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Pork Barrel Spending. On the Wane?Author(s): Gary J. AndresSource: PS: Political Science and Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 207-211Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/420347 .

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Pork Barrel Spending--On the Wane?*

Pork Barrel Spending-On the Wane?*

Gary J. Andres, Dutko and Associates. Inc.

Is pork barrelI spending on the wane? Many think it is, including reformers inside and outside of Congress. Citing the recent decline of earmarks in House appropriations bills for projects in members' districts, reformers suggest that a new era of congressional spending practices is dawning.

This article argues instead that the rise in number of earmarks in the last decade as well as the recent decline depends on whether Congress and the executive branch are controlled by the same or different parties. It further predicts that the Republican takeover of the House and Senate after the 1994 congressional elections could lead to a resurgence of earmarking, in a different form, as long as the Dem- ocrats control the White House.

Among scholars, pork barrel spending analysis represents a ven- erable specialty in the profession, generating some of the most engag- ing debates and finest research in recent years. This literature ana- lyzes how members of Congress create institutions and use legislative rules to enhance their electoral

goals. While not mutually exclu- sive, the two dominant approaches in recent years are the "distributive" and "informational" models of congressional policy making. (For a good review of the last two decades of scholarly research on the subject, see Krehbiel 1991).

Reformers in the 103rd Congress were emboldened by the success of groups such as the "pork busters," an informal group led by Represen- tative Harris Fawell (R-IL), who routinely offered amendments to cut pork and unnecessary directed spending in appropriations bills. Also, some chairs of House autho- rizing committees like George Brown (D-CA), chairman of the Science, Space and Technology Committee, declared an all-out as- sault on directed spending in appropriations bills. Brown's efforts were aimed at directed spending not pre- viously "authorized" by his committee. Even the Omnibus Crime bill of 1994 was initially defeated in the House on a procedural vote because opponents claimed it included too much pork.

Other examples of progress in

the war on pork are recent press accounts and studies citing a decline in the 103rd Congress in the number of congressional earmarks in appropriations bills. The Wash- ington Post reported at the end of the first session of the 103rd Con- gress that "earmarking, the congressional practice of adding foot- notes to spending bills to fund pet projects without public review, is half of what it was two years ago in four major appropriations bills." In the belief that public scrutiny will end the practice of earmarking, spending-reform advocates in the Congress, like Representatives Brown and Fawell, try to force pork out of the back rooms and into the public domain through hearings and other public relations initiatives. "Earmarks are like mushrooms," Brown told the Washington Post. "They grow best in the dark."

Patterns of Earmarks During the Past Decade

As Table 1 indicates, earmarks for academic grants grew from a

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FIGURE 1 Trends in Academic Earmarks, 1980-93

600 550 500 450-

w400 350

S300 250

E 200 - z 150

100 50

'80 '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 Fiscal Year

Split Party Control House and Executive

SEstimact ual - Estimate (based on news accounts) Unitary Party Control

Source: Developed by the author from Congressional Research Service documents and news accounts in The Washington Post, 11-3-93.

handful in the early 1980s to hun- dreds in the early 1990s. During the same period, this pattern of earmark growth was repeated in other appropriations bills. In fact, the proliferation of directed spending over the last decade led one Appro- priations Committee staffer to con- clude that "one of the biggest changes in the appropriations process over the past ten years is the ravenous increase in pork. Ear- marks in this year's (FY'92) legislation are just nauseating. We are trying to develop a good bill, but the chairman's piggish ways are eating into ongoing programs" (Munson 1993, 195).

According to the Washington Post article, however, this trend was reversed in 1993, giving the impression that directed spending is on the wane. Anecdotal evidence suggests a similar decline in directed spending in other appropriations bills during 1993 (FY'94). One

staffer involved with the Appropria- tions Committee for many years put it this way: "This is the first year I can remember Chairman X had no earmarks in his bill. He told everyone there would be no earmarks this year and he held the line. He wears the concept of "no earmarks" in his bill around here like a badge of honor." Even the total number of pages in House Ap- propriations Committee reports re- viewed for this study declined for the first time in 1993 (FY'94), a further indication of a reduction in directed spending.2

So is that the whole story? Are earmarks going the way of the buggy whip solely because of nega- tive publicity?

Maybe. Yet that conclusion is troubling from the standpoint of political science research on Con- gress, particularly for proponents of distributive theories of legislative policy making. Are the same mem-

bers who sought distributive bene- fits from the legislative process during the 1980s now rejecting these policies because they have become politically unpopular? If pork barrel politics greased the skids of the legislative process in the past, what is today's substitute for this congressional lubricant?3

Patterns of Congressional Earmarks: An Institutional Explanation

My interviews and observations suggest that the most critical vari- able in explaining the rise and fall of earmarks was not the growing level of reformers' ire, but instead an institutional consideration: Was the government operating under conditions of unitary or split control of the executive and legislative branches of government? Other

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Pork Barrel Spending--On the Wane?*

things being equal, the number of earmarks should be higher during periods of split control compared to periods of unitary control. This hy- pothesis is also consistent with distributive and informational interpre- tations of congressional policy making.

Earmarking and Distributive Models of Congressional Policy Making

Distributive theories of congressional policy making suggest that legislators earmark funds to ensure that the executive branch carries out legislators' distributive intent. Hence, earmarking is a statutory method of locking in distributive gains. But are there also nonstatutory means of realizing distributive rewards? And do the opportunities to achieve nonstatutory gains vary depending on conditions of split or unitary control? According to the interviews, the answer is a re- sounding "yes" to both questions. Indeed, there are more nonstatutory methods available to achieve distributive gains when the same party controls the executive branch and Congress, and fewer under divided government. Therein lies a clue as to why earmarks declined when the Democrats achieved unitary control in 1992.

Unitary control means Congress can count on the administration for help in realizing distributional goals through means other than just pass- ing laws. Commenting on the process in 1994, during conditions of unitary control, one staffer put it this way: "Letters from congress- men to the administration, phone calls, statements at hearings and other types of communications with the executive branch all can have the same effect as an earmark if the same party controls the White House and Congress. You couldn't do that under split control. You can now. Nods and winks from friendly individuals who control spending in the agencies can have the same effect as an earmark."

Another source put it this way: "If you get assurances from the agency up front that your program is in their budget when they send it to the Hill, you'll spend time de-

fending the agency's budget request, instead of trying to change it with an earmark amendment. That's much easier to do when your party controls the agency." Consider this example from a staffer who works for an Appropri- ations Committee member: "Sure, we don't have any earmarks in our bill this year. That's because the chairman gets all his priorities and his friends' priorities wired with the administration before the budget comes up here. That way we don't need to earmark." Transactions like this could not take place with the same amount of regularity and ease under conditions of split control.

Sometimes personnel associated with a particular earmarked program make job changes because of shifts in administrations. This too provides opportunities for nonstatutory directed spending. One staffer told about a program that was earmarked for a congressional leader for several years. After the administration changed and President Clinton took office, a staffer from this congressman's office went to work at the agency where the earmarked money was spent. "We dropped the earmark in this year's appropriations bill for the first time because we knew (staffer X) would take care of his ex-boss now that he's at the agency."

The situation is completely different under divided government. A lack of responsiveness by the administration for a member's distributional priorities begets frustration, and frustration begets earmarks. One source knowledge- able with the appropriations process said this: "We reached a low point in the Reagan Administration when (OMB Director) Miller sent a letter to all the agencies telling them to ignore earmarks in (legislative) report language. It was at that point that many Democrats in Con- gress said it's time to start putting our preferences in these bills."

Frustration and the absence of nonstatutory options led to this conclusion-and to growth in earmarks. Indeed, under divided government, earmarks often are the only option to address members' distributional needs. Subcommittee

chairs become the individuals best positioned to satiate members' distributional preferences. Munson (1993) quotes an Appropriations Committee member: "I used to plead endlessly for grants from the agencies, but I've since learned that it's far quicker and less com- plicated to approach the cardinal (subcommittee chair) directly (for an earmark request), (Munson 1993, 67-68).

Earmarking and Informational Models of Congressional Policy Making

Earmarks are not always exclu- sively aimed at securing gains from distributive politics. An alternative approach to distributive theory in developing explanations of congressional organization is so-called "In- formational Theory" (see Austen- Smith and Riker 1987; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990). One of the funda- mental tenets of informational theory is that legislators achieve their political goals (i.e., getting re- elected) by acquiring policy expertise and by specializing. In other words, obtaining distributive bene- fits is not the only way congress- men seek to attain their goals in the legislative process. Sometimes achieving "expert" status in a policy area can generate dividends as well. "Informational theory" inter- pretations of legislative behavior were also supported in the conversations and interviews conducted with staff.

For example, one of the themes that emerges during discussions about the appropriations process is that a goal of these committee members is to become, as one staffer put it, "full players with the administration in the budgetary process." My interviews supported the conclusion that members sought to become "full players" for reasons other than just achieving goodies for the folks back home. They want to become ex- perts in certain policy areas and gain the notoriety associated with being a specialist and guru in a particular field, such as transportation policy, telecommunications, bank- ing, or the environment. They want

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to write columns for the New York Times, give speeches at think tanks, or appear on "Meet the Press." Directed spending is one way to get the administration's attention, achieve some notoriety for members, and put them on the map for the administration and the outside world. What better way to receive attention than to force the administration to spend money in a particular way or structure a program to your liking through directed spending.

One appropriations staffer put it this way: "If you're unhappy with something an agency is doing, and it may have nothing to do with a parochial project-you just want to get their attention on a policy question-you go after funding for the secretary's (of the agency) office. That kind of directed spending usu- ally gets a member included in lots of policy discussions."

Another put it this way: "I've seen lots of situations where a member of Congress wants to be a player in terms of promoting a certain type of technology. If you promote this type of technology through a demonstration project and a line item, even if it doesn't benefit your district in a parochial way, you (as the member) tend to participate a lot more in the policymaking process compared to those who didn't promote the spending."

Again, however, a determinant of how a member pursues becoming a full player is often dictated by whether or not the member's party controls the other end of Pennsyl- vania Avenue.

Unitary control provides members of Congress a richer array of opportunities to participate as full players without resorting to earmarks. For example, legislators find a more hospitable environment to receive information, have some- one listen to their suggestions, and operate as equals in a team approach with the executive branch when political appointees and members of their own party control the White House, the Office of Man- agement and Budget, and the agencies.

On the other hand, during periods of split control, the majority party in the Congress has fewer

options to participate as full part- ners with the administration. Under these conditions, using votes as muscle, the majority forcefully in- jects itself into the process by the sheer strength of its numbers. Members put their preferences in an earmark because it's the only way to play under conditions of split control or get attention. This all changes when the same party controls both institutions.

Other sources indicated that the level of trust and the amount of flexibility Congress is willing to grant the administration increases dramatically during periods of unitary control. Conversely, under conditions of divided government, Congress must write its views into law to have a chance at getting them implemented. Munson (1993, 189) quotes the chief clerk of an appropriations subcommittee during a period of split control: "We take care to provide no wiggle room for the agencies." No wiggle room means more than just carrying out a member's distributional motives. It means doing things the way Con- gress wants to enhance the overall clout, prestige, and expertise of the member-outcomes that are all consistent with informational theories of congressional policy making.

In summary, during the 1980s and early 1990s, an era of split control, earmarking was an institutional mechanism to help members attain distributive gains and to become full players in the process. When President Clinton was elected in 1992, earmarking changed in at least two ways.

First, Democrats had greater success in securing their personal pro- grammatic initiatives directly in the Clinton administration's budget. Hence, the need for specific earmarks was less critical compared to the previous years of split party control.

Second, Democratic members had greater assurance that the executive branch would be receptive to signaling from the Hill (through letters, hearings, and phone calls) now that these initiatives were re- ceived by political appointees of the same political party. Members could enhance their expertise and reputation in a policy field with the

help, rather than opposition, of the administration. The need to force the administration to share information, take certain positions, or em- brace priorities through earmarks became less critical.

Now that institutional conditions of split control have reemerged, will earmarking return with a ven- geance? For all the reasons out- lined above, we can expect it will. There is, however, one caveat. The new Republican majority on Capi- tol Hill is more reluctant to expand government spending than most of their Democratic counterparts. Cet- eris paribus, this would suggest a decline rather than a resurgence in traditional distributive or pork barrel programs in FY'96 appropriations bills. We may see, however, a resurgence of directed spending decisions aimed at cutting back or reprioritizing programs to make appropriations bills more consistent with Republican principles. In other words, directed spending may increase in this year's appropriations bills to make the new majority Republican lawmakers full players in the process, but the spending may be directed to a lower dollar amount. Using directed spending to zero out programs inconsistent with Republican policy priorities (reverse pork barrel) will also likely emerge as a political tactic by the new majority.

Conclusion Reformers may be premature in

declaring victory over pork barrel spending. This alternative "institutional" explanation of directed spending suggests reformers should consider how Congress can use so- phisticated nonstatutory methods to achieve the same ends as congressional earmarks during periods of unitary control. Understanding con- tours, nuances, and options available under various institutional conditions is a key to understanding the full story of directed spending.

As a result of the 1994 elections, we can expect directed spending to increase. Directed spending may consist of new projects for Republi- can districts or states. Or, because

210 PS: Political Science & Politics



this time it is the fiscally conserva- tive party that controls the appropriations process, directed spending legislation may be used to reduce the size and scope of pork barrel spending or even restrict spending for programs that are inconsistent with the policy preferences of the new majority party (reverse pork barrel). In either case, since the number of nonstatutory options has been reduced under the current institutional conditions, the evidence gathered from these interviews suggests Republicans will use directed spending to become full players in policy making.

Early support for this prediction emerged shortly after the election in 1994 when Representative Tom Delay (R-TX), the newly elected Republican Whip said: "We will aggressively pursue this (policy of directing spending). We'll use limitations (on funding for programs inconsistent with Republican policies), and that's only natural when you have a Democratic president and a Republican Congress" (Wall Street Journal 1994, A2). Indeed, predicting the demise of directed spending may be premature.

Notes *I would like to thank Barry Rundquist,

Richard Munson, LeeAnn Petersen, and the

anonymous reviewers who made many help- ful suggestions for an earlier draft of this paper. I'd also like to thank Emaan Abdel- baki for production help with the graphics.

1. Pork barrel, directed spending, and earmarking are used synonymously in this paper to describe the phenomenon of Con- gress using legislative mechanisms to direct executive branch spending practices. The practice includes, but is not limited to, directing an agency to spend a certain amount of money in a particular district to limiting an agency from spending funds in a particular manner.

2. One anonymous reviewer suggested counting the number of pages in Appropria- tions Committee reports as another way to measure the decline in directed spending. The reviewer suggested that fewer pages of report language might be a surrogate measure of directed spending levels. While time limitations precluded me from conducting an exhaustive search, I did review four House Committee Reports for FY'93-95. In all four cases the number of pages peaked in FY'93 and then leveled off or declined, a finding consistent with the overall decline in earmarks during the same period.

3. To better understand why earmarks grew during the 1980s as well as why they have recently declined, I interviewed Appro- priations Committee members and staffers on Capitol Hill during the summer of 1994. The conversations, interviews, and observations were not based on the traditional sur- vey research model with its use of standard closed-end or open-ended interview proto- cols on a randomly selected population.

Instead, I approached the question as a political scientist who happens to be work- ing on the Hill to try to gain insights into a phenomenon that is difficult to understand using traditional empirical methodological tools. I spend a lot of time "hanging around" the congressional process due to my line of work, and these observations are

based in large part on the way I understand how the process operates.

References Austen-Smith, David, and William H. Riker.

1987. "Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation." American Political Science Review 81:897-918.

Fenno, Richard F. 1978. Homestyle: Repre- sentatives in Their Districts. Boston: Lit- tle Brown.

Gilligan, Thomas W., and Keith Krehbiel. 1990. "Organization of Informative Com- mittees by a Rational Legislature." American Journal of Political Science 34:531-64.

Munson, Richard. 1993. The Cardinals of Capitol Hill. New York: Grove Press.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. "Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?" American Political Science Review 84:149-63.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Con- gressional Policymaking. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Savage, James D. 1992. Trends in the Distri- bution of Apparent Academic Earmarks in the Federal Government's FY 1980-92 Appropriations Bills. Washington: Con- gressional Research Service: The Library of Congress.

Wall Street Journal, December 13, 1994, A2.

About the Author Gary Andres is a partner and vice president of Dutko & Associates in Washington, D.C. He served as deputy assistant to the president for legislative affairs in the Bush administration, and is a former APSA Con- gressional Fellow.

John C. Calhoun, Lani Guinier, and Minority Rights

John C. Calhoun, Lani Guinier, and Minority Rights1

John L. Safford, University of South Carolina at Sumter

Early in the first year of his presi- dency, Bill Clinton floated the name of Lani Guinier to be the Jus- tice Department's chief civil-rights lawyer. Although Guinier never made it to Senate confirmation hearings, she was well qualified by education and professional training. Moreover, as a black Jewish fe- male, it was evident to her that ma- joritarian democracy is often less than fair-and she was forthright about wishing to correct it by democratic means.

Ironically, the minority veto, one of the alleged means by which Guinier wished to assure fairness, harkened back to the process of government advocated by John C. Calhoun (1782-1850). For Calhoun, constitutionalism or limited government was justified by epistemologi- cal nominalism, and was ensured by the concurrent majority and nul- lification.

Like that of Aristotle, James Madison, and Karl Marx, Calhoun's political philosophy was based on

class analysis. Indeed, the historian of American thought, Richard Hof- stadter, subtitled a chapter on Cal- houn, "The Marx of the Master Class." As Hofstadter explains, in Calhoun,

.*. there is discernible a rough par- allel to several ideas that were later elaborated and refined by Marx: the idea of pervasive exploitation and class struggle in history; a labor theory of value and of a surplus appro- priated by the capitalists; the con- centration of capital under capitalistic

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