Mr. Edward A. DeGregorio *Dr. Raymond A. Janssen **Dr. Lee W. Wagenhals ***
Dr. Richard Messier *
2004 CCRTS
Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium
June 15 -17, 2004
San Diego, CA
Integrating Effects-Based and Attrition-Base Modeling
Integrating Effects-Based and Attrition-Base Modeling
GMU
George Mason UniversityIntegrated Defense Systems
* *****
2GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
OVERVIEW
• Purpose: Examine process and methods of interfacing high-level probabilistic Effects-Based models with higher fidelity attrition-based models and performing evaluations of alternative Courses of Action using the combination of these modeling techniques
• Outline:– Effects-Based Challenge– Case Study from Persian Gulf War– Conclusions
3GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
Evolution of Warfare* and Modeling & Evolution of Warfare* and Modeling & Simulation ApproachesSimulation Approaches
* Measuring the Effects of Network Centric Warfare, Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1999
PCW Ni NCW (N)n
Single Dimension WarfareSingle Dimension Warfare
RomanRoman
LegionLegion
Lanchester’s Equations: Attrition Modeling
Lanchester’s Equations: Attrition Modeling
Force N on M
Physics-Based Force-on-Force Attrition Modeling
(Campaign, Engagement)
Physics-Based Force-on-Force Attrition Modeling
(Campaign, Engagement)
** BGEN Deptula, USAF, 2001, on “EBO: Change in the Nature of War”
CarthaginiansCarthaginians
Paradigm Shift to EBO** requires modeling Physical + Belief +
Reason Domains
Paradigm Shift to EBO** requires modeling Physical + Belief +
Reason Domains
4GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
Network-Centric Effects-Based Operations Network-Centric Effects-Based Operations (EBO) … Shaping the Adversary’s Behavior(EBO) … Shaping the Adversary’s Behavior
• JFCOM defines EBO as “a process for obtaining a strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through synergistic, multiplicative, and cumulative application of the full range of military and non-military capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels”.
• Network-Centric Operations (NCO) enables EBO– NCW enabled by 4 technologies:
• Sensors• IT and Network Architectures • Precision Weapons• Stealth Platforms
EBO is the key to broadening the role of NCO EBO is the key to broadening the role of NCO beyond Attrition Warfarebeyond Attrition Warfare
EBO is the key to broadening the role of NCO EBO is the key to broadening the role of NCO beyond Attrition Warfarebeyond Attrition Warfare
5GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems Dimensions of Network Centric Dimensions of Network Centric Warfare (NCW)*Warfare (NCW)*
Force
Force
Tim
eT
ime
SpaceSpace
Engagem
ent G
rid
Engagem
ent G
rid
(Wee
ks …
Min
utes)
Information/Knowledge GridInformation/Knowledge Grid
(Nanoseconds)
Sensor GridSensor Grid
(1000s - 1,000,000s m.)(1000s - 1,000,000s m.)
* Measuring the Effects of Network Centric Warfare, Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1999
Network & Info Technology
Network & Info Technology
Stealth Platforms, Precision Weapons
Stealth Platforms, Precision Weapons
C2ISR Sensor
Networks
C2ISR Sensor
Networks
6GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
Integrate Physical & Cognitive Integrate Physical & Cognitive Effects ModelingEffects Modeling
TimeTime
(Nanosec.)(Nanosec.)
Space (Battlespace Vol.)Space (Battlespace Vol.)
ForceForce
Perceptions Perceptions (Red & Blue)(Red & Blue)
Cause-Effects Cause-Effects RelationshipsRelationships
COA SelectionCOA Selection
MoveMove
StrikeStrike
ProtectProtect
Sit Sit AwarenessAwareness
CC22
Speed of Speed of CommandCommand
Physics-BasedPhysics-Based
Attrition ModelsAttrition Models
Force-on-ForceForce-on-Force
Effects-Based Effects-Based Operations Operations
(EBO)(EBO)ModelsModels
CC22ISR, Comms ISR, Comms ModelsModels
Physical
Physical
SpaceSpace
Reason, BeliefReason, Belief
MappingMapping
7GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
EBO Modeling Linked to Attrition-Based Modeling EBO Modeling Linked to Attrition-Based Modeling & Simulation& Simulation
Kill
Ch
ain
AccessAccess LocateLocate IDID TrackTrack DesignateDesignate CommComm AttackAttack AssessAssess
+
EBO NCW
Operational
System
(Physical Dimension: Force, Space, Time Domain)
Intel & Planning
Cam
pai
gn
Pla
n
Intel + Planning + Execution Assessment
Blue Actions
Influence Net
Lead to
AnalystsAnalysts
t
ABC
tA BC
COA 1
COA 2Candidate COAs t
ABC
tA BC
COA 1
COA 2Candidate COAs
Timed Probability Profile
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 10 20 30Time
COA 1
COA 2
Timed Probability Profile
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 10 20 30Time
COA 1
COA 2
Effects
Blue and RedCOA Analysis
(Reason & Belief Domain)
* EBO are coordinated sets of actions – including diplomatic, economic, information operations, psychological operations, and lethal/non-lethal warfare—directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes and neutrals in military operations
8GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
CASE STUDY APPROACH
• Persian Gulf War (Desert Storm) well documented; much unclassified information published. Many of the situations encountered there are still significant today.
• We first used documentation* from Desert Storm to create a high level EBO model – Model behavior was “validated” using the Final Report
• We attempted to discover how the higher level model can foster the development and analysis of the lower level model and how, in turn, the lower level model results can impact the higher level model.
• By using a known situation it was possible to validate model results and to test the postulated interfaces between the models that were developed
• Specific results then are generalized
"Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress" [DoD, 1992]
9GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
National Policy Objectives(5)(6)
CINCCENT’s Mission(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)
CENTCOM’s Theater Military Objectives(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)
JFACC’s Tactical Components(18)(19)(20)(21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26)
(27)(28)(29)
Maritime Campaign Objectives(30)(31)(32)(33)(34)
NAVCENT’s Tactical Components(35)(36)(37)(38)(39)(40)(41)
Ground Campaign Objectives(44)(45)
Air Campaign Objectives(13)(14)(15)(16)(17)
Joint Force Tactical Components(42)(43)(46)(47)(48)
*(x) refer to event numbers in the report that were assigned the EB model
FLOW DOWN OF PERSIAN GULF WAR OBJECTIVES
10GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
Desert Storm War Scenario
11GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
Fleet CommandFleet Command Naval Warfare Simulation… Naval Warfare Simulation…3D Real-Time Modeling, Simulation & Visualization3D Real-Time Modeling, Simulation & Visualization
Adapted by Raytheon for use on DARPA / NAVSEA Submarine Payloads & Sensors Program. Developed HLA-compatible interface to Raytheon Hi-Fi Missile Server. Can be run in Monte Carlo mode (turn off graphics).Tested sensitivity to various Mission / System Concepts within context of ScenariosConducted Operational Utility Analysis to Quantify Military Value:
»Notional Korea-China Scenario, (UNCLASS ver.)»Persian Gulf Scenario (UNLCASS ver.)
Features: Geographically accurate 3D environment
–Bathymetric Data (display depth with mouse) –1000 meter resolution Terrain (Standard)
»Integrated DTED Level 1 (100 m resolution)
Complete Jane’s Order Of Battle for 16 countries; countries can be added
Sim Objects include Submarines, UUVs, Surface Ships, Aircraft, UAVs, Missiles, Tanks, TELs, Land Vehicles, undersea mines and some ground installations; can customize sim objects
Multiple views of unfolding scenario
Fleet Command functionality:• Set up Geo-scenario using Mission Editor GUI• Modify Platform/Sensor/Weapon Parameters with Database GUI • “Drag and Drop”: Lay-down Red/Blue Forces (Lat/Long) on Geographic Map Window• Simulation can be run in different ways:
– Computer (Blue) vs Computer (Red)– Human (Blue) vs. Computer (Red) – Human (Blue) vs Human (Red)
Fleet Command functionality:• Set up Geo-scenario using Mission Editor GUI• Modify Platform/Sensor/Weapon Parameters with Database GUI • “Drag and Drop”: Lay-down Red/Blue Forces (Lat/Long) on Geographic Map Window• Simulation can be run in different ways:
– Computer (Blue) vs Computer (Red)– Human (Blue) vs. Computer (Red) – Human (Blue) vs Human (Red)
12GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems HLA Architecture Supports Distributed Scenario HLA Architecture Supports Distributed Scenario Generation, Req’mnts Analysis & Concept Generation, Req’mnts Analysis & Concept
DevelopmentDevelopment
Federates
Functions
Create Scenario x
Send Scenario x
Receive Scenario x x
Convert Scenario x
Execute Scenario x x
Send Results x
ScenarioProcessor
FleetCommand
RMAST:
MissileComms
Model
Net
Net
Raytheon ORION Network
RTI
RMAST FOM
RTI
RMAST FOM
Raytheon Mission Analysis & Simulation Technology (RMAST)
ScenarioProcessor
VisLink
VIS
Dedicated
UNIX Server
Aircraft
Server
Threats & Interceptors
• Standard Missile• TBMs• Projectiles
(AGS, ERGM, Excalibur)
• Cruise Missiles
• ESSMs
• Others
(Manual
Link)
IDS-Portsmouth
RMS-Tucson (2001-2003)
x
VIS
(Dec 03)
Effects-Based Models**George Mason Univ Tools installed at IDS/Portsmouth
Comms Network Modeling Tool
NCS, Fullerton
(Dec 04)
Real- Time Naval Warfare Sim
•
13GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
COURSES OF ACTION FOR EBO
• An effects-based way of thinking has been evolving for some time. Objectives can be obtained by achieving effects. Effects can be achieved by actions that comprise COAs
• Needed is an approach that captures the rationale for COAs that explain how actions can achieve effects
• Different levels of detail impact the type of analysis that can be done
– Detailed Engineering and physics knowledge can allow engineering models to show the behavior of systems to actions
• How to disrupt electric power, POL, an IADS are examples
• If we have the knowledge and the models they can give very precise results
– Qualitative knowledge about system or the reasoning belief and decision make aspects require a more abstract approach
• Probabilistic modeling techniques may be helpful
14GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
Effects Based Modeling for COA Development
Command Intent
Desired End States
Set of Desired and Undesired Effects on Red
EffectsActions Model Construction
Set of Desired BlueEndStates
15GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
Effects Based Modeling for COA Development
Set of Desired BlueEndStates
Command Intent
Desired End States
Set of Desired and Undesired Effects
Probabilistic model relating actionable events to effects through a network of influencing relationships: Influence Net model
From Red’s Point of View
May include Red’s COAs
EffectsActions Model Construction
16GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems Effects Based Modeling for COA Development
Command Intent
Set of Blue’s potential Actions that will affect Red.
Time-phased broad actions Desired End States
Set of Desired and Undesired Effects
Probabilistic model relating actionable events to effects through a network of influencing relationships: Influence Net model
EffectsActions Model Construction
Set of Desired BlueEndStatesFrom Red’s Point of View
May include Red’s COAs
17GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems Effects Based Modeling for COA Development
Set of Desired BlueEndStates
Command Intent
Ops
Pol
TransFin
Rel
IO
Set of Blue’s potential Actions that will affect Red.
Time-phased broad actions Desired End States
Set of Desired and Undesired Effects
Probabilistic model relating actionable events to effects through a network of influencing relationships: Influence Net model
From Red’s Point of View
May include Red’s COAs
EffectsActions Model Construction
18GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
Red achieves Brown annexation
Red achieves Brown annexation
Red uses WMD takes military action
Red uses WMD takes military action
Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity
Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity
Forces invade Red and change regime
Forces invade Red and change regime
.13 .50
.07 .50
0.0 .50
.0.0 .50
Effects-Based Modeling
Objective: Codify belief structure of Adversary to establish cause and effect relations and impact of actions
Identify - Intent/outcome - Beliefs - Initial events - Actions
Establish - Cause and effect relationships - Probability estimates - Times (when, how long)
Link with Engagement Models - Quantity appropriate action for increased fidelity
Blue believes assured success
is achievable
Blue believes assured success
is achievable
Red believes Blue using covert sensing
Red believes Blue using covert sensing
Red believes Blue will attack
Red believes Blue will attack
Red believes its sovereignty has been
threatened
Red believes its sovereignty has been
threatened
Red achieves Brown annexation
Red achieves Brown annexation
Red uses WMD takes military action
Red uses WMD takes military action
Red believes additional attacks imminent
Red believes additional attacks imminent
Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity
Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity
Forces invade Red and change regime
Forces invade Red and change regime
.01 .50
0.0 .50
.82 .50
.05 .50
.13 .50
.07 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.0.0 .50
Int’l community believes Red doing WMD issues
sanctions
Int’l community believes Red doing WMD issues
sanctions
.01 .50
Blue initiates efforts for coalition force
Blue initiates efforts for coalition force
Red initiates UN support important
Red initiates UN support important
Blue believes assured success
is achievable
Blue believes assured success
is achievable
Blue deploys covert maritime assets in theater
Blue deploys covert maritime assets in theater
Red initiates WMD activities
Red initiates WMD activities
Red leadership takes aggressive posture
Red leadership takes aggressive posture
Red believes Blue using covert sensing
Red believes Blue using covert sensing
Red captures part of SOFRed captures part of SOF
Additional Red WMD activity observed
Additional Red WMD activity observed
Blue takes unilateral action
Blue takes unilateral action
Blue attacks first WMDBlue attacks first WMD
Red believes Blue will attack
Red believes Blue will attack
Red believes its sovereignty has been
threatened
Red believes its sovereignty has been
threatened
Red achieves Brown annexation
Red achieves Brown annexation
Red uses WMD takes military action
Red uses WMD takes military action
Blue attacks Red military infrastructure
Blue attacks Red military infrastructure
Red believes additional attacks imminent
Red believes additional attacks imminent
Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity
Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity
Forces invade Red and change regime
Forces invade Red and change regime
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.01 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.82 .50
.05 .50
.13 .50
0.0 .500.0 .05
.07 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.0.0 .50
Red terrorists attacks on potential coalition partners
Red terrorists attacks on potential coalition partners
Blue initiates efforts for coalition force
Blue initiates efforts for coalition force
Red initiates UN support important
Red initiates UN support important
Red initiated anti-access measures
Red initiated anti-access measures
Blue believes assured success
is achievable
Blue believes assured success
is achievable
Blue deploys covert maritime assets in theater
Blue deploys covert maritime assets in theater Blue initiates covert ISRBlue initiates covert ISR
Red initiates WMD activities
Red initiates WMD activities
Red leadership takes aggressive posture
Red leadership takes aggressive posture
Red believes Blue using covert sensing
Red believes Blue using covert sensing
Red captures part of SOFRed captures part of SOF
Red preemptively invades Brown uses
WMD
Red preemptively invades Brown uses
WMD
Blue coalition formed
Blue coalition formed
Blue publishes Red WMD evidence
Blue publishes Red WMD evidence
Red discovers Blue has collected irrefutable
evidence
Red discovers Blue has collected irrefutable
evidence
Red claims to Int’l community that Red sovereignty invaded
Red claims to Int’l community that Red sovereignty invaded
Red proclaims its sovereignty cannot be violated
Red proclaims its sovereignty cannot be violated
Additional Red WMD activity observed
Additional Red WMD activity observed
Blue takes unilateral action
Blue takes unilateral action
Int’l inspections show WMD exists
Int’l inspections show WMD exists
Blue attacks first WMDBlue attacks first WMD
Additional forces flow into area
Additional forces flow into area
Brown places its military on heightened alert
Brown places its military on heightened alert
Red believes Blue will attack
Red believes Blue will attack
Red believes its sovereignty has been
threatened
Red believes its sovereignty has been
threatened
Red achieves Brown annexation
Red achieves Brown annexation
Red postures for attack on Brown
Red postures for attack on Brown
Red civilian collateral damage occurs
Red civilian collateral damage occurs
Red uses WMD takes military action
Red uses WMD takes military action
Blue attacks Red military infrastructure
Blue attacks Red military infrastructure
Red believes additional attacks imminent
Red believes additional attacks imminent
Blue attacks Red mainland WMD sites
Blue attacks Red mainland WMD sites
Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity
Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity
Forces invade Red and change regime
Forces invade Red and change regime
.05 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.05 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.05 .50
.05 .50.05 .50
.01 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.05 .50
.82 .50
.05 .50
.010 .50
.01 .50
.05 .50
.14 .50
0.0 .50
.13 .50
.15 .50
0.0 .500.0 .05
.07 .50
.05 .50
0.0 .50
.010 .50
0.0 .50
.01 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.0.0 .50
+S, -S
+S, -S
+S, -S
+S, -M +S, -W
+S,-W
+S, -S
Red terrorists attacks on potential coalition partners
Red terrorists attacks on potential coalition partners
Blue initiates efforts for coalition force
Blue initiates efforts for coalition force
Red initiates UN support important
Red initiates UN support important
Red initiated anti-access measures
Red initiated anti-access measures
Blue believes assured success
is achievable
Blue believes assured success
is achievable
Blue deploys covert maritime assets in theater
Blue deploys covert maritime assets in theater Blue initiates covert ISRBlue initiates covert ISR
Red initiates WMD activities
Red initiates WMD activities
Red leadership takes aggressive posture
Red leadership takes aggressive posture
Red believes Blue using covert sensing
Red believes Blue using covert sensing
Red captures part of SOFRed captures part of SOF
Red preemptively invades Brown uses
WMD
Red preemptively invades Brown uses
WMD
Blue coalition formed
Blue coalition formed
Int’l community believes Red doing WMD issues
sanctions
Int’l community believes Red doing WMD issues
sanctions
Blue publishes Red WMD evidence
Blue publishes Red WMD evidence
Red discovers Blue has collected irrefutable
evidence
Red discovers Blue has collected irrefutable
evidence
Red claims to Int’l community that Red sovereignty invaded
Red claims to Int’l community that Red sovereignty invaded
Red proclaims its sovereignty cannot be violated
Red proclaims its sovereignty cannot be violated
Additional Red WMD activity observed
Additional Red WMD activity observed
Blue takes unilateral action
Blue takes unilateral action
Int’l inspections show WMD exists
Int’l inspections show WMD exists
Blue attacks first WMDBlue attacks first WMD
Additional forces flow into area
Additional forces flow into area
Brown places its military on heightened alert
Brown places its military on heightened alert
Red believes Blue will attack
Red believes Blue will attack
Red believes its sovereignty has been
threatened
Red believes its sovereignty has been
threatened
Red achieves Brown annexation
Red achieves Brown annexation
Red postures for attack on Brown
Red postures for attack on Brown
Red civilian collateral damage occurs
Red civilian collateral damage occurs
Red uses WMD takes military action
Red uses WMD takes military action
Blue attacks Red military infrastructure
Blue attacks Red military infrastructure
Red believes additional attacks imminent
Red believes additional attacks imminent
Blue attacks Red mainland WMD sites
Blue attacks Red mainland WMD sites
Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity
Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity
Forces invade Red and change regime
Forces invade Red and change regime
.05 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.05 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.05 .50
.05 .50.05 .50
.01 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.05 .50
.82 .50
.05 .50
.01 .50
.010 .50
.01 .50
.05 .50
.14 .50
0.0 .50
.13 .50
.15 .50
0.0 .500.0 .05
.07 .50
.05 .50
0.0 .50
.010 .50
0.0 .50
.01 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.0.0 .50
+S, -W
+M, -S
+S, -
S
+M, -W
+W, -S
+W, -M
-W,+S
+S, -S
+S,-S
+M, -S
+S, -S
+S, -S
+M, -S
+S, -S
+M,-M
+M, -M
N, N
+S, -M
+M, -
W
+M, -
S
+S, -M
+S,-W
+S,-W
+M, -S
+W, -S
+S, -M
N, -S
+S, -S
+M, -S+S, -W
+S, -S
+M, -S
+S, -S-M, N
+M, -M
+S, -S
+S, N
+S,-W
+S, -S
+S,-S
-M, +W
+S,-W
+S, -S
-S, +W
+M, -W -M,+M
-S,+M
+M,-S
+W ,-S
+S, -
S
+M, -
M
+S,
-S
+S, -
S-W
, +W
+W, N
+M, N
+M, -W
-S, +W
-M, +W
+W, -S
+M, -S
+M, -S
+M, -M
+M, -S
+M, -M
+S, -W
+M, -
S
-S, +W
+M, -S
+W, -S
-S, +
S
+M, -S
+S, -M
Red terrorists attacks on potential coalition partners
Red terrorists attacks on potential coalition partners
Blue initiates efforts for coalition force
Blue initiates efforts for coalition force
Red initiates UN support important
Red initiates UN support important
Red initiated anti-access measures
Red initiated anti-access measures
Blue believes assured success
is achievable
Blue believes assured success
is achievable
Blue deploys covert maritime assets in theater
Blue deploys covert maritime assets in theater Blue initiates covert ISRBlue initiates covert ISR
Red initiates WMD activities
Red initiates WMD activities
Red leadership takes aggressive posture
Red leadership takes aggressive posture
Red believes Blue using covert sensing
Red believes Blue using covert sensing
Red captures part of SOFRed captures part of SOF
Red preemptively invades Brown uses
WMD
Red preemptively invades Brown uses
WMD
Blue coalition formed
Blue coalition formed
Int’l community believes Red doing WMD issues
sanctions
Int’l community believes Red doing WMD issues
sanctions
Blue publishes Red WMD evidence
Blue publishes Red WMD evidence
Red discovers Blue has collected irrefutable
evidence
Red discovers Blue has collected irrefutable
evidence
Red claims to Int’l community that Red sovereignty invaded
Red claims to Int’l community that Red sovereignty invaded
Red proclaims its sovereignty cannot be violated
Red proclaims its sovereignty cannot be violated
Additional Red WMD activity observed
Additional Red WMD activity observed
Blue takes unilateral action
Blue takes unilateral action
Int’l inspections show WMD exists
Int’l inspections show WMD exists
Blue attacks first WMDBlue attacks first WMD
Additional forces flow into area
Additional forces flow into area
Brown places its military on heightened alert
Brown places its military on heightened alert
Red believes Blue will attack
Red believes Blue will attack
Red believes its sovereignty has been
threatened
Red believes its sovereignty has been
threatened
Red achieves Brown annexation
Red achieves Brown annexation
Red postures for attack on Brown
Red postures for attack on Brown
Red civilian collateral damage occurs
Red civilian collateral damage occurs
Red uses WMD takes military action
Red uses WMD takes military action
Blue attacks Red military infrastructure
Blue attacks Red military infrastructure
Red believes additional attacks imminent
Red believes additional attacks imminent
Blue attacks Red mainland WMD sites
Blue attacks Red mainland WMD sites
Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity
Blue believes Red will stop WMD activity
Forces invade Red and change regime
Forces invade Red and change regime
.05 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.05 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.05 .50
.05 .50.05 .50
.01 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.05 .50
.82 .50
.05 .50
.01 .50
.010 .50
.01 .50
.05 .50
.14 .50
0.0 .50
.13 .50
.15 .50
0.0 .500.0 .05
.07 .50
.05 .50
0.0 .50
.010 .50
0.0 .50
.01 .50
0.0 .50
0.0 .50
.0.0 .50
Detailed Component Modeling & Sim
Subsystem/Product Performance
System Engineering/Integr
Engagement
Campaign
EngagementModel
AN INTEGRATE MODELING APPROACH
Strategic Model
19GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
HYPOTHESES
• Use of more detailed modeling improves the derivation of the elements of the higher-level EBO model– High fidelity simulations can provide more accurate values
for the conditional probability values and the time delay information that the higher-level models use as input.
• High fidelity simulations can be useful in providing a more detailed look at actionable events that are created in the high level EBO model
Gulf War Model Rev 16b(18) Attack leadership
command facilities
(42) Position Coalition forces West
of Kuwait
(20) Attack Telecomm. and C3
nodes
(11) RGF in KTO neutralized
(14) Iraqi regime isolated
(48) Use electronic warfare to disrupt
comms.
(40) Prepare naval gunfire support
(9) Iraqi supply lines severed
(28) Attack railroads and
bridges
(34) Coalition coastline defended
(26) Attack oil refining and
distribution facilities
(22) Attack air forces and fields
(37) Prepare ASUW Operations
(32a) Naval tactical aircraft
strikes conducted
(45) RGF attacked from West
(43) Draw Iraqi reserve forces away from main attack
(47) Conduct SOF
(31) Iraqi shipping neutralized
(21) Attack strategic IADS
(39) Prepare MCM paths to Kuwait for amphibious assault
(16) Iraqi offensive capability
neutralized
(19) Attack electrical production facilities
(23) Attack NBC research,
production and storage facilities
(25) Attack Scud missiles, launchers, prod and storage
facilities
(32b) TLAM strikes conducted
(38) Prepare submarine TLAM
launches
(33) Amphibious assault feint conducted
(12) Kuwait City liberated
(17) Iraqi mechanized
equipment in KTO rendered
ineffective
(35) Prepare AAW operations
(36) Prepare Naval forces and port
logistics
(41) Decide not to do amphibious assault
(24) Attack military storage and
production sites
(15) Iraqi NBC delivery capability
neutralized
(2) Iraqi armed forces ejected from
Kuwait
(5) Legitimate government
restored in Kuwait
(3) RGF neutralized
(1) Iraqi National Command Authority
neutralized
(4a) Ballistic missile capability
neutralized
(8) Air superiority achieved
(10a) NBC production capability
neutralized
(7a) Political & military leadership
attacked
(13) Air supremacy gained
(30) Naval support conducted
(29) Attack army and RGF in KTO
(46) Conduct Psychological
operations to degrade morale
(4b) NBC capability
neutralized
(10b) NBC storage capability
neutralized
(7b) C2 neutralized
(27) Attack naval forces and port
facilities
(44) Supporting attack conducted
from South
06
07
08
01
02
09
10
03
04
0543
11
41
40
35
36
37
3839
13
14
18
19
20
21
22
24
4445
51
26
3334
28
30
29
3231
25
59
58
57
52
53
56
73
55
54
49
48
507267
46
47
42
81
65
83
63
66
71
70
6968
60
84
61
62
78
76
80
79
82
64
74
77
15
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
09
00
10
43
43
34
37
00
00
30
30
30
038
00
6
2810
2810
2810
038
335
4
5
3
40
12
40
40
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(6) Iraqi military capabilities
reduced 01617
23
27
TACTICAL COMPONENTSCAMPAIGN
OBJECTIVESTHEATER MILITARY
OBJECTIVESMISSION & NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES
Influence Key: h(%) g(%)strong 90 -90moderate 66 -66light 33 -33other other n
n
n
n
Event Nomenclature Key
(#) Event Name
##
Shorthand for the Event Name
Delay time (in days) of the event
COA start time (in days) for Actionable Events only
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
MARITIME
CAMPAIGN
AIR
CAMPAIGN
GROUND
CAMPAIGN
21GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
HIGH LEVEL MODEL VALIDATION
• Concentrated on the overall behavior given the choice of values for the influence strength parameters, since the structure and timing more were directly derived from the Final Report to Congress.
• Examined static behavior by examining how changes in input actionable events result in reasonable changes throughout the net as well as changes at the overall effect nodes (Mission and National Policy Objectives).
• Compared dynamic behavior with timelines in Final Report.
Actionable Event Group Probability of Effect
Air
Mar
itim
e
Gro
un
d
(5)
Legitimate government restored in
Kuw ait
(6) Iraqi
m ilitary capabilities
reduced
(2) Iraqi
armed forces
ejected from Kuw ait
(3) RGF
neutralized
(1) Iraqi
National Command Authority
neutralized
(4a) Ballistic
missile capability
neutralized
(4b) NBC
capability neutralized
no no no 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.12 no no yes 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.12 no yes no 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.29 0.35 0.09 0.28 yes no no 0.04 0.78 0.20 0.71 0.64 0.91 0.34 no yes yes 0.35 0.11 0.30 0.29 0.35 0.09 0.28 yes no yes 0.52 0.78 0.86 0.71 0.64 0.91 0.34 yes yes no 0.33 0.95 0.55 0.90 0.84 0.96 0.65 yes yes yes 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.90 0.84 0.96 0.65
22GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
(04a) Ballistic missile capability neutralized(01) Iraqi National Command Authority neutralized
(04b) NBC capability neutralized(03) RGF neutralized
(02) Iraqi armed forces ejected from Kuwait(05) Legitimate government in Kuwait restored
(06) Iraqi military capabilities reduced
Model = Gulf_War_Model_Rev_16b
COA = COA_Set_02 DELAY = Delay_Set_05
DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR - INITIAL HI LEVEL MODEL
23GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
INTEGRATING ATTRITION MODEL
• Identified specific tactical engagements within the campaigns (from the Final Report to Congress) for modeling with physics-based simulations
• Used a modified version of Jane's® Fleet Command™ [modified by Raytheon]
(40) Prepare naval gunfire support
(34) Coalition coastline defended
(37) Prepare ASUW Operations
(32a) Naval tactical aircraft
strikes conducted
(31) Iraqi shipping neutralized
(39) Prepare MCM paths to Kuwait for amphibious assault
(32b) TLAM strikes conducted
(38) Prepare submarine TLAM
launches
(33) Amphibious assault feint conducted
(35) Prepare AAW operations
(36) Prepare Naval forces and port
logistics
(41) Decide not to do amphibious assault
(30) Naval support conducted
MARITIME
CAMPAIGN
(40) Prepare naval gunfire support
(34) Coalition coastline defended
(37) Prepare ASUW Operations
(32a) Naval tactical aircraft
strikes conducted
(31) Iraqi shipping neutralized
(39) Prepare MCM paths to Kuwait for amphibious assault
(32b) TLAM strikes conducted
(38) Prepare submarine TLAM
launches
(33) Amphibious assault feint conducted
(35) Prepare AAW operations
(36) Prepare Naval forces and port
logistics
(41) Decide not to do amphibious assault
(30) Naval support conducted
Bubiyan Engagement
Prepared
Iraqi Port facilities 70% destroyed
Iraqi Navy 80% destroyed
Iraqi air forces rendered 90%
ineffective
Iraqi Airfields 60% destroyed
Iraqi SAM sites 40% destroyed
Iraqi Radar sites 50% destroyedM
ARITIME
CAMPAIGN
24GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
INTEGRATING ATTRITION MODEL
• The attrition-based model provides quantitative measures of effectiveness (% killed) of the engagement participants versus time.
– Thus, the effect(s) of the attrition model are events that reflect achievement in progress for the neutralization of adversarial participants.
• Such events became the vehicle for interfacing information from the lower level to the Hi Level EB model
• Several engagements were run in the attrition-based model and used to enhance the Hi Level EB Model
– Additional structure added
– Time delays refined
• The enhancements to the Hi Level model did not effect its basic behavior, but provided a more detailed description of intermediate events that could be examined
25GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
(18) Attack leadership command facilities
(42) Position Coalition forces West
of Kuwait
(20) Attack Telecomm. and C3
nodes
(11) RGF in KTO neutralized
(14) Iraqi regime isolated
(48) Use electronic warfare to disrupt
comms.
(40) Prepare naval gunfire support
(9) Iraqi supply lines severed
(28) Attack railroads and
bridges
(34) Coalition coastline defended
(26) Attack oil refining and
distribution facilities
(22) Attack air forces and fields
(37) Prepare ASUW Operations
(32a) Naval tactical aircraft
strikes conducted
(45) RGF attacked from West
(43) Draw Iraqi reserve forces away from main attack
(47) Conduct SOF
(31) Iraqi shipping neutralized
(21) Attack strategic IADS
(39) Prepare MCM paths to Kuwait for amphibious assault
(16) Iraqi offensive capability
neutralized
(19) Attack electrical production facilities
(23) Attack NBC research,
production and storage facilities
(25) Attack Scud missiles, launchers, prod and storage
facilities
(32b) TLAM strikes conducted
(38) Prepare submarine TLAM
launches
(33) Amphibious assault feint conducted
(12) Kuwait City liberated
(17) Iraqi mechanized
equipment in KTO rendered
ineffective
(35) Prepare AAW operations
(36) Prepare Naval forces and port
logistics
(41) Decide not to do amphibious assault
(24) Attack military storage and
production sites
(15) Iraqi NBC delivery capability
neutralized
(2) Iraqi armed forces ejected from
Kuwait
(5) Legitimate government
restored in Kuwait
(3) RGF neutralized
(1) Iraqi National Command Authority
neutralized
(4a) Ballistic missile capability
neutralized
(8) Air superiority achieved
(10a) NBC production capability
neutralized
(7a) Political & military leadership
attacked
(13) Air supremacy gained
(30) Naval support conducted
(29) Attack army and RGF in KTO
(46) Conduct Psychological
operations to degrade morale
(4b) NBC capability
neutralized
(10b) NBC storage capability
neutralized
(7b) C2 neutralized
(27) Attack naval forces and port
facilities
(44) Supporting attack conducted
from South
06
07
08
01
02
09
10
03
04
0543
11
41
40
35
36
37
3839
13
14
18
19
20
21
22
24
4445
51
26
3334
28
30
29
3231
25
59
58
57
52
53
56
73
55
54
49
48
507267
46
47
42
81
65
83
63
66
71
70
6968
60
84
61
62
78
76
80
79
82
64
74
77
Bubiyan Engagement
Prepared
Iraqi Port facilities 70% destroyed
Iraqi Navy 80% destroyed
Iraqi air forces rendered 90%
ineffective
Iraqi Airfields 60% destroyed
Iraqi SAM sites 40% destroyed
Iraqi Radar sites 50% destroyed
15
85
86
87
88
89
90
93
96
99
94
97
102
101
103
105
107
100
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
00
10
43
43
34
37
00
00
30
00
30
038
00
6
2810
010
2810
038
335
4
5
3
40
12
28
29
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(6) Iraqi military capabilities
reduced 0
1
1
81
1
1
1
Operation Centers 100% destroyed
11011
1
Battle of Al Khafji
Prepared
Armored vehicles 80% destroyed
Small vehicles 60% destroyed
119
113
114
NGFS (Ras Al-Khafji)
122
121
123
Battle at Al Khafji
Combat Unit HQs 60% destroyed
112
115
118
Gun positions 80% destroyed
Troop transports 80% destroyed
117
Ras Al-Khafji Prepared
109
3
3
3
1
1
1
8
1
Attrition Engagements
Bubiyan Island
108
95
98
104
106
91
92
120
TACTICAL COMPONENTSCAMPAIGN
OBJECTIVESTHEATER MILITARY
OBJECTIVESMISSION & NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES
Influence Key: h(%) g(%)strong 90 -90moderate 66 -66light 33 -33other other n
n
n
n
Event Nomenclature Key
(#) Event Name
##
Shorthand for the Event Name
Delay time (in days) of the event
COA start time (in days) for Actionable Events only
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
MARITIME
CAMPAIGN
AIR
CAMPAIGN
GROUND
CAMPAIGN
ENHANCED HI LEVEL MODEL
26GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
(04a) Ballistic missile capability neutralized(01) Iraqi National Command Authority neutralized
(04b) NBC capability neutralized(02) Iraqi armed forces ejected from Kuwait
(03) RGF neutralized(05) Legitimate government in Kuwait restored
(06) Iraqi military capabilities reduced
Model = Gulf_War_Model_Rev21c COA = COA_Set_04
DELAY = Delay_Set_03
Refined Results
27GMUGeorge Mason University
Integrated Defense Systems
CONCLUSIONS
• Using a case study approach we explored a process for relating a high- level effects-based model with detailed attrition-based models– Attrition models can provide a more detailed look at actionable events
that are created in the high-level EBO model and can help planners refine the courses of action selected from analysis of the EBO model
– Attrition models can help refine the structure and the conditional probability and time parameters EB model (increases the confidence in the EB model)
• Creating the interfaces was labor intensive; no “automated” technique for linking the two types of models was discovered
• Some preliminary “rules of thumb” were postulated for creating new structure in the EB model as a result of the analysis of the attrition model
• More research should yield a more efficient approach to establishing the ties between hi level effects based models and the higher fidelity attrition models