects on its behavior. While the latter aspect is dealt with in the next two sub-
section, the rest of this subsection concentrates on the former.
As the first building block of the proposed theoretical model, this article espouses a
state-centric approach in line with structural realism. However, state-centrism assumes
a somewhat different form when wielded from a realist-constructivist perspective. On
the one hand, realists are right in emphasizing the anarchical order of the international
system as a fundamental driver of competitive self-help behavior, creating a deep-
seated particularistic element in international politics (cf. Aaron, 1966; Waltz, 1979). On
the other hand, constructivists are equally right in attributing this particularistic ele-
ment to the inherent group mentality of human beings, based on insights from experi-
mental Social Identity Theory (e.g. Mercer, 1995; Hymans, 2006). In other words, inter-
national anarchy and human group mentality seem to generate the same kind of partic-
ularistic incentives, underpinning a fragmented state-based organization of internation-
al politics. Moreover, while the prerogative, if not virtual monopoly, of states to exert
collective violence is another strong realist asset in warranting a state-centric approach,
constructivists would rather highlight the strong discursive and institutional underpin-
nings of state-centrism with the principle of state sovereignty being a case in point
9 The premises of a quasi-essentialist approach and the distinction between innate, structural and materi-al constraints on discursive representations are both further explored in Forsby 2012.
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(e.g. ). Adopting a realist-constructivist perspective, however, is not simply an exercise
in combining the best theoretical insights from either approach. Hence, instead of view-
ing states as basically “like units” homogenized by the socializing imperatives of anar-
chy, this article taps into the longstanding constructivist tradition of opening up the
state units and ascribing independent explanatory power to their identity dynamics. Put
differently, what is objectified in this theoretical context is merely the reference object of
the state as a discursively reified foundation for collective identity formation.10 In fact, it
is the variation in state identities that is of interest here. By treating state identity as a
significant variable, which at the systemic level produces different overall patterns of
inclusion/exclusion among states, one may take the first step towards developing a re-
alist-constructivist structuralist logic that incorporates both power and identity dynam-
ics at the system level.
In adopting a quasi-essentialist ontology, this article takes state-centrism as a necessary
theoretical starting point. Of course, with the overall aim being to develop a model for
explaining state security behavior, a state-centric approach is, in effect, smuggled on
board from the outset. Yet, by employing a realist-constructivist perspective, state-
centrism takes on a different hue. That is, the realist focus on interstate anarchy and
power dynamics is merged with the constructivist emphasis on human group mentality
and identity dynamics to generate a new structuralist logic of the international system.
State identity constitution
The next step in developing a realist-constructivist model is to establish the premises
for an identity-based structuralist logic as a counterpart to the power-based logic of
structural realism. In order to do this, I propound a four-staged argument about state
identity constitution. At each stage, the discussion is preceded by a main hypothesis on
state identity constitution, pertaining to its causal relevance, its constitutive dynamics,
its normative content and its policy-guiding role respectively. Let me begin, though, by
observing that the following discussion deliberately downplays the distinction between
state (national) and interstate (international) identity constitution, since it is largely
irrelevant in this theoretical context.11
The first main hypothesis states:
A collective identity, e.g. a state identity, may be regarded as a fundamental
driver of collective action owing to its causal autonomy (identity dynamics
can be separated from other drivers of collective action) irreducibility (iden-
tity dynamics are rooted in human nature) and universality (identity dynam-
ics are omnipresent across time and space).
10 For a critical discussion of this point see Walker (1993); Neumann (2002: 638-39); Cedermann & Daase (2006). 11 Accordingly, unless otherwise specified the following discussion of state identity constitution concerns both the unit and system level.
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The introduction of the identity concept into IR and the attempts by mainstream con-
structivists to render the concept fit for theorization have been predicated on different
bodies of sociological and psychological literature. Most convincingly perhaps, many
constructivists have drawn on the insights from experimental studies in Social Identity
Theory (SIT). Simply put, SIT is able to demonstrate how groups of people, even groups
constructed at random, invariably engage in social identity dynamics with each other
(by means of categorization, identification and comparisons), thereby creating in-group
loyalties and out-group demarcations.12 In other words, SIT shows us that all identity
formation processes are characterized by a basic tendency for “in-group favoritism” at
the expense of out-groups with respect to the ascription of motives, the evaluation of
qualities and the distribution of goods.13 Most fundamentally, the predisposition of hu-
man collectivities to engage in some sort of identity delimitation and to care about their
self-image seems to be rooted in human nature whether understood as cognitive psy-
chology or perhaps evolutionary biology (cf. Sterling-Folker, 2002). As such, social iden-
tities provide a basic driver for human collectivities creating discursive and behavioral
patterns/regularities, which may be categorized and generalized along several dimen-
sions (e.g. according to type, content or relative stability).14 By attempting to establish
the causal autonomy, irreducibility and universality of collective identities, I am at the
same time paving the way for developing a new structuralist logic based on state identi-
ty dynamics.15
The second main hypothesis states:
A state identity may be defined as an discursively framed understanding of
what it means to be a member of the respective state-based community, and
this understanding must rest on both positive (constitutive) and negative
(differentiating) identification markers.
In narrowing the focus from collective identities in general to state identities in particu-
lar the theoretical insights from the SIT-literature may be further developed in order to
build a state-centric identity logic. Hence, the second main hypothesis provides an ini-
tial definition of state identities that corresponds more or less to the way state identities
are defined in the mainstream constructivist literature (e.g. Cronin, 1999: 18-38; Wendt,
1999: 193-246; Hopf, 2002: 3-11). The constitution of state identities is, of course, a
complex process, and in this context I merely want to emphasize a few aspects. First of
all, it is important to underline that any state identity is predicated on a complementary
12 For an introduction to SIT see Brown (2000); Hogg (2006); for examples of how SIT is used in IR see e.g. Kowert (1998); Cronin (1999); Gries (2005); Hymans (2006); Shannon & Kowert (2012). 13 Based on more philosophically and historical-empirically informed arguments, several social scientists have demonstrated the universal need of human collectivities for identity and self-esteem. For a convinc-ing recent attempt, see Ned Lebow (2008: 14-19). 14 Attempts to categorize and generalize social identities include Brewer & Gardner (1996), Wendt (1999), Chandra & Laitin (2002) and Abdelal et al. (2005). 15 Similar, more or less explicit, attempts to treat identity as an independent causal variable include many of the contributions in Katzenstein (ed., 1996) and Adler & Barnett (eds.,1998); Hall (1999); Wendt (1999); see also Mattern (2000) for a discussion and Hansen (2006: 25-28) for a critique.
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set of constitutive principles that may be termed “positive” and “negative” identification
markers. On the one hand, state identities are constructed “positively” on the basis of
materially rooted generic elements – for instance, geography, ethnicity, language, reli-
gion, beliefs, ideology, history, institutions and values – which are discursively framed
as constituting the cornerstones of the state community, uniting its citizens across time
and space (Smith, 1991: 4-8). But at the same time, the relative importance and thus
discursive salience of such generic elements depend on the extent to which they can be
“negatively” differentiated from “significant others”, whether these are intra-state
groupings or – more relevant in this context – other states that function as focal points
of reference (Abdelal et al. 2006; 698-99). Moreover, when it comes to state identity
differentiation, it is worth repeating the commonsensical observation that it covers a
wide spectrum, ranging from insignificant differences (merely being different sovereign
states) to radicalized differences (being cast in existential terms of arch enemies)
(Eriksen, 1993: 157-58). This leads me to a final point of relevance for my theoretical
model. The identification of radical differences is a crucial discursive identity practice of
state communities because of its indirect effect of effacing other less significant dividing
lines, not only domestically but also internationally among groups of states that have a
shared perception of radicalized differences (or more simply: threats).
The third main hypothesis states:
The discursive framing of state identities may be characterized as a relatively
hierarchical, inert and therefore stable process in the sense that the positive/
negative identification of the state tend to be centered around a single or a
few grand narratives that defines the “essence” of the state community.
The view that state identity constitution displays discursive stability rather than flux is
prevalent among mainstream constructivists (e.g. Jepperson et al., 1996: 60-61; Gries,
2004: 46-47), while the notion of a discursive hierarchy is also found in several variants
in the constructivist literature (Reus-Smit 1999: 29-30; [Wæver, 2002: 30; Buzan 2004a:
25-27]). One may capture these aspects of state identity constitution by introducing the
concept of “grand narrative”, which delineates the character of the state community at
the deepest level of abstraction. Ideal-typical examples include liberalism, communism,
fascism, absolute monarchism, exceptionalism and religious fundamentalism although
in the real world of politics grand narratives of state identity are rarely this clear-cut.
Still, the argument here is that for most states their grand narratives are sufficiently
distinct to not only constitute a range of broad guidelines for legitimate political action
but also to function as a sort of navigation compass for the state (the latter point is fur-
ther developed below). As legitimacy is an important precondition for regime stability
in most states, overall policies tend to be identity-guided in this broad sense. Further-
more it is argued that even though a grand narrative, in line with the basic precepts of
constructivism, should be regarded as a contestable hegemonic discursive position, sig-
nificant reformulations rarely happens overnight or in the absence of a status quo-
disrupting crisis. In other words, given that a grand narrative is based on discursively
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sedimented interpretations of salient identification markers, it may be regarded as a
variable that lends itself to theorization, since it does not vary too much.
Identity-based security policies
Whereas the argument so far has sketched a general identity-based framework for ex-
plaining legitimate political action, the fourth main hypothesis narrows the scope to
state security policies:
Any state is guided by its basic self-understanding – its hegemonic grand nar-
rative of state identity – when it interacts with other states, organizes its for-
eign relations in patterns of inclusion/exclusion, identifies threats and formu-
lates its security policies.
The idea that state identity guides (or influences, affects, conditions, shapes16) foreign
policy is probably one of the most well-established assumptions in the constructivist
literature (Wendt, 1992: 403-07; Barnett, 1996: 400-13; Hopf, 1998: 186-87; Cronin,
1999: 8-13). This assumption comes in a “soft” and “strong” variant. While state identity
according to the soft variant functions as a navigation compass that enables the state to
differentiate between friends, rivals and foes (e.g. Rousseau, 2006: 4)– the strong vari-
ant treats state identity as a construction manual, conditioning the security interests of
the state in a more fundamental way (e.g. Risse-Kappen, 1996: 365-71). More specifical-
ly, if state identity is seen as a navigation compass, one would merely expect, for in-
stance, a liberal-democratic state to establish friendly, cooperative relations with like-
minded states and to be more skeptical, even hostile, towards states informed by dis-
parate grand narratives. If state identity is viewed as a construction manual, one would
furthermore infer that liberal-democratic states are likely to build comprehensive secu-
rity communities with one another, to base their interaction on multilateral institution,
to be sensitive to losses and take human rights considerations in armed conflict, to ac-
tively promote their liberal values etc. Accordingly, state identity constitutes a specific
manual for constructing the security interests of the state. In the light of this distinction,
I only subscribe to the soft variant in developing the identity-based structural logic, not
only because it builds more directly on the theoretical insights from SIT but also be-
cause it more easily facilitates the formulation of a generalizable logic.
The argument so far may be summarized this way: In order to theorize the security be-
havior of states from a realist-constructivist perspective, one needs to adopt a state-
centric approach that treats the state as a discursively reified reference object for causal
identity dynamics with a substantial effect on state security behavior. Any state identity
must be based on both positive and negative identification markers, which – at the
deepest level of abstraction – are discursively framed in the sedimented form of a heg-
emonic grand narrative that provides the overall guidelines for legitimate policies. Fur-
16 All these terms, of which I prefer ”guide”, are indicative of a conditional causal argument, since state security behavior is co-determined by several causal variables (more on this below).
10
thermore, the grand identity narrative of a state may be treated as a navigation compass,
guiding its overall interaction with other states, organizing its foreign relations in dif-
ferentiating patterns of inclusion/exclusion, shaping its construction of threats and thus
conditioning its security behavior. This line of reasoning constitutes the foundation of
an identity-based structural logic that is developed more fully at the system level in the
next main section.
What are the most obvious limitations so far to this identity-based structural logic?
Firstly, the effect of state identity on state security behavior is generally stronger, the
more basic the matters of security are for the state in question. While the very identity
of a state community is necessarily at stake when it designates another state (or non-
state actor) as an existential threat, most security issues are not so fundamental as to
involve identity dynamics. Such issues are rather handled according to more specific (i.e.
bureaucratic, local, lobby-based or idiosyncratic) interests of the state (Wæver, 2002:
27-28). In that sense, the argument bear on state behavior at the same overall level of
abstraction as is the case in structural realism – e.g. whether states display balancing
behavior, cf. third main section. Secondly, one may argue that identity dynamics are on-
ly or at least mostly relevant for liberal-democratic states that have to justify even their
security policies for domestic (and international) audiences. Thus, authoritarian re-
gimes tend to be more instrumental in framing the state’s self-understanding, in some
cases viewing identity related questions as nothing but windows dressing. However,
such objections are not very pertinent as long as one limits oneself to a soft version of
identity structuralism at the system level – where identity at the system level is regard-
ed as a tool of mutual differentiation to organize inter-state relations in patterns of in-
clusion/exclusion – since no (authoritarian) state may position itself internationally at
its own choosing.17 Finally and most importantly, overall state security behavior is, of
course, affected by other factors than identity dynamics. The next main section argues
that power and identity dynamics are the most important factors to include when it
comes to state security behavior.
A new realist-constructivist model at the system level The missing link to structural realism
While the theoretical argument so far has implicitly pertained to the unit level, the basic
insights can easily be transferred to the system level, which is what this main section
intends to do. The discussion still concentrates on the identity-dimension of the pro-
posed model since this is where I hope to make an independent contribution. As stated
in the introduction, systemic approaches to state security behavior are dominated by the
power-permeated concept of structure associated with Waltzian realism. Few main-
stream constructivists question the centrality of power dynamics in international poli-
17 In addition, even if an authoritarian regime has a freer hand in questions of identity, it is bound to be chronically unstable if it completely disregards its traditional identification markers.
11
tics, but they want either to supplement power with other explanatory variables or to
embed power in its socially constituted settings. This section sets out along the first
route by introducing a new, socially constituted, structural variable at the system level
that may function as a theoretical counterpart to the structural concept of Waltzian real-
ism. However, rather than treating power and identity as competing variables, my real-
ist-constructivist model seeks to establish them as complementary variables that to-
gether produces a new structuralist logic of the international system (cf. Barkin, 2003:
337-38).
Deep structure: International political and societal structures
Let me start by saying that given my ambition to be able to explain the overall patterns
of security behavior among states, it would seem reductionist not to employ a systemic
perspective. That is, a perspective that views the international system as a connected
whole of interacting states, generating certain relational dynamics, which cannot be re-
duced to the states themselves (i.e. their own logics), and which, therefore, should ra-
ther be analyzed as a structural component on the system level (cf. Waltz 1979: 18-37;
Bull, 1977: 9-10). More specifically, this section takes as its starting point Waltz’ three-
stringed concept of structure, which he formulated in Theory of International Politics
(1979). The basic idea is that the structure (of international politics) conceptualizes
how the units (the states) stand in relation (are positioned) to one another in the sys-
tem. I furthermore adopt the useful conceptual modifications suggested by John Ruggie
and Barry Buzan, who introduce a distinction between two layers of “deep structure”
(Ruggie, 1983: 266) and a third layer of “distributional structure” (Buzan et al., 1993:
51-54). Although the 3rd layer of structure is accorded a central role in developing a new
structural logic, my initial focus is on the deep structural layers in order to show how
power and identity may be regarded as complementary structural forces in an ontologi-
cal sense.
Waltz conceptualizes the two deepest levels of structure according to the “ordering
principle” (anarchy/hierarchy, 1st layer) and the “functional differentiation of units”
(similarity/differentiation, 2nd layer), which taken together constitutes the political or-
ganization of units in the international system (Waltz, 1979: 100-01).18 The generic log-
ic of the deep structures is described by Waltz this way: International politics is epito-
mized by an anarchical structure that creates strong incentives for security-seeking
states to adopt self-help behavior and thus to maintain their functional independence,
thereby causing states to be primarily concerned with their relative position of power
(ibid.: 102-16). While this description certainly captures important structural incentives
that confront the states, I argue that the concept of deep structure should be expanded
to include not only its political organization but also its social constitution in order to
provide a better foundation for explaining state security behavior. What is needed, then,
is a correspondingly systemic and positional conceptualization of the social constitution
18 Indeed, chapter 5 in Theory of International Politics is simply entitled “Political structures” (ibid.: 79).
12
of the state-units. One may think of many ways to theorize the social dimension of the
international system – e.g. on the basis of norms, values, discourses, practices and insti-
tutions – but I prefer to focus on identity-based dynamics, not least because of the sug-
gested causal relation between identity and security. The social dimension of deep
structure may also be arranged into two layers:
1st layer of deep structure: the social constitution of units
(main variable: identity/difference)
2nd layer of deep structure: the organizational differentiation of units
(main variable: union/sovereignty)19
Let me briefly suggest a generic logic for the social dimension of the international sys-
tem’s deep structure: As an ontological starting point any system must encompass units
that are so relatively distinct that they can be differentiated from one another. Yet, any
system also presupposes a basic element of identity between its units in order for them
to recognize each other as co-units, with whom interaction may take place. When it
comes to the international system, states are – at the most fundamental level of social
constitution – differentiated from each other on the basis of sovereignty, which in itself,
as a principle and institution, is predicated on the ongoing confirmatory state practice of
recognizing each other as (a community of) sovereign states with certain duties and
rights. Hence, the generic logic of social constitution in the states system is to some ex-
tent a dialectical one, inducing the states to engage in a simultaneous process of interna-
tional differentiation and identification. However, at the level of deep structure, the so-
cial logic ultimately encourages states to worry about differentiation, lest they lose their
status (identity) as sovereign units in the system.20
To what extent is the suggested broadening of the concept of deep structure warranted?
To begin with, the introduction of the social constitution of states as an additional di-
mension of deep structure may be argued to represent a limited and consistent broad-
ening of a notoriously parsimonious concept of structure, which most scholars find too
circumscribed for the study of state security behavior (see introduction). Moreover, the
structural addition is fully compatible with the existing framework. The two dimensions
of deep structure are formulated in a parallel manner, since they represent two differ-
ent – albeit partly overlapping – structural perspectives on the same international sys-
tem of states. Consequently, the default structural logic of the system generates a paral-
lel pattern of co-variation in the main variables (anarchy/difference => functional simi-
19 To be sure, this main variable may also be argued to capture important aspects of the political organiza-tion of the system. However – apart from the simple fact that it was not included as part of Waltzian real-ism’s concept of structure – the distinction between sovereignty/union may easily well be viewed as per-taining to identity related questions of the societal constitution of states (see also Barkin & Cronin, 1994; Reus-Smit, 1999; Buzan et al., 1993). 20 This overall structural incentive may in some cases induce states to strategically pool their sovereignty in a unionized form to ensure a stronger international identity. Throughout history, though, state sover-eignty has much more commonly been lost as a result of imperial conquest by great powers.
13
larity/sovereignty). But consistency and complementarity does not in itself warrant
loosening the parsimony of structural realism. Most importantly, by abandoning struc-
tural realism’s isomorphic approach to the state unit in order to incorporate the identi-
ties of states and thus their social constitution as a community, I lay the foundation for
revising the structural logic of the international system. This may not be entirely clear at
the level of deep structure, but once the third layer of structure is introduced, the distri-
butional character of international identity constitution becomes a useful entry point
for my theoretical agenda.
Distributional structure: International constellations of identity
Moving down to the third level of the international system’s structure, the central ques-
tion is how to translate the social dimension of deep structure into a distributional
component of structure that may play a role similar to that of polarity in Waltzian real-
ism. To provide an answer, let me first return to my understanding of state identity as a
navigation compass guiding the state’s overall interaction with other states and organiz-
ing its foreign relations in differentiating patterns of inclusion/exclusion, based on its
hegemonic grand narrative. Following the generic logic of deep social structures de-
scribed above, states are primarily concerned with differentiating themselves; yet sov-
ereignty, or nationalism for that matter, far from exhausts the range of salient differen-
tiation/identification markers, around which states build their grand narratives. Rather,
most states are at the same time deeply engaged in a far broader and more substantive
process of international differentiation, defining the status and legitimacy of interna-
tional society’s member states.21 Accordingly, one may view the grand identity narrative
of a given state as a necessary, albeit not sufficient,22 source of the state’s navigation and
thus positioning in international society in the sense that the state tends to employ in-
clusive practices of cooperation with like-minded states and resort to exclusionary
practices of differentiation vis-à-vis states, whose identity rests on disparate grand nar-
ratives.
This aspect of state identity constitution – the generation of discursively structured pat-
terns of international inclusion/exclusion – seems like an good starting point for devis-
ing a distributional component of social structure (see also Goddard & Nexon, 2005: 45-
46). More specifically, I propose the following conceptualization:
The third layer of structure, pertaining to the social constitution of the inter-
national system, is defined here by the relative distribution of mutually irrec-
oncilable systemic identities among the state units, where a systemic identi-
ty is defined as a state (or more commonly a community of states) having a
universalistic identity narrative, and where irreconcilability is defined in
terms of incompatible grand narratives.
21 This process has been intensively explored by constructivists, see e.g.… 22 I claim here that a state’s positioning in international society is primarily based on identity dynamics, but other factors are also relevant (see below).
14
The different systemic distributions are called identity constellations, and one may dis-
tinguish between three ideal-types of constellations according to the number of system-
ic identities: hegemony, dichotomy and polyphony (respectively characterized by one,
two and several systemic identities). Indeed, the structural logics of these constellations
are claimed to be sufficiently distinct to warrant treating it as a structural shift whenev-
er the system changes from one type of constellation to another (see also Buzan et al.,
1993: 63-64). To be more specific, the three most obvious examples of systemic identi-
ties in the 20th century are liberal democracy, communism and fascism, and the century
may in part be viewed as a discursive struggle between these systemic identities, chang-
ing the structural constellation of the system from polyphony (until 1945) to dichotomy
(until 1989) and to hegemony (see next main section). Within the confines of a shared
systemic identity states may face serious and prolonged political discord (like in the
1960s between the United States and France and between the Soviet Union and China).
However, only when states with universalistic aspiring self-understandings are framing
each other as mutually irreconcilable in existential terms, does it make sense in this
theoretical context to categorize them as separate systemic identities.
Having conceptualized all three layers of the international system’s social structure, let
me briefly suggest a few modifications on the third level of political structure, which I
prefer to call the power constellation of the system. Most importantly, unlike Waltz I re-
gard unipolarity as a stable structural variant, thereby theoretically juxtaposing unipo-
larity to bipolarity and multipolarity (see Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008: 12-13). Moreover,
a systemic power is introduced as a term for any great power, which constitutes a pole –
with respect to power capabilities – not only in a regional but in a global sense (see
Buzan, 2004a: 40-45). Hence, whether a separate systemic identity is promoted by a
secondary power (like the Taleban-regime of Afghanistan), a regional great power (like
China after the Sino-Soviet split) or a fully fledged systemic power, matters greatly to
the structural configuration of the system (see next section). An overview of the pro-
posed structural reconceptualization of the international system is presented by figure
1.
[insert figure 1]
Systemic patterns of conflict
With the formulation of an identity-based structural counterpart to Waltzian realism I
am now in a position to advance a realist-constructivist model on state security behav-
ior. The model is based on what I consider to be the two main independent variables for
explaining the overall patterns of state security behavior, i.e. constellations of systemic
power and identity at the third level of structure. Other potential explanatory factors at
the system level include the economic organization of state relations or the relative mil-
itary-technological interaction capacity of states (e.g. Deudney, ; Buzan et al., 1993; ).
While such systemic factors certainly have an impact, I maintain that power and identity
15
are the key drivers when it comes to the overall security behavior of states. Further-
more, as variation is only likely to occur on the third level of structure, the independent
variables should be derived from this level insofar as one wants to be able to explain
basic change in the patterns of state security behavior. Either of the two main inde-
pendent variables covers three structural variants. By combining them one obtains a
nine-fold typology where each field represents an aggregated, “fused value” of the inde-
pendent variable, which I refer to as structural variants of international society. Being
based only on the power and identity constellation of the system, this somewhat narrow
conceptualization of international society differs from the more traditional approaches
associated with the English School of IR (e.g. Bull, 1977; Wight, 1977; see also Buzan,
2004b: 6-26).
One thing is to claim – from a realist-constructivist perspective – that both power and
identity are crucial explanatory factors; another is to combine them into a truly com-
plementary theoretical model. I attempt to do this by virtue of three theoretical assump-
tions, connecting power and identity to international society and linking the structural
variants of international society to the concept of main pattern of conflict in the system.
The latter constitutes the dependent variable of my model, from which the specific hy-
potheses on state security behavior are generated in the next main section.
1. The relative distribution of power and identity in the international system pro-
vides the foundation for different structural variants of international society.
That is, the system is organized into concentrically arranged relations around
one or several mutually differentiated centers of international society, with a cen-
ter being defined as a systemic power that constitutes a distinct systemic identity.
The societal structure of the international system may be described as mono-,
duo- or multicentric according to the number of centers.23
2. The relative distribution of power and identity in one or several structural clus-
ters of international society determines what is referred to as the main pattern of
conflict in the system, a rough expression of the line of gravity of international
conflict. The main pattern of conflict tends to crystallize between distinct centers
of international society unless the system is monocentric.
3. The intensity of international identity dynamics depends on the type of identity
constellation in the system (hegemony, dichotomy or polyphony), which, there-
fore, also determines the clarity of the main pattern of conflict, compared to oth-
er lines of conflict. That is, the relative clarity of the main pattern depends on
whether there is one, two or several competing systemic identities (see below).
[insert figure 2]
23 The current international system may thus be regarded as monocentric (US unipolarity + liberal-democratic hegemony) as long as rising powers do not constitute a rivaling systemic identity.
16
Figure 2 present an overview of the nine structural variants of international society,
linking systemic power and identity together in different ways based on the three theo-
retical assumptions. Let me finally specify the dependent variable of the model – the
main pattern of conflict – and its potential variation. The dependent variable alternates
according to the two separate dimensions introduced above: the gravity and clarity of
the main pattern of conflict. As to gravity, the dependent variable may take three differ-
ent values, defining the main pattern of conflict as:
concentric, if it involves, on the one side, a systemic power (or several adhering
to the same systemic identity) and, on the other side, a regional power or sec-
ondary state (or even a potent state-aspiring actor).
intercentric, if it involves two or several systemic powers, which belong to dis-
parate centers of international society.
With regard to clarity, the main pattern of conflict may be defined as:
diffuse, if it is located within a hegemonic constellation of identity. That is, the
system has, in effect, no systemic main pattern of conflict but is rather character-
ized by diverse, unrelated regional and intra-state lines of conflicts.
distinct, if it is located within a dichotomous constellation of identity. That is, the
system is characterized by a single overriding line of conflict, which dominates
most other patterns of conflict throughout the system.
versatile, if it is located within a polyphonic constellation of identity. That is, the
system potentially has several (alternating) main lines of conflict depending on
the number of centers of international society and their relative mutual irrecon-
cilability.
The hypothesized causal relation between independent and dependent variables of the
proposed model, i.e. the nine structural variants of international society and their re-
spective main patterns of conflict, is illustrated by figure 2. For instance, the model pos-
its that an international system with a hegemonic constellation of identity and a multi-
polar constellation of power will result in a concentric and diffuse main pattern of con-
flict. What this entails in terms of state security behavior, and how, more generally, the
dependent variable is translated into testable hypotheses on state security behavior is
the concern of the final main section.
Explaining state security behavior Generating hypotheses from the main pattern of conflict
In order to take the final step towards presenting a new model for explaining state secu-
rity behavior I need first to define what is meant by “security behavior” and then to
translate the dependent variable of the model into testable hypotheses. Security behav-
ior is defined here as the military and diplomatic measures taken by states as part of their
actual or potential conflicts with other states. This rather narrow definition of security
17
mirrors the focus of most realist studies of security in IR for the sake of being able to
directly compare the relative explanatory power of my realist-constructivist model with
that of structural realism. However, since there is a wide range of military and diplomat-
ic measures that states may adopt, I need to further clarify the scope of the hypotheses
by introducing a couple of analytical distinctions, which generate four different catego-
ries of state security behavior:
Conflict-anticipating military and diplomatic measures of state security behavior:
1) The type of external balancing (i.e. the overall pattern of strategic alignment in
the system)
2) The intensity of internal balancing (i.e. the relative level of internal arms build-
up and deployment of weapons)
Armed military measures of state security behavior:
3) The type of armed conflict (i.e. specification of the main pattern of armed conflict)
4) The intensity of armed conflict (i.e. specification of the level of military mobiliza-
tion among involved states)
Figure 3 provides an overview of the four suggested categories of hypotheses on state
security behavior according to the two main dimensions (gravity and clarity) of the
main pattern of conflict. Lack of space does not allow me to discuss the specific transla-
tion of the main pattern of conflict into behavioral hypotheses. Yet, let me specify that
since these hypotheses are derived from structural incentives/logics that operate at the
system level, it seems reasonable to assume that the more powerful a state is, the more
likely it is to observe the overall structure of identity and power and thus to behave in
accordance with the hypotheses. Still, it is claimed that all states are at least indirectly
constrained by the structural premises of the system.
[insert figure 3]
Although a proper empirical test of my realist-constructivist model (subsequently ab-
breviated RCM) is beyond the scope of this article, it may suffice here to indicate its ex-
planatory merit. To this end, I need to identify a historical period, where structural real-
ism and the RCM produces diverging hypotheses on state security behavior. Below, fig-
ure 4 provides an overview of how recent history may be arranged graphically accord-
ing to the main independent variables of the model. While the stated shifts in the sys-
temic power constellation reflect well-established interpretations of history in the real-
ist literature, the suggested shifts in the identity variable is based on my own reading of
history. Now, the main challenge in devising a comparative test is the limited number of
usable historical periods. Firstly, the applicability of the model can hardly be extended
further back than to the French Revolution. From the inception of the modern Westpha-
lian states system in 1648, which heralded the rise of functionally similar, sovereign
states, it took almost another 150 years before the French Revolution undermined the
European kings’ claim to absolute state power, in the process empowering the people
18
and hence “opening” the state more fundamentally to collective identity dynamics. Sec-
ondly, in the theoretical terminology of the model, the main part of recent history has
taken place within multipolar/polyphonic and bipolar/dichotomous structural constel-
lations (1853-1989), which are unfit for comparative analysis, since they do not gener-
ate competing hypotheses. That leaves me with four potential historical periods
(marked by an * in figure 4), of which the most recent, the unipolar post-Cold War-era
from 1989 onwards, seems to be well suited for an initial evaluation.
Rivaling hypotheses on security behavior after the Cold War
My preliminary comparison of structural realism and the RCM is limited to what is
probably the most intensively debated of the four categories of state security behavior
in the IR literature: external, alliance-strategic balancing (category 1 in figure 3). Here, I
merely present and tentatively evaluate the competing hypotheses by virtue of the ex-
isting secondary literature. According to its basic Waltzian tenets, structural realism
posits that security-seeking states in general adopt balancing behavior against other
states that currently or potentially hold a dominating position of power in the system
(Waltz, 1979: 118-28). By definition, a unipolar system is out of balance, and this is why
most states would feel (structurally) impelled to check the power of the unipole by
means of internal and external balancing (Layne, 1993; Waltz, 1993). Yet, most struc-
tural realists concede that the post-Cold War era has not in any meaningful way been
characterized by traditional hard balancing behavior against the United States.24
As mentioned in the introduction, structural realists have responded in different ways
to the refuting evidence against what used to be the main behavioral hypothesis of
structural realism. Some of the most prominent responses have been the reconceptual-
ization of unipolarity as a regular structural variable that does not generate structural
incentives to balance the unipole (Ikenberry et al., 2009; Wohlforth, 2009) and the in-
corporation of auxiliary assumptions that supplement the core structural logic. These
include, among others, geostrategic factors such as the hemispheric isolation of the
United States (e.g. Mearsheimer, 2001), intersubjective factors such as threat percep-
tions (e.g. Walt, 2009) and intervening variables at the unit level (e.g. Schweller, 2006;
Lobell et al., 2009). The main issue here is not so much whether these attempts to revise
Waltzian realism should be regarded as ad hoc adjustments, which may even violate the
ontological core of structural realism (cf. Elman & Elman, 2003: 21-70; see also Legro &
Moravscik, 1999: 54; Wæver, 2009). Rather, I merely want to suggest the potential in
undertaking a more comprehensive reformulation of structural realism along the lines
of the RCM-model in order to arrive at an entirely new structural logic, from which to
infer alternative hypotheses on state security behavior.
24 Some structural realists have claimed – at the height of the global war on terror – that the United States was instead the object of so-called “soft balancing” due primarily to the increasingly unilateralist policies of the George W. Bush-administration (e.g. Art, 2005; Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005). For a powerful dismissive reply from leading structural realists see (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2005; Lieber & Alexander, 2005; see also Brooks & Wohlforth, 2008).
19
What expectations about state security behavior in the post-Cold War era can be de-
rived from the RCM-model? Unlike structural realism, the RCM operates with a struc-
tural shift in the post-Cold War era: a shift in the identity variable provoked by the ter-
rorist attacks on 9/11, 2001, where the liberal democratic hegemony was temporarily
challenged by a revisionist systemic identity in the form of Islamist fundamentalism. In
the terminology of the RCM (figure 4), the entire post-Cold War era has been character-
ized by a concentric pattern of conflict in the system, which was diffuse until 2001 and
distinct during most of the Bush-administration before gradually reverting to a more
diffuse state. According to figure 3, a concentric pattern of conflict leads to flocking alli-
ance-strategic behavior around the systemic power given its overwhelming power and
its central position as standard bearer of a systemic (universalistic) identity. Moreover,
regional powers and secondary states are located in concentric circles of strategic
alignment based on their relative identification with/differentiation from the systemic
power. When looking at the actual security behavior of states in the post-Cold War era,
it seems indeed to have taken such a concentric form: Liberal-democratic countries,
headed by the United States, have constituted the core of a NATO-based security archi-
tecture, where regional powers such as Brazil, Russia, India and China have assumed a
more distantly associated role, while a few secondary states (like Iran, North Korea and
Iraq before 2003) have been relegated to the outskirts of international society (cf. Joffe,
2009).
Furthermore, the RCM posits that a diffuse pattern of conflict in the system, due to the
absence of a competing systemic identity, will lead to limited strategic alliance-building
against the systemic power and therefore an atmosphere of détente at the system lev-
el.25 This comes close to describing overall state security behavior prior to 9/11, not
only because the period was marked by an almost unprecedented level of coordination
among the major powers, but also because the most openly revisionist secondary states
(like Ex-Yugoslavian Serbia) represented local rather than systemic challengers (cf.
Walt, 2000). Conversely, the RCM assumes that a distinct pattern of conflict, due to the
presence of a competing systemic identity, will give rise to an alliance-strategic pattern
of containment, which (in a concentric system) takes an asymmetric form against the
secondary state orchestrated by the systemic power. International security behavior in
the aftermath of 9/11 represents an extreme example of this type of case, as the non-
state al-Qaeda terrorists temporarily – owing not least to its shocking ability to project
destructive power – appeared to be a systemic contender, provoking the United States
to launch a large-scale campaign of anti-terror containment.26 However, the extreme
asymmetry of the War on Terror has gradually undermined its potential as a distinct
line of conflict in the system, instead engendering a return to a diffuse pattern of threat
where counter-terrorism is no longer an overriding international priority.
25 Interestingly, since no state in the system is able to balance the unipole on its own, the absence of ex-ternal balancing is in itself an apt indicator of a diffuse pattern of conflict. 26 Especially during the early phase of the War on Terror the U.S. containment strategy was very intense, involving a rapidly rising military budget and the initiation of two wars (cf. Buzan, 2006).
20
Conclusion The purpose of this brief analysis of overall state security behavior in the post-Cold War
era has merely been to indicate the explanatory potential of my realist-constructivist
model compared to structural realism. The explanatory power of any theoretical model,
of course, hinges on both its empirical and logical plausibility, and the bulk of this article
has concentrated on establishing the latter. While it is patently necessary to subject the
model to far more systematic and rigorous testing – especially in the four periods that
produces competing hypotheses compared to structural realism – the logical plausibil-
ity of the model also requires much more elaboration than what has been possible in
this article. Hence, the introduced core assumptions, variables and hypotheses all need
to be further specified (Forsby, u.p.).
Based on what has been termed a quasi-essentialist ontology, this article has attempted
to formulate a realist-constructivist model on state security behavior. The key objective
has been not only to develop an identity-based conceptual counterpart to structural
realism but also to combine power and identity at the system level in a consistent and
complementary manner in order to create a new structuralist logic that affects overall
state security behavior. Over several stages, the article has advanced a number of theo-
retical arguments and assumptions to establish the quasi-essentialist framework of the
model. Firstly, I have espoused state-centrism as a necessary starting point in a security
context; yet from a realist-constructivist perspective the state is merely objectified as a
discursively reified frame of reference for collective identity dynamics, which are essen-
tial in generating state interests. Secondly, I have propounded a four-stringed argument
on state identity constitution to set up the premises for an identity-based structural log-
ic. The argument has evolved by first attempting to establish identity as a causal varia-
ble, then defining the key features of state identity formation, subsequently highlighting
the behavioral effects of the grand narratives of states and finally outlining a “soft” iden-
tity structuralism, which views state identity as a navigation compass. That is, state
identity is seen as guiding the state’s interaction with other states, organizing its foreign
relations in differentiating patterns of inclusion/exclusion, shaping its construction of
threats and thus conditioning its security behavior. Thirdly, I have presented a new
three-layered, identity-centered conceptualization of international social structure with
a distributional component at the third level in order to lay the foundation for combin-
ing power and identity and hereby provide a new structuralist logic for the internation-
al system. The result is a realist-constructivist model, linking the independent variables
of power and identity together into different structural variants of international society,
each of which generates a main pattern of conflict in the system, i.e. the dependent vari-
able of the model. And fourthly, I have inferred a number of testable hypotheses on state
security behavior from the model’s dependent variable and, more specifically, focused
on the patterns of external balancing among states in the post-Cold War era to indicate
the explanatory potential of my model compared to structural realism.
21
Let me finally suggest how my realist-constructivist model may also be applied to the
study of the much-touted rise of China. Notwithstanding some indications of a more
self-assertive behavior since 2009,27 China is still basically sticking to its status quo-
oriented course of “peaceful development”, distancing itself from certain elements of
the Liberal Order but not directly challenging it nor its primary standard bearer, the
United States (e.g. Jisi, 2011; Kissinger, 2012). As long as China chooses to continue
along this path, the current “monocentric order” (see figure 2) – and its diffuse and con-
centric conflict pattern – will persist with China in a more or less associated position,
regardless of whether China is merely a regional power or becomes a fully fledged sys-
temic power.28 In other words, Beijing and Washington are not bound to clash simply
because of the cyclical rise and fall of great powers, as many realists assume (e.g.
Mearsheimer, 2006; Kaplan, 2010). However, as several scholars have argued, China is
currently in the process of forging a new grand narrative of identity as the decades-long
hegemony of Communist ideology has been gradually undermined. Taking stock of the
alternative discursive currents of Chinese self-understanding, which includes a Confu-
cian informed collectivism, a civilizational Middle Kingdom mentality, a Tianxia-
inspired political authoritarianism and a Han-based ethnocentrism, there seems to be
ample justification for framing a non-Western grand identity narrative (e.g. Jacques,
2009; Qin, 2010; Zhang, 2011; Forsby, 2011). If indeed China’s rulers should come to
portray Chinese self-understanding in a more particularistic manner – thereby paving
the way for a dichotomous identity constellation – then a new structure of international
society would ensue with a more distinct pattern of conflict between China and the
United States. To be sure, the rise in China’s power may in itself render China more in-
clined to frame an alternative systemic identity, but in the end this is a matter of politi-
cal choice. In this sense, Chinese policy-makers have an important role in determining
the future patterns of conflict in the international system.
27 For an overview of these tendencies see, for instance, Christensen (2011). 28 If China becomes a systemic power, the structure of the system would shift from “classical” to “bipartite monocentrism”, causing no change in the main pattern of conflict (see figure 2).
22
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