1

7

Geographical Indications as Property European Union Association Agreements and Investor State Provisions

AnselmKampermanSanders

7.1 Introduction

UnderEuropeanUnion(EU)law,geographicalindications(GIs)areprotectedunder

threeguises:theprotectedGIs(PGI),theprotecteddesignationsoforigin(PDOs),and

thetraditionalspecialitiesguaranteed(TSGs).FortheEU,theprotectionofitsGIsin

andoutsideofEuropeisaveryrelevanteconomicissue,asthevalueofGIproductsin

2010wasestimatedat€54.3billion,ofwhichthesaleofwinesaccountsformorethan

half.1ItisnosurprisethattheEUisvigorouslytryingtoobtainprotectionforitsGIsin

majortradepartnernations.However,inthecontextoftheWorldTradeOrganization

(WTO),newworldnations,mostnotablytheNorthAmericas,AustraliaandNew

Zealand,haveconsistentlyrejectedthenotionofamultilateralregisterforGIsthatis

dominatedbyEuropeanclaims.Thus,itcomesasnosurprisethenthatinthecontextof

theWTOnegotiationmandatecontainedintheAgreementonTrade-RelatedAspectsof

1SeeFinalReportofAnd-Internationalontheexternalstudy:‘Valueof

productionofagriculturalproductsandfoodstuffs,wines,aromatisedwinesandspiritsprotectedbyageographicalindication(GI)’(October2012),http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/external-studies/value-gi_en.htm.

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IntellectualPropertyRights(TRIPS)2underArticle23,3nosignificantprogresshasbeen

madeorcanbeexpectedinthenearfuture.

Asaresultofthisstalemateatthemultilaterallevel,thestrategyoftheEUhas

beentoplacetheprotectionofGIsattheheartofitsintellectualproperty(IP)chapters

inbilateraltradeandinvestmentagreements(BTIAs).Inparticular,Article3(1)(e)of

theTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion(TFEU)4providestheEUwiththe

exclusivecompetencetodealwithcommoncommercialpolicy.5AccordingtoArticle

2SeeAgreementonTrade-RelatedAspectsofIntellectualPropertyRights,15April,1994,MarrakeshAgreementEstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization,Annex1C,1869U.N.T.S.299[hereinafterTRIPS].

3Seeid.art.23(4),whichmandatesthat‘negotiationsshallbeundertakenintheCouncilforTRIPSconcerningtheestablishmentofamultilateralsystemofnotificationandregistrationofgeographicalindications’.

4ConsolidatedVersionoftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,10October2012,2012O.J.(C326)1[hereinafterTFEU].

Begin Complex Note

5Seeid.Art.3(1)(e).SeeCase22/70,Comm’nv.Council,1971E.C.R.263[hereinafterERTA]:

EachtimetheCommunity[…]adoptsprovisionslayingdown

commonrules[…],theMemberStatesnolongerhavetheright,acting

individuallyorevencollectively,toundertakeobligationswiththird

countrieswhichaffectthoserules.[…]Whensuchcommonrulescome

intobeing,theCommunityaloneisinapositiontoassumeandcarryout

contractualobligationstowardsthirdcountriesaffectingthewhole

sphereofapplicationoftheCommunitylegalsystem.[…]Totheextentto

whichCommunityrulesarepromulgatedfortheattainmentofthe

objectivesoftheTreaty,theMemberStatescannot,outsidethe

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207(1)oftheTFEU,6thisincludescommercialaspectsofIP.Notsurprisingly,the

numberofEUBTIAsisquicklygrowingandtheEU-SouthKorea7andEU-Singapore8

FreeTradeAgreements(FTAs),therecentCanada-EUTradeAgreement(CETA)9and

theEU-VietnamTradeAgreement10allcontainannexeslistingtheGIsthataretobe

protectedinthepartnercountriesaspartofthetradedeal.

ThenatureofBTIAs,however,isthatthesearemixedagreementsdealingwith

issuesoftariffsandtrade,butalsowithinvestmentprotectionand,increasingly,

investor-statedisputesettlement(ISDS).InthecontextoftheongoingnegotiationsISDS

hasbecomeahighlycontroversialissue,includinginthenegotiationsurroundingthe

TransatlanticTradeandInvestmentPartnershipAgreement(TTIP).11Thecontroversy

frameworkoftheCommunityinstitutions,assumeobligationswhich

mightaffectthoserulesoraltertheirscope.

End Complex Note

6TFEU,art.207(1).7EU-SouthKoreaFreeTradeAgreement,EU-S.Kor.,16September2010,54O.J.

(L127)1,46–47,http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:TOC.

8EU-SingaporeFreeTradeAgreement,EU-Sing.,20September2013,http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/singapore/.

9ComprehensiveTradeandEconomicAgreement,Can.-EU,ConsolidatedCETAText,ch.22,IntellectualProperty,26September2014,http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf[hereinafterCETA].

10EU-VietnamFreeTradeAgreement,EU-Viet.,5August2015,http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/august/tradoc_153674.pdf[hereinafterEU-VietnamFTA].

11TheTransatlanticTradeandInvestmentPartnership(TTIP)iscurrentlystillundernegotiation.FurtherdetailscanbeseenatInfocus:TransatlanticTradeand

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liesinthefactthatthepolicyfreedomofasignatorystatetoanagreementcontaining

ISDSmaybecomelimitedonaccountofinvestorexpectationsthathavetobehonoured.

ThecontroversyisremarkabletotheextentthatISDShasbeenaprominentfeaturein

internationaltradeandinvestmentframeworkssincethemid-1970s.Infact,the

proliferationofISDSinbilateralagreementsissowidespreadandaffectssomany

tradingnationsglobally12thatitisalmostsurprisingthatrelativelyfewcaseshavebeen

broughtsofarclaimingviolationsundertheseprovisions.Alsoregionaltrade

agreementsliketheNorthAmericanFTA(NAFTA)13andtheTrans-PacificPartnership

Agreement(TPP)14containISDSclauses.

However,theconceptofISDSisrelativelynewinthefieldofIP.Thisisduetothe

factthatIPonlybecameaglobaltradeissuerelativelyrecentlythroughtheintegration

ofIPstandardsandIPenforcementintheWTOframework.Thatsaid,IPisalsopeculiar

inthesensethatthevaluationofIPasanobjectofpropertythatcanbeviewedasan

investmentisalsoarelativelynewconcept.Evennow,variousapproachestovaluation

accordingtoincome-based,market-basedandreviewofcost-basedapproaches,

coupledwithdivergingreportingstandards,yielddifferentresults.15Still,thenumberof

InvestmentPartnership(TTIP),EUR.COMM’N,http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/(lastupdated2June2016).

12AshortinternetsearchalsorevealsthatISDSisnotexclusivetotradedealsinvolvingWesternnations.Asiancountriesareequallypartiestosuchagreements,alsowhenitconcernstheirregionaltradeandinvestmentpartners.

13NorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement,US-Can.-Mex.,17December1992,32I.L.M.289(1993)[hereinafterNAFTA].

14Trans-PacificPartnership,ch.18,IntellectualProperty,5November2015,https://medium.com/the-trans-pacific-partnership/intellectual-property-3479efdc7adf#.ux18hliw0[hereinafterTPP,IntellectualPropertyChapter].

15SeeFinalReportfromtheExpertGrouponIntellectualPropertyValuation(29November2013),https://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/Expert_Group_Report_on_Intellectual_Property_Valuation_IP_web_2.pdf.

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ISDScomplaintsisrisingandthefirstcasesinvolvingcoreissuesofIPexpropriationare

currentlypending.

OfallIPrights,theEUregimeontheprotectionofGIsinvitesasubstantial

involvementofpublicauthorityindefiningtheGI’sspecification,aswellasthequality

maintenancethereof.Thismeansthatanychangeinthespecificationmaygiverisetoan

investor-statedispute.ThischapterchartsthelikelihoodthatGIsmaybecomeaboneof

contentionunderconstitutionalexpropriationprotectionlaws,WTOdisputesandISDS,

andconcludesthatgiventhenatureofGIprotection’sinclusionofspecifications,there

isahigherstateinvolvement,andaccordingly,ahigherlikelihoodthatmeasures

negativelyaffectingaGIproprietor’srightscanbeattributedtoastate.

7.2 Geographical Indications and Specifications in the European Union

TheEUPGI,PDOandTSGschemesoperateonthebasisofregistrationintheDatabase

OfOriginandRegistration(DOOR).16Therearealsoproduct-specificregimesand

databases,suchastheE-BACCHUS17forwinesandE-SPIRITDRINKS18forspirits.EU

lawalsoprotectsGIsforaromatizedwineproducts.19Generally,EUlawappliesto

productsoriginatingfromEUMemberStatesandthirdcountriesthatcomplywithEU

16SeeDOOR,EUR.COMM’N,

http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/list.html(lastvisited5June2016).17SeeE-Bacchus,EUR.COMM’N,http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/wine/e-

bacchus/.18SeeE-Spirit-Drinks,EUR.COMM’N,http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/spirits/.19Councilregulation1601/91of10June1991,layingdowngeneralrulesonthe

definition,descriptionandpresentationofaromatizedwines,aromatizedwine-baseddrinksandaromatizedwine-productcocktails,1991O.J.(L149)1.

6

rules.Alongsidetheexistingpublicregistries,thereareseveralcertificationschemesfor

agriculturalproductsandfoodstuffsintheEU.Theserangefromcomplianceobligations

withcompulsoryproductionstandardstoadditionalvoluntaryrequirementsrelatingto

environmentalprotection,animalwelfare,organolepticqualities,etc.Also,allkindsof

‘fairtrade’or‘slavefree’epithetsfallwithinthesevoluntaryregimes.Alltheseregimes

should,however,beincompliancewiththe‘EUbestpracticeguidelinesforvoluntary

certificationschemesforagriculturalproductsandfoodstuffs’,20inordertobein

compliancewithEUlaw.

In2005,theUnitedStates(theUS)andAustraliasuccessfullychallengedthe

legitimacyofECRegulation2081/9221onGIsforagriculturalproductsandfoodstuffs,

whichwastheregulationinforceatthetime,beforetheWTO.Theregulationcontained

anumberofcontentiousprovisions,namelyonthe(1)equivalenceandreciprocity

conditionsinrespectofGIprotection;(2)proceduresrequiringnon-EUnationals,or

personsresidentorestablishedinnon-EUcountries,tofileanapplicationorobjection

intheEuropeanCommunitiesthroughtheirowngovernment,butnotdirectlywithEU

MemberStates;and(3)arequirementonthird-countrygovernmentstoprovidea

declarationthatstructureswereinplaceontheirterritoryenablingtheinspectionof

compliancewiththespecificationsoftheGIregistration.Onallthreepoints,theWTO

Panel22foundviolationsofArticle3(1)ofTRIPS23andArticleIII(4)oftheGeneral

20CommissionCommunication–EUbestpracticeguidelinesforvoluntary

certificationschemesforagriculturalproductsandfoodstuffs,2010O.J.(C341)4,5.21CouncilRegulation2081/92of14July1992,ontheprotectionofGIsand

designationsoforiginforagriculturalproductsandfoodstuffs,1992O.J.(L208)1–8.22ComplaintbytheUnitedStates,EC–TrademarksandGeographicalIndications

forAgriculturalProductsandFoodstuffs,WTODoc.WT/DS174/R(adopted20April2005);ComplaintbyAustralia,EC–ProtectionsofTrademarksandGeographicalIndicationsforAgriculturalProductsandFoodstuffs,WTODoc.WT/DS290/R(adopted

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AgreementonTariffsandTrade1994(GATT),24andthattheGATTviolationswerenot

justifiedbyArticleXX(d)ofGATT.25IntheAustralianReport,theWTOPanelfurther

foundthattheseinspectionstructuresdidnotconstitutea‘technicalregulation’within

themeaningoftheAgreementonTechnicalBarrierstoTrade(TBT).26Asaresult,the

EUchangeditsregimeinMarch2006toensurecompliancewiththeWTOregime,

currentlyprimarilythroughtheFoodstuffsRegulation,27andcorrespondingprovisions

intheotherRegulations.28Thescopeorprotectionextendstoconsumerdeception;29

20April2005);seealsoLotharEhring,NationalTreatmentUndertheGATT1994,inTHEPRINCIPLEOFNATIONALTREATMENTININTERNATIONALECONOMICLAW–TRADE,INVESTMENTANDINTELLECTUALPROPERTY34–54(AnselmKampermanSandersed.,2014)[hereinafterTHEPRINCIPLEOFNATIONALTREATMENTININTERNATIONALECONOMICLAW];AnselmKampermanSanders,NationalTreatmentUndertheTRIPSAgreement,inTHEPRINCIPLEOFNATIONALTREATMENTININTERNATIONALECONOMICLAW,supra,at286–99.

23SeeTRIPS,art.3(1)(obligatingNationalTreatment(NT)inrespectofWTOMemberStates).

24SeeGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade,15April1994,MarrakeshAgreementEstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization,Annex1A,LegalInstruments–ResultsoftheUruguayRound,art.III(4),1867U.N.T.S.187(1994)[hereinafterGATT1994].

25GATT1994,art.XX(d)(providingthatanexceptioncanbemadetomeasuresfallingfoulofthemandatedstandardsiftheyare‘necessarytosecurecompliancewithlawsorregulations’).

26SeeAgreementonTechnicalBarrierstoTrade,GATTSecretariat.UruguayRoundofMultilateralTradeNegotiations:LegalInstrumentsEmbodyingtheResultsoftheUruguayRoundofMultilateralTradeNegotiationsdoneatMarrakeshon15April1994(2003),GATTDoc.MTN/FAII-A1A-6(15December1993)[hereinafterTBT],www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt.pdf.

27Regulation1151/2012concerningcertainfoodstuffsandcertainnon-foodagriculturalproducts(the‘FoodstuffsRegulation’),2012O.J.(L343),1–29.

28Regulation1308/2013concerningwinesandsparklingwines,2013O.J.(L347)671–854;Regulation110/2008onthedefinition,description,presentation,labellingandtheprotectionofgeographicalindicationsofspiritdrinks,2008O.J.(L39)16–54;CouncilRegulation1601/91of10June1991,layingdowngeneralrulesonthe

8

commercialuseincomparableproducts;30commercialuseexploitingreputation;31and

misuse,imitationorevocation32inrelationtotheregisteredGI.TheenforcementofaGI

is,however,aprivatelawissue.

Moreinteresting,forthepurposeofthischapter,however,istheproduct

specification–itsestablishment,inspectionandenforcement–asthisrequiresthe

involvementofpublicauthority.Thedefinitionoftheproductaccordingtoprecise

specificationsanditsanalysisbynationalauthoritiesisaprocessintegraltothe

registrationoftheGIattheEUlevel.

Begin Table

Table Image

Source:http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/schemes/index_en

.htm

End Table

Thedefinitionoftheproductcomprisesthefollowingelements:theproduct

name,applicantdetails,productclass,thenameoftheproduct,thedescriptionofthe

product,adefinitionofthegeographicalarea,proofoftheproduct’sorigin,adescription

ofthemethodofproduction,thelinkagebetweentheproductandthearea,the

definition,descriptionandpresentationofaromatizedwines,aromatizedwine-baseddrinksandaromatizedwine-productcocktails,1991O.J.(L149)1–9.

292012O.J.(L343),art.13(c)–(d).302012O.J.(L343),art.13(a).31Id.32Id.art.13(b).

9

nominationofaninspectionbodyandlabellinginformation.33ForPDOs,allproduction

stepsmusttakeplacewithinthegeographicalarea,whereasforPGIsatleastone

productionstepmusttakeplacewithinthegeographicalarea.Itisalsoatthispoint

wherespecificrulesconcerningslicing,grating,packagingandthelikeoftheproductto

whichtheregisterednamerefersmaybestatedandjustified.Giventhefactthatthese

typesofconditionsonrepackagingorslicingresultingeographicalrestrictionshaving

strongprotectionistandanticompetitiveeffects,theyareamongthemostcontroversial

specifications.

In1997,theConsorziodelProsciuttodiParma,34theItaliantradeassociationof

200traditionalproducersofParmaHam,soughtinjunctionsagainstAsdaStoresinthe

UnitedKingdomtorestrainthemfromsellingpre-slicedpacketsofprosciuttoas‘Parma

Ham’,aprotectedPDO.ThehamwasslicedbyasupplierofAsdaoutsidetheproduction

region,andpre-packagedwithoutsupervisionbytheinspectionbodyresponsiblefor

enforcingEUproductionregulations.Theslicingofthehamitselfcannotbeproblematic

assuch,35butthequestioniswhetherslicingthehamawayfromtheconsumer’seyes

andofferingthemasapre-packagedproductnotbearingtheConsorzio’smarkwould

beinfringinguponthePDO.TheConsorzio’sargumentwasthattheconsumercouldnot

verifytheorigin,andthequalityofthehamcouldnotbeguaranteed.TheCourtof

33SeeGuidetoApplicants,EUR.COMM’N,

http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/schemes/guides/guide-for-applicants_en.pdf(lastvisited5June2016).

34SeePROSCIUTTODIPARMA,www.prosciuttodiparma.com/(lastvisited5June2016).

35Onecanfollowthehilariousvideosofthe‘ProsciuttodiParmaDOPslicinginstructionvideosonYouTube.ProsciuttodiParmaDOP,EnglishTutorial:PreparingandslicingParmaHam,YOUTUBE(16October2012),www.youtube.com/watch?v=_qfVIzmqlGE.

10

JusticeoftheEuropeanUnion(CJEU36)held37thatprotectionconferredbyaPDOdid

notnormallyextendtooperationssuchasgrating,slicingandpackagingtheproduct.

TheCJEU,however,statedthatthoseoperationswereprohibitedtothirdparties

outsidetheregionofproductiononlyiftheywereexpresslylaiddowninthe

specification,andifthisconditionwasbroughttotheattentionofeconomicoperators

byadequatepublicityinCommunitylegislation.Thelatterwasnotyetthecaseunder

theoldregime.38UnderArticle8.239ofRegulation1151/2012,theproductspecification

isnowtobeincludedinthesingledocumentthatiscontainedintheDOORregister,and

theConsorziocannowenforceitsslicingandpackagingrules.

Thespecificationalsocontainsthenamesoftheinspectionbodiesresponsible

forenforcingEUproductionregulations.40IneachMemberState,publicauthoritiesor

governmentagenciesareentrustedwiththistask.Whenitcomestodefiningor

redefiningthespecification,however,quitealotofstateinvolvementcanbeobserved.

Acaseonpointistheenlargementin2009,activelysupportedbytheItalian

government,oftheareaofproductionfor‘ItalianProsecco’.41Theproductionofthis

36FormerlyEuropeanCourtofJustice(ECJ).37CaseC-108/01,ConsorziodelProsciuttodiParmaenSalumificioS.RitaSpAv.

AsdaStoresLtdandHygradeFoodsLtd.,2003E.C.R.I-5163.38Regulation2081/92ontheprotectionofgeographicalindicationsand

designationsoforiginforagriculturalproductsandfoodstuffs,1992O.J.(L208)1–8.392012O.J.(L343),art.8(2).40Foralistofinspectionbodies,seeEUR.COMM’N,

http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/schemes/compliance-authorities_en.pdf(lastvisited5June2016).

41SeeProseccoWine,WINE-SEARCHER,www.wine-searcher.com/regions-prosecco(lastupdated7November2013),forabriefsummary;FilippoMattiaGinanni,The2009ProseccoDOCReform,WINE&SPIRITEDUC.TR.,www.wsetglobal.com/documents/julian_brind_scholarship_2015_prosecco_reform__filippo_ginanni.pdf.

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sparklingwinehasbeentraditionallyconfinedtotheVenetoRegionaroundVenice,but

itwassuddenly‘strategically’expandedtoincludethetownofProsecco,whichis

locatedintheFriuli-VeneziaGiuliaRegionnearTriesteandtheSlovenianborder.Thisis

theplacewheretheProseccograpevarietyisbelievedtohaveoriginatedfrom.Yet,

uponaccessiontotheEUin2013,CroatiafoundthatitssweetProšekdessertwine,

whichisdifferentfromItalianProseccoinallaspectsofmethodsofproductionand

grapesused,couldnolongercoexistintheEUwithItalianProsecco.42

Inshort,GIsarepeculiarinthesensethattheyconstituteatypeofIPrightwhere

alotofstateinvolvementcanbeobserved,especiallyinthedrafting,maintenanceand

alterationoftheGI’sspecification.ThismayleadtotheconsortiumofGIproducers,or

the(semi-)stateauthorityitselftoalteraGIspecificationaftertheGIhasbeen

registered.Asaconsequence,thismaygiverisetoinvestor-statedisputesbyprivate

partiesthatmayconsiderthemselvesaffectedbythesechangesortherecognitionofGIs

ingeneral(inthattheymaynolongerbeabletomarkettheirproductsunderthesame

orsimilarnames),sincemanyofthesemeasuresleadingtothedefinitionoftheGI’s

specificationcanbedirectlyorindirectlyattributedtothestate.

7.3 Geographical Indications as Property

LikeotherIPrights,GIsareprotectedasproprietaryinterests.Thisbecomesapparent

fromtheWTOPanelreportinEC–TrademarksandGeographicalIndications,43but

evenmoresointhecontextoftheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(ECHR).

42SeeAnselmKampermanSanders,GeographicalIndicationsofOrigin:WhenGIs

BecomeCommodities,AllGlovesComeOff,46IIC-INT’LREV.INTELL.PROP.&COMPETITIONL.(IIC)755–59(2015).

431992O.J.(L208)1–8.

12

InthecaseofAnheuser-Buschv.Portugal,theEuropeanCourtofHumanRights

(ECtHR)heldthattheprotectionprovidedforbyArticle1oftheProtocolNo.1tothe

ECHR,44whichguaranteestherighttoproperty,45isapplicabletoIPassuch.46This

44SeeMonicaCarss-Frisk,AGuidetotheImplementationofArticle1ofthe

ProtocolNo.1totheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights,inHUMANRIGHTSHANDBOOK(Eur.Council,HumanRightsHandbooksNo.4,2001),www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRHAND/DG2-EN-HRHAND-04(2003).pdf.

Begin Complex Note

45ConventionfortheProtectionofHumanRightsandFundamentalFreedomsProtocol1art.1,4November1950,213U.N.T.S.222(EuropeanConventiononHumanRights)[hereinafterECHR]:

Everynaturalorlegalpersonisentitledtothepeacefulenjoyment

ofhispossessions.Nooneshallbedeprivedofhispossessionsexceptin

thepublicinterestandsubjecttotheconditionsprovidedforbylawand

bythegeneralprinciplesofinternationallaw.

Theprecedingprovisionsshallnot,however,inanywayimpairthe

rightofastatetoenforcesuchlawsatitdeemsnecessarytocontrolthe

useofpropertyinaccordancewiththegeneralinterestortosecurethe

paymentoftaxesorothercontributionsorpenalties.

End Complex Note

46Anheuser-BuschInc.v.Portugal,App.No.73049/01,44Eur.H.R.Rep.42,para.72(2007)(statingthat‘Article1ofProtocolNo.1isapplicabletointellectualpropertyassuch’,butinthecaseathanddecidedthatlegitimateregulatoryinterestsmayjustifyinterferencewiththerightofpropertyinlinewiththecourt’sgeneralapproachtointerferencewiththerighttoproperty).SeealsoAnselmKampermanSanders,ProfessionalCaseComment,CaseNo.73049/01oftheGrandChamberoftheECHR,Anheuser-BushInc.v.Portugal,4EUR.HUMANRIGHTSCASES(EHRC)433–37(2007).

13

meansthattheownerofanintellectual‘possession’isprotectedinrespectof(1)the

peacefulenjoymentofproperty;(2)deprivationofpossessionsandtheconditions

thereto;and(3)thecontroloftheuseofpropertybythestateinaccordancewith

generalinterest.Inherentintheconventionistherecognitionthatafairbalanceneeds

tobestruckbetweenthedemandsofthegeneralinterestsofsocietyandthe

requirementsoftheprotectionoftheindividual’sfundamentalrights.47

Since2000theEUCharterontheProtectionofFundamentalHumanRights48

recognizedsimilarprinciplesthatEUcitizenscanrelyon.InScarletExtendedv.

Sabam,49theCJEUheld:

47SeeJamesv.theUnitedKingdom,8Eur.H.R.Rep.A98,para.46(1986).

Begin Complex Note

48CharterofFundamentalRightsoftheEuropeanUnionart.17,18December2000,2000O.J.(C364)1,ontherighttopropertyprovides:

1. Everyonehastherighttoown,use,disposeofandbequeathhisorher

lawfullyacquiredpossessions.Noonemaybedeprivedofhisorher

possessions,exceptinthepublicinterestandinthecasesandunderthe

conditionsprovidedforbylaw,subjecttofaircompensationbeingpaidin

goodtimefortheirloss.Theuseofpropertymayberegulatedbylawinso

farasisnecessaryforthegeneralinterest.

2. Intellectualpropertyshallbeprotected.

End Complex Note

49CaseC-70/10ScarletExtendedv.SociétéBelgedesauteurs,compositeursetéditeursSCRL(SABAM),2011E.C.R.I-11959.

14

Theprotectionoftherighttointellectualpropertyisindeed

enshrinedinArticle17(2)oftheCharterofFundamentalRightsofthe

EuropeanUnion(‘theCharter’).Thereis,however,nothingwhatsoeverin

thewordingofthatprovisionorintheCourt’scase-lawtosuggestthat

thatrightisinviolableandmustforthatreasonbeabsolutelyprotected…

Theprotectionofthefundamentalrighttoproperty,whichincludesthe

rightslinkedtointellectualproperty,mustbebalancedagainstthe

protectionofotherfundamentalrights.

Opinionsonhowthisbalanceshouldbestruck,however,naturallydiffer,dependingon

one’sperspective.InaEuropeancase,BritishAmericanTobacco,50involvingchallenges

torestrictionsonadvertising,brandingandtrademarkcommunicationinrelationto

tobaccoproducts,theCJEUheldthatrestrictionsontrademarkuserequiringlabelsto

displayhealthwarningsbytakingup30percentofthefrontand40percentoftheback

ofacigarettepackage51amounttoalegitimaterestrictionthatstillallowsforanormal

useofthetrademark.Thetobaccocompanieshadarguedthatthereisadefacto

expropriationoftheirpropertyinthetrademark.Asimilarargumentwasmadeinthe

well-publicizedcaseconstitutionalchallengetotheAustralianTobaccoPlainPackaging

Act2011.52TheHighCourtofAustraliainBATv.CommonwealthofAustralia53heldthat

50CaseC-491/01,TheQueenv.SecretaryofStateforHealth,exparteBritish

AmericanTobacco(Investments)LtdandImperialTobaccoLtd.,2002E.C.R.I-11453.51CurrentrequirementsareevenmorestringentunderDirective2014/40/EU,

oftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof3April2014,ontheapproximationofthelaws,regulationsandadministrativeprovisionsoftheMemberStatesconcerningthemanufacture,presentationandsaleoftobaccoandrelatedproductsandrepealingDirective2001/37/EC,2014O.J.(L127)1,withArts.8–10amountingtoa‘75%rule’intermsofthepackagehavingtodisplayhealthwarnings.

52SeeTobaccoPlainPackagingAct2011(Austl.).

15

therewasnoacquisitionofpropertythatwouldhaverequiredso-called‘justterms’

protectionundertheAustralianconstitution.YetitistheAustralianTobaccoPlain

PackagingAct2011thathasalsoproducedtwoWTOchallengestotobaccoplain

packaging,byUkraine54andbyanumberofotherstates.55AlthoughUkrainesuspended

itsproceedingson28May2015,thelitigationbyHonduras,Cuba,Indonesiaandthe

DominicanRepublicremainsunaffected.Plainpackagingalsosparkedinvestor-state

disputes.56Thesecasesraisequestionsontheremainingpolicyfreedomthatnation

stateshaveinregulatingtheuseorexerciseofIPinlightofsocietalinterests,suchas

publichealth,inthecontextofmultilateralandbilateraltradeagreements,and

investmentprotectionagreements.

53BritishAmericanTobaccoAustralasiaLimitedandOrsv.Commonwealthof

Australia,2012250CLR1.54ComplaintbyUkraine,Australia–CertainMeasuresConcerningTrademarks,

andOtherPlainPackagingRequirementsApplicabletoTobaccoProductsandPackaging,WTODoc.WT/DS343/1(13March2012).

55ComplaintbyHonduras,Australia–CertainMeasuresConcerningTrademarks,GeographicalIndicationsandOtherPlainPackagingRequirementsApplicabletoTobaccoProductsandPackaging,WTODoc.WT/DS435/1(4April2012[hereinafterAustralia–CertainMeasuresConcerningTrademarks);ComplaintbyDominicanRepublic,Australia–CertainMeasuresConcerningTrademarks,WTODoc.WT/DS441/1(18July2012);ComplaintbyCuba,Australia–CertainMeasuresConcerningTrademarks,WTODoc.WT/DS458/1(3May2013);andComplaintbyIndonesia,Australia–CertainMeasuresConcerningTrademarks,WTODoc.WT/DS467/1(20September2013).

56SeeinfraPartV.

16

7.4 Investor-State Dispute Settlement and WTO Law

Bilateralfreetradeandinvestmentagreementsmayprovideadditionalprotectionto

investorsinrelationtotheirinvestmentsthatarethenconsideredtobe‘possessions’in

thestatewheresuchinvestmentshavebeenmade.Thequestionisthentowhatextent

protectiongrantedbymeansofbilateralagreementschangesthelegalrelations

betweenWTOMembers.AlthoughtheannexestoEUBTIAslistGIsthataretobe

protectedundertheagreement,57itremainstobeexaminedwhattheireffectunderthe

WTODisputeSettlementUnderstanding(DSU)is.

TheWTOAppellateBody,inMexico–TaxesonSoftDrinks,58rejectedthenotion

thatpartiescanmodifyWTOobligationsbymeansofanFTA,whereastheWTOPanelin

Peru–AdditionalDuty59wasnotsocategoricallyopposed.Inthelattercase,thereare

numerousreferencestoPeru’sfreedomtomaintainapricerangesystem(PRS)under

anFTAwithcomplainantGuatemala.TheWTOPanel,however,observedthattheFTA

inquestionwasnotyetinforce,andthatitsprovisionsshouldthereforehavelimited

legaleffectsonthedisputeathand.Peru’sargumentsinrespectoftheFTAwerethat,

evenassumingthatPeru’sPRSwasWTO-inconsistent,PeruandGuatemalahad

modifiedbetweenthemselvestherelevantWTOprovisionstotheextentthattheFTA

allowedPerutomaintainthePRS.Uponappeal,theAppellateBodystated:

57SeesupraPartI.58AppellateBodyReport,Mexico–TaxMeasuresonSoftDrinksandOther

Beverages,WTODoc.WT/DS308/AB/R,(adopted6March2006).59PanelReport,Peru–AdditionalDutyonImportsofCertainAgricultural

Products,WTODoc.WT/DS457/R(adopted27November2014)[hereinafterAdditionalDutyPanelReport].

17

[W]eareoftheviewthattheconsiderationofprovisionsofanFTA

forthepurposeofdeterminingwhetheraMemberhascompliedwithits

WTOobligationsinvolveslegalcharacterizationsthatfallwithinthescope

ofappellatereviewunderArticle17.6oftheDSU.60

However,italsoconsideredthatWTOMemberscannotmodifyWTOprovisionssuch

thatthesebecomeWTO-inconsistent,evenifthesechanges‘merely’operatebilaterally

interpartesandnotamongstallWTOMembers.Inparticular,theAppellateBodyheld:

Wenote,however,thatPeruhasnotyetratifiedtheFTA.Inthis

respect,itisnotclearwhetherPerucanbeconsideredasa‘party’tothe

FTA.Moreover,weexpressreservationsastowhethertheprovisionsof

theFTA(inparticularparagraph9ofAnnex2.3),whichcouldarguablybe

construedastoallowPerutomaintainthePRSinitsbilateralrelations

withGuatemala,canbeusedunderArticle31(3)oftheVienna

ConventioninestablishingthecommonintentionofWTOMembers

underlyingtheprovisionsofArticle4.2oftheAgreementonAgriculture

andArticleII:1(b)oftheGATT1994.Inourview,suchanapproachwould

suggestthatWTOprovisionscanbeinterpreteddifferently,dependingon

theMemberstowhichtheyapplyandontheirrightsandobligations

underanFTAtowhichtheyareparties.61

Inthecaseathand,thismeansthatPeruundertheFTAisonlyallowedtomaintaina

WTO-consistentPRS,whichshouldmeettherequirementsofArticleXXIV62oftheGATT

60AppellateBodyReport,Peru–AdditionalDutyonImportsofCertain

AgriculturalProducts,5.86WTODoc.WT/DS457/AB/R(adopted20July2015).61AdditionalDutyPanelReport,supranote60,at¶5.106.62GATT1994art.XXIV(5)(providingthatpartiescanformcustomunionsor

freetradeareas,subjecttocertainconditionsbeingmet).

18

1994,whichpermitscertainspecificdeviationsfromWTOrules.Allsuchdepartures

requirethatthelevelofdutiesandotherregulationsofcommerceapplicableineachof

theFTAmemberstothetradeofnon-FTAmembersshallnotbehigherormore

restrictivethanthoseapplicablepriortotheformationoftheFTA.63

InTurkey–Textiles,64theAppellateBodyheldthatthejustificationformeasures

thatareinconsistentwithcertainGATT1994provisionsrequiresthepartyclaimingthe

benefitofthedefenceprovidedforbyArticleXXIVGATT1994liesincloserintegration

betweentheeconomiesofthecountriespartytosuchanagreement.Itisclearthat

Peru’sPRSmeasurecannotbeinterpretedasameasurefosteringcloserintegration;

rather,itresultsintheopposite.TheGI‘claw-back’annexestoEUBTIAscanarguably

beheldtocontainobligationsthatapproximatetheeconomiesofthepartiestothe

agreement,providingtheholderofsuchaGIlegalcertaintynotonlyastotheprotection

andenforcementoftheGIbutalsoastotheprotectionofan‘investment’intermsof

productionandmarketingofaGIproduct.

TheWTODisputeSettlementBodyhasmeanwhileestablisheddispute

settlementpanelsinrelationtoAustralia’stobaccoplainpackagingmeasure.GIsare

partofthepropertypackageonwhichtheclaimisbased.Thefivecomplainantsare

arguingthatthemeasureisinconsistentwithAustralia’sWTOobligationsunder

TRIPS,65TBT66andtheGATT1994.67InrespectoftrademarksandGIs,theclaimisthat

restrictionsontheiruseamounttoanexpropriationofproperty.Thereisonlyone

63GATT1994art.XXIV(5)(a).64AppellateBodyReport,Turkey–RestrictionsonImportsofTextileand

ClothingProducts,WTODoc.WT/DS34/AB/R(adopted19November1999).65TRIPS,supranote2.66TBT,supranote26.67GATT1994art.III(4).

19

caveatthatwillbeofrelevancetoadecisioninthesecases68inthecontextofTRIPS,and

thatisthatinEC–GeographicalIndications,thepanelheld:

[T]heTRIPSAgreementdoesnotgenerallyprovideforthegrantof

positiverightstoexploitorusecertainsubjectmatter,butrather

providesforthegrantofnegativerightstopreventcertainacts.This

fundamentalfeatureofintellectualpropertyprotectioninherentlygrants

Membersfreedomtopursuelegitimatepublicpolicyobjectivessince

manymeasurestoattainthosepublicpolicyobjectiveslieoutsidethe

scopeofintellectualpropertyrightsanddonotrequireanexception

undertheTRIPSAgreement.69

7.5 Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Geographical Indications

TheISDScaseofPhilipMorrisAsiav.Australia70showsthatinvestor-statedisputescan

bebroughtinsupportof,orasanalternativeto,constitutionalandWTOchallenges.In

thiscase,PhilipMorrisAsiachallengedthetobaccoplainpackaginglegislationunder

the1993AgreementbetweentheGovernmentofAustraliaandtheGovernmentofHong

KongforthePromotionandProtectionofInvestments.Thearbitrationwasconducted

undertheUnitedNationsCommissiononInternationalTradeLaw(UNCITRAL)

68Seesupranotes54&55.TheChairofthepanelinformedtheDispute

SettlementBodyon10October2014thatthepanelexpectstoissueitsfinalreporttothepartiesinthesecondhalfof2016.

69SeePanelReport,EC–TrademarksandGeographicalIndications,7.210,WTODoc.WT/DS/174R(adopted15March2005).

70PhilipMorrisAsiaLimited(HongKong)v.TheCommonwealthofAustralia,CaseNo.2012–12(Perm.Ct.Arb.22June2011),www.pcacases.com/web/view/5.

20

ArbitrationRules2010.71Inadecisionof18December2015,theTribunalhearingthe

caseruledthatithadnojurisdictiontohearPhilipMorrisAsia’sclaim.

However,itisimportanttorealizethattheproliferationofISDSclausesin

bilateraltradeagreementsisincreasing.Investor-statedisputesettlementrevolves

aroundthequestionofwhetherexpropriation,directlyorindirectly,hasbeen

conductedaccordingtotheprinciplesofFairandEquitableTreatment(FET).FETis

determinedthroughapplyingprinciplesof(1)reasonableness,(2)consistency,(3)non-

discrimination,(4)transparencyand(5)dueprocess.Inthiscontext,thelegitimate

expectationsofaninvestoraretakenintoconsiderationinordertoassesswhetherthe

statehasexpropriatedinbadfaith,throughcoercion,bymeansofthreatsor

harassment.Duetothefactthatthereisnotrueharmonizedmultilateraldispute

settlementsysteminrelationtoinvestmentdisputes,theinterpretationandapplication

oftheseprinciplesarenotuniform.Duetotheconfidentialnatureofarbitration,notall

arbitrationreportsarepublic.Themostconcreteexpressionsofwhatlegitimate

investorexpectationsarecanbefoundinstatementsmadeinpublishedcasesthatseem

toindicatethatabalancemustbestruck.

Forexample,inInternationalThunderbirdv.Mexico,72aNAFTAdispute

conductedunderUNCITRALArbitrationRules,thepanelheld:

[A]situationwhereaContractingParty’sconductcreates

reasonableandjustifiableexpectationsonthepartofaninvestor(or

investment)toactinrelianceonsaidconduct,suchthatafailurebythe

71UNCITRALArbitrationRules,U.N.COMM’NINT’LTRADEL.,

www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2010Arbitration_rules.html(lastvisited6June2016).

72InternationalThunderbirdGamingCorporationv.TheUnitedMexicanStates,NAFTA,ArbitralAward(26January2006),www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/itn_award.pdf.

21

NAFTAPartytohonourthoseexpectationscouldcausetheinvestor(or

investment)tosufferdamages.73

Conversely,inSalukav.CzechRepublic,74aninvestor-statedisputealsoconducted

underUNCITRALArbitrationRules,thepanelheld:

Noinvestormayreasonablyexpectthatthecircumstances

prevailingatthetimetheinvestmentismaderemaintotallyunchanged.

Inordertodeterminewhetherfrustrationoftheforeigninvestor’s

expectationswasjustifiedandreasonable,thehostState’slegitimateright

subsequentlytoregulatedomesticmattersinthepublicinterestmustbe

takenintoconsiderationaswell.75

TherearefewISDScasesinvolvingIP.76Thesearecasesthathavebeenarguedunder

therulesoftheInternationalCentreforSettlementofInvestmentDisputes(ICSID),

whichisanindependentbranchoftheWorldBank.

First,therewasafailedattemptatarguingatrademarkinfringementcaseunder

investor-statedisputesettlementinAHSv.Niger.77Inthiscase,althoughaconcessionto

serviceNiger’snationalairporthadbeenterminated,therewascontinueduseofseized

equipmentanduniformsbearingthetrademarksofthecomplainant.Thepanelheld

73Id.at49,para.147.74SalukaInvestmentsBV(TheNetherlands)v.CzechRepublic,PartialAward,

(Perm.Ct.Arb.17March2006),http://archive.pca-cpa.org/SAL-CZ%20Partial%20Award%20170306ba57.pdf?fil_id=105.

75Id.at66,para.305.76Foracomprehensiveoverview,seeH.GrosseRuse-Khan,Litigating

IntellectualPropertyRightsinInvestor-StateArbitration:FromPlainPackagingtoPatentRevocation(Univ.Cambridge,LegalStudiesResearchPaperSeriesNo.52,2014).

77AHSNigerandMenziesMiddleEastandAfricaS.A.v.RepublicofNiger,ICSIDCaseNo.ARB/11/11Award(15July2013),www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3034.pdf.

22

thatithadnojurisdiction,asIPenforcementisacivilmatterthatcannotberaisedinthe

contextoftheISDSexpropriationcomplaint.

Second,thereistheongoingcaseofPhilipMorrisv.Uruguay78thatisargued

undertheUruguay-SwitzerlandFTA,79andwherethelegitimacyofplainpackaging

tobaccoproductsischallenged.Inthiscasejurisdictionhasbeenestablishedand

proceedingsonthemeritsaretofollow.

Third,thereisaNAFTA80casearguedunderUNCITRALArbitrationRules.InEli

Lillyv.Canada,81pharmaceuticalcompanyEliLillysoughtdamagesfor$100million

CADandchallengedchangestothepatentabilityrequirementsinrespectofutilityor

industrialapplicability,leadingtheCanadianpatentofficetoinvalidatetwoofEliLilly’s

patentsfortheStratteraattention-deficitdisorderpillandtheZyprexaantipsychotic

treatment.EliLillyarguedthattheinterpretationoftheterm‘useful’intheCanadian

PatentActbytheCanadiancourtsledtoanunjustifiedexpropriationandaviolationof

Canada’sobligationsunderNAFTAonthebasisthatitisarbitraryanddiscriminatory.

CanadaconverselyarguedthatEliLilly’sclaimswerebeyondthejurisdictionofthe

Tribunal.ThehearingisscheduledforMay30–June9,2016.

CasesinvolvingIPcanbeandareclearlybroughtifmeasuresnegatively

impactinguponthe‘investment’canbeattributedtoastatethathassubmittedtoISDS.

IssuessuchasIPenforcementorthresholdsforpatentabilityassuchappeartobe

78PhilipMorrisBrandsSàrlv.OrientalRepublicofUruguay,ICSIDCaseNo.

ARB/10/7,www.italaw.com/cases/460.79AgreementBetweentheSwissConfederationandtheOrientalRepublicof

UruguayontheRecipocalPromotionandProtectionofInvestments,7October1988,1976U.N.T.S.389.

80NAFTA,supranote13.81EliLillyandCo.v.TheGovernmentofCanada,ICSIDCaseNo.UNCT/14/2

NAFTA(7November2012).

23

outsideoftheremitofISDS,astheseareciviloradministrativematterswhereaccessto

judicialreviewisusuallyprovided.However,complaintsover(arbitraryor

discriminatory)denialofjusticemaynotbe.Inthecasesdescribedabove,onecanargue

thatthegeneralmeasurestakenareneitherofanarbitrarynordiscriminatorynature.

GIspecifications,ontheotherhand,arediscriminatorybynaturesincetheyarealways

specificallytargeted,andthischaracteristicexceedsthealreadyexclusionarynatureof

anIPright.Thisisbecause,aswehaveseen,thedefinitionoftheproductcomprisesnot

onlytheproductnameandrelatedlabellingbutalsothedescriptionoftheproduct,a

definitionofthegeographicalarea,proofoftheproduct’sorigin,adescriptionofthe

methodofproduction,thelinkagebetweentheproductandthearea,thenominationof

aninspectionbodyempoweredtopolicethespecification.

Thismeansthatthereareanumberofactionsthatmayhaveanimmediate

impact,notonlyontheexistenceandexerciseofaGI,butalsoonitsvalueandcosts.

TheexampleoftheItalianProseccoDOCreform82comestomind,asanenlargementof

thegeographicalarea,butalsoapossiblereductionthereofhasimmediateeffectsfor

producerswithinandoutsideofthearea.Productionmethodsmayalsobesubjectto

changes.Changestoproductionrequirementsresultingfromaraiseinfoodsafety

standardsmaybelegitimizedwithinthecontextoftheWTOAgreementonthe

ApplicationofSanitaryandPhytosanitaryMeasures(SPS).83ManyoftheGIproduction

requirementsare,however,steepedinatraditionandculturethatsolicitthedemand

82Seesupranote41.83SeeAgreementontheApplicationofSanitaryandPhytosanitaryMeasures,15

April1994,MarrakeshAgreementEstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization,Annex1,1867U.N.T.S.493.

24

foraparticularproduct.Ifone,forexample,ordersLimburgGrottoCheese,84one

expectsthecheesetohavebeenripenedthroughcompletelynaturalprocessesby

exposureofthecheesetotheatmosphereofalimestonecavethatcontainsthe

BrevibacteriumLinensthatproducesacheesewithapungentodour.Thecheesesripen

onoakwoodenboardsandneedtobeturnedregularly.Thisisadelicateoperationas

thefungigrowingonthecheesesarepoisonous.Theresultoffoodsafetystandards(no

oak,stainlesssteelracks,etc.)hasbeenthatthetraditionalproductionforthe

traditionalconnoisseurconsumerhasnowmovedliterallyandfiguratively

underground.Asaresult,onlythemoreindustrialproducersremainaroundtosella

productthatiscompliantwithlegalstandards.Theyaresellingaproductthatmaybe

safer(althoughthisisoftendisputed)butiscertainlyfarlesstraditionalthanthe

consumerisledtobelieve.Phasing-outrulesconcerningslicing,grating,packaging,etc.

stemfromadesiretofreethemarketfromanticompetitiverestrictions,butarguably

thesecouldalsobemeasuresthathaveanegativeimpactontheinvestmentsmadeby

producersbenefittingfromGIspecificationscontainingsuchrules.Theseformsof

proprietaryprotectionofGIsviaindividualregulationsarealsoopentonon-European

entities,aswehaveseenabove.So,aUSassociationthatholdsanEUGI,suchasthe

IdahoPotatoCommission,85couldthenalsosuebeforethespecialISDScourts

envisagedundertheTTIP86foraweakeningorstrengtheningofprotectionstandardsin

Europe.Inmostcases,afterall,themeasurecanbeattributedtothestate,anddespite

84The‘DuchyofLimburg’wasastateintheHolyRomanEmpire(1065–1794)andapartoftheGermanConfederation(1839–1867).Since1839‘Limburg’isaprovinceinBelgium,andaprovinceintheNetherlands.Furthermore,itisthenameofatowninBelgium,andinGermanyitisusedinrespectofvariouscities,towns,acastle,abbeyandairfield.

85SeeIDAHOPOTATOCOMM’N,https://idahopotato.com(lastvisited6June2016).86EU-VietnamFTA,supranote10.

25

attemptsbyEUMemberStatestodenyprivatepartiestherighttoinvokeinternational

treaties,theCJEUhasaffirmedthedirecteffectofinternationaltreatiesthatbindthe

EU.87

7.6 Conclusion

MorethananyotherIP,aGIdisplaysaveryhighlevelofstateinvolvementinrelationto

specificationsthatdonotdirectlyconcerntheexerciseoftheIPrightintermsof

protectionagainstconsumerconfusionandthelike,butthatverymuchinfluencesthe

valueoftheGIforitsowner.Definitionsofterritory,methodsofproduction,sanitary

andphytosanitarystandards,andothermorenefariousrulesconcerningslicing,

grating,packaging,etc.canbechangedatthebehestofmembersoftheconsortium,but

alsoof(semi-)stateauthoritiesoragencies.Insofarastheseleadtoanegativeimpacton

membersoftheconsortium,orthirdparties,thereappearstobeanincreaseinthe

optionstochallengesuchmeasuresunderdomesticconstitutionalandWTOrules,or

bilateralandregionaltradeandinvestmentagreementscontainingISDS.TheseISDS

87CaseC-104/81,HauptzollamtMainzv.C.A.Kupferberg,1982E.C.R.3641.See

alsoCaseC-265/03,IgorSimutenkovv.MinisteriodeEducaciónyCulturaandRealFederaciónEspañoladeFútbol(EU-RussiaPartnershipAgreement),2005E.C.R.I-2579(precludingimposinglimitsinfieldingindividualsportsmenfromnon-EEAmembers).ButseeCaseC-240/09,LesoochranárskezoskupenieVLKv.MinisterstvoživotnéhoprostrediaSlovenskejrepubliky(AarhusConvention),2011E.C.R.I-1255(holdingthatintheabsenceofEUrulesgoverningthematter,itisforthedomesticlegalsystemofeachMemberStatetolaydownthedetailedproceduralrulesgoverningactionsforsafeguardingrightswhichindividualsderivefromEUlaw);JoinedCasesC-404&C-4055/12P,Councilv.StichtingNatuurenMilieuandPesticideActionNetworkEurope(AarhusConvention),2015EUR-LexCELEXLEXIS62012CJ0404(13January2015)(holdingthatanNGOhasnostandingtoinvoketheAarhusConventioninachallengetothepostponementofcleanairrequirements).

26

clausesarecommonlyincludedinrecentUSandEUtradeandinvestmentagreements,

alsothosewithAsianpartners.Todate,onlyalimitednumberofsuchcasesthathave

beenbroughtinvolveIPrights.Thelikelihoodofsuccessappearslimited,butseveral

keycasesarestillpending.InISDScomplaintsoverIPenforcement,tribunalsseem

hesitanttoacceptjurisdictionoverthesecases.Intheplainpackagingtobaccocases,the

questionwillbetheextenttowhichWTOMembershavepolicyfreedominarticulating

exceptionstoWTOobligations.

EUGIspecificationsareverytargetedandindividualinnature,sothatany

measureaffectingthemmaybeconsideredarbitraryordiscriminatorymuchmore

easilyascomparedtogeneralpolicymeasuresaffectingtheuse,grantorscopeofa

trademark,design,copyrightorpatentright.Furthermore,manyspecificationsare

rootedincultureandcustomratherthaninscienceandutility,whichraisesthechances

ofadisputeoverarbitrarinessanddiscriminationinstandardsimposedwhen

determiningissuesofcultureandcustom.Finally,measuresaffectingGIspecifications

areoftenattributabletoapublicauthorityoragency.Thiscombinationincreasesthe

likelihoodofsuccessofclaimsforprotectionofGIsaspropertyandinvestments.If,for

example,anEUcompanytakesover(i.e.,invests)abusinesslocatedinVietnamor

KoreathatisinvolvedintheproductionofaGIproduct,andtheVietnameseorKorean

authorityredefinesthegeographicalareainsuchawaythattheEUcompanycanno

longerusethatGI,thiscouldgiverisetoanISDScase.ThesamecouldbetrueforaUS

companymakinginvestmentsinAsianjurisdictions.Thisshouldbetakeninto

considerationwhendraftingorchangingGIproductspecifications.