Author: Malcolm Scott Date: March 15, 2012 Palestinian nationalism did not become an autonomous, established movement until the
1960s, but the underlying conceptual frameworks for Palestinian nationalism dates back at least
to the late nineteenth century. The formation of these conceptual frameworks began in response
to the increasing divisions within the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, and these conceptual
frameworks became more important after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. While
these frameworks existed, the relevance of ideas for Palestinian nationalism was limited
primarily to intellectuals and local Palestinian elites. Even for that subset of the population,
Palestinian notables divided into factions either supporting Palestinian nationalism or a broader
pan-Arab unity (Muslih 1988, 155-156). For most of the population, there was a need for
familiar institutions such as Islamic beliefs to generate a sense of identity, and there needed to be
greater distinctions between factions of Arab nationalists to limit the viability of Palestinians as
pan-Arab supporters. For Palestinian nationalism to develop in the form seen after the 1940s,
religious institutions were some preexisting institutions supporting an immature nationalist
movement, and tensions within the pan-Arab/Arab nationalist movement were necessary to
interpret Arab identity within a Palestinian perspective. Different sources of preexisting identities
and institutions were necessary to form the basis for Palestinian nationalism.
The union of multiple identities within Palestinian nationalism is not necessarily unusual
or exceptional. During the early twentieth century, this was a common trend among nationalist
movements in counties of the Middle East. In this context, nationalist movements for Lebanon,
Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt all developed based on previous circumstances and preexisting
affiliations (Khalidi 1997, 20). The development of Palestinian nationalism from previous
cultural, informal institutions and the basis on regional affiliation was not unique or unexpected
compared to the rest of the region. Local affiliations were necessary for the development of
nationalism in many areas of the Middle East (Khalidi 1997, 21). These local affiliations
arguably then became a lens through which to interpret other ideologies and movements
impacting the Middle East, such as Zionism, Arab nationalism or Islamism (Khalidi 1997, 21).
A sense of Palestinian identity did not fail to begin its formation towards the end of the
Ottoman Empire (Khalidi 1997, 58). One newspaper Filastin was notable for its increasing
references to ‘Palestine’ and ‘Palestinians’, and this occurred as the Ottoman Empire was in its
final years (Khalidi 1997, 58). In the early twentieth century, there was already a nascent sense
of regional if not national identity in the Palestinian locale. A few newspaper references to a
Palestinian identity were not sufficient to have cultivated a new nation. However, the sense of
identity was already present before World War I, even if this sense of identity was weak. This
Palestinian identity would face additional barriers to its synthesis into a national identity aside
from its immaturity.
Palestinians had a greater focus on local, family or political divisions compared to other
nationalist movements (Khalidi 1997, 25). While other nationalist movements in areas such as
Tunisia and Egypt were stronger and more cohesive, internal social divisions weakened the
nascent nationalism in Palestine (Khalidi 1997, 25). While other Arab nationalist movements
also had internal divisions impeding nationalism (and within nationalist movements themselves
in the case of Lebanon), other Arab nationalist movements still formed a minimal modicum of
consensus and unity despite internal differences (Khalidi 1997, 24-25). A significant advantage
for other Arab nation-states in formation was the presence of central states that reinforced
nationalist narratives, and this was not advantage available for Palestinian nationalists (Khalidi
1997, 20). In addition, the Palestinian was under pressure from the British Empire and the
Zionist movements. Under those circumstances, shifts in cultural paradigms would be much
more difficult for developing Palestinian nationalism, and overlapping, intertwined identities
would become more important for the early formation of nationalistic ideas.
Palestinian identity would not necessarily conflict with other sources of identity such as
Arabism, Ottomanism, or Islam. These identities existed in a framework in which these different
identities were complementary. Such a dynamic can be seen in the mindset of Ruhi al-Khalidi, a
notable born in 1868 of the al-Khalidi family. Ruhi al-Khalidi received traditional religious
education in Jerusalem and attended other schools in Jerusalem, Beirut, Tripoli and France
(Khalidi 1997, 76-77). He eventually received the position of Ottoman Consul-General in
Bordeaux in 1898 (Khalidi 1997, 79). In his mind, local Jerusalem, Arab, Palestinian and
Ottoman identities were overlapping and not mutually exclusive (Khalidi 1997, 85). His
construction of identities could not qualify as part of the Palestinian nationalist movement
necessarily, because Arab identity for him was cultural in form (Khalidi 1997, 85). While under
the Ottoman Empire and as a member of the Committee of Union and Progress (political
organization in the Ottoman Empire and later Turkey), this Arab identity was not yet political in
nature (Khalidi 1997, 85). Ruhi al-Khalidi was not alone in his regard of diverse identities.
Different intellectuals shared the regard for diverse identities espoused by Ruhi al-
Khalidi. His uncle Yusuf Diya’ shared these conceptions of these multiple identities (Khalidi
1997, 87). Nonetheless, intellectuals and notables such as Ruhi al-Khalidi had provided a
framework for these multiple identities to coexist and helped to provide a foundation for
Palestinian nationalism (Khalidi 1997, 85). For most of his life, the Ottoman Empire was
relevant force, but his reconciliation of his different identities provides a demonstration of the
mechanisms facilitating Palestinian nationalism. Additional examination demonstrates a
religious dimension to local Palestinian identity from the late nineteenth to early twentieth
century.
The location of the city Jerusalem in the Palestinian locale was important for the
development of religious movements in association with Palestinian nationalism. The city of
Jerusalem is well known as a holy site for three monotheistic beliefs, Judaism, Christianity and
Islam (Khalidi 1997, 29). It was not only Jerusalem to be of religious significance but also other
cities, including and not limited to Hebron, Bethlehem, Gaza, Acre and Jericho (Khalidi 1997,
29). Prior to the rise of Palestinian nationalism, these sacred spaces created preliminary national
boundaries for a Palestinian locale. Because most Palestinians had a shared connection with the
city of Jerusalem through one of the faiths, the city became a focal point for Palestinian identity
(Khalidi 1997, 35). These dynamics would create at least one means by which religious and
nationalist interests could intersect during the twentieth century.
An additional phenomenon was the contribution of religious families to the foundations
of Palestinian nationalism. A trend was the transition of members of families specializing in
religious authority to roles in government bureaucracy (Khalidi 1997, 70). A demonstration of
this dynamic was a member of the al-Khalidi family, Yusuf Diya’, uncle to Ruhi al-Khalidi
(Khalidi 1997, 70). His father was al-Sayyid Muhammad ‘Ali al-Khalidi (1781-1865), who had
become a qadi in Jerusalem (Khalidi 1997, 65). Likewise, three of the brothers of Yusuf Diya al-
Khalidi had trained to become ulama (Khalidi 1997, 67). By contrast, as part of a growing
broader trend, Yusuf Diya’ acquired additional training in foreign languages and other subjects
aside from Islamic studies, and he eventually became a member of the Ottoman parliament
(Khalidi 1997, 67-68). As illustrated in this instance, Islamic social practices within Palestine
provided a reserve of competent and qualified individuals who could also provide support for
political activity and facilitate the development of Palestinian nationalism. However, the
relationship between local, Palestinian identity and religious identity is deeper than the power of
religious families and geography of sacred sites.
Islam in the early twentieth century Palestine was instrumental to the development of
Palestinian nationalism. Under the mandate system, there was often an alignment of outsider
identities and non-adherence to Islam (Gershoni and Jankowshi 1997, 196). Distinction between
peoples of different beliefs could be means to distinguish local Palestinians from deemed
outsiders of others, such as Zionists or European labor forces for the mandate system (Gershoni
and Jankowshi 1997, 196). In this perspective, it is not difficult to understand that religious
institutions could have facilitated the process of “othering” necessary for the development of
Palestinian identity. However, the role of Islamic institutions in nascent Palestinian identity
cannot be ascribed simply to bigotry.
Religious leaders (primarily imams and khatibs) were often instrumental in mass
mobilization. Acts of resistance under the mandate system received a dimension of religious and
spiritual significance in a society with weak local identities (Gershoni and Jankowshi 1997, 196).
National identity in Palestine was barely existent and few people aside from intellectuals and
local notables considered it (Gershoni and Jankowshi 1997, 196). Islamic institutions and
symbols provided a means of communication familiar to most individuals, which was an effect
of Ottoman power (Gershoni and Jankowshi 1997, 196). Through religious narratives
encompassing events as early as the Crusades even, religious discourse began to provide a
foundation for a broader narrative for Palestinian identity, and this discourse provided a history
for the local identity (Gershoni and Jankowshi 1997, 196). In this perspective, Palestinian
religious institutions acted as supporting cultural institutions and as scaffolding for a Palestinian
national identity. These institutions themselves did not exert influence on Palestinian society
unilaterally, but these institutions had frequently intersected with narratives for Arab
nationalism.
The broad nature of Arab nationalism had been a feature of its earlier narratives during
the 1920s through 1950s (Gershoni and Jankowski 1997, 7). The primary focus in the foundation
of Arab nationalism had originally been lingual, and the Arab nation was early conceived as the
community of those who spoke the Arabic language (Gershoni and Jankowski 1997, 7). Arabic
speech determined the physical and metaphysical boundaries for what was the Arab nation
(Gershoni and Jankowski 1997. 7). In these early narratives, history of the Arab nation and its
icons and customs formed to create a greater narrative for the nationalists living in the early
twentieth century (Gershoni and Jankowski 1997. 7). Within this narrative, there was an early
distinction between Arab nationalism and regard for more provincial homelands (Gershoni and
Jankowski 1997, 8). Conceptually, the early narrative for Arab nationalism already had a
framework for distinction between the Arab community as a whole and specific, provincial
communities of Arabs within that broader community. This tension was more clearly seen
between Palestinian and Syrian nationalists after World War I. It is important to note that Islam
was incorporated into the narratives for Arab nation, in which Islam was a stage in the
development of the Arab nation (Gershoni and Jankowski 1997, 7). Early in the narrative of
Arab nationalism, there was already a conceptual space for Islam in Arab nationalism, and this
made it easier for the different streams of thought to align.
The alignment of Islamic and pro-Arab sentiments is exemplified in the activities of a
Syrian intellectual known as Muhammad Rashid Rida. Rida was primarily an Islamic intellectual
and moved to Egypt from Syria in 1897 (Muslih 1988, 74). Once in Egypt, he edited a monthly
publication known as al-Mansar, and he attempted to combine pro-Islamic and pro-Arabic
sentiments as an early member of the salafis, those who advocated practices in accordance with
Muslim forbears (Muslih 1988, 74). His interpretation was notable. His intellectual ancestors
were Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abduh, two leading nineteenth century
thinkers, who focused mostly on the Islamic reform or the advance of Muslims (Muslih 1988,
74). When the Ottoman Empire practiced policies that Rida regarded as detrimental to Arab
interests when the Young Turks deposed the sultan, however, he then became a strong advocate
of Arab Islam and an aggressive anti-Zionist (Muslih 1988, 74). The instance of Muhammad
Rashid Rida is an illustration of different, evolving identities in the wake of the declining
Ottoman Empire; as the Ottoman Empire explicitly assumed Turkish language and culture, the
distinction between Arab and Turkish identities arose and likewise different interpretations of
Islam, which had previously been a broader, more capacious Ottoman Islam.
When the political movement known as the Young Turks seized power from the Ottoman
sultanate in 1909 and the Committee of Union and Progress rose to power in what would become
Turkey, the differentiation between Arab and Turkish identities began. Across the Arab world, in
Mecca, Baghdad and Damascus, there was widespread opposition to the coup of the Young
Turks (Muslih 1988, 57). The reaction among Palestinian elites formerly aligned with the
Ottoman Empire was similar to that of Arab regions of the empire, and the sentiment is
demonstrated in Ihsan al-Nimr and his accounts of their reactions (Muslih 1988, 57). Al-Nimr
described the opposition from older, Palestinian elites to the Committee of Union and Progress,
including that of al-Hajj Tawfiq Hammad, leader of a branch of the Muhammadan Union Society
(Muslih 1988, 57). This is a stark contrast to earlier years of Ottoman Palestine, in which Arabs
and non-Arabs had these identities subsumed under a more capacious Muslim identity (Muslih
1988, 59). This more expansive religious identity was key to the union of the Ottoman Empire
even as Arab and Turkish identities became more distinct during the nineteenth century (Muslih
1988, 60). The role of religiosity in the Ottoman Empire and the emphasis on the umma, the
community of Muslim believers, could have been a precursor for the role of religion in
Palestinian nationalism. However, Turkish nationalism became a matter of imperial politics.
When the Young Turks attempted to impose Turkish language and culture on Arab populations,
Arab nationalism became a more significantly stronger movement than before that time (Muslih
1988, 60). The attraction of Arab nationalism was especially strong for younger Palestinian elites
compared to the older elites who gained power originally through the Ottoman Empire. Some of
these elites had maintained their power via relations with the Committee of Union and Progress
(Mulih 1988, 64). However, from 1909 to the end of the World War I, the Ottoman identity itself
was gradually weakening in Palestine, and this was important for the rise of pan-Arab, Arab
nationalist identities for Palestinians (Muslih 1988, 68).
There had originally been broad aspirations for pan-Arabism as the Ottoman Empire went
into decline. A notable thinker in this regard was Arab nationalist Najib ‘Azuri, who was also a
staunch anti-Zionist (Muslih 1988, 76). In 1905, ‘Azuri published a book in Paris translated into
English as The Awakening of the Arab Nation. Through this book, ‘Azuri advocated that the
Arabs secede from the Ottoman Empire in response to intolerable persecution, as he saw it
(Muslih 1988, 74). More importantly, ‘Azuri had a vision for pan-Arabism in which an empire
would extend through Mesopotamia, Syria, the Arabian Peninsula and Palestine (Muslih 1988,
74). His work contained dimensions of anti-Semitism that could be found in the works of other
Arab nationalists for that time (Muslih 1988, 78). In his opposition to Zionism, ‘Azuri had made
regional and social assessments of Palestine, albeit often inaccurate assessments (Muslih 1988,
78). In the work of ‘Azuri, there is groundwork for the development of Arab nationalism as it
was originally conceived. While this was not the same interpretation of Arab nationalism as
espoused by Arab nationalists in Palestine, an overall principle unity and the foundation of pan-
Arab unity has its beginning partly from the work of ‘Azuri. This emphasis on unity more
closely reflected the general sentiment compelling Palestinian Arab nationalists to unite with
Syria. This would become less feasible as greater distinctions between different factions of Arab
nationalists became prominent after World War I.
The strongest barrier to broader pan-Arab unity was the mandate system, which would
facilitate the development of Palestinian nationalism. The barrier of the mandate system can be
seen through the perspective of ‘Anwi ‘Abd al-Hadi. ‘Abd al-Hadi was a Palestinian lawyer
educated in France who assisted Prince Faisal, son of Sherif Hussein of Mecca, to prevent the
separation of Palestine and Syria under the mandate system (Talhami 2001, 6). In his mind, the
nation of Syria encompassed both Palestine and Transjordan (Talhami 2001, 6). When Prince
Faisal appointed to direct foreign affairs after his return in Damascus in 1920, he had a special
view into the divisions of Arab communities created as a result of the mandate system (Talhami
2001, 6). When the French and British governments began to divide Syria under the mandate
system, ‘Anwi ‘Abd al-Hadi observed how these imposed divisions created divisions within
Arab communities, which was a surprise for him (Talhami 2001, 7). When these divisions within
Arab communities were created through the mandate system, this facilitated the creation of
multiple, locally derived identities within the broader Arab identity espoused for Arab
nationalism. This transformation of Arab identity from the beginning of the twentieth century to
the beginning of the mandate system facilitated regional interpretations of Arab identity,
including in Palestine. The internal weaknesses of Arab nationalism during the first few years
after World War I merely facilitated this process.
Forces within the Arab nationalist movements were pulling Palestinians and other Arab
factions apart after the end of World War I. Originally Palestinian Arab nationalists had immense
power in the government of King Faisal, which they tried to use to great effect for Palestinian
incorporation into Greater Syria (Muslih 1988, 201; 119). Many thousands of Palestinians
worked in different positions of Syrian government in Damascus, and they exerted their
influence to try to incorporate Palestine into this envisioned country (Muslih 1988, 119). Along
with Iraqis, their influence in the government in Damascus provoked much resentment and
contempt from Syrian notables (Muslih 1988, 151). This tension between Syrian notables and
Palestinian and Iraqi advocates weakened the cohesion of the pan-Arab movement (Muslih 1988,
201). Members of the Syrian National Party were the most vehement opponents of Palestinian
advocates and their ideal of Palestinian integration (Muslih 1988, 201). An additional weakness
for the Arab nationalist movement stemmed from policy decisions of Prince Faisal, and this was
simply another factor in the development of Palestinian nationalism.
The pan-Arab unity further underwent weakening in response the policies of Prince
Faisal in response to Zionism. For Prince Faisal, an agreement with local Zionists was useful to
secure British support (Muslih 1988, 202). While this was suitable for Syria as a primary
objective, Palestinians who saw their locale as a primary objective and opposed Zionist
movements found this course of action to violate their highest priorities (Muslih 1988, 202).
Zionism was a highly specific target in their local struggles (Muslih 1988, 202). Both tensions
between Arab notables and the policies of Faisal towards the Zionists revealed crucial
weaknesses in the pan-Arab movement: the movement encompassed and often subordinated to
diverse, local regional interests (Muslih 1988, 203). A primary weakness was there were Arabs
of considerably different backgrounds enclosed within this whole regional movement, and the
local identities were too powerful to be contained with the Arab nationalist movement (Muslih
1988, 203).
This represented a crucial break for Arab nationalists from Palestine. Their Arab identity
would more directly have local elements of Palestinian identity, as there would be for Iraqis and
Syrians (Muslih 1988, 203). By 1920, the political separation of Palestine and Syria had entered
its completion. Even though, this was not the end of an evolving relationship between Palestinian
and Arab identities, there was an evolution of an Arab identity in Palestine that would have
distinctly Palestinian dimensions. From the end the nineteenth century to the early twentieth
century, Palestinian identity was originally Ottoman, then pan-Arab, and then Arab with a local,
increasingly explicit Palestinian dimension. By this time, there was an alignment of Arab and
religious identities, and this was visible in the Young Muslim Men’s Association of the 1920s.
The Young Men’s Muslim Association demonstrated the alignment of Arab and religious
interests for Palestinian nationalism during the 1920s and 1930s. The Young Men’s Muslim
Association (YMMA) was simply a variation of the Young Men’s Christian Association
conception; Palestinian branches for the YMMA were founded, starting in 1928 Jaffa (Yukie
2009, 240). For the creation of the Palestinian branches of the organization, those offices had the
support of the Supreme Muslim Council (Yukie 2009, 241). While the YMMA has had a
reputation in much historical literature as source of terrorism performed in the name of Islam, the
bulk of its activities were political and not religious in nature (Yukie 2009, 240). Although the
YMMA had been dissolved by 1934, many former members were instrumental to the
mobilization of different groups in Palestinian society (Yukie 2009). This organization (its
former members, more specifically) was pivotal to the creation of cohesive movements for the
first stage of the 1936-1939 Great Arab Revolt (Yukie 2009, 238). An additional fact of
importance was that the YMMA was inclusive of multiple Palestinian communities (Yukie 2009,
240). These assessments of the YMMA demonstrate how religious and local institutions aligned
along lines of Arab identity, and this cohesion was part of a developing Palestinian identity. That
this nominally religious organization originally had the support of the Supreme Muslim Council
does not indicate merely that these organizations were more relevant than Palestinian identity.
More importantly, these other institutions had been nurturing Palestinian identity and precursors
for Palestinian nationalism. The involvement of the YMMA and its origins illustrate how
religious and Arab identities could align to enhance a local, Palestinian narrative.
Preexisting religious and Arab nationalist institutions were necessary to cultivate
Palestinian nationalism during and after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. These contributed
auxiliary support and characteristics for the nationalist movement. The institutions created new
features of Palestinian nationalism as they intersected with each other and impacted local
problems such as a lack of social services (Yukie 2009). Arab nationalism became increasingly
local in scope as internal tensions arose within the pan-Arab/Arab nationalist movement, and
religious institutions remaining from the Ottoman Empire provided a means of cohesion for
Palestinian non-elites. The auxiliary institutions were not sufficient to create a fully developed
Palestinian nationalism, but they provided the intellectual groundwork for when this narrative
would have greater appeal.
Works Cited
Gershoni, Israel and James Jankowski. Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Print
Khalidi, Rashid. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Print.
Muslih, Muhammad Y. The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1988. Print.
Tahami, Ghada Hashem. Syria and the Palestinians: The Clash of Nationalisms. University
Press of Florida, 2001. Print.
Yukie, Tamura. “Turning Social Problems into the Basis for Inclusive Movements: A Study of
the Influence the Young Men’s Muslim Associations Had in Palestine through Their
Charitable Activities in the Late 1920s.” Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies. 3.1
(2009): 237-248. Print.