VOL.211,JULY16,1992 517
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
G.R.No.68102.July16,1992.*
GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE,petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,JAIMETAYAGandROSALINDAMANALO,respondents.
G.R.No.68103.July16,1992.*
CARMENDAYRITKOH,LETICIAKOH,JULIETAKOHTUQUERO,ARACELIKOHMCKEE,ANTONIOKOHandELIZABETH KOH TURLA, petitioners, vs.INTERMEDIATEAPPELLATECOURT,JAIMETAYAGandROSALINDAMANALO,respondents.
CivilProcedure;Actions;ConsolidationofanindependentcivilactionfortherecoveryofcivilliabilityauthorizedunderArticles32,33,34or2176of theCivilCodewith the criminalactionallowedunderRuleIIIoftheRevisedRulesofCourtsubjecttotheconditionthatnofinaljudgmenthasbeenrenderedinthecriminalcase.—Inthe recent case ofCojuangcovs.Court ofAppeals, thisCourt heldthat the present provisions of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules ofCourt allow a consolidation of an independent civil action for therecovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33, 34 or2176oftheCivilCodewiththecriminalactionsubject,however,tothe condition that no final judgment has been rendered in thatcriminalcase.
CivilLaw;Negligence;Theresponsibilityarisingfromfaultornegligence in a quasidelict is entirely separate and distinct fromthe civil liability arising from negligence under the PenalCode.—As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, the responsibilityarisingfromfaultornegligenceinaquasidelictisentirelyseparateanddistinctfromthecivilliabilityarisingfromnegligenceunderthePenal Code. And, as more concretely stated in the concurringopinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, “in the case of independent civil
action under the new Civil Code, the result of the criminal case,whetheracquittalorconviction,wouldbeentirely irrelevanttothecivilaction.
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of any collusion, thejudgmentofconvictioninthecriminalcaseagainstGalangwouldhave
________________
*THIRDDIVISION.
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518 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
beenconclusive in thecivil cases for thesubsidiary liabilityof theprivate respondents.—What remains to be the most importantconsiderationastowhythedecisioninthecriminalcaseshouldnotbe considered in this appeal is the fact that private respondentswerenotpartiestherein.Itwouldhavebeenentirelydifferentifthepetitioners’causeofactionwasfordamagesarisingfromadelict,inwhich case private respondents’ liability could only be subsidiarypursuanttoArticle103oftheRevisedPenalCode.Intheabsenceofany collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal caseagainstGalangwouldhavebeenconclusiveinthecivilcasesforthesubsidiaryliabilityoftheprivaterespondents.
Same;Same;Definitionofnegligence.—NegligencewasdefinedanddescribedbythisCourt inLayuganvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt,thus:“xxxNegligenceistheomissiontodosomethingwhichareasonableman,guidedbythoseconsiderationswhichordinarilyregulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing ofsomething which a prudent and reasonable man would not do(Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooleydefinesit,‘(T)hefailuretoobservefortheprotectionoftheinterestsof another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilancewhichthecircumstancesjustlydemand,wherebysuchotherpersonsuffersinjury.’
Same; Same; Same; Under what is known as the emergencyrule, “onewhosuddenly findshimself inaplaceofdangerand is
requiredtoactwithouttimetoconsiderthebestmeansthatmaybeadoptedtoavoidtheimpendingdanger,isnotguiltyofnegligence,if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection mayappeartohavebeenabettermethod,unlesstheemergencyinwhichhe findshimself isbroughtaboutbyhisownnegligence.—On thebasisoftheforegoingdefinition,thetestofnegligenceandthefacts
obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be
imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man
wouldhave tried toavoid running over the twoboysby swerving
the car away from where they were even if this would mean
enteringtheoppositelane.Avoidingsuchimmediateperilwouldbe
the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the
opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well
slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the
oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency
rule, “onewhosuddenly findshimself inaplaceofdanger,and is
requiredtoactwithouttimetoconsiderthebestmeansthatmaybe
adoptedtoavoidtheimpendingdanger,isnotguiltyofnegligence,
ifhefailstoadoptwhatsubsequentlyanduponreflection
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VOL.211,JULY16,1992 519
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
mayappeartohavebeenabettermethod,unlesstheemergencyin
whichhefindshimselfisbroughtaboutbyhisownnegligence.”
Same;Same;Definition of proximate cause.—Proximate causehas been defined as: “x x x ‘that cause, which, in natural and
continuoussequence,unbrokenbyanyefficientinterveningcause,
produces the injury,andwithoutwhich theresultwouldnothave
occurred.’Andmore comprehensively, theproximate legal cause is
thatactingfirstandproducingtheinjury,eitherimmediatelyorby
setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, eachhavinga close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediatelyeffectingtheinjuryasanaturalandprobableresultof
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
personresponsibleforthefirsteventshould,asanordinaryprudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to somepersonmight
probablyresulttherefrom.”
Same;Same; Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a persondrivingavehicleispresumednegligentifatthetimeofthemishap,he was violating any traffic regulation.—The truck driver’snegligenceisapparentintherecords.Hehimselfsaidthathistruckwasrunningat30miles (48kilometers)perhouralongthebridgewhile themaximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30kilometersperhour.UnderArticle2185oftheCivilCode,apersondrivingavehicleispresumednegligentifatthetimeofthemishap,hewasviolatinganytrafficregulation.
Same;Same;Doctrine of last clear chance;The doctrine statesthatthecontributorynegligenceofthepartyinjuredwillnotdefeattheclaim fordamages if it is shown that thedefendantmight,bythe exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided theconsequences of the negligence of the injured party.—Last clearchance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that thecontributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat theclaim fordamages if it is shown that thedefendantmight, by theexercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided theconsequencesofthenegligenceoftheinjuredparty.Insuchcases,the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap isconsideredinlawsolelyresponsiblefortheconsequencesthereof.
Same;Same;Same;Same;Applyingtheforegoingdoctrine,itisnot difficult to rule that it was the truck driver’s negligence infailing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collisionwhichwas inlawtheproxi
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520 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
matecauseofthecollision;Employersdirectlyandprimarilyliablefor the resulting damages.—Applying the foregoing doctrine, it isnotdifficult to rule,asWenowrule, that itwas the truckdriver’snegligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collisionwhich was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. Asemployers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, underArticle2180of theCivilCode,directlyandprimarily liable for theresultingdamages.Thepresumption that theyarenegligent flowsfromthenegligenceoftheiremployee.Thatpresumption,however,isonlyjuristantum,notjurisetdejure.Theironlypossibledefense
isthattheyexercisedallthediligenceofagoodfatherofafamilyto
preventthedamage.
Remedial Law; Appeal; The Supreme Court is not a trier offacts.—TheprincipleiswellestablishedthatthisCourtisnotatrieroffacts.Therefore,inanappealbycertiorariunderRule45oftheRevisedRules of Court, only questions of lawmay be raised. The
resolutionoffactualissuesisthefunctionofthelowercourtswhose
findings on thesematters are receivedwith respect and are, as a
rule,bindingonthisCourt.
Same;Same;Same;The foregoingrulehowever isnotwithoutexceptions.—Theforegoingrule,however,isnotwithoutexceptions.FindingsoffactsofthetrialcourtsandtheCourtofAppealsmaybe
setasidewhensuchfindingsarenotsupportedbytheevidenceor
when the trial court failed to consider the material facts which
wouldhaveledtoaconclusiondifferentfromwhatwasstatedinits
judgment.Thesameistruewheretheappellatecourt’sconclusions
aregroundedentirelyonconjectures,speculationsandsurmisesor
where the conclusions of the lower courts are based on a
misapprehensionoffacts.
PETITIONforreviewfromtheresolutionofthethen
IntermediateAppellateCourt.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
DAVIDE,JR.,J.:
Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.G.R. CV Nos.
6904041,promulgatedon3April1984,whichsetasideits
previous Decision dated 29 November 1983 reversing the
Decision of the trial court which dismissed petitioners’
complaintsinCivil
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VOL.211,JULY16,1992 521
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
CaseNo.4477andCivilCaseNo.4478ofthethenCourtof
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga
entitled “Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh
Tuquero,AraceliKohMcKeeandElizabethKohTurlavs.
JaimeTayagandRosalindaManalo,”and “GeorgeMcKee
and Araceli Koh McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda
Manalo,”respectively,andgrantedtheprivaterespondents’counterclaim for moral damages, attorney’s fees andlitigationexpenses.The said civil cases for damages based on quasidelict
werefiledasaresultofavehicularaccidentwhichledtothedeathsofJoseKoh,KimKohMcKeeandLoidaBondocandcausedphysicalinjuriestoGeorgeKohMcKee,ChristopherKohMcKeeandpetitionerAraceliKohMcKee.Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors
George Koh McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and thedeceasedKimKohMcKee,weretheplaintiffsinCivilCaseNo.4478,whilepetitionerCarmenDayritKohandhercopetitionersinG.R.No.68103,whoarethewifeandchildren,respectively,ofthelateJoseKoh,weretheplaintiffsinCivilCaseNo.4477.Upon the other hand, private respondentsare the owners of the cargo truck which figured in themishap;acertainRubenGalangwasthedriverofthetruckatthetimeoftheaccident.Theantecedentfactsarenotdisputed.Between nine and ten o’clock in the morning of 8
January 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthurHighway, between Angeles City and San Fernando,Pampanga, a headoncollision took place between anInternationalcargotruck,Loadstar,withPlateNo.RF912TPhilippines’76ownedbyprivaterespondents,anddrivenbyRubenGalang,andaFordEscortcarbearingPlateNo.S2850 Pampanga ’76 driven by Jose Koh. The collisionresulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim KohMcKee andLoidaBondoc,andphysicalinjuriestoGeorgeKohMcKee,Christopher Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, allpassengersoftheFordEscort.JoseKohwasthefatherofpetitionerAraceliKohMcKee,
the mother of minors George, Christopher and Kim KohMcKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was the babysitter of one and a half year old Kim. At the time of thecollision,Kimwas seated on the lap ofLoidaBondocwhowasatthefrontpassenger’sseatofthecarwhileAraceliandhertwo(2)sonswereseatedatthe
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522 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
car’sbackseat.Immediatelybeforethecollision,thecargotruck,which
wasloadedwithtwohundred(200)cavansofriceweighingabout10,000kilos,was traveling southward fromAngelesCity to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound forManila.TheFordEscort,ontheotherhand,wasonitswaytoAngelesCityfromSanFernando.Whenthenorthboundcarwasabout(10)metersawayfromthesouthernapproachof thebridge, two (2) boys suddenlydarted from the rightsideoftheroadandintothelaneofthecar.Theboysweremovingbackand forth,unsure ofwhether to crossall thewaytotheothersideorturnback.JoseKohblewthehornofthecar,swervedtotheleftandenteredthelaneofthetruck;he thenswitchedon theheadlightsof thecar,applied thebrakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane.Beforehe coulddoso,his car collidedwith the truck.Thecollision occurred in the lane of the truck, whichwas theoppositelane,onthesaidbridge.The incident was immediately reported to the police
station in Angeles City; consequently, a team of policeofficerswasforthwithdispatchedtoconductanonthespotinvestigation.Inthesketch
1preparedbytheinvestigating
officers, the bridge is described to be sixty (60) “footsteps”longandfourteen(14)“footsteps”wide—seven(7)“footsteps”from the center line to the inner edgeof the sidewalkonbothsides.
2PulongPuloBridge,whichspansadrybrook,is
madeof concretewithsoft shouldersandconcrete railingsonbothsidesaboutthree(3)feethigh.Thesketchoftheinvestigatingofficerdisclosesthatthe
rightrearportionofthecargotruckwastwo(2)“footsteps”from the edge of the right sidewalk, while its left frontportionwastouchingthecenterlineofthebridge,withthesmashed front side of the car resting on its front bumper.Thetruckwasaboutsixteen(16)“footsteps”awayfromthenorthernendofthebridgewhilethecarwasaboutthirtysix(36)“footsteps”from
__________________
1Exhibit“S.”2In the sketch plan prepared by Geodetic Engr. Benito J. Caraan
[Exhibit “Y”], thebridge is estimated to be42.15meters in lengthand
7.5metersinwidth.
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VOL.211,JULY16,1992 523
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
theoppositeend.Skidmarksproducedbytherightfronttireofthetruckmeasurednine(9)“footsteps,”whileskidmarksproducedbytheleftfronttiremeasuredfive(5)“footsteps.”The two (2) rear tires of the truck, however, produced noskidmarks.In his statement to the investigating police officers
immediately after the accident, Galang admitted that hewastravelingatthirty(30)miles(48kilometers)perhour.Asaconsequenceofthecollision,two(2)cases,CivilCase
No. 4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977before the thenCourt of First Instance of Pampanga andwereraffledtoBranchIIIandBranchVofthesaidcourt,respectively. In the first, herein petitioners in G.R. No.68103prayedfortheawardofP12,000.00asindemnityforthe death of Jose Koh, P150,000.00 as moral damages,P60,000.00asexemplarydamages,P10,000.00forlitigationexpenses,P6,000.00 for burial expenses,P3,650.00 for theburiallotandP9,500.00forthetomb,plusattorney’sfees.
3
Inthesecondcase,petitionersinG.R.No.68102prayedforthe following: (a) in connection with the death of KimMcKee, the sumofP12,000.00asdeathbenefit,P3,150.00for funeral services, P3,650.00 for the cemetery lot,P3,000.00 for the tomb, P50,000.00 as moral damages,P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 asmiscellaneous damages; (b) in the case of Araceli KohMcKee, in connection with the serious physical injuriessuffered, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages,P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P12,000.00 for loss ofearnings,P5,000.00 for thehospitalization expensesup tothedateofthefilingofthecomplaint;and(c)withrespecttoGeorgeMcKee,Jr., inconnectionwiththeseriousphysicalinjuriessuffered,thesumofP50,000.00asmoraldamages,P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the followingmedical expenses: P3,400 payable to the Medical Center,P3,500.00 payable to the St. Francis Medical Center,P5,175.00 payable to the Clark Air Base Hospital, andmiscellaneousexpensesamountingtoP5,000.00.Theyalsosoughtanawardofattorney’sfeesamountingto25%ofthetotalawardplustravelingandhotelexpenses,withcosts.
4
________________
3RecordonAppeal,220.4Id.,1618.
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524 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
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On1March1977,anInformationchargingRubenGalangwith the crime of “Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic)Multiple Homicide and Physical Injuries and Damage toProperty”wasfiledwiththetrialcourt.ItwasdocketedasCriminalCaseNo.3751andwasraffledtoBranchVofthecourt, the same Branch where Civil Case No. 4478 wasassigned.
5
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No.4477, private respondents asserted that it was the FordEscortcarwhich“invadedandbumped(sic)thelaneofthetruckdrivenbyRubenGalangand,ascounterclaim,prayedfortheawardofP15,000.00asattorney’sfees,P20,000.00asactual and liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as moraldamagesandP30,000.00asbusinesslosses.
6InCivilCase
No.4478,privaterespondentsfirstfiledamotiontodismisson grounds of pendency of another action (Civil CaseNo.4477)andfailuretoimpleadanindispensableparty,RubenGalang, the truck driver; they also filed a motion toconsolidate the case with Civil Case No. 4477 pendingbeforeBranchIIIofthesamecourt,whichwasopposedbytheplaintiffs.
7BothmotionsweredeniedbyBranchV,then
presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong. Thereupon,privaterespondents filedtheirAnswerwithCounterclaim
8
whereintheyallegedthatJoseKohwastheperson“atfaulthavingapproached the laneof the truckdrivenbyRubenGalang, x x xwhichwas on the right lane going towardsManilaandatamoderatespeedobservingalltrafficrulesand regulations applicable under the circumstances thenprevailing;”intheircounterclaim,theyprayedforanawardof damages asmay be determined by the court after duehearing,andthesumsofP10,000.00asattorney’sfeesandP5,000.00asexpensesoflitigation.Petitioners filed theirAnswers to theCounterclaims in
bothcases.Toexpeditetheproceedings,theplaintiffsinCivilCase
No. 4478 filed on 27 March 1978 a motion to adopt the
testimonies
__________________
5RecordonAppeal,121124.6Id.,226227.7Id.,2225;2628;2832;3436.8Id.,3943.
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VOL.211,JULY16,1992 525
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
ofwitnessestakenduringthehearingofCriminalCaseNo.3751, which private respondents opposed and which thecourtdenied.
9Petitionerssubsequentlymovedtoreconsider
the order denying the motion for consolidation,10 which
JudgeCapulonggrantedintheOrderof5September1978;he thendirected thatCivilCaseNo.4478 be consolidatedwithCivil CaseNo. 4477 inBranch III of the court thenpresidedoverbyJudgeMarioCastañeda,Jr.LeftthenwithBranchVofthetrialcourtwasCriminal
CaseNo.3751.In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses
Araceli Koh McKee, Fernando Nuñag, Col. RobertFitzgerald, Primitivo Parel, Eugenio Tanhueco, CarmenKoh and Antonio Koh,
11 and offered several documentary
exhibits. Upon the other hand, private respondentspresented as witnesses Ruben Galang, Zenaida Soliman,JaimeTayagandRomanDayrit.
12
In the criminal case, the prosecution presented aswitnessesMrs.AraceliMcKee,SaludSamia,Pfc.FernandoNuñag, Dr. Ramon Panlilio, Dr. Robert Fitzgerald, Dr.RobertoYuson,Dr.HectorUlanday,Pfc.BenignodeLeon,Marina Bolos, Primitivo Parel, Rogelio Pineda, BenitoCaraan and Eugenio Tanhueco, and offered severaldocumentaryexhibits.
13Upon the other hand, the defense
presented the accused Ruben Galang, Luciano Punzalan,Zenaida Soliman and Roman Dayrit, and offereddocumentaryexhibits.
14
On1October1980,JudgeCapulongrenderedadecisionagainsttheaccusedRubenGalangintheaforesaidcriminalcase.Thedispositiveportionofthedecisionreadsasfollows:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is herebyrendered finding the accused Ruben Galang guilty beyondreasonabledoubtofthecrimechargedintheinformationandafterapplyingtheprovisionsofArticle365oftheRevisedPenalCodeandindeterminate
________________
9RecordonAppeal,4548;4952;5253.
10Id.,5357.
11Id.,91,92,100,101,103,104and105.
12RecordonAppeal,107,109,111and112.
13Id.,124,etseq.
14Id.,138,etseq.
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526 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
sentencelaw,thisCourt,imposesuponsaidaccusedRubenGalangthepenaltyof six (6)monthsofarrestomayor asminimum to two(2)years,four(4)monthsandone(1)dayofprisioncorreccionalasmaximum; the accused is further sentenced to pay and indemnifytheheirs ofLoidaBondoc theamount ofP12,000.00as indemnityforherdeath;toreimbursetheheirsofLoidaBondoctheamountofP2,000.00 representing the funeral expenses; to pay the heirs ofLoida Bondoc the amount of P20,000.00 representing her loss ofincome; to indemnify and pay the heirs of the deceased JoseKohthe value of the car in the amount ofP53,910.95, and to pay thecosts.”
15
The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17November 1980; on the same day, counsel for petitionersfiledwithBranch III of the court—where the two (2) civilcases were pending—a manifestation to that effect andattachedtheretoacopyofthedecision.
16
Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr.dismissedthetwo(2)civilcaseson12November1980andawarded the private respondents moral damages,exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
17 The dispositive
portionofthesaiddecisionreadsasfollows:
“WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of evidence to be infavor of thedefendants andagainst theplaintiffs, these cases arehereby orderedDISMISSEDwith costs against the plaintiffs. The
defendants had proven their counterclaim, thru evidences (sic)presentedandunrebutted.Hence, theyareherebyawardedmoraland exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 plusattorney’s fee of P15,000.00 and litigation expenses for (sic)P2,000.00.Theactualdamagesclaimedfor (sic)bythedefendantsis(sic)herebydismissedforlackofprooftothateffect(sic).”
18
A copy of the decisionwas sent by registeredmail to thepetitioners on 28 November 1980 and was received on 2December1980.
19
________________
15Id.,160161.16RecordonAppeal,120121.17Id.,86120.18Id.,119120.19Id.,6.
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McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
AccusedRubenGalangappealedthejudgmentofconvictiontotheCourtofAppeals.TheappealwasdocketedasC.A.G.R.Blg.24764CRandwasassigned to the court’sThirdDivision. Plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478likewise separately appealed the 12 November 1980decision to theappellatecourt.Theappealsweredocketedas C.A.G.R. No. 69041R and C.A.G.R. No. 69040R,respectively, andwere assigned to theFourthCivilCasesDivision.On4October1982,therespondentCourtpromulgatedits
decision20 in C.A.G.R. Blg. 24764CR affirming the
conviction of Galang.21 The dispositive portion of the
decisionreads:
“DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong paghahabol ayAmingpinagtitibaysakanyangkabuuan.Angnaghahabolparinangpinagbabayadnggugolngpaghahabol.”
AmotionforreconsiderationofthedecisionwasdeniedbytherespondentCourtinitsKapasiyahanpromulgatedon25November1982.
22Apetitionfor itsreview
23was filedwith
thisCourt;saidpetitionwassubsequentlydenied.Amotionfor its reconsideration was denied with finality in theResolutionof20April1983.
24
On29November1983,respondentCourt,bythenknownas the Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated itsconsolidated decision in A.C.G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and69041,
25thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:
“WHEREFORE,thedecisionappealedfromisherebyreversedandset aside and another one is rendered, ordering defendantsappelleestopayplaintiffsappellantsasfollows:
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20PerAssociateJusticeOnofreA.Villaluz,concurredinbyAssociateJustices
CrisolitoPascualandGuillermoP.Villasor.
21Annex“C”ofPetition;Rollo,6977.
22Annex“C1,”Id.;Id.,78.
23G.R.No.62713.
24Annex“D,”Petition,op.cit.;Rollo,op.cit.,79.
25PerAssociateJusticePorfirioV.Sison,concurredinbyAssociateJustices
AbdulwahidA.Bidin,MarcelinoR.VelosoandDesiderioP.Jurado.
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528 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
ForthedeathofJoseKoh:P50,000.00asmoraldamagesP12,000.00asdeathindemnityP16,000.00forthelotandtomb(Exhs.UandU1) P4,000.00expenses forholdingawake (p.9, tsnApril19,
1979)P950.00forthecasket(Exh.M)P375.00forthevaultservices(Exhs.VandV1)ForthedeathofKimKohMcKee:P50,000.00asmoraldamagesP12,000.00asdeathindemnityP1,000.00forthepurchaseoftheburiallot(Exh.M)P950.00forfuneralservices(Exh.M1)P375.00forvaultservices(Exhs.VandV1)ForthephysicalinjuriessufferedbyGeorgeKohMcKee:P25,000.00asmoraldamagesP672.00forClarkFieldHospital(Exh.E)
P4,384.00paidtoAngelesMedicalClinic(Exhs.D,D1andD2)P1,555.00paidtoSt.FrancisMedicalCenter(Exhs.BandB
1)ForthephysicalinjuriessufferedbyAraceliKohMcKee:P25,000.00asmoraldamagesP1,055.00paidtoSt.FrancisMedicalCenter(Exhs.GandG
1)P75.00paidtoSt.FrancisMedicalCenter(Exhs.G2andG
3)P428.00toCarmeliteGeneralHospital(Exh.F)P114.20toMuñozClinic(Exh.MM)ForthephysicalinjuriessufferedbyChristopherKohMcKee:P10,000.00asmoraldamagesP1,231.10toSt.FrancisMedicalCenter(Exhs.LandL1)P321.95toF.C.E.A.Hospital(Exhs.GandD1)In addition,We awardP10,000.00 as counsel (sic) fees inCivil
CaseNo.4477andanotherP10,000.00ascounsel(sic)feesinCivilCaseNo.4478.Nopronouncementastocosts.SOORDERED.”
26
________________
26Rollo,8889.
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VOL.211,JULY16,1992 529
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The decision is anchored principally on the respondentCourt’sfindingsthatitwasRubenGalang’sinattentivenessor reckless imprudence which caused the accident. Theappellate court further said that the law presumesnegligence on the part of the defendants (privaterespondents),asemployersofGalang, in theselectionandsupervisionofthelatter;itwasfurtherassertedthatthesedefendants did not allege in their Answers the defense ofhavingexercisedthediligenceofagoodfatherofafamilyinselecting and supervising the said employee.
27 This
conclusionofrecklessimprudenceisbasedonthefollowingfindingsoffact:
“In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial positions, the
determinative issue inthisappeal isposited inthefourthassignederrorasfollows:
‘IV
THETRIALCOURTERREDWHEN ITHELDTHE (sic) DRIVEROF
THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS TRUCK BLEWHIS HORN SWITCHED
ONHISHEADLIGHTSANDCOULDNOTSWERVETOTHERIGHT.’
Supportive of plaintiffs’ version, principal witness Araceli KohMcKeetestifiedthus:
‘Q Whathappenedafterthat,asyouapproachedthebridge?
A Whenwewereapproachingthebridge,two(2)boystriedtocrosstherightlaneontherightsideofthehighwaygoingtoSanFernando.Myfather,whois(sic)thedriverofthecartriedtoavoidthetwo(2)boyswhowerecrossing,heblewhishornandswervedtothelefttoavoidhittingthetwo(2)boys.Wenoticedthetruck,heswitchedontheheadlightstowarnthetruckdriver,toslowdowntogiveustherightofwaytocomebacktoourrightlane.
Q Didthetruckslowdown?
A No,sir,itdidnot,just(sic)continuedonitsway.
Q Whathappenedafterthat?
A Afteravoidingthetwo(2)boys,thecartriedtogobacktotherightlanesincethetruckis(sic)coming,myfathersteppedonthebrakesandallwhat(sic)Iheardisthe
_________________
27Id.,88.
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soundofimpact(sic),sir.’(tsn,pp.56,July22,1977);or(Exhibit‘O’intheseCivilCases).
xxx
Q Mrs.howdidyouknowthatthetruckdrivenbythehereinaccused,RubenGalangdidnotreduceitsspeedbeforetheactualimpactofcollision(sic)asyounarratedinthisExhibit‘1,’howdidyouknow(sic)?
A Itjustkeptoncoming,sir.Ifonlyhereducedhisspeed,wecouldhavegot(sic)backtoourrightlaneonside(sic)ofthehighway,sir.’(tsn.pp.3334,July22,1977)or(Exhibit‘O’in
theseCivilCases)’(pp.3031,Appellants’Brief).
Plaintiffs’ version was successfully corroborated to Oursatisfactionbythefollowingfactsandcircumstances:1. An impartial eyewitness to themishap, Eugenio Tanhueco,
declared that the truck stopped onlywhen it had already collidedwiththecar:
xxx
Tanhueco repeated the same testimony during the hearing in the
criminalcase:
xxx
Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an accommodation witness
becausehewasoneofthefirsttoarriveatthesceneoftheaccident.As
a matter of fact, he brought one of the injured passengers to the
hospital.
We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to defendants’
witnesses, Zenaida Soliman, a passenger of the truck, and Roman
Dayrit,whosupposedlylivedacrossthestreet.
Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the ordinary
courseofeventspeopleusuallytakethesideof thepersonwithwhom
they are associated at the time of the accident, because, as a general
rule,theydonotwishtobeidentifiedwiththepersonwhowasatfault.
Thus an imaginary bond is unconsciously created among the several
personswithinthesamegroup(Peoplevs.Vivencio,CAG.R.No.00310
CR,Jan.31,1962).
WithrespecttoDayrit,Wecannothelpsuspecting(sic)thatheisan
accommodation witness. He did not go to the succor of the injured
persons. He said he wanted to call the police authorities about the
mishap,buthisphonehadnodialtone.Bethis(sic)asitmay,thetrial
courtinthecriminalcaseactedcorrectlyinrefusingtobelieveDayrit.
531
VOL.211,JULY16,1992 531
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
2. Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not include the claimthat Galang stopped his truck at a safe distance from the car,according toplaintiffs (p. 25,Appellants’Brief).This contentionofappellantswascompletelypassedsubsilencioorwasnotrefutedbyappelleesintheirbrief.Exhibit2isoneoftheexhibitsnotincludedintherecord.AccordingtotheTableofContentssubmittedbythecourt below, said Exhibit 2 was not submitted by defendantsappellees.Inthislight,itisnotfarfetchedtosurmisethatGalang’s
claim that he stopped was an eleventhhour desperate attempt to
exculpatehimselffromimprisonmentanddamages.
3.Galangdivulgedthathestoppedafterseeingthecarabout10
metersaway:
‘ATTY.SOTTO:
Q DoIunderstandfromyourtestimonythatinspiteofthefact
thatyouadmittedthattheroadisstraightandyoumaybeable
to(sic)see5001000metersawayfromyouanyvehicle,you
firstsawthatcaronlyaboutten(10)metersawayfromyoufor
thefirsttime?
xxx
A Inoticedit,sir,thatitwasaboutten(10)metersaway.
ATTY.SOTTO:
Q So,forclarification,youclarifyandstateunderyouroaththat
youhave(sic)notnoticeditbeforethatten(10)meters?(Tsn.3
to5,Sept.18,1979).’(p.16,Appellants’Brief)’
Galang’s testimonysubstantiate (sic)Tanhueco’sstatementthat
Galang stopped only because of the impact. At ten (10) meters
away,withthetruckrunningat30milesperhour,asrevealed in
Galang’saffidavit (Exh.2;p.25,Appellants’Brief), it iswellnigh
impossibletoavoidacollisiononabridge.
5. Galang’s truck stopped because of the collision, and not
because hewaited for JoseKoh to return to his proper lane. The
police investigator, Pfc. Fernando L.Nunag, stated that he found
skid marks under the truck but there were not (sic) skid marks
behind the truck (pp. 1920, t.s.n.,Nov. 3, 1978).Thepresence of
skidmarks show (sic) that the truckwas speeding. Since the skid
markswerefoundunderthetruckandnonewerefoundattherear
ofthetruck,thereasonableconclusionisthattheskidmarksunder
thetruckwerecausedbythetruck’s frontwheelswhenthetrucks
(sic)suddenlystoppedsecondsbeforethemishapinanendeavorto
avoidthesame.But,asaforesaid,
532
532 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
Galangsawthecaratbarely10metersaway,averyshortdistance
toavoidacollision,andinhisfutileendeavortoavoidthecollision
heabruptlysteppedonhisbrakesbutthesmashuphappened just
thesame.
For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of Galang, the
law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants in theselectionoftheirdriverorinthesupervisionoverhim.Appelleesdidnot allege such defense of having exercised the duties of a goodfatherofafamilyintheselectionandsupervisionoftheiremployeesintheiranswers.Theydidnotevenadduceevidencethattheydidinfacthavemethodsofselectionandprogramsofsupervision.TheinattentivenessornegligenceofGalangwastheproximatecauseofthemishap. If Galang’s attention was on the highway, he wouldhavesightedthecarearlierorataverysafedistancethan(sic)10meters.Heproceededtocross thebridge,andtriedtostopwhenacollisionwasalreadyinevitable,becauseatthetimethatheenteredthebridgehisattentionwasnotrivetedtotheroadinfrontofhim.Onthequestionofdamages,theclaimsofappellantswereamply
proven,buttheitemsmustbereduced.”28
Amotionforreconsiderationallegingimproperappreciationof the factswas subsequently filedbyprivate respondentsonthebasisofwhichtherespondentCourt,initsResolutionof3April1984,
29reconsideredandsetasideits29November
1983decisionandaffirmedintotothetrialcourt’sjudgmentof 12 November 1980. A motion to reconsider thisResolutionwasdeniedby the respondentCourt on4July1984.
30
Hence,thispetition.PetitionersallegethatrespondentCourt:
“I
x x x COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERRORWHEN IT TOTALLY REVERSED ITS DECISION BY MERELYBASING IT FROM (sic) A MERE ‘PRESUMPTION,’ TOTALLYDISREGARDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ DRIVER’SADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS, WHO EXCLUSIVELYCOMMITTED
_________________
28Rollo,8388.
29Rollo,6165.
30Id.,67.
533
VOL.211,JULY16,1992 533
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
THEPROXIMATECAUSEOFTHEACCIDENT (sic),FURTHER,IT ALSO DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED ANDFOUND IN THE RECORDS; THEREFORE, RESPONDENTCOURT’SRESOLUTIONS (ANNEXESA andB,PETITION)ARECLEARLYERRONEOUS,PURELYBASEDONSPECULATIONS,CONJECTURES ANDWITHOUT SURE FOUNDATION IN THEEVIDENCE.
II
x x x GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERREDWHEN IN EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A DOCTRINE LAIDDOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT BY STATING AMONGOTHERS, ‘IT CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THEFINDINGS OF GUILT IN THE CRIMINAL CASEWHERE THEDRIVEROFTHETRUCK INVOLVED INTHEACCIDENTWASINDICTED.’
III
x x x PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETIONANDMADEAMISLEADINGPRONOUNCEMENT,WHEN IT HELD: ‘IT IS THUS INCUMBENT UPON THEPLAINTIFFSAPPELLANTS (APPELLEES WRONGLYMENTIONED IN THE RESOLUTION) TO PROVE THEIRALLEGATIONS THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THEACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATERESPONDENTS’DRIVER.’
IV
x x x COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic) ERROR,COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CITEDANOTHER CASE WHICH IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TOTHESECASES.
V
x x x COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELYABUSED ITSDISCRETION INADOPTINGTHEFINDINGSOFTHETRIALCOURTWHICHARECLEARLYERRONEOUSANDCONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE RECORDS,SPECIALLY THEY (sic) ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTEDFACTSANDJUDICIALADMISSIONSMADEBYTHEPRIVATERESPONDENTS’DRIVER.
VI
534
534 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
xxxEXCEEDEDITSJURISDICTION,COMMITTEDGRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITAWARDED DAMAGES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTSWHENSAIDAWARD ISNOT SUPPORTEDBYEVIDENCE, INTHERECORDS,ANDSAIDAWARDISNOTALLOWEDBYLAWAND THE CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLECOURT.
VII
xxxEXCEEDEDITSJURISDICTION,COMMITTEDGRAVEABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS DECISION AWARDINGDAMAGES TO PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY INACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, THE LAW ANDJURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE AWARD OFDAMAGES.”
31
In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We requiredprivaterespondentstoCommentonthepetition.
32Afterthe
saidComment33 was filed, petitioners submitted a Reply
34
thereto; this Court then gave due course to the instantpetitionsandrequiredpetitionerstofiletheirBrief,
35which
theyaccordinglycompliedwith.There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the
main task of dissecting the arguments and counterarguments, some observations on the proceduralvicissitudesofthesecasesareinorder.Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the
recoveryof civil liabilityarising fromaquasidelict underArticle 2176 in relation toArticle 2180 of theCivilCode,werefiledaheadofCriminalCaseNo.3751.CivilCaseNo.4478waseventuallyconsolidatedwithCivilCaseNo.4477forjointtrialinBranchIIIofthetrialcourt.Therecordsdonot indicateanyattemptonthepartof theparties,and itmaythereforebereasonablycon
_________________
31Rollo,213214.
32Rollo,150.
33Id.,157175.34Id.,185198.35Id.,199.
535
VOL.211,JULY16,1992 535
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
cluded that nonewasmade, to consolidateCriminalCase
No.3751withthecivilcases,orviceversa.Thepartiesmayhavethenbelieved,andunderstandablyso,sincebythenno
specific provision of law or ruling of this Court expressly
allowed such a consolidation, that an independent civil
action, authorized under Article 33 in relation to Article
2177oftheCivilCode,suchasthecivilcasesinthiscase,
cannotbeconsolidatedwiththecriminalcase.Indeed,such
consolidationcouldhavebeenfarthestfromtheirmindsas
Article 33 itself expressly provides that the “civil action
shallproceedindependentlyofthecriminalprosecution,and
shallrequireonlyapreponderanceofevidence.”Bethatas
itmay, therewas then no legal impediment against such
consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court,
which seeks toavoidamultiplicity of suits, guardagainst
oppression and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested
dockets to simplify theworkof the trial court, or in short,
attain justice with the least expense to the parties
litigants,36
would have easily sustained a consolidation,
thereby preventing the unseeming, if not ludicrous,
spectacleof two (2) judgesappreciating,according to their
respective orientation, perception and perhaps even
prejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafterrenderingconflictingdecisions.Suchwaswhathappenedinthiscase.Itshouldnot,hopefully,happenanymore.Inthe
recentcaseofCojuangcovs.CourtofAppeals,37
thisCourt
heldthatthepresentprovisionsofRule111oftheRevised
RulesofCourtallowaconsolidationofanindependentcivil
action for the recovery of civil liability authorized under
Articles 32, 33, 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the
criminal action subject, however, to the condition that no
finaljudgmenthasbeenrenderedinthatcriminalcase.
Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in
CriminalCaseNo. 3751 findingGalang guilty of reckless
imprudence,althoughalreadyfinalbyvirtueofthedenial
bynolessthanthisCourtofhislastattempttosetasidethe
respondentCourt’s affirmance of the verdict of conviction,
hasnorelevanceor
________________
36Cañosvs.Peralta,115SCRA843[1982],citing1C.J.S.13421343.
37203SCRA619[1991].
536
536 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
importancetothiscase.
AsWeheldinDionisiovs.Alvendia,38
the responsibility
arisingfromfaultornegligenceinaquasidelictisentirelyseparate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligenceunderthePenalCode.And,asmoreconcretely
statedintheconcurringopinionofJusticeJ.B.L.Reyes,“in
the case of independent civil actions under the newCivil
Code, the resultof the criminal case,whetheracquittalor
conviction,wouldbeentirelyirrelevanttothecivilaction.”39
InSalta vs.DeVeyra andPNBvs. Purisima,40
thisCourt
stated:
“xxxItseemsperfectlyreasonabletoconcludethatthecivilactions
mentioned inArticle 33, permitted in the samemanner tobe filed
separatelyfromthecriminalcase,mayproceedsimilarlyregardlessoftheresultofthecriminalcase.Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a
criminal case, to be filed separately and to proceed independently
evenduringthependencyofthelattercase,theintentionispatent
to make the court’s disposition of the criminal case of no effect
whatsoeverontheseparatecivilcase.Thismustbesobecausethe
offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other
offenses not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a
separate civil action because of the distinct separability of their
respectivejuridicalcauseorbasisofactionxxx.”
Whatremainstobethemostimportantconsiderationasto
why the decision in the criminal case should not be
consideredinthisappealisthefactthatprivaterespondents
were not parties therein. It would have been entirely
differentifthepetitioners’causeofactionwasfordamages
arising from a delict, in which case private respondents’liabilitycouldonlybesubsidiarypursuanttoArticle103of
theRevisedPenalCode.Intheabsenceofanycollusion,the
judgmentofconvictioninthecriminalcaseagainstGalang
wouldhavebeenconclusiveinthe
_______________
38102Phil.443[1957].
39Atpage447.
40117SCRA212,218219[1982];seealsoCastillovs.CourtofAppeals,
176 SCRA 591 [1989]; Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191
SCRA195[1990].
537
VOL.211,JULY16,1992 537
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
civil cases for the subsidiary liability of the private
respondents.41
Andnowtothemeritsofthepetition.
It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the
principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not
respondentCourt’sfindingsinitschallengedresolutionare
supported by evidence or are based onmere speculations,
conjecturesandpresumptions.
TheprincipleiswellestablishedthatthisCourtisnota
trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari underRule45oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,onlyquestionsoflaw
may be raised. The resolution of factual issues is the
functionofthelowercourtswhosefindingsonthesematters
arereceivedwithrespectandare,asarule,bindingonthis
Court.42
The foregoing rule, however, is notwithout exceptions.
FindingsoffactsofthetrialcourtsandtheCourtofAppeals
maybesetasidewhensuchfindingsarenotsupportedby
theevidenceorwhen the trial court failed to consider the
materialfactswhichwouldhaveledtoaconclusiondifferent
fromwhatwas stated in its judgment.43
The same is true
where the appellate court’s conclusions are grounded
entirely on conjectures, speculations and surmises44
or
where the conclusions of the lower courts are based on a
misapprehensionoffacts.45
It isatonceobvioustothisCourtthatthe instantcase
qualifies as one of the aforementioned exceptions as the
findings and conclusions of the trial court and the
respondent Court in its challenged resolution are not
supportedbytheevidence,
_________________
41Martinezvs.Barredo,81Phil.1[1948];Mirandavs.MalateGarage
andTaxicab,Inc.,99Phil.670[1956];Manalovs.RoblesTransportation
Co.,Inc.,99Phil.729[1956].
42FNCB Finance vs. Estavillo, 192 SCRA 514 [1990]; Rañeses vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 187 SCRA 397 [1990]; Remalante vs.
Tibe,158SCRA138[1988].
43Capcovs.Macasaet,189SCRA561[1990].
44Orcinovs.CivilServiceCommission,190SCRA815 [1990]; Tupue
vs.Urgel,161SCRA417 [1988];Tolentino vs. De Jesus, 56 SCRA 167
[1974].
45Pajunar vs. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 464 [1989]; Sese vs.
IntermediateAppellateCourt,152SCRA585[1987].
538
538 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
arebasedonamisapprehensionoffactsandtheinferences
made therefrom aremanifestlymistaken. The respondent
Court’s decision of 29 November 1983 makes the correct
findingsoffact.
In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held
thatthefactthatthecarimproperlyinvadedthelaneofthe
truckandthatthecollisionoccurredinsaidlanegaveriseto
thepresumption that thedriver of the car, JoseKoh,was
negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the
appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose
Koh’s negligence that was the immediate and proximate
causeofthecollision.Thisisanunwarranteddeductionas
theevidenceforthepetitionersconvincinglyshowsthatthe
carswervedintothetruck’s lanebecauseas itapproached
the southernendof thebridge, two (2) boysdartedacross
theroadfromtherightsidewalkintothelaneofthecar.As
testifiedtobypetitionerAraceliKohMcKee:
Q Whathappenedafterthat,asyouapproachedthe
bridge?
A Whenwewereapproachingthebridge,two(2)boystriedtocrosstherightlaneontherightsideofthehighwaygoingtoSanFernando.Myfather,whois(sic)thedriverofthecartriedtoavoidthetwo(2)boyswhowerecrossing,heblewhishornandswervedtothelefttoavoidhittingthetwo(2)boys.Wenoticedthetruck,heswitchedontheheadlightstowarnthetruckdriver,toslowdowntogiveustherightofwaytocomebacktoourrightlane.
Q Didthetruckslowdown?
A Nosir,itdidnot,just(sic)continuedonitsway.
Q Whathappenedafterthat?
A Afteravoidingthetwo(2)boys,thecartriedtogobacktotherightlanesincethetruckis(sic)coming,myfathersteppedonthebrakesandallwhat(sic)Iheardisthesoundofimpact(sic),sir.”
46
Hercredibilityandtestimonyremainedintactevenduringcross examination. Jose Koh’s entry into the lane of thetruckwasnecessaryinordertoavoidwhatwas,inhismindatthattime,agreaterperil—deathorinjurytothetwo(2)boys.Such
________________
46TSN,22July1977,56;Exhibit“O,”Rollo,83.
539
VOL.211,JULY16,1992 539
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
actcanhardlybeclassifiedasnegligent.Negligencewas defined and described by thisCourt in
Layuganvs.IntermediateAppellateCourt,47thus:
“x x x Negligence is the omission to do something which areasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarilyregulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing ofsomething which a prudent and reasonable man would not do(Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooleydefinesit,‘(T)hefailuretoobservefortheprotectionoftheinterests
of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance
whichthecircumstancesjustlydemand,wherebysuchotherperson
suffersinjury.’(CooleyonTorts,FourthEdition,vol.3,265)
In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. 809, 813), decided more than
seventyyearsagobutstillasoundrule,(W)eheld:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a
particularcasemaybestatedasfollows:Didthedefendantindoingthe
alleged negligent act use that (reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?) If
not, then he is guilty of negligence. The lawhere in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreetpaterfamiliasoftheRomanlaw.xxx”
InCorlissvs.ManilaRailroadCompany,48
Weheld:
“xxx‘Negligenceiswantofthecarerequiredbythecircumstances.
It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its
applicationdependsuponthesituationofthepartiesandthedegree
of care and vigilancewhich the circumstances reasonably require.
Wherethedangerisgreat,ahighdegreeofcareisnecessary,and
the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the
circumstances.(citingAhernv.OregonTelephoneCo.,35Pac.549
(1894).’”
On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of
negligenceandthefactsobtaininginthiscase,itismanifest
that no negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any
reasonableandordinaryprudentmanwouldhavetriedto
avoidrunningover
________________
47167SCRA363[1988].
4827SCRA674[1969].
540
540 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
the two boys by swerving the car away from where they
were even if this wouldmean entering the opposite lane.
Avoidingsuchimmediateperilwouldbethenaturalcourse
totakeparticularlywherethevehicle intheopposite lane
would be several meters away and could very well slow
down, move to the side of the road and give way to the
oncoming car. Moreover, under what is known as the
emergencyrule,“onewhosuddenlyfindshimselfinaplace
ofdanger,andisrequiredtoactwithouttimetoconsiderthe
best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger,isnotguiltyofnegligence,ifhefailstoadoptwhat
subsequentlyanduponreflectionmayappeartohavebeen
a bettermethod, unless the emergency in which he finds
himselfisbroughtaboutbyhisownnegligence.”49
Consideringthesuddenintrusionofthetwo(2)boysinto
thelaneofthecar,WefindthatJoseKohadoptedthebest
meanspossibleinthegivensituationtoavoidhittingthem.
Applyingtheabovetest,therefore,itisclearthathewasnot
guiltyofnegligence.
In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh isnegligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the
proximatecauseofthecollision.Proximatecausehasbeen
definedas:
“x x x ‘that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
andwithoutwhich the resultwouldnothaveoccurred.’Andmore
comprehensively, theproximate legalcause is thatacting firstand
producingtheinjury,eitherimmediatelyorbysettingotherevents
inmotion,allconstitutinganaturalandcontinuouschainofevents,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the finalevent in the chain immediatelyeffecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted,undersuchcircumstancesthatthepersonresponsibleforthe
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person,
have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.”50
_________________
49Gan vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 378 [1988], citing Siegl vs.
Watson,195NW867andothers.
50Vda. de Bataclan vs. Medina, 102 Phil. 181 [1957], citing 38 Am.
Jur.695696.
541
VOL.211,JULY16,1992 541
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
Applyingtheabovedefinition,althoughitmaybesaidthat
theactofJoseKoh,ifatallnegligent,wastheinitialactin
thechainofevents,itcannotbesaidthatthesamecaused
theeventualinjuriesanddeathsbecauseoftheoccurrence
of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the
truckdriver,whichwastheactualcauseofthetragedy.The
entryof thecar into the laneof the truckwouldnothave
resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the
emergency signals given by the former to slow down and
givethecaranopportunitytogobackintoitsproperlane.
Insteadofslowingdownandswervingtothefarrightofthe
road,whichwas the proper precautionarymeasure under
thegivencircumstances,thetruckdrivercontinuedatfull
speed towards the car. The truck driver’s negligence
becomesmoreapparentinviewofthefactthattheroadis
7.50meterswidewhilethecarmeasures1.598metersand
the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that
bothcarandtruckcouldpasssidebysidewithaclearance
of 3.661meters to spare.51
Furthermore, the bridge has a
levelsidewalkwhichcouldhavepartiallyaccommodatedthe
truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the given
situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of
meetingitheadon.
Thetruckdriver’snegligenceisapparentintherecords.
Hehimselfsaidthathistruckwasrunningat30miles(48
kilometers)perhouralongthebridgewhile themaximum
speedallowedbylawonabridge52
isonly30kilometersper
hour.UnderArticle2185oftheCivilCode,apersondriving
avehicleispresumednegligentifatthetimeofthemishap,
he was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give
credence to private respondents’ claim that there was an
error in the translation by the investigating officer of the
truck driver’s response in Pampango as to whether the
speed citedwas in kilometers per hour ormiles per hour.
The law presumes that official duty has been regularly
performed;53
unless there is proof to the contrary, this
presumptionholds.Intheinstantcase,privaterespondents’
claimisbasedonmereconjecture.
_________________
51Rollo,148.
52Section53,MotorVehicleLaw.
53Section2(m),Rule131,RevisedRulesofCourt.
542
542 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
Thetruckdriver’snegligencewaslikewisedulyestablished
through the earlier quoted testimony of petitionerAraceli
KohMcKeewhichwasdulycorroboratedbythetestimonyof
EugenioTanhueco,animpartialeyewitnesstothemishap.
AraceliKohMcKeetestifiedfurther,thus:
xxx
“Q Mrs.howdidyouknowthatthetruckdrivenbythe
hereinaccused,RubenGalangdidnotreduceitsspeed
beforetheactualimpactofcollisionasyounarratedin
thisExhibit‘1,’howdidyouknow?
A Itjustkeptoncoming,sir.Ifonlyhereducedhisspeed,
wecouldhavegot(sic)backtoourrightlaneonside
(sic)ofthehighway,sir.’(tsn,pp.3334,July22,1977)
or(Exhibit‘O’intheseCivilCases)(pp.3031,
Appellants’Brief)”54
whileEugenioTanhuecotestifiedthus:
“Q Whenyousawthetruck,howwasitmoving?
A Itwasmoving50to60kilometersperhour,sir.
Q Immediatelyafteryousawthistruck,doyouknow
whathappened?
A Isawthetruckandacarcollided(sic),sir,andIwentto
theplacetohelpthevictims.’(tsn,28,April19,1979)
xxx
Q Fromthetimeyousawthetrucktothetimeofthe
impact,willyoutellusifthesaidtruckeverstopped?
A Isawitstopped(sic)whenithas(sic)alreadycollidedwiththecaranditwasalreadymotionless.’(tsn.31,April19,1979;Italicssupplied).(p.27,Appellants’
Brief).”55
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver’s subsequent
negligence in failing to take the proper measures and
degreeofcarenecessarytoavoidthecollisionwhichwasthe
proximatecauseoftheresultingaccident.
Even if JoseKohwas indeednegligent, the doctrine of
lastclearchancefindsapplicationhere.Lastclearchanceis
a doctrine in the law of torts which states that the
contributory
_________________
54Rollo,8384.
55Id.,84.
543
VOL.211,JULY16,1992 543
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
negligenceofthepartyinjuredwillnotdefeattheclaimfor
damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the
exerciseofreasonablecareandprudence,haveavoidedthe
consequencesofthenegligenceoftheinjuredparty.Insuch
cases,thepersonwhohadthelastclearchancetoavoidthe
mishap is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequencesthereof.56
InBustamantevs.CourtofAppeals,57
Weheld:
“The respondent court adopted the doctrine of ‘last clear chance.’
Thedoctrine, statedbroadly, is that thenegligenceof theplaintiff
does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant
whereitappearsthatthedefendant,byexercisingreasonablecare
and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the
plaintiffnotwithstandingtheplaintiff’snegligence.Inotherwords,
thedoctrineoflastclearchancemeansthateventhoughaperson’s
ownactsmayhaveplacedhiminapositionofperil,andaninjury
results, the injured person is entitled to recovery (sic). As the
doctrineisusuallystated,apersonwhohasthelastclearchanceor
opportunityofavoidinganaccident,notwithstandingthenegligent
acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the
opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequencesoftheaccident.(Sangco,TortsandDamages,4thEd.,1986,p.165).
Thepracticalimportofthedoctrineisthatanegligentdefendant
isheldliabletoanegligentplaintiff,oreventoaplaintiffwhohas
beengrosslynegligentinplacinghimselfinperil,ifhe,awareofthe
plaintiff’speril,oraccordingtosomeauthorities,shouldhavebeen
aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had in fact an
opportunitylaterthanthatoftheplaintifftoavoidanaccident(57
Am.Jr.,2d,pp.798799).”
InPantrancoNorthExpress,Inc.,vs.Baesa,58Weruled:
“Thedoctrineof lastclearchancewasdefinedbythisCourt inthecaseofOngv.MetropolitanWaterDistrict,104Phil.397(1958),inthiswise:
__________________
56Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District, 104 Phil. 405 [1958]; Del
Pradovs.ManilaElectricCo.,52Phil.900[1929];Picart vs. Smith, 37
Phil.809[1918].57193SCRA603[1991].58179SCRA384[1989].
544
544 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
Thedoctrineofthelastclearchancesimply,meansthatthenegligence
of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of
defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to
claimantnotwithstandinghisnegligence.
The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff wasguiltyofpriororantecedentnegligencebutthedefendant,whohadthelastfairchancetoavoidtheimpendingharmandfailedtodoso,is made liable for all the consequences of the accidentnotwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v.Smith,37Phil.809(1918);GlanPeople’sLumberandHardware,etal.v.IntermediateAppellateCourt,CeciliaAlferezVda.deCalibo,etal.,G.R.No.70493,May18,1989].Thesubsequentnegligenceofthedefendantinfailingtoexerciseordinarycaretoavoidinjurytoplaintiffbecomesthe immediateorproximatecauseof theaccidentwhich intervenes between the accident and the more remotenegligenceoftheplaintiff,thusmakingthedefendantliabletotheplaintiff[Picartv.Smithsupra].Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the
purposeofmakingadefendant liabletoaplaintiffwhowasguiltyofpriororantecedentnegligence,althoughitmayalsoberaisedasadefensetodefeatclaim(sic)fordamages.”
Applyingtheforegoingdoctrine,itisnotdifficulttorule,asWe now rule, that it was the truck driver’s negligence in
failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the collisionwhich
was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As
employersofthetruckdriver,theprivaterespondentsare,
underArticle2180oftheCivilCode,directlyandprimarily
liablefortheresultingdamages.Thepresumptionthatthey
arenegligent flows fromthenegligenceof their employee.
Thatpresumption,however, isonly juristantum,not juriset de jure.
59
Their only possible defense is that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
preventthedamage.Article2180readsasfollows:
“TheobligationimposedbyArticle2176isdemandablenotonlyfor
one’sownactsoromissions,butalsoforthoseofpersonsforwhom
_________________
59Ramosvs.PepsiColaBottlingCo.,19SCRA289[1967],citingBahiavs.
Litonjua,30Phil.624[1915].
545
VOL.211,JULY16,1992 545
McKeevs.IntermediateAppellateCourt
oneisresponsible.
xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
businessorindustry.
xxx
Theresponsibility treatedof in thisarticleshallceasewhenthe
personshereinmentionedprovethattheyobservedallthediligence
ofagoodfatherofafamilytopreventdamage.”
The diligence of a good father referred to means the
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.60
TheanswersoftheprivaterespondentsinCivilCasesNos.
4477and4478didnot interpose this defense.Neitherdid
theyattempttoproveit.
TherespondentCourtwasthencorrectinitsDecisionof
29 November 1983 in reversing the decision of the trial
courtwhichdismissedCivilCasesNos.4477and4478.Its
assailedResolutionof3April1984findsnosufficientlegal
andfactualmoorings.
In the light of recent decisions of this Court,61
the
indemnity for death must, however, be increased fromP12,000.00toP50,000.00.WHEREFORE, the instant petition isGRANTED. The
assailedResolutionoftherespondentCourtof3April1984isSETASIDEwhile itsDecisionof 29November1983 inC.A.G.R. CV Nos. 6904041 is REINSTATED, subject tothemodification that the indemnity fordeath is increasedfrom P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of JoseKoh and Kim Koh McKee. Costs against privaterespondents.SOORDERED.
Gutierrez,Jr.(Chairman),FelicianoandRomero,JJ.,concur.
________________
60Ramosvs.PepsiColaBottlingCo.,supra.61People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643 [1989]; People vs. Narit, 197
SCRA 334 [1991]; People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 [1991]; People vs.
Lubreo, 200 SCRA 11 [1991]; Dangwa Trans., Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals,202SCRA574[1991].
546
546 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Eudelavs.CourtofAppeals
Bidin,J.,No part. I participated in the appealeddecision.
Petitiongranted.
Note.—Doctrine of last clear chance applies in a suitbetweentheownersanddriversoftwocollidingvehicles,notwhere the passenger demands responsibility from thecarriertoenforcecontractualobligations(PhilippineRabbitBusLines,Inc.vs.IntermediateAppellateCourt,189SCRA158).
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