Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
La Economía de las Asociaciones Público-Privadas
Eduardo Engel
Universidad de Chile and Yale University
5ta Conferencia Boliviana de Desarrollo EconomicoSanta Cruz, BoliviaNoviembre 15, 2013
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Motivation
Highways
Problems
Promises
Experience
How
Taking Stock
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Motivation
Highways
Problems
Promises
Experience
How
Taking Stock
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Motivación
� Grandes de�cit de infraestructura pública en América Latina
� Cuello de botella para crecimiento y desarrollo
� Creciente importancia de las asociaciones público privadas (APPs)
� ¾Parte de la solución o profundizan los problemas?
� ¾Cómo hacerlo para que contribuyan a la solución?
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Infraestructura: LAC vs. OECD
Indicador LAC OECD
Infraestructura de transportes 3.30 4.96
Calidad general 3.86 5.53Calidad de carreteras 3.58 5.19Calidad ferrocarriles 1.90 4.47Calidad puertos 3.93 5.21Calidad aeropuertos 4.44 5.58
Oferta eléctrica 4.24 6.13
Uso TIC 2.72 5.29Individuos usando internet, % 35.15 75.02Suscripciones banda ancha/100 pob 6.00 26.51Banda ancha internacional, kb/s por usuario 17.08 83.03Banda ancha móvil suscrip./100 pob 5.35 45.96Suscrip. telef. móvil/100 pob 112.49 118.16Telef. �jos/100 pob 17.02 41.46
Executive Opinion Survey, World Economic Forum, 2012. Puntajes van de 1.0 a 7.0.
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Calidad General de Infraestructura
Pos. País Valor Pos. País Valor
1 Suiza 6.6 69 China 4.33 Finlandia 6.5 81 Uruguay 4.05 Francia 6.4 85 Ecuador 3.99 Alemania 6.2 95 Costa Rica 3.711 Portugal 6.2 96 Rep. Dominicana 3.718 España 5.8 97 Honduras 3.724 Reino Unido 5.6 106 Nicaragua 3.425 EE.UU. 5.6 107 Brasil 3.431 Chile 5.4 108 Colombia 3.436 Australia 5.2 111 Perú 3.439 Noruega 5.2 112 Argentina 3.444 Panamá 5.1 118 Bolivia 3.265 México 4.4 135 Venezuela 2.866 El Salvador 4.4 140 Paraguay 2.667 Guatemala 4.4 144 Haití 1.9
How would you assess general infrastructure (e.g., transport, telephony, and energy) in your country?[1=extremely underdeveloped; 7=extensive and e�cient] by international standards.WEF 2011-12 weighted average.
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Inv. en APPs: países ingresos bajos y medios 1990�2009
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 20100
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Year
PP
P in
vest
men
t com
mitm
ents
(bi
llion
US
dol
lars
)
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Inv. en APPs: Unión Europea 1990�2009
1990 1995 2000 2005 20100
5
10
15
20
25
30
Year (financial closure)
PP
P in
vest
men
t (bi
llion
eur
os)
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Conceptos básicos
Infraestructura pública:
� Inversión de larga duración e irreversible, utilizada para proveer unservicio público.
Tipos de infraestructura provistas vía APPs:
� Caminos, carreteras, puentes, túneles, ferrocarriles, aeropuertos,puertos, aguas, hospitales, escuelas, cárceles, estadios deportivos, ...
Tipo de APPs:
� BLT, BLTM, BOT, DBOT, DBFO, DBFO/M, ROT, JV,...
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Motivación
Tres diseños institucionales para proveer infraestructura pública:
� provisión pública/método tradicional/servicio público
� privatización
� asociación público-privada/APP/concesión
Esta presentación:
� APPs vs. provisión pública
� carreteras
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Motivación
Bajo los tres diseños institucionales: empresas privadas
Diferencias en:
� asignación de riesgo
� diseño y licitación de contratos
� fuentes de �nanciamiento
� contabilidad �scal
� economía política
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Relación contractual bajo servicio público
� El sector público es dueño de los activos (gobierno nacional,estadual, municipal)
� El gobierno �nancia directamente el proyecto con deuda pública
� Presupuesto público es el demandante residual (`residual claimant')de los riesgos de
� construcción� mantenimiento� demanda
� El gobierno contrata por separado una empresa constructora y unoperador
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Relación contractual bajo servicio público
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Relaciones contractuales bajo APP
� La �rma tiene control (parcial) sobre los activos a lo más durante laduración de la concesión
� El gobierno y la �rma comparten (a veces de manera ambigua) losriesgos de:
� construcción� mantenimiento� demanda
� Plani�cación pública juega un rol importante
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Relaciones contractuales bajo APP
� Empaquetamiento (bundling) de construcción y operación en uncontrato de servicio de largo plazo entre la autoridad y una empresaprivada dedicada exclusivamente al proyecto (special purpose vehicleo SPV)
� Proyecto autocontenido, legal y económicamente:
� �ujo de caja prendado para pagar la deuda del proyecto
� Compensación del concesionario (SPV): alguna combinación detarifas y transferencias del gobierno
� Pagos de gobierno pueden ser contingentes a ciertos eventos: v.g.,garantías de ingreso mínimo
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Relaciones contractuales bajo APP
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Motivación
� 25 años de experiencia con APPs:
� luces y sombras� hora de evaluar
� Argumentos a favor de APPs:
� válidos� inválidos� ¾magnitudes?
� Argumentos a favor de servicios públicos (o privatización):
� válidos� inválidos� ¾magnitudes?
� Preguntas a responder:
� ¾cuándo es una APP la mejor opción?� ¾cómo debiera hacerse una APP?
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Una asociación de investigación:
Trabajos de Engel, Fischer y Galetovic
�Licitación de carreteras en Chile�, Estudios Públicos, 1996
�Highway Franchising: Pitfalls and Opportunities�, AER, 1997.
�Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising�, Journalof Political Economy, 2001.
�Privatizing Highways in Latin America: Fixing What Went Wrong,� Economia,2003.
�Soft Budgets and Renegotiations in PPPs,� working paper, 2009.
�Renegociación de concesiones en Chile,� Estudios Públicos, 2009.
�The Basic Public Finance of PPPs,� Journal of the European EconomicAssociation, 2013.
�Renegotiation and corruption�, work in progress.
�Is there a PPP interest rate premium,� work in progress.
The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships: A Basic Guide. CambridgeUniversity Press, forthcoming.
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Motivation
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Highways
Main type of infrastructure with PPPs (by value)
Book considers other types as well
Top 10 Low-Middle Inc. Ctries. (MM USD 1990�2011)
China 47,449Brazil 32,142Mexico 25,374India 24,766Malaysia 16,552Argentina 14,094Chile 8,876Turkey 8,170South Africa 5,374Colombia 5,164
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
The case of Chilean highways: 1990
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
The case of Chilean highways: 2005
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Physical Characteristics of Highways
� Investments:
� large, sunk upfront, long lived asset� usually a natural monopoly (interurban) or part of a network (urban)
� Operation:
� excludable, rival (congestion an issue)
� Deterioration (and therefore maintenance):
� highly nonlinear in axle weight� proportional to usage� apparent long after it is optimal to restore the road
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Physical Characteristics of Highways
� Quality of service is contractible:
� state of road can be veri�ed by independent parties� can measure quality of service (e.g.: time needed to remove brokencars)
� Demand:
� high (and mainly exogenous) uncertainty� example: Dulles Greenway
� Why public intervention?
� network planning� intensive use of public space and rights-of-way� monopoly requires toll regulation
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Motivation
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Problems of Public Provision
Poor choice of projects
� Brazil, 1979�1984
� built 6,000 kms of new roads ... while 8,000 kms of existing roadswent from fair or good to bad quality
Enforcing projects that are built ful�ll service obligations
� insu�cient and untimely maintenance, too little, too late
� three times the cost
� lower quality of service on average
Excessive cost of projects chosen
� cost overruns
� delays
� capture and corruption
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Motivation
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Promises of PPPs
Relieving strained budgets
� obviously not true if �nanced via government transfers� yet also not true when �nanced via user fees
E�ciency gains:
� advantages of bundling ... when service contractible� incentives for appropriate maintenance
Introducing competition
� Chadwick vs. Williamson
Charging appropriate user fees
� Indiana Toll Road example
Filtering white elephants
� market test ... if �nanced via user fees and no major governmentguarantees
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Adam Smith and White Elephants
�When high roads are made and supported by the commerce that is carried on
by means of them, they can be made only where that commerce requires them.
[. . . ] A magni�cent road cannot be made merely because it happens to lead to
the country villa of the intendant of the province [. . . ]�
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Motivation
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Typical contract
� Fixed term: e.g., 30 years
� Firm chosen via competitive auction
� Bidding variable: lowest toll, shortest concession term, highestannual payment to the government (cannon), lowest subsidy
� Minimum income guarantees
� Fiscal accounting: poor or totally absent
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Governance
� Typically the same agency in charge of planning, adjudicating,monitoring and regulating the concession contracts
� Leads to poor monitoring and lax regulation
� Argentina's General Comptroller Report of 2003
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Soft Budgets
PPPs allow o�-budget spending.
Useful for politicians/government.
In the UK, only 23% of capital cost of 599 PFI projects up to April 2009are on balance sheet.
�Cynics suspect that the government remains keen on PFI notbecause of the e�ciency it allegedly o�ers, but because it allowsministers to perform a useful accounting trick.�
The Economist, July 2nd, 2009.
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Renegotiations and Spending Anticipation
While sometimes necessary, they are problematic
Often lead to additional works unrelated to original project
� circumventing budgetary controls
� paid by future administrations
� Santiago water collectors example
Guasch (2004), Guasch, La�ont and Straub (2007, 2008): analyze1000+ PPPs in Latin America
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
E�ciency Costs of Renegotiations
� Lack of competition for additional works may increase costsubstantially
� Adverse selection of ine�cient �rms good at lobbying
� Moral hazard problem: government becomes careless
� Bad project selection: white elephants more likely
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Evidence from Chile
� 50 concessions (28 highways)
� 147 signi�cant renegotiations (avge.: every 2.5 years)
� Upfront investment: US$ 8.4 bn
� Renegotiations: US$ 2.8 bn
� How: Bilateral renegotiations: 83% (remainder by arbitration)
� When: 78% during construction phase � incomplete contracts?
� What: 84% involves additional investment.
� Who pays: 65% of bilateral paid by future administrations.
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Motivation
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
How should it be done
1. Avoiding bad faith renegotiations
2. Improving public accounting
3. Improving contract design
PPP legislation in various countries in Latin America have been reformedalong these lines.
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
How � Improving governance of renegotiations
Independent specialized agency reviews and approves projects, reducingspace for renegotiations.
Use service and not input standards in the PPP contract.
Additional works should be publicly tendered, if possible.
Independent agency ensures that contract value does not change afterrenegotiation:
� �lters �bad faith� renegotiations
� avoids adverse selection problem
� does not avoid anticipating spending
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
How � Improving budgetary accounting
Improve budgetary accounting of future capital costs, and of demandguarantees (tolled highways).
Including future liabilities in current budget not enough:
� increase in investment resulting from renegotiations must a�ectcurrent budget one-for-one
Intertemporal budget =⇒ PPP = public provision
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
How � Flexible Term Contracts
Flexible term contracts:
� reduce demand risk (beyond the control of the �rm)
� reduces need for guarantees and renegotiations
Particular case � PVR contract:
� government sets user fee and discount rate
� �rms bid on present value of toll revenues (PVR)
� contract lasts until winning bid collected:
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
How � Flexible Term Contracts
Properties of PVR:
� fair compensation is easy to calculate
� sizeable reduction in risk premium
� improves political economy of the contract
� easy to adjust tolls to demand: urban highways
� avoids winner's curse (cost-oriented bids)
First used in the UK: Queen Elizabeth II bridge at Dartford
Portugal's Litoral Centro: Euro�nance project of 2004
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Experience with Flexible Term Contracts: Chile
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Experience with Flexible Term Contracts: Chile
Month/year Winning bidProject auctioned (million USD)Ruta 68 (Stgo-Valparaíso-Viña) 02/1998 513Ruta 160, Coronel-Tres Pinos segment 04/2008 342Airport access road 07/2008 56Melipilla-Camino de la Fruta connection 08/2008 46Ruta 5, Vallenar-Caldera segment 11/2008 288Ruta 5, Puerto Montt-Pargua 05/2010 31Concepción-Cabrero highway 01/2011 318Alternative access road, Iquique 01/2011 167
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
How � Financing
� Project �nance commonly used
� Is there a PPP premium?
� PPPs: higher cost of �nancing than under public provision� public �nancing costs don't incorporate implicit governmentguarantee
� observed PPP premium may re�ect faulty contract design: �xedterm vs. �exible term
� incentives may be essential to realize e�ciency gains and ofteninvolve larger risk for the �rm
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Motivation
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Summary � Conceptual
� Incentives and e�ciency:
� PPPs closer to privatization
� Public �nance � accounting for PPPs:
� PPPs closer to public provision
� Private �nance:
� PPPs closer to privatization
� Contract design and risk sharing:
� PPPs fundamentally di�erent from privatization and public provision:can use contract length when allocating risk
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
In favor of PPPs
Suspect:
� Saves public resources
Valid:
� Better and cheaper maintenance: bundling or political economy?
� Filter white elephants
� Easier to collect user fees and reduce distortionary taxes
� Avoid public agencies
Huge potential gains: 20 - 50% of upfront investment for three of theabove
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
In favor of public provision
Suspect:
� Lower �nancing costs
Valid:
� Expropriation risk less important
� Cannot be used to anticipate public spending
� Fewer opportunities to renegotiate
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Conclusion
� Potentially large welfare gains under PPPs for highways
� Three out of four advantages of PPPs rely on user fees being amajor source of revenue for the concessionaire
� Contractible quality of service also important
� Case for PPPs less clear for other types of infrastructure (schools,hospitals)
� We now know the policies to handle some of the main pitfalls underPPPs
� avoid bad faith renegotiations� appropriate �scal accounting� �exible term contracts
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
Table of Contents
The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships: A Basic Guide
1. Introduction
2. Country Studies: UK, Chile, US, China
3. Highways
4. Incentives
5. Private Finance
6. Public Finance
7. Renegotiations
8. Governance
9. When and How to Implement PPPs
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Motivation Highways Problems Promises Experience How Taking Stock
References � Engel, Fischer and Galetovic
�Licitación de carreteras en Chile�, Estudios Públicos, 1996
�Highway Franchising: Pitfalls and Opportunities�, AER, 1997.
�Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising�, JPE,2001.
�Privatizing Highways in Latin America: Fixing What Went Wrong,� Economia,2003.
�Soft Budgets and Renegotiations in PPPs,� working paper, 2009.
�Renegociación de concesiones en Chile,� Estudios P�blicos, 2009.
�The Basic Public Finance of PPPs,� JEEA, 2013.
�Renegotiation and corruption�, work in progress.
�Is there a PPP interest rate premium,� work in progress.
The Economics of Public-Private Partnerships: A Basic Guide. CambridgeUniversity Press, forthcoming.
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