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Meaning SkepticismMeaning Skepticism

QuineQuine

Willard Van Orman QuineWillard Van Orman Quine Word and ObjectWord and Object (1960) (1960) Two Dogmas of Empiricism Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951)(1951)

QuineQuine

SynonymySynonymy We’ve seen it’s an important feature of We’ve seen it’s an important feature of

languagelanguage We need ‘meanings’ to be able to talk We need ‘meanings’ to be able to talk

about itabout it How can we know that any terms are How can we know that any terms are

synonymous?synonymous? Quine thinks we really can’tQuine thinks we really can’t

Indeterminacy of Indeterminacy of TranslationTranslation

A scientific linguist deals with:A scientific linguist deals with:

language as the complex of present dispositions to verbal behaviour

……All the objective data he has to go on are the forces that he sees impinging on the native’s surfaces and the observable behaviour, vocal and otherwise, of the native


Define the Define the modulusmodulus of an utterance of an utterance as all the stimulus that is relevant to as all the stimulus that is relevant to the utterance as languagethe utterance as language The modulus of ‘that’s a duck’ includes The modulus of ‘that’s a duck’ includes

the duck, the audience, the alarm at duck the duck, the audience, the alarm at duck presence, etcpresence, etc

It excludes yesterday’s breakfast, the It excludes yesterday’s breakfast, the seagull overhead, etc.seagull overhead, etc.

The linguist must use his informed The linguist must use his informed judgement to define a modulusjudgement to define a modulus


Linguist sees that a native can see a rabbitLinguist sees that a native can see a rabbit Native says ‘gavagai’Native says ‘gavagai’

The rabbit was within the modulus of ‘gavagai’The rabbit was within the modulus of ‘gavagai’ Does ‘gavagai’ mean ‘rabbit’?Does ‘gavagai’ mean ‘rabbit’?

Test by comparing other occurrences of Test by comparing other occurrences of ‘gavagai’‘gavagai’

If conditions of assent and dissent seem ok thenIf conditions of assent and dissent seem ok then Define Define stimulus-meaningstimulus-meaning as as the class of

stimulations prompting identically assent and dissent


Stimulus-meaning is not meaningStimulus-meaning is not meaning Doesn’t even guarantee the same referentsDoesn’t even guarantee the same referents Perhaps native applies ‘gavagai’ to the object Perhaps native applies ‘gavagai’ to the object

which is the-fusion-of-all-rabbit-partswhich is the-fusion-of-all-rabbit-parts The synonymy of ‘rabbit’ and ‘gavagai’ is The synonymy of ‘rabbit’ and ‘gavagai’ is

an an analytical hypothesisanalytical hypothesis The ‘rabbit’/‘all-rabbit-parts’ phenomenon The ‘rabbit’/‘all-rabbit-parts’ phenomenon

can persist as further analytical hypotheses can persist as further analytical hypotheses are madeare made


No hypothesis can be declared No hypothesis can be declared impossibleimpossible Any hypothesis can be maintained by Any hypothesis can be maintained by

revising other hypotheses to make it revising other hypotheses to make it consistent with observed speech-dispositionsconsistent with observed speech-dispositions

There can be no doubt that rival systems of analytical hypotheses can fit the totality of dispositions to speech behaviour as well, and still specify mutually incompatible translations of countless sentences insusceptible of independent control.


Translation/synonymy/meaning is Translation/synonymy/meaning is radically underdetermined radically underdetermined by all by all possible empirical evidence possible empirical evidence Indeterminacy is also true of theories in

science Flat Earth Phlogiston Evolution Global warming

The Skeptical ClaimThe Skeptical Claim

The indeterminacy of translation is different from the indeterminacy of scientific theorizing Posits are made in science to explain/simplify

theories about real phenomena Meaning posits are made to explain/simplify

our ability to find synonyms But there’s no reason to think that we can find

synonyms So there’s no reason to suppose there are

meanings

KripkensteinKripkenstein

Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations (1953)

Saul Kripke Wittgenstein on Rules and Private

Language (1982)

KripkensteinKripkenstein

K also thinks that there are no facts for meanings

His argument derives from considerations about what it is to follow a rule

AdditionAddition

Ask Bob to add two numbers together 68 + 57 He has never added such large numbers

before You think the correct answer is 125 Why do you think so?

Because you have followed the right rules? The right rules being those you followed in the past?

QuadditionQuaddition

A skeptic may say:

Perhaps, he suggests, as I used the term ‘plus’ in the past, the answer should have been ‘5’! Of course the sceptic’s suggestion is obviously insane. My initial response to such a suggestion might be that the challenger should go back to school and learn to add. Let the challenger, however, continue.


A skeptic may say:

After all, he says, if I am now so confident that, as I used the symbol ‘+’, my intention was that ’68 + 57’ should turn out to denote 125, this cannot be because I explicitly gave myself instructions that 125 is the result of performing the addition in this particular instance. By hypothesis, I did no such thing.


A skeptic may say:

But of course the idea is that, in this new instance, I should apply the very same function or rule that I applied so many times in the past. But who is to say what function this was?


A skeptic may say:

In the past I gave myself only a finite number of examples instantiating this function. All, we have supposed, involved numbers smaller than 57.So perhaps in the past I used ‘plus’ and ‘+’ to denote a function which I will call ‘quus’ and symbolize by ‘Q’.

x Q y = x + y if x, y < 57= 5 otherwise

Who is to say that this is not the function I previously meant by ‘+’

Facts about MeaningsFacts about Meanings

You reply: that’s just silly There is a fact of the matter about the

meaning of + We know what those facts are We know what the rule is and how to follow it

Ok, then; what facts are relevant? Try two kinds of facts to make this work:

about Behaviours Mental States


Behaviours: the claim is We know all our past behaviours

including linguistic These facts determine the meaning of +

But this can’t be right Past behaviours only involved numbers

< 57 So behaviours can’t distinguish

between addition and quaddition


Mental states: the claim is The relevant mental states are the facts that

determine what the meaning is Consider ‘Normal’ mental states

The theory has to be that a sentence has a meaning because understanding it is associated with the occurrence of the mental item

But we can show that these items are neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding


Not necessary There are no mental states that have to

come before the mind before we can understand ‘cat’

Not sufficient We can have all sorts of items in our head

that won’t help with understanding You could be thinking about chips through this

lecture You wouldn’t mistake the content of this lecture

for chips


Perhaps there are special mental states All we’d know about these is that they

ground meanings That is completely ad hoc We still wouldn’t know how they

grounded meanings


Perhaps dispositions are the right mental states If in the past I was disposed to go from 68 + 57

to 125, then I was adding If I was disposed to go from 68 + 57 to 5, then I

was quadding No

That’s about what I was disposed to do, not what was right to do – it misses out normativity

I might be disposed to cry if I see maths problems

Skeptical SolutionSkeptical Solution

K says the same kinds of objections will work for any facts you propose to ground meaning And what is true for + is true for any word

So there are no truth-determining facts about meaning But we can talk about things usefully even

when those things don’t have truth-determining facts

But what use are they? That’s another topic