Download pdf - Giving Practical Reasons - University of Michigan

volume11,no.4 march2011

Giving Practical

Reasons

David EnochThe Hebrew University

© 2011DavidEnoch <www.philosophersimprint.org/011004/>

1. Introduction

Iamwritingamediocrepaperonatopicyouarenotparticularlyinter-estedin.Youdon’thave,itseemssafetoassume,a(normative)reasontoreadmydraft.Ithenaskwhetheryouwouldbewillingtohavealookandtellmewhatyouthink.Suddenlyyoudohavea(normative)reason to readmydraft.What exactlyhappenedhere?Yourhavingthereasontoreadmydraft—indeed,theveryfactthatthereissuchareason—depends,itseems,onmyhavingaskedyoutoreadit.Bymyasking,Imanagedtomakeitthecasethatyouhavesuchareason,ortogiveyouthereasontoreadthedraft.Whatdoessuchreason-givingconsistin?Andhowisitthatwecandoit?Isitakindofnormativemagic?Especiallyifreasonsareinanimportantsenseobjectiveandautonomous,how is it thatbysheeractsofwillwecanbring themintobeing,changetheirforce,andperhapseveneliminatethem?1If,asseemslikely,“reasonmustconstrainandguidethewill”,howisitthatwecancreatereasonsatwill,forinstancebymakingarequest?2

Requests do not exhaust, of course, the space of reason-giving.Somethingrathersimilarseemstobegoingonwhen,forinstance,anauthorityissuesacommand,therebygivingtheaddresseea(perhapsspecialkindof)reasontoactinacertainway,areasonthatwasnottherebeforethecommand.AndwhenIpromise,oneofthethingsIseemtobedoingisgivemyselfareason(perhapsofaspecialkind)toactinacertainway,areasonthatwasnottherebeforethepromise.3 Nowmorecontroversially,perhapsbyforminganintentionIgivemy-selfareasonthatwasnottherebeforetofollowthroughonthatinten-tion.Andtheremaybeothercasesaswell.4Alloftheseseem—quite

1. Forthelocusclassicusofthoughtsonpromisesandmagic,seeHume’sTrea-tise3.2.5.

2. Forthiswayofputtingthingsinacloselyrelatedcontext,seeWatson(2009,p.158).

3. Inthecontextofadiscussionofpromises,Watson(2009,p.160)noticesthattheyareaparticularinstanceofamuchwiderphenomenon.

4. Perhaps,forinstance,byapologizing,onegivesreasonstoforgive.(Ithank

ImprintPhilosophers’

davidenoch Giving Practical Reasons

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.11,no.4(march2011)

perhaps,orobligation,orsomesuch.Andthecaseofpromisesismorecomplicatedthanthatofrequestsbothbecausethereasongiventheretooisarguablyadutyoranobligation,andbecausepromisesarecasesofreflexivereason-givingandsuchreflexivitymayresultinyetmorecomplications.5Sothecaseofrequestsisasimplercaseofrobustrea-son-givingthanthosetwo,andforthisreasonitseemsmethodologi-cally advisable to start with requests. Furthermore, commands andpromisesarethetopicsofhugephilosophicalandothercontroversies.Andforthisreasontooitseemslikethere’sbetterhopeofprogressifwe start elsewhere,where political implications andprevious philo-sophical commitments are less likely tobias the characterizationofthephenomenologicaldata.Requestsseemideallysuitedforthisrole.But—despitethecentralroleofrequestsinwhatistofollow—thispa-perisprimarilyaboutrobustreason-giving,notaboutrequests.Thus,whilemuchofthediscussionwillfocusonrequests,Iwillnotbeat-temptingtoofferafullanalysisofrequests:Iuserequestsonlyinor-dertohighlightthecrucialfeaturesofrobustreason-giving.AndIwillhavenothingatalltosayonotherquestionsthatmayberelevanttoafullerdiscussionofrequests(like,forinstance,whenitisandwhenitisnotappropriatetomakearequest).

Second,my discussion of giving reasons is obviously closely re-lated—in spirit, at least—to Darwall’s recent emphasis on the sec-ond-personstandpointinthebookbythatname(2006),andindeedI am indebted to this work. But precisely because of the similaritybetweenmydiscussionandDarwall’s,itmaybeworthwhiletohigh-lightsomeimportantdifferencesbetweenthetwoalreadyatthisearlystage.Onedifferencehasalreadybeennoted—obligations,whicharecentral toDarwall’sdiscussion,aremostly irrelevant tomine. In thepartsofthebookclosesttomytopichere,though,Darwalldiscussessecond-personalreasons,whichheofficially6definesthus:

5. Forinstance,thisreflexivitygivesrisetobootstrappingworriesthatdonotseemtoariseforrobustreason-givingingeneral,orforrequestsinparticular.

6. Whilethisistheonlyofficialdefinitionofsecond-personalreasonsIcould

pre-theoretically—tohavesomethingincommontothem.(InSection3, Iwillargue that thispre-theoreticalseeming isoneweshouldac-ceptat facevalue.) It is that thingthat I try tounderstand—andde-mystify—inthispaper.Andifwemakeprogressonthegeneralphe-nomenonthatallof theseareinstancesof, thisseemslikeapromis-ingwaytothenmakeprogressonphilosophicalaccountsofauthority,ofpromises,of intentions,andperhapsofotherrelatedphenomena(workthatIwillhavetoleavetofutureoccasions).

In thenextsection, Idistinguishbetweenwhat Icallpurelyepis-temicreason-giving,merelytriggeringreason-giving,andthekindofreason-givingIwillbeprimarilyinterestedin,thekindpresumablyin-volvedinrequests,whichIcallrobustreason-giving.Then,inSection3,Itrytocharacterizeinsomedetailtheintuitiveorphenomenologi-caldata.Itry,inotherwords,toclarifywhatitiswewantanaccountofrobustreason-givingtoaccommodate.ButattheendofSection3it remains entirely openwhether any possible account in fact satis-fiesthesedesiderata.InSection4,Ithusproceedtoinquirewhethersuchanaccountistheretobefound.Iarguethattheonlyplausiblewayofmakingsenseofrobustreason-givingisasauniqueparticularinstanceof triggering reason-giving. I then characterize thisuniqueparticularinstanceintermsoftherathercomplicatedintentionsofthereason-giverandthenormativebackground.

Beforeproceeding,though,twopreliminariesareinorder.First, the role of requests in this paper—as in the openingpara-

graph—isthatofaparadigmaticexampleofreason-givingofthekindIaminterestedin,thekindIcallrobustreason-giving.Eventhoughthephenomenonofrobustreason-givingis—ifIamright,atleast—muchbroaderthanthatofrequests,stilltherearegoodmethodologicalrea-sonstofocusonrequestsinstudyingrobustreason-giving.Thus,thecase of authority and command ismore complicated, in that (argu-ably,atleast)thereasontheregivenisofaspecialkind—itisaduty,

DavidSosa for this suggestion.)Andperhapsby taking responsibilityonegives others reasons to hold one responsible. Seemy “Being Responsible,TakingResponsibility,andPenumbralAgency”(forthcoming).



sensecanbemadeofthephenomenonofgivingreasons,thenafortio-riDarwall’ssecond-personalreasonsareindanger.Furthermore,ifthephenomenonofgivingreasonscanbemadesenseofreductively—inaway that isnotessentiallyand irreduciblysecond-personal inanyinterestingsense—thenDarwall’sclaimabouttheirreducibilityofthecircleofsecond-personalconcepts(e. g.,p.11)isalsocastintoseriousdoubt.Itisnotcompletelycleartomewhethertheaccountofrobustreason-givingIendupoffering(insection4.4)issufficientlysecond-personaltosatisfyDarwall.7

In theseways, then, it seems tome the discussion in this paperismoregeneralthan,andperhapsphilosophicallypriorto,Darwall’s:evenifDarwall’sprojectfails,stillweneedanaccountofreason-giv-ing.Andwithouttheavailabilityofsuchanaccountofreason-giving,andsoalsoofgivenreasons,Darwall’sprojectcannotsucceed.

2. Some Relevant Distinctions

Hereaselsewhere,natural languageis tricky. It is thus importanttodistinguish between several possible readings of such locutions as‘givingsomeoneareasontoΦ’.Thiswillbehelpfulinclosinginonthesenseweareafter,thesenseIattempttocaptureinfollowingsections.

IhavetentativelydecidedtotellacolleagueexactlywhatIthinkofhim,anditwon’tmakeforacharmingscene.Youurgemenotto.Icanthensaysomethinglike“Givemeonereasonnottodoit!”Supposeyoureplybynotingthebadeffectssuchascenewillhaveontheintel-lectualatmosphere inourdepartment. It seemsas ifyousucceededingivingmea reasonnot toproceedwithmy ill-advisedplan.Andthere’snothingwrongwithsodescribingthesituation.But,ofcourse,thisisnotwhatweareafterhere.Whatyou’vedone—thethingnatu-rallydescribedintermsofgivingmeareasontoshutup—istoindicate tome,orshowme,areasonthatwasthereallalong, independentlyofyourgivingittome.Perhaps,inmyfury,Ihadn’tpaidattentiontoit,andsoyourinterventioncanmakeadifference.Butitdidn’tmake

7. Igetbacktothispointinafootnoteintheconcludingsection.

Asecond-personalreasonisonewhosevaliditydependson presupposed authority and accountability relationsbetweenpersons,and,therefore,onthepossibilityofthereasonbeingaddressedperson-to-person.[2006,p.8]

Whilethereareclearsimilaritiesbetweenthesesecond-personalrea-sonsandwhatmaybecalledgivenreasons(likethereasonyouhavetoreadmydraft),stillthereareimportantdifferencesbetweenthem.Yourreasontoreadmydraftneednot—foranythingthathassofarbeensaid,atleast—dependonauthorityandaccountabilityrelations(thoughitmaydependonsomeanaloguethereof,oronsomegeneral-izedrelationofwhichtheauthorityrelationsDarwallisafterisapar-ticularinstance).Andpossibleaddressisirrelevantforgivenreasons.Rather,whatmattershereisthatthisreasonwas actually (ratherthanpossibly)given(ratherthanaddressed).Sothoughthereis,inanintui-tivesense,somethingsecond-personalaboutgivenreasons(likethosecreatedby requests); still theyare tobedistinguishedat least fromDarwall’ssecond-personalreasonsasofficiallycharacterized.Further-more,Iamnotconvincedthatsecond-personalreasons(asofficiallydefinedbyDarwall)exist,andwhileIthinkthatgivenreasonsdoexist,Iamnotsuretheycompriseaninterestingkindofreasons,a“norma-tivekind”asitwere.Myfocushereisnotongivenreasons,butratheronthegivingofreasons.Also,whileDarwallisinterestedinground-ingmoralityin(hiskindof)second-personalreasons,itisnopartofmyambitionhere(exceptforahintatthisdirectionintheparagraphconcluding this paper). I keep thingsmuch simpler.Keepingmoral-ity for another occasion, I focus on the rather undeniable intuitivedata—oftenwegiveeachotherreasonsforaction—andtrytogiveanaccountofthisdata.Whetheranythingofmoregeneralinterest—forinstance,tomorality—willfollowisnotmymainconcernhere.

Thesedifferencesnotwithstanding,itseemstomethediscussionhere is of relevance to an evaluation ofDarwall’s project. For if no

findinDarwall’sbook,attimesIthinkDarwallusesthislocutioninalooserway.



thecontrastwithpurelyepistemicreason-givingisafeatureofrobustreason-givingingeneral(andnotjustofrequests).

Nowsupposeyourneighborhoodgrocerraisedthepriceofmilk.Itisnaturaltosaythatshehastherebygivenyouareasontoreduceyourmilkconsumption. It is,afterall, true thatyoudidn’thave thisreasonbeforeherrelevantaction,thatyoudoafterit,andfurthermorethatyouhavethisreasonbecauseofherraisingtheprice.Inaperfectlyordinarysense,then,shehascreatedthisreason:shehasgivenyouareasontobuylessmilk.Butthereisnothingmysterious—nonorma-tivemagichere.Theobviousthingtosayaboutthiscaseisthatthegivinghereisamuchlessradicalgivingorcreatingthanincasesofrequests,commands,andpromises.Whatthegrocerdid,itseemsnat-uraltosay,ismerelytomanipulatethenon-normativecircumstancesinsuchawayastotriggeradormantreasonthatwasthereallalong,independentlyof thegrocer’s actions.Arguably, youhaveageneralreason(roughly) tosavemoney.Thisreasondoesn’tdependonthegrocer’sraisingof thepriceofmilk.Byraisingthepriceofmilk, thegrocertriggeredthisgeneralreason,therebymakingit thecasethatyouhaveareasontoreduceyourmilkconsumption.Indeed,perhapsyouevenhadallalongtheconditionalreasonto-buy-less-milk-if-the-price-goes-up.Again, this conditional reasondoesn’t depend for itsexistenceonthegrocer’sactions.Butthegrocercanmakethecondi-tionalreasonintoanunconditionalone,simplybymanipulatingtherelevant non-normative circumstances.And this iswhat she did byraisingthepriceofmilk.

Examplesof thistriggeringcaseareallaroundus.Byplacinghisfootontheroad,apedestriancangiveadriverareasontostop,11butonlybecause thedriverhadall along,and independentlyof thepe-destrian’sactions,theconditionalreasonto-stop-should-a-pedestrian-start-crossing. By placing his foot on the road, the pedestrian thustriggersthispre-existingreason,therebygivingthedriverareasontostop.Perhapsallofushaveareasontodo(someof)whatwecanto

11. SeeEstlund(2008,p.143)forthisexample.

adifferencebywayofcreatinganewreason,8asmyrequestthatyoureadmydraftdid.Wecancallsuchreason-givingpurely epistemic,forthe roleof thegivingherehasnothing todowith the reason’sexis-tence,andeverythingtodowithmyknowingthatitisthere,appreciat-ingit,andactingforit.Now,requestscertainlyhaveanepistemicdi-mensiontothem.Often,oneofthethingsarequestdoesisinformtheaddresseethatthespeakerhascertainneeds,orwants,orpreferences,orthatthedesirestheaddresseealreadyknewaboutareparticularlystrong,orsomesuch.SoIdonotwanttoclaimthatrequestsdonotinvolveepistemic reason-giving.Nevertheless, itdoesseemclear tomethatthereason-givinginvolvedinrequestsisnotexhaustedbysuchepistemicreason-giving.9Toseethis,wemustimaginecasesthatareepistemically“transparent”,sothatbothspeakerandaddresseeknowallthereistoknowaboutthespeaker’spreferencesandthelike,andfurthermorebothknowthatbothknowthese things,andsoon (sothattherelevantfactsareamatterofcommonknowledge).Butinsuchcasestootherequestseemstomakeanormativedifference—thead-dresseeseemstobegivenareasonbysucharequest,even thoughnothingpurelyepistemicchanges.Andthismeansthatthekindofrea-son-givinginvolvedinrequestsisnotsimplythatofpurelyepistemicreason-giving.10 The same seems true—perhaps even more clearlyso—ofcommands,sothattheirsignificancetooisnotexhaustedbytheirepistemicvalue.Anditisveryhardtothinkofpromisesasgivingreasonsmerely epistemically, seeing thatwith promises the reason-giverandthereason-receiverareoneandthesame.Soitseemsthat

8. It’s possible that while the reason was there independently of your inter-vention,myhavingitdiddependonyourintervention.(ButseeSchroeder[2008]foracriticismoftheideaseeminglypresupposedbythiswayoftalk-ing.)ButIcansafelybypasssuchdifficultieshere.Formypurposes,itissuf-ficientthattheexistenceofthereasonishereindependentofthegiving.

9. Forasimilardistinctionbetweenpurelyepistemicreason-givingandthekindthat is involvedinrequests,seeCupit(1994,p449).AndWallace(2007,p.24)emphasizesthatDarwall’snotionofsecond-personalreasonsisnotonegroundedinepistemicconsiderations.

10. Forpressingmeon these and relatedpoints, I thankHagitBenbaji,YuvalEylon,DavidHeyd,andAdiKoplovitz.



mepleasure(acaseofreason-givinginthepurelyepistemicsense)orfrommakingnon-collegialityagroundfordenyingtenure(acaseofreason-givinginthetriggeringsense).Andthesameistrue—atthisstage, on a pre-theoretic, phenomenological level—for commandsandpromises.Thecasesofreason-givingIaminterestedin,liketherequestcase,arenotmerelyonesinwhichareasonisgiveninthepure-lyepistemicor in the triggeringsense.The reasons given in thiswaymaynotbeall thatunique (for instance, theyneednotbe strongerthanother,not-robustly-given reasons).But in the casesmentionedthegiving isadistinctphenomenon,or—ifitisaparticularinstanceofoneoftheotherkindsofreason-giving—itisanespeciallyinterest-ingparticularinstance,onewithspecialfeaturesthatmakeitworthaseparatediscussion.Withoutbegginganyquestions,then,letuscallthiskindof reason-giving—theonepresumablypresent in casesofrequests,andtheoneIwillbefocusingon—robust reason-giving.

3. What More Could We Want?

With thesedistinctions inmind, then,whatmoredowewant fromrobustreason-giving,beyondwhatcanbeaccommodatedbypurelyepistemic or by merely triggering reason-givings? In this section Ihighlightsomeofthepre-theoretic,phenomenologicaldata,tryingtocarefully characterize someof theunique features of robust reason-giving.Iwillbeprimarilyusingthecaseofrequests,butthephenom-enologicaldataIwillbecollectinghereappliesequally,itseemstome,tocommandsandpromises.Sowecanbemoderatelyconfidentthatwhat Iwill ineffectbe characterizing is thephenomenonof robustreason-giving(ratherthanthemoreparticularoneofrequests).

3.1 ThreatsWhenweissue(conditional)threatswe(purportto)givepeoplerea-sons foraction.But threatsseemtome—pre-theoretically—tobeaparticularinstanceofthetriggeringsenseofreason-giving.Bythreat-eningtovoteagainstyourgettingtenureifyoufailtoreadmypaper,Iammerelymanipulatingthenon-normativecircumstancessoasto

helpthehungry.Ifso,bygivingyoualotofmoneythereisasenseinwhichIamgivingyouareasontodonatemoretofaminerelief;forIamheremanipulatingthenon-normativecircumstancessothatanen-ablingconditionfortherelevantreasonwhichwasn’tsatisfiedisnowsatisfied, therebymaking it the case that youhavea reason togivemoremoneytofaminerelief.Andtheremaybeotherwaysinwhichmanipulatingthenon-normativecircumstancescouldmakeitthecasethatapre-existingreasonapplies,waysthatneednotinvolvethesatis-factionoftheconditionaconditionalreasonisconditionedon,ortheenablingconditionforareason(perhaps,forinstance,itcoulddefeatadefeaterforthatreason).Iamgoingtocallallofthesecases,casesofreason-givingin the triggering sense,andIwillusethetriggeringofcon-ditionalreasonsastheparadigmofthismoregeneralphenomenon.12

ButwhenIrequestthatyoureadmydraft,somethingelseseemstobegoingon.True,Idoheremanipulatethenon-normativecircum-stances,butitdoesn’tseemthatImerelydothat.Rather,Iseemtobegivingyouareasoninsomemorerobust,yet-to-be-specifiedsense.13 This yet-to-be-specified sense is going to bemymain topic for theremainderofthepaper.Fornow,though, letmejustemphasizethefollowing:Requestingthatyoureadmypaperseemsimportantlydif-ferentfrom,say,informingyouthatyourreadingmypaperwillcause

12. MarkvanRoojendrewmyattention to the relevancehereof the locution“I’llgiveyouareason!”,utteredinathreateningtoneofvoice.(Igetbacktothreatsbelow.) In fact, suchutterances tradeon an ambiguity in “giving areason”.Typically, someonewill ask for a reason tobegiven in thepurelyepistemicsense,thatis,foranindicationofareasontheexistenceofwhichdoesn’tdependonthisgiving.Andtheanswer“Youwantareason?I’llgiveyou a reason!”will express an intention to give a reason in the triggeringsense.Neitherofthesesenses,then,istheoneIamafterhere,theonethatisarguablyinplacewhenIgiveyouareasontoreadmydraftbyrequestingthatyoudoso.

13. Forasimilardistinction in thecontextofcommands,seeEstlund(2008,p.143). Estlund calls the (analogue of) the cases I callmere triggering cases“side-effectcases”.Forreasonsthatwillbecomeclearlateron,Idon’tthinkthisisagoodterminologicalsuggestion.Estlunddoesnotdevelopanaccountofthedifferencebetweentriggeringandrobustreason-giving.

AndseePostema(2001,pp.482–3)forahistoricalsurveyofasimilardis-tinctiontotheoneinthetext(alsointhecontextofcommands).



something else.16 An understanding of robust reason-giving shouldbothexplainwhythreatsarecloserthantheprice-of-milkcasetoro-bust reason-giving, andwhy threatsneverthelessdonot amount torobustreason-giving.

3.2 PersonhoodInrobustreason-giving,itseemsliketherelevantpersonsareinvolvedinamuchmore,well,personalwaycomparedtotheirinvolvementinpurelyepistemicandtriggeringcasesofreason-giving.

Considerthereason-giverfirst.Inacaseofpurelyepistemicreason-giving,theroleofthereason-giveristhatofanindication,drawingat-tentiontoareasonthat’salreadythere.Andjustaboutanythingcanplaythatrole.Thatthebarometerissuesacertainreadingcaninthissensegiveyouareasontotakeyourumbrella.Inthepurelyepistemicsenseofreason-giving,then,thereason-giverneednotbeapersonatall.17Similarlyforreason-givinginthetriggeringsense:theimminentstormcangiveyouareasonnottogoout.Butrobustreason-giving,thekindofreason-givinginvolvedinrequests(andalso,itseemsclear,intheissuingofcommandsandinthemakingofpromises)isdiffer-ent:suchreasonscanonlybegivenbypersons,oratleastperson-likeagents.Perhaps,forinstance,godcangivereasonsinthisway.Perhapssocanthestate,ormaybeeven(thoughIdoubtit)yourdog.Butthebarometercan’t,norcantheimminentstorm.

bytriggeringreasonsthatarealreadythere.Thereisnoparallelphenomenon,asfarasIcansee,forrequests.

16. In fact, threatscombinealsoelementsof thepurelyepistemicsenseofrea-son-giving.ConsidertheHollywood-styledialogue:“Isthisathreat?No,it’sawarning”.Agenuinewarningisjustanattempttodrawone’sattentiontoapre-existingreason,onethatisindependentofthewarningitself.Athreatisanattempttosimultaneouslycreatethereason(inthetriggeringcase)andalerttheaddresseeofthethreattoitsexistence.(Afterall,athreatcan’tsuc-ceedasathreatiftheaddresseedoesn’tknowaboutit.)Forsomeinitialdis-cussionofthedistinctionbetweenthreatsandwarningsseeDarwall(2006,pp.50–2).

17. Perhaps there are some kinds of epistemic reason-giving that can only bedonebypersons.Perhaps—Iamnotsure—adviceisofthisnature.Butepis-temicreason-givingingeneraldoesnotrequirepersonhood.

trigger a pre-existing reason, namely, your reason to promote yourchancesofgettingtenure.(Iamalso,ofcourse,lettingyouknowthatI’vesomanipulatedthecircumstances.)

Butthreatsareaparticularlyinterestingparticularinstanceoftrig-geringreason-giving,becausetheyaresecond-personalinawaymanyotherofitsinstancesarenot.Comparethethreatcaseandtheraising-the-price-of-milkcase.Oneofthedistinctivefeaturesofthethreatcaseisthatinitthereason-givingisamajorpartofthepointofthethreat.Thereisasenseinwhichthethreattoomerelyraisesthepriceofsome-thing(namely,ofnotreadingmypaper).Butitisacaseofraisingthepricepreciselyin order togiveyouareasontoreadthepaper.Notsointhecaseofthepriceofmilk,whereitwasnotthegrocer’sintentioninraisingtheprice,orherreasonforsodoing,togiveyouareasontobuylessmilk.Sheknowshowthemarketworks,ofcourse,andsosheforeseesthatthiswillbeaconsequenceofheraction,butstill,thisisnotwhatsheisafterinperformingit.(Indeed,shemaythinkofthisasareasoncountingagainstraisingtheprice,areasonthatisoutweighedinthecircumstancesbystrongerreasonsforraisingtheprice.)

This, I take it, is thesense inwhich threatsaremoresecond-per-sonal:thereason-givinginvolvedinthemisapartoftheirpoint.Butstill, the reason-giving involved inmy threatening you into readingmypaper isverydifferent fromthat involvedinmyaskingthatyouread it.14Thoughbothare casesof reason-giving,and thoughsomeunpleasantconsequencesmaybeforeseeableinbothcases(perhaps,forinstance,youforeseethatifyoudenymyrequestandfailtoreadmypaper,Iwillfailtocommentonyournextdraft),stillathreatseemsmerely to trigger a conditional reason,15 and a request seems to do

14. Commandsmaybeaninterestinghybridcase:theycertainlyinvolverobustreason-giving,buttheremaybesomethingthreat-likeaboutcommandsaswell.Ihopetodiscusscommandsonanotheroccasion.

15. Hereisanotherconsiderationshowingthatthisisso.(IthankJaniceDowellfordrawingmyattention to it.)Empty threats—threatswhere thereceiverdoesnot thinkof thecontentof the threatassomethingbad—donotsuc-ceedingivingreasons.Thisshowsthatthreatsgetalltheirnormativeforce



or some such.Anddifferent abilitiesmaybeneeded inorder to re-spond to thedifferentkindsof reason-giving. Inparticular, it seemsliketherecouldbeafairlysimpleagentwhocouldrespondtopurelyepistemically given reasons, and to reasons given in the triggeringsense,butnottorequestsorcommands.Ireturntothispointbelow.19

Because of the centrality of the persons to robust reason-giving,itisunsurprisingthatpersonalrelationsarealsorelevanthere.Bothpurelyepistemicreason-givingandtriggeringreason-givingcanoftenbeexhaustivelyunderstoodinfairlythinterms:wedon’tneedtoknowanythingabouttherelationbetweenthegrocerandtheconsumerinordertounderstandthewayinwhichtheformer’sraisingofthepriceofmilkgivesreasonstothelatter.Butwithrobustreason-givingweof-tenneedathickerdescriptionoftherelationshipbetweenthepersonsinvolved.Afterall,itisnotasifallrequestscreate(evenweak)reasonsforactions.Anditisplausibletosupposethatoneofthefactorsdeter-miningwhetheragivenrequestgivesareasonforaction(andcertain-lyoneofthefactorsdeterminingthestrengthofsuchgivenreasonswhentheyexist)isthenatureoftherelevantrelationship.Thisisalsotrue,ofcourse,ofcommands,whichareplausiblyparasiticonsomeauthorityrelationbetweentherelevanttwopersons.20Robustreason-giving,then,is,inasense,backedupbythenatureoftherelevantre-lationshipinawaythatpurelyepistemicandtriggeringreason-givingsusuallyaren’t.21

19. Ibelieve it is this intuition thatunderliesDarwall’s talkof the standing toissue second-personal reasons, andof theassumptions that arenormativefelicity conditions here about the ability of both reason-giver and reason-receivertoseetherelevantreasonasareason.

20.Promisesareharderhere,becauseofthereflexivenatureofthereason-givingtheyinvolve.Butitishardtodenythatpeopledooftenstandinanormativelysignificantrelationtothemselves.

21. Thepoint in the text isconsistentwith theobservation(forwhich I thankHagit Benbaji and Yuval Eylon) that in the context of close personal rela-tionshipsrequestsmaysometimesbeinasenseredundant.Thismaybeso,first,because,asalreadystated,requestssometimeshaveanepistemicfunc-tion—drawing theaddressee’sattention to the speaker’s relevantneedsorwants—butwithincloserelationshipstheremaysometimesbenoneedforrequeststoperformthisepistemicrole,asthoseinacloserelationshipoften

Movingontothereceivingendnow,is thereanycomparablere-strictiononwhocanberobustlygivenareason?Well,arguably,onlypersonscanbegivenreasons,butforverygeneralreasonsthathavenothingtodowithourtopichere.Perhaps,forinstance,onlypersons(oronlyagents)canhavereasons.Andofcourse,youcan’tgivesome-oneareasonwhocan’thaveareason.Ifso,onlypersons(oragents)canbegivenreasons,butthiscan’tteachusanythinginterestingaboutthegivingofreasons.

Thepersonhoodofthereason-receiverwillnothelpus,then,info-cusingattentiononrobustreason-giving.Butthereissomethingmorehelpfulinthevicinityhere.Inorderto(intentionally)givesomeoneareasonforactioninthepurelyepistemicsense,itseemsthatImustbelieve that she is able to respond to the relevant pre-existing rea-son.Inorderto(intentionally)givesomeoneareasoninthetriggeringsense,itseemsthatImustbelievethatsheisabletorespondtotherelevantreason(andthroughit,tothegeneralorconditionalreasonthatwas there all along).And in order to robustly give someone areason,itseemslikeImustbelievethatshecanrespondtoareasonthus given.Thispointappliestothreatsjustasitdoestorequests:ifIthinkthatyoucan’trespondtothreats,Ican’tsincerelyissueathreataddressedtoyou.Similarly,ifIthinkyoucannotrespondtorequests,Ican’tsincerelyaskthatyoureadmypaper,therebyattemptingtogiveyouareasonintheusualwayrequestsdo.(Imayhaveotherreasonsforutteringtherelevantwords—apointIreturntobelow—butthisisirrelevanthere.)

Thus,theabilityofthereason-receivertorespondtothegivenrea-sonseemstobeassumedinsomesensebytheveryactofthereason-giving.Thisabilityseemstobea“normativefelicitycondition”18oftherelevantreason-giving,oneintheabsenceofwhichthereason-givingfails,ormisfires,orwithoutthebeliefinwhichtherequestisinsincere,

18. A termDarwall uses extensively in a closely related context. SeeDarwall(2006,p.24).Forasomewhatsimilarideainthecontextofrequests,seeCu-pit(1994,p.450).Andforahistoricalsurveyofthisideainthetraditionofthinkingaboutthelawascommand,seePostema(2001,pp.477–9).



whetherwecanrobustlygiveeachotherepistemicreasons.Andhereitseemstometheanswerisratherclearlyno.

Supposethatmyrequestisnotthatyoureadmypaper,butthatyoubelieveit’sagoodpaper.Thereseemstobesomethingdeeplywrongwiththisrequest.Itdoesn’tseemlikethekindofthingthatcouldbethe subjectof abona-fide request. Somuch so, that there is signifi-cantpressure in this case to interpretmy request (ormy “request”)insomenon-standardway:perhapsIamconfusedaboutthenatureofrequests,orperhapsIamreallyaskingthatyousaythatitisgood,orinotherwaysactas ifyoubelievethatitisgood,orperhapsIamaskingthatyousomehowget yourselftohavethatbelief.Andsimilarpointsseemtoapply toattemptsatgivingepistemicreasonsbyem-ployingcommands(“Iherebyorderyoutobelieve thatmypaper isgood!”)orpromises(“Letmereadyourpaper.IpromiseIwillbelievethatit’sgood”).

Thedifferenceherebetweenepistemicandpractical reasonscanbe put also in terms of the discussion of the previous subsection.There,Inoticedhowthenatureoftherelevantpersonalrelationshipisrelevantforrobustreason-giving,butnotforotherkindsofreason-giving.Anditseemstomethisresultnicelycohereswiththepointintheprevious twoparagraphs, according towhichepistemic reasonscannotberobustlygiven.Foritseemstomepersonalrelationshipsarecompletelyirrelevantwhenitcomestothegivingofepistemicreasons.

Epistemicreasons,then,cannotberobustlygiven.23Anaccountofrobustreason-givingshouldexplainwhy.24

23. Thoughseefootnote57belowforarelevantcomplication.

24.Darwall (2006,p.253)alsodiscusses therelevantdifferenceherebetweentheoretical and practical reasoning, suggesting that it lies in the fact thatwhiletheviewsofotherscanbecompletelydiscardedepistemicallyifmistak-en,thisisnotsoforthepracticalcase.Ifweapplythispointtorequests,thepointbecomestheinterestingonethatrequeststhatoughtnottohavebeenmade arenotnecessarilynormatively void (seehereCupit [1994, p. 543]).ButinfactIthinkthatDarwallhereisnotappreciatingthefullcomplexityoftheepistemiccase.Theviewsofothers,evenwhenmistaken,canserveasevidence.Forsomerelevantdiscussioninthecontextofthephenomenonof

3.3 Giving Epistemic Reasons So far I’veonlybeen talkingabout reasons for actionwe sometimesgiveeachother.Butwealsogiveeachotherreasonsfor belief.Inwhichofthethreesensesdistinguishedabovedowegiveeachotherreasonsforbelief?

Obviously, there are examples of purely epistemic reason-givingofthiskind.Bydirectingyourattentiontothefingerprint,Icanepis-temicallygiveyouareasontobelievethatthebutlerdidit.Andtherearefairlystraightforwardcasesofgivingepistemicreasonsinthetrig-gering sense aswell. Perhaps, for instance, by conducting a certainoriginalexperimentIcanmakeitthecasethatyouhaveareasontobelievethetruthofatheory,areasonthatdidnotexistbeforetheex-periment.22Themoreinterestingquestioninourcontextis,ofcourse,

knowmuchmoreabouteachother’swantsandneedsthanothersdo.Andsecond,caringforeachother’swell-beingisarguablyaconstitutivepartofmanyformsofcloserelationships,andsotheaddresseeofapotentialrequestmayhaveareasontoperformtherelevantactionindependentlyofarequest.Furthermore, this not-request-dependent reason may be overwhelminglystrongerthantheonepresumablysuppliedbytherequest.Ifso,makingtherequestwillbe,thoughnotnormativelyinert,stillpracticallyredundant.Itissuchconsiderationsthatexplainhow,withinacloserelationship,complaintssuchas“Ishouldn’thavetoask”maysometimesmakeperfectsense.Eveninsuchcontexts,though,requestsstillmakeadifference,asperhapscanbelearned fromtheappropriatenessof locutionssuchas “Do I reallyhave toask?”,a locutionwhichsimultaneously indicatesboth the (presumed)pres-enceofareasonthatisindependentofthepossiblyforthcomingrequest,andthefactthatthepossiblyforthcomingrequestwillstill,ifmade,makeanor-mativedifference.

Afullerdiscussionwouldalso includethe interestingtopic—relatedtothatofrequests,butprobablynotidenticaltoit—ofaskingforanddoingfavors.(IthankMichaelSevelformakingmeseethepossiblerelevanceoffavorshere.)

22. Butthingsaretrickyhere.Inthecaseofepistemicreasons,thedistinctionbe-tweenthepurelyepistemicandthetriggeringsenseofreason-givingsome-timesbecomesproblematic.Itcanperhapsbeargued,forinstance,thattheexperimentcase isonewhere the reason tobelieve the theory’s truthwasthere all along, and by conducting the experiment Imerely drew your at-tentiontoit,sothatthisisacaseofpurelyepistemicratherthantriggeringreason-giving.Orperhapsitcanbearguedthatwhilethereasonwasthereallalong,youdidn’thaveitbeforetheexperiment.Thesecomplications,in-teresting though they are, arenot ones I need to address in detail formypurposeshere.



must be—if there is such a thing, and appearances to the contrarynotwithstanding—aparticularinstanceoftriggeringreason-giving.InSection4.3,Ibrieflyconsiderthemoreradicaloptionsofanerrorthe-oryandanirreducibilityviewofrobustreason-giving.InSection4.4,Ifinallypresentmysuggestedaccountofrobustreason-giving,andinSection4.5,Ishowhowthisaccountsatisfiesthedesideratafromtheprevioussection.

4.1 Conditional Reasons and ConditionalsThere isnoplausibleroomin logicalspace for robust reason-givingthat isnot an instanceof triggering reason-giving.Here’s the initialstorywhy(itwillberefinedlateron).

Thinkaboutmyrequestthatyoureadmydraft.Weareassumingthatbeforetherequestyouhadnoreasontoreadthedraft,andafterityoudo.Butthismeansthattheconditional“IfIaskyoutoreadthedraft,youwillhaveareasontoreadit”wastrueallalong,oranywayshortlybefore—and independently of—my actuallymaking its antecedenttrue(byrequestingthatyoureadthedraft).Butthenitisverytempt-ingtothinkofthiscaseasyetanothertriggeringcaseofreason-giving;forallIdidhereistomanipulatethenon-normativecircumstancessoastotriggeryourconditionalreasonto-read-the-draft-if-I-ask-you-to.

Butitwouldbetooquicktoimmediatelyconcludefromthisthatallcasesofrobustreason-givingareinstancesoftriggeringreason-giving.Asitstands,theargumentinthepreviousparagraphmovestooquick-lyfromthetruthoftheconditional(“IfIaskyoutoreadthedraft,youwillhaveareasontoreadit”)anditsindependenceofmyrequest,totheexistenceofaconditionalreasonthat’sindependentofmyrequest.Butasiswell-known,suchconditionalscanbereadinmorethanoneway,andnotallreadingslicensesuchaninference.

The conditional can be read in at least the following twoways:The normative operator (“you have a reason to”) can be under-stood as having wide scope, ranging over the entire conditional,resultingin,roughly:

4. Can We Get What We Want?

Cases of robust reason-giving—as in requests, commands, prom-ises—are, then, different from cases of purely epistemic or merelytriggeringreason-giving.Robustreason-givingseemstoinvolveaper-sonaldimension that isnot typically apartofpurelyepistemicandmerelytriggeringreason-giving.Andwhileepistemicreasonscancer-tainlybegiven, theycannotberobustlygiven.As for threats:whiletheygive reasons inways that seemclose to thatof requests (or torobust reason-givingmore generally) in that they involve an inten-tionto(hereby)givesomeoneareason,stillthreatsdonotamounttorobustreason-giving.

Thediscussionsofar,summarizedinthepreviousparagraph,wasinasenseunambitious,forsofarIhavesettledforcharacterizingwhatseem to be our pre-theoretical thoughts about the kind of reason-givinginvolved(forinstance)inrequests,givingittheplace-holdingname ‘robust reason-giving’.But it isnow time for theory. Fornoth-ingthusfarsaidrulesoutthepossibilitythatrobustreason-giving,ascharacterized,would involve toomuch byway of normativemagicandisthereforesimplyimpossible,sothatnoonecanevergivesome-oneelseareasontoΦinanythinglikethesenseItriedtocaptureintheprevioussection.25Inthissection,then,Itakesomestepstowardsdeveloping an account ofwhat robust reason-giving consists in, anaccountthat,ifsuccessful,willaccommodatethedatafromtheprevi-oussection.26InSections4.1and4.2,Ishowwhyrobustreason-giving

“peer disagreement”, seemy “Not Just a Truthometer: TakingOneself Seri-ously(ButNotTooSeriously)inCasesofPeerDisagreement”(forthcoming).

25. TheanalogousworrywithregardtoDarwall’stheoryisthatsecond-personalreasonsashedefinesthemjustdonotexist.Ididn’tfindinDarwall’sbookaconvincingreplytothisworry.Forhisattempt,see, for instance,Darwall(2006,p.299).

26. Itissometimessaidthateachofusisa“self-originatingsourceofvalidclaims”(Rawls[1980,p.546]),orsomesuch.Itisnotatallclear,ofcourse,whatthismetaphorcomesto.Butfirst, it is importanttoseethatthismetaphorisatbestacatchynameforourproblem(whatrobustreason-givingconsists in,andhowitisthatit’spossible),notasolutionforit.Andsecond,thediscus-sionthatfollowsmaybethoughtofasonewayoffleshingoutthismetaphor.



latter.Afterall,requestsarespecialinsomenormativelyrelevantway.Had I uttered very differentwords, had I committed some very dif-ferent speech act (or had I refrained from committing any relevantspeechactatall),Iwouldnothavegivenyouareasontoreadmypa-per.Furthermore,ourpersonalrelationshipis,asemphasizedabove,relevant here. Perhaps, for instance, had a complete stranger askedyoutoreadherdraftshewouldnotsucceedintherebygivingyouareasonsotodo.Myrequestisspecial,then,notjustcomparedtootherthingsIcouldhavedone(orfailedtodo)butalsocomparedto(some)others’requests.What is it, then, thatexplainswhymyrequest thatyoureadmydraftsucceededingivingyouareason,butalltheseotherpossiblethingswouldnotsosucceed?Thenaturalreplyseemstobeintermsofsomethinglikethewide-scopeconditional:thenormativelyrelevant uniqueness of requests, and indeed of my request, is pre-ciselyduetothetruthofsomethinglikethewide-scopeconditional.Theonlythingthatcanexplainwhymyrequestcreatedreasonsherewhereasmyexclamation “Thedraft I amworkingon is really cool!”doesnotispreciselythatyouhaveapriorconditionalreasonto-read-my-draft-if-I-ask-you, but you don’t have a prior conditional reasonto-read-my-draft-if-I-say-it’s-really-cool. The worry, then, is that theonlyway thenarrow-scopeconditional canbenon-mysteriously trueisifthewide-scopeconditionalexplainsitstruth.Andweknowthatwheneverareasoncanberobustlygiven,attheveryleastsomethinglikethenarrow-scopeconditionalmustbetrue.Soinordertoavoidthemysteriousnessofabrutenarrow-scopeconditionalof thiskind,wemustconcludethatwheneverareasoncanberobustlygiven,thewide-scopeconditionalistrueindependentlyoftheactofreason-giv-ing(say,themakingoftherequest).Andifso,wemustconcludethatanycaseofrobust(orapparentlyrobust)reason-givingisreallyacaseofthetriggeringof(roughlyspeaking)aconditionalreason.30

30.ThisargumentisaparticularinstanceofSchroeder’s“Cudworthyargument”,hisgeneralizationoftheargumentagainstdivinecommandtheoryhefindsinCudworth, thoughapplied to reasons,not toobligations.And seeespe-ciallythequotefromPriceonp.12andSchroeder’srelevantdiscussion.

WideScope:Youhaveareasonto(readthedraftifIask youtoreadit).

Oritcanbereadashavinganarrowscope,rangingoveronlythecon-sequent,withtheantecedentremainingentirelynon-normative,out-sidethescopeofanyrelevantnormativeoperator:

NarrowScope:IfIaskyoutoreadthedraft,youhavea reasontoreadit.

We do not have to engage herewith the recent literature onwide-scopismandnarrow-scopism.27Forourpurposeshereit issufficientthatthenarrow-scopeisonepossiblereadingoftheconditional,andindeedone that isperhapscloser than thealternative to itsnatural-languageformulation.Furthermore,theintuitivelineofthoughtpre-sentedabove—namely,thatbecauseyoudidn’thaveareasonbeforeIaskedyoutoreadmypaper,anddoafterwards,thisshowsthattheconditionalistrue—doesnotsupportthewide-scopeconditionaloverthenarrow-scopeone.Theavailabilityofthisnarrow-scopereadingoftheconditional,aswellassomeotherdata,28showsthatthetruthofthe conditionalneednot entail theexistenceof the conditional rea-son.The truthof the conditional itself, then,doesnotestablish theclaimthatrobustreason-givingcanonlybeaninstanceoftriggeringreason-giving.

Nevertheless, aworry remains.29 For it is a natural thought thatwhilethenarrow-scopereadingdoesnotentailthewide-scoperead-ing,stilltheonlyplausibleexplanationoftheformerisintermsofthe

27. See,forinstance,Schroeder(2004),andthereferencesthere.

28.Asnotedearlier,thetriggeringmodelencompassesmorethanjustthetrig-geringofconditionalreasons.It includesalsothetriggeringofareasonbyassuringthatanenablingconditionis inplace,bydefeatingadefeater,etc.Withthesecasestoo,therelevantconditionalistrue,butthereisnorelevantconditionalreason.

29.Thediscussionintherestofthesubsectionandinthenextonereliesheav-ilyonMarkSchroeder’s“CudworthandNormativeExplanations”(2005),towhichIammuchindebted.



Gettingback, then, toreason-giving, theargumentattempting toshowthatanyrobustreason-givingisreallymerelythetriggeringof(roughly)apre-existingconditionalreasoncanberesistedifwecanofferanexplanationofthetruthsoftherelevantconditionals(like“IfIrequestthatyoureadmydraft,youwillhaveareasontodoso”)alongthelinesoftheconstitutivemodel.Canthisbedone?

Well,inordertodoso,onewouldhavetoarguethathavingarea-sontoreadmydraftconsists inmyhavingaskedyoutoread it, thattherequestconstitutes thehavingof thereason, thathavingbeenre-questedtoreadthedraftis(perhapspartly)simply what it istohaveareasontoreadit.Butthisjustseemsutterlyimplausible.32Whatevertheproblemsofdivinecommandtheory,at leastgod’suniqueplaceintheuniverse(andinthetheory)givessomeplausibilitytotheclaimthatbeingunderanobligation just isbeingcommandedbygod.Nosuchplausibilitycarriesovertothecaseathand.Thesuggestionthatthe relation between requests—worse still,my requests—and yourhavingreasonsisaconstitutiveoneseemsjust toomuchtobelieve.And it seemsevenharder tobelieve thatanything like this isgoingonwhenwe remember that requests give reasons only sometimes,dependingonmanycontextualfactors.Thedivinecommandtheoristhasaverysimpleconditionalsheneeds toexplainusingaconstitu-tive-modelexplanation(whenevergodcommandsthatyouΦyouareunderanobligationtoΦ),andsotheconstitutiveclaimsheendsupwithissimilarlysimple(beingunderanobligationtoΦjustishavingbeencommandedbygodtoΦ).Buttheconditionalthatwouldhavetobeexplainedinordertoapplytheconstitutivemodeltothecaseofreason-givingwouldhavetobemuchmorecomplicated:Whensome-oneasksthatyouΦ,andwhenΦ-ingisnottoohard,andwhenthe

32.Notice the distinction between saying that the request constitutes the rea-son,andsayingthathavingbeenrequestedisjustwhatitistohaveareason(here).InthetextIattributeimplausibilitynottotheformerbutonlytothelatter,anditisthelatterthatistheappropriateanalogueoftheclaimthatbe-ingcommandedbygodisjustwhatitistobeunderanobligationfromthedivinecommandtheoryexample.Thus,itisthis(implausible)claimthatisneededfortheapplicationoftheconstitutivemodeltorobustreason-giving.

4.2 The Constitutive ModelSchroeder argues, quite convincingly, I think, that the explanatorymodel underlying this little argument—the one he calls “The Stan-dardModel”,according towhich the truthofanynarrow-scopenor-mativeconditionalisexplainedbythetruthofsomecategoricalnor-mativestatement(forinstance,thewide-scopeonefromtheprevioussection)—isbut oneexplanatorymodel,andthatthereisatleastonealternative,theonehecalls“TheConstitutiveModel”.

Ifyouareadivinecommandtheorist,forinstance,youbelievethatforanyΦ,ifgodcommandedthatyouΦ,thenyouareunderanob-ligationtoΦ.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatyouarecommittedtotheclaimthatthereisanother,moregeneralobligation,onethatdoesnotdependongod’scommands,namelythegeneralobligationtodoasgodcommands,ortheconditionalobligationto-Φ-if-god-commands-that-you-Φ,or any such thing.True, you still oweus anaccountofhowitisthatwhengodcommandsthatyouΦyouaresuddenlyunderanobligationtoΦ,butwhenIcommand(or“command”)thatyouΦyouoftenaren’t.Butthewaytoexplainthisistopointtothefactthatobligationsare (perhapspartly) constituted bygod’s commands (butnot,alas,bymine), thatbeingcommandedbygodtoΦis(perhapssomewhatroughly)just what it istobeunderanobligation.31Thesamegoes,arguesSchroeder,foranyotherperfectlygeneraltheoryofmoralobligation:theconditionalcapturinganysuchtheory’sheart—when-evergodcommands thatyouΦ,youareunderanobligation toΦ;wheneverΦ-ingwillmaximizeutility,youareunderanobligationtoΦ;wheneverpartiesinsomeprivilegedchoice-situationrequirethatyouΦ,youareunderanobligationtoΦ;etc.—shouldbeexplainedaccordingtotheconstitutiveratherthanthestandardmodel(onpainoffallingvictimtoSchroeder’s“CudworthyArgument”,aninstanceofwhichconcludedtheprevioussubsection).

31. AsJohnDeighremindedme,thissketchofadivinecommandtheorymaybeacaricature.Theremaybeversionsofdivinecommandtheoryaccordingtowhichthereason-givingpowerofgodisnotthatdifferentfromthatofhumanrobustreason-giving.Thesedetailsneednotconcernushere,though.



mustbesomeconstitutiveaccountofhavinga(practical)reason;andsecond,itmustbethecasethatbyrequestingthatyoureadmypaperImakeitthecasethatthatthingwhichisconstitutiveofhavingarea-son—whateveritis—infactholds.Idonothaveanargumentshow-ingthatthereisnowayoffillinginthedetailsthatcansatisfytheseconditions.But I can’t thinkofanyremotelyplausiblewayofdoingthis.AndsoIconjecturethatthereisnosuchway.

Let’s recap.Theconcernwas thatgiven the truthof the relevantconditionals (“If I ask you to read the draft, youwill have a reasontoreadit”),andtheneedtoexplainthem,wewouldbeforcedtoac-knowledgesomethinglikeaconditionalreason(toread-if-I-ask-you-to).FollowingSchroeder,Ipointedoutthattheremaybeotherwaysofexplainingtherelevantconditionals,forinstanceaccordingtotheConstitutiveModel. But now I’ve claimed that for the ConstitutiveModeltoapplytothecaseathandsomehighlyimplausibleproposi-tionswouldhavetobetrue.SotheConstitutiveModel—whateveritsmeritsingeneral—cannothelpushere.

Arethere,then,anyothertypesofexplanationsofconditionalsofthe relevant kind? Schroeder introduces (12) “The Standard-Consti-tutiveConjecture”,accordingtowhichtheonlyexplanationsofsuchconditionalsareeitherinlinewiththeStandardModel,orinlinewiththeConstitutiveModel.Heintroducesitasaconjecture,offeringnoargumentfortheclaimthatitisinfacttrue.Idon’thavesuchanargu-menttooffereither.ButIcan’tthinkofanotherpossibleexplanatorymodelhere,34andso Iamgoing toproceedontheassumptionthatnoneistobefound.35

34. Inconversation,MarkSchroedermadeitclearthatneithercanhe.

35. JohnGardnersuggestedtomethefollowingheuristicallyhelpfulwayofput-tingmypointhere.Ifwethinkofreasonswithaclassicalpracticalsyllogisminmind,thenepistemicreason-givingamountstopointingoutafullpracti-calsyllogismthatwasavailabletotheaddresseeallalong;triggeringreason-giving amounts tobringing about a change in aminorpremise; instancesoftheConstitutiveModelareoneswhereanewmajorpremiseisbroughtabout;andtheclaimthattheConstitutiveModeldoesnotapplytorequestsamountstotheclaimthatrequestscanonlybringaboutchangesinminorpremises,thoughinsyllogismswithinterestinglyuniquemajorpremises.

personalrelationshipbetweenyouandthepersonissuingtherequestis such as to support such requests, andwhenΦ-ing is not too im-moral,and…,thenyouhaveareasontoΦ.Consequently,andalsobecausenotallreasonsdependonrequests,theconstitutiveclaimthatwouldbeneededherewouldbe terribly complicated,andsomuchlessplausiblethanthesimpleconstitutiveclaimthedivinecommandtheoristneeds.

TheConstitutiveModelmaybeappliedherealsoinasomewhatdif-ferentway.33Supposewethinkthatthereissomeotherconditionalthatisexplainedinthesketchedconstitutiveway.Perhaps,forinstance,wethinkthatthetruthoftheconditional“IfyouwantX,andbelievethatΦ-ingcangetyouX,thenyouhaveareasontoΦ”isexplainedbythefactthathavingtherelevantbeliefanddesireisjustwhatitistohaveareason.AndsupposethatyoubelievethatΦ-ingcangetyouX,butyoudonot(yet)wantX.Icanthengiveyou—robustly,itseems—areasontoΦbymakingitthecasethatyouwantX.IfIcanseetoitthatyouacquirethisdesire,IwilltherebybemakingitthecasethatyouhaveareasontoΦ(forhavingthebeliefwhichyoualreadyhaveandthedesireIamabouttoseetoitthatyouhaveisjustwhatitistohavethe reason), andnotby triggeringapre-existing conditional reason(fortheexplanationoftheconditional“IfyouwantX,andbelievethatΦ-ingcangetyouX,thenyouhaveareasontoΦ”isaninstanceoftheConstitutiveratherthantheStandardModel).

IagreethatthereisroominlogicalspaceforthiswayofapplyingtheConstitutiveModel.Nevertheless,Ithinkwedonotneedtopur-sueitfurtherhere,forthefollowingtworeasons.First,itisnotcleartomethatthiswayofthinkingofrobustreason-givingcansatisfythede-siderataoutlinedinSection3(itisnotobvious,forinstance,whysuchreason-givingcannotoccurwithregardtoepistemicreasons).Second,andmoreimportantly,Ijustdonotseehowthedetailscanbefilledinhereinaplausibleway.Herearetheconditionsthatmustbemetforsomethingalongtheselinestoworkforourrequestcase:First,there

33. IthankMarkvanRoojenformakingmeseethis.



requests), so thatwenever in fact succeed ingivingeachother rea-sonsinthewaycharacterizedinSection3.Andasisusualwitherrortheories,forthetheorytobeatallplausibleanexplanationwillhavetobeofferedoftherelevanterror.Butsuchanerrortheory,itseems,issufficientlyimplausible37tobeavoidedifatallpossible.

Asforirreducibility,hereaselsewhere,thereissomethinglessthanfullytheoreticallysatisfyingaboutsuchamove.Wehavealreadyseenthatwhere robust reason-giving ispossible, a certainkindof condi-tional is true,suchas“If Iaskyoutoreadmydraft,youwillhaveareasontodoso”.AndI’vediscussedtwopossiblekindsofexplanationforthetruthofsuchconditionals.Endorsingrobustreason-givingasan irreducible,suigenerisnormativephenomenonthusamounts toadmitting the truthof such conditionals asbrute, unexplained, andunexplainable.Andthisseemslikeadesperatemove(thoughperhapsnotasdesperateasendorsinganerrortheory).38

If at all possible, then,we should steer a course somewhere be-tweenthetwoextremesoferrortheoryandirreducibilism.Now,giventhediscussionearlierinthissection,robustreason-giving(ifitispos-sible)cannotbutbeaninstanceoftriggeringreason-giving.Andwealreadyknow—fromtheprevioussection—thatrobustreason-givinghascharacteristicsthatarenotsharedbyother,perhapsmoreparadig-maticcasesofmerelytriggeringreason-giving.Soifrobustreason-giv-ingispossible,thismustbebecauseitisanespeciallyinterestingin-stanceoftriggeringreason-giving,39onethespecialelementsofwhich

37. Itcouldperhapsbemadesomewhat(butnotmuch)lessimplausibleifsoft-enedbysomekindof instrumentalismorfictionalismaboutrobustreason-giving.Watson (2009, p. 157, footnote 9) suggests something along theselinesasapossiblereadingofHumeonpromises.

38.Darwall (2006) emphasizes the irreducibility of the second-personal. Andthis isalreadysomewhatunsatisfying.ButDarwallnowherediscussesany-thingliketheconditionalsofthekindmentionedinthetext,andsodoesn’tacknowledgetheevenmoreproblematicresult—admittingthetruthofsuchconditionalsasbrute.Lavin(2008)alsoemphasizesacloseexplanatorychal-lengeleftunansweredbyDarwall.

39. Inthecontextofadiscussionofauthority—again,plausiblyaparticularin-stanceofrobustreason-giving—Raz(2005,pp.1012–3,1020)clearlythinks

4.3 The Scylla of Error Theory and the Charybdis of IrreducibilityInSection4.4Iamgoingtoofferanaccountthatunderstandsrobustreason-givingasanespeciallyinterestingparticularinstanceoftrigger-ingreason-giving,36thespecialfeaturesofwhich(comparedtoothercasesof triggeringreason-giving)accommodate thedesiderata fromSection3.Before Idothat, though, letmebrieflyaddress twomoreextremestrategiesthatatthispointnaturallysuggestthemselves.

Thefirst isanerror theoryaboutrobustreason-giving.What theargumentsthusfarhaveestablished,itcanbeargued,issimplythatnothingcanqualifyasgenuinelyrobustreason-giving.Nothing,afterall,canbothbeaninstanceoftriggeringreason-giving(asthediscus-sioninthissectionsuggestsrobustreason-givingmustbe)andfailtobe an instance of triggering reason-giving (as the discussion in theprevioussectionseemstosuggestmustbetrueofrobustreason-giv-ing).Robustreason-giving,then,issimplyimpossible.

Intheotherextreme,wemaybe ledtoanirreducibilityview,ac-cordingtowhichthephenomenonofrobustreason-giving issuige-neris,notbestunderstoodorexplainedinotherterms.Themistakeinthediscussionsofar,thethoughtcango,wastheattempttoofferanaccountofrobustreason-givinginother,nottoocloselyrelatedterms.But it is this attempt thathasbeen reduced to an absurd, and so itmustbeabandoned.Wemustsimplyacknowledgethatthenormativesphereisricherthanwemayhavethought,anditcontains—ontopofeverythingelseitcontains—alsotheirreduciblerelationofrobustreason-giving.

Bothof these suggestions are indeedoptions, but they are onestooptforonlyasalast(orsecondtolast)resort,forbotharehighlyimplausible. Startwith an error theory.Going error theoretic aboutrobust reason-giving entails that there is some systematic error inourpracticeofreason-giving(forinstance,inourpracticeofmaking

36.Raz (1986, p. 84) seems to say explicitly that (inmy terms) robust reasongivingmustbean instanceof triggeringreason-giving,whenhewrites(inthecontextofadiscussionofconsent):“Thoughthe[will]can,withinlimits,createreasons,itcandosoonlywhenthereisanon-will-basedreasonwhyitshould.”Forasimilarpoint,seeWatson(2009,p.159).



dictator“orders”youtoperformsomeaction.Heis,ofcourse,notau-thorized to issuesuchanorder,notevenaccording to the ruleshisdictatorfatheraccepts.Butifyoudon’tdoasthechildsays,hisfatherwillbecomeveryangry,indeedangrytothepointofbrutalizingsomeinnocentpeople.Inthiscase,itseemsyounowhaveareason(indeed,anobligation;butformypurposesareasonwoulddo)todowhateverthedictator’ssonorderedyoutodo.Thedictator’ssonhassucceededingivingyouareasonforaction.Andindeed,thisisexactlywhatheintendedtodo.But,ofcourse,thisisnotacaseofrobustreason-giving.Itismerelyacaseofatriggeringreason-giving:youhaveastandingreason topreventhorrible disasters frombefalling innocent people,andthedictator’ssonhassuccessfullymanipulatedthenon-normativecircumstancesso that thisgeneral reasonwill implyamorespecificonetodoashesays.41

Tomakesomeprogress,comparethreatsandwarnings.Whenallother things are equal, if a threat (“If youdon’tΦ, Iwill kill you!”)givesyouareasontoΦ,sowouldtherelevantlysimilarwarning(“Ifyoudon’tΦ,BadGuywillkillyou!”).Theintentionoftheoneissuingthethreattogiveyouareasonforaction—thoughverymuchapartofwhatmakesthethreatathreat—still inthiswaydropsoutofthenormativepicture.42Abenevolentpersonissuingawarning,orindeedanon-personindicatoroftheimminentdanger,woulddojustaswellintermsofyourreasontoΦ.

Nowconsiderrequestsagain,andconsiderthefollowingtwocases.In thefirstone, I askyou to readmypaper, andyougoaheadandread it because,well, I askedyou to. In the second case, you couldnotcarelessaboutmeandmyrequests.Butyou’venoticedthatour

41. Estlunddistinguishesthecaseofthedictator’schildfromcasesofrealauthor-ity.Buthedoesn’tofferasatisfyingexplicationofthedistinction.Noticethatthevery fact that this caseseemssoverydifferent fromagenuinecaseofauthorityshowsthatitwouldbewrongtothinkaboutcasesofauthorityasuninterestingparticularinstancesoftriggeringreason-giving.

42. PerhapsthisisroughlywhatEstlundhasinmindwhenhesays(aboutthedictator’schildexample):“thecommanditselfdropsoutofthesetofreasonsforaction”(2008,p.118).

(thosenotsharedbyother instancesof triggeringreason-giving)ex-plaintheuniquefeaturesofrobustreason-giving.

4.4 My SuggestionApromisingstartistothinkaboutthecharacteristicintentionsofthereason-giver(andperhapsalsothereason-receiver)incasesofrobustreason-giving,comparedtocasesofpurelyepistemicandmerelytrig-gering reason-giving. It seems like a necessary condition for some-thingtoqualifyasarequestthatthepersonmakingtherequestintendtotherebygiveareasontotheaddressee.Somethinglikethisneces-saryconditionalsoholdsforthecaseofcommands,astheliteratureonauthoritymakesclear:onecannotissueacommandinadvertently,withoutintendingtoissueacommand,thatis,(perhapsamongotherthings) to give the addressee a rather strong reason toperform therelevant action. And notice that this condition is not necessary formanycasesofpurelyepistemicandmerely triggeringreason-giving.Onecan,forinstance,indicatethatthereisareasoninadvertently,oranywaywithout intendingso todo.Andonecancertainly triggeraconditionalreasonwithoutintendingtodoso,asthegrocerexampleshowsclearly.Soinsistingonthisintentiondoesseemlikeastepintherightdirection.

Butwealreadyknow that this intention isnota sufficientcondi-tionforrobustreason-giving,becausetherearecaseswherethisinten-tionispresentbuttherelevantreason-givingisnotrobust.Onekindofcasehasalreadybeenmentioned—thatofthreats.Moregenerally,takeacaseoftriggeringreason-giving(likethatofthegrocerandthepriceofmilk),thenaddanintentiontogiveareason,andstillallyouhaveisacaseoftriggering,notrobust,reason-giving.OrconsideranexampleItakefromDavidEstlund(2008,p.118).40Thesonofabrutal

thatthereason-givinginvolvedisaninstanceof(whatIcall)triggeringrea-son-giving.Itisnotcleartomewhetherhethinksthisismerelysuchapar-ticularinstance,oronethatcanbespecialinroughlythewayIproceedtosuggest.

40.EstlundhimselfgivesthecreditforthisexampletoJohnDeigh.



intendtogiveyouareason,Idonotintendthegivingofthereasontodependonyouracknowledgingofthisveryintention.

Theseconsiderationssupport,then,thefollowingaccount,whichitwillbeconvenienttopresentfirstasanaccountofattemptingtoro-bustlygiveareason,thenaddingtherelevantsuccessconditions:

OnepersonAattemptstorobustlygiveanotherpersonBareasontoΦjustincase(andbecause):

(i) A intendstogiveBareasontoΦ,andAcommuni-catesthisintentiontoB;

(ii) AintendsBtorecognizethisintention;

(iii)AintendsB’sgivenreasontoΦtodependinanap-propriatewayonB’srecognitionofA’scommunicat-edintentiontogiveBareasontoΦ.43

Thethirdconditioncanbeunderstoodasageneralizationofsuchnat-uralthoughtsasthatwhenIaskyoutoΦ,Iintendthatyourreasonfor

43. Thereisanobviousstructuralsimilaritybetweenthisaccountand(onever-sionof)Grice’s accountof sentence-meaning. It’snot clear tomewhetherthesimilarityismerelysuperficial.Bethatasitmay,eveniftherearesomeobjections thatmakeaGriceanaccountofmeaningunacceptable, theydonot seem tome toapply to the reason-givingcase.Rather, theyareeitherinstancesofdeviantcausalchainsofthekindImentioninthetextbelow,ortheirforceasobjectionstotheGriceanaccountentirelydependsonthelatterbeinganaccountofmeaning.ThispointisclearestinSchiffer(1972,pp.42–3),wherehedistinguishesthephenomenonofspeaker-meaningandthatoftell-ing(thatorto),notingthat(inmyterms)purelyepistemicreason-givingisconsistentwiththeformerbutnotthelatter.AndforasurveyoftheproblemsfacingbroadlyGriceanaccountsofmeaning,seeSchiffer(1987,Chapter9).

Forasimilarunderstandingofrequests,thistimeinspiredbySearleratherthanbyGrice, seeCupit (1994, p. 450): “To request is to attempt to affectanother’sactions,bydoingnomorethanpresentingthosewishesinaformwhich constitutes an attempt to affect action.” Similarly, Raz (1975, p. 83)writes:“Apersonwhomakesarequestintendshismakingtherequesttobeareasonfortheaddresseetocomplywithit.”AndthereissomethinginthesamegeneraldirectioninRobertson(manuscript).AndforexplicitlyGriceandiscussionsofcloselyrelatedissues,seeHart(1982),andSciaraffa(2009).

departmentchairheardmeaskingthatyoureadthepaper,youknowthatshethinksyoushoulddoas Iask,andyourecognizeyourgen-eral,standingreasontokeepherhappy.Youproceedtoreadthepapermerelyinordertoavoidaconflictwiththedepartmentchair.Thereseems to be an important difference between the two cases.WhileyouhavedoneasIaskedinbothcases,inthelattertherequestdidnotfunctioninthewayIintendedittofunction.Thinkofitthisway.Ifyoucometobelievethatmyrequestwasnotinfactsincere(say,Iwasjustpretendingtomakearequest),inthefirstcaseyouwillcometotheconclusionthatyoudon’thaveanyreasontoreadmydraft.Notsointhesecondcase:solongasthedepartmentchairbelievestherequestwasearnest,yourreasonforreadingthedraftstands.Sowhat is im-portantinthecaseofrequestsisthatthereason-givernotonlyintendstogiveareason,butalsothatsheintendsthegivingofthereasontodependonthereason-receiver’srecognizingthatveryintention,andindeedonthisrecognitionplayinganappropriateroleinthereason-receiver’spracticalreasoning.Thereisnothing,then,whichstandsinthesamerelationtorequestsaswarningsdotothreats:athreattreatedby the addresseemerely as awarning is a fully successful threat.Arequesttreatedbytheaddresseemerelyasanincentiveisnotafullysuccessfulrequest.

Wecangainmoresupportforthisbythinkingaboutavariantofthekeeping-the-department-chair-happycase.SupposethatIknewallalonghowlittleyoucaredaboutmeandmyrequests,andsoIwouldneverhavebotheredtoaskyoutoreadthepaperifitweren’tforthedepartmentchair’spresence.Givenherpresence,Iknowthatmyutter-ing“Wouldyoumindhavingalookatmydraft?”willsucceedingivingyouareasontoreadmydraft.Itseemstomethatthiscase—inwhichIintendtogiveyouareason,andsucceedindoingsobyutteringwordsthatsoundlikethemakingofarequest—isnotagenuinerequestatall,preciselybecausethereason-givinginvolvedisnotrobust.Rather,itisacaseofintentionaltriggeringreason-giving.Whatseemstobelackinghereisthecomplicatedintentionmentionedearlier:thoughI



otherwayabletorobustlygivereasonsinthisway,sothatsheletsthechild’sreason-givingintentionsplaytheappropriateroleinherpracti-calreasoning.Still,it’sclearthatthechildhasnotmanagedtorobustlygiveareasonforaction.Whatismissinginthiscaseisthenormative success-condition,namely, theattemptmustmake it thecase thatareasontoΦreallydoesemerge(intheappropriateway).Andweal-readyknowthatwhether thisprocedurewill result in therebeingareasontoΦherewilldependontherebeinganindependentreasonthatistriggeredbythisprocedure46—roughly,areason(forB)todoasAintendsthatBhaveareasontodo.Inthedictator’schildexample,thereisnogeneralreasontodoasthechild“commands”,andsohisreason-givingintentionsdonottriggersuchageneralreason,andsohedoesnotsucceedinrobustlygivingareason,whetherornothisaudiencebelievesthathedoes.ButwhenIaskyoutoreadmypaper,presumablythereisthisgeneralreason(todoasIask,withinlimits,inacertaincontext,etc.),onethatIpresumablysucceedintriggeringbymakingtherequest.Itisinthisway,then,thatthesuggestedaccountof robust reason-giving is a particular instance (but an importantlyuniqueone)oftriggeringreason-giving.47Now,Idonothave(here)moretosayonwhensuchatriggeredreasondoesandwhenitdoesnotexist:itseemstomethatsometimessuchareason(inthecaseofrequests,roughly,todoasoneisaskedtodo)exists,thatsometimesitdoesnot,thatthestrengthofthereason(whenitdoesexist)willvaryfromcasetocase,andthatageneralanswertothequestion“Whendoesapotentially triggered reasonexist,andhowstrong is it?” isapartofthemostgeneralsubstantivetheoryofwhatreasonswehave,

46.UnlesstheConstitutiveModeldoesapply.Insuchcases—asDimitriosKyrit-sisnoted—thenormativesuccessconditionistriviallysatisfied.

47. Ihopetodiscussthecaseofauthority—plausiblyaparticularinstanceofro-bustreason-giving—onanotheroccasion.Letmejustquicklynoteherethatthepointinthetextiswherediscussionsofthejustificationofauthoritycomein. In the frameworkof thesuggestedaccountof robust reason-giving, forinstance,Raz’sserviceconceptionofauthority(e. g.,Raz2005)isbestseenasanaccountofwhichpriorconditionalreasonsexist,andsowhichattemptsatrobustreason-giving(inthespecialauthorityway)cansucceed.

Φ-ingbethat I asked you to;thatwhenIcommandthatyouΦ,IintendthatyourreasonforΦ-ingbethat I said so,etc.

Thus,whenIaskyoutoreadmydraft,(i)Iintendtogiveyouarea-sontoreadmydraft,andIcommunicatethisintentiontoyoubywayofsayingsomethinglike“Doyoumindhavingalook?”;44(ii)Iintendyoutorecognizethis intention;and(iii) I intendthisrecognitionofyourstoplayanappropriaterole inyourpracticalreasoning,ascanbeseenfromthefactthatmyrequestmisfireswhenyouproceedtoreadthedraft(asIasked)onlyforthereasonthatthiswillkeepourdepartmentchairhappy.Andasimilaranalysisseemsplausibleforatleast someother casesof robust reason-giving (for instance, thatofcommands).

Therearetwokindsofsuccessconditionsnecessaryforrobustrea-son-giving.Thefirstkindisnon-normative:ForA’sattempttorobustlygiveBareasontoΦtosucceed,BmustrecognizeA’sabovespecifiedintentions,andfurthermoreBmustallowtheseintentionstoplayanappropriateroleinhispracticalreasoning.45Noticethatthisconditionisnotnecessaryfortheattempttosucceedinamountingtoarobustreason-giving,butratherforittosucceedinhavingtheintendedkindofeffectintheworld.

Butthisconditionisnotsufficientfortheattemptatreason-givingtosucceed,notevenforittosucceedinamountingtoarobustreason-giving.Toseethis,thinkagainaboutthedictator’schild,andnowas-sume,first,thathehasalloftheintentionsspecifiedabove,sothathegenuinelydoesattempttorobustlygiveareason;andsecond,thatthepersonheaddresses treatshimasgenuinelyauthorizedor in some

44. Thecommunicationis importanthere. It isnotsufficientforrobustreason-givingthatIintendthatyouknowaboutmyrelevantintentions;itisimpor-tant(ascanbeseenfrom[iii])thatwhatplaysaroleinyourpracticalreason-ingisthatIactuallycommunicatedtoyoutheintentionthatyoutakethisverycommunicated intentionasa reason. (I thank JosephRaz foremphasizingthispointtome.)

45. Noticethat the“communicates” incondition(i) isnotunderstoodasasuc-cessterm,requiringuptakeofsomekind.Itrequiresmerelytheattempttocommunicatetherelevantintention.(IthankHanochSheinmanforarelatedpoint.)



Ishouldalsonotesomethingitdoesnottakefortheroleplayedbythegivenreasoninthereceiver’spracticalreasoningtobeappropriate.Itisnotrequiredthattherolebe,asitwere,ultimate.51Inotherwords,it is perfectly consistentwith robust reason-giving thus understoodthat therebea further, fuller,perhapsmorebasic storyofwhy it isthatBdoesandshouldtakeA’srelevantintentionsasreason-giving.Perhaps,forinstance,Bisasimpleutilitarian,andlet’sfurtherassumethatsimpleutilitarianismisindeedthetruefundamentalstoryaboutallreasonsforaction.Ifso,BwilltakeA’srequestasareasontoΦifandonlyif,andbecause,doingsowillmaximizeutility.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatshedoesn’ttake,inthosecases,A’srequesttobea(non-ultimate)reason.Thecrucialquestioniswhethertheultimate(orper-hapsjustmorebasic)storyhereisonethatgoesthroughthereason-giver’sspecialintentionsidentifiedabove(andthereceiver’srecogni-tionthereof),asinthecaseoftheutilitarianrequest-receiver,inwhichcasewemayhaveacaseofrobustreason-giving;orwhetherthemorebasicstoryhereworksdirectly,leavingnoroleforthespecificinten-tions thatmakereason-givingrobust(as is thecase in thedictator’schildexample).Casesof this latter typearenot,on theaccount I’msuggestinghere,casesofrobustreason-giving.Andthisseemstometheindependentlyplausibleresulthere.

Noticethattheintentionsmentionedabovedonotincludesome-thinglikethe intentionthatBactuallyΦs.This issobecauseAcangiveBareasontoΦknowingwellthatotherreasonsmayberelevant,includingpossiblystrongerreasonsnottoΦ.52Indeed,itseemstomeAcanmakeagenuinerequestthatBΦs,allthetimeacknowledgingthatifcertainotherconsiderationsbearonthecase,Bshouldnot(allthingsconsidered)Φ.Wedonotwanttorestrictrobustreason-givingto just thecases inwhichthereason-giver intendsthegivenreasontooutweighallothers.Forsimilarreasons,AneednotintendthatthegivenreasonbetheonlyreasonforwhichBΦs.

51. IthankCianDorrforpressingmeonarelatedpoint.

52. SeeRaz(1975,p.83).

a theory Iunfortunatelydonothaveupmysleeve.48So Iamgoingtohavetosettleforstatingthenormativeconditionitself:Forrobustreason-givingtooccur,theremustbe,independentlyoftheattemptatrobustreason-giving,areasontriggeredbysuchanattempt.49

Iamnotsurewhatmoretosayaboutthe“appropriateway”qual-ification in (iii). It ismeant to ruleoutdeviant causal (andperhapsother)chains.50Itwouldhavebeennicetohaveanexplicitaccountofhowexactlytodothis.ButIwillhavetosettlefornotingthatusuallyweknowadeviantcausalchainwhenweseeone,andforclaimingcompanions in guilt—for almost everyone needs an account of de-viantcausalchains.Thisqualification in (iii) thusdoesn’tmake (iii)(ortheaccountofwhichitisapart)empty,nordoesitraiseanynewproblemsthatarepeculiartomyaccountofrobustreason-giving.(Ifyouneverthelessthinkthatthereisnowayforthe“appropriateway”qualificationtobemaderespectable,thenyoumayhavetoreconsidertheirreducibility“wayout”fromsection4.3above.)

48. In the IntroductionI insistedthat thephenomenonIaminterested in—ro-bustreason-giving—doesnot,unlikethephenomenaDarwallisinterestedin,necessarily includeanythinglikeassumedauthority-relations.Butonewayofdescribingthepointinthetexthereisintherelated(but,ofcourse,notnecessarilyinstitutional)termofstanding.Perhaps,forinstance,thequestionwhetherthereissuchatriggerablereasoncanberedescribedasthequestionwhetherthespeakerhasthestandingtorobustlygivecertainreasons(like,forinstance,whethershehasthestandingtomaketherelevantrequest).

49. AboveIrejectedanerrortheoryaboutrobustreason-giving.ButthefactthatIdonotheresupplyageneraltheoryaboutwhatreasonswehave,orinpar-ticularananswertothequestionwhenaretherereasonsthataretriggerablein thewaydescribed in the text,means that there isanotherkindoferrortheorythatIhavenotarguedagainst.Forperhapseventhoughthereisnoth-ingincoherentaboutrobustreason-givingstilltherejustarenoreasonsthataretriggerableinthisway.Ifso,therearenocasesofrobustreason-giving,but this issobecauseofsubstantivenormativeconsiderations, rather thanthosehavingtodowiththenatureofrobustreason-giving.Now,torepeat,Ibelievethatwedosometimessucceedinrobustlygivingeachotherreasons,andsoIrejectthisversionofanerrortheoryaswell.ButIdonotargueforthisclaiminthispaper.IthankNadeemHussainandJosephRazforpressingmeonthispoint.

50.Foradiscussionofsomedeviant-causal-chaincasesinthecontextofadiscus-sionofGrice’saccountofmeaning,seeSchiffer(1972,pp.17andff.).



presentinsomethreats,perhapswhentheoneissuingthethreatalsoattemptstogiveareasonrobustly.Butthesefurtherintentionsareinnowaynecessary,oreventypical,forthreats.Thegrocerwhoraisesthepriceofmilkintendingtogiveherclientareasontobuylessmilkalsolacksthesefurtherintentions.Thisiswhyherhavingtheintention(i)doesn’tmakeherreason-givingrobust.Andwe’vealreadyseenthatifIutterwhatsoundslikearequest,butIdon’thavetheintentions(ii)and(iii),thenthereisconsiderablepressurenottointerpretmywordsasagenuinerequestatall.Asforthedictator’schild,inordertoknowwhetherheattemptstorobustlygiveareasonweneedtoknowmoreabouthispsychology.Thestoryisconsistent,however,withhishav-ingtheintentions(i)–(iii),andso,asstatedabove,it’squitepossiblethathedoesattempttodoso.Buthedoesn’tsucceed,becauseofthenormativesuccessconditionhighlightedabove:whilethechildmayintendyourgiven reason todepend inanappropriatewayonyourrecognitionofhisintentiontogiveyouareason,yourreasondoesnotdependonthisatall(evenifyouthinkotherwise).

InSection3, Iemphasized the relevanceofpersonhoodandper-sonal relationships to robust reason-giving. It seems tome the sug-gested account can explain this fact. First, and rather obviously, be-causeof thecomplex intentionsonemusthave inorder to robustlygivereasons,robustreason-givingisrestrictedtorathercomplicatedcreatures,perhapsjustcreaturesthatarepersonsandperson-like.Adog,forinstance,cancertainlybegforhistreat,andinsomecontextsitwillbenaturaltosaythatheasksforit.Butitseemstomeitwouldbeahugestretchtosaythatthedogmakesagenuinerequest,thatherobustlygivesyouareasontogivehimhistreat.Andthesuggestedaccountexplainswhy:dogsdonotandperhapscannothavetheinten-tionsnecessaryforrobustreason-giving.Furthermore,becausehavinganintentionthatpisinconsistentwithabeliefintheimpossibilityof

Youmaybeworriedaboutcircularity:theintentionsappearinginthesuggestedanalysisofrobustreason-givingarethemselvespickedout intermsofreason-giving.Butnoticethattheanalysandumisro-bustreason-giving.Andthereason-givingappearingintheanalysansneednotberobust: itcanbe,andperhapsusually is, triggeringrea-son-giving.53Thus,whenIaskyoutoreadmydraft,I intendtogiveyouareasontoreadmydraftandforthisreasontoplayanappropriateroleinyourpracticalreasoning.ButIneednotintendtorobustlygiveyouareasontoreadmydraft.Icertainlyneednotintendtorobustlygiveyouareasonunder this description. Imayintendtotriggerarea-sonforyoutoreadmydraftwithmyrelevantcomplexintentions,andthisgivingmayamounttoacaseofrobustreason-giving,butIneednotintenditas such.Thesuggestedaccount,then,explainsthenatureof robust reason-giving in termsof intentions to (not-necessarily-ro-bustly)givereasons.Atworst—whentheintentionsthemselvesaretorobustlygivereasons—thereissomethingbenignlyrecursiveinthesuggestedaccount.54

4.4 Evaluating the Suggestion: The Desiderata AgainDoes the suggested account of robust reason-giving satisfy the de-siderata from Section 3? Howwell does it fit with—and howwelldoes it explain—the phenomenon of robust reason-giving astherecharacterized?

First,thisaccountseemstometogetthecentralcasesright,andforwhatseemtobe theright reasons.Threats, for instance,arenotcasesofrobustreason-giving(andsoarecasesofmerelytriggeringrea-son-giving),because,thoughtheintention(i)ispresentinthreats,(ii)and(iii)typicallyaren’t.Ofcourse,theintentions(ii)and(iii)maybe

53. I don’t think that an intention to epistemically give reasonswould sufficehere.Thisiswhywarningsdonotqualifyascasesofrobustreason-giving.(IthankTomHurkaforthispoint.)

54. Ifyou’renotconvinced,comparetherecursivebutnotcircularfollowingdefi-nitionofinstrumentalvalue:“Somethingisofinstrumentalvalueifandonlyifitisinstrumentaltosomethingthatisofvalue”(wherethislastoccurrenceof“value”standsfor“not-necessarilyinstrumentalvalue”).



Toseethis,suppose(forreductio)thatAattemptstorobustlygiveBareasontobelievep.Onthesuggestedaccount,forthistobethecase,Amustintend

(i) togiveBareasontobelievep;

(ii) Btorecognizethisintention;

(iii)B’sgivenreasontobelieveptodependinanappropriatewayonB’srecognitionofA’scommunicatedintentiontogiveBareasontobelievep.

Idon’tseeanyinterestingproblemswith(i)and(ii).But(iii)ishighlyproblematic.A’s reason-giving intention—andB’s recognition there-of—seemof thewrong type for an epistemic reason to depend onthem.Afterall,theyhavenothingtodowithp’struth,orwithevidencesupporting the belief that p. So on the suggested account, in ordertoeven attempttorobustlygiveanepistemicreason,thereason-givermustbeconfusedaboutthedistinctionbetweenepistemicandprag-matic reasons (for instance, for belief).And, of course, evenwheresuchanattemptispossible(becausethereason-giver isconfusedinthisway),stillnosuchattemptcansucceed,becauseofthenormativesuccess condition: there just isnopre-existing epistemic reason thatcanbetriggeredinthisway.57

57. Thereisnowaviewintheepistemologyoftestimony—sometimescalledtheAssurance View—according to one understanding of which the epistemo-logicalstatusoftestimonyisthoughtofinawaycloselyresemblingrobustly-givenepistemic reasons. See, for instance,Moran (2005). I cannotdiscussthisviewatlengthhere(andhopetodosoelsewhere).Letmejustmakethefollowingtwopoints,then.First,partlyforthereasonssketchedinthetexthere,totheextentthattheAssuranceViewistobeunderstoodasclaimingthatepistemicreasonscanberobustlygiven,itisforthisveryreasonhighlyimplausible.Andsecond,weshoulddistinguishbetween thephenomenol-ogyoftellingandbeingtoldandtheepistemologyoftestimony.Theformermayindeedbeveryclosetothephenomenologyofrobustreason-giving(ascanbeseenfromreadingMoran’spaperalongsidethisone).Butfromthisnothingfollowswithregardtotheepistemologyoftestimony.

p,55ifAistointendthatBrecognizehisreason-givingintentionandrespondtoit,AmustconceiveofBasatleastinprincipleablesotorecognizeandsotorespond.Sothesuggestedaccountcorrectlypre-dictsthattherearerestrictionsonA’sconceptionofBifAistoattempttorobustlygiveBareasonforaction.56Furthermore,evenifaconfusedAattemptstorobustlygiveherdogareasonforaction,thenormativesuccessconditionguaranteesthatshecannotsucceed,becausethereisnogeneralreasonthatappliestodogsandthatistriggerablebythecomplexintentionsinvolvedintheconfusedattempt.

InSection3,Ialsonotedthatthereisasenseinwhichrobustrea-son-giving—unlikepurelyepistemicandmerelytriggeringreason-giv-ing—ismorecloselybackedupbythepersonalrelationshipbetweenthe reason-giverand the reason-receiver.This toocanbeexplainedbythesuggestedaccountofrobustreason-giving.ForitfollowsfromthisaccountthatinorderforAtoattempttorobustlygiveareasontoB,Amust(somewhatroughly)intendthatBtakeA’sintentiontogiveareasonasareasonforaction.Butthereisnothingobviousaboutthis.WhetherBdoes—orevenwhetherBshould—takeA’scomplexinten-tionsasareasonissomethingthatishighlycontext-dependent.AndoneofthefeaturesofthecontextthisisdependentonispreciselythenatureoftherelationshipbetweenAandB.

Another characteristic of robust reason-giving that I emphasizedinSection3was thatepistemic reasonsdonot seem tobe robustlygivable.Thistooissomethingthesuggestedaccountnicelyexplains.

55. Thismuch is, I take it,uncontroversialamong thosewritingon intentions.Thecontroversialquestionsarewhetheranintentionthatpentailsabeliefthatp,orsomesuch.Noticethattheassumptioninthetextismuchweakerthananaffirmativeanswertothisquestion.

56.Darwall (2006, pp. 22 and ff.) emphasizes the distinction between givingsomeoneanincentive,andaddressingademandinawaythattheaddresseeisexpectedtorecognizeandinternalize.Heretootheaccountinthetextdif-fersfromDarwall’sinitsdetails,butmaybesimilartoitinitsspirit.Darwall(2006,p. 269)also insists that addressing second-personal reasonsalwayspresupposesthataddresseescanfreelyandrationallydeterminethemselvesby the addressed reasons.Here too a similarity to the point in the text isevident.



strangers)wouldn’titbetoomuchtopackintotherequestthecom-plexintentionsmyaccountofrobustreason-givingutilizes?

I can thinkof twowaysof thinkingabout trivial requests inourcontext.Onewouldbetorulethemlessthanfull-bloodedrequests,orperhapstoallowthemtocountasfull-bloodedrequestsatthepriceofseveringthetiebetweenrequestsandrobustreason-giving.Thisisnotentirelyimplausible;perhapswhentherequestistrivialenough,the distinction between robust reason-giving andmerely triggeringreason-giving loses some of its force (it certainly losesmuch of itsimportance).

Amuchmore interesting response, however, would be to insistthat even such trivial requests among complete strangers are casesofrobustreason-giving.Suchinsistencewouldinvolveinsistingthatwedohave therelevantcomplex intentionswhenmaking trivial re-quests,andsoalsothatweassumethatcompletestrangerscanandshouldtakeourintentionstogivethemareasonasgenuinelyreason-giving.Perhapsthiswayofthinkingaboutthingsgetsusbacktothespirit ofDarwall’s insistenceon thenormative felicity conditionsofsecond-personaladdress,thekindofaddressweallexperience,bothasaddressorsandasaddressees.58Perhapsourtendencybothtomaketrivialrequestsandtorespondtothemshowsthatinasenseweas-sumethatprettymuchallofuscanrespondtoreasons,andindeedtorobustlygivenreasons.(Thiswouldamounttoanotherwayinwhichrequests are a better starting point in understanding robust reason-giving, compared to commands, for instance, as clearlymuchmoreisneeded forcommands than for requests tobepossible.)Andper-hapsthisshowsnotthatrobustreason-givingispossibleevenamongpeoplewhostandatnonormativelysignificantrelationtoeachother,58. I don’t knowwhether robust reason-giving, as understood bymy suggest-

ed account,will satisfyDarwall’s taste for the irreducibly second-personal.Indeed, this accountmaybe thoughtof as anobjection to this irreducibil-ityclaim:If Iamright,andsomuchcanbeexplainedwithoutresortingtothe irreducibly second-personal, resorting to it loses much of its underly-ingphilosophicalmotivation.Nevertheless,perhapsDarwallcanreplythatfilling in some of the missing details will after all require the irreduciblysecond-personal.

5. Conclusion

Itentativelyconclude,then,thatwhenIaskyoutoreadmydraftthere-by successfully giving you a reason to read it, I do trigger a reasonthatwasthereallalong,independentlyofmyrequest.Butthisdoesn’tshowthatrobustreason-giving—inthecaseofrequests,ormoregen-erally—isanillusion,orthatthere’sanythingmagicalormysteriousabout it.Robust reason-giving isaparticularly interestingparticularinstanceofwhat I’ve called triggering reason-giving. It isunique inthecomplexintentionsit involves,andthereforealsoinsomeof itsphenomenologicalcharacteristics.

Letmenotpretendthatthisaccountiswithoutproblems.Foronething,andasInotedalreadythere,itisincertainrespectsincomplete(lackinganaccountofwhenthereareandwhentherearenottrigger-ablereasonsoftherelevantkind,andlackinganaccountofdeviantcausalchains).Further,thoughIthinkthesuggestedaccountgetsthecentralcasesatleastroughlyright,itmayhavesomemoderatelycoun-terintuitiveresults.For instance, fairlyyoungchildren—perhapstooyoungtohavethecomplexintentionsmyaccountuses—seemtobeabletoissuefull-bloodedrequestsjustliketherestofus.Imayneedtoclassifysuchrequestsaslessthanfull-bloodedrequestsafterall(intheotherdirection,itseemstomethat“requests”addressedatveryyoungchildrenareoftennotfull-bloodedrequests).Thismaybeasomewhatawkwardresult,butnot,Ithink,tooawkward,giventheadvantagesofthesuggestedaccount.

Letmementionanotherpossibleobjection.Therequeststhatthisaccountroughlyfits,itmaybeargued,areratherthickrequests—re-queststhatrelyonsomefairlythickpersonalrelationship,thatareofnon-trivialsignificance,andsoon.Butmany,perhapsmost,requestsarenotlikethisatall.Ifwearetwocompletestrangers,andyouaskmetotellyouthetime,haven’tyousucceededinissuingafull-blood-edrequest?Haven’tyousucceededinrobustlygivingmeareasontotellyouthetime?Butwithsuchtrivialrequests(forinstance,among



butratherthatthepossibilityofrobustreason-givingamongstrangersshowsthatevencompletestrangersdoafterallstandinsomeimpor-tantnormativerelationstoeachother,andindeedthatallofusknowasmuch.59

59. Forhelpfuldiscussionandconversations, I thankHagitBenbaji,MitchBer-man,AnneBurkard,TerenceCuneo,JohnDeigh,CianDorr,JaniceDowell,LuísDuarted’Almeida,YuvalEylon,AlonHarel,ScottHershovits,TomHur-ka,ArnonKeren,SerenaOlsaretti,JosephRaz,HiliRazinsky,GideonRosen,Mark Schroeder, Stefan Sciaraffa, Russ Shafer-Landau, Hanoch Sheinman,DavidSobel,DavidSosa,NickSouthwood,SigrúnSvavarsdóttir,MarkvanRoojen;audiencesattheHebrewUniversity,Oxford,Rice;andtwoextreme-lyhelpfulrefereesforThePhilosopher’sImprint.WhileworkingonthispaperIwasafellowattheInstituteforAdvancedStudiesattheHebrewUniversityinJerusalem,andIgratefullyacknowledgetheInstitute’ssupport.Also,thisresearchwassupportedbytheIsraelScienceFoundation(grantno.136/09).



JosephRaz, “TheProblemofAuthority: Revisiting the ServiceCon-ception”,90 Minnesota Law Review (2005–6),1003–1044.

SimonRobertson,“CreatingReasons”,unpublishedmanuscript.StephenSchiffer,Meaning(OxfordandNewYork:OxfordUniversity

Press,1972).Stephen Schiffer, Remnants of Meaning (Cambridge, MA: The MIT

Press,1987).Stefan Sciaraffa, “On Content-Independent Reasons: It’s Not in the

Name”,Law and Philosophy28(2009),233–260.MarkSchroeder,‘TheScopeofInstrumentalReason.’Philosophical Per-

spectives18(Ethics),2004,337–364.MarkSchroeder, “CudworthandNormativeExplanations”, Journal of

Ethics and Social Philosophy 1(3) (2005),availableon lineatwww.jesp.org.

Mark Scroeder, “Having Reasons”, Philosophical Studies 139(1) (April2008),57–71.

R. JayWallace, “Reasons,Relations,andCommands:ReflectionsonDarwall”,Ethics118(2007),24–36.

GaryWatson,“Promises,Reasons,andNormativePowers”,inReasons for Action, edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009),155–178.

References

GeoffreyCupit, “HowRequests (and Promises)CreateObligations”,The Philosophical Quarterly44(1994),439–455.

StephenDarwall, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,2006).

StephenDarwall,“ReplytoKorsgaard,Wallace,andWatson”,Ethics118(2007),52–69.

DavidEnoch,“NotJustaTruthometer:TakingOneselfSeriously(ButNotTooSeriously)inCasesofPeerDisagreement”,forthcominginMind.

DavidEnoch,“BeingResponsible,TakingResponsibility,andPenum-bralAgency”, forthcoming inLuck, Value and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams,editedbyUlrikeHeuerandGer-aldLang,OxfordUniversityPress,2011.

David M. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (PrincetonandOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress,2008).

H.L.A.Hart,“CommandsandAuthoritativeLegalReasons”,inhisEs-says on Bentham(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1982),243–268.

Douglas Lavin, “Stephen Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint: Mo-rality, Respect, and Accountability”, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, available at: http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=12063.

RichardMoran, “Getting Told and Being Believed”, Philosophers’ Im-print 5(5) (2005), available at: http://www.philosophersimprint.org/images/3521354.0005.005.pdf.

Postema, Gerald, “Law as Command: The Model of Command inModernJurisprudence”,Philosophical Issues11,470–501.

Rawls,J.(1980),“KantianConstructivisminMoralTheory”,The Journal of Philosophy77,515–572.

JosephRaz,Practical Reason and Norms (London:Hutchinson&Co.,1975).

JosephRaz,The Morality of Freedom(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1986).

http://www.jesp.org

http://www.jesp.org

http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=12063

http://www.philosophersimprint.org/images/3521354.0005.005.pdf

http://www.philosophersimprint.org/images/3521354.0005.005.pdf