Legal Watch:Property Risks & CoverageJune 2014
Issue 006
In This Issue:
• Welcome new colleagues
• Re-amendment of claim not permitted
• A brief post Mitchell update
• Relief from sanctions – late service of witness
evidence
• Consequential losses can be recovered under the
Riot (Damages) Act 1886
• Landowner’s duty where her tree fell onto railway
line
Contact UsIf you would like any further information on the cases or articles featured in this issue, please contact:
Nathan Rehbock
T: 0207 469 6242
Marise Gellert
T: 0207 469 6249
IntroductionThanks this month go to Nathan Rehbock for his article on Co-
operative Group Ltd v Birse Developments Ltd & Ors.
The post Mitchell debate continues and once again, we could
fill an entire issue with cases on relief from sanctions. Instead
we have provided a brief post Mitchell update and featured
one particularly interesting case, Gordon v Fraser (No.1),
where relief was granted in respect of witness evidence on the
first morning of the trial.
We also look at the landmark Court of Appeal decision on
consequential losses under the Riot (Damages) Act 1886 (see
Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd & 5 Ors v Mayor’s
Office for Policing & Crime below) and the case of Stagecoach
South Western Trains Ltd v Kathleen Hind & Andrew Steel
which looks at the duty owed by a neighbouring landowner in
respect of a tree that fell onto a railway line.
Welcome new colleagues
Daniel Carter
Dan comes to Greenwoods’ Property Risks & Coverage
Group with substantial experience of subrogated recoveries,
having acted for some of the country’s biggest household
insurers across all perils but with particular experience of
complex litigation claims involving fire and subsidence.
He has dealt with parties ranging from sole traders to
international companies and councils throughout the
country.
Lori McConnachie
Lori began her legal career in 2005 as a paralegal in a national
insurance litigation firm, where she went on to undertake
her professional training. She qualified as a solicitor in 2012.
Lori has experience in defending property damage claims,
advising on coverage issues and pursuing subrogated
recoveries on behalf of insurers. She has a particular interest
in disputes arising in the construction industry.
Re-amendment of claim not permittedIn the case of Co-Operative Group Ltd V (1) Birse
Devlopments Ltd (In Liquidation) (2) Stuarts Industrial
Flooring Ltd (In Administration) (3) Jubb & Partners (A Firm)
[2014] EWCA Civ 707 the appellant company (A) appealed
against a refusal to permit re-amendment of its claim against
the respondent company (R) for damages for breach of
contract concerning allegedly defective concrete floors in
its warehousing facility.
“...it was not fair, reasonable or accurate to characterise the new case as arising out of substantially the same facts as already had been pleaded.”The Court of Appeal held that the circuit judge had been
correct to refuse the re-amendment of the claim where it
was not fair, reasonable or accurate to characterise the
new case as arising out of substantially the same facts as
already had been pleaded.
FactsA contracted with R to design and build two large
warehouses and an office block at A’s distribution centre.
Two years after completion A issued a claim for breach of
contract, asserting that the internal concrete floors were
defective and that the floors did not meet the required
standards set out in the contract because they were below
the required thickness and were suffering from heave. The
cost of repairing the defects was estimated to be £381,000.
A later discovered that the steel fibre content of the concrete
floors was substantially less than required and the floors
were in danger of collapse. As a result, A replaced the floors
at a cost of £2.5 million. A’s earlier application to amend its
claim to include an allegation of reduced steel fibre content
was refused because it introduced a new cause of action.
The proposed new breach of contract claim contained a
summary of “the basis for [A’s] complaint that the slab was
insufficiently thick in places”. The only complaint of that
nature was that the slab was “below the design thickness of
150mm, being only 112mm thick in places”. It was common
ground that the specification contained neither an explicit
requirement that the concrete slab be of 150mm thickness,
whether with or without tolerance, nor any reference to
design thickness as such. However, a clause in the contract
called for the ground floor concrete slab to reliably deliver
a pallet racking leg load of 70kN/leg and that would only
be met on the basis that the floor met the design intent of
150mm thickness (less tolerance). The crux of the complaint
was thus that the thickness of the floors was insufficient to
meet the loading requirements specified in the clause.
The trial judge did not consider that the proposed re-
amended particulars of claim sought to add a new cause
of action but he declined to permit the amendment on
discretionary case management grounds.
The appealR contended that:
1. The trial judge’s exercise of his discretion should be
upheld but in any event the proposed re-amendment
was impermissible because it sought to rely on a new
cause of action not arising out of substantially the same
facts as were already in issue for the purposes of the
Limitation Act 1980 s.35 and CPR r.17.4(2); and
2. The “new claim” which A sought to rely on was
substantially the same as that the Court of Appeal had
already held to be a “new claim” falling outside the
category of those which could be added after expiry of
the limitation period.
The Court of Appeal held that all that was in substance new
or different about the second proposed re-amendment was
the assertion, contrary to the case previously advanced and
contrary to the concern expressed in the contemporaneous
documents, that in fact the lack of fibre was not and would
never have been a separate, free-standing feature which
would, of itself, have compromised the ability of the slab to
withstand the racking leg load requirement. Thus the new
proposed pleading was, in substance, the case previously
proposed to be advanced, merely shorn of any complaint
regarding fibre content. The factual substratum of the original
allegations was cracking of the concrete slabs, damaged
edges and localised areas of insufficient thickness, which
were said to require patchwork repair at costs of about
£380,000. The new claim was of a systemic defect affecting
the entirety of the floor slabs, which required the replacement
of the whole floor and it was not fair, reasonable, or accurate
to characterise that new case as arising out of substantially
the same facts as were already in issue.
The Court of Appeal held that in the circumstances, it
was unnecessary to express any view upon the manner in
which the trial judge had exercised his discretion to refuse
permission to amend.
CommentWhat this judgment demonstrates is that the courts will
allow quantitative but not qualitative amendments. Whilst
A’s counsel submitted that the essential character of A’s
complaint was unchanged and it was simply that the number
of areas thought to be thin had been found to be greater
than first thought, the court held that the amendments were
qualitative, not quantitative, or at the very least, a difference
in degree which amounted to a difference in kind.
A brief post Mitchell update
The Court of Appeal, including Master of the Rolls, Lord
Dyson and Lord Justice Jackson last week heard three
conjoined cases concerning relief from sanctions. They
will attempt to use the cases to clarify the position on the
enforcement of the new compliance rules and provide
definitive guidance on when to grant relief from sanctions
following Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013]
EWCA Civ 1537.
The three cases are:
• Decadent Vapours Ltd v Bevan & Ors – an application
for relief where a case was struck out for the late
payment of court fees
• Denton & Ors v TH White – an appeal against relief
from sanctions being granted for a party that served six
witness statements late, requiring the adjournment of a
hearing
• Utilities TDS Ltd v Davies – where the court will decide
whether two trivial breaches aggregate so as to become
one significant breach
Such is the concern about the decisions and their knock on
effect that the Law Society and Bar Council have intervened
in the cases, on the basis that the respective professions
have an interest in the case. They are calling for a clarification
of the Mitchell criteria to avoid further satellite litigation and
to enable parties to actively work together to bring a case to
trial, rather than focus on ‘catching each other out’.
We will report further as soon as the judgments are to hand.
“Such is the concern about the decisions and their knock on effect that the Law Society and Bar Council have intervened in the cases...”
Relief from sanctions – late service of witness evidenceIn the case of Scotbert Gordon v Osra Fraser (No.1) [2014] the
court applied a more flexible approach in giving relief from
sanctions in relation to the late service of witness evidence
than has been seen in other recent cases. It is possible that
the court did so in light of the unusual background to the
case.
The defendant had otherwise complied with the rules and,
although there was no detailed explanation of the reason for
the breach, the court took the view that it was likely that it
was inadvertent, not deliberate. The claimant accepted that
its case was not prejudiced.
BackgroundThe defendant (F) was being sued by the claimant (G), her
93 year-old father, for the alleged improper withdrawal
of money, of which he was the beneficial owner, from a
Santander bank account in their joint names. There were
many individual withdrawals and G’s case was that most
of them were withdrawals by F, although some had been
made by him as a result of F’s ‘undue influence’. F’s defence
was that G had withdrawn the money himself to finance his
girlfriends and gambling.
F intended to call the manager of the branch of Santander in
question as a witness.
After a series of extensions of time, a date for exchange
of witness statements was agreed but no statement was
served for the branch manager. Almost three months after
that date, F served a witness summary containing her
evidence, which was that G had attended the bank on his
own and made the withdrawals.
Although F experienced problems with obtaining a signed
statement from the branch manager, she served her other
witness statements on time. Under CPR 32.9 where a party
cannot obtain a witness statement from a witness whom he
wishes to call, he may serve a witness summary instead. The
witness summary must be served within the period in which
the witness statement would have had to be served. CPR
r.32.10 provides that if a witness statement or summary is
not served in respect of an intended witness within the time
specified by the court, the witness may not be called to give
oral evidence without the court’s permission.
F made an application on the first day of trial to call the
branch manager, despite having failed to serve a witness
statement or witness summary in time.
It appears that during the course of the proceedings and
prior to service of the witness summary, F’s solicitors
successfully applied to come off the court record, so that
F was acting in person, although it does appear she was
represented by counsel at the trial.
The judge granted permission and the trial proceeded.
The judge agreed to give full reasons for his decision in his
judgment.
The decisionThe judge held that as the application was made after the
time for service of the statement had expired, it was governed
by the principles in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers
Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1537, [2014] 1 W.L.R. 795 relating to
applications for relief from sanctions pursuant to CPR3.9.
Notwithstanding that he took the view that the breach was
neither trivial nor covered by a good reason, the judge
allowed the application, giving three main reasons for doing
so:
a) That to have tried the case without the only available
independent evidence would have given rise to a serious
risk of injustice
b) That F’s breach had neither prejudiced the claimant nor
had any effect on the efficient conduct of the litigation and
c) To have refused the application would have led to an
adjournment which was not needed if he gave permission
“...the principles set out in Mitchell, while of general application and to be applied robustly, are not entirely inflexible.”The judge commented that “the principles set out in Mitchell,
while of general application and to be applied robustly, are
not entirely inflexible.” He formed the view that the Mitchell
principles “represent an unforgiving doctrine” where an
application for relief from sanctions will, at least usually, be
refused, if there is any procedural error other than a trivial
one (which is narrowly interpreted) for which there is no
good reason. This may be the case even if the default has
neither prejudiced the other party nor disrupted the running
of the court in such a way as to affect other court users, as
was clearly the case here. In the words of the judge “one
strike and you are out”.
The judge noted that the court still had to give effect to
the overriding objective and ensure that its response to
default was proportionate and fair. He referred to the cases
of Associated Electrical Industries Ltd v Alstom UK [2014]
EWHC 430 (Comm) and Chartwell Estate Agents Ltd v
Fergies Properties SA [2014] EWCA Civ 506, [2014] C.I.L.L.
3513 and commented that apart from those cases there
was little guidance as yet as to the circumstances in which it
would be appropriate to depart from the usual rule and, more
particularly, as to the weight to be attached to the prospect
of satellite litigation (apart from the application itself). He
made the point that relief from sanctions may be applied in
a wide variety of circumstances and the practical effect of
refusing it may also vary considerably in different contexts.
He gave the example that in Mitchell the effect was a drastic
curtailment of the costs recoverable by the solicitors but
it would have no other effect on the proceedings but in
other cases, the practical effect of refusing permission “in
furtherance of the objectives of promoting efficient litigation
and preventing a waste of the court’s resources” may be to
cause much greater disruption and waste than would be
caused if that permission were to be granted.
It was also relevant that the basic aim of a trial was to
correctly decide a party’s rights. The exclusion of relevant
evidence ran the risk of an incorrect decision being reached.
The judge was aware of the evidence of the branch
manager from a summary provided during the making of the
application and indicated that in the circumstances of this
case he would have felt “very uncomfortable in proceeding
to try the case after excluding it”. He said that it would
have been “difficult if not impossible to be unaffected by
the knowledge that the evidence existed, even though it
could not now be tested”. To have tried the case without
the only available independent evidence would have been
very undesirable, and would have given rise to a serious risk
of injustice and to the possibility of an incorrect conclusion
that F was a thief. The judge referred to the case of Durrant
v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset [2013] EWCA Civ
1624, [2014] 2 All E.R. 757 as being the only case he was
aware of in which this particular issue had arisen.
In the circumstances he held that it was appropriate to allow
F’s application.
CommentWhether this case represents a turning of the tide remains
to be seen. The judge made the point that while her default
was not trivial, it was “not high on the scale of seriousness”.
Other judges have, of course, applied the rules to the letter
and one suspects that the facts of this particular case
garnered some sympathy for the defendant. The judge
does say in his judgment that the position would have been
a little different if counsel had told him no more than that
he wished to call the Santander branch manager, without
explicitly stating what her evidence was. That said, he
would still have had difficulty having excluded the evidence,
in trying the case fairly on the remaining evidence.
Consequential losses can be recovered under the Riot (Damages) Act 1886The Court of Appeal has overturned a ruling that
consequential losses could not be recovered from the
police following a riot.
In what is considered to be a landmark decision in the case
of Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co. (Europe) Ltd and 5 Ors
v Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime [2014] EWCA Civ
682, the Court of Appeal held that there was no bar on the
recovery of consequential losses, such as loss of profit or
rent.
BackgroundThe appeal arose out of three conjoined claims brought
against the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPC)
pursuant to the Riot (Damages) Act 1886.
The facts of this action are well-known and arise following
an incident on 6 August 2011 when Mark Duggan was shot
and killed by police, following which thousands of people
rioted in London and other English cities.
During that period, a gang of youths broke into the Sony
distribution warehouse in Enfield, looted it and burned it
down with petrol bombs. It was accepted that if the gang
were “persons riotously and tumultuously assembled” the
MOPC is liable to compensate anyone who sustained loss
by reason of the looting or arson (or if their insurers have
paid, their insurers, by way of subrogated recovery). At
first instance the judge held that the gang were “persons
riotously and tumultuously assembled” but the MOPC’s
liability did not extend to consequential losses.
MOPC appealed against the finding of liability and the
insurers (as well as the owners of some of the uninsured
stock contained in the warehouse) cross appealed against
the decision on the extent of the liability.
The owner of the warehouse, its occupier (Sony) and three
companies which had stored goods there all sustained
losses as a result of the looting and the fire. Their losses
included the physical loss of the warehouse and its contents
and consequential losses including business interruption
losses, loss of profit and loss of rent. The warehouse and
its contents were completely destroyed and the fire is said
to have been the largest arson in Europe. Sony was insured
not only for damage to the contents of the warehouse but
also against business interruption losses in respect of which
insurers paid out under the policy. Their claim in this action
included £9.8 million paid out for loss of profits, including
the costs of mitigation. Cresta Estates Limited (the owners
of the warehouse) were insured not only against physical
damage to the warehouse but also against loss of rent. Their
insurers paid out approximately £1.5 million in respect of
loss of rent. A third disputed claim was made by the owners
of stock held in the warehouse, who claimed approximately
£3 million for loss of profit, in respect of which they were
not insured.
“Liability to compensate under the Act is strict, not fault-based...”The decision
The Court of Appeal considered not only the factual
background to the incident in August 2011, but also the legal
and historical background to the Riot (Damages) Act 1886
(‘the Act’). Liability to compensate under the Act is strict,
not fault-based. The test was not whether the police should
have been alert to, or should notionally have prevented the
damage, nor was it whether the group’s behaviour was
such that it should have been obvious to the police that
something needed to be done. The Court of Appeal took the
view that the focus of the inquiry was whether property had
been damaged or destroyed as a result of mob violence.
Whether an assembly is “riotous and tumultuous” is a
question of degree and it was for the trial judge to carry out
an evaluative exercise to decide that question in light of the
primary facts found.
The Court of Appeal found that the judge’s findings of
primary fact (borne out by the CCTV evidence) amply
justified his conclusions that this was mob violence. The
judge at first instance carried out an evaluative exercise on
the basis of the primary facts that he found and directed
himself correctly in law. The result of his evaluation was one
to which the Court of Appeal held he was entitled to come
and was the sort of evaluation an appeal court should be
very reluctant to overturn. On that basis the appeal on the
question of liability was dismissed.
The Court of Appeal then went on to consider whether
Section 2(1) provided a right to compensation that included
consequential losses. The Court of Appeal concluded
that Section 2(1) provides a right to compensation “for all
heads of loss proximately caused by physical cause to
property for which the trespasser is liable at common law,
save to the extent that they are excluded or varied by the
statute.” In principle, Section 2(1) covers all heads of loss
compensable under English law for damage to property
caused by trespassers in the course of a riot and the heads
of compensation recoverable are to be determined with
reference to the English law of damages as it develops over
time. There was nothing within the wording of Section 2(1)
to suggest that consequential losses caused by damage to,
or destruction of property should not be included.
CommentThis is the first time that a court has ruled that compensation
payable under the Act is not limited to physical damage.
The police remain entitled to fix an amount of compensation
taking into account the behaviour and precautions taken by
the affected business, which may have a “knock-on effect”
to the extent that the police may seek to dispute more
claims.
The Court of Appeal did say that it is surprising that
the community should be under a strict liability to pay
compensation for the consequences of riotous and
tumultuous behaviour at all, when the police are not liable
in tort for such consequences even when they have been
seriously at fault but because this has been the law since
1714, only parliament can change it. Whether there will now
be calls for parliament to do so remains to be seen but they
are unlikely to be calls made by the insurance industry!
Landowner’s duty where her tree fell onto railway line In the recent case of Stagecoach South Western Trains Ltd
v (1) Kathleen Hind (2) Andrew Steel [2014] EWHC1891
(TCC) the court held that the duty of a landowner in respect
of a tree on her land which fell on to a railway line did not
extend further than the carrying out of periodic and formal
or preliminary observations or inspections, in the absence
of any trigger or warning sign.
BackgroundThe claimant train operator (S) claimed the cost of repairing
damage to a train, as well as other consequential costs, as a
result of an ash tree owned by the first defendant (H) , which
fell onto a railway line. The second defendant (TS) was a
tree surgeon.
H’s garden backed on to the railway line in Staines. On 18
December 2009 one of S’s trains collided with the stem of
an ash tree, which had fallen onto the railway line from H’s
garden.
The claim against TS related to work carried out to trees and
shrubs in H’s garden in 2006 and 2007.
The tree was about 150 years-old and was originally made
up of three separate stems. One stem (described as ”the
northern stem”) had fallen away many years before H
purchased the property. The two remaining stems grew out
of a common trunk. They were largely vertical, although
it became apparent during the trial that there was a large
branch growing off the eastern stem approximately along
the boundary line.
Shortly after H bought the property she employed a tree
surgeon, Mr Holmes, to cut back trees and shrubs to let
some light into the garden. She was not happy with his
work and did not use him again. She felt he had caused
unnecessary damage to the trees. It is not clear if he did
any work to the ash tree in question and if so, what he did.
In January 2006 H engaged TS to carry out some further
work. This work included cleaning out of the crown of the
ash tree and the removal of dead wood. H said that she did
not ask TS to inspect the tree and that she had asked him to
clear out the crown and remove the dead wood, principally
twigs, in order to allow more light in. H said that she sought
TS’s advice only to the extent that he would advise on, for
example, how much of the branches should be cut out. TS
did not suggest what needed to be done and H did not seek
his advice generally about the tree.
In June and September 2007, TS undertook further work in
the garden but it does not appear any work was undertaken
to the ash tree.
On the night of 17/18 December 2009, the eastern stem of
the ash tree fell onto the railway tracks. Thankfully, the train
that collided with the branch was empty.
During the course of the evidence given at the trial it became
clear that TS had carried out some work on the western
stem some three years previously and that he had climbed
on to the western stem for the purpose of clearing dead
wood.
It appears that the eastern stem fell because the union
between the stems was what was known as “an included
bark union” and also as a result of decay that had spread
from the wound left by the fallen northern stem some years
earlier. The bark of the two stems push against one another
and year-on-year growth does not provide increasing
stability; it causes continuing force between the stems and,
as occurred here, causes a crack to develop in the union
itself.
It is not suggested that anyone saw a crack prior to the
collapse but there was debate as to whether or not it should
have been seen.
S argued that H owed a duty to have the tree regularly
inspected by an arboriculturalist. Had that happened, the
arboriculturalist would have been obliged to carry out a
detailed inspection of the base of the tree and would have
discovered the crack and decay.
The judge formed the view that the issues regarding the
potential liability of H were as follows:
1. Is an ordinary landowner obliged as a matter of course
to instruct an expert arboriculturalist to carry out regular
inspections of the trees on his or her land?
2. If not, is the landowner obliged to carry out preliminary/
informal inspections?
3. Did H have sufficient knowledge and experience to carry
out proper preliminary/informal inspections?
4. Did she carry out proper preliminary/informal
inspections?
The decisionThe judge held that a reasonable and prudent landowner
was not obliged, as a matter of course and without any
trigger or warning sign, to pay for an arboriculturalist to
carry out periodic inspections of the trees on his land. This
follows the decision in Micklewhite v Surrey County Council
[2011] EWCA Civ 22.
Closer inspection by an expert was required only when
something was revealed by the informal or preliminary
inspection that gave rise to cause for concern.
The judge commented that an ordinary landowner, required
to act reasonably and prudently, was obliged to carry out
regular preliminary/informal inspections of the trees on
his or her land, particularly where those trees may border
a highway, a railway or the property of another. The judge
suggested that there may be circumstances in which it might
be appropriate for an arboriculturalist to be instructed, such
as where the landowner may be absent for long periods
of time or is physically unable to undertake such a task.
Although he considered it less likely, it could also be that
the landowner was so completely ignorant of trees that they
would be unable to carry out a meaningful inspection.
In this instance, the judge was of the view that H was more
than capable of carrying out a meaningful preliminary/
informal inspection of her trees. She plainly knew a
reasonable amount about trees, bearing in mind she was a
“regular and enthusiastic” gardener. The evidence given by
H was that she carried out regular informal inspections and
that the tree was apparently healthy. The judge accepted
that the included bark union would not have alerted an
ordinary landowner to any problems and was, in any event,
covered in ivy, as was the wound. A reasonable and prudent
landowner was not obliged to inspect the trunk of an
apparently healthy tree which was difficult to access and
was covered in ivy. On that basis there was nothing that
should have alerted H or put her on notice that the tree was
anything other than healthy or required her to instruct an
arboriculturalist to undertake a closer inspection. On that
basis the claim against H failed.
TS was a tree surgeon and not an arboriculturalist. Whilst
he might have expressed an opinion as to how the work
was carried out, H told him what work she wanted to be
carried out. He had not been asked to inspect the tree and
his contractual obligations did not require him to do so. His
duties were circumscribed by his contractual obligations
as per the case of Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (1)
[1995] 2 AC 145.
For a duty of care to arise there had to be sufficient proximity
between S and TS. Although TS owed a duty of care in
relation to the manner in which the works were carried out,
there was no suggestion that he carried out those works in
anyway deficiently so as to be in breach of duty. The court
held that there was an insufficient degree of proximity to
give rise to a wider duty of care. TS was not involved in
an activity which gave him a measure of control over, and
responsibility for, the safety of S’s trains.
So far as the duty to warn was concerned, it was accepted
that in certain circumstances a professional man and/or a
contractor can owe a duty to their employer to warn them
of inherent defects in the work, even if those defects or that
work were not in their direct responsibility. The court did not
accept that such a duty arose on the facts of this case.
On that basis the claim against TS also failed.
The information and opinions contained in this document are not intended to be a comprehensive study, nor to provide legal advice, and should not be relied on or treated as a substitute for specific advice concerning individual situations. This document speaks as of its date and does not reflect any changes in law or practice after that date. Plexus Law and Greenwoods Solicitors are trading names of Parabis Law LLP, a Limited Liability Partnership incorporated in England & Wales. Reg No: OC315763. Registered office: 8 Bedford Park, Croydon, Surrey CR0 2AP. Parabis Law LLP is authorised and regulated by the SRA.
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CommentIt is notable in this case that the judge was critical of the
claimant’s expert’s evidence. The judge indicated that
in the case of this sort what assists the court the most is
agreement about the state of the tree before the incident
and, in respect of the case against TS, a discussion of a
various professional obligations which he may or may not
have had. Although there was a useful joint statement, the
judge felt that the experts (particularly the claimant’s expert)
spent far too much time on dealing with matters of law and
contentious matters of fact.
It was also clear from the judgment that the judge was
impressed by H, who he described as an “educated woman
and a primary school headmistress”. She was a regular
enthusiastic gardener who clearly knew a reasonable
amount about trees and had even undertaken research in
respect of various aspects of trees to teach children. That
may have swayed his judgment in forming the view that she
had carried out a meaningful inspection of her trees.
Recommended
