Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2004305
1
Draft of an article forthcoming in Critical Sociology
Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Change and Continuity under Dilma
Par Engstrom
Human Rights Consortium, University of London, UK
Abstract
This article evaluates the degree of policy change and continuity at the intersection of human
rights and foreign policy in the early period of the Dilma Rousseff administration in Brazil.
The smooth character of succession of power in Brazil that Dilma’s election represented
suggests significant policy continuity with her immediate predecessor Luis Inácio Lula da
Silva. In the area of human rights, however, there have been some early indications of policy
shifts. Four particularly salient dimensions of both change and continuity in the areas of
human rights and foreign policy are examined: (i) Brazil’s role as an advocate for global
governance reforms; (ii) its efforts to foster South-South relations; (iii) the character of
Brazil’s power projection; and (iv) its regional leadership role. The article also evaluates the
emergence of Brazil as a pivotal player in global governance and assesses the implications for
the engagement with international human rights by Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil will have
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2004305
2
to manage increasing expectations that the country should play a more active and forceful
role in shaping the development of the international human rights regime.
Keywords
Brazil, Dilma, foreign policy, human rights, Lula, rising power
Introduction
That Brazil is ‘rising’ is increasingly taken for granted both in the academic literature and in
policy-circles. Brazil’s gradual emergence as a pivotal player in global governance together
with its current buoyant economic performance indicate for many a fundamental global
economic and political shift toward the ‘Global South’ and a new multi-polar global order.
During the Lula administrations (2003-2010), Brazilian foreign policy became increasingly
active. Indeed, the increasing assertiveness of Lula’s Brazil was seen by many as a
progressive force on the international arena. In order to distinguish itself from his
predecessor’s perceived acceptance of the liberalizing agenda of the 1990s, Lula pursued a
highly visible foreign policy agenda.
Yet, in the area of international human rights, Lula’s foreign policy remained uneven
and raised fundamental questions regarding the future role of Brazil in the international
human rights regime. This was due to a combination of internal and external factors,
3
including: a fragile domestic social order with continuing human rights violations; a foreign
policy process that tends to privilege narrow conceptions of national interest; and continuing
uncertainty over the role of emerging states in the international human rights regime. These
uncertainties notwithstanding, the rise of Brazil in international relations has generated
increasing expectations, both domestically and in international fora, that Brazil should play a
more prominent role in the international human rights regime (Human Rights Watch, 2009).
The transition of power in Brazil through the election of Dilma Rousseff on 31
October 2010 raised further questions regarding the degree of change or continuity with
Lulismo. The smooth character of succession of power in Brazil that Dilma’s election
represented suggests significant policy continuity with Lula. We may therefore need to look
hard for any indications of change. In the area of human rights, however, many commentators
have been seized on early indications of change.
This article evaluates the degree of policy change and continuity in the early period of
the Dilma administration at the intersection of human rights and foreign policy.i It is divided
into three parts. The first part seeks to very briefly locate human rights in the broader
tradition and trends of Brazilian foreign policy and maps Brazil’s increasing engagement with
the international human rights regime since the transition to democracy in 1985. The second
and main part assesses the extent to which human rights influence Brazil’s formulation and
pursuit of foreign policy objectives. It situates human rights in the broader context of Brazil’s
foreign policy process during the Lula administrations (2003-2010) and examines the early
4
period of the Dilma administration. The concluding part seeks to evaluate the importance of
human rights concerns for Brazilian foreign policy. It also provides some tentative reflections
on present and future trends in Brazilian foreign policy with regards to human rights. 2
Brazil and International Human Rights Since 1985
Since the early days of the international human rights regime Brazil’s relationship with
human rights has been characterized by a significant gap between diplomatic support in
international fora and a problematic human rights record at home. Brazil was an active
participant in the creation of the United Nations and early supporter of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Following the military coup in 1964 however, Brazil became
the target of international human rights pressures as, for example, Amnesty International
adopted Brazilian prisoners of conscience and brought cases of the political use of torture to
the attention of the outside world (Macaulay, 2010). Yet parallel to extensive human rights
abuses being committed in their own country Brazilian diplomats continued to engage with
the international human rights regime, contributing to the drafting of the UN Covenants on
Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights respectively. Brazil’s
military government relied on diplomacy to prevent close examination of its own human
rights record in the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, in order to avoid
5
condemnatory reports such as the ones targeting the Pinochet regime in Chile in particular,
and the Argentine military juntas to a lesser extent.3
In contrast to other Southern Cone countries where human rights significantly shaped
processes of political transition to democratic government, during Brazil’s protracted
transitional period issues related to ‘transitional justice’ played a relative minor role in the
return to civilian rule (Pinheiro, 1998; Barahona de Brito, 2001). In part this can be explained
by the closed and negotiated character of Brazil’s transition to democracy. But the broadly
undisputed 1979 Amnesty Law also ensured that questions of accountability for violations
committed under the military regime remained marginalised during the democratic
transition.4
Yet, since the transition to democracy successive Brazilian governments have
gradually accepted the legitimacy of international concern for the human rights record of
individual countries. Over the course of the last three decades of democratization, Brazil has
shifted its relationship with the international human rights regime from a defensive and
sovereigntist position to a broadly multilateral one. This can most clearly be seen in the
significant increase in the number of Brazilian ratifications of international human rights
treaties, signalling an increasing Brazilian engagement with the international human rights
regime both regionally and globally. Following the transition to democracy successive
Brazilian governments have ratified all the core international human rights treaties, putting in
place a domestic infrastructure of human rights. In the process, Brazil gradually shifted from
6
an obstructionist to a more cooperative relationship with international human rights
monitoring bodies. Moreover, government responses to continuing human rights violations
have evolved as well, from being defensive and reactive to a more pro-active and
institutionalised policy-making (Panizza and Barahona de Brito 1998: 21). In large part these
shifts are driven by broader foreign policy concerns of attaining international legitimacy and
recognition as a reliably democratic state and a global ‘good citizen’. But political leadership
by committed government policymakers played an important role as well. More significantly
though, Brazil’s human rights community started towards the end of the 1990s to pressure the
government with demands for more active human rights policies to ensure compliance with
the country’s international commitments. As Brazilian foreign policy has democratized –
with increasing civil society input – and as Brazil has emerged as a pivotal player in global
governance, the engagement with international human rights by Brazilian foreign policy has
increased. This shift has created the necessary policy conditions for a more active Brazilian
role in the international human rights regime on the one hand, and a more prominent role for
human rights in Brazilian foreign policy more generally, on the other.
Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights: From Lula to Dilma
The installation of the first Lula government in January 2003 was met with significant
anticipation by human rights activists in Brazil and beyond. Given the Workers Party’s record
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of opposition to the military regime and its support for human rights at the local and
municipal levels throughout the 1990s these expectations were to some extent justified.
Moreover, in order to distinguish itself from the Cardoso government’s perceived acceptance
of the liberalizing agenda of the 1990s, Lula pursued an increasingly assertive foreign policy
agenda. Indeed, the Lula presidencies were seen by many as a progressive force on the
international arena in particular. Following Dilma’s election on 31 October 2010, four
particularly salient dimensions of both change and continuity in the areas of human rights and
foreign policy need to be highlighted: (i) Brazil’s role as an advocate for global governance
reforms; (ii) its efforts to foster South-South relations; (iii) the character of Brazil’s power
projection; and (iv) its regional leadership role.
Brazil and Global Governance Reforms
Under Lula Brazil sought to increase its weight and influence in international institutions
through strongly advocating for reform of global governance institutions and the revision of
global norms. This was most clearly seen in intensified efforts to gain a permanent seat on the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but also in Brazil’s successful efforts in joining the
core group of states negotiating the Doha round trade talks of the World Trade Organization.
Brazil has not been strongly revisionist in the positions taken, but it has been opposed to the
status quo as reflected in the policies pursued with regards to issues such as nuclear
8
proliferation (regarding the sanctions regime imposed on Iran) and climate change (regarding
the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ that stresses the need for
developed countries to shoulder the greater burden of the costs of adapting to climate
change). The foreign policy discourse of the Lula administration stressed the need for a more
multi-polar world, and it continued the Brazilian foreign policy tradition of emphasising
multilateralism. It also reflected the more instrumental character of the Brazilian Foreign
Ministry’s attitude towards multilateralism, which tends to frame Brazil’s own interests in
terms of arguments for greater justice and representativeness in global governance
institutions (Hurrell, 2008: 53). These claims resonate widely in Brazil’s ongoing campaign
to reform the UNSC, which draws on the widespread sense of the unrepresentative nature of
international institutions in order to boost Brazil’s own claim for a permanent seat on the
UNSC.5
As highlighted in the negotiations around the new head of the International Monetary
Fund, the Dilma government is likely to continue to press Brazilian demands for global
institutional reforms. Although more assertive in tone, foreign policy under Lula built upon a
deep-rooted nationalist tradition in Brazil of viewing international institutions suspiciously
and the international order as entrenching the privileges of the developed world. The
divisions within Brazilian political elites as to the way to achieve a more prominent role in
the international arena are long-standing. There is a certain ambivalence among political
elites about whether Brazil is part of the ‘West’ and should seek convergence with the global
9
liberal order, or whether the country is a member of the ‘Third World’ and should therefore
identify with the struggle for development and ally with the developing world in order to
push for a greater role in international affairs. Although Brazil has long shared Western ideas
about international law and society, since the 1960s the more nationalist and
developmentalist side of Brazil’s foreign policy identity has prevailed. The foreign policy of
the Cardoso administration drew more actively on the other side of Brazilian national identity
emphasising Brazil’s convergence with the liberal norms of the 1990s. Under Lula the
emphasis was on economic and political sovereignty and on seeking alliances within the
Global South against the West.6 Although Dilma may adopt a less assertive rhetoric she is
likely to follow Lula in viewing the liberal norms of the 1990s concerning democracy, human
rights, and free markets as not reflecting a universal consensus but instead narrow national
interests.7
The consequences for Brazil’s human rights foreign policy are significant. Brazilian
diplomatic discourse on human rights is likely to continue to stress internationalism and
multilateralism and support for global liberal values. And the contrast with Brazil’s
continuing pluralist and ‘Third World’ discourse on matters related to international trade
negotiations, international finance, and the environment is likely to remain unaltered. Hence,
there has been very little evidence of any ‘mainstreaming’ of human rights in Brazilian
foreign policy on the international arena. Brazil under Dilma is likely to remain a
comparatively inactive participant in terms of diplomatically supporting the international
10
human rights regime, launching human rights initiatives in multilateral fora8, and funding and
staffing international agencies with rights mandates.9
Brazil and South-South Relations
The Lula administration prioritised the expansion of relations with other major developing
countries, especially China, India, and South Africa. Efforts to intensify South-South
dialogues were reflected in the increasing formalization of the IBSA forum (India, Brazil, and
South Africa) and the gradual institutionalization of the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India,
and China), but were also seen in the more activist Brazilian diplomacy towards Africa, and
to a lesser extent the Middle East. Partly these diplomatic efforts need to be understood in the
context of Brazil’s attempts to mobilise support for its bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC,
although stronger ties with the Third World also have deep roots in Brazilian national
identity.
Yet, the ambition to build South-South strategic alliances and to gain support for a
UNSC seat has led Brazil to compromise on its commitment to human rights. Although
Brazil has traditionally refused to criticise other countries’ human rights record, for the Lula
administration pragmatic strategic interests trumped more principled concerns for human
rights. Brazil consistently supported China, gave a quick endorsement of Iran’s disputed
presidential elections in 2009, and invited Iran’s president for an official visit. Supporters of
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this pragmatic approach stress the importance of engaging rather than isolating Iran, for
example, and Brazilian diplomats may have calculated that they have very little influence to
change the domestic behaviour of states such as China and Iran in any case. But Lula’s trip to
Israel in March 2010, which was billed as a peace initiative, and to Iran in May 2010 indeed
demonstrated the difficulties for Brazil to engage with international conflicts and promote
humanitarian values.
Here there are some potentially significant indications of a shift by the Dilma
administration. In a much publicised interview with the Washington Post a few days before
taking office on 1 January 2011, Dilma sought to distance herself from Lula by criticising
Brazil’s abstention on the vote on Iran at the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in 2010. The
Dilma administration followed up on this by changing Brazil’s historical voting pattern at the
HRC by supporting an initiative, proposed by the United States, to appoint a rapporteur to
monitor the human rights situation in Iran.10
The vote reflects, in addition to a shift in Brazil’s
relationship with Iran, an increasing government willingness to criticise individual countries
for their human rights record. It is therefore noteworthy that the Brazilian Ambassador in
Geneva justified the vote on the grounds of impartiality:
Brazil believes that all countries, no exception, have challenges to face in this field.
President Rousseff made it quite plain that she will closely monitor the human rights
situation globally, beginning with Brazil. [...] [I]t is a motive of particular concern for
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us the non observance of a moratorium on the death penalty, not only in Iran but in all
those countries that still practice such an execution as punishment . (MercoPress,
2011)
Beyond the diplomatic rhetoric, the signalling seemed to have generated domestic
political dividends. It represented for many a departure from Lula and a step for Dilma out of
the shadow of Lula, which was achieved at a relatively modest cost. For example, Senator
Cristovam Buarque, from the Democratic Labour party (PDT) and Lula’s former education
minister, concurred with the vote:
There are differences between Dilma and Lula. The vote was correct, it does not
condemn Iran; rather it accepts an investigation. The bottom line is that Brazil
believes there are certain universal policies that define human rights. (MercoPress,
2011)
Yet, to what extent does Dilma’s divergence from her predecessor’s policy on Iran
signal a substantive departure? It is true that in foreign policy terms Iran had become a high-
profile issue for Lula himself. In May 2010 Turkey, Brazil and Iran had announced a nuclear
fuel swap deal that was aimed at pre-empting further UN sanctions. The deal was also
heralded as an example of the increasing clout of emerging countries in a new multi-polar
13
world, even in an area of global governance such as international peace and security
dominated by Western powers. The Brazilian government, and the then foreign minister
Celso Amorim in particular, therefore openly expressed their frustration with a US
government that quickly moved to discredit the nuclear deal. But also domestically the deal
attracted significant criticisms, despite the Lula government’s assurances that it was in
Brazil’s self-interest to cultivate closer ties with a country that has emerged as one of Brazil’s
largest trading partners in the Middle East.
Dilma’s policy shift on Iran has exposed one of the main fault lines in Brazilian
diplomacy on human rights that pit principled rhetorical condemnation against pragmatic and
‘cordial’ dialogue.11
As an example of the latter, former foreign minister Celso Amorim has
strongly criticized the Iran vote at the Human Rights Council on the grounds that it
undermined any opportunities to pursue a dialogue with the Iranian leadership. In an
interview, Amorim also defended the Brazilian diplomatic tradition of impartiality, and
preference for mediation over condemnation (MercoPress, 2011). Amorim’s intervention
indicates that Dilma’s position on Iran does indeed reflect an independence of mind and a
willingness to depart from some of Lula’s preferred foreign policies. Yet, the Iran vote does
not by itself reflect a fundamental shift in Brazilian diplomacy on human rights towards a
more assertive and condemnatory rhetoric as cautioned against by Amorim.
The Character of Brazil’s Power Projection
14
The Lula administration maintained Brazil’s preference for soft power over hard power
strategies. This was reflected in Brazilian positions taken in debates over coercive sanctions
(Iran) and in Brazil’s continuing reluctance to accept the legitimacy of military interventions
for humanitarian purposes. Brazil's traditional ‘allergy’ to the use of force, deeply held doubts
about the utility of force, and preference for mediation and diplomacy is likely to endure
under Dilma.
For example, Brazilian reluctance to support coercive enforcement measures was seen
in its response to the conflict in Libya. In March 2011 Brazil, as a temporary member of the
UN Security Council, joined with China, India, Russia and Germany to abstain from the vote
authorising ‘all necessary measures’ against Libya. Following the onset of NATO bombing
of Libya, Brazil’s opposition to the bombing hardened in the aftermath of the visit of US
President Barack Obama to Brazil in March 2011 with the Foreign Ministry, the Itamaraty,
issuing statements condemning the loss of civilian lives, and calling for a ceasefire and the
initiation of a dialogue.
Brazil’s opposition to the NATO bombing campaign in Libya reflects the country’s
traditional aversion to the use of force and its preferences for mediation and diplomacy.
However, the expectations on Brazil, particularly by the USA and the EU, to shoulder
increasing responsibilities for the management of international security concerns may
continue to grow. Brazil’s continuing leadership role in the UN mission in Haiti reflects an
15
increasing willingness to engage in more robust UNSC-mandated missions and a shift in its
position on the legitimacy of coercive peace enforcement. And, often overlooked given the
focus on UNSC Resolution 1973 that authorised the use of force in the case of Libya is the
fact that Brazil voted in favour of a previous UNSC Resolution (1970) in February 2011 that
imposed sanctions on Libya and that referred the situation to the International Criminal
Court. This is in contrast to previous reluctance to support coercive sanctions in the case of
Iran for example. Any Brazilian policy shifts in these matters need to be understood in the
context of the ongoing campaign to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC. It is also
important to note that Brazilian aversion to the use of force even for humanitarian purposes
needs to be differentiated from its position on other (softer) human rights enforcement
measures, such as diplomatic dialogue and local capacity-building.
Brazil as an Ambivalent Regional Leader
Brazil’s multilateralism has traditionally tended to be projected beyond the region of Latin
America. But under Lula there was some recalibration of foreign policy priorities, as the
administration sought to intensify relations with the South American sub-region in particular.
This was seen in efforts to broaden Mercosur (to include Venezuela) as well as deepen it
(beyond purely economic relations and towards political cooperation, including on human
rights matters). The regionalization of Brazilian foreign policy was also reflected in the
16
creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Brazil under Lula showed
itself to be prepared to be politically more assertive in the wider Latin American region by
becoming involved in politically contested issues, such as Brazil’s leadership role in the UN
peace-keeping mission in Haiti, and (tentative) expression of willingness to mediate in the
Colombian conflict. However, these attempts have been fraught with problems, as regional
countries do not necessarily sign off on Brazilian regional leadership. 12
With regards to human rights policy more specifically the limits of Brazil’s regional
leadership are also apparent. Even if it were willing to promote human rights as part of its
regional foreign policy (Brazilian relations with Cuba indicates otherwise), Brazil’s capacity
to shape political outcomes in the region is limited, as seen, for example, in the political
negotiations following the July 2009 coup in Honduras and its ongoing political and human
rights aftermath. 13
Brazil is also a regional outlier in the Southern Cone in that political
democratization coincided in the first decade that followed the transition to democracy in
1985, with a deterioration of the domestic human rights record, at least on measures related to
citizen security (Macaulay, 2010). 14
Hence, despite the return of electoral democracy and
Brazil’s increasing engagement with international human rights, processes of democratization
in Brazil have moved at a different speed, and occasionally in different directions, than
human rights change.
Moreover, although Brazil’s ratification record is notable compared to many other
regional states (the USA for example) 15
, it is in many ways a regional laggard. In terms of
17
recognition of regional human rights norms and mechanisms, Brazil was one of the last
Organisation of American States (OAS) member states in Latin America to recognize the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Brazilian perception of
having a self-contained legal system combined with a reluctance to accept international
scrutiny of the country’s domestic human rights record on sovereignty grounds has made
Brazil a relative latecomer to the international human rights regime (at least judged on
regional terms). 16
This is particularly evident in Brazil’s relationship with the Inter-American
human rights system (IAHRS). Brazil’s engagement with the regional human rights regime
has been reluctant. For example, comparatively few cases were submitted to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) during the military regime. Following the
democratic transition, Brazil has had comparatively few dealings with the IAHRS, and by the
mid-1990s only a handful of the several hundred cases pending before the IACHR concerned
Brazil (Cavallaro, 2002: 483). 17
As seen in Figure 1, this pattern of recourse to the IAHRS
continued throughout the 2000s.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Moreover, up until the mid-1990s at least, Brazilian authorities put pressure on the
IACHR not to recognize cases from Brazilian petitioners. During the Cardoso government
however, the Brazilian state moved from an obstructionist to a more cooperative relationship
18
with the IAHRS reaching a number of friendly settlement agreements with the IACHR. Also,
Brazil supported the candidacies of Antônio Cançado Trindade to the Inter-American Court
on Human Rights (serving as judge on the Court from 1995 to 2006) and of Hélio Bicudo, a
deputy of the Workers’ Party and former prosecutor in São Paulo, who was elected member
of the IACHR in 1997 (and served 1998-2001). 18
Yet, in terms of concrete engagement with
the IAHRS on specific cases, Brazilian state institutions have tended either to ignore
judgements by the regional system or choose not to implement substantial measures. 19
Moreover, the federal government’s increasingly responsive human rights policy has not been
matched by a parallel recognition at sub-national level. Brazil has ‘an extremely fragmented
and heterogeneous polity which limits the central state’s capacity to implement effective
strategies’ (Panizza and Barahona de Brito, 1998: 21). The character of Brazilian federalism
means that accountability for human rights violations remains dispersed – with the notorious
Brazilian military police being controlled at sub-national level – which has further limited the
capacity of the IAHRS to put pressure on Brazilian federal authorities to provide effective
remedies for violations. In part, the relative neglect of the regional human rights system is
explained by the fact that Brazilian governments’ engagement with international human
rights has tended to be projected outside the region and towards the UN, which has led to
Brazil not having a clearly defined presence within the IAHRS. 20
The absence of Brazilian regional leadership is particularly noteworthy in the area of
transitional justice. In some ways Lula built on Cardoso’s approach by extending
19
compensation policy to victims of past state violence and by offering some support for the
creation of a National Truth Commission. Yet, despite widespread protests from victims’
groups, the Lula government extended the Secrecy Law to allow military files considered
sensitive to be kept from public view for 60 years. 21
Lula also resisted efforts to circumvent
the 1979 Amnesty Law and legal attempts to prosecute military and police personnel for
human rights violations committed under the military regime. Significantly, the Lula
government was openly divided over the Amnesty Law with parts of the Ministry of Justice
in favour of prosecution while Defence Minister Nelson Jobim referred to justice efforts by
victims’ groups as ‘revenge’ (Barahona de Brito, 2010).
In the early period of Dilma’s presidency there have been some indications of change,
but also of continuity, in the area of transitional justice. On the one hand, for its supporters it
is currently an exceptionally opportune moment for the creation of a Truth Commission with
a president who herself is a victim of human rights violations under the military regime. The
new Special Secretary for Human Rights, Maria do Rosário Nunes, has publicly confirmed
the president’s support of a Truth Commission, ‘despite certain voices working against the
initiative’:
Dilma Rousseff, because of her history and her commitment, is absolutely allied with
human rights [and for her the Truth Commission is a project close to her heart, which
she] clearly supports. […] The president belongs to a generation that fought for
20
democracy and she is working [so that Brazil] clears its debt with the past and
recognizes history no matter how painful it may be. (ANSA, 2011)
In a political triumph for Dilma the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies approved in
September 2011 the legislative proposal to create a Truth Commission with a mandate to
investigate the whereabouts of forcibly disappeared people; to clarify the responsibilities and
structures behind torture, forced disappearances and arbitrary executions; and that
incorporates an explicit recognition of victims’ right to the truth. 22
Moreover, notwithstanding the policy preference for ‘truth’ over ‘justice’ as
demonstrated by the Dilma government, it may simply not be possible to put a full stop to
increasingly concerted legal efforts to hold individual military and police personnel to
account for their involvement in human rights violations under the military regime. Indeed,
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recently ruled in the Gomes Lund et al.
(Guerrilha do Araguaia) case that Brazil’s Amnesty Law violated the country’s international
obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights to investigate and prosecute
human rights crimes committed by the military regime. 23
The Dilma government has thus far
been able to resist growing pressures to implement this ruling, but, as Alexandra Barahona de
Brito points out, other countries in the region have learned from experience that both
domestic and international pressures to implement such rulings have a corrosive effect on
impunity for past human rights violations (Barahona de Brito, 2010). For example, Viviana
21
Krsticevic, the executive director of CEJIL, one of the organisations that brought the Gomes
Lund case to the Inter-American human rights system, makes an explicit link between the
Brazilian government’s lack of progress on transitional justice and its potential for regional
leadership:
Latin America has advanced significantly in the resolution of crimes against humanity
committed by dictatorial governments. Brazil, however, is still in debt with family
members [of victims] and society when it comes to the establishment of truth and
justice in relation to this topic. [The ruling by the Inter-American Court in the case of
Gomes Lund] represents a unique opportunity for Brazil to show that it is capable of
leadership both internationally as well as nationally with regards to human rights and
democracy. For this reason, Brazil must overturn [dejar sin efecto] the aspects of the
amnesty law that prevent justice to be done when confronted by crimes against
humanity. (CEJIL, 2010)
There are clearly strong political incentives for the Dilma government to resist such
pressures, particularly out of concern of not jeopardizing the relatively friction-free
relationship that the Worker’s Party has developed with the military during its time in
government. 24
Yet, such appeasement of the security forces will also indicate the limits of
22
civilian control over the military establishment as well as the limits of human rights
accountability in Brazil more broadly (Barahona de Brito, 2010).
Conclusion: ‘Rising Brazil’- What Role for Human Rights?
Brazil is important for the future development of the international human rights regime. The
distinctiveness of the country, both in terms of its domestic human rights record and in terms
of its relationship with international human rights, means that Brazil is likely to impact on
debates on the meaning and nature of democratic rule and human rights in the decades to
come. Together with India and South Africa (and China), Brazil is not likely to develop
understandings of human rights governance in line with Western ideals. 25
Brazil has
traditionally emphasised the importance of universalist multilateral institutions, including
with regards to the international human rights regime. But Brazil has also continued to stress
the importance of the protections from external interference as enshrined in the principle
national sovereignty and voiced opposition to the idea and practice of humanitarian
intervention. It has also resisted the inherent selectivity of Western criticisms of certain
countries’ human rights records (with, for example, Iran singled out as a human rights and
security pariah, whereas Saudi Arabia is afforded the status of a key Western ally).
What then are the prospects for a more assertive and consistent set of human rights
policies by the Dilma government? True, Dilma has generated significant domestic support as
23
a result of the policy shift on Iran, and to a certain extent with her support for a truth
commission with a mandate to investigate human rights abuses committed by the Brazilian
military regime. Yet, the extent and significance of these policy changes, albeit important,
should not be overstated.
In relation to the global democratization agenda, Brazil will continue to stress the
importance of ‘democratizing’ global governance. As a consequence, Brazil will continue to
favour dialogue over confrontation. Hence, although there is a case to be made for labelling
Brazil ‘Western’, ‘democratic’, and even ‘liberal’, Brazil’s foreign policy objectives will
continue to diverge from what is commonly associated with these labels by dominant strands
of academic theorizing. This has significant implications for the international human rights
regime, as one cannot assume that emerging powers will simply be absorbed within the
current global liberal order.
There are of course significant domestic challenges in terms of Brazil’s own deeply
problematic human rights record. Yet, it is important to acknowledge the very significant
developments in Brazilian human rights policies over the course of the last few decades. And,
domestic experiences of human rights challenges can provide important opportunities to
pursue informed and effective policies abroad (e.g. the struggle against poverty as can be
seen in Lula’s initiative on combating hunger, 26
and Brazil’s constructive role in the follow-
up to the Durban conference on racial discrimination). And, of course dominant countries
have had their own internal human rights challenges (US and racial segregation, UK and
24
colonial rule, and France in Algeria), while simultaneously supporting the development of the
international human rights regime, even before the more contemporary rights violating
policies and practices by powerful states in the ‘war on terror’.
It is also important to note some of the structural features that will continue to shape
Brazilian policies when it comes to international human rights both during the Dilma
administration(s), as well as beyond. In particular, there are two key dimensions to the future
direction of Brazilian human rights policies, both connected to increasing expectations and
normative pressures facing Brazilian policy-makers.
First, on the domestic side, the increasing pluralisation of Brazilian society has also
had its impact on foreign policy making. The formal embedding of Brazil in the international
human rights regime has created important political and legal opportunities for human rights
activism. There has been an increasing professionalization of Brazil’s human rights
organization over the course of the last decade. This is partly the result of increased interest
by major international donors such as the Ford Foundation. There has also been increased
interaction between local NGOs and transnational networks as evidenced in the creation of
Justiça Global in 1999 by human rights professionals who previously worked at HRW and
CEJIL. As a consequence, Brazilian human rights NGOs, and even social movements, have
increasingly plugged into international human rights networks. Also, domestic human rights
groups, such as Conectas, have increasingly sought to influence Brazilian foreign policy in
human rights matters. Conectas, for example, played an active role in NGO lobbying efforts
25
shaping the creation of the UN Human Rights Council. It has also worked with ‘key
countries’ to produce international norms (e.g. in relation to framing of norms around issues
concerning discrimination based on sexual orientation). Conectas has also been active in
lobbying the Congressional Committee on human rights and foreign policy. In short,
Brazilian foreign policy is no longer merely what the Itamaraty says it is (Cason and Power,
2009). This has also led to an increasing politicisation of the foreign policy process, a trend
that has intensified in recent years with the Workers’ Party increasingly putting its stamp on
Brazilian foreign policy priorities under Lula.
Second, internationally Brazil will have to manage increasing expectations that the
country should play a more active and forceful role in shaping the development of the
international human rights regime. Attempts in recent years on the part of the most powerful
states in the international system to shift the normative balance between human rights and
security in the name of the ‘war on terrorism’ have showed, according to some, the inherent
power-based logic underpinning the global human rights regime (Dunne, 2007). For others,
however, the resilience and normative strength of the human rights system is demonstrated by
the ways in which the human rights discourse has re-asserted itself at various levels (Foot,
2007). Beyond the more immediate human rights concerns, however, the international human
rights regime is facing a more uncertain future as highlighted in the debates surrounding the
meaning and wider implications of the rise of non-Western states, shifting global power
balances, and what some predict could be the beginning of the end of the period of US
26
hegemony. In many ways the rise of Brazil is seen as distinct from authoritarian China, and
other ‘middle-powers’ such as Iran (and for some, to use a more regionally relevant example,
Venezuela). Yet, one cannot simply assume Brazil to converge to global liberal norms and
values, including human rights (although such expectations in Brazil’s quest for international
status and prestige may assert some influence on foreign policy behaviour). Confronted with
increasing expectations and demands to assume greater international responsibilities,
Brazilian foreign policy-makers need to balance and assess often conflicting policy
objectives. Dilma’s government will therefore face some of the long-standing tensions in
strategy and national identity of whether Brazil’s future lies as the leader of the South, as the
mediator between North and South, or as a rising power drawing on universal standards of
legitimacy for its own instrumental purposes (Hurrell, 2008: 57).
27
-Figure 1. Number of Petitions Submitted to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, by Country
Source: Author’s own based on data from Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Annual Reports, 1999-2009.
28
Notes
1 This discussion of Brazilian human rights policies cannot aim to be exhaustive of course. A
number of key human rights concerns are dealt with in other articles in this special issue. See,
particularly, Macaulay (forthcoming).
2 This article draws, with permission, on materials previously published as Engstrom (2011).
The author is grateful for the constructive comments of two anonymous reviewers on an
earlier version of this article.
3 For an account of Brazil’s role in limiting the scope of the mandate of the United Nation’s
Human Rights Commission with regards to the question of disappeared persons during this
period see Kramer and Weissbrodt (1981).
4 The unofficial truth report sponsored by the Archdiocese of São Paulo with support from
the World Council of Churches, provided an important account, however, of the systematic
human rights violations committed by the military regime, including use of torture,
disappearances, and extra-judicial executions (Archdiocese of São Paulo, 1985). For external
opposition to the Brazilian military regime, see Green (2010).
29
5 Brazil has been a non-permanent member of the Security Council during the following
years: 1946–1947; 1951–1952; 1954–1955; 1963–1964; 1967–1968; 1988–1989; 1993–1994;
1998–1999; 2004–2005; and 2010– 2011.
6 Lula’s foreign policy managed overall to tread a delicate balance between strengthening
diplomatic and economic ties with the ‘developing world’ and securing access to the
exclusive gatherings of the ‘developed world’ such as the G8.
7 These fissures are long standing as highlighted by Pinheiro (2000: 32): ‘The military, the
right, and traditional sectors of Brazilian diplomacy refused transparency and dialogue with
NGOs because this was regarded as interference in domestic affairs by subversive elements
intent on mobilising a campaign against the values of the dictatorship. On the other hand,
sectors of the left (including elements within Brazilian diplomacy) considered that most
human rights initiatives as tools implemented by the industrialised nations (it didn’t matter
that those nations were democratic) against the interests of the Third World.’
8 One important exception to this tendency is Brazil’s leading role over the last decade in
support of a United Nations resolution on sexual orientation and gender identity. Together
with South Africa, Brazil led the UN Human Rights Council, against significant opposition
30
(mainly from member states from the non-Latin American Global South), in the adoption of
the resolution in June 2011.
9 It is noteworthy that arguably the most prominent Brazilian on the global ‘humanitarian
scene’, the late Sergio Vieira de Mello, received practically no official or diplomatic support
from his country of birth (Power, 2008). And, the absence of any voluntary Brazilian
financial support of the UN office that Vieira de Mello was heading at the time of his death,
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, is all the more glaring in light of
modest, yet diplomatically significant, funding given by countries such as Argentina, Chile,
and Mexico.
10 The decision follows a highly publicised move in July 2010 when Lula offered asylum to
an Iranian woman, Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, who had been sentenced to death by
stoning for alleged adultery in Iran.
11 The idea of ‘cordiality’ plays a defining role in Brazil’s national self-image. In terms of its
conduct and normative preferences in international affairs, this idea is reflected in Brazil’s
traditional preference for negotiation and mediation over direct confrontation in the pursuit of
national interests.
31
12 Although the intensity of Argentina-Brazil rivalry has dramatically diminished following
Argentina’s relative economic decline in recent decades, Argentina does not support Brazil’s
campaign for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Beyond South America, Mexico’s foreign
policy reorientation towards the US since the 1990s has not been favourably received by the
Itamaraty. And, Chavez’ Venezuela has its own ideas about regional integration that do not
necessarily align with those of Brazil.
13 There are multiple reasons for Brazil’s active involvement in Honduras following the coup
including its concern over the repression of demonstrators and political supports of the
deposed president, Manuel Zelaya, who took refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa.
Yet, the overriding concern of Brazil, together with the majority of Latin American states,
was the violation of the regional norm for the respect of democratically elected government
enshrined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States.
14 For the current citizen security situation, and the responses of Brazilian authorities to
rising public fear of crime, see Fiona Macaulay’s contribution to this special issue.
15 The USA’s human rights ratification record stands in marked contrast to most other
democratic countries in that it has not ratified a range of widely supported international
human rights treaties including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
32
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. At
a regional level, the USA distinguishes itself, together with Canada and most of the English-
speaking Caribbean countries for example, by not having ratified the American Convention
on Human Rights.
16 For example, in a general comparison with other Latin American states, Brazil has been
slow to accept the competence, where available, of UN human rights mechanisms to receive
and consider inter-state and individual complaints. It took Brazil, for instance, until 2006 to
accept Article 22 under the Torture Convention and until 2009 to ratify the first optional
protocol under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which give
the respective monitoring committees the competence to review individual complaints.
17 As an illustration, in terms of the number of petitions received by the IACHR in 2008, 151
cases involved Argentina, while 76 involved Chile and 64 cases were submitted against
Brazil. Clearly this pattern of recourse to the IAHRS by individual petitioners and groups in
these countries cannot primarily be explained in terms of sheer numbers of human rights
violations in the respective countries. Rather, this evidence suggests that the reasons for the
differentiated relationship with the IAHRS are found in patterns of human rights mobilization
by civil society actors primarily, but also in terms of engagement with international human
33
rights institutions by domestic judiciaries and state officials. See further: Engstrom and
Hurrell (2010).
18 Very few Brazilians have been elected to the IACHR: Carlos A. Dunshee de Abranches,
1964-1983; Gilda Maciel Correa Russomano, 1984-1991; and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 2004-
2011. Cançado Trindade is the only Brazilian who has served as Judge on the Inter-American
Court.
19 This is seen, for example, in the piecemeal reactions to the provisional measures adopted
by the IACtHR in relation to the case of Urso Branco prison. IACtHR, Provisional measures
in Urso Branco (Brazil), 25 November 2009.
20 Moreover, the reaction of the Dilma government to the April 2011 decision of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights to grant interim measures to suspend the
construction of the Belo Monte dam in the Amazon basin reflects Brazil’s reluctance to
submit to the authority of the regional human rights system. In response to the Commission’s
decision Dilma reportedly ordered the suspension of Brazil’s annual contribution of
approximately US$ 800,000 to the Inter-American system.
34
21 As president Dilma initially supported a legislative proposal to revise the Secrecy Law
through the adoption of a freedom of information law. Yet after strong criticisms from
opposition politicians Dilma toned down her support for the proposal, which has led to the
proposal being stalled in the Senate.
22 At the time of writing (October 2011), the legislative proposal has moved to the Brazilian
Senate for approval.
23 The case refers to the arrest, torture, extra-judicial killings, and disappearances by the
Brazilian military of members of a guerrilla group that was active in the early 1970s in the
Araguaia River region.
24 See further the article by Juliana Bertazzo in this special issue.
25However, Brazil’s understanding of the concept of human rights does not significantly
diverge from that of the West, at least when compared to other emerging powers in the
international system, such as China and perhaps even India. Moreover, it must be noted that
there is much divergence even within the ‘West’ in this regard. Consider, for example,
Northern European conceptions of social welfare, and of the appropriate balance between
individual freedoms and collective responsibilities, with Anglo-American conceptions.
35
26 Lula sought to build foreign policy on domestic policy achievements. This could most
clearly be seen in Lula’s social commitment at home (‘Zero Hunger’ programme) being
projected abroad through policy initiatives such as ‘Action against Hunger and Poverty’. This
initiative was launched by Brazil at the United Nations in 2004 and seeks to use ‘innovative
financing mechanisms’ to raise funds for hunger and poverty alleviation programmes
globally.
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For correspondence: Par Engstrom, Human Rights Consortium, School of Advanced Study,
University of London, Malet Street, London, WC1E 7HU. United Kingdom. Email: