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The Threat of Homegrown Terrorism

Curtis Pittman

Government 490

Dr. Rizova

October 31, 2014

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Abstract:

A growing problem within the United States of America is homegrown terrorism. Since

the attacks of September 11, 2001 there has been an increase of extreme, violent jihadists that are

being established on American soil. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that

there have been 63 homegrown violent jihadist plots or attacks in the United States since that

tragic time in American history. The apparent increase in homegrown terrorist activity seems to

suggest that the attitudes and ideologies supporting a violent jihad continue to influence some

Americans. Although it may seem as if this is an insignificant amount of American extremists, it

only takes one homegrown terrorist to sow destruction on the homeland and potentially victimize

innocent American citizens. The answer to the question of whether homegrown terrorism is a

severe threat to the United States will be answered by looking at failed, foiled, and successful

post September 11, 2001 attacks, by understanding the factors and forces that cause domestic

extremism, and by understanding law enforcement and intelligence efforts that combat and

counter homegrown terrorism.

This analysis will look to understand the significance that homegrown terrorism plays on

the United States of America as well as determine whether or not these acts of terror can be

deemed as a serious threat. The research will focus only on post 9/11 violent Jihadist terrorists

within the American borders and not on various other forms of domestic terrorism. There are

many forms of domestic terrorism that have occurred throughout the history of the United States,

but the use of homegrown terrorists by jihadist organizations seems to be on the rise. Since the

attacks of 9/11, there has been an increased threat of jihadist based terror groups that have been

plotting and attacking the American Homeland. Along with looking at the post 9/11 attacks,

there will be research conducted that looks into the reasoning and forces that cause this domestic

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extremism. Is there a trend of likely extremist candidates? If so, what causes their radical

thoughts and actions? After the preliminary research is conducted, there will be more research

done on the already implemented efforts to combat and prevent domestic terrorism. This analysis

will specifically look into the local law enforcement and intelligence agencies to better

understand what has to be done to deter this violence and how we can better the already

implemented efforts. This research also discusses tactics that could be used to combat the threat

of homegrown terrorism. Statistical references will be gathered from resources such as the World

Wide Threat Assessment, various militaristic and law enforcement reports, scholarly reports, as

well as books about Islamic extremists in the West. Another outlet for understanding the

ideologies of homegrown jihadist extremists will come from the United Kingdom’s take on

homegrown terrorism, which will offer references, comparisons, and support for the research.

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The Threat of Homegrown Terrorism

How serious of a problem is homegrown terrorism in the United States?

Throughout the past several centuries, the United States has been a repeated target for

terrorists and their organizations. Terrorism against the United States ranges from organizations

such as the KKK, to anti-government extremists, to the more recent Islamic extremists. Being a

world power and having a stronghold on the majority of the world, the U.S. will always be

targeted by violent groups that wish to overthrow and overpower the country. A threat that seems

to be on the rise in the United States is that of homegrown terrorism, specifically that associated

with violent jihadists. This trend is viewed by some as a high risk threat that needs to be resolved

while others do not see a threat at all. The answer to the question of whether homegrown

terrorism is a severe threat to the United States will be answered by looking at failed, foiled, and

successful post September 11, 2001 attacks, by understanding the factors and forces that cause

domestic extremism, and by understanding law enforcement and intelligence efforts that combat

and counter homegrown terrorism.

Over the past twenty years, the United States has seen a great deal of terrorist

organizations publicly declare war and proclaim their hatred on the country. There are three

specific groups that tend to stand above the others when dealing with how threatening they are

and the potential for harvesting homegrown terrorists, or foreign fighters, within the borders of

America. The three groups that are more well-known and threatening to the United States are the

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most experienced Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, and the more recent Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

(ISIS).

Al Qaeda has been a threat to the United States for many years and continues to be a

significant danger to the security of the country. This group is a militant Islamist based

organization that is prevalent worldwide and operates out of the countries of Pakistan,

Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. Al Qaeda was started by the infamous Osama bin Laden and was

responsible for the attacks on the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon in Washington,

D.C. on September 11, 2001. As far as homegrown terrorism associated with Al Qaeda, there is a

new approach that this organization is taking. Because the security of the United States has

drastically risen since 9/11, plotting another large attack is almost out of the question for

terrorists because it will get shut down before it is carried out. The success rate of big attacks is

minimal, so Al Qaeda has recently publicly announced that they are adopting the strategy of

conducting smaller attacks at a more recurrent rate (Dershowitz, 2014). With this idea at the core

of their scheme, homegrown terror will play a pivotal role in the success of their attacks. These

homegrown terrorists obviously have some advantages that will propel attacks and heighten their

rate of accomplishment. These terrorists can disguise themselves and freely enter the country

without being stopped or questioned, especially if they have a clean record, which cannot be

randomly checked without probable cause. Once they enter the country, they will blend into

society and obtain residency, ultimately becoming a United States citizen. After this takes place,

they can freely enter and leave the country and connect with terror organizations to exchange

information, seek support, and devise plans of attack (Dershowitz, 2014). The use of homegrown

terrorism looks to be a big player in Al Qaeda’s plan to destroy not only America, but all

Western nations.

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The second terror organization that poses a threat to the United States is Al Shabaab. This

organization is also a militant jihadist group and is based primarily out of Somalia. This group

became a risk to the United States in 2008 and has since been increasing its prominence not only

against the U.S. but against all Western nations as well. Although this is an Islamist group

stationed primarily in Africa, this organization draws a significant amount of Western supporters.

In 2011, Al Shabaab deployed a strategy to recruit foreign fighters from Muslim communities

within the United States (Kron, 2011). By infiltrating the U.S., Al Shabaab will attempt to

gather fellow believers of the Muslim faith and convert them to their radical ideologies, thus

obtaining homegrown fighters for their organization. Since 2007, according to the United States

House Committee on Homeland Security, Al Shabaab has successfully enlisted more than forty

Muslim Americans into its organization as foreign fighters (Pelofsky, 2011). With the gaining of

these American extremists, Al Shabaab has increased not only their army, but also their

intelligence.

The third organization that is a high threat to the United States homeland is the Islamic

State of Iraq and Syria, also known as ISIS. This terror organization is also a militant jihadist

based group that prevails in the Middle East and operates out of Iraq as well as Syria. Just as the

previously mentioned groups, ISIS also attracts foreign fighters from Western civilizations. An

article published in the New York Times in the fall of 2014 cited that over 2,000 European

citizens and over 100 American citizens were amongst the foreign fighters within the ISIS army

(Schmidt, 2014). Again, this is a red flag when dealing with homegrown terrorism. If American

citizens are willing to leave their homeland to join radical groups such as these three mentioned

above, they will certainly be willing to obtain and distribute any vital information that they can

retrieve, thus causing problems with American counterterrorism efforts.

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Since the tragic events that took place on September 11, 2001, there has been an effort by

the United States to further protect and safeguard the homeland. While there are many

implemented strategies that combat the threat of foreign terrorist acts, there must also be some

form of defense against that of domestic terrorism. Jerome P. Bjelopera, a specialist in organized

crime and terrorism, states in his work entitled American Jihadist Terrorism: Combatting a

Complex Threat, that homegrown terrorism is a term that not only describes terrorist acts

committed within the borders of the United States but can also be described as American citizens

who commit terror acts outside the boundaries of the country (Bjelopera, pg. 1). The term

“jihadist” refers to radical persons who use Islam as a religiously based justification for their

belief in establishing a worldwide “caliphate” (Bjelopera, pg. 1). The caliphate that these

jihadists seek can be understood as being a dominion which is religiously and authoritatively

ruled by a Muslim, known as a caliph (Bjelopera, 2013).

For the purposes of this research, only attacks occurring after September 11, 2001 will be

investigated. Since 9/11, there have been a total of 63 domestic jihadist attacks or conspiracies in

the United States, according to the Congressional Research Service (CRS). From May of 2009 to

December of 2012, 42 arrests were made on suspected domestic jihadists in the United States.

Bjelopera concludes that the 42 plots and attacks during that span were an echoing development

of violent jihadists that were not directly correlated with significant affiliates of big name groups

such as Al Qaeda (Bjelopera, 2013). In 2010 there were 12 terror plots, 2011 had 10, and 2012

presented 8. Although this may seem like a small percentage of plots and attacks, this evidence

proves that American citizens are influenced and predisposed by the ideological ramifications of

jihadist violence.

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Bjelopera also points out that homegrown terrorists who are not associated with a specific

terrorist organization typically tend to be less equipped than more large-scale terror groups. In

most cases, these homegrown radicals are not trained by affiliates of big organizations, which

therefore underscore what they are capable of. Without the proper training and connection to

international networks, these radicals are not familiar with practical terror tactics such as bomb

making, nor do they have much support or a great deal of experience, and weapons are not

readily available for them to use (Bjelopera, 2013). Without having these necessary tools, it is

likely that homegrown terrorists will not deploy a large scale attack like 9/11, rather, they will

engage in smaller attacks that target specific places or people.

Of the homegrown jihadist terror plots and attacks that have occurred since September

11, 2001, there has not been a generic grouping that these terrorists can be categorized in to. The

Intelligence Division of the New York Police Department released a study in 2007 that states

that there is no way to successfully predict who will become the next jihadist inspired radical,

but do give some insight on the radicalization process itself (Silber and Bhatt, 2007). The NYPD

Intelligence Division developed a 4-stage progression that allows for the understanding of the

radicalization process. The stages are broken down and shown as follows:

Stage 1: Pre-Radicalization

Stage 2: Self-Identification

Stage 3: Indoctrination

Stage 4: Jihadization

The Pre-Radicalization stage defines the individual’s life and the world that he or she

lives in, which can include his or her lifestyle, community, religion, lineage, and education,

before they begin the overall radicalization process (Silber and Bhatt, 2007). The next step, the

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Self-Identification stage, is greatly influenced by external as well as internal forces. This stage is

when the individual begins to explore different avenues of life and begin moving away from

their former identity and begin creating a new mantra related to the ideologies of Islam (Silber

and Bhatt, 2007). The next step in the radicalization process is the Indoctrination stage. This is

when the newly identifying individual begins to heighten his religious beliefs and fully commits

to the jihadist ideology, thus paving the way to becoming a militant jihadist (Silber and Bhatt,

2007). The final stage of this process is what the NYPD deems as Jihadization. This fourth stage

is revealed as the individual accepts their responsibility to partake in his jihad and become “holy

warriors” or “mujahedeen” (Silber and Bhatt, pg. 45). This is the stage when the individual will

plot out terror attacks for the completion of his jihad and ultimately become a violent jihadist

terrorist.

Categorizing homegrown violent jihadist plots and attacks since 9/11 is not an easy task

and has brought about problematic elements that hinder the understanding of these terrorist acts.

The term “homegrown” seems to perceive the notion that the attacks only occur within the

boundaries of the United States, but this is not always the case. Many domestic jihadist terror

plots are linked to some sort of international aspect, whether it is the association with a specific

terror group, training techniques, or plans from foreign propaganda through the internet and

social media (Bjelopera, 2013). Since 9/11, 38 homegrown terror schemes directed their

attention to domestic targets, 22 concentrated on foreign targets, and 3 were linked to both

domestic and international targets (Bjelopera, 2013). According to Bjelopera, of the 63 violent

homegrown jihadist attacks and plots that have occurred post 9/11, there are four principal

themes that are displayed. These four themes include: a variety of endgames, little stomach for

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suicide or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone wolves, and varied capabilities

among the plots.

Terrorists have different individual motives for becoming radicals, which results in a

variety of endgames. Some solely want to associate with foreign fighters, while some stay at

home and attempt their attacks with bombs or shooting sprees. Of the 63 post 9/11 plots, twenty-

two have dealt with individuals trying to become members of terrorist groups that are already

ensnared in conflict (Bjelopera, 2013). One of the primary examples of this occurrence can be

found when looking at recruitment of Al-Shabaab. As previously mentioned, this organization is

searching for young, potentially radical individuals in Muslim communities in the United States.

These young radicals are supporting the efforts of Al Shabaab and leaving their homeland to

journey away and fight in Somalia. These deserters can be considered homegrown terrorists

because they are American citizens who leave the country and fight for extreme Islamist views

and ideologies. Another specific example of this idea that Bjelopera looks into is the “Northern

Virginia Five” in 2009. These five men, who were American citizens and lived in Northern

Virginia, were arrested in Pakistan after traveling there in hopes to become members of jihadist

groups and fight against the United States in Afghanistan (Bjelopera, 2013). The five men were

convicted of terrorism in an anti-terror court in Pakistan in 2010 on charges of the attempt to join

forces with a militant group, planning an attack on a nuclear plant and air base in Pakistan, as

well as planned attacks on “territories of the United States” (Markon, 2010). Because these men

were United States citizens, they are considered to be homegrown terrorists who were attempting

to harm American citizens, specifically soldiers, on an international level.

The second theme that Bjelopera discusses is the lack of suicide terrorism as an attack

method. From the 63 attacks that are examined in this study, only 2 undoubtedly were linked to a

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suicide mission (Bjelopera, 2013). However, in 10 other cases, individuals expressed the idea

and willingness to partake in a suicide mission to fulfill their jihads (Bjelopera, 2013). A specific

example of this willingness to become a martyr was expressed by Coleen LaRose, a native of

Detroit, Michigan. LaRose, also known as “Jihad Jane” wrote in emails that were recovered by

government authorities that she was prepared to give her life to satisfy her ideologies; she was

later sentenced to ten years in prison for her involvement in an attempted murder with other

Islamic extremists (Shiffman, 2014).

Of the 63 cases of homegrown terror plots since 9/11, only 4 were successful, and they

were all carried out by “lone wolves”. Three of the four successful attacks were carried out with

the use of firearms and were targeting United States military personnel (Bjelopera,

2013).Bjelopera states that it is somewhat difficult to generalize this notion from such a small

sample size, but he points out that these four successful cases may link contrasting points. First,

he believes that U.S. law enforcement potentially faces major challenges when trying to target

and prevent lone wolf terrorists who are unaffiliated with large terror organizations (Bjelopera,

2013). Secondly, he feels as though U.S. law enforcement agencies have been successful in

countering and stopping homegrown terror systems since the events of 9/11 (Bjelopera, 2013).

This point is crucial when determining whether homegrown terrorism is a serious threat to the

United States. Yes, there have been very few successful attacks that have occurred since 9/11,

but is that because U.S. law enforcement agencies are triumphant in preventing and countering

these attacks? Without viewing homegrown terrorism as a high threat to the security of the

Homeland, more attacks would be carried out and more attacks would end in favor of the

terrorists.

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The final theme that was discovered within this study is the fact that homegrown

terrorists have various capabilities. Some plots displayed the use of bomb making skills, some

were attempting suicide missions, some used firearms, some were experienced terrorists, while

others and no prior experience at all. Not knowing the capabilities that terrorists possess make it

extremely hard to predict and prevent what will occur and who will be targeted. With the

unpredictability of homegrown terrorists, there must be a intensified sense of security in order to

fully protect the Homeland and the citizens that live within its borders.

The Heritage Foundation, behind the research of Jessica Zuckerman, Steven P. Bucci,

Ph.D, and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D, released a report in July of 2013 that takes an in-depth look

into some 60 post 9/11 terrorism cases. According to the report, of the 60 plots that are reviewed,

49 can be deemed as homegrown violent jihadist attacks. Of the 60 total cases, 4 ended with the

terrorists being successful, 3 were prematurely stopped out of luck, and the others were

immobilized by United States law enforcement agencies (see Chart 2). With 53 of these plots

being stopped before they imposed grave danger to the public, many people never heard about

the attacks and therefore do not understand that the actual threat is there. Zuckerman, Bucci, and

Carafano state that “now is not the time for the US to stand still… the best way to protect the

United States from the continued threat of terrorism is to ensure a strong and capable domestic

counterintelligence enterprise (Zuckerman, Bucci, and Carafano, 2013).”

From a national intelligence perspective, the threat of homegrown terrorism is not an

uncommon occurrence. The Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community is

an annual document that is presented by a select committee within the US intelligence system.

This document gives an overview on global as well as regional players that pose a threat to US

homeland security. James Clapper, US Director of National Intelligence, heads this report and

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touches on two major points dealing with terrorism that this analysis will cover. The first is the

potential of insider threats, which Clapper states will bring about a daunting task within the

counterintelligence community (Clapper, pg.4). With the already established threat of American

extremists, there is a possibility that an insider could obtain vital, classified information about the

American government and distribute it to various terror groups as well as foreign governments.

Clapper reiterates the fact that these potential homegrown insiders pose a serious danger to the

security of the homeland. The second important point that Clapper speaks on is the threat of

homeland plotting, specifically that of homegrown violent extremists (Clapper, 2014). He states

that “US-based extremists will likely continue to pose the most frequent threat to the US

Homeland….the extent of their ideological radicalization can represent challenging and lethal

threats (Clapper, pg.4).” As mentioned earlier, large-scale terror attacks are less likely to occur

because of the intensified security of the U.S. Homeland. Just as Clapper explains, this leads to

the use of smaller, more frequent insider attacks that pose a serious threat to the innocent lives of

American citizens. By using a more incognito approach for attacks, it will be more difficult for

U.S. counterterrorism and intelligence agencies to predict and foil these attacks, thus causing a

problem with the National Security of the United States.

Evaluating the endangerment that comes with the radical jihadist groups in the US brings

about debate with the prominence of this threat. The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West

Point points out that even though there are increasing threats by groups separate from Al Qaeda,

there is still a danger that continues from Al Qaeda (Mudd, 2010). Since 9/11, Al Qaeda has been

the biggest threat to the American Homeland and that trend is still prevalent today. There are,

however, other actors, such as ISIS, that are breaking onto the scene and imposing uncertainty to

the security of the United States. Phillip Mudd of the CTC believes that the ideologies of groups

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such as Al Qaeda are inspiring other organizations because “the number of people absorbing the

ideology has broadened the threat, both operationally and geographically (Mudd, pg.2)”, thus

making the United States a continued target for many terror groups. With a target on our backs,

the American population is constantly under the threat of foreign and domestic terrorist acts.

Paul Cruickshank, also of the CTC, validates the notion that homegrown terrorism is on the rise

in the US in his article entitled The Growing Danger from Radical Islamist Groups in the United

States. His fundamental argument of why this is a problem stems from the allowance of Islamist

groups to rightfully and willingly proliferate extremist ideology in the United States.

Cruickshank states that groups, such as Revolution Muslim and the Islamic Thinkers Society,

who promote the radicalization process, are key contributors in causing concern to

counterterrorism efforts and hinder the deduction of homegrown radicals (Mudd, 2010).

Although the idea of homegrown violent jihadist terrorism seems to pose a threat to the

United States, there are however, some scholars who downplay the threat of these militants. Risa

Brooks, a professor of Political Science at Marquette University, concludes in her research of

Muslim “Homegrown” Terrorism in the United States that there is not a serious threat posed by

these perpetrators (Brooks, 2011). Brooks also points out that this trend is not a growing problem

and specifically is not a threat to “deadly attacks within the United States (Brooks, pg.42).”

Brooks poses the question of “why has the threat of terrorism by Muslim Americans prompted

such alarm?” and proceeds to offer some answers (Brooks, pg. 46). Her first answer deals with

the public and emotional undercurrents stemming from the attacks on 9/11. She states that there

is a “conferring of collective responsibility by Americans on all Muslims for the horrendous acts

of the September 11 terrorists” (Brooks, pg. 46). While this is not always the case, Brooks

seems to undercut the patriotic unity that the United States has rallied around since the agonizing

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events that shook the nation. Another answer that Brooks presents is the preparation that

politicians and public officials have taken to ready citizens of possible, local terror attacks in the

future (Brooks, 2011). Again, this could be a factor in the alarming response by the American

people to homegrown terrorism, but precautions must be taken in order to safeguard the citizens

and protect the nation. From a standpoint of successful homegrown attacks within the American

borders, it seems to be a miniscule occurrence, but the threat is very real and there has to be a

continuation of homeland security in order to defend and maintain the confidence that the United

States thrives upon.

When combating homegrown terrorism, The United States and The United Kingdom

unfortunately have both seen problems over the past years. However, since these two countries

are atop the charts when dealing with terrorist attacks, there can be many comparisons and

similarities that help to identify reoccurring themes (see Chart 3). A study by Daveed

Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman titled Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An

Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process focuses on the social indicators that affect

the radicalization process. Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman look into 117 cases of homegrown

jihadist terrorists who lived the majority of their lives in western culture, coming from the United

States as well as the United Kingdom. This study gathers information of these 117 terrorists from

personal writings, blogs and social media, governmental information, and court cases

(Gartenstein-Ross, pg.11). The findings of this study point to a six step course that plays a

significant role in the radicalization process of homegrown terrorists. These steps include: “the

adoption of a legalistic interpretation of Islam, coming to trust only a select and ideologically

rigid group of religious authorities, viewing the West and Islam as irreconcilably opposed,

manifesting a low tolerance for perceived religious deviance, attempting to impose religious

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beliefs on others, and the expression of radical political views (Gartenstein-Ross, pg. 61).”

According to the researchers, these six steps seemed to be a reoccurring theme throughout the

117 cases and offer an understanding of the individuals’ thought progression as they ventured

into the realm of domestic extremism. Their findings were somewhat synonymous to the

research conducted by the NYPD Intelligence Division in a sense that religious ideology,

demographics, and Muslim engagement play a significant role in the radicalization process.

As mentioned in the work of Zuckerman, Bucci, and Carafano, New York city is the

second most targeted place for terrorist attacks behind that of military bases (see Map 1),

(Zuckerman, Bucci, Carafano, 2013). Since the events of 9/11, as previously mentioned, the

NYPD plays a quintessential role in understanding the causes and devising plans to combat

homegrown terrorism. Local law enforcement is the main contributor for countering and

combating foreign and homegrown terrorism, but it is the job of all state and federal law

enforcement agencies to keep the homeland secure. After experiencing the events of 9/11, we

now know that local law enforcement will be the first responders in an instance of terror acts

committed on the homeland. The US Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented

Policing Services released an article in 2002 entitled Local Law Enforcement Responds to

Terrorism, Lessons in Prevention and Preparedness that illustrates the importance of regional

law enforcement agencies when dealing with terrorism. The article suggests that officials must

“strategically rethink public security procedures and practices in order to maximize the full

potential of their resources (Cohen, pg. 1).” The US Department of Justice clearly states in this

article what is required of local law enforcement as well as what procedures and preventative

measures will be used to ensure the protection of American citizens in a time of crisis. The

highlighted efforts that are suggested by the U.S. DOJ include “improving data and intelligence

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processing, increasing the capacity to address terrorism by capitalizing on technological

advancements, communicating with other public safety agencies, and responding to citizen fear

and preparing to assist potential victims” (Cohen, pg. 1).

Cohen and the U.S. DOJ look to data sharing as a key source to combating homegrown

terrorism. Data sharing is describes as “systematically linking large amounts of data from

neighboring law enforcement jurisdictions and also from different levels of law enforcement and

other institutions (Cohen, pg. 7)”. By allowing every agency to connect and distribute vital

information, it will become an easier process to piece clues together and gain leads on suspected

terrorists and their actions. Along with this notion comes the necessary compatibility of different

technological systems that is needed to allow for the proper circulation of information between

law enforcement agencies and their allies (Cohen, pg. 11). When a terror situation arises,

information must be given out to all probable combaters in a timely fashion in order to

successfully counter any plots devised by terrorists. By using technology to quickly distribute

information, the U.S. law enforcement divisions will be well equipped to contest and defend the

American people from any attack.

Along with data sharing, a crisis plan is pivotal in protecting the people and acquiring the

safety of everyone involved in the case of a terrorist attack. Just as cities have plans for

hurricanes, earthquakes, and flood, there must be the same idea in an instance of terrorism.

Cohen points out that the use of crisis plans are important and gives some examples of how

computers and geographic information systems (GIS) play an essential role. It is stated in the

article that “computer simulations and data mining techniques can be used to predict risks and

decrease loss of life and property caused by terrorist attacks (Cohen, pg. 15)”. Along with the

predictability of attacks and the possible decrease of fatalities, these crisis plans using computers

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and GIS can help pinpoint needed resources during an attack, constantly evaluate the threat at

hand, and also coordinate the interchange of information between local, state, and federal law

enforcement agencies (Cohen, pg. 16).

Another key element when combating domestic terrorism is the response to victimized

citizens and the reduction of public fear (Cohen, pg.18). Just as Risa Brooks pointed out in her

research, there tends to be a stereotype for all Muslim people by American citizens, especially

after tragic events such as 9/11. Cohen reiterates this fact by stating that law enforcement

agencies have seen an increase in hate crimes and illegal bigotry towards Middle Eastern people

and more specifically those professing the Muslim faith (Cohen, pg. 18). By engaging the

community with a more “restorative justice” approach, citizens will be more inclined to embrace

the community in a positive manner and support other citizen’s within the community (Cohen,

pg. 18). Along with taking a restorative approach to terrorist’s attacks, it is the community’s job

to decrease the fear of its residents. Cohen believes that it is the police’s role to lead this

restoration and support the confidence needed to sustain the community (Cohen, pg. 18). He

concludes by stating that “this can be done through sustaining visibility, actively responding to

specific community questions and directing people to the appropriate community services to

keep the level of fear and uncertainty to a minimum (Cohen, pg. 18)”.

A key contributor to counterterrorism, other than local law enforcement, is the Federal

Bureau of Investigation. A book by Terry Turchie and Kathleen Puckett, entitled Hunting the

American Terrorist: The FBI’s War on Homegrown Terror, expounds on the fundamental

resources and strategies that the FBI uses to combat acts of terror. Turchie and Puckett explain

the significance of homegrown terrorism and state ways in which these terrorists can be

contained and ultimately detained. They look specifically into lone wolf attacks and concur with

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Bjelopera that these terrorists are harder to discover and prevent. The book also gives an

explanation for the reasoning behind terrorist thought and their ideologies, which further aids in

understanding the forces and factors that cause domestic extremism.

On June 23, 2006, Robert Mueller, then director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

delivered a speech that was directed towards the threat of homegrown terrorism within the

United States. The main points he touched on were the evolving of use of terrorism specifically

that of homegrown terrorism, the radicalization process, and what steps the FBI is taking to

combat and handle this new, developing threat. Mueller points out that al Qaeda has been the

most significant threat not only to America but around the entire globe. He states that although

U.S. military and law enforcement agencies have “destroyed their training camps and disrupted

both their funding and their means of communication…al Qaeda may be weakened, but it is not

dead (Mueller, 2006)”. With al Qaeda being a dominate terror organization, they have many

offshoot groups that follow their lead and operate in synonymous ways. Because these offshoots

are smaller and more “under the radar”, it makes it difficult to combat their attacks and foil their

plots. Just as Bjelopera pointed out in his research, Mueller concurs that “today, terrorist threats

may come from smaller, more loosely-defined individuals and cells who are not affiliated with al

Qaeda, but who are inspired by a violent jihadist message. These homegrown terrorists may

prove to be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, if not more so (Mueller, 2006)”. Mueller and

the FBI view the beginning of the radicalization process as being connected with a dissatisfied

individual who can be American born or a citizen that has immigrated into the United States.

Once the individual becomes involved with an extremist organization, that person will then begin

to identify with the radical ideology and hence be on their way to becoming a terrorist. Mueller

concludes that “the evolution from extremism to terrorism can take place anywhere, from

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academic settings, mosques, prisons, and community centers to the Internet (Mueller, 2006)”. Of

these proposed settings, prisons and the Internet are seemingly the two avenues that recruit the

most terrorists. Prisons are good recruiting grounds for future terrorists because “it may help

justify their violent tendencies…these persons represent a heightened threat because of their

criminal histories, their propensity for violence, and their contacts with fellow criminals

(Mueller, 2006).” As far as the Internet is concerned, terror organizations use the World Wide

Web as a propaganda tool which aids not only in recruitment but information sharing, attack

planning, and motivational encouragement. Mueller discusses “there are between 5,000 to 6,000

extremist websites on the Internet, encouraging extremists to initiate their own radicalization and

to cultivate relationships with other like-minded persons (Mueller, 2006).” Although the U.S. has

shattered and destroyed terrorist training facilities, the use of the Internet allows for these

organizations to further their coaching and spread the practice of radical beliefs. There are many

behind-the-scene activities that take place within terror organizations, but there are also many

that take place within the United States that keep the citizens safe from potential attacks. Mueller

wraps up his speech by commenting that,

“It has been nearly five years since the last terrorist attack on America. Yet there is no

room for complacency. As we have seen in recent months, our enemies are adaptive and

evasive. They are taking full advantage of technology. They are combining their

resources and their expertise to great effect. We must do the same (Mueller, 2006)”.

He also points to unity as the quintessential element that binds America together and allows for

the combating of homegrown terrorism. By sharing information and having cooperation between

local, federal, and intelligence agencies, counterterrorism becomes more effective. He goes on to

state that we may not know the exact locations and times that terrorists will attack, but we do

know that acts of terror will continually be carried out and attempted. Although these attacks

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have occurred and will likely be tried again, “we must not let terrorism change our way of life

(Mueller, 2006)”. Mueller ends his speech with a quote from James Thurber, a cartoonist of the

20th century, which I feel relates perfectly with the ongoing situation that America is dealing

with involving homegrown terrorism. Thurber wrote "Let us not look back in anger, nor forward

in fear, but around in awareness (Mueller, 2006).” The main purpose of terrorism is to inflict an

uneasy feeling into the targeted group of people. Terror groups use fear as their chief tool, which

directly correlates to a sense of anger and hatred for the victimizing group. Rather than looking

back in anger or forward in fear, we must look around into the present with awareness, just as

Thurber suggests. Mueller finalizes his speech by focusing on looking around in awareness,

stating that there must be awareness “of our citizens and our communities, and of the dangers we

face. Most importantly, let us look around in awareness of the strength of our democracy, the

strength of our unity, and the strength of our resolve. Armed with these strengths, we cannot and

we will not fail (Mueller, 2006).”

The idea of homegrown violent jihadist terrorism is gaining prominence and continues to

serve as a threat to the American homeland. Although it may not seem like a serious threat, there

are many elements at work behind the scenes that continuously protect American citizens on a

day to day basis. Multiple sources of research shows that homegrown terrorism does play a

substantial role in the security of the American homeland and it also has determined concise

points to the forces that cause this extremism. By looking at incidents that have occurred after

September 11, 2001 and drawing comparisons from other countries such as the U.K., there can

be a determination of the forces and factors that cause the threat of domestic terrorism as well as

the preventive measures that must be taken by law enforcement agencies that aid in combating

and defeating the threat of homegrown violent jihadist terrorism. Homegrown terrorism is a

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serious problem and should not be downplayed as a non-threating occurrence to the American

homeland and the American citizens alike.

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