Transcript
Page 1: Extremist Network Interdiction

Extremist Network Interdiction

LCDR Michael Albrecht

LCDR Brian Colburn

LT Michael Wiederholt

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Current Captured US POWs

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Warren Weinstein Caitlan Coleman

Sgt Bowe Bergdahl

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Initial Problem Statement

• How do we rescue our American captives?

• Options:– Department of Defense

• Holding location is believed in the vicinity of Miramshah, Pakistan

• Intractable option due to geo-political boundaries and sensitivities

– State Department• Negotiations

• Prisoner Swap

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Roadblock to Negotiations?

Drone Strikes

•5 Nov 2013, Hakimullah Meshud was killed by a suspected drone strike.

– Claimed to be the reason the Taliban left the peace table.

•Double-Edged Sword

– Significantly degrades the ability, and influence, of our enemies.

– Possibility of severing the ties between the Islamic Emirate and the insurgents who are directly in control of the American captives.

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New Problem Statement

With continued drone strikes, how resilient is the terrorist network

communication?

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Intel Center - Unclassified

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Dirt Bag But not necessarily “terrorist”

Question: How to connect the all the dots?

Associate the connection between the Islamic Emirate to the captives

Mullah Omar

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Compress Chart to Excel

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Name id Within Connections Province strength Attackable

AnwarDangar ANW_DAN PeshawarShura KabulAttackNetwork Parwan$Kapisa 50 1

JalaluddinHaqqani JAL_HAQ HaqqaniNetwork CAPTIVES 1000 1

Dawood DA_W KabulAttackNetwork 1 1

… … … … … ..

.. … … … … .. …

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The Area of Responsibility

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Shura & Province Nodes

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Insurgent Nodes

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The Network

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Shortest-Path

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50

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5

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GAMS Formulation

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Shortest Path Objective

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GAMS Formulation

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Interdiction Dual

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Resilience Curve

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Order of Attack:1. Sirajuddin Haqqani2. Taj Mir Jawad 3. Mullah Omar

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Attack Results

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Resilience Curve

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Order of Attack:1. Ahmed Taha Khalid 2. Badruddin Haqqani 3. Jalaluddin Haqqani 4. Maulawi Sangin Zadran 5. Mohammed Nasir 6. Sirajuddin Haqqani

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Omar not attacked

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Resilience Curve

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Order of Attack:1. Ahmed Taha Khalid 2. Eid Mohammed 3. Hamid Dullah 4. Maulawi Mohammed Ahmed 5. Maulawi Sangin Zadran 6. Sarwar Khan 7. Sirajuddin Haqqani 8. Taj Mir Jawad

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Omar and Jalaluddin not attacked

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Measure of Effectiveness

• Results list– Ahmed Taha Khalid – Eid Mohammed – Hamid Dullah – Maulawi Mohammed Ahmed – Maulawi Sangin Zadran – Sarwar Khan – Sirajuddin Haqqani – Taj Mir Jawad

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Uses of Model

• Identify critical nodes– Sever communications between insurgent entities– Fracture any two insurgent networks

• Modify the start and end nodes

• Prevent unwanted results– Conflicting directives between agencies

• DPMO / State Department work to negotiate release

vs

• DoD strikes to degrade insurgent capabilities

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Limitations / Follow-On Work

• The list is roughly “all or nothing”– Many multiple paths

• Does not detail the significance of any one individual– Higher fidelity influence information is required

• Run model on CLASSIFIED Network– Unknown networks or individuals?

• Other Networks other than Islamic Emirate to negotiate with Haqqani

• Unknown Networks that could influence Haqqani

• Purchase a license through Intel Center (NPS Investment)– Just need $3K-$100k no big deal

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Resources

• Intelcenter.com– Network graph

• Gams code by Dr. Ned Dimitrov– Modified spstop.gms

• Various news articles– www.longwarjournal.com

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Questions?

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QUESTIONS?

COMMENTS?

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