LCDR Hui Lee LCDR Ashwin Anupdev 03 Nov 2011
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE NETWORK IN SOUTH AMERICA
Background Network Model Network Formulation Analysis Conclusion
AGENDA
BACKGROUND
Dec 2004 – Indian Ocean, Tsunami from a 9.1 mag earthquake, over 283,000 death.
Oct 2005 – Pakistan, 7.6 mag earthquake, over 87,000 death.
Jan 2010 – Haiti, 7.0 mag earthquake, over 316,000 death.
Mar 2011 – Japan, Tsunami from a 9.0 mag earthquake, over 5,000 death
BACKGROUND
Global reach and provide an immediate response to distressed populations wherever and whenever.
Provide rapid, effective, low-cost and sustainable services.
Build key capacity in partner nations to promote national security and stability in the theater.
US DEPT OF DEFENSE (DOD)
An earthquake of magnitude 8.0 – Honduras.
USSOUTHCOM – tasked to provide humanitarian relief.
Network operation – deliver water, power generator, communication and medical support.
Purpose - analyze the cost savings and the benefits of network.
SCENARIO - HONDURAS
Nodes :• Fleet Industrial Supply Centers• Naval Air Stations• US Naval and Coast Guard ships• Fixed Air wings• Defense Logistic Agencies• NPS HFN team (Hastly Formed Network – Nemesis
Network Warfare Van, deployable wireless communications)
NETWORK MODEL
Intermediate node –FISC San Diego, NAS Forth Worth, Ships.
End node - USSOUTHCOM – all activities report back for completion.
Edges – (Transfer Cost, 0, Capacity)
Limiting factors – capacity availability and cost of modes Ships Planes Trucks
NETWORK MODEL
NETWORK
SupplyIntermediateDemand
NETWORK
FORMULATION
Primal Problem – LP – to find the min- cost multi commodity flow
Dual Problem – MIP – to find the best interdiction plan (arc or node)
To find the min-cost flow with the current interdiction plan
FORMULATION
Objective Function
Constraints◦ BALANCE OF FLOW◦ CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS◦ FIXING Y
PRIMAL PROBLEM - LP
ANALYSIS
Arcs – eliminate an arc completely by putting maximum delay.
Nodes – eliminate node completely by putting maximum delay in arc between fake start and end nodes.
ATTACKS
ATTACKING NODES
MIN-COST FLOW
OPERATOR RESILIENCE (ARCS)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9500
550
600
650
700
750
800
850
ATTACKS
CostCOST(IN 1000)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7500
550
600
650
700
750
OPERATOR RESILIENCE(NODES)
ATTACKS
COST
(IN 1
000)
For more number of attacks the Cost changes slightly.
Big jump from 1 to 2.
The cost does not change when NasFortWorth is attacked.
When FiscJacksonville is interdicted the cost goes up to huge amounts.
ATTACKS(NODES)
Pre-position the equipment and supplies in the near high probable disaster areas.
Shorter response distance and time will result less cost overall.
CONCLUSION
If the project presentation was next week?
◦ Time Element
◦ Stochastic Element
◦ Cost considered per unit of shipment
◦ Complex network
CONCLUSION
THANK YOU
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