tO
fficeof
JusticeProgram
s
National Institute
ofJustice
/IS
I1(’.Sal?(1
Natio
nal
Itistituteof
Justic
e/J)J
.(j.j)
LC)LC)
cY
,
N
Street-Level
Drug
Enforcem
ent:E
xamining
theIssues
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U.S.
Dep
artmen
tof
Justice
1/
Natio
nal
Institu
teof
Justice
Office
of
Com
munication
and
Research
Utilization
Street-L
evelD
rugE
nforcement:
Exam
iningthe
Issues
Contributors:
Mark
A.R
.K
leiman
Arnold
Barnett
Anthony
V.
Bouza
Kevin
M.
Burke
Editor:
Marcia
R.
Chaiken
Septem
ber1988
Issuesan
dP
racticesin
Crim
inalJustice
isa
publicationof
theN
ationalInstitute
ofJustice.
Designed
forthe
criminaljustice
professional,eac’h
Issuesand
Practicesreport
presentsthe
programoptions
andm
anagement
issuesin
atopic
area,based
ona
reviewof
researchand
evaluationfindings,
op
etational
experience,and
expertopinion
inthe
subject.T
heintent
isto
providecrim
inaljustice
managers
andadm
inistratorsw
iththe
information
tom
akeinform
edchoices
inplanning,
implem
entingand
improving
programs
andpractice.
Prepared
forthe
National
Instituteof
Justice,U
.S.
Departm
entof
Justice,by
Abt
Associates
Inc.,under
contract#O
JP-86-C
-002.P
ointsof
viewor
opinionsstated
inthis
document
arethose
of
theauthors
anddo
notnecessarily
representthe
officialposition
orpolicies
of
theU
.S.
Departm
ento
fJustice
notthe
organizationsw
ithw
hichthe
authorsare
affiliated.T
heauthors
areM
arkA
.R.
Kleim
an,L
ecturerin
Public
Policy,
Research
Fellow
inC
riminal
JusticeP
olicyand
Managem
ent,John
F.K
ennedySchool
ofG
overmuent,
Harvard
University;
Arnold
Barnett,
The
Sloan
School
of
Managem
ent,M
assachusettsInstitute
ofT
echnology;A
nthonyB
ouza,C
hiefof
Police
inM
inneapolis;K
evinB
urke,D
istrictA
ttorneyin
Essex
County,
Massachusetts;
andM
arciaC
haiken,S
eniorS
ocialS
cientist,A
btA
ssociatesInc.
National
Instituteof
Justice
James
K.
Stew
art
Director
Program
Monitor
Jonath
anB
udd
National
Instituteof
Justice
Washington,
D.C
.
The
Assistant
Attorney
General,
Office
ofJustice
Program
s,
coordinatesthe
activitiesof
thefollow
ingprogram
Offices
andB
ureaus:N
ationalInstitute
ofJustice,
Bureau
ofJustice
Statistics,
Bureau
ofJustice
Assistance,
Office
ofJuvenile
Justiceand
Delinquency
Prevention,
andO
fficefor
Victim
s
ofC
rime.
Contents
Forew
ordv
James
K.
Stew
artD
irectorN
ationalInstitute
of
Justice
Chapter
1S
treet-Level
Drug
Enforcem
ent:In
troductio
nto
theIssues
1M
arciaR
.C
haikenS
eniorS
ocialS
cientistA
btA
ssociatesInc.
Chapter
2C
rackdowns:
The
Effects
ofIntensive
Enforcem
enton
Retail
Heroin
Dealing
3M
arkA
.R.
Kleim
anL
ecturerin
Public
Policy
Research
Fellow
inC
riminal
JusticeP
olicyand
Managem
entJo
hn
F.K
ennedyS
choolof
Governm
entH
arvardU
niversity
Chapter
3D
rugC
rackdowns
andC
rime
Rates:
AC
omm
entof
theK
leiman
Report
35P
rofessorA
rnoldB
arnettS
loanS
choolof
Managem
entM
assachusettsInstitute
of
Technology
Chapter
4E
valuatingS
treet-Level
Drug
Enforcem
ent43
Anthony
V.
Bouza
Chief
of
Police
Minneapolis,
Minnesota
Chapter
5C
omm
entson
Street-L
evelD
rugE
nforcement
49K
evinM
.B
urkeD
istrictA
ttorneyE
ssexC
ounty,M
assachusetts
Bibliography
53
‘‘I
Forew
ord
No
singleagency
canfulfill,
throughits
own
efforts,the
public’sjustifiable
Bdem
andthat
we
ridour
comm
unitiesof
drugabuse
andthe
crime
andviolence
itfosters.
Interagencycooperation
atall
levelso
fgovernm
entis
anessential
ingredientof
successfuldrug
law-enforcem
entstrategies.
One
suchstrategy
—intensive
street-leveldrug
enforcement
—attracts
widespread
interestam
ongpolice
andsheriffs
departments.
Crackdow
nsare
afavored
tacticfrequently
calledfor
bypolitical
leadersand
concernedcitizens
andcom
munity
groups.To
determine
theeffects
of
suchcrackdow
nson
usersand
dealersw
hotransform
citystreets
intodrug
bazaars,research
reportedin
thispublication
analyzeddata
fromareas
thathad
carriedout
intensiveenforcem
entof
druglaw
s.
As
thisreport
indicates,there
iscom
pellingevidence
that,under
some
cir
cumstances,
street-leveldrug
enforcement
canrid
citystreets
of
drugdealers
andusers.
Other
kindsof
predatorycrim
eth
atthe
publicfears
alsom
aybe
reducedin
thecrackdow
narea.
Yet,
analysisof
some
crime
datafrom
areasthat
intensifystreet-level
enforcement
shows
thattaking
dealersand
usersoff
thestreets
of
onearea
isnot
enough.W
ithoutcooperation
between
neighboringareas,
thedrug
market
may
notbe
destroyedbut
merely
displacedto
anotherneighborhood.
Other
researchby
theN
ationalInstitute
of
Justiceshow
sthat
reducingsupply
and
demand
fordrugs
isbest
accomplished
bya
cooperativeeffort
among
criminal
justice,education,
healthpractitioners,
andyouth
leaders.S
imilarly,
aconcerted
effortis
requiredam
onglocal,
State
andF
ederallaw
enforcement
agencies.A
ndw
ithineach
jurisdiction,drug
involvedoffenders
canbest
bem
anagedby
closecoordination
among
police,prosecutors,
andcorrectional
officers.
Given
theanalyses
of
street-leveldrug
enforcement
presentedin
thisreport,
criminal
justiceagencies
will
findthe
lessonsin
planningand
cooperationit
presentsa
usefulguide
foraction.
The
researchstrongly
suggeststhat
criminal
justiceagencies
thatare
willing
tow
orktogether
will
findthey
canrid
theirstreets
of
drugusers
anddealers
alikeand
make
inroadsagainst
otherpredatory
crime
atthe
same
time.
James
K.
Stew
art,D
irectorN
ationalInstitute
of
Justice
Forew
ordv
Chapter
1
ST
RE
ET
-LE
VE
LD
RU
GE
NF
OR
CE
ME
NT
:IN
TR
OD
UC
TIO
NT
OT
HE
ISS
UE
S
Marcia
R.
Chaiken
Mounting
nationalconcern
overillicit
druguse
—and
theim
pactof
opendrug
markets
onthe
neighborhoodsin
which
theyoperate—
hasspurred
renewed
interestin
street-leveldrug
enforcement.
The
effectivenessof
crackdowns
asa
lawenforcem
enttactic,
however,
remains
asubject
of
debate.T
hisreport
examines
thedebated
issues.It
isone
of
aseries
of
publicationsthat
providereview
sof
researchon
drug-involvedoffenders
andstrategies
fordealing
with
them.
Ihave
hadthe
pleasureo
fediting
thisseries.
This
volume
presentsa
studyth
atadvocates
street-levelcrackdow
nson
heroinm
arketsand
suggeststhey
may
reducenon-drug
crime
asw
ell;it
alsoincludes
threecritical
reviews
of
thestudy
andthe
recomm
endedpolicy.
Together,
thepaper
andreview
saddress
theconcerns
of
criminal
justicepractitioners
who
arecurrently
implem
entingthis
formof
policing,those
consideringinstituting
sucha
practice,and
thosew
hoare
opposed.L
egislatorsand
citizensw
how
antto
knowm
oreabout
specificform
sof
lawenforcem
entefforts
forcontrolling
thesales
of
illicitdrugs
will
alsofind
thesem
aterialsinform
ative.
None
of
theauthors
viewcrack-dow
nsas
apanacea.
Nor
doany
of
themsuggest
thatstreet-level
drugenforcem
entby
itselfcan
eliminate
theuse
of
illicitdrugs.
Rather,
thefocal
questionaddressed
bythis
setof
papersis:
What
effectsreasonably
canbe
expectedfrom
streetlevel
drugenforcem
ent?
These
paperspresent
fourdifferent
perspectiveson
theansw
erto
thatq
ues
tion.T
heprim
arypaper,
authoredby
Mark
Kleim
an,a
policyanalyst
atthe
Kennedy
School
of
Governm
ent,H
arvardU
niversity,presents
atheory
onthe
potentialbenefits
andcosts
of
street-leveldrug
enforcement.
His
centralhypothesis
assertsthat
crackdowns
onstreet-level
heroindealers
and
buyersincrease
thenon-m
oneycosts
ofdrug
use(the
riskof
arrestand
the
time
requiredto
findnew
sourcesof
drugs)and
reduceconsum
ption.H
e
arguesthat
thecom
binationof
increasedrisk
andtim
edrives
some
usersto
desist:he
alsosuggests
thatthose
who
continueto
usedrugs
can“score”
lessfrequently.
Additionally,
hecontends
that,since
offendersw
hocom
mit
robberyand
burglaryoften
doso
toget
money
fordrugs,
crackdowns
—by
reducingdrug
consumption
without
increasingthe
drugprice—
canalso
reducethe
numbers
ofstreet
crimes.
Based
onanalysis
of
datacollected
in
severalareas
which
haveexperienced
crackdowns
onstreet
drugm
arkets,
Kleim
anconcludes
that“street-level
heroincrackdow
ns,under
some
cir
cumstances,
producegreat
benefitsat
modest
costs.”H
echallenges
practi
tionersto
“tryit
andsee.”
The
reviews
arew
rittenby
Professor
Arnold
Barnett,
theS
loanS
choolof
Managem
ent,M
assachusettsInstitute
ofT
echnology;A
nthonyB
ouza,C
hief
of
Police
inM
inneapolis;and
Kevin
Burke,
District
Attorney
inE
ssex
County,
Massachusetts.
Each,
drawing
onhis
own
richbasis
of
experience
andexpertise,
reactsto
Kleim
an’spaper
andpolicy
recomm
endationsin
a
differentw
ay.
District
Attorney
Burke
stronglyendorses
thepolicy,
buthe
takesissue
with
some
of
Kleim
an’sreservations.
Mr.
Burke’s
primary
goalin
instituting
street-leveldrug
enforcement
inhis
districtw
asto
improve
thequality
of
lifein
areasdom
inatedby
dealersand
addicts.B
ecausethese
peopleleft
the
targetareas
following
crackdowns,
heheartily
endorsesthe
practice.
The
two
otherreview
ersare
lessoptim
isticthan
Kleim
anabout
theresults
of
crackdowns.
Chief
Bouza
hasseen
street-leveldrug
enforcement
merely
shiftthe
localeof
dealing.H
ehas
watched
arresteddealers
quicklysh
unt
edback
onthe
streetsbecause
of
overcrowded
courtsand
prisons.H
ede
ploresthe
waste
of
resourcesand
concludesthat,
althougha
crackdown
temporarily
providesgood
publicity,“T
heonly
problemis
thatit
doesn’t
work.”
Professor
Barnett
reviews
theanalysis
thatled
toK
leiman’s
conclusionthat
undersom
ecircum
stancescrackdow
nshelp
reducestreet
crime.
Innon
technicalterm
s,he
shows
howthe
numbers
usedby
Kleim
anto
dem
on
stratesuccess
canbe
misleading.
He
ism
orepessim
isticthan
Kleim
an
aboutthe
negativeand
positiveconsequences
of
crackdowns.
How
everhe
agreesw
iththe
Kleim
anconclusion
to“try
itand
see.”“O
nlythrough
an
extensiveprocess
of
trialand
error,”he
suggests,“can
we
learnthe
circum
stancesunder
which
crackdowns
producem
orebeneficial
thanharm
fulef
fects.”It
isin
thisspirit
of
learningthat
theN
ationalInstitute
of
Justice
presentsthese
papers.
2C
haiken
Chapter
2
CR
AC
KD
OW
NS
:T
HE
EF
FE
CT
SO
FIN
TE
NS
IVE
EN
FO
RC
EM
EN
TO
NR
ET
AIL
HE
RO
IND
EA
LIN
G
Mark
A.R
.K
leiman
Introduction
In1985,
more
than800,000
citizensw
erearrested
fordrug
lawviolations.
The
Anti-D
rugA
buseA
ctof
1986[P.L
.99-570]
provided$230
million
tostate
andlocal
enforcement
agenciesfor
enhanceddrug
enforcement
ac
tivities.Y
etthe
valueof
suchpolice
enforcement
haslong
beendebated.
Part
of
thisdebate
concernsthe
purposesand
justificationsfor
suchef
forts.S
ome
arguethat
theenforcem
entactivity
isjustified
simply
becauselaw
sagainst
druguse
exist,and
itis
theclear
obligationof
theS
tateto
en
forcethe
laws.
Others
seethe
laws
andim
provedenforcem
entas
justifiedby
theirim
pacton
levelsof
illicitdrug
use.’Still
otherssee
drugen
force
ment
asa
potentiallyuseful
approachto
controlling“street
crimes”
suchas
robberyand
burglary.2
The
debatealso
concernsthe
practicaleffect
ofenforcem
entefforts
onthese
objectives.T
hereare
conflictingtheories
aboutthe
causalm
echanisms
thatlink
localdrug
enforcement
effortsto
theobjectives
of
controllingdrug
useand
streetcrim
e.A
ndthere
isonly
alim
itedam
ountof
empirical3
evidenceto
testour
theoriesor
evaluatethe
resultsof
localen
forcem
ent.
4
Recent
evidenceand
reasoningabout
oneform
of
localdrug
enfo
rcem
ent—crackdow
nson
retailheroin
markets—
suggestthat
suchcrackdow
nsm
aybe
onew
ayto
uselocal
drugenforcem
entefforts
toproduce
valuableresults.
The
Effects
of
IntensiveE
nforcement
onR
etailH
eroinD
ealing
The
Lynn
Drug
Task
Force
The
Progm
m
Inearly
1983,the
Massachusetts
State
policenarcotics
unithad
decen
tral
ized.Its
agentsw
eredispersed
intocounty
drugtask
forcesunder
thed
i
rectionof
theelected
District
Attorneys.
The
District
Attorney
forE
ssex
County,
Kevin
Burke,
foundhim
selfw
ithsix
narcoticsofficers
athis
disposal.
Burke
decidedthat
spreadingsix
drugofficers
overa
countyw
itha
pop
ula
tionof
750,000w
asunlikely
toproduce
substantialresults.
Chronic
com
plaintsfrom
residentsand
merchants
inL
ynn,M
assachusetts,about
open
heroindealing
inthe
High
Rock
neighborhood,just
fourblocks
fromthe
centralbusiness
district,suggested
atarget
form
oreconcentrated
efforts.
Lynn
hadthe
secondhighest
crime
rateof
allM
assachusettscities
anda
policedepartm
entw
hosesw
ornstrength
hadfallen
byabout
one-third
(from180
to120)
dueto
fiscalpressures.
Burke
electedto
concentratehis
entireT
askForce
onstreet-level
heroindealing
inL
ynnto,
ashe
described
it,“im
provethe
qualityof
life.’”
The
Lynn
Drug
Task
Force
beganoperations
inS
eptember
1983w
ithsix
State
troopersand
onedetective
fromthe
Lynn
Police
Departm
ent.O
ver
thefirst
10m
onthsof
itsexistence,
thetask
forceaveraged
6full-tim
e-
equivalentpolice
plusI
part-time
civilianclerk.
This
representedabout
5
percentof
thetotal
sworn
policeforces
availablein
Lynn,
andcost
app
rox
imately
$20,000per
month,
or25
centsa
month
perresident.
Subsequently,
theS
tatetroopers
were
slowly
shiftedaw
ayfrom
Lynn
andtow
ardthe
largerm
arketin
Law
rence,at
theother
endof
thecounty,
butthe
Lynn
Police
Departm
entadded
more
of
itsow
nofficers
tothe
Task
Force.C
ur
rentstrength
(fouryears
later)varies
fromfour
tosix
sworn
oficers.6
The
strategyof
theT
askForce
was
tom
akeit
difficultfor
dealersto
make
salesand
forheroin
buyersto
“score”in
thestreets
of
Lynn.
Itsofficers
watched
known
dealinglocations
andquestioned
suspectedbuyers
and
sellers,m
adearrests
forpossession
afterobserving
transactions,used
info
r
mants
tom
akesm
all-scalepurchases,
andexecuted
searchw
arrantson
premises
usedfor
dealing.Tw
oofficers
spentseveral
weeks
inone
conven
tionalundercover
operation.A
“Hot
Line”
foranonym
oustips
was
established,m
aintained,and
heavilypublicized;
information
fromH
otL
ine
callscontributed
tom
anyarrests
andsearches.
Inits
first10
months,
theL
ynnD
rugT
askForce
made
140arrests;
these
representedbetw
een5
percentand
10percent
of
theL
ynnP
oliceD
epart
ment’s
arrestactivity
overthat
period.E
levenarrests
were
forpossession
of
heroinw
ithintent
todistribute.
Sixtym
orew
erefor
otherheroin-related
charges:sim
plepossession
orpossession
of
injectionequipm
ent.T
herew
ere
20arrests
forpossession
ofcocaine
with
intentto
distributeand
12for
simple
possessionof
cocaine.O
therarrestees
were
chargedw
itha
4K
leiman
miscellany
of
drugand
non-drugoffenses
ortaken
onoutstanding
arrestand
fugitivew
arrants.N
inety-sixdefendants
were
convictedor
pleadedguil
ty,including
10on
felonyheroin
charges.N
ominal
minim
umsentences
onall
chargestotaled
110years.
Arrests
havecontinued
since,but
ata
much
lower
rate.
The
Results
Burke’s
goalfor
theprogram
—”to
improve
thequality
of
lifein
Lynn”—
was
abroad
one.A
ta
minim
um,
itm
eanthalting
theopen
dealingof
Bheroin
andstilling
thecom
plaintsof
citizensoffended
andfrightened
bythe
openheroin
market.
More
ambitiously,
itm
eantreducing
thelevel
ofheroin
usein
Lynn
(andperhaps
elsewhere
ifL
ynndrug
dealingw
assu
pporting
consumption
inother
areas)by
making
itdifficult
forexperim
entaldrug
usersto
haveaccess
toheroin
andby
givingcurrent
usersincentives
toabandon
theiruse.
Even
more
ambitiously,
itm
eantreducing
streetcrim
essuch
asrobbery
andburglary
inL
ynn—
eitherby
incapacitatinghero
inusing
offendersthrough
incarceration,or
byreducing
theirpredatory
activi
tyas
aside-effect
of
reducingtheir
heroinconsum
ption.T
heresults
were
unexpectedlygratifying.
Disorder
Reduction
andQ
ualityof
Life
The
preliminary
resultsof
theoperation
includeda
marked
decreasein
thevolum
eand
flagrancyof
theL
ynnheroin
market.
Avisitor
walking
throughthe
High
Rock
areaon
asum
mer
afternoonsees
aplacid,
rathersuburban
neighborhood,not
thedrug
bazaarthat
reportedlyused
toexist.
Interviewed
ninem
onthsafter
theinception
of
theT
askForce,
High
Rock
residents,their
electedrepresentatives,
andm
erchantsin
thenearby
businessdistrict,
describedthem
selvesas
pleasedw
iththe
changes.M
oresurprisingly,
othersin
theC
ityappeared
tonotice
andappreciate
theeffects
of
theT
askForce:
37percent
of
therespondents
ina
city-wide
surveyconducted
inthe
sum
mer
of
1984thought
thatpolice
andprosecutors
were
doinga
betterjob
inenforcing
thedrug
laws
thana
yearpreviously;
only12
percentthought
thatthey
were
doinga
worse
job.
Heroin
Consum
ption
Of
allthe
effectsof
drugenforcem
ent,the
impact
ondrug
consumption
isam
ongthe
hardestto
measure.
Most
of
theevidence
available,how
ever,suggests
thatheroin
consumption
inL
ynndeclined
substantiallyafter
theinception
of
theT
askForce.
Drug
treatment
workers
inL
ynnbelieve
thatthe
easyavailability
of
heroinin
theearly
1980’shad
resultedin
there-addiction
of
many
heroinusers
who
hadbeen
abstinentduring
thelate
1970’s.T
heyreport
that,as
aresult
of
theT
askForce,
heroinusers
inL
ynnfound
itharder
tobuy
drugsand
were
worried
aboutbeing
arrestedfor
possessionof
narcoticsif
theydid
succeedin
buying.A
sa
result,som
eof
themw
entinto
drugtreatm
ent.
8
The
Effects
of
IntensiveE
nforcement
onR
etailH
eroin
fl1in
c
Interviews
with
drugusers
intreatm
entconfirm
edthis
account.
9O
fcourse,
usersin
treatment
donot
constitutean
unbiasedsam
pleof
allusers.
The
impression
thatincreased
enforcement
pressuretended
todecrease
heroinuse
isconfirm
edby
thepattern
ofdem
andfor
drugtreatm
entser
vicesin
Lynn.
Unlike
treatment
facilitieselsew
herein
Massachusetts,
the
programin
Lynn
experiencedm
orethan
an85
percentincrease
indem
and
forservice
overthe
10m
onthsstarting
inS
eptember
of1983.
By
that
point,w
aitinglists
hadstarted
todevelop
andfurther
changesin
treatment
demand
became
hardto
measure.°
Lynn-area
heroinusers
whose
consumption
of
heroindecreased
orceased
asa
resultof
thetask
forcem
ayw
ellhave
increasedtheir
consumption
of
otherdrugs,
particularlyother
depressantsincluding
syntheticopiates
and
opioids,barbiturates,
andalcohol.
These
may
actas
substitutes—in
both
thepsychological
andeconom
icsenses
ofthat
term—
forheroin.
The
extent
of
thateffect
was
notm
easured.
Property
andV
iolentC
rime
Perhaps
them
ostsurprising
resultof
theL
ynnD
rugT
askForce
was
itsim
pacton
streetcrim
es:specifically,
robbery,burglary,
andcrim
esagainst
the
person(hom
icide,forcible
rape,and
aggravatedassault).
Com
paringthe
12
months
startingS
eptember,
1983,w
iththe
previous12
months,
reported
robberiesw
eredow
n18.5
percent,reported
burglariesw
eredow
n37.5
per
cent,and
reportedcrim
esagainst
theperson
were
down
afull
66percent.’
Inthe
following
12m
onths,the
reportedburglaries
remained
attheir
new,
lower
level,and
reportedrobberies
declinedstill
further,to
alevel
30per
centbelow
thebase
year(see
Figures
1,2,
and3
fora
graphicalrep
resenta
tionof
thesechanges;
seethe
section,“P
ossibleE
xplanationsfor
Decreases
inC
rime,”
below,
fora
statisticalanalysis).
This
apparentdecrease
incrim
e,
ifvalid
(asw
ellas
statisticallysignificant)
representsa
large,and
largely
unexpected,benefit
of
theprogram
.Indeed,
itm
akesit
seemthat
cracking
down
onstreet-level
heroindealing
might
bea
cost-effectiveapproach
to
crime
controlas
well
asan
instrument
ofdrug
abusecontrol
policy.
Before
decidingthat
thiskind
of
programw
ouldbe
usefulacross
theco
un
try,how
ever,it
isnecessary
toplace
thisexperience
ina
broadercontext:
to
identifythe
fullrange
of
effectsrelevant
tothe
evaluationof
street-level
drugenforcem
entprogram
s,to
supplement
theresults
fromL
ynnw
ith
reportsof
lessw
ell-documented
effortselsew
here,to
considerhow
some
of
theeffects
ofsuch
programs
come
about,and
toconsider
what
enviro
n
mental
featuresof
agiven
siteaffect
theprospects
of
success.M
uchof
this
paperis
guidedby
inferencesfrom
generalprinciples
asw
ellas
bydirect
evidence.T
heaim
istherefore
notto
establishdefinitively
what
istrue
but
toim
proveour
understandingof
theprobability,
conditions,and
mechanism
sof
successfulretail
heroincrackdow
ns.
IcV
b.im
n
r 0
1980 JANFEB
MARAPRMAYJUNJUL
AUGSEPOCTNOVDEC
1981 JANFEB
MARAPRMAYJUNJUL
AUGSEPOCTNOVDEC
1982 JANFEB
MARAPRMAYJUNJUL
AUGSEPOCTNOVDEC
1983 JANFEB
MARAPRMAYJUNJUL
—4 IAUGZTS SEP
OCTNOVDEC
1984 JANFEB
MARAPRMAYJUNJULAUGSEPOCTNOVDEC
1985 JANFEB
MARAPRMAYJUNJUL
AUGSEPOCTNOVDEC
ROBBERIESmean, JaY 1980-DeC 1985
z-.4z 10 —J
0a.a.-‘
m0
-nC,r c
8<
9
U’
FIGU
RE
2
Burglaries
inL
ynn:1980-1985
357
339
321
303
285
267
249W
a,
231
2202
213
‘aE195
177
159
141
123
110
MO
NT
H
9LD
TF9
99
99
BE
GIN
S9
9
8K
leiman
127
118
108
99908172
443526176
MO
NT
H
00
LD
TF
00
0600IN
S0
0
FIGU
RE
3C
rimes
Against
the
Perso
nin
Lynn:
1980-1985
z0(I)
I-6
0—
Z62854
The
Effects
of
IntensiveE
nforcement
onR
etailH
eroinD
ealing9
Evaluating
Street-L
evelH
eroinE
nforcement
Efforts
The
aboveaccount
of
theL
ynnprogram
suggeststhe
wide
rangeof
effects—beneficial
andotherw
ise—such
activitiesm
ayhave.
This
sectiono
f
fersa
more
systematic
catalogueof
benefitsand
coststo
providea
struc
turefor
theevaluation
of
pastefforts
andfor
decidingw
hetherfuture
ones
arelikely
tobe
justified.W
ebegin
with
benefitsthat
aredirectly
andim
mediately
produced,proceed
tobenefits
thatare
more
remote,
andthen
ad
dressthe
issueof
costsincurred
instreet-level
heroinenforcem
ent.
Benefits
Neighborhood
Conditions
Open
drugdealing
isbad
forthe
neighborhoodsw
ithinw
hichit
occu
rs.2
In
additionto
theproblem
sof
trafficand
noisethat
accompany
anystreet-
cornercom
mercial
activity,drug
dealingposes
two
specialthreats:
that
some
neighborhoodresidents,
particularlychildren,
may
become
users;and
that
thebehavior
of
buyersand
sellersw
illbe
disruptiveor
worse.
Inpoor
neighborhoods,the
opportunityfor
quickm
oneyoffered
bythe
illicit
market
may
compete
with
entry-levellicit
jobsand
divertlabor-m
arketen
trantsfrom
legitimate
careers.3
When
thedrug
soldis
heroin,residents
are
likelyto
bebothered
byusers
“nodding”in
doorways
andheroin-using
pro
stitutessoliciting,
andeven
carryingon,
businessin
ways
thatdisturb
neighborsand
passers-by.
Reducing
thevolum
e,or
atleast
theflagrancy,
of
streetheroin
dealing
shouldtherefore
becounted
asa
benefitseparate
fromthe
reductionin
heroinconsum
ption.T
hisbenefit
canbe
detectedby
simple
inspectionof
thearea,
beforeand
after;by
formal
orinform
alsurveys
of
residents;or
indirectlythrough
suchm
easuresas
realestate
values.
Controlling
Heroin
Use
The
laws
againstthe
possessionand
saleo
fheroin
reflecta
socialjudgm
ent
thatthe
useof
thedrug
ispernicious.
The
ethnographicliterature
onheroin
addictsprovides
ample
supportfor
thatview
,w
hichappears
tobe
shared
bym
any,if
notm
ost,heroin
usersthem
selves.14
Inthinking
aboutthe
effectsof
street-levelenforcem
enton
heroincon
sumption,
itis
usefulto
distinguishthe
effectson
peoplew
hoare
already
drug-dependentfrom
theeffects
onthose
who
arebeginning
toexperim
ent
orthinking
aboutexperim
enting.T
heeffects,
andthe
mechanism
sth
atpro
ducethe
effects,w
illbe
quitedifferent
onthe
two
classesof
users,because
experiencedusers
arelikely
tohave
bothm
ore“connections”
(sources)and
more
resourcefulnessand
determination
about“scoring.”
Even
forsom
eex
10K
leiman
periencedusers,
however,
street-levelenforcem
entis
likelyto
reducecon
sumption.
The
effectw
illoccur
throughseveral
mechanism
s.
First,
inthe
courseof
acrackdow
n,m
anyexperienced
heroinusers
will
bearrested
forsale
orpossession.
Their
arrest,and
thedisposition
of
theircases,
will
tendto
reducetheir
consumption
throughthe
familiar
mechanism
sof
specificdeterrence,
incapacitation,and
rehabilitation.S
ucheffects
arelikely
tobe
particularlystrong
when
thecrackdow
nsare
accom
paniedby
urinetesting
atthe
time
of
arrest,and
mandated
urinescreening
asa
conditionof
bail,probation,
orp
arole.
5
Second,
anexperienced
userw
hois
notarrested
may,
inthe
faceof
increas
edpressure
onthe
streets,decide
thatnow
isa
usefultim
eto
reduceor
abandonheroin
use.H
em
aybe
deterredby
theprospect
of
arrest.H
em
aybe
inconveniencedby
thearrest
of
hisregular
“connection”and
thedif
ficulty(increased
byenforcem
ent)of
findinga
newone.
Or,
more
likely,the
increaseddaily
inconvenienceand
anxietyof
“copping”w
illcum
ulateto
theextent
that“drying
out”w
illappear
relativelyattractive.
The
likelihoodof
addicts’m
akingthis
choicecan
beincreased,
iftreatm
entservices
arereadily
availableto
thoseheroin
usersw
how
antit.
The
impact
of
street-levelheroin
enforcement
onnew
usersis
potentiallylarger,
andover
thelong
run,m
oresignificant.
Itis
largerbecause
experim
entalusers
arem
uchless
comm
ittedto
usingheroin
thanestablished
addicts,and
much
lessresourceful
in“copping.”
They
arealso
harderfor
streetsellers
todistinguish
forundercover
narcoticsofficers,
andare
thuslikely
toencounter
particularlygreat
difficultiesw
hen“the
heatis
on.”
6
Ifstreet-level
enforcement
raisesthe
averagetim
erequired
to“score”
from5
minutes
to2
hoursand
forcesdealing
eitherindoors
orto
more
dangerousparts
of
town,
noviceusers
will
bem
orelikely
thanexperienced
addictsto
gow
ithoutheroin.
The
same
isprobably
trueof
thefear
of
ar
restfor
possession.’7
Effects
onthe
initiationof
heroinuse
orthe
progressfrom
initiationto
regularuse
areparticularly
worth
achieving,because
theresult
isthe
elimination
of
anentire
addictcareer
ratherthan
simply
shorteningone.
With
respectto
adolescents,parents
havethe
primary
responsibilityfor
preventingheroin
initiation.Street-level
enforcement
canhelp
restoretheir
capacityto
accomplish
thattask.
All
parents,regardless
ofeconom
iclevel
orethnicity,
areeager
toprotect
theirchildren
fromthe
effectsof
heroinuse.
As
longas
thestreets
areopen
drugm
arkets,very
highlevels
of
paren
talsupervision
may
beneeded
tobe
effective.O
nthe
otherhand,
ifthe
streetsare
relativelysafe
orclear
of
drugdealing,
thenparental
adm
oni
tionsagainst
druguse
areless
likelyto
beignored.
Another
potentialbenefit
of
street-levelheroin
crackdowns
isits
potentialcontribution
tothe
broader,higher-level
effortto
minim
izethe
supplyof
drugsthrough
theim
mobilization
of
traffickingorganizations.
Street-levelenforcem
entcontributes
tothis
effortw
heneverit
turnsup
apiece
ofin
telligencethat
canbe
usedin
anongoing
federalinvestigation
ora
defen
The
Effects
ofIntensive
Enforcem
enton
Retail
Heroin
Dealing
11
dantw
how
ouldbe
willing
tobecom
ean
informant.
Street-level
heroinen
forcement
may
alsouncover
traffickingorganizations
andnetw
orksth
at
were
previouslyunknow
nto
thehigher-level
investigators.B
ecausestreet-
levelenforcem
entefforts
arenot
guidedby
intelligenceinform
ationbut
at
tackw
hatis
rightin
fronto
fthem
,they
may
serveas
“earlyw
arningnet
works”
forthe
growth
of
newtrafficking
organizations.O
neshould
notex
pectthese
discoveriesoften.
But
when
suchdiscoveries
dooccur,
theyw
ill
beextrem
elyim
portantcontributions
tothe
overalleffectiveness
ofsupply
reductionefforts.
Reducing
“StreetC
rimes”
Athird
potentialbenefit
of
street-levelheroin
crackdowns
isthe
prevention
ofproperty
andviolent
crimes.
The
impact
onthese
crimes
isim
portantin
evaluatingstreet-level
heroinenforcem
entfor
severalreasons.
First,
itis
possiblethat
thesecrim
esw
illincrease
asa
resultof
street-leveldrug
en
forcement,
andthus
must
becounted
asa
costof
street-levelenforcem
ent
ratherthan
abenefit.
Ifstreet-level
enforcement
increasesthe
priceof
heroinbut
failsto
decreaseconsum
ption,addicts
will
haveto
stealm
ore.
Thus,
theold
saw,
“thedrug
squadm
akesw
orkfor
theburglary
squad.”If
thatanticipated
effectdoes
notoccur,
thenone
potentialcost
of
street-level
enforcement
will
beelim
inated.
Second,
theintrinsic
importance
of
thesecrim
es—
particularlyin
poor
comm
unities—
makes
anyeffect
onthem
veryim
portant.S
mall
increases
(severalpercent)
inLevels
ofrobbery
andburglary
would
besufficiently
im
portantto
cancelout
benefitsm
easuredin
terms
of
theelim
inationof
drug
markets
orthe
encouragement
of
drugusers
toseek
treatment.
On
the
otherhand,
small
reductionsin
levelsof
robberyand
burglaryw
ouldcon
stitutean
important
justificationfor
street-levelenforcem
enteven
ifit
pro
ducedno
otherbenefits.
Third,
controllingrobbery
andburglary
iscentral
tothe
mission
of
criminal
justiceagencies.
Ifthese
crimes
increasedas
aresult
ofheroin
crackdowns,
policeand
prosecutingorganizations
would
notbe
enthusiasticabout
them
evenif
therew
eresubstantial
benefitsgained
inthe
comm
unity’ssense
of
orderand
reductionin
druguse.
Fourth,
thefact
thatthese
effectsare
relativelyeasy
tom
easurem
akesthem
inexpensiveindicators
ofw
hethera
programis
“working.”
With
alltheir
well-know
nfoibles,
countsof
crimes
reportedto
thepolice
areat
leastcol
lectedm
onth-by-month,
andcan
thereforebe
manipulated
statistically,
while
otherbenefit
measures
arefar
harderto
quantify.T
hus,effects
on
streetcrim
esare
aninevitable
andim
portantdim
ensionto
beused
in
evaluatingstreet-level
enforcement
efforts.
Costs
The
costsof
street-levelenforcem
entregister
inthree
areas:1)
thedirect
financialcost
of
mounting
theoperations;
2)the
valueof
policeresources
1?
VIp
im,n
comm
ittedto
street-levelenforcem
entin
alternativeuses;
and3)
thep
oten
tialthreat
tocivil
libertiesassociated
with
more
extensiveand
aggressivestreet-level
enforcement.
Moreover,
itis
important
torecognize
thatthese
costsregister
acrossthe
criminal
justicesystem
—not
simply
within
thepolice
organizationsthat
initiatethe
operations.
Financial
Costs
of
Street-L
evelH
eroinC
rackdowns
The
directpayroll
costsof
policeem
ployedin
heroincrackdow
nsare
notthe
onlyfinancial
coststo
beconsidered
inevaluating
suchprogram
s.B
enefitpackages
(includingretirem
ent)need
tobe
takeninto
account.So
do“overhead”
costs:buildings,
vehicles,adm
inistration,supervision.
At
leastin
thecase
of
Operation
Pressure
Point
Iin
New
York,
concernsabout
thepotential
forcorruption
andother
misconduct
ledto
aheavier-
than-normal
ratioof
supervisorsto
patrolofficers
andline
detectives.’8
The
otherm
ajorcost
implicit
inthe
establishment
of
suchoperations
isthe
needto
maintain
themover
time.
This
needm
aybe
more
politicalthan
operational,but
itis
nonethelessreal.
New
York
Police
Com
missioner
Ben
jamin
Ward
reportsthat
Pressure
Point
Iand
otherstreet-level
anti-narcotics
activitiesgenerated
som
uchneighborhood
supportthat
anyattem
ptto
phasethem
down
afteronce
flagrantdealing
haddeclined
met
with
vigorouslocal
resistance.’9
Thus
adecision
tostart
acrackdow
nm
ayinvolve
along-term
resourcecom
mitm
ent.
Alternative
Uses
of
Enforcem
entR
esourcesP
oliceobserving
heroinsales
arenot
answering
callsfor
serviceor
decoyingrobbers.
Prosecutors
tryingstreet
salecases
arenot
tryingburglary
orpro
stitutioncases.
Aprison
bedfilled
bya
heroindealer
might
holdan
autothief
instead.D
etectivesassigned
toa
taskforce
directedat
retailheroin
dealingare
nottapping
cocainew
holesalers’telephones.
Urban
lawenforcem
entis
nota
world
ofslack
resources.B
enefitsw
ouldhave
beenobtained
fromthe
work
ofthe
peopleinvolved
with
aretail
heroincrackdow
n,had
theybeen
assignedto
dosom
ethingelse
instead.T
hese“lost”
benefitsshould
becounted
asa
costof
thecrackdow
n.
Determ
iningin
detailthe
resultsof
“onem
ore”arrest,
conviction,or
month
of
incarcerationin
varioususes
islargely
beyondthe
stretchof
theavailable
lawenforcem
entliterature.
The
“opportunitycost”
of
theresources
employed
incrackdow
nscannot,
therefore,be
measured
with
anyprecision.
The
alternativew
ouldbe
toadd
resourcesto
thesystem
tocarry
outcrackdow
ns,and
thenm
easurethe
benefitsof
thecrackdow
nsagainst
thedollar
costsof
thenew
resources.In
practice,how
ever,new
dollarsm
aynot
beavailable.
Effects
onO
therA
gencyO
perationsC
rackdowns
canhave
avariety
of
effectson
theother
operationsof
theagencies
involvedbeyond
thesheer
useof
resources.
The
Effects
of
IntensiveE
nforcement
onR
etailH
eroinD
ealing13
They
canbe
more
orless
professionallyrew
ardingand
interestingfor
thepersonnel
involvedthan
alternativeassignm
ents,and
thusim
proveor
worsen
morale.
No
formal
studyhas
beendone,
butit
appearsthat
only
am
inorityof
policefind
retailheroin
enforcement
aprofessionally
stim
ulatingactivity.
Their
boredomneeds
tobe
countedon
thecost
sideof
theledger.
Prosecutors’
lackof
interestin
suchcases
may
beeven
more
marked.
Crackdow
nscan
strengthenor
weaken
policeknow
ledgeof,
andrelations
with,
neighborhoodsand
theircitizens.
The
directionand
magnitude
of
sucheffects
will
varyw
ithcircum
stancesand
tactics.P
riorconsultation
with
localleaders,
publicrelations
efforts,and
thelike
may
make
adif
ference.
Finally,
corruption,corruption
scandals,and
corruption-controlm
easures
needto
beconsidered.
These
canbe
enormously
expensivein
terms
of
theability
of
policeforces
toexecute
anyof
theirduties.
None
ofthe
street-
levelefforts
discussedhere
hasrun
intocorruption
problems,
andit
isdif
ficultin
theabstract
tojudge
whether
crackdowns
arem
oreor
lesslikely
to
breedcorruption
thanother
policeactivities.
Retail
crackdowns
involvefar
lesslong-term
undercoverw
orkthan
investigationsof
high-leveldealers.
It
issuch
long-termundercover
work
thathas
spawned
many
ofthe
spec
tacularcorruption
casesof
thepast.
Enforcem
entIntrusiveness
andA
buseo
fA
uthority
Indrug
cases,as
inother
casesinvolving
consensualcrim
es,the
absenceof
complainants
complicates
enforcement
efforts.D
ruginvestigations
involve
deceitby
thepolice,
theextensive
useof
criminal
informants,
andclose
questionsabout
searchand
seizure.S
treetenforcem
entm
ayinvolve
the
stoppingand
questioningof
many
citizensw
ithoutany
basisfor
arrest.T
he
difficultyof
making
narcoticscases
thatw
illstand
upin
courthas
evendriven
some
narcoticsofficers
tom
anufactureevidence
andto
perjurethem
selves.
There
aretw
oseparate
questionshere:
theintrusiveness
of
lawful
tacticsus
edin
crackdowns
intocitizens’
affairsand
thestrain
theym
ayput
onthe
toleranceof
thecom
munity
fordistasteful
policetactics,
andthe
temp
ta
tionthey
createfor
unlawful
behaviorby
police.B
othm
ustbe
reckonedas
costsof
street-levelenforcem
ent.
14K
leiman
Other
Street-L
evelC
rackdowns
The
Lynn
Task
Force
was
thefirst
street-leveldrug
crackdown
toreceive
aform
alevaluation,
butother
areashave
mounted
street-levelenforcem
entef
forts.T
heirexperience
isinstructive.
Manhattan,
Low
erE
astSide
(Operation
Pressure
Point
I)If
theheroin
tradein
Lynn
in1983
representedone
extreme
among
drugm
arkets—
small,
concentrated,isolated
—the
tradein
Manhattan’s
“Alphabet
City”
onthe
Low
erE
astSide
representedthe
other:big,
cosmopolitan,
andin
acity
with
thrivingdrug
markets
inseveral
otherneighborhoods.
The
Low
erE
astSide
was
alsothe
siteof
am
ajorcrackdow
n,an
apparentsu
ccess
interm
sof
itseffects
onlocal
streetdealing,
druguse,
andcrim
e.
As
of
January1984,
thearea
around2nd
Street
andA
venueB
was
acenter
)of
well-organized
retaildrug
dealing.D
rugbuyers
crowded
aroundsellers;
atsom
elocations,
theyw
aitedin
orderlydouble
lines.
20
Many
storesand
apartment
buildingsin
thearea
were
abandoned;drug
dealingappeared
tohave
replacedvirtually
everyother
economic
activity.A
mong
thearea’s
at
tractionsfor
drugsellers
was
itsdivision
among
threepolice
precincts(5th,
7th,and
9th).T
hethree
were
noteven
within
thesam
epatrol
zone.A
sa
result,it
was
almost
impossible
tofocus
enforcement
attentionon
thedrug
market
without
creatingan
organizationalunit
which
couldspan
existingboundaries.
Benjam
inW
ard,sw
ornin
asP
oliceC
omm
issioneron
January1,
1984,gave
priorityto
anim
mediate
crackdown
ondrug
dealing.P
ressureP
ointI
was
initiallyconceived
asa
60-daycrash
project.It
beganJanuary
19,1984,
andtw
oyears
laterw
asstill
runningat
veryclose
toits
originalresource
levels.T
hecosts
of
Pressure
Point
I,in
salaryalone,
were
approximately
$12m
illionper
yearfor
itsfirst
two
yearsof
operatio
ns.
2’
This
isabout
25tim
esthe
costof
theL
ynnT
askForce.
New
York
City
asa
whole
hasabout
100tim
esthe
populationof
Lynn;
theP
ressureP
ointtarget
areahoused
onlya
tinyfraction
of
that,but
itscustom
erscam
efrom
allover
thecity
andnorthern
New
Jersey.
Inthe
beginning,P
ressureP
ointI
reliedon
massive
numbers
ofarrests.
For
thefirst
fourw
eeks,it
averagedsom
e65
arrestsper
day,of
which
more
thanone-third
were
onfelony
narcoticscharges.
Then,
asm
arketpar
ticipantsbecam
em
orew
ary,the
number
of
arrestsfell
tofew
erthan
20per
day,and
felonydrug
chargesbecam
era
rer.
12
Som
eof
thetactics
employed
inthis
programw
ere:“observation
sales”;undercover
buys;raids
ondealing
locations;use
of
ananonym
ous“H
otL
ine”;arrests
fora
wide
rangeof
misdem
eanorsand
violations,such
asdisorderly
conductand
loitering;and
aggressivetraffic
andparking
enforcement,
includingtow
ing.C
asesw
heredealers
were
usingjuveniles
asrunners
were
handledby
takingthe
kidsback
totheir
parentsand
warning
thatanother
arrestof
thechild
fordrug
The
Effects
of
IntensiveE
nforcement
onR
etailH
eroinD
elinQ
1 c
dealingw
ouldresult
incharges
of
abuseand
neglectagainst
theparents.
Vehicles
usedto
transp
ort
drugs,including
carsdriven
bydrug
buyers,w
ereseized
andforfeited
underF
ederaldrug
laws.
Pressure
Point
I,like
theL
ynnT
askForce,
haddram
aticeffects
ondrug
markets,
crime,
andneighborhood
welfare.
Although
dealinghas
notbeen
eliminated,
Alphabet
City
hasseen
asubstantial
reductionin
heroinstreet
activity,so
much
sothat
policeofficials
havebeen
criticizedfor
con
tributingto
the“gentrification”
of
apreviously
low-rent
area.L
ower
East
Sidedrug
treatment
programs,
alreadycrow
deddue
tofunding
cutbacksand
increasingfear
of
AID
Sam
ongheroin
users,have
seena
newinflux
of
clientsdue
toP
ressureP
oint.
Reported
crime
ofm
anykinds
hasbeen
drasticallyreduced
inthe
Pressure
Point
“Target
Area,”
hardlya
surprisingresult
giventhe
sheervolum
eof
policepresence
ina
limited
area.In
thetarget
area(com
posedof
partso
fthree
precincts),betw
een1983
and1984,
robberiesfell
47percent,
burglaries37
percent,grand
larcenies32
percent,and
homicides
62percent
(13co
m
paredto
34).T
heparts
of
thethree
precinctsoutside
thetarget
areaalso
showed
decreasesin
crime;
crime
inthe
adjacentprecincts
was
unch
anged
.23
One
possibleresult
of
alocal
drugcrackdow
nis
tocreate
anew
market
justoutside
thearea
of
heavyenforcem
ent,“displacing”
them
arketfrom
onestreet
cornerto
another.N
osuch
market
arosenear
theP
ressureP
oint
Itarget
area.T
herew
ere,how
ever,reports
ofdealers
andusers
relocatingto
other,already
establisheddrug
markets
within
thecity;
thereare
severalin
Manhattan
andin
nearbyparts
of
Brooklyn.
Whether
thedisplaced
activityw
asa
largefraction
ofthe
previousL
ower
East
Side
tradeis
unknown.
By
thesam
etoken,
thefact
thatstreet
crime
didnot
risein
theareas
aroundP
ressureP
ointdoes
notconclusively
demonstrate
thatit
was
notdisplaced
elsewhere
inthe
city.A
seriousinvestigation
of
thisquestion
would
requirea
carefulstudy
ofindividual-level
criminal-history
files;otherw
ise,it
isvirtually
impossible
totell
whether
some
personsw
hohad
beencom
mitting
crimes
inthe
Pressure
Point
areabefore
thecrackdow
n
begancom
mitting
themelsew
herelater.
There
were
noobvious
crime
“bulges”in
otherareas,
butthere
isno
way
toknow
what
crime
ratesw
ouldhave
beenin
otherdrug-dealing
areasin
theabsence
of
theP
ressureP
ointoperation.
Pressure
Point
I,then,
clearlyim
provedlocal
conditions,but
itseffects
elsewhere,
bothin
terms
ofdisplacing
druguse
andcrim
eand
interm
sof
crowding
outother
policeand
courtactivity,
areopen
toquestion.
Law
rence,M
assachusetts
The
Lynn
experiencedem
onstratesthe
possiblesuccess
of
street-leveldrug
enforcement
incontrolling
othercrim
es.L
awrence
demonstrates
itspossible
failure.A
fterthe
firstnine
months
of
theL
ynnoperation,
thestate
policeassigned
toL
ynnw
erem
ovedslow
lyto
Law
rence.T
heL
awrence
Task
Force
appearedto
succeedin
suppressingheroin
dealingin
theone
housingpro—
jectw
hereit
hadbeen
most
flagrant,and
drugusers
interviewed
reportedfinding
heroinsom
ewhat
harderto
buyin
Law
renceafter
thecrackdow
nsta
rted.
24
How
ever,overall
trafficdid
notseem
toshrink
nearlyas
much
inL
awrence
asit
hadin
Lynn
oron
theL
ower
East
Side.In
addition,the
cityC
of
Low
ell,a
fewm
ilesaw
aybut
acrossthe
countyline,
remained
largelyw
ideopen
forheroin
dealing,thus
givingL
awrence
heroinusers
analter
natesource
ofsupply.
The
resultsin
terms
ofpersonal
andproperty
crimes
were
discouraging.W
hilecrim
eagainst
theperson
inthe
28m
onthsafter
theinception
ofthe
taskforce
were
down
37percent
compared
toprevious
rates,robberies,
êburglaries,
andlarcenies
allincreased
noticeably(albeit
notto
astatistically
significantdegree)
(SeeT
able1).
Table1:
Com
pariso
nof
Month
lyC
rimes
Before
and
After
Interv
entio
nin
Law
rencefo
rL
awren
ce
Before
InterventionA
fterIntervention
Difference
Significant
Crim
eM
eanSt.
Dcv.
Months
Mean
St.D
ev.M
onthsat
p=
.01A
gainstT
hePerson
26.612.8
5616.5
5.428
YES
Robbery
12.96.3
5618.8
5.228
NO
Burglary
125.729.7
56163.0
65.328
NO
Larceny
142.773.0
56198.4
58.228
NO
Police
involvedw
ithboth
theL
ynnand
Law
renceoperations
citedseveral
differencesto
explainthe
apparentfailure
of
theL
awrence
Task
Forceto
reduceproperty
crimes:
alarger
andm
oregeographically
dispersedheroin
market;
lessvigorous
supportfrom
citizens,com
munity
institutions,and
localpolice;
diversionof
policeattention
toL
awrence’s
flourishingw
hole
salecocaine
trade;tactical
decisionsthat
putless
emphasis
onobservation
salearrests
andm
oreem
phasison
searchw
arrants;and
thepresence
ofthe
Low
ellm
arkets.’
Other
Instances
Norfolk
(Virginia),
Seattle
(Washington),
andSydney
(Australia)
havereportedly
succeededin
reducingdrug
dealingand
othercrim
eby
crackingdow
non
concentratedareas
of
streetlevel
drugdealing.
On
theother
hand,P
hiladelphia’s“O
perationC
oldT
urkey”w
as,by
allaccounts,
adisaster.
Instead
of
concentratingresources
onone
ora
fewareas
with
major
dealing
The
Effects
of
IntensiveE
nforcement
onR
etailH
eroinD
ealing17
problems,
Cold
Turkey
chosetw
o“drug
corners”from
eachof
thecity’s
23
policeprecincts.
Of
the1,000
personsstopped
andsearched
byC
old
Turkey’s
450officers
overfour
days,only
80w
erearrested
onnarcotics
charges,and
150m
orefor
disorderlyconduct.
Public
protestand
alaw
suit
broughtthe
operationto
anend
afterfour
days,w
ithno
measurable
result
exceptfor
citizenhostility.
Washington
(D.C
.)has
substantiallyincreased
its
effortsagainst
retaildrug-dealing
(notjust
heroindealing)
ina
varietyof
forms,
apparentlyw
ithouteffect
oncom
mon
crimes.
Miam
i(F
lorida)has
alsoreportedly
mounted
aprogram
of
enhancedstreet-level
drugen
force
ment;
itseffects
oncrim
eare
unknown.
Inaddition,
sixcities
havereceived
discretionaryfunds
fromthe
Bureau
of
JusticeA
ssistancefor
street-level
drugenforcem
ent;their
programs
arestill
toonew
toev
aluate.
26
18K
leiman
Possible
Explanations
forD
ecreasesin
Crim
e
No
elaboratetheory
isrequired
toexplain
theobservation
thatenhanced
street-leveldrug
enforcement
makes
drugsharder
tobuy,
reducesdisorder,
andim
provesconditions
forresidents
andm
erchantsin
itsim
mediate
area.It
takesa
littlem
oresophistication
toanalyze
andm
easurethe
effectson
levelsof
druguse.
But
thehardest
resultsto
understandfrom
bothL
ynnand
Pressure
Point
arethe
dramatic
decreasesin
reportednon-drug
crimes.
This
sectionw
illreview
severalm
echanisms
thatm
ightlink
crime
decreasesw
ithstreet-level
drugcrackdow
ns—
some
implying
realsocial
benefitsand
some
not—and
examine
theevidence
fromL
ynnand
elsewhere
thatm
ighthelp
distinguishvalid
explanationsfrom
invalidones.
Statistical
Artifact
The
simplest
way
toexplain
theL
ynnresults
isto
denythat
anyreal
effectoccurred.
Measurem
entm
ighthave
beenflaw
ed,or
areal
decreasem
ightbc
attributableto
something
otherthan
theprogram
.A
nyintervention
that
startsafter
aperiod
of
more-than-usual
problems
startsw
itha
favorablebasis
forcom
parison;if
conditionssim
plyreturn
tonorm
alon
theirow
n,the
interventionw
illappear
tobe
effective.T
hisphenom
enon—
“regressionto
them
ean”—is
afam
iliartrap
forevaluators.
Table
2is
acom
parisonof
mean
monthly
reportedcrim
esin
Lynn
beforeand
afterthe
inceptionof
theT
askForce.
Robberies
declinedby
28percent,
burglariesby
36percent,
andcrim
esagainst
theperson
by75
percent.F
igures1,
2,and
3display
thesam
einform
ationgraphically;
theblack
horizontallines
throughthe
middle
of
thegraphs
representthe
means
forthe
entireperiod
(pre-and
post-intervention);the
verticalslashed
linesrepresent
thestart
of
theT
askForce
operations.
Table2:
Co
mp
arison
of
Month
lyC
rimes
Before
and
After
Interv
entio
nin
Lynn
for
LynnB
eforeIntervention
After
InterventionD
ifferenceS
ignificanC
rime
Mean
St.D
ev.M
onthsM
eanS
t.D
ev.M
onthsat
p=
.01A
gainstT
heP
erson88.6
21.144
22.221.7
28Y
ES
Robbery
21.86.1
4416.4
6.528
YE
SB
urglary255.6
45.744
164.639.0
28Y
ES
Larceny
215.754.2
44207.1
26.828
NO
The
Effects
of
IntensiveE
nforcement
onR
etailH
eroinD
ealing19
Atim
e-seriesanalysis
designedto
detectboth
seasonaleffects
andreg
res
siontow
ardthe
mean
confirmed
thatthe
interventionw
assignificant
(the
nullhypothesis,
thatthe
post-interventionm
odelw
asthe
same
asthe
pre
interventionm
odelw
asrejected
atthe
.01level)
forall
threecrim
e
categories.
Tocontrol
statisticallyfor
theeffects
of
broadersocial
andeconom
ic
changesaffecting
Massachusetts
comm
unitiesgenerally,
Lynn
crimes
in
eachcategory
were
computed
asa
percentageof
allcrim
esin
that
category
forM
assachusettscities
of
comparable
size.F
orburglary,
theL
ynn-to-
Massachusetts
ratiofell
by13
percentafter
theinception
of
theT
askForce.
The
ratiofor
robberyfell
25.1percent.
The
ratiofor
crimes
againstthe
per
sonfell
by77
percent.A
llthree
changesw
erestatistically
significantat
the
.01level
(SeeT
able3)27
Table3:
Crim
esin
Lynn
asa
Pro
portio
nof
Crim
esin
All
Massachusetts
Cities:
Before
and
After
theIn
terven
tion
Before
After
InterventionIntervention
Difference
St.
St.
Percent
Significant
Crim
eM
eanD
ev.M
onthsM
eanD
ev.M
onthsD
ifferenceat
p=
.01
Against
The
Person.2227
.041544
.0501.0392
28-77.5o
YES
Robbery
.1724.0537
44.1291
.042228
-25.1°oY
ES
Burglary
.1671.0281
44.1454
.029428
-13.0°oY
ES
Thus
therate
of
burglaries,robberies,
andcrim
esagainst
theperson
fellby
largeram
ountsthan
canbe
explainedby
chance,by
seasonality,by
regres
siontow
ardthe
mean,
orby
variationselsew
here.T
heeffect
ofthe
Lynn
Task
Forceon
reportedcrim
esin
Lynn
appearsto
bereal.
Displacem
ent
The
dro
pin
crime
ratesin
Lynn
was
nota
resultof
crine
moving
outof
Lynn
andinto
thesurrounding
area.M
eanm
onthlyreports
of
crimes
againstthe
personin
surroundingcities
went
upslightly
butinsignificantly
afterstreet-level
enforcement
began.M
eanm
onthlyreports
ofrobberies
and
burglariesin
surroundingcities
actuallydeclined
significantly,though
not
nearlyas
precipitouslyas
inL
ynn.M
eanm
onthlyreports
of
larcenies
declined,but
notsignificantly
(SeeT
able4).
20K
leiman
Table
4:
Com
pariso
nof
Month
lyC
rimes
Before
and
After
Interv
entio
nin
Lynn
foreig
hborin
gT
owns
Before
InterventionA
fterIntervention
Difference
Significant
Crim
eM
eanS
t.D
ev.M
onthsM
eanS
t.D
cv.M
onthsat
p=
.01A
gainstT
heP
erson31.5
13.044
34.011.9
28N
OR
obbery16.0
4.344
12.44.0
28Y
ES
Burglary
236.934.6
44207.4
35.928
YE
SL
arceny338.9
74.944
308.143.1
26N
O
Decreased
Crim
eD
ueto
Decreased
Heroin
Consum
ptionTo
unsophisticatedeyes,
theL
ynncrim
eresults
areutterly
unsurprising.A
fterall,
“everybodyknow
s”that
druguse
causescrim
e.W
hatcould
bem
orenatural
thanthe
findingthat
enforcement
designedto
decreasedrug
usedecreases
propertyand
violentcrim
eas
well?
On
reflection,how
ever,the
secondproposition
doesnot
appearto
imm
ediatelyfollow
fromthe
first.T
hatheroin
usersare
over-representedam
ongoffen
ders,
28
thatheroin-using
offenderstend
tohave
higheroffense
ratesthan
otheroffen
ders
29
andthat
heroin-usingoffenders’
crimes
arecon
centratedinto
periodsalso
characterizedby
heavyheroin
use
30
—all
of
thisdoes
notdirectly
imply
thatinterventions
inthe
heroinm
arketw
illsuppress
comm
oncrim
e.Indeed,
insofaras
theheroin
crime-link
isforged
byheroin
users’need
form
oneyto
buydru
gs
3and
insofaras
enforcement,
byim
po
sing
costson
heroindealers,
tendsto
increasethe
priceof
thedrug,
enfo
rcem
entcould
plausiblylead
toincreases
inproperty
crime.
Toillustrate
thispoint,
considera
hypotheticalexam
ple.A
heroinuser
who
injects10
milligram
s(pure)
perday,
about2
streetbags,
andpays
thena
tionalaverage
retailprice
of
$2.50per
purem
illigram,
spends$25
perday
onheroin.
Ifim
provedenforcem
entcaused
aprice
increaseto
$3per
purem
illigram,
which
might
takethe
formof
adecrease
inpurity
from5
per
centto
4percent,
andif
thatuser
maintained
a10-m
illigram-per-day
con
sumption
level,the
resultw
ouldbe
anincrease
indaily
heroinspending
from$25
to$30,
anincrease
thatm
ightbe
reflectedin
increasedproperty-
crime
activity.
Of
course,not
allusers
would
maintain
previousconsum
ptionlevels
inth
eface
of
aprice
increase.S
ome
would
cutback
ontheir
heroinconsum
ption;som
em
ightquit
altogether.D
ependingon
users’responses,
aprice
increasefor
heroinm
ightlead
toan
increaseor
adecrease
inm
oneyspent
onthe
drug.T
heone
empirical
studyaddressing
thisquestion
suggeststh
atin
creasingheroin
pricestend
togenerate
increasesin
propertycrim
e,but
thequestion
isfar
fromsettled
.32
The
Effects
ofIntensive
Enforcem
enton
Retail
Heroin
Dealing
21
But
money
pricefails
totell
thew
holestory.
Buying
heroinis
notlike
buy
ingcigarettes.
Finding
aw
illingand
reliableseller
may
bea
substantialp
ro
blemfor
aw
ould-beheroin
buyer,requiring
notonly
cashbut
alsoco
nnec
tions,skill,
andtim
e.It
isas
ifthere
were
two
distinctprices
tobe
paidfor
heroin,one
inm
oneyand
theother
intim
e,risk,
andag
grav
ation
.33
Enforcem
entcan
increaseboth
kindsof
price.E
itherhaving
tospend
more
money
orhaving
toendure
more
hasslein
orderto
acquireheroin
may
causesom
eusers
toreduce
theirdrug
consumption.
The
relativeeffec
tivenesso
flonger
searchtim
eversus
higherm
oneyprice
indiscouraging
heroinuse
isa
matter
of
conjecture.
The
money-price
of
heroindepends
largelyon
therisks
facedby
high-level
drugdealers.
Ifenforcem
entcan
increasethose
risks,the
pricew
illrise
and
some
usersw
illrefuse
topay
it.T
henon-m
oneyprice
of
heroindepends
on
howm
anystreet
dealersthere
are,w
hothey
are,w
herethey
are,and
how
aggressivelythey
lookfor
newcustom
ers.If
street-levelenforcem
entcan
shrinktheir
numbers,
restricttheir
location,and
make
themm
orecautious,
itcan
influencedrug
consumption
evenif
them
oneyprice
ofheroin
re
mains
unchanged.
Street-level
drugenforcem
entdoes
nothave
asits
primary
effectan
increase
inheroin
prices.Indeed,
itm
aynot
increasethe
costof
abag
of
heroinat
all.
34
Rather,
itm
ayincrease
thetim
e,inconvenience,
andrisk
involvedin
making
retailheroin
purchases,and
doso
ina
way
with
anunam
biguously
beneficialeffect
oncrim
erates.
Ifconsum
ptionfalls
asa
result,w
hile
money
pricedoes
notrise,
thetotal
number
of
dollarsspent
onheroin
must
decrease.
This
analysishelps
make
senseof
theL
ynnand
Pressure
Point
results.If
street-levelheroin
enforcement
canincrease
thedifficulty
of
buyingheroin
atretail,
we
shouldexpect
itto
decreasethe
number
ofincom
e-producing
crimes.
Incapacitationof
High-R
ateO
ffenders
Heroin
dealersand
heroinusers
includem
anyvery
activeproperty
offenders.T
heirarrest
andincarceration
asa
resultof
street-leveldrug
enforcement
will
thushave
adirect
effecton
propertycrim
e.F
orthis
pur
pose,the
precisenature
of
therelation
between
druguse
andcrim
eis
ir
relevant;the
simple
correlationbetw
eenheroin
useand
heroindealing
on
theone
handand
propertyand
violentoffenses
onthe
otherm
eansthat
drugenforcem
entarrestees
arelikely
tobe
worth
incapacitatingfrom
the
viewpoint
of
propertycrim
econtrol.
The
valueof
lockingthem
upw
illbe
thesam
ew
hetherthey
arearrested
ondrug
chargesor
pickedup
on
outstandingw
arrantsdue
tothe
concentrationof
policein
drug-buying
areas.
Given
theextrem
elyhigh
crime
ratescharacteristic
of
some
heroinusers,
theincarceration
of
relativelysm
allnum
bersof
themm
ightbe
responsible
forsubstantial
changesin
crime
ratesin
acity
suchas
Lynn.
Adetailed
22K
leiman
analysisof
individual-levelcrim
inalhistories
might
helpillum
inatethe
extent
tow
hichthis
effectw
asat
work
inL
ynnand
theL
ower
East
Side.
Disruption
ofS
tolen-Goods
Markets
Som
edrug
dealersalso
actas
fences,bartering
heroinfor
stolenproperty.
Police
believethis
tohave
beenthe
casein
Lynn
.3
5W
heredealers
arealso
fences,drug
enforcement
canhelp
disruptthe
stolengoods
markets
asw
ellas
thedrug
markets.
Itseem
splausible
thatm
akingstolen
goodsharder
tosell
might
make
theftless
attractive,but
thereis
littleem
piricalw
orkabout
anysuch
effect.
Dispersal
ofC
oncentrationsof
Predators
andV
ictims
Both
thedecrease
inheroin
expendituresand
thedisruption
ofstolen
goodsm
arketshelp
toexplain
thedecreases
inincom
e-producingcrim
es.B
uthow
shouldw
eunderstand
theapparent
effectivenessof
crackdowns
inL
ynn,L
ower
Manhattan,
andL
awrence
inreducing
thefrequency
of
homicides,
rapes,and
aggravatedassaults?
Aplausible
explanationw
ouldbe
thatstreet
drugm
arketsinvolve
concentrationsof
bothlikely
aggressorsand
attractivevictim
s:attractive
bothbecause
theyhave
money
anddrugs
worth
stealingand
becausethey
areless
likelythan
averageto
complain
tothe
police.In
addition,business
disputesam
ongdrug
dealersand
between
drugdealers
anddrug
customers
may
resultin
violencerather
thanlitigation.
Breaking
upthe
drugm
arketdisperses
potentialvictim
sand
offenders,m
akingit
lesslikely
thatthey
will
come
intocontact
with
oneanother.
Reducing
thefrequency
of
drugtransactions
reducesthe
frequencyof
disputesabout
themthat
may
leadto
violence.
PerceivedP
oliceP
resence
Ifproperty
criminals
tendto
stealless
when
theythink
thatrisks
frompolice
arehigh,
andif
theytend
tospend
much
oftheir
time
indrug-
dealingareas,
thenthe
concentrationof
policein
thoseareas
forstreet-level
drugenforcem
entm
ayhave
auseful
“advertising”effect.
An
increasein
policepresence
where
propertycrim
inalshang
outm
aypersuade
some
of
themto
cutback
ontheir
propertycrim
eactivity
bygiving
themthe
(pro
bablyincorrect)
impression
thatthe
risksof
arrestfor
thefthave
goneup.
While
itseem
sreasonable
toexpect
thatany
sucheffect
would
betem
porary,very
littleis
known
abouthow
criminals
evaluaterisks.
Reduced
Tolerance
ofD
isorder
The
“Broken
Window
s”hyp
oth
esis56
assertsthat
toleranceby
thepolice
andcitizens
of
low-level
lawbreaking
ina
givenarea
givesa
signalto
potentialcrim
inalsthat
theareas
areopen
tothe
comm
issiono
fm
oreserious
crimes.
When
thereare
clearsigns
thatsuch
tolerancehas
come
toan
end,it
can
The
Effects
of
IntensiveE
nforcement
onR
etailH
rnin
flp1
in,
beexpected
that
thenew
perceptionof
orderw
illspread
toaffect
other,
more
serioustypes
of
crime.
Open
streetdrug
dealingm
aycreate
sucha
“Broken
Window
s”effect;
ifso,
breakingup
suchm
arketsw
illreduce
the
frequencyof
seriouscrim
esnearby.
24K
leiman
Crackdow
nsvs.
theO
verallIntensity
ofR
etailE
nforcement
While
itm
akessense
thatstreet-level
enforcement
shouldtend
toreduce
thefrequency
ofproperty
crimes,
thereis
noreason
tobelieve
thatsm
allin
creasesor
decreasesin
suchenforcem
enthave
largeeffects
oncrim
erates.
Nor
hasanyone
demonstrated
statisticallya
consistentrelationship
between,
forexam
ple,narcotics
arrestsand
reportedburglary
rates.T
herefore,the
mere
factof
street-levelarrests
andprosecutions
isnot
sufficientto
explainU
theL
ynnresults.
Moreover,
thedifference
between
theeffects
of
increasedstreet-level
enforcement
inL
ynnand
itseffects
inL
awrence
areinconsistent
with
theidea
thata
littlestreet-level
enforcement
isgood
forreducing
burglaries,and
alittle
more
isa
littlebetter.
Som
ethingseem
sto
havehap
penedin
Lynn
thatsim
plydid
nothappen
inL
awrence.
Itis
possibleto
frame
atheory
toaccount
bothfor
thedram
aticsuccess
of
theL
ynneffort
andthe
failurein
Law
rence,though
carefulevaluations
of
many
more
casesw
ouldbe
requiredto
definehow
closelythe
theoryfits
thefacts.
The
basicidea
isth
atconcentration
(geographicallyand
bydrug
type)and
persistenceof
street-leveldrug
enforcement
effortscan
createresults
fundamentally
differentfrom
thoseachieved
bym
oresporadic
andunfocused
effo
rts.3’
Itseem
splausible
that
therisk
of
apprehensionfor
anyone
drugbuyer
ordrug
sellershould
increasew
iththe
number
of
officersassigned
todrug
en
forcement
anddecrease
with
thenum
berof
otherbuyers
andsellers,
simply
becausepolice
can’tpay
attentionto
everybodyat
once.W
henbuyers
andsellers
congregatein
largenum
bers,they
tendto
“screen”each
otherby
“swam
ping”police
attention.
Asm
allincrease
instreet-level
enforcement
activityw
illhave
littleeffect
onthe
number
of
buyersor
sellers.B
uta
largeincrease
may
havea
substantialeffect.
Som
ew
illbe
injail.
Others,
facingcharges,
will
worry
aboutthe
consequencesof
rearrestw
hileon
bail.Still
othersw
illw
antto
lielow
untilstreet
conditionsreturn
to“norm
al.”
Ifconditions
doreturn
tothe
previousnorm
atthe
endof
ashort
burstof
increasedenforcem
entactivity,
buyersand
sellersw
illreturn
tothe
market
andthings
will
bem
uchas
theyw
erebefore.
How
ever,if
alevel
of
enfo
rcem
entactivity
greatenough
tocause
them
arketto
shrinktem
porarilyis
maintained,
thenthe
arithmetic
of
copsand
robbershas
moved
ina
way
unfavorableto
thecontinued
operationof
them
arket.If
increaseden
force
ment
shrinksthe
market,
eachrem
ainingm
arketparticipant
will
facetw
osources
of
increasedrisk:
more
police,and
fewer
drugbuyers
andsellers.
The
riskof
apprehensionw
illincrease
againas
thenum
berof
dealersdecreases,
leavingm
orepolice
pertransaction.
Thus
anenforcem
enteffort
largeenough
tostart
ageneral
shrinkageof
them
arketm
ay,if
itis
maintained,
startto
feedon
itsow
nsuccess;
bystarting
The
Effects
of
IntensiveE
nfnrcement
nn
Pt1
-
abend
towards
greaterand
greaterrisk
andefibrt
pertransaction.
Ifthis
accountis
correct,then
aconcentrated,
persistentstreet-level
crackdown
representsa
differentstrategy
fromthe
business-as-usualoflocal
drugenforcem
ent.
The
Cost
Side:
System
Impacts
andC
ivilL
iberties
Resources
andSystem
Impacts
The
successfulcrackdow
nefforts
we
havediscussed
hereall
involvedre-allocations
of
lawenforcem
entresources
fromother
programs.
Crack-
downs
make
inroadsinto
theprosecutors,
courttim
e,jail
space,and
policeforces
availablefor
acom
munity’s
otherlaw
enforcement
need
s.38
Furtherm
ore,once
acrackdow
ngets
started,it
may
bepolitically
hardto
stop.A
sin
thecase
of
Operation
Pressure
Point,
itis
likelythat
neig
hborhood
demand
will
placeconsiderable
politicalpressure
onlocal
officialsto
continuea
programat
fullstrength,
well
beyondthe
persistencerequired
tom
akea
crackdown
work.
This
may
beconsidered
acom
pliment
tothe
localeffectiveness
of
suchprogram
s,and
anim
portantaspect
of
goodpublic
relations.H
owever,
itm
ayalso
presenta
resourceallocation
problem,
when
resourcesused
forthe
crackdown
aretaken
away
fromother
partsof
thelaw
enforcement
system,
anda
morale
problem,
when
officersassigned
toarrest
street-leveldrug
dealersfind
thatthere
arefew
erand
fewer
suchpersons
toarrest.
The
floodof
narcoticscases
arisingout
of
Operation
Pressure
Point
clearlytended
to“crow
dout”
othernarcotics
casesin
Manhattan;
theoverall
number
of
narcoticsfelony
convictionsborough-w
idein
Pressure
Point’s
firstyear
was
virtuallyunchanged
fromthe
yearbefore.
The
casesforegone
needto
becounted
ascosts
of
theprogram
;the
same
istrue
forim
pactson
jailsand
prisons.A
comprehensive
evaluationof
drugcrackdow
nsw
ouldrequire
notonly
am
easurement
of
theireffects,
butan
estimate
of
theeffects
of
theother
activitiesdisplaced
bythem
.
Intrusivenessand
Abuses
ofA
uthority
The
Philadelphia
experienceshow
sthat
street-levelenforcem
entefforts
canbe
designedand
executedin
ways
thatcreate
unnecessaryintrusion
intocitizens’
rightsto
goabout
theirlaw
fulbusiness.
Som
eof
thetactics
usedin
Operation
Pressure
Point
I,in
particularthe
largenum
berof
“Disorderly
Conduct”
arrests,m
aybe
closeto
theline.
The
historyof
retail-leveldrug
enforcement
inN
ewY
orkin
thelate
1960’s,and
inparticular
thenotorious
“dropsy”cases
(where
some
policeap
paren
tly
routinelyperjured
themselves
toconceal
theirequally
routineuse
of
un
warranted
personalsearches
of
drugdealers)
illustratesthe
riskthat
retaillevel
drugenforcem
entcan
leadto
abusesof
authority.T
hepotential
forfinancial
corruptionneeds
nocom
ment.
The
absenceof
anycorruption
orabuse
scandalsarising
outof
theL
ynn,L
awrence,
andP
ressureP
ointI
operationsis
reassuringto
some
extent.
The
Effects
of
IntensiveE
nforcement
onR
etailH
eroinD
ealing27
How
ever,it
shouldbe
notedboth
thatthe
effortsare
stillrelatively
new,
andth
atthe
Pressure
Point
staffingplan
calledfor
veryheavy
useof
sergeantsand
lieutenantsspecifically
tom
inimize
thepossibility
of
misconduct.
Rk
’ipim
n
Open
Questions
CK
eyR
atiosand
How
They
Vary
Across
Circum
stancesIf
concentrationand
persistencem
akethe
differencebetw
eenlow
-impact
routineheroin
enforcement
operationsand
high-impact
crackdowns,
them
ostim
portantquestion
facinga
localdecision-m
akerbecom
es:how
much
isenough?
Given
thecharacteristics
of
adrug
market,
howm
anyofficers,
working
forhow
long,w
illbe
requiredto
make
itcollapse?
That
may
dependon
many
factors:num
berof
users,num
berof
dealers,num
berof
transactions,w
hethercurrent
transactionsare
indooror
outdoor,the
geographicarea,
ethnicdiversity,
climate,
thelevel
of
neighborhoodcooperation,
andthe
performance
of
prosecutors,courts,
andprobation,
parole,and
correctionsagencies.
One,
necessarilycrude,
way
tothink
aboutthe
problemis
toim
aginethat
thereis
some
baselinecritical
ratioof
policeto
thenum
berof
usersa
market
supportsabove
which
them
arketw
illstart
tocontract.
The
actualcritical
ratioin
areal
situationm
aybe
higheror
lower
thanthe
baseline,depending
ongeography,
ethnicity,and
othersim
ilarfactors.
That
would
varyw
iththe
otherfactors
cited.T
heL
ynnand
Pressure
Point
operationsappear
tohave
involvedabout
oneofficer
forevery
75users;
Law
rence,allow
ingfor
thepolice
time
spenton
cocainew
holesalingoperations,
hadabout
oneofficer
foreach
150users.
Itis
tooearly
tosay
thatthe
differencein
ratiosw
asthe
differencebetw
eensuccess
andfailure.
Displacem
entW
ithinB
igC
ities
As
notedabove,
thereis
noevidence
thatthe
Lynn
projectdisplaced
sign
ificant
amounts
ofeither
drugdealing
orcrim
e,but
theevidence
aboutP
ressureP
ointI
isfar
lessclear.
The
valueof
heroin-market
crackdowns
ascrim
econtrol
inbig
citiesis
thereforestill
tobe
shown.
That
showing
would
requirea
city-wide
crackdown
somew
here,probably
involvingthe
diversiono
fofficers
frompatrol
functionsinto
street-leveldrug
enforcement.
The
Effects
of
Inten
civF
nfnrm
nt
D+
n;1
..-....
i-..1:.-
-i
Conclusion
Itis
possibleto
sayw
ithconfidence,
basedupon
theL
ynnresults,
that
street-levelheroin
crackdowns,
undersom
ecircum
stances,produce
great
benefitsat
modest
costs.It
iseven
possibleto
givean
accountof
why
that
shouldbe
true.It
isnot
yetpossible
tom
easureall
of
thecosts
ofsuch
ac
tivitiesin
theform
ofother
criminal-justice
activitiesnot
undertaken,
morale,
intrusiveness,abuse,
andcorruption
(thoughit
isreasonably
clear
thatin
Lynn
evena
fullcost
accountingw
ouldstill
leavea
healthysurplus
of
benefits).M
oreseriously,
itis
notyet
possibleto
defineunder
what
cir
cumstances
retailheroin
crackdowns
will
proveto
besuch
low-cost,
high-
benefitventures.
But
anargum
entcan
bem
adefor
tryinga
crackdown
wherever
alarge
retailheroin
market
exists.T
heL
ynnand
Manhattan
resultssuggest
that
thetraditional
ascriptionof
alarge
fractionof
violentand
propertycrim
e
toheroin
can,under
some
circumstances,
betranslated
intoeffective
action.
Moreover,
therisks
involvedare
limited
bytw
ofactors.
First,
ifa
crackdown
failsto
decreaseproperty
andviolent
crime,
thefailure
may
not
distinguishthis
policetactic
fromother
possiblepolice
activities.T
he
criminal-justice
evaluationliterature
includesm
anyexam
plesof
lawen
force
ment
strategiesthat
faile
d.
39
Second,
drugcrackdow
nsare
notlong-term
in
vestments;
theanti-crim
eeffects
of
thetw
osuccessful
programs
studiedso
far—L
ynnand
Pressure
Point
I—becam
eapparent
within
afew
months.
Where
thepotential
gainsare
largeand
therisks
limited,
“tryit
andsee”
may
bea
more
usefulguide
toaction
thanany
elaboratecalculation.
Notes
1.See
Mark
H.
Moore,
“Lim
itingS
uppliesof
Drugs
toIllicit
Markets,”
Journalof
Drug
Issues,V
olume
9,(S
pring1979)
p.291;
Mark
H.
Moore,
Buy
and
Bust:
The
Effective
Reg
ula
tionof
anIllicit
Mark
etin
Heroin
(Lexington,
MA
:D
.C.
Heath
&C
o.,1976),
p.248.
2.Jam
esA
.Inciardi,
“Exploring
theD
rugs/C
rime
Connectio
n,”
unpublishedpaper,
Division
of
Crim
inalJustice,
University
of
Delaw
are,1987.
3.M
arkK
leiman
andC
hristo
pher
Putala,
“State
andL
ocalD
rugL
awE
nforcement:
Issuesand
Practices,”
Working
Paper,
no.87-01-06,
Program
inC
riminal
JusticeP
olicyand
Managem
ent,John
EK
ennedyS
choolof
Governm
ent,H
arvardU
niv
ersity,
Cam
bridge,M
A,
1987;R
obertL
.D
upontand
Mark
H.
Greene,
“The
Dynam
icsof
aH
eroinA
ddictionE
pidemic,”
Science,
Volum
e181,
(August,
1973):p.
715.
4.John
Kaplan,
The
Hardest
Drug:
Heroin
and
Public
Policy
(Chicago,
IL:
The
University
of
Chicago
Press,
1983).
5.K
evinB
urkeinterview
,A
ugust1984.
6.M
arkK
leiman,
William
Holland,
andC
hristo
pher
Hayes,
“Report
tothe
District
Attorney
of
Essex
County:
Evaluation
of
theL
ynnD
rugT
askF
orce,”W
orkingP
aper;no.
87-01-03,P
rogramin
Crim
inalJustice
Policy
andM
anagement,
JohnF.
Kennedy
School
of
Governm
ent,H
arvardU
niv
ersity,
Cam
bridge,M
A,
1987,p.
5.7.
Ibid.,p.
11.T
hreeyears
later,the
same
surveyinstrum
entw
asadm
inisteredto
residentsof
Lynn
andL
awrence,
which
atthe
time
was
thefocus
of
adrug
crackdown
concentratedon
“indoor”dealing,
andin
a“co
ntrol”
cityw
hichhad
experienced
noextraordinary
drugen
force
ment
activity.In
eachcase,
respondentsw
ereab
out
equallydivided
between
“better”and
“worse.”
8.T
reatment
professionals’view
s:Interview
sconducted
byW
illiamE
.H
ollandw
ithtre
at
ment
workers
atP
rojectC
OP
E,
Lynn,
MA
,A
ugust,1984.
9.Interview
sconducted
byC
hristo
pher
Putala
with
heroinaddicts,
Septem
ber1986
thro
ugh
August
1987.R
eportson
thoseinterview
sw
illbe
included
ina
reportto
besu
bm
itted
tothe
Natio
nal
Instituteof
Justiceby
theD
istrictA
ttorneyunder
agrant
toevaluate
theL
ynnand
Law
renceefforts.
10.K
leiman,
Holland,
andH
ayes,p.
8and
Figure
1.T
hecom
parisonis
between
theP
rojectC
OP
Eunit
inL
ynnand
unitsof
thesam
eorganization
elsewhere
inthe
state.T
reatment-dem
andfigures
forM
assachusettsas
aw
holedo
notap
pear
tobe
available.
11.Ibid.,
p.8,
Table
2,and
Figures
2and
3.See
alsoD
avidC
avanagh,“E
ffectsof
Drug
Task
Forces
inL
ynnand
Law
renceon
Com
mon
Crim
esR
eportedto
theP
olice,”(P
rovidence,
RI:
Applied
Social
Research,
1987).“C
rimes
againstthe
person”w
erelum
pedtogether
becausehom
icidesand
rapesw
eretoo
infrequentto
make
monthly
measurem
entsm
eaningful.12.
Tw
oreports
byP
eterK
errin
theN
ewY
orkT
imes
(“AP
or
traitof
Washington
Square
Park:
Insidea
Drug
Bazaar,”
January
12,1987,
B1:2,
and“C
rushingthe
Drug
Dealers
ofW
ashingtonS
quare,”9
Novem
ber1987,
Al:3)
givean
accountof
theim
pactof
openm
arijuan
aand
cocainedealing
onthe
neig
hborh
ood
around
Washington
Square
Park
in
L.ower
Manhattan,
andof
theeffectiveness
ofconcentrated
en
forcement
indispersing
them
arketand
improving
neighborhoodconditions.
Ap
parently,neither
thepossible
ef
fectof
them
arketon
druguse
byresidents
norits
connectionw
ithproperty
andviolent
crime
was
asalient
issuefor
theneighbors;
theyseem
edto
regardthe
market
asa
neighborhooddisam
enity,like
agarbage
dump
ora
noisybar.
13.R
onaldFerguson,
“The
Drug
Problem
inB
lackC
om
munities,”
Working
Paper
no.87-01-01,
Program
inC
riminal
JusticePolicy
andM
anagement,
JohnF.
Kennedy
School
ofG
overnment,
Harvard
Universi
ty,C
ambridge,
MA
,1987,
p.9.
14.P
hilipB
aridon,A
ddiction,C
rime,
andS
ocialPolicy
(Lex
ington,M
A:
Lexington
Books,
1976);See
alsoB
ruceD
.Johnson
etal,
Taking
Care
of
Business:
The
Econom
icsof
Crim
eby
Heroin
Abusers
(Lex
ington,M
A:
Lexington
Books,
1985).
15.“R
educingthe
Risk
Through
Testing,”
NJJ
Reports
(Washington,
DC
:N
ationalIn
stituteof
Justice,S
eptember/O
ctober1986).
Carver
discussesa
programin
Washington,
D.C
.set
upto
testthe
hypothesisthat
closem
onitoringof
adefendant’s
druguse
coupledw
ithquick
sanctionsfor
violatorsw
oulddeter
druguse
andreduce
criminal
activity;E
ricW
ish,M
aryT
oborgand
JohnB
ellassai,“Identifying
Drug
Users
andM
onitoringT
hemD
uringC
onditionalR
elease,”N
ationalInstitute
ofJustice
andN
arcoticand
Drug
Research,
Inc.,and
Toborg
Associates,
Decem
ber1987.
16.M
arkH
.M
oore,“Policies
toA
chieveD
iscrimination
inthe
Effective
Priceof
Heroin,”
Am
ericanE
conomic
Review
,V
olume
63(M
ay1973):
p.926.
17.For
adiscussion
ofarrests
foruse
offensesas
deterrents,see
JohnK
aplan,T
heH
ardestD
rug:H
eroinand
Public
Policy
(Chicago,
IL:
The
University
ofC
hicagoPress,
1983),chapter
5.
18.Interview
with
New
York
City
Assistant
Chief
Arthur
J.M
cNevin,
conductedby
Mark
Kleim
an,S
eptember
15,1986.
19.Interview
with
New
York
City
PoliceC
omm
issionerB
enjamin
Ward,
Septem
ber12,
1987.
20.N
ewY
orkPolice
Departm
entvideo
tape:Interview
with
Lieutenant
Phillip
McG
uire,N
ewY
orkC
ityPolice
Dep
artm
ent,S
eptember
15,1986.
21.N
ewY
orkPolice
Departm
entinternal
documents;
intervieww
ithM
cGuire,
Septem
ber15,
1986.
22.A
uthurJ.
McN
evin,“S
tatusR
eport-
6W
eeks”(internal
New
York
PoliceD
epartment
mem
orandum),
March
1,1984
(PBM
S#0010-9);
McN
evin,“1984
Status
Report”
(internalN
ewY
orkPolice
Departm
entm
emorandum
),January
4,1988
(PB
MS
#0010-28).
23.P
ressureP
ointA
reaFigures
fromM
cNevin,
“1984S
tatusR
eport”;other
figuresfrom
New
York
City
PoliceD
epart
ment
Crim
eA
nalysisU
nit,“C
omplaints
andA
rrests,”m
on
thlystatistical
report,1985.
There
isa
somew
hatm
oredetailed
descriptionof
Pressure
Point
Iin
Kleim
an,“B
ringingB
ackStreet-L
evelH
eroinE
nforcem
ent,”W
orkingP
apersSeries,
no.86-01-08,
Program
inC
riminal
JusticePolicy
andM
anagement,
JohnF
Kennedy
School
ofG
overnment,
Harvard
University;
Seealso
thediscu
ssion
ofP
ressurePoint
op
erations
andresults
inL.
Zim
mer,
“Operation
Pressure
Point:
The
Disruption
ofStreet-L
evelD
rugT
radeon
New
York’s
Low
erE
astSide,”
Occasional
Papers
fromT
heC
enterfor
Research
inC
rime
andJustice,
New
York
2’
k’lp
im9n
University
Schoolof
Law,
New
York,
1987.
24.Interview
sw
ithaddicts,
con
ductedby
Christopher
Putala,
Septem
ber1986
throughA
ugust1987.
25.Interview
sw
ithL
awrence
Police,conducted
byC
hristopherP
utala.
26.N
orfolk:reported
verballyby
William
Spelm
an,Police
Ex
ecutiveR
esearchF
orum;
Sydney:reported
verballyby
Inspector
Christine
Nixon,
N.SW
.Police;
Seattle:reported
verballyby
Ricardo
Martinez,
SpecialD
eputyP
rosecutingA
ttorney,K
ingC
ounty;P
hiladelphia:new
spaperaccounts,
not-for-attribution
verbalreports
ofa
rankingP
hiladelphiaP.D
.of
ficial;W
ashingtonD
C:
un
publishedreports
bythe
Rand
Corporation.
As
ofthis
writing,
nopublished
evaluationsexist
ofany
ofthese
efforts.27.
This
analysisis
recountedin
detailin
David
Cavanagh,
“Ef
fectsof
Drug
Task
Forcesin
Lynn
andL
awrence
onC
om
mon
Crim
esR
eportedto
thePolice,”
(Providence,R
I:A
pplied
SocialR
esearch,1987).
28.E
ricW
ish,E
lizabethB
rady,and
Mary
Cuadrado,
“Drug
Use
andC
rime
inA
rresteesin
Manhattan,”
apaper
presentedto
am
eetingof
The
Com
mittee
onP
roblems
ofD
rugD
ependence,June
1985.29.
JanC
haikenand
Marcia
Chaiken
Varieties
of
Crim
inalB
ehavior(S
antaM
onica,C
A:
Rand
Corporation,
1982).30.
M.
Douglas
Anglin
andG
eorgeSteckert,
“Narcotics
useand
Crim
e:a
Multi-S
ample
Multi-
Method
Analysis,”
Crim
inologyS
pring1988;
Seealso
George
Steckertand
M.
Douglas
Anglin,
“Narcotics
Use
andC
rime:
AC
ausalM
odelingA
pproach,”
Journalof
Quan
titativeC
riminology
2(1986):
3-28;See
alsoJ.C
.B
all,L.
Rosen,
J.A.
Flueck,
andD
.N.
Nurco,
“The
Crim
inalityof
Heroin
Addicts:
When
Addicted
andW
henoff
Opiates,”
inJ.A
.Inciardi,
ed.,T
heD
rugC
rime
Connection
(Beverly
Hills,
CA
:Sage,
1981),pp.
39-65.31.
Bruce
D.
Johnson,“Street-L
evelH
eroinM
arkets:T
heC
opingB
ehaviorof
Addicts,”
inPaul
Goldstein,
Edw
ardPreble,
James
Schmeidler,
Douglas
S.L
ipton,B
arryS
punt,and
Thom
asM
iller,T
akingC
areof
Business:
The
Econom
icsof
Crim
eby
Heroin
Abusers
(Lex
ington,M
A:
Lexington
Books,
1985).
32.G
eorgeF.
Brow
nand
Lester
P.Silverm
an,“T
heR
etailPrice
ofH
eroin:E
stimation
andA
pplications,”
Journalof
theA
merican
Statistical
Asso
ciation,
Volum
e69
(Septem
ber1974).
33.M
arkH
.M
oore,“Policies
toA
chieveD
iscrimination
inthe
Effective
Priceof
Heroin,”
p.926.
34.R
euterand
Kleim
an,“R
isksand
Prices,”
pp.328-329.
35.K
leiman,
Holland,
andH
ayes,p.
4.
36.G
eorgeK
ellingand
James
Wilson,
“Broken
Window
s:T
hePolice
andN
eighborhoodS
afety,”
The
Atlantic
Monthly,
Volum
e249
(March
1982):31—
“Socialpsychologists
andpolice
officerstend
toagree
thatif
aw
indowin
abuilding
isbroken
andleft
unrepaired,all
therest
ofthe
window
sw
illsoon
bebroken.”
One
unrepairedbroken
window
signalsthat
noone
caresand
will
perpetuateneighborhood
decayand
minor
infractionsof
thelaw
,p.
3.37.
Reuter
andK
leiman,
“Risks
andPrices,”
p.330.
38.For
adram
aticaccount
ofthe
responseof
New
York
City’s
prosecutors,courts,
andco
rrections
facilitiesto
aflood
ofdrug
arrests,see
Aric
Press,“P
iecingT
ogetherN
ewY
ork’sC
riminal
JusticeSystem
:the
“
Response
toC
rack,”A
ssocia
tionof
theB
arof
theC
ityof
New
York,
4(D
ecember
1987);See
alsoSteve
Belenko
andJe
ffrey
Fagan,“C
rackand
theC
riminal
JusticeSystem
,”N
ewY
orkC
ity:N
ewY
orkC
ityC
riminal
JusticeA
gency,N
ovember
1987.
39.G
.L.
Kelling,
T.Pate,
D.
Dieckm
anand
C.E
.B
rown,
“The
Kansas
City
PreventiveP
atrolE
xperiment:
asum
mary
report,”in
G.V
.G
lass,ed.,
Evaluation
Studies
Review
An
nual,V
olume
1(B
everlyH
ills,C
A:
Sage,1976),
pp.605-657.
)At’
1.,.,...,,,
Chapter
3
DR
UG
CR
AC
KD
OW
NS
AN
DC
RIM
ER
AT
ES
:A
CO
MM
EN
TO
NT
HE
KL
EIM
AN
PA
PE
R
Arnold
Barnett
Igreatly
enjoyedreading
Professor
Kleim
an’spaper
(andthe
backupstatistical
analysisby
Cavanagh
[1987]).T
hepaper
was
lucid,honest,
painstaking,and
thoughtful.P
rofessorK
leiman
didnot
simply
dwell
onfavorable
findings:H
em
adeclear
thatthe
crime
reductionsw
itnessedin
Lynn
were
notreally
replicatedin
Law
rence,any
more
thana
similar
suc
cessin
New
York
was
replicatedin
Philadelphia
orW
ashington.A
ndhe
recognizedthe
needto
considerpotential
reasonsthat
theapparent
achievem
entsin
Lynn
couldbe
theresult
of
astatistical
artifact.C
learly,this
isnot
someone
who
would
scream“E
ureka!”at
thevery
firstshred
ofen
couragingevidence.
But
despitehis
caution(or
perhapsbecause
ofit),
Professor
Kleim
anis
highlyenthusiastic
aboutthe
outcome
of
theL
ynnheroin
crackdown.
“Itis
possibleto
sayw
ithconfidence,”
heasserts,
thatcircum
stancesexist
inw
hichstreet-level
heroinenforcem
entcan
“producegreat
benefitsat
modest
costs.”F
utureexperim
entscan
assume
theefficacy
of
thepolicy
andgo
onto
investigatethe
conditionsin
which
thebenefit/cost
ratioreaches
itspeak.
My
own
assessment
of
theevidence,
unfortunately,is
somew
hatless
op
timistic
thanP
rofessorK
leiman’s.
This
ispartially
becauseof
certainpat
ternsin
thedata,
andpartially
becauseof
thestrong
limits
Isee
onany
inferences
drawn
fromaggregate
statistics.L
etm
edevote
therem
ainderof
thispiece
toexplaining
my
comparatively-subdued
reaction.
Law
rence
Professor
Kleim
anfocuses
ontw
oheroin
crackdowns
inM
assachusetts,one
thatstarted
inS
eptember
1983in
Lynn
andanother
thatbegan
inL
awrence
oneyear
later.T
he“experim
entalconditions”
were
apparentlydifferent
inthe
two
cities,as
were
theobserved
changesin
crime
levelsafter
thecrackdow
ns.In
Lynn,
crimes
againstthe
personfell
drastically,robbery
andburglary
droppedsignificantly,
andlarceny
was
essentiallyunchanged.
InL
awrence,
crimes
againstthe
persondropped
considerably—although
notnearly
sosteeply
asin
Lynn—
while
robbery,burglary,
andlarceny
allin
creased“albeit
notto
astatistically
significantdegree.”
The
readerthus
getsthe
impression
that,in
terms
of
crime
reduction,the
two
Massachusetts
experim
entsproduced
onew
inand
onedraw
.
One
couldplausibly
contend,how
ever,that
theoutcom
ein
Law
rencew
ascloser
toa
lossthan
adraw
.A
sT
able1
reminds
us,the
post-interventiongrow
thin
Law
rence’srobberies,
burglaries,and
larceniesw
asquite
sizable,especially
inrelation
toconcurrent
declinesin
thesecrim
esin
comparable
Massachusetts
cities.
Table1:
Changes
inA
verageM
onthlyF
requenciesof
Three
Inco
me-P
rod
ucin
gC
rimes
After
aD
rugC
rackdown
inL
awrence,
Massachusetts
MO
NT
HL
YA
VE
RA
GE
PercentageC
hangeC
ompared
toB
eforeA
fterP
ercentageS
imilar
Offense
Crackdow
nC
rackdown
Change
Mass.
Cities
Robbery
12.918.8
+4
5.7
%+
52.3
%
Burglary
125.7163.0
+29.7
%+
71.5
%
Larceny
142.7198.4
+3
9.0
%+
55.1%
Note:
This
tablearises
fromdata
inT
ables4
and6
ofC
avanagh(1987),
which
compare
apre
interventionperiod
1/80-8/84w
iththe
post-interventionperiod
9/84-12/86
As
we
will
discuss,assessing
thestatistical
significanceof
suchchanges
istrickier
thanit
might
atfirst
seem.
But
asT
able2
illustratesfor
thecrim
erobbery,
itw
ouldbe
hardto
arguethat
Lynn’s
dropw
assignificant
while
Law
rence’sincrease
was
not.In
absoluteterm
s,in
percentageterm
s,and
inrelation
tothe
statewide
trend,the
robberygrow
thin
Law
rencew
asgreater
thanthe
declinein
Lynn.
And
thereare
notechnical
reasons(e.g.,
ashorter
observationperiod)
fortreating
theL
awrence
numbers
asless
reliablethan
theirL
ynncounterparts.
(Analyses
forthe
crimes
burglaryand
larcenyyield
similar
conclusions.)
16B
arn
ett
Table
2:A
verageM
onthlyR
obberyL.evels
inT
wo
Massachusetts
Cities,
Before
andA
fterH
eroinC
rackdowns
BE
FO
RE
AF
TE
RP
ER
CE
NT
AG
EC
HA
NG
E
Com
paredto
Similar
Actual
Mass.
Cities
Lynn
21.816.4
—24.8%
—21.4%
Law
rence
12.918.8
+45
.7%
+52
.3%
Tw
o-City
Total
34.735.2
+1.4
%+
4.5
%
Note:
These
dataarise
fromT
ables1,
4,and
6of
Cavanagh
(1987).T
he“before”
periodw
as1/80-8/83
inL
ynnand
1/80-8/84in
Law
rence;the
“after”periods
inL
ynnand
Law
rencew
ere,respectively,
9/83-12/85and
9/84-12/86.T
hedata
forcom
parableM
assachusettscities
pertainsto
9/84-12/85,the
16m
onthsfor
which
thepost-
interventionperiods
ofthe
two
citiesoverlap.
The
bottomline
ofthe
tablereveals
thatthe
netoutcom
eof
thetw
oex
periments
was
am
odestincrease
inrobbery.
One
couldm
akethe
case,therefore,
thatthe
badnew
sfrom
Law
renceabout
thisoffense
more
thancancelled
thegood
news
fromL
ynn.
Professor
Kleim
anprovided
atheoretical
explanationof
howa
drugcrackdow
ncould
causean
increasein
income-producing
crimes.
Although
hedoes
notsay
so,the
adversepattern
observedin
Law
rencecould
reflectthe
realizationof
thispossibility.
Certainly,
theresult
underscoresan
imp
or
tantpoint:
therange
of
possibleeffects
of
adrug
crackdown
isnot
merely
fromsuccess
toineffectuality,
butfrom
lessenedrisk
tothe
citizenryto
aperceptible
increasein
danger.
Lynn
Actually,
notall
crimes
declinedin
Lynn
inthe
aftermath
of
itsheroin
crackdown.
Burglary
andlarceny—
thetw
ononviolent
crimes
inthe
Kleim
an/Cavanagh
analysis—w
ereessentially
constantin
9/83-12/85relative
tothe
Massachusetts
trend.(B
urglariesfell
12%in
comparison
with
similar
Massachusetts
cities,w
hilethe
about-equally-numerous
larceniesrose
12%.)
But,
asT
able3
makes
clear,violence
was
farlow
erin
Lynn
during1984-85
thanduring
1980-82.
As
Professor
Kleim
anacknow
ledges,how
ever,T
able3
doesnot
provethat
theprogram
was
beneficial.P
ossibleexplanations
forthe
observeddrop
include
some
kindof
statisticalfluctuation
orthe
geographic“export”
of
crimes
fromL
ynnas
opposedto
theirprevention.
But
Professor
Kleim
anargues
thatsuch
perverseexplanations
arenot
credible.
Table
3:
Reported
Violent
Crim
esin
Lynn
inthe
Years
1980-1985
CR
IME
19801981
19821984
1985
Murder
24
51
4
Rape
914
346
27
Robbery
235312
254163
183
Aggravated
Assault
1054998
978192
150
Note:
1983is
excludedfrom
thistable
becausep
arto
fth
atyear
precededthe
crackdown
andp
artfollow
edit.
These
data
generallycam
efrom
thean
nual
UN
IFO
RM
CR
IME
RE
PO
RT
S.
Incertain
years,L
yn&s
crime
statisticsdid
notap
pear
inthe
UC
R’s;
the
Crim
eA
nalysisB
ureauo
fthe
Com
monw
ealthof
Massach
usetts
was
kindenough
to
supplythe
missing
numbers.
Kleim
anand
Cavanagh
offerserious
evidencethat
Lynn’s
successin
reduc
ingviolence
was
real.B
utsom
efurther
issuesare
worth
bearingin
mind.
One
was
indirectlyraised
byP
rofessorK
leiman’s
statement
that“given
the
extremely
highcrim
erates
of
some
heroinusers,
theincarceration
ofsm
all
numbers
of
themm
ightbe
responsiblefor
substantialchanges
incrim
e
ratesin
acity
suchas
Lynn.”
The
more
generalpoint
hereis
that,if
acity’s
crime
problemis
largelythe
work
ofa
fewindividuals,
avery
small
number
ofarrivals
ordepartures
canabruptly
changethe
prevailinglevel
of
offenses.T
hereis
adanger
thatsuch
suddenshifts
cancause
standardfo
r
mulas
todescribe
asstatistically
significantchanges
incrim
erates
thatare
notat
allso.
Acontrived
example
makes
thepoint
clearer.C
onsidera
small
comm
unity
inw
hich:
(i)A
llburglaries
arecom
mitted
bychronic
offendersw
hoalw
aysavoid
arrest.
(ii)T
henum
berof
suchburglars
oscillatesinfrequently
between
oneand
two.
(iii)E
achactive
burglarcom
mits
anaverage
of
onecrim
eper
week.
Inthis
unrealisticsetting,
thecom
munity’s
annualburglary
levelw
illvary
asdepicted
inF
igure1.
Som
eonew
hoanalyzed
with
usualm
ethodsthe
datafrom
periodA
would
attachgreat
statisticalsignificance
tothe
decline
att.
But
giventhe
abruptups
anddow
nsthat
arepart
of
theexisting
pat
tern,any
conclusionth
atthe
patternhad
dramatically
changedw
ouldbe
unwarranted.
Figure1:
Burg
laryL
evelsin
aS
mall
Co
mm
un
ityw
ithO
neor
Tw
oB
urglars
100
AN
NU
AL
BU
RG
LA
RIE
S
50
TIM
EA
Having
saidthis,
Iw
ouldnot
suggestthat
Lynn’s
reductionin
crime
—
which
soclosely
correspondedw
iththe
startof
itsheroin
crackdown—
was
solelythe
resultof
chance.W
hatI
would
suggestis
thatw
ebe
cautiousin
interpretingboth
them
agnitudeof
thedrop
andits
apparentdurability.
That
pointis
reinforcedby
Table
4,w
hichpresents
dataabout
Lynn
vio
lencefor
thetw
oyears
afterthose
thatK
leiman
andC
avanaghanalyzed.
(For
easeof
comparison,
we
alsopresent
datafor
1985,the
lastyear
inthe
Kleim
an/Cavanagh
studyperiod.)
Table4:
Reported
Violent
Crim
esin
Lynn
inT
hreeS
uccessiveY
ears
CR
IME
19851986
1987M
urder4
17
Rap
e27
2340
Aggravated
Assault
150185
346R
obbery183
252315
Note:
The
1985and
1986data
come
fromthe
Uniform
Crim
eR
eports;
thosefor
1987w
erekindly
providedby
theL
ynnP
oliceD
epartm
ent.
Table
4reveals
anupw
ardtendency
inthe
lasttw
oyears
thatw
asespecially
pronouncedin
1987.A
ndfurther
perspectiveis
providedby
Table
5,w
hichcom
paresaverage
crime
ratesfor
1980-82—the
threefull
yearsin
thepre
interventionperiod—
with
thosefor
1986-87.A
sw
esee,
murder,
rape,and
robberyw
erehigher
inthe
latterperiod
thanin
theyears
rightbefore
thecrackdow
n.(Indeed,
the1987
levelsof
murder
androbbery
were
thehighest
of
thisdecade,
while
therape
levelw
asthe
secondhighest.)
The
onlyv
isi
Drug
Crackdow
nsand
Crim
eR
ates39
bleenduring
consequenceof
thecrackdow
nw
asa
sharpdecline
inag
gravatedassaults;
giventhe
near-doublingof
thiscrim
ein
1987,how
ever,
eventhat
achievement
couldprove
short-lived.
Table5:
Average
Annual
Levels
ofV
iolencein
Lynn
inTw
oD
ifferentP
eriodsin
the1980’s
CR
IME
1980-821986-87
Murder
3.674.0
Rape
19.0031.5
Aggravated
Assault
1010.00265.5
Robbery
267.00283.5
Looking
backfrom
1988,therefore,
Lynn’s
long-termcrim
ereduction
associatedw
ithits
crackdown
seems
ratherlim
ited.It
isconceivable,
of
course,that
thecrackdow
nw
asvirtually
abandonedby
1986.B
utP
rofessor
Kleim
anhas
notprepared
usto
expectsuch
adevelopm
ent:he
recounted
thepopularity
of
them
easuresin
Lynn
andtold
usthat
“oncea
crackdown
getsstarted,
itm
aybe
politicallyhard
tostop”
because“neighborhood
demands
will
placeconsiderable
politicalpressure
onlocal
officialsto
co
n
tinuethe
programat
fullstrength.”
At
am
inimum
,the
jarringL
ynndata
from1987
would
seemto
requirean
explanation.
Displacem
ent
As
Professor
Kleim
annoted,
crimes
might
diminish
ina
cityafter
acrackdow
nnot
becausethey
havebeen
averted,but
ratherbecause
theyhave
beenshifted
elsewhere.
Such
displacement
couldnot
beexcluded
after
the“P
ressureP
oint”crackdow
nin
Manhattan
thatdram
aticallycut
local
crime
rates.D
rugdealers
andusers
may
simply
haverelocated
theirtran
s
actions(and
accompanying
crimes)
toother
drugm
arketsin
Brooklyn
and
Manhattan.
Professor
Kleim
anseem
sconfident,
however,
thatsuch
displacement
did
notattenuate
theobserved
improvem
entsin
Lynn.
The
primary
reasonfor
hisoptim
ismis
thatcrim
edid
notgrow
inthe
post-crackdown
yearsin
comm
unitiesadjacent
toL
ynn.S
econdarily,he
pointsto
growing
enro
ll
ments
inL
ynn’sdrug-treatm
entprogram
safter
them
easurestook
effect.
These
lastobservations
arenot
irrelevant,but
Iquestion
theprem
iseo
fthe
Kleim
an/Cavanagh
searchfor
displacement
effects.T
heassum
ptionseem
s
tobe
thatno
addictsw
ouldactually
move
outof
Lynn,
andthus
thatany
crimes
displacedfrom
thecity
would
reappearin
itsim
mediate
surro
und
ings.B
utif
buyingheroin
inL
ynngot
bothriskier
andm
oreinconvenient,
might
notsom
eusers
decideto
takeup
residencein
Low
ellor
Boston
or
(forthat
matter)
New
York?
Heroin
addicts,after
all,m
ightnot
haveespecially
strongcom
munity
ties;in
anycase,
Lynn
isno
furtherfrom
Boston
thanm
idtown
Manhattan
fromB
rooklyn.
BA
sthe
searchfor
displacedcrim
esgets
wider,
though,it
becomes
increas
inglyfutile.
The
activitiesof
Lynn’s
transplantsw
ouldscarcely
seemvisible
inthe
crime
statisticsof
New
York
orB
oston.A
more
promising
detectionm
ethod(m
entionedby
Professor
Kleim
anin
anothercontext)
would
involvean
all-pointssearch
forpost-crackdow
narrests
among
offendersw
ithlong
previousrecords
inL
ynn.Such
asearch
couldobviously
runinto
problems
(e.g.,aliases)
but,in
anera
of
precisephysical
testsand
ubiquitouscorn-
Bputers,
suchtroubles
might
notbe
insurmountable.
As
of
now,
though,w
ecan’t
reallybe
surethat
theforces
thatcut
Lynn’s
crime
in1984-85
didn’tlead
toincreases
elsewhere.
And
unanswered
qu
estions
aboutdisplacem
enthave
unnervingpolicy
implications.
Conceivably,
displacement
reflectsthe
presenceof
a“safety
valve”through
which
addictsescape
crackdowns
andreach
unfettereddrug
markets.
But
ifm
anyco
mm
unitiesim
posedsim
ultaneouscrackdow
ns,such
addictsm
ightfind
theyhave
nowhere
torun,
andtheir
attempts
tofinance
much
costlierdrug
pu
rchases
couldlead
toan
upsurgein
crime.
Measures
thatm
ightappear
suc
cessfulin
isolation,therefore,
couldbe
terriblycounterproductive
were
theyto
proliferate.
Sum
mary
The
main
pointsof
thisreview
are:
(1)In
theafterm
athof
itsdrug
crackdown,
Law
renceexperienced
arise
inrobbery,
burglary,and
larcenythat
was
bothsu
bstantial
andlarger
thanthe
correspondingdecline
inL
ynn.T
hus,the
Law
renceoutcom
ew
asin
some
respectsas
troublingas
theL
ynnresults
were
encouraging.
(2)T
hecrim
ereductions
inL
ynnafter
itscrackdow
nw
erelargely
transient.T
herew
asno
meaningful
declinein
nonviolentp
rop
ertycrim
e,and
onlytem
porarydrops
inm
urder,rape,
androbbery.
Aggravated
assaultsdid
fallenorm
ously,but
eventhey
increasedby
90percent
from1986
to1987.
(3)T
heK
leiman-C
avanaghanalysis
didnot
(and,w
ithaggregate
statistics,largely
couldnot)
verifythat
crimes
absentfrom
Lynn
shortlyafter
itscrackdow
ndid
notreappear
beyondits
imm
ediatesurroundings.
Under
thecircum
stances,I
amm
orepessim
isticthan
Professor
Kleim
anabout
what
happenedin
Law
rence,and
more
tentativein
describingw
hathappened
inL
ynnas
asuccess.
Istrongly
agreew
ithP
rofessorK
leiman,
however,
thatthe
experiments
per
formed
thusfar
were
of
veryhigh
caliberand
justifym
anym
oreendeavors.
Only
byan
extensiveprocess
of
trial-and-errorcan
we
hopeto
understandw
hencrackdow
nsclearly
engenderm
oregood
thanharm
.
Acknow
ledgements
Iam
gratefulto
theP
oliceD
epartment
of
Lynn,
Massachusetts
forp
ro
vidingm
ethe
city’s1987
crime
statistics,and
tothe
Crim
eA
nalysis
Bureau,
Com
monw
ealtho
fM
assachusetts,for
providingm
eL
ynn’scrim
e
datafor
severalyears
inthe
early1980’s
when
theyw
erenot
includedin
the
Uniform
Crim
eR
eports.
Chapter
4
EV
AL
UA
TIN
GS
TR
EE
T-L
EV
EL
DR
UG
EN
FO
RC
EM
EN
T
Anthony
V.
Bouza
Does
streetlevel
drugenforcem
entby
thecops
reducecrim
eand
drugabuse?
That
isthe
questionaddressed
byM
arkA
.R
.K
leiman
in“C
rackdow
n:T
heE
ffectsof
IntensiveE
nforcement
onR
etailH
eroinD
ealing.”H
ereview
spolice
saturationefforts
inL
ynnand
Law
rence,M
assachusetts,as
well
as“O
perationP
ressureP
ointI,”
inM
anhattan,and
“Operation
Cold
Turkey”
inP
hiladelphia.T
heseoperations
narrowly
focusedon
interruptingthe
connectionbetw
eenseller
anduser—
arguablythe
lowest
rungin
thegrow
er-importer-distributor-w
holesaler-cutter-sellerdrug
tradeorganizational
ladder.
Other
recentstudies
havedem
onstratedin
dramatic
fashionthe
unsuspectedconnection
between
drugsand
seriouscrim
e.Tw
othirds,
orm
ore,of
suspectsarrested
forrobberies
orother
seriousstreet
crimes
havedrugs
intheir
systemw
henthey’re
pickedup
bythe
cops.T
hereis
aconnection
bet
ween
druguse
andbeing
partof
thesm
allpopulation
ofoffenders
who
repeatedlycom
mit
many
andvaried
streetcrim
es.T
heconnection
isstrong.
But
thereasons
forthe
connectionare
notas
clearas
itsexistence
oras
easyto
seeas
itseffects.
Street
conditions—peddling
inneighborhoods
andnear
schools;huddled
knotsof
usersand
hurrieddealing;
occasionalviolence;
radiatingburglaries;
ageneral
senseof
decay—
theseare
what
thepublic
sees,feels,
andresents.
Suchconditions
conveyan
“anythinggoes,
nothingis
barred”atm
ospherethat
sapsa
neighborhood’senergy
anddrains
itsm
orale.T
hepeople
findit
hardto
understandw
hythe
copsdon’t
“dosom
ethingabout
it,and
fast.”A
fterall,
ifthey
cansee
it.w
hycan’t
thecops?
Most
practitionersknow
theansw
er.To
alarge
degreea
freesociety
must
policeitself.
Com
munity
crime
preventionefforts,
neighborhoodpatrols,
andother
cooperativeprogram
sare
partof
thesocial
gluethat
keepsour
societysafe.
Itis
theanom
icsense
thatno
onecares,
thatno
onew
illhelp,
thatkeeps
everyone’seyes
avertedw
henbad
thingshappen
oncrow
dedstreets
inN
ewY
ork.
One
of
them
ajorfunctions
of
thecops
isto
supporta
society’sw
illto
policeitself—
toinsure
cohesionand
peace.A
sgovernm
entrepresentatives
itis
important
forus
topreserve
thesocial
fabricby
providinga
senseof
structure,m
aintainingstandards
anddiscipline,
andattending
toother
qualityof
lifeissues.
Cosm
eticscan
beim
portant.Signs
of
decay—graffiti,
brokenw
indow,
andhuddled
knotso
fdrug
users—
suggesta
dissolutionof
valuesand
increasesocial
breakdown.
But
isstreet
levelenforcem
enta
goodsolution?
Can
itjustify
reversingthe
tideof
technologicaladvancem
entsw
e’vem
ade?S
houldw
escrap
rapidresponse
tovictim
sof
violentcrim
esand
putthe
copback
onthe
beat?
Street
levelenforcem
entis
sexy,visible,
andpopular—
butis
iteffective?
Mr.
Kleim
an’sstudies
appearto
suggestyes
...
with
sensiblecaveats.
But,
fromm
yperspective,
theansw
eris
closerto
no.A
sa
responsibleofficial,
Im
ustexplain
some
harshtruths.
Street-level
enforcement
hasfew
goodeffects
First
let’slook
atthe
goodeffects
Kleim
ansays
street-leveldrug
enfo
rcem
entcan
have.M
uch,for
example,
ism
adeof
thereduction
inhom
icidesunder
operationP
ressureP
ointI.
But
didit
actuallyreduce
murders?
Pres
sureP
ointI
startedin
January1984.
The
numbers
of
murders
allover
New
York
City
starteddropping
yearsbefore;
1800m
urdersin
‘81,1700
in‘82,
1600in
‘83,1500
in‘84,
1400in
‘85,(and
backup
to1600
in‘86).
Kleim
analso
saysthat
Pressure
Point
Ireduced
robberiesand
burglariesin
thetarget
area.B
utthe
operationtook
placeduring
thesam
etim
ethat
robberiesand
burglariesstopped
increasingall
overthe
city.W
hatcan
we
concludefrom
thosetrends?
Itappears
that
itw
asnot
Pressure
Point
Ithat
hada
noticeableim
pacton
othercrim
es.
Now
let’slook
atdrug
arrests.W
asconsum
ptionor
dealingreduced?
Did
availabilityof
drugsdecline
anddid
theirprice
rise?T
heansw
eris,
pro
bably
no.
Short
circuitingthe
connectionsbetw
eendrug
buyerand
seller,through
policesaturations
andconcentrated
streetenforcem
ent,can
onlyserve
asa
temporary
palliative.T
headdict
isnot,
afterall,
acustom
erw
ithm
anyo
ptions
andchoices.
He’s
hooked.H
ehas
tofind
asource
and,judging
bythe
admitted
availabilityand
pricestability
of
drugs,he
does.
Iam
reminded
ofa
cynicalpractice
theN
YP
Dused
toem
ployto
confusecorrupt
plainclothescops
inthe
viceunits.
The
entireorganization
would,
AA
Rn
nv
onesurprising
day,be
shippedout
—“back
tothe
bag”(returned
touniform
duty)—and
anew
bunch—probably
unsulliednew
ertroops
fromuniform
edassignm
ents—
poppedin.
The
corruptconnections
were
notinterrupted
orconfused
forlong.
What
man
hadinvented,
cannym
ancircum
vented.S
oonall
was
restoredas
beforeand
thepads
andscores
flowed
uninterruptedly—or
atleast
untilthe
temporary
dislocationof
thenext
massive
shifts.
Putting
acop
onthe
Streetin
frontof
yourhouse
will
certainlyresult
temporarily
ina
more
peacefuland
betterordered
nearbyenvironm
ent—
butis
thisthe
bestuse
of
theresource?
The
factsare
thatthis
isgood
publicity,but
othervirtues
arehard
tosee.
Street-level
enforcement
hasm
anybad
effects
For
theprofessional
who
hasbeen
pushedtim
eand
time
againby
aspooked
publicto
resortto
procrusteansim
pleand
simplistic
solutions,the
disabilitieso
fstreet-level
enforcement
areobvious.
Such
focused,co
ncen
tratedefforts
asthose
inL
ynn,L
awrence,
Philadelphia,
andM
anhattan,bear
thecharacteristics
of
sweeps
andindiscrim
inateround-ups
thathave
beendiscredited.
They
uselim
itedenergy
againstthe
lowest-level
operators.T
heyresult
inm
anyarrests
thatflood,
overwhelm
,and
defeata
systemalready
undersevere
strain.Instead
of
more
goingto
jail,few
erdo.
As
theagencies
tryto
decongest,they
areunable
todistinguish
between
biggerfish
andm
innows.
All
getthrough
thenecessarily
stretchednet.
The
criminal
justicesystem
hasfinite
resourcesw
ithw
hichto
dealw
iththe
tremendous
problems
of
violenceand
crime.
There
were
800,000drug
arrestsin
1985and
justabout
500,000persons
inour
overcrowded
prisons.T
heconclusion
isobvious.
There
ain’troom
atthe
inn.
When
Governor
Rockefeller
andthe
New
York
Legislature
mandated
thejailing
ofdrug
pushersin
theearly
seventies,this
panderingto
thepublic’s
fearsproved
popular.N
oone
daredvote
againstand
fewhad
thecourage
tocounsel
sense.T
heprisons
soonfilled
with
dealers,leaving
noroom
form
urderers,rapists,
robbers,or
burglars,for
whom
therew
ereno
mandated
sentences.In
theend
theeffort
hadto
beabandoned.
Given
enoughprison
space,m
aybeincapacitation
couldreduce
crime.
But,
with
abouttw
othirds
of
thestates
undercourt
ordersto
decongestprisons
(prisonscrow
dedduring
thehysteria-over-crim
e-in-the-streetsof
thesev
enties
andearly
eighties)dangerous
criminals
arenow
pouringout
of,not
into
ourpenal
institutions.
13C
omplex
publicissues
tendto
havethis
jack-in-the-boxcharacteristic—
poppingup
inunexpected
places,w
hensom
eonepresses
down
ona
pro
blem
somew
hereelse.
Street
drugoperations
indisputably“clean
up”the
areaof
focus,but
what
will
popup
elsewhere?
When
streetenforcem
entresults
inm
orearrests,
fewer
prosecutionsare
suc
cessful.A
ndw
ehave
allseen
thatpressures
toproduce
“goodcases”
have
resultedin
flaking,dropsy,
perjury,entrapm
ent,and
framing,
bycops
anx
iousto
pleasedem
andingsuperiors.
There
shouldbe
pressuresto
performand
produce,but
thesem
ustbe
accompanied
bya
sensiblesense
ofpriorities
anda
sensitivityto
becoming
counterproductive.
Street
operationsalso
areseductive.
They
developa
constituencythat
makes
shiftsdifficult
when
policem
anagersm
ostneed
flexibility.T
hepolice
needto
beflexible
toattack
othervery
realand
seriousproblem
s.T
heyshould
nothave
restrictiveassignm
entsto
Potem
kinV
illagesbuilt
todazzle
un
inform
edcitizens.
Street-leveloperations
alsodistract
usfrom
meaningful
assaultson
drugabuse.
When
we
considerthe
most
effectivew
ayof
reducingthe
availabilityof
illegaldrugs
we
oughtto
thinkof
theT
ylenolanalogy.
When
pillssuspected
ofbeing
poisonedhad
tobe
roundedup
quickly,it
became
ob
viousthat
them
ostprom
isingsources
oflarge
batchesw
erew
arehouses,not
individualm
edicinecabinets.
Not
thatthe
lattercould
beignored
butthe
programhad
tobe
guidedby
asense
of
priority.
And,
while
we’re
aboutit,
why
focuson
supplyalone?
What
became
of
de
mand?
Why
dow
ehave,
asa
nation,such
anappetite
fordrugs?
Has
the30-second
TV
comm
ercialturned
usinto
adruggy
culture?
What
shouldw
edo?
There
issom
eevidence
thatthe
currentpassion
foreducating
usto
thehorrors
of
illicitdrugs
istaking
hold.W
hite,educated
Am
ericaseem
sto
beconsum
ingless.
They
appearto
havereceived
them
essage.W
heredoes
thisleave
theexcluded,
desperate,frequently
blackand
almost
always
poorghetto
dweller?
Hooked.
His
triphas
toconsist
ofa
fixor
acheap
bottleof
wine.
Arresting
himis
notenough.
The
questionof
criticalancillary
issuessuch
asthe
availabilityof
treatment
programs
deservesm
oreconsideration.
Drug
addictionand
criminality
havetheir
rootsin
joblessness,hopelessness,
illiteracy,teenage
pregnancy,and
theinfirm
itiesof
poverty.
Hum
anbehavior
canbe
changedthrough
positiveand
negativeco
nse
quences,w
ithem
phasison
consequences.R
oundups
allowall
toslip
througha
netthat
can’tcontain
themall.
Arrests
arenot
enough—there
hasto
befollow
through,positive
andnegative.
What
we
needare
effectiveresponses
tothe
problem—
notpolitically
motivated
actions.
Public
officialshave
anobligation
toeducate
peopleand
teachthem
thedifferences
between
beingw
ellserved
andbeing
pleasedor
panderedto.
We
needto
tellthem
what
we
know—
andw
hatw
edon’t
know.
We
donot
knowenough
aboutdrug
use,drug
dealing,or
them
osteffec
tivew
aysof
combatting
theproblem
.W
eare
beginningto
getdata
andthis
isenlightening,
asw
ellas
surprising.
Street-leveldrug
enforcement
may
getheadlines,
pleasethe
neighbors,and
bringpeace
tothe
area,but
itsdisplacem
enteffects,
waste
of
resources,burdenings
of
thesystem
,inflexibility,
potentialfor
abuse,and
dy
sfun
ctional
aspectsall
arguepow
erfullyfor
skepticismas
toits
efficacy.
Kleim
an’sstudy
isuseful
forthe
lightit
castson
theissue
andfor
thediscussion
itinspires.
Itis
not,in
my
view,
thew
ayto
go.W
e,the
soupschool
graduatesw
horun
thecountry’s
policeagencies,
desperatelyneed
thereturn
of
thescholars,
toguide
ourefforts
throughtheir
analysesand
experiments.
This
isw
herethe
federalfunds
andlocal
effortsshould
beconcentrated.
Sum
mary
Focused,
saturationstreet
enforcement
will
cleanup
anarea,
butit
iscostly
andinefficient.
Itrobs
otherareas
of
theirfair
shareof
scarceresources
andit
doesnot
eliminate
theintractable
problemof
drugdealing,
butm
erelydisplaces
it.It
alsofocuses,
inefficiently,on
thelow
estlevel
of
thecrim
inalchain
andis
sureto
leadto
abusesand
repression,w
ithsw
eepsand
round-ups.
Once
installed,such
operationsare
politicallydifficult
torem
ove.B
yproducing
largenum
berso
farrests
theycreate
stresseson
afrequently
overloadedcrim
inaljustice
systemw
hichthen
findsit
more
difficultto
discriminate
between
them
enacesth
atought
tobe
incapacitatedand
thecasual
dealeror
user;usually
theyall
gofree.
“Buy
andbust”
operations,observation
arrestsand
enforcement
byuniform
edofficers
isinherently
primitive
andinefficient.
Itcreates
pressuresto
performthat
producea
disproportionaterisk
of
flaking,dro
psy,
entrapment,
orperjury.
These,
of
course,exist
inall
policeoperations,
butthey
existat
varyinglevels
of
risk.
Interdictingdrugs
requiressophisticated
enforcement,
aimed
atthe
hig
her
leveldealer,
andeducational
programs
aboutthe
dangersof
druguse.
Stabilizing
aneighborhood
requiresa
strategyth
atcreates
comm
unityco
he
sion;a
strategyw
hichcan
beextended,
with
limited
resources,city
wide.
Street-level
enforcement
ispopular,
sexy,and
producesw
onderfulp
ublici
ty.T
heonly
realproblem
isthat
itdoesn’t
work.
Pv
1iitin
otr,t
_T
l,rn
Chapter
5
CO
MM
EN
TS
ON
ST
RE
ET
-LE
VE
LD
RU
GE
NF
OR
CE
ME
NT
Kevin
M.
Burke
Iam
theperson
directlyresponsible
forthe
establishment
anddirection
of
theL
ynnD
rugT
askF
orceand
theL
awrence
Drug
Task
Forcedescribed
byM
arkK
leiman
inhis
paperon
crackdowns.
Mr.
Kleim
anclearly
andaccurately
outlinesthe
operationsof
theseefforts.
How
ever,he
concludesthat
theefforts
inL
ynnw
eresuccessful
while
thosein
Law
rencew
erenot.
Ibelieve
itis
necessaryto
judgethe
effectsof
theintensive
street-levelen
forcement
incom
parisonw
ithother
enforcement
methods.
Iw
ouldargue
thatw
hencom
paredto
previousattem
ptsto
controlthe
opendrug
market,
operationsin
bothL
ynnand
Law
renceproduced
remarkably
successfulresults.
Itw
asless
calculationof
thepossible
benefitsof
street-levelenforcem
entand
more
my
senseof
frustrationw
iththe
typesof
drugenforcem
entused
previouslyin
Lynn
andL
awrence
thatled
tothe
formation
of
theT
askForces.
As
theD
istrictA
ttorneyin
Essex
County,
itis
my
responsibilityto
combat
drugabuse.
Because
of
itsdetrim
entaleffect
onusers
andits
effectof
increasingstreet
crimes,
drugshad
beenthe
targetof
everytraditional
enforcement
method.
These
methods
hadlittle
orno
visibleresults.
From
1979until
1983,I
triedundercover
operationsaim
edat
bothstreet-
levelenforcem
entand
theheads
of
relativelysophisticated
drugcon
spiracies.In
separateoperations
inL
ynnand
Law
rence,I
usedundercover
State
Police
officersto
make
drug“buys”
fromas
many
peopleas
possible.A
sa
resultof
theseundercover
operations—
some
lastingas
longas
sixm
onths—
we
simultaneously
arrestedas
many
as80
people.A
dditionally,to
targetheads
ofdrug
distributiongroups,
Iused
electronicsurveillance
(telephonetaps,
etc.)of
drugdistributors
andraids
timed
tocoincide
with
thereceipt
ofshipm
entsof
largequantities
of
drugs.A
sa
result,w
eo
ccasionally
seizeddrugs
worth
millions
of
dollarson
thestreet.
These
drugs
rin
mnt
An
ctr
t_T
gv
pl
flrii&P
nfA
rnm
Pn
tIIQ
were
destinedfor
them
arketsin
Lynn
andL
awrence.
Yet,
afterseveral
effortsof
thesetypes,
therew
asno
discernibleeffect
onthe
targetedcom
munities.
The
opendrug
marketplaces
returnedto
thepre-raid
levelof
businessw
ithina
month
of
theenforcem
enteffort.
The
upper-leveltraffickers
who
were
arrestedw
ereusually
replacedby
others,or
operationsw
erecontinued
bythe
same
groupw
itha
small
shake-upin
per
sonnel.A
lthoughI
was
usingthe
investigativeresources
availableto
me
forcom
battingdrug
trafficking,the
market
stillappeared
tobe
unaffected.
By
contrast,both
Drug
Task
Forcesthat
Kleim
andescribes
operatingin
Lynn
andL
awrence
producedobservable
changesin
thequality
of
lifein
thetargeted
neighborhoods.A
ndthat
was
theprim
arygoal
of
theprogram
.In
Law
rence,S
tateP
oliceconcentrated
enforcement
inthe
areaof
ahous
ingproject
thathad
become
infamous
forits
openheroin
market.
After
thiseffort
began,conditions
visiblyim
proved.L
ifew
ithinthe
projecthas
become
lessdisrupted
byheroin
addictsand
thejunkie-dealer
ism
uchless
likelyto
bea
visiblem
odelfor
neighborhoodchildren.
Placing
highlyvisible
policeofficers
onthe
streetsand
intensivelyenforcing
druglaw
shas
hadother
positiveeffects
inboth
comm
unities.A
com
parisonof
addresseson
carregistrations
beforeand
afterthe
taskforces
went
intooperation
clearlyshow
edthat
taskforces
reducedthe
numbers
of
nonresidentpeople
who
droveto
Lynn
andL
awrence
tobuy
heroin.T
henum
berof
newheroin
usersalso
was
reducedin
bothareas.
And
thein
for
mation
aboutdrug
distributiongathered
onthe
streetso
fL
awrence
hasbeen
utilizedby
lawenforcem
entofficials
inseveral
states.T
hesestreet
datahave
beenm
oreuseful
thaninform
ationgathered
throughundercover
investigation
becausethey
areconstantly
beingupdated
andrefined.
The
effortsin
bothL
awrence
andL
ynnresulted
innum
erousparticular
improvem
ents.B
othsuccessfully
improved
theoverall
qualityof
lifein
thetargetted
areas.H
owever,
Mr.
Kleim
ancalls
Lynn
asuccess
andL
awrence
afailure
because“street
crimes”
suchas
robberyand
burglarydeclined
inL
ynnbut
notin
Law
rence.I
believethat
sinceL
awrence
issim
ilarto
Lynn
inall
measurable
effectsbut
one,the
overalljudgm
entof
theL
awrence
ef
fortalso
shouldbe
“success.”
Moreover,
thefailure
of
theL
awrence
Drug
Task
Force
toreduce
Streetcrim
eas
Mr.
Kleim
anindicates,
may
beexplained
bythe
presenceof
drugm
arketplacesnear
toL
awrence.
Heroin,
availablein
neighboringH
averhill,L
owell,
andsouthern
New
Ham
pshire,allow
sthe
junkieto
fulfillthis
needw
ithoutconcern
forprice
oravailability.
Therefore,
theneed
tosteal
stillexists
becauseof
theavailability
of
heroinclose
toL
awrence.
Ifone
were
toexpand
thestreet
enforcement
effortsto
drugm
arketplacesadjacent
toL
awrence,
itis
fairto
speculatethat
thestreet
crime
would
bereduced
dueto
thelack
of
availabilityof
heroin.
Inany
case,w
henconducting
acom
parativebenefit
analysisof
drugfighting
efforts,it
ism
ystrong
opinionthat
intensivestreet-level
enfo
rcem
entproduces
thebest
resultsand
theL
awrence
projectdoes
notdisprove
thispoint.
cnB
iirki
Mr.
Kleim
annot
onlydiscusses
thebenefits
of
theL
ynnand
Law
renceD
rugT
askForce,
butadditionally
analyzesthe
cost.H
owever,
Iam
notsure
thatI
totallyagree
with
Mr.
Kleim
an’scost
analysis.
The
administrative
costsof
mounting
aT
askForce
operationdefinitely
arem
easurable.T
heyinclude
rentalcost
of
offices,cars,
andoffice
machinery,
asw
ellas
thecost
of
hiringclerical
help.A
dditionally,as
Mr.
Kleim
anpoints
out,officers
working
ona
Task
Forceoperation
generatem
oreo
ver
time
expensethan
officerson
generalassignm
ent.
Iw
ould,how
ever,argue
with
Mr.
Kleim
an’scontentions
thatofficers
usedfor
Drug
Task
Forcew
orkare
divertedfrom
fightingother
crimes,
andtherefore,
“alternativeuse”
of
thesepolice
becomes
acost
of
street-levelen
forcement.
This
contentionsuggests
thatspecially
assigneddrug
officersdo
notbecom
ecognizant
of
othercrim
es.To
thecontrary,
itis
my
observationthat
street-leveldrug
officersknow
more
aboutevery
categoryof
crime
thanany
othertype
ofpolice
officer.B
ecausea
largenum
berof
offendersw
hocom
mit
“streetcrim
es”are
alsodrug
offenders,drug
officersoften
canprovide
more
hardinform
ationand
evidenceon
burglaryand
vicecrim
ethan
policeassigned
totask
forcesspecializing
inthese
areas.T
heform
alassignm
entof
acop
todrugs
isvirtually
thesam
eas
aninform
alassig
nm
entto
larceny,burglary,
andm
urderinvestigations.
Iw
ouldalso
arguethat
theintrusiveness
ofthe
enforcement
effortas
acost
must
bem
easuredagainst
theintrusiveness
of
drugdealing
onyour
doorstep.
Itis
notclear
justw
hatw
eightM
r.K
leiman
would
assignthe
lattercost.
How
ever,it
seems
tom
ethat
when
balancedagainst
theenvironm
entof
anopen
drugm
arket,a
visible,active
policepresence
isnot
atrem
endous
intrusionand
thereforenot
asignificant
costof
astreet-
leveloperation.
Ifthere
isone
criticalthesis
uponw
hichthis
paperturns,
andw
ithw
hichI
would
agreecom
pletely,it
isthe
ideathat
intensivestreet-level
heroinen
forcement
canresult
ina
reductionin
streetcrim
e.T
hereasoning
Mr.
Kleim
anadvances
forthis
conclusionis
backedby
hisanalysis
of
thedata
fromthe
Lynn
Drug
Task
Forceprogram
andthe
New
York
City
Operation
Pressure
Point;
itis
notdisproven
bythe
Law
renceproject.
Mr.
Kleim
anreasons
thatthe
druguser
must
paytw
odistinct
pricesfor
heroin.F
irst,there
is,o
fcourse,
theretail
priceestablished
bythe
pusher.T
hem
arketprice
risesw
iththe
riskim
posedby
lawenforcem
entefforts.
How
ever,it
isnot
theretail
pricealone,
asM
r.K
leiman
indicates,w
hichm
ightlead
ajunkie
toabstain
fromheroin
useand
stopstealing
topay
fordrugs.
Infact,
asthe
paperpoints
out,other
studieshave
shown
thatin
creasesin
retaildrug
pricescan
leadto
more
crime.
Kleim
ancontends
thatit
isthe
non-monetary
“secondprice,”
onw
hichstreet-level
enforcement
ef
fortshave
thegreatest
effect.B
yincreasing
thetim
e,inconvenience,
andrisk
of
arrestinvolved
inm
akingheroin
purchases,street-level
enforcement
drivessom
ejunkies
toabstain
fromheroin.
Therefore,
Mr.
Kleim
anargues
thecom
ponentsof
aneffective
street-levelenforcem
enteffort
are“concentration”
(geographicallyand
bydrug
type)
T....1
fl_.._
r_L
’
and“persistence.”
The
validityof
thisargum
entw
asborne
outin
Lynn
and
Operation
Pressure
Point,
where
concentrationon
heroinsales
inspecific
neighborhoodsover
arelatively
longperiod
of
time
ledto
greaterabstinence
andless
crime.
Italso
explainsthe
comparative
“failure”in
Law
rence,since
Law
rencehas
adrug
market
which
stretchesbeyond
the
jurisdictionof
thepolice
andhas
toofew
policeofficers
tom
eetthe
demands
of
evena
limited
jurisdiction.
Mr.
Kleim
an’sconclusion
thatthe
potentialgains
ofstreet-level
enforcement
“arelarge
andthe
riskslim
ited,”is
supportedin
thispaper
andhis
cautious
callto
“tryit
andsee”
isjustified.
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