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EDUCATING FOR JOINTNESS; AN ANALYSIS OF THE JOINT PROFESSIONAL
MILITARY EDUCATION SYSTEM OF THEUNITED STATES
Craig A. DeareJohn T. Fishel
Salvador G. Raza
A study prepared for presentation to the Chilean Academa Nacional de
Estudios Polticos y Estratgicos , January 2003.
Disclaimer: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or
implied in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not necessarilyrepresent those of the National Defense University, the Department ofDefense, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.
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Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION.1
BACKGROUND......3
DESIGN AND HAPPENSTANCE....11
EVALUATION..... .18
INSTRUCTIONAL METHODOLOGY: Faculty and Student Mix ......20
CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT...29
LESSONS LEARNED.......37
ANNEX A: JPME CONSOLIDATED LEARNING OBJECTIVES.....41
ANNEX B: LIST OF ACRONYMS......46
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Educating for Jointness: An Analysis of the Evolution of the Joint Professional Military Education System of the United States
Craig A. Deare, John T. Fishel, and Salvador G. Raza
Despite the uncertainties of the threats of the 21 st century, it is increasingly clear that
today s evolving military missions, coupled with the dramatic decline of defense resources,
are causing armed forces around the world to shape their force structures, doctrines and
strategies to maximize efficiency in resource allocation in order to satisfy the increased
demands for combat effectiveness. In the past, officers from different services have worked
together when required to do so, often rotating among joint and service positions sequentially
as th ey progressed through the ranks. Currently, jointness emerges as the most effective
way to craft present and future military operations, providing military synergy to respond to
changing demands of effective warfare capabilities in the tactical, operational and strategic
domains to achieve politically determined objectives.1
Recognizing the growing complexity
of these demands over twenty years ago, the U.S. endeavored to develop leaders at all levels
with both service expertise and joint specialized skills, not only to fight effectively but also to
provide civilian leaders in the administration and Congress with sound military advice.
The purpose of this research project is to convey the results of the efforts of the United
States to improve the quality of joint education. The circumstances of the U.S. case are
unique for a number of reasons, principal among which was the role of the legislative branch
in bringing about the significant change in the emphasis regarding joint education in the U.S.
military. The U.S. case is also unique in that it involves a complex array of educational
institutions, each with its own historical baggage, that faces significant challenges in imbuing
1
A fundamental assumption of jointness is that combining two or more military forces produces greater effectsthan each force operating independently. Since jointness is a coined word, we have put it in quotes for thesefirst two uses. Henceforth, it will appear without quotes.
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future military leaders with a joint perspective and culture. Notwithstanding, the lessons
learned by the U.S. might prove themselves useful for other countries engaged in similar
efforts to educate military leaders who, according to David McCormick, 2 not only know one
field deeply but who possess the broad range of leadership skills, confidence, experience, and
intellectual flexibility required to adapt to present and future uncertainties in a joint
environment.
The initial section of this paper briefly examines the history of the U.S. joint experience
and sets the stage for the review of the unprecedented emphasis on joint professional military
education (JPME), following the recommendations made by the 1989 Skelton panel. 3
Significant attention is paid to the findings of the Skelton panel, due to its major influence on
the changes in the U.S. Professional Military Education (PME) system. This review covers
relevant implications in the U.S. PME schools organizational architecture, explaining the
conceptual framework that supported the changes. Furthermore, evaluation procedures,
instructional methodologies and curriculum development are analyzed. In addition to the
experience of the authors as military instructors in senior-level military and civilian
educational programs and interviews conducted with current and former faculty members of
those schools, this analysis is strongly supported by accreditation reports conducted to assess
the degree to which military schools implemented joint education policies (PAJE Process
for Accreditation of Joint Education). Finally, the paper summarizes some of the lessons
learned, remaining challenges, and both positive and negative consequences of the decisions
made in U.S. JPME.
We note that the intent of this paper is not meant to be prescriptive in any way. Rather,
the objective is to be descriptive and analytical, for the purpose of making it relevant to
present and future national joint education policy formulation in Latin America, contributing
2 McCormick, D. The Downsized Warrior: Americas Army in Transition. New York; New York University
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to the relatively scant body of work on joint military education in the region, and inviting
similar efforts.
BACKGROUND
Prior to analyzing the specific aspects of the educational component of jointness, it is
useful to understand the subject of jointness in itself as both a way of thinking and a form of
warfare. These two characteristics mutually reinforce each other, improving the performance
of military forces through gains in efficiency which enhance military capabilities. Jointness is
desired when no single service can perform the mission alone as well as it could jointly.
Jointness results when operational commanders conceive of joint solutions to accomplish an
assigned mission, which are both more efficient as well as more effective than a single
service solution. It is a contextual necessity to accommodate diverse and different
approaches to war-fighting through a single unified perspective which eliminates the
redundancy that causes an inefficient allocation of resources and results in military disasters.
It is worth noting that the initial efforts at jointness within the U.S. military began prior
to the First World War, with the establishment of a Joint Board of Army and Navy
representatives in 1903, to plan for joint operations. Due to the lack of any legitimate
authority, the Joint Board had virtually no significant effect on the U.S. operations during
World War I. It was evident, however, that the services understood the operational need for
joint planning.
The next step involved the agreement between the Army and Navy secretaries to
reestablish and strengthen the Joint Board (in 1919), with membership including the Service
Chiefs, their deputies, and the Chief of War Plans Division for the Army and Director of
Plans Division for the Navy. In addition to the Joint Board, they were supported by a staff --
the Joint Planning Committee -- with officers from the plans divisions from both the Army
Press, 1998. p. 160.
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and Navy. However, this new attempt suffered the same fate as its predecessor, once more
due to the lack of authority to effect change. The board was disbanded in 1947.
Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the American President and British
Prime Minister established the Combined Chiefs of Staff to provide strategic direction of the
combined 4 U.S.-British operational planning efforts. For its part, the British Chiefs of Staff
Committee had provided administrative coordination, tactical coordination, and strategic
direction to British forces since 1924. Although the U.S. did have the Joint Board, because it
lacked legitimacy and effectiveness, it was incapable of coordinating effectively with the
British staff.
The requirement to create a staff element capable of developing effective staff products
of a joint nature led to the adoption of what Admiral Leahy described as a "unified high
command" in 1942. It was this entity that would eventually become known as the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. This group worked during the Second World War in an ad hoc fashion,
without formal Presidential definition or legislation, but it did enjoy Presidential support.
The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the counterparts to the Chiefs of the British
Army, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force. 5
Following the Second World War, it was clear that the U.S. required a formal structure
for joint staff planning and operational requirements. The Joint Chiefs of Staff offered a
workable model as a point of departure, and the enactment of the National Security Act of
1947 formally established the Joint Chiefs of Staff in law. This step began the process of
legislative and executive actions which ultimately led to the 1986 Department of Defense
Reorganization Act, known better as the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
3 See our discussion of the Skelton Panel on pp. 9-11.4 By combined it is understood as elements forces/agencies of two or more allies. This is differentiated from
joint in that the latter is understood as elements of two or more forces. 5 Admiral William D. Leahy, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's special military adviser, with the title ofChief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy; General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of
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The National Security Act of 1947 represented a watershed change in the manner in
which the defense and security establishment was organized. In addition to creating the
National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense
was established. The War Department and the Navy Department combined with the newly
created Air Force Department to form the Defense Department, along with an Office of the
Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. This initial schema has evolved since 1947 to its
current structure, with the 1958 and 1986 Defense Authorization Acts effecting additional
changes.
THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT
The intent of much of the 1958 and 1986 legislation was to improve the effectiveness of
the armed forces by emphasizing the ability of the military to conduct joint operations. The
more influential of these two bills was clearly the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act, which attempted to achieve the following objectives:
Reorganize the Department of Defense and strengthen civilian authority in the Department
Improve the military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and theSecretary of Defense
Enhance the authority of Unified Commanders 6
Clarify the responsibilities of Unified Commanders
Increase attention to the formulation of strategy and contingency planning
Provide for more efficient use of defense resources
Improve Joint Officer management policies
the Army; Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet; andGeneral Henry H. Arnold, Deputy Army Chief of Staff for Air and Chief of the Army Air Corps.6 A Unified Commander is the senior military officer responsible for a Unified Command, which is a
command with a broad continuing mission composed of significant assigned components of two or moreMilitary Departments, that is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defensewith the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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Enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve the management andadministration of the Department of Defense
The trend toward jointness developed from the historical experience that a single
service approach was often grossly ineffective to confront tactical, operational and strategic
demands within the context of complex, multidimensional warfare environments. 7 Jointness
became an attempt to reduce interservice rivalry, largely a result of individual service cultures
and insufficient focus on the collective, real, problem, with each service following its own
interests, competing for peacetime roles and resources they believed would accrue to their
unique strategic approach to war fighting.
Goldwater-Nichols created powerful incentives for joint education by enacting new
personnel and assignments policies; in particular one policy which decreed that no officer
could be promoted to general or flag rank without first serving in a prior joint assignment.
The legislation also created a new category of officer, the Joint Specialty Officer (JSO),
promoted at the same rate as officers on service staffs, who should fill half of the joint slots,
alternating their assignments between service and joint tours lasting at least two years. In
addition, strict responsibilities for joint education were specifically assigned to the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who shall be responsible for the following:
Doctrine, Training, and Education.
Developing doctrine for the joint employment of the armed forces.
Formulating policies for the joint training of the armed forces.
Formulating policies for coordinating the military education and training of members of thearmed forces. 8
7 See David C. Jones, Reform: The Beginnings, especially pp. 3 -6 and John M. Shalikashvili, Goldwater - Nichols Ten Years from Now, p. 66, in Dennis J. Quinn (ed.), The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization
Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective , Washington, D.C., NDU Press, 1999.8 U.S. House of Representatives. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1986.
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The legislation required the Chairman -- in his planning, advice, and policy formulation
functions -- to make policies regarding the military education of members of the armed
forces. However, it gave little specific guidance other than directing the Secretary of Defense,
with the advice a nd assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to periodically
review and revise the curriculum [of the joint schools] to enhance the education and
training of officers in joint matters. 9
Joint thinking progressed slowly -- due to obdurate opposition -- to become something
resembling second nature in the armed forces. However, the JPME process still faced
difficulties in preparing officers to support joint operations, especially in ensuring that
officers effectively internalize the appropriate set of intellectual and technical abilities
required by high quality armed forces.
Education is one of the fundamental tools available to enhance professional military
efficiency, supplementing and reinforcing organizational changes. As Williamson Murray
expresses, what makes PME so important is the role that it has played in military innovation
and effectiveness in war throughout the twentieth century. To a great extent, it has been a
major factor in determining how military institutions will adapt to the actual conditions of
war. 10
Despite these efforts, JPME has not achieved the desired degrees of preparation of
military warriors at the respective levels, due to a fundamental unresolved duality: on one
side, the need to develop, achieve, and maintain distinctive combat capabilities that leverage
single services respective strengths; and on the other, the need to generate the synergistic
effects which jointness produces, which implies training and operating in a collective fashion
9 US. House of Representatives. Report of the Panel on Military Education (Skelton Panel). Washington, D.C.U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989. p.51f.10
Murray W. Remarks on Conference on Military Education for the 21 st
Century Warrior . in ConferenceProceedings: Military Education for the 21 st Century Warrior Monterrey, Ca. Naval PostGraduate School andOffice of Naval Research, 15-16 January 1998. p. 4-22.
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for extended periods of time. Balancing these two critical yet generally competing demands
presents commanders at all levels a serious challenge.
However, finding the proper balance among these two poles propels one into the
devilishly higher level threefold goal of: (1) building armed forces better able to assure
military effectiveness; (2) assuring operational efficiency stemming from good planning and
close coordination with supporting and participating forces able to perform old and new sets
of roles, functions, and missions within a democratic environment; and (3) promoting
economy through a variety of approaches to problem-solving that increases the likelihood of
innovation at less cost .
THE DOUGHERTY BOARD AND THE SKELTON PANEL
The Goldwater-Nichols Act was a watershed event, putting in place the basic
requirements for the transition towards enhanced jointness in the U.S. military through a
comprehensive legal framework, coherent policy determinants, and structured organizational
arrangements. 11 The implications for Professional Military Education (PME) resulting from
the Goldwater-Nichols legislation led to two separate studies -- one military and another
congressional -- to assess the current status of PME, and provide recommendations to meet
the legislative requirements.
The first of these efforts was the Senior Military Schools Review Board (SMSRB),
appointed by the Chairman, JCS, in 1987 to review PME in joint matters and preparation for
officers for joint assignments. The board was headed by General Russell E. Dougherty,
USAF (Ret.), a former Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command, and was subsequently
referred to as the Dougherty Board. In May 1987, the Dougherty Board issued its report
11 For a critique and limitations of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, see Quinn, D.J. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1999.
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strongly supporting that the intermediate and senior Service sch ools maintain their identities
and continue to teach the roles and capabilities of the individual Services. 12 The Board also
recommended that all service professional military education schools be accredited as joint
and that joint matters would comprise a minimum of 25 percent of the total curriculum hours.
The Board went on to recommend the maintenance of a (vaguely defined) student and faculty
service mix at each school. The Dougherty Board had no authority to mandate any changes;
it made recommendations only. The barriers to a joint oriented education were difficult and
awkward while opposition was even hostile at times.
Recognizing shortfalls in the results of military implementation of joint education, in
late 1987 the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Les Aspin,
appointed a Panel on Military Education of the Committee on Armed Services, and
designated Representative Ike Skelton as the panel s chairman. In his letter appointing the
panel, Aspen indicated the panel
sh ould review Department of Defense plans for implementing the joint professional military
education requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act with a view toward assuring that this
education provides the proper linkage between the Service competent officer and the
competent joint officer. The panel should also assess the ability of the current Department of
Defense military education system to develop professional military strategists, joint
warfighters and tacticians. 13
Skelton transmitted his report back to Aspin on April 3, 1989, a volume in excess of
200 pages. This major effort to study the PME system of the Defense Department was
conducted primarily by the panel s staff, led by a House Armed Services Committee
professional staff member and four uniformed officers -- one from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, and one each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force -- assigned by the Defense
12 The Report of the Senior Military Schools Review Board on Recommendations to the Chairman of the JointChiefs of Staff Regarding Professional Military Education in Joint Matters. Washington, D.C.: JCS, May 7,
1987, p.7.13 Letter from Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, dated November13, 1987.
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Department to the panel chairman. These five individuals had graduated from six of the
intermediate and senior military colleges, two of them having served on war college faculties.
This exceptionally well-qualified staff performed the following tasks to get a factual
assessment of the state of PME:
Reviewed previous studies and data about the PME system; Interviewed more than 100 military and civilian educators and officials; Visited all 10 PME schools, and held hearings with all the school
commandants/presidents
Arranged for the testimony from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, all four Service Chiefs, four current unified commanders; in all, 48
witnesses testified at 28 hearings; and Visited British, French, and German military schools of comparable levels.
The results of the Skelton panel were deeply influential in shaping U.S. JPME in the
years ahead, correctly recognizing and anticipating its key requirements:
Comprehensive organizational architecture and conceptual framework for developingcourse objectives and establishing required student performance
Continuous institutional and student evaluation Explore active learning instructional methodologies within a proper faculty student mix
from the several services
Pro-active curriculum development integrated across all levels of teaching
In the following section, we analyze some of the Skelton panel key components,
comparing its 1989 recommendations to the current situation in the U.S., with an effort to
abstract the discussion into general elements transparent -- and perhaps useful -- to other
countries making similar efforts in joint education. The panel recommendations, therefore,
are used merely to frame the discussion, and are not recommendations that we propose be
adopted by any other country due to the unique conditions which pertain to the United States.
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U.S. Professional Military Education System*
* The Skelton panel refered to the 10 PME Schools. The chart above depicts oringial 10 PME schools, plusthe Marine Corps War College, surrounded by the bold box.
DESIGN AND HAPPENSTANCE
Most of the Skelton panel recommendations were included in the Officer Professional
Military Education Policy that promulgates the guidelines, procedures, objectives, and
responsibilities for officer professional military education (PME). 14 Nevertheless, there is a
great deal to question regarding just how much education can do to increase jointness. There
can be no question that the United States now conducts joint operations much more
effectively than it did before the Goldwater-Nichols Act came into effect. How much of that
14 USA. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. Officer Professional Military Education Policy(OPMEP) . CJCSI 1800.01A. Dec. 2000.
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is due to education and how much to other factors, such as experience with joint forces, is an
open question. 15 Still, it cannot be denied that, at a bare minimum, education can reinforce
what has been learned through experience and may give the student the intellectual skills
required to effectively integrate those experiences into an operating paradigm.
Organizational Architecture and Conceptual Framework
After weighing the quality of education offered at military schools, the Skelton panel
concluded that a genuinely joint education should be conducted by an authority independent
of any individual service. However, this position was not recommended because, as with
other possible courses of action that were assessed, the disadvantages of doing so outweighed
the advantages. Among the many specific issues at play were such factors as the hierarchical
structure of the armed forces. Judith Stiehm, in her analysis of the U.S. Army War College,
for example, stated:
The Army chief of staff selects the commandant and sometimes has a close relationship with
him. He may issue formal or informal guidance as to the curriculum or other aspects of the
Army War College.... Even if supervision is light, the chief and the commandant are in a
senior-subordinate relationship. 16
This critique fails to take account of several important facts. First, commandants serve
for only three years. Most of them have not had prior service as faculty of the institution they
will be commanding. All of them come to the institution from some other assignment that
has not focused on academic issues. So, unless they come with an agenda based on
knowledge of the place, they will find it difficult to affect curriculum other than at the
margins. Second, most commandants are other than military academics. Hence, their
learning curve is likely to be fairly steep. By the time they know what they want to do, they
15
On the basis of direct observation between 1992 and 1997, incoming students at an intermediate level serviceschool each year were significantly more committed and receptive to the concept of jointness than the studentsof the previous year.
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are often nearing the end of their tenure and are without the time to implement their desired
curriculum changes. Third, the military faculty is also short-term, with three years being the
norm, and they too usually face the same learning curve. Finally, the civilian faculty and
staff provide the institutional memory and have the capability to resist unwanted changes,
particularly those introduced in the second half of a commandant s tenure. In addition, some
commandants wear multiple hats and therefore cannot focus their entire attention on
institutional change. 17
The panel s only critique of commandants and presidents of war colleges was their
short tenure, typically a standard three-year assignment. This is still a recurrent problem
entwined with the pattern of career requirements within the personnel structure of the U.S.
Armed Forces, a much larger issue.
The Skelton panel also recommended sharpening the focus of the colleges using a
comprehensive framework so that each successive level of schooling could be built on the
previous level, tying together curricula at the joint and service schools based on a single
determinant: the major subject of professional military education should be the employment
of combat forces, the conduct of war. 18
This framework was proposed along with what the panel named its most
fundamental 19 recommendation: that joint specialist education should be accomplished in a
joint school, following a proposal for restructuring the architecture of courses and of joint
16 Stiehm, J.H. U.S. Army War College: Military Education in a Democracy. Philadelphia: Temple UniversityPress, 2002. p.17617 One of the authors has served at both an intermediate and senior service institution. In that capacity, he sawcommandants wearing three separate hats having no desire to effect change in the institution. At the sameschool, the Deputy Commandant was responsible for the running of the place and his tenure was often as shortas one year, with the norm being two years. At another institution he witnessed a well- qualified commandantspending most of his time dealing with issues for the Chief of Staff of his service that had nothing to do withcurriculum. The only case where a commandant is known to have instituted major curriculum change is the
Naval War College during the tenure of Admiral Stansfield Turner during the 1970s who came in with an pre-
conceived agenda.18 Skelton Panel, op.cit ., p.7.19 ibid , p.8
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education aiming at greater operational competence with sound, imaginative strategic
thinking. 20
In order to operationalize their recommendations, the panel divided the spectrum of war
into four categories, assigning each one as the focus of specific levels of education, courses,
and schools. The result made the pre-commission and primary level schools (academies and
specialization equivalents in Latin America) focus on branch or warfare specialty at the
tactical level. The intermediate schools (staff college equivalents) should focus on operational
art, theater warfare, broadening the officer s knowledge of multi -service particularities and
requirements. Selected graduates of the services intermediate schools would attend a joint
school enlarging and deepening joint force planning and employment skill. The senior
schools (service war college equivalent) should focus on national military strategy; selected
officers would progress into the national security strategy arena in a proposed National
Center for Strategic Studies, and those promoted to general/flag rank would attend a
Capstone course focusing on jointness in force employment with substantive study of strategy
issues.
The panel clearly defined the intermediate level as the principal schools for all officers
to study the foundations and practicalities of jointness, reserving to the joint schools the role
of educating joint specialists, thus creating an interlocked structure of service experts and
jointness specialists.
One of the underlying difficulties in implementing both the Goldwater-Nichols
derived directives and the recommendations of the Skelton panel was that joint education was
to be grafted onto a preexisting structure of military schools. Each of the four services had its
own intermediate level staff college, while the Army, Navy, and Air Force each had a senior
service college (the Marine Corps would soon acquire one as well). In addition, the Joint
20 ibid , p.10
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community also had its schools with the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) at the
intermediate level, and the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces at the senior level. The AFSC was founded in 1946, became part of the National
Defense University (NDU) in 1981, and changed its name to Joint Forces Staff College in
2001. For its part, the National Defense University (NDU) was formally established on
January 16, 1976, as a consequence of recommendations made by the Department of Defense
Committee on Excellence in Education, bringing together in a university concept the two
Senior Colleges -- the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College.
The National War College was founded in 1946 while the ICAF was established as the Army
Industrial College in 1924. It closed its doors in 1940 to reopen in 1947 as the ICAF. The
principal point is that these preexisting institutions had significant historical baggage, which
for good or ill, would serve to both guide the direction that the institutions would take as well
as constrain their possibilities. The following table chronicles the establishment of the
institutions.
1881 - U.S. Army School of Application of Cavalry and Infantry established in FortLeavenworth, KS (predecessor of Command & General Staff College)
1884 - U.S. Naval War College established in Newport, RI 1903 - U.S. Army War College established in Washington, D.C.1920 - U.S. Marine Corps Field Officers' Course established in Quantico, VA1922 - U.S. Army Command & General Staff College established in Fort Leavenworth, KS1924 - Army Industrial College established in Washington, D.C.1940 - U.S. Army War College suspends classes1943 - Army-Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) established in Washington, D.C.1946 - National War College (formerly ANSCOL) established in Washington, D.C.1946 - Industrial College of the Armed Forces (formerly Army Industrial College)
established in Washington, D.C.
1946 - Air War College/Air Command and Staff School established at Maxwell, AL1947 - Armed Forces Staff College (formerly ANSCOL) established in Norfolk, VA1951 - U.S. Army War College relocates to Carlisle Barracks, PA1976 - National Defense University established in Washington, D.C.1981 - Armed Forces Staff College joins NDU1986 - Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act1991 - U.S. Marine Corps War College established in Quantico, VA2001 - Joint Forces Staff College (formerly Armed Forces Staff College) established in Norfolk, VA
Table 1: Chronology of Intermediate and Senior Service Institutions
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In order to more effectively implement the recommendations of the Skelton panel, as
well as to oversee the JPME process, the JCS Chairman instituted a series of organizational
and procedural steps:
Created the J-7 Directorate -- Operational Plans and Interoperabililty -- with
responsibilities for joint plans, training, exercises, evaluation, education, interoperability
and joint doctrine. Within that Directorate, he also created the Military Education
Division (MED) to formulate CJCS policy for educating members of the Armed Forces to
ensure compliance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act. 21
Created the Military Education Coordination Conference (MECC), a forum to discuss
issues regarding PME and JPME issues, coordinate efforts to improve PME, and review
joint curricula. The MECC includes the Director, Joint Staff (the MECC Chairman), the
President of the NDU, the commandant/president of each intermediate and senior Service
school, and the commandants of the three NDU PME colleges.
Created the Process for the Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) procedure for
assessing the effectiveness of JPME across the intermediate and senior Service schools. 22
These major elements represented the Chairman s intent to ensure the JPME was
implemented as uniformly as possible -- given the realities of divergent Service inclinations
previously discussed -- across the intermediate and senior Service schools. Certainly, the
quality of the JPME product was independent of these procedural steps; nonetheless, the
Chairman s intent was to attempt to institutionalize a process that wou ld lend formality,
weight, and rigor to the JPME effort.
Another result of the Skelton panel s recommendations was a two -tiered approach to
joint education. The lower tier, called Phase I, was to be the responsibility of the services and
was to be taught in the intermediate and senior service schools. The upper tier, called Phase
II, was to be the responsibility of the joint schools particularly the Armed Forces Staff
College whose curriculum was completely revamped to fit within 12 weeks (instead of 26).
This approach worked best at the intermediate level as all the service staff colleges met or
21
This took place in 1987. Subsequently, the Military Education Division became the Joint Doctrine,Education, and Training Division, with a subordinate Joint Education Branch, Joint Training Branch, and JointDoctrine Branch.
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exceeded the standards and learning areas identified in the joint documents such as the
Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP) 23. Following their attendance at
the service staff college, officers selected for joint assignments would attend the AFSC for
the new 12-week course that constituted Phase II. While most attended on their way to the
joint assignment a significant minority attended while on joint duty.
The report also recommended that an accrediting process be set up so the service
schools could demonstrate their compliance with Goldwater-Nichols in a two-phase process.
Phase I of joint education should provide all officers with what they should know about
jointness. School accreditation would be given or denied for this phase based on the
recommendations of an independent evaluation. Phase II would provide enhanced education
in jointness for qualified students through the above-mentioned short course at the Armed
Forces Staff College.
When it began in 1987, the process of moving professional military education into
civilian academic like accreditation with academic degrees (Masters) was not universally
applauded.
There were critics at the time who held that the nature of military education and training was
such that academic practices and standards were quite inappropriate. War is not an academic
exercise; soldiers understand soldiers and the intrusion of scholars might deflect the
decisiveness of command into the divisiveness of academic debate. One also should
understand that the senior colleges, ICAF and NWC already had extended and accomplished
histories; they felt that their efforts needed neither an external guarantor nor encumbrance in
the extended authority of the National Defense University. 24
22 The concept for evaluating JPME in a centralized fashion was approved by the Chairman in November, 1987.23 Interviews with former instructors at AFSC and USAF instructors in the Department of Joint and CombinedOperations at the Army Command and General Staff College who attended AFSC as students during their jointinstructor assignments confirm this but also make the point that of all the services the Army prepared their
students the best for Phase II joint education. Interviews in 1997, 98, 99, 2000 and 2001.24 Report of the Middle States Commission on Higher Education Evaluation Team to the National DefenseUniversity on accreditation, http://ndunet.ndu.edu/ndu_ar/2002reportsms.htm
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Nevertheless, the process has moved ahead on two fronts: Joint accreditation and civilian
academic accreditation along with the conferring of advanced degrees (in many of the
schools).
The major problem in joint education seems to come at the senior level. Here many of
the students at the senior service schools have already served on joint duty assignments.
Although other senior service school selectees have not served on a joint staff or other joint
duty, all have now been through Phase I in the intermediate level schools. In addition, only
those who will be assigned to joint duty will go to AFSC (now JFSC) for Phase II education.
This has resulted in some confusion as to the desired joint educational objectives in the senior
service schools. Does their Phase I merely duplicate the Phase I of the intermediate schools?
Does this curriculum serve merely as a refresher? Or is there something new added?
Finally, there is the question of the two senior level joint schools. Both ICAF and
NWC teach curricula that are deemed to meet the criteria for both Phase I and Phase II of
joint education. This raises questions of efficiency and economy as well as effectiveness.
First, all military students at ICAF and NWC are graduates of Phase I at an intermediate
service school raising the question of whether these two curricula merely repeat the Phase I
curricula that all the other service schools teach. If not, then is what they teach really Phase
I? Do t heir curricula parallel the Phase II curricula of JFSC s intermediate and senior
courses? If so, is this redundant? If not, is it really Phase II or something else? 25
The current US policy for joint education (2000) defines the focus of each
educational l evel in terms of major levels of war, tactical, operational and strategic, linking
the educational levels so each builds upon the knowledge and values gained at previous
levels 26 ( bold in the original). It also recognizes the interdependence of joint and Service
25 In an interview in November 2002, a former professor at the National War College and AFSC stated that
while there was no substantive equivalence between NWC and AFSC (JFSC), the objective of inculcating a joint thought process was met by both institutions.26 OPMEP, op.cit ., p. A-B-1.
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schools, keeping with the Service schools the role of developing Service specialists with
emphasis primarily from a Service perspective and attributing to joint schools the emphasis
on joint education from a joint perspective. Each has a focus similar to that recommended by
the Skelton panel. The only noticeable difference rests on the rejection of the proposal to
transform The National Defense University into the proposed National Center for Strategic
Studies. 27
EVALUATION
The Skelton panel also recognized that equally important as clearly defining the
intended outcomes of education is assessing both the students and institutions actual
achievement, not only to guide the development of individual students, but also to monitor
and continuously improve the quality of the course and provide evidence of accountability to
its stakeholders.
To address these evaluation issues -- with emphasis on the latter -- the Chairman
created the Program for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) under the J-7 of the Joint
Staff. The PAJE periodically reviews the curricula of all the intermediate and senior schools
to determine how well they meet joint standards and learning areas.
To accomplish this, the PAJE process follows the practice of civilian academic
accreditation associations in the U.S. by evaluating how well the institution does what it says
it does. This is accomplished by reviewing the institution s self -study and teaching materials
provided by the institution. PAJE does not go into the classroom to determine if the
27 The panel believed that the study of strategy required more emphasis in the senior schools. Arguing that theservice war colleges should increase their emphasis on national military strategy, they further argued that thenext higher level is national security strategy, which includes the military, economic, diplomatic, and politicalelements of national power. The panel recommended that the National War College be converted into a
National Center for Strategic Studies -- with a focus on this level -- and study the application of all the elements both in peacetime and during crisis and war.
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institution actually is doing what it says it does. To date, all the institutions have been
reviewed twice, with the third cycle having just begun in 2001 2002.
An accurate analysis of the nature of the problems of joint education and the changes
that can be expected in the joint schools, as well as the links among them, depends upon the
characteristics of the evaluation processes available and on their sources of information. The
PAJE system emerged as a key enabler of increased efficacy in the fundamental shift to
enhanced joint education. The operational value or benefit of the accreditation process is
derived from its ability to generate and integrate more complete, accurate, and timely
information than can be produced by schools reports operating in stand-alone mode. The
very essence of the PAJE system lies in the ability of the CJCS to make the most out of the
situations reported, comparing the schools against identified standards and learning areas.
The desired result is a set of compatible outcomes among schools of the same level.
As a result of this increased centralization, high-level joint education policy decision-
makers will find themselves with more resources to monitor the situation, and looking ahead,
to ensure that problems are identified and resolved as quickly as possible, perhaps even
before the schools realize they exist. On the other hand, the system makes services joint
education planning activities significantly easier as plans no longer need to hedge against
policy uncertainties. The schools curriculum and instructional methodologies can now focus
instead on being consciously proactive in producing emergent properties of individual
schools that derive from policy intent, as internalized by its leadership, the degree of
knowledge available on the educational environment and the ability of the organizations to
minimize the constraints imposed by virtue of the resources allocated.
That this model works well for the U.S. JPME system is clear. Indeed, it is a system
that, as practiced by the JPME schools, is inductive rather than deductive and flexible rather
than constrained. In its operation it is analogous to the U.S. legal system based on case (or
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common) law as opposed to the code law systems practiced in continental Europe and Latin
America. Thus, the JPME system provides a vehicle that ensures the necessary comparability
among the several service institutions at the intermediate and senior levels without putting
them in an intellectual straight jacket.
Nevertheless, the very efficiency of the PAJE system could drive its future limitations,
especially if it were adopted in toto by Latin American institutions operating from a
deductive approach similar to that discussed above. This apparent paradox suggests that as
the system becomes more efficient in achieving its goals, it might preclude necessary changes
needed for joint education requirements to support the evolving joint warfighting
environment and its associated military capabilities.
Joint education must be proactive. To the extent we currently understand the conditions
under which some degree of success in joint education happens, a different set of conditions
is what we might experience in the future; therefore, there is the need to let some aspects of
the problem vary and try innovative approaches that could anticipate future demands. The
PAJE system -- with the advantages of centralization -- has the burden to incorporate
mechanisms of innovativeness in its policy recommendations. The danger is that the
presence of this requirement is not clear in the current system and the attempts of individual
efforts towards innovation by the schools may be seen as a deviation from the norm -- and
thus forcing them to conform to artificially rigid standards. While there is no evidence that
this danger has come to pass in the U.S. JPME system, it is a very real risk in systems with
traditions and modes of thinking that differ significantly from the U.S. approach.
INSTRUCTIONAL METHODOLOGY: STUDENT AND FACULTY MIX
From a conceptual perspective, instructional methodologies should be explored in joint
education to foster conceptual thinking as a result of close, detailed, reflective study. The
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Skelton panel gave considerable attention to rigor in the proper use of instructional
methodologies, addressing the ability of JPME to develop military strategists, joint war
fighters, and tacticians. Its recommendation on this issue established the standard that would
orient JPME schools curricula to develop strategy practitioners rather than strategy theorists.
The importance of this point is reinforced by the following -- rather long -- quotation:
From the numerous attributes identified, the panel has distilled four characteristics
prerequisites, if you will of the ideal strategist. First, a true strategist must be analytical. He
has to be able to move beyond isolated facts or competency in any given subject area to see
and develop interrelationships. Second, he must be pragmatic. The accelerated pace of change
in today s world, especially technological change, is self -evident. A true strategist is on top of
emerging trends and aware of the need to constantly revalidate his strategic constructs. Third,
he must be innovative. Fashioning strategies is, after all, a creative process one that
frequently challenges the status quo . Fourth, he must be broadly educated. Thinking
strategically requires individuals who are generalists rather than specialists. Given the potential
impact of many different areas on strategic thinking -- trends in political, technological,
economic, scientific, and social issues, both domestic and international -- strategists must have
the broadest possible educational base.
Few officers possess all of these attributes. It is rare to find individuals capable of a high
degree of conceptualization and innovation the attributes that most distinguish the
theoretical from applied strategist (emphasis added). Fortunately, the objective of PME
system is not the creation of a large pool of military officers who are strategists of the order of
Mahan. In the view of the panel, only a small number of genuine theoretical strategists are
need. More officers, however, can and should become skilled in the application of
strategy.Practical problem solvers -- applied strategists -- should be relatively easier to
nurture and more numerous. A large number of the nearly 1,100 general and flag officers
should be applied strategists. Overall, the panel believes that it is within the capacity of the
military education system to produce applied strategists and to identify and nurture theoretical
strategists. Thus the goals of the PME system with respect to strategists should be two-fold: (1)to improve the quality of strategic thinking among senior military officers and (2) to encourage
the development of a more limited number of bona fide theoretical strategists. 28
This emphasis on applied strategy, to some extent, helped to placate any criticism that
could have emerged from the scholarship intrusion into the traditional military school. It
28 Skelton Panel, op.cit ., p. 28.
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asserted that the JPME would be conducive to soldiers, who understand soldiers, teaching
soldiers.
The initial resistance to having civilian teaching faculty in the academies, staff colleges
and, to a lesser extent, in the war colleges was overcome; however, some resistance still
persists in some segments of institutions such as the Army General Staff College tactics
department. Currently, high expertise requirements for those teaching soldiers stresses the
crucial importance of having a properly sized civilian faculty who can bring formally trained
academic expertise into military schools and catalyze higher rigor and standards in education.
The focus of this expertise is largely on the academic disciplines such as economics and
international relations that are relevant to the strategic curriculum as well as regional studies.
To facilitate joint education, the panel recommended that the joint schools have both a
student and faculty service mix. Joint education, the Report stre ssed, is often used,
incorrectly to refer to instruction in joint matters without regard to such important factors as
the composition of the student body and faculty or who controls the school. Courses are
misleadingly termed joint education if they add ress multi-service problems and issues or
joint staffing procedures and systems. In fact, curriculum only sets the stage for the joint
educational experience (emphasis added). Beyond curriculum, a mixed student body and
faculty and an independently controlled school are all important elements of joint
education 29.
The panel also acknowledged the importance of active learning (which was
progressively introduced in the U.S. military schools since the 1950s) recognizing that the
educating 21 st century joint officers, with styles of learning profoundly influenced by global
networking of knowledge are all significantly different from those of past decades.
29 Ibid , p.64
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Modes of instruction that emphasize active learning and collaborative activities engage
students in intellectual discovery. Clearly, these modes are the most effective, as shown by
research over the past half century.
Collaborative activities is a generic term for various small group interactive
instructional procedures. Activities are structured so that students need each other to
accomplish their common task or learning activities. Students working in collaborative
groups usually divide responsibility for the domain, and produce networks of linked cognitive
structures. These can grow to become very complex, particularly if they are part of activities
such as those of a research group.
The cognitive architecture required for joint thinking is shaped in mixed classes. When
students who attempt to impose their service bias on the discussion are challenged in mixed
classes, they are forced to recognize complementary possibilities in ideas, values, and
traditions of their services.
According to this view, the instructor s task is to interact with students in ways that
enable them to acquire new information, practice new skills, and reconfigure and expand
their knowledge. Guiding students through cooperative processes is easier and more
understandable for those who will practice implementation of the ideas, concepts, and
practices that are the products of a facilitated session. The instructor, then, is the one who
provides structure and process to group interaction leading to high-quality decisions and who
helps, enables, and supports others toward performance excellence.
However, with candor rare among most mili tary educators, the panel noted that at the
present [1989], although there is a dearth of knowledge about joint operations and of joint
doctrine, joint faculties can address the joint employment problems that have plagued our
armed forces over the past 40 yearsit follows that the educational qualifications and
military experience of the joint faculty are paramount. Instructors must be able to explain and
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debate joint issues with the confidence that only experience and study can provide. An
inexperienced faculty member with a weak educational background will have little success in
broadening the uni- service perspectives of his students. 30
Further, the panel argued that expertise was not necessarily linked to rank faculty did
not have to outrank students. Expertise can command respect. Such expertise would also
contribute to fulfilling other panel recommendations about careful grading, counseling and
more feedback that addresses analytical performance. The panel also gave a strong
endorsement to simulations and war-gaming.
There was nothing timorous about the panel s argument that student exchange in the
classroom was conducive to reproducing past errors because of faculty lack of teaching
qualifications and subject matter expertise, whereas facilitating was mistakenly taken as a
synonym of ordering the speakers sequence. 31
Conceptually, the Skelton panel hit the target on many issues -- while missing it on
some significant ones. One specific case in point is with regard to sending more students to
another service s college meant fewer of each service s students attending its own schools.
The Navy and the Air Force, more so than the Army, found it difficult to simultaneously
change their schools structure to accommodate the demands for increased non -host service
representation, or conversely to increase the number of officers in education billets each year
to make other services colleges more joint within the same budget appropriation.
The tables below exemplify the accomplishment in student and faculty mix at the Army
Command and General Staff College. These tables were compiled from data presented in a
masters thesis at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Their value is
in providing a comparative analysis of the students and faculties just before and ten years
after the Skelton panel recommendations. The 1998 data are consistent with the latest (in
30 ibid , p. 64
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1998) Report of Accreditation 32 for phase I joint (64 Air Force Students and 64 Sea Service
students 44 Navy and 20 Marine Corps) and should serve as a spot check on the validity of
the PAJE reports for the other intermediate level Service schools.
Service1987-1988
1998-1999
Percent ChangeRelative to Service
Representation
Percent ChangeRelative to Total
Student Size Army 819
81.2%834
79.2% (2.3%) (1.9%) Navy 3
0.3%43
4.1% 1,266.6% 3.8%USMC 18
1.8%20
1.9% 5.5% 0.1%Air Force 40
4.0%64
6.1% 52.5% 2.1%International 128
12.7%91
8.6% (32.2%) (4.1%)Total 1008 1052 4.37%
Table 2: Comparative Analysis of Service Representation in Army Command and GeneralStaff College 1987/1988 1998/1999.
Service 1987-1988
1998-1999
Percent ChangeRelative to Service
Representation
Percent ChangeRelative to Total
Faculty SizeArmy 24395.3%
17789.0% (6.51%) (6.3%)
Navy 31.2%
63% 150% 1.8%
USMC 31.2%
42% 66.67% 0.8%
Air Force 62.3%
126% 160.87% 3.7%
Total 255 199 (20.96%)Table 3: Comparative Analysis of Service Faculty Representation in Army Command andGeneral Staff College 1987/1988 1998/1999.
The numbers presented in these charts and Accreditation Reports for other Colleges
(senior and intermediate) indicate that the mix of sister Service representatives meets the
31
ibid , p.13532 USA, CJS. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, US Army CJCS Accreditation, Command and General StaffOfficers Course Resident Program. Texas, Kansas - Fort Leavenworth, June 1997. p.2.
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required standard posed by the Officer Professional Military Education Policy graphically
depicted in Table 4. 33
College Class and Seminar Mix forResident Programs
Faculty Mix
Senior Level(NDU and ICAF)
Approximately equal representation fromeach of the three Military Departments
Approximately 33 percent from eachMilitary Department
Service SeniorLevel
A minimum of 20-percent from non-hostMilitary Departments
No less than 25 percent of the totalmilitary faculty from non-host militarydepartments.
IntermediateLevel
At least one officer from each of the twonon-host Military Department in eachseminar
Minimum of 5 percent of military facultymembers whose primary duty is jointeducation
Table 4: Faculty and students mix requirements.
However, it cannot be said that the purpose for which this mix was established have
been adequately achieved: to provide a diversity of service experience to foster active
learning in joint education. This can be seen in the following appreciation of the current
status of the joint learning process:
in reality, the lack of a good Service mix in the classroom and the faculty causes skewed
instruction and unrealistic and even incorrect portrayal of non-Army capabilities andlimitations. For example, the course book includes detailed, robust force listing of U.S. Air
Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and coalition air forces and a reasonably plausible command and
control relationship of these forces in a Joint Task Force. However, in the classroom, the roles
of these non-Army forces are seldom, if ever, mentioned and if they are, it is usually because
of a zealous Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, or international officer student who puts in the
considerable extra effort to show how these forces could produce results important to the Army
commanders. Even with such effort by a student, these results of airpower, seapower,
amphibious, and coalition operations are often discounted as insignificant. 34
The author of this appreciation, Major Carney, U.S. Air Force, is talking about a course
within the curriculum -- tactics -- that is taught by the most service parochial department at
the CGSC. Nevertheless, his critique focuses well on the requirements for faculty/student
mix at the intermediate level. These are the bottom two cells of Table 2. Indeed, his critique
33 The requirements can be found at: USA. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. Officer
Professional Military Policy. CJCSI 1800.01A. Dec. 2000. Enclosure B.34 Carney, M. Joint Professional Military Education 1999: Where to Now? Kansas, Fort Leavenworth: U.S.Army Command and General Staff College. Masters Thesis (unclassified), 1999. p.56.
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is especially powerful with regard to the faculty mix requirement in the bottom right cell. In
the course he is discussing, there are no faculty members from non-host military departments
required. This leaves the two non-host students to raise joint type issues alone. Major
Carney s candid criticism, however, makes explicit the actual commitment to academic
freedom in the U.S. intermediate and senior military schools for expressing ideas and
recommendations.
That appreciation should also be contextualized as an individual student perspective on
a rather complex issue, suggesting caution in its generalization; notwithstanding, if the
schools are achieving the standards but the purpose of that standard is not met, then the
standard should be reviewed. At least one officer from each of the two non-host services
seems to have proved itself not an adequate standard for enhancing joint education. This
might be a far too strong a conclusion; the point however, is the necessity of rethinking the
interaction that is actually achievable within the school house between students versus
students, students versus faculty, and department versus department based on current
standards so that a better ratio would be devised.
Another problematic aspect found in the instructional methodologies currently
practiced in the U.S. JPME regards the difficulty to reconcile active learning requirements
which impose highly selective content - with the high volume of knowledge students are
required to get in order to achieve the learning objectives. The result is a tension between
what might be called an educational model and a training model. 35 This tension is reflected
in the structure used to frame information, keeping students busy , whether attending a lecture,
meeting in seminar, or participating in an exercise, precluding the students from considering
and challenging their own intellectual assumptions and prejudices.
35 Over many years of teaching at the Army Command and General Staff College in both military and civilianstatus, one of the authors has been involved in countless discussions of this tension.
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The objectives are oriented to educate students in thinking logically about tough
problems. Explicitly, they are told to think differently -- from one another and from the way
they had thought in the past. However, there is a danger that the instructional methodologies -
- and the culture of the seminar system -- implicitly keep them on the same track, with a
tendency to seek certainty and consensus reinforced by the use of questions that force
students to reach a conclusion. This situation is not ameliorated with the exercises, i.e.
requirements to take action in war games and crisis management exercises and, at least
temporarily, cease inquiry and reflection on what they have read, heard, and discussed.
Making sure that the right information is available at the right time -- following the
schedule -- is one such element that is a major concern for the faculty. Students are constantly
being briefed with shorthand versions of a variety of information. These briefings -- lectures -
- ambitiously condense what one might think would merit a whole course into a single
lesson. 36
Recognizing these tensions, textbooks containing required and supplementary readings
are made available to students. This procedure seems to imply that having been briefed and
read the readings, students not only are assumed to be entitled to an opinion (know enough to
have an opinion -- even on issues on which experts do not agree) but are also assumed to be
ready to act. These are not simple problems with easy solutions, making faculty development
a critical requirement in joint education, so that professors can gain new insights into how
knowledge is created, retained, transferred and used within their courses, using available
tools to analyze, design, develop, deliver and evaluate post-graduate level courses in diverse
educational environments using a variety of effective teaching methodologies, delivery
techniques, planning approaches and instructional strategies.
36 This lament is often heard among the academics on the faculty of both the intermediate and senior serviceschools.
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CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT
Within the architecture recommended by the Skelton panel, the common education
standard of all U.S. Professional Military Education should be to develop joint awareness,
perspective, and attitudes . The JPME curricula should prepare graduates to operate in a joint
environment and to bring a joint perspective to bear in their tactical, operational, and strategic
thinking.
From a conceptual perspective, the challenges in designing an academic curriculum to
achieve educational objectives revolve around taking advantage of inherent efficiencies in
individual services tradition, doctrines, discipline and procedures, blending service strengths
on a mission basis to provide higher combat output than either any single service or the sum
of individual service contributions could produce.
On one hand, fostering services inherent efficiency promotes specialization and
ultimately argues in favor of a command and control system that keeps the responsibilities
and operations of various service components distinct and separated. It is concerned with
maintaining distinctions and keeping lines of responsibility from overlapping. Keep
components from getting in each other s way and allow them to carry out their particular
specialty with greatest effectiveness. Once each service component meets the demands of its
particular mission, the result will be an effective, smoothly conducted war or operation. Air
Force, Navy, and Army components focus on air, sea, and ground campaigns respectively,
the overall operation will benefit. Resources will not be diluted, stretched or diverted.
On the other hand, implementing joint education demands the confrontation of
multiple-often incompatible-military strategy, doctrine, training, evaluation, and the need to
execute programs in support of those strategies. Because services desire to preserve their
rights and options in determining appropriations use, jointness challenges the role of the
service in determining the training status of their units. Fostering joint education argues in
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favor of convergent and complementary functional capabilities with efficient management
tools for working out the myriad of aspects of joint operation in assigned missions, aiding and
facilitating operations of the other service components: helping other services do what they
must do, without positing a unique subordinate role for the army, navy or air force. It means
coming to appreciate tactical, operational and strategic priorities from the perspectives of the
other services, and acting accordingly to produce a rapid build-up of power deployed in a
logical sequence and properly sustained. It implies a cooperative arrangement that extends
the range of the operational scheme as well as the command and control nodes and links
through which an operational scheme can be implemented to achieve strategic objectives and,
ultimately, political objectives.
The information depicted below (Table 5) consolidates learning areas and the
respective teaching goals of the curriculum currently practiced in the U.S. JPME schools --
explaining how the tension depicted above was accommodated at the U.S. military schools --
with a focus on courses at the senior level. Furthermore, the U.S. institutions of military
higher education, typically disaggregate these goals into specific objectives aligned with
cognitive levels using Bloom s taxonomy described in Table 6 to produce the list of
objectives compiled in Annex A: JPME Consolidat ed Learning Objectives. 37
This listing of Consolidated Learning Objectives at Annex A permits a comparative
analysis of the U.S. JPME Schools. The course of study directed by these objectives at
different cognitive levels may seem very complex; however, its logic is straightforwardly
simple with three easily recognizable stages. In the first stage, academic activities are
designed to provide students with the intellectual tool to derive relevant data from empirical
observation and perform critical analysis to a recognized problem; the next step within this
37
U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. Officer Professional Military Education (CJCSI1800.01 A.) Washington, D.C. Dec. 2000, p. E.2. For a detailed ex planation of Bloom s Taxonomy, see:Bloom, B.S. (ed.) Taxonomy of Educational Objectives . New York: Longman, 1956.
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LearningAreas
Goals
Foundationsof NationalPower
and theGeo-Strategic
Context
This learning area provides students with the intellectual environment tocomprehend and assess the full spectrum of national power in order to developsensitivity to the political, economic and societal factors that influence nation s
security and well-being, providing students the opportunity to appraise globaland regional aspects of political, social, economic, and military trends from the perspective of national interests, policies, and strategies.Related activities are designed to expose students to many complex issues,events, and policies faced by national policymakers, whom they might have toadvise in the future, related activities led students to learn how to weigh therelative importance of nonmilitary factors and strategies that could affect militarycapabilities, strategies (security, military and operational) and tactics, providingthe instance of reference for assessing military needs and budget requirements.
Theory ofWar
This learning area is dedicated to the acquisition of concepts, theories, andapproaches to the art and science of war, the military profession under theframework of war as a political, social, and moral phenomenon.
Related activities are designed to expose the relationship between military forcesand national political aims across the spectrum of conflict and the levels of war,with the comprehension that, regardless of how conscientious the planning, thesituation becomes fluid once combat begins. Fog and friction derail plans;intelligence, communications, logistics, and more do not deliver as scheduled.
NationalPlanningSystems,
Processes andStructures
This learning area makes students reflect and critically analyze the institutionsand processes that make security policy and how it is translated into capabilityrequirements and budget elements. With varying degrees of details, studentslearn how to institutionalize institutional changes through the exploration of therelationship of organizational structure and the security and defense decision-making process.This process leads students to recognize, first, the arcanities of the U.S.interlocked planning methodologies, with emphasis on the Joint StrategicPlanning System (JSPS), the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System(JOPES), and the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). Andsecond, how the planning processes works in reality to conciliate resources andcompeting demands within an interagency bargain process.
MilitaryCapabilities,
Doctrine,
Organization and JointCampaigning
This area of study is oriented towards students acquisition of the skills tomanage large combat formations at the corps level and higher. Translate politicalguidance into operation plan, understanding the needs for, and the means toward,organizing variety of system to achieve integration.Activities are designed to permit the examination of actual force organization,
capabilities and the instrumental role of doctrine (services and joint) to achieve politically oriented objectives (at several levels), guide students into theformulation and assessment over the appropriateness of strategy, developing
performance indicators for capabilities alternatives and organizations possibilities.
StrategicLeadership
andManagementDevelopment
This learning area is oriented to prepare students to be initiators rather than justimplementers of policy, performing well not just within the framework ofcertainty provided by armed services regulations and field manuals, but in a newenvironment characterized by complexity and, more important, by ambiguity.Leadership and management are woven into a number of other topics that chargestudents to carry new responsibilities and acquire new skills and information forinterpersonal relations in managing and leading a joint/combined force.
Table 5: Consolidated learning areas and teaching goals.
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stage is the acquisition of the required skills to perform, elaborate, and abstract cognitive
processes in transforming these data according to accepted procedures. In a second stage,
academic activities demand that students develop creative alternatives that respond to the
perceived problem, together with criteria for their assessment.
Finally, this logic requires students to assess the results and present their conclusions in
a rational way. In sum, the logic that defines the structure of joint education curriculum is the
logic of scientific reasoning, exploring a set of concepts and instrumental planning
methodologies.
Level Description Key words
Knowledge Remember Define, describe, identify, label, list, match, name, outline,reproduce, select, state
Comprehension Grasp themeaning
Convert, defend, distinguish, estimate, explain, extend,generalize, exemplify, infer, paraphrase, predictRewrite, summarize, translate, understand
Application Use in a newsituation
Change, compute, demonstrate, discoverManipulate, modify, operate, predictPrepare, produce, relate, show, solve, use
Analysis Break down incomponents
Break down, diagram, differentiate, discriminate,distinguish, illustrate, infer, outline, point out, select,separate, subdivide
Synthesis Put together toform a newwhole
Categorize, combine, compile, compose, create, divide,design, explain, generate, modify, organize, plan, rearrange,reconstruct, relate, reorganize, revise, rewrite, summarize,tell, write
Evaluation Judge thevalue for agive purpose
Appraise, criticize, discriminate, explain, justify, interpret,support
Table 6: Taxonomy of cognitive levels. Source: OPMEP, p. E2.
Although the curriculum of each school component of the U.S. JPME is assigned with
the same logic, each one takes conceptual elements from the former, creating an evolving
process of knowledge acquisition and progressive skills in critical thinking. This logic
structure might justify some degree of the redundancy found in the compared objectives of
courses and schools. It also explains recurring high-level cognitive objectives in all courses.
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On the other side, this also means a progression from the strict hierarchy of rigid
conceptual compartmentalization of knowledge proposed by the Skelton panel structure,
towards a spiral-like structure of superimposed concepts without a rigid
compartmentalization. Interestingly enough, the foundations for this implicit departure from
the former into the latter rests in the guidance found in the Officer Professional Military
Education Policy , which states its adoption of the hierarchical framework but produces a
more network-like web of educational objectives which effectively guide the formulation of
subordinate objectives by the schools. 38
The logic is sound. Moreover, it could easily be emulated by any institution seeking to
enhance joint education. The problems as one would expect lie - in pragmatically turning
that logic into real activities with measurable parameters of effectiveness where both the
curriculum and the instructional methodologies complement themselves in a coherent,
interlocked program at several levels.
In Table 7 we present some selected comments collected though the PAJE system that
lay out current tensions in the joint education curriculum. We wish to emphasize, however,
that the existence of these tensions does not imply any deep or systemic weakness within or
across the institutions. To the contrary, we share the sentiment of the Skelton panel when
they observed in 1989, a basic judgment of the panel is that the DoD military e ducation
system is sound. 39 Indeed, the implementation of many of the panel s recommendations
subsequent to its publication have only served to make the system stronger. Nonetheless,
there are shortcomings, and improvements can be made.
The problem can be simply stated: too ambitious, too much. Some schools objectives
just seem too ambitious, going much beyond the applied strategy level. This reflects a
tension between the intentions of producing a rigorous academic program and the pragmatic
38 Ibid.
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reality of the schools limited by the academic qualifications of their military faculty and even
more by their expertise as trainers rather than as educators. Broad objectives lead students to
think they know even when experts acknowledge that they themselves do not. Table 7
provides the basis for these conclusions as drawn from the comments sections of a
representative sample of the PAJE reports.
One difficulty found in the structure of the PAJE process -- fundamental for critically
accessing schools curricula -- is that it does not explore teaching and adult learning aspects
of performance evaluation concerning stated objectives. Notwithstanding, two conclusions
are clearly evident.
First, outcomes achieved should not be mistaken for anything but limited expertise.
After only a few weeks of regional study, for example, students construct a strategy for that
region to include not just the military component, but also political, economic, and
psychological elements. These products are clearly limited and usually biased.
Second, students have no time for arriving at a truly original idea. Absorbing so much
material makes it difficult to develop enough distance to make independent judgments. In
this situation, dealing with abstraction and speculation runs the risk of ceasing to be the order
of the day, allowing the enforcement of a methodology to reign as an implicit goal. The
difficulty -- one would recognize -- lies in finding the proper balance between applying
strategic concepts on one side, and meta-cognition and analysis on the other. In the former,
ordeal is not synonymous with a systematic approach to the thinking process. In the latter, a
simplistic approach to the procedures for investigation is not a qualification in epistemology
this would be a doctorate in itself.
39 Skelton Panel, op.cit ., p.18
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School Year CommentsIndustrialCollege ofthe Armed
Forces
1994 The program does not adequately address JTF planning and operationsand command and control and provides too few opportunities to reachthe application level of learning.The use of student briefing and discussion teams to address thecapabilities and limitations of the Services permits a wide variance in thequality and content of the information exchanged.The emphasis of the strategic level prevents potential joint specialtyofficers (JSOs) graduating from the ICAF from having equivalentoperational level expertise as those graduating from other Phase I and II
programs.Global Rally (exercise) is conducted during the end of the year whenstudents have one foot out the door. Student appointments and outsidecommitments interfere with active learning. Additionally, timeconstraints preclude opportunities to replay poor solutions and/or provideconstructive feedback to students.
Army
Commandand GeneralStaff College
1997 In several lesson plans, the coverage of PAJE learning objectives appears
to be overstated. This practice tends to lead the students into believingthey are receiving more joint education than may really be the case.The end of course war game is primarily oriented on Army tacticaloperations, with joint issues occupying a peripheral role.
AirCommandand StaffCollege
1997 The coverage of available sub-organizational structures (including jointtask forces, sub-unified commands, and single Service Commands) islimited throughout the curriculum.The curriculum does not adequately cover the integration of joint andService systems at the operational level of war.
Air WarCollege
1997 The level of awareness and the understanding of the joint doctrinedevelopment process should be increased beyond just a cursory readingof key doctrine publications.
Army WarCollege
1998 The coverage allotted to the understanding of the capabilities andlimitations of non-host U.S. military forces and to sustaining nationalmilitary resources is spread minimally among various lessons. Onelecture on joint force capabilities offered during the midcourse resident
phase addresses Service capabilities and logistics but, except for onechapter of Joint Pub 4-0 covering logistics, there are no Service-specificreadings assigned to this lesson.
College ofNaval
Commandand Staff
Naval WarCollege
1998 The curriculum covers force planning issues relative to the NationalMilitary Strategy but does not specifically address how the joint staff isorganized.Instructors should review joint publications to familiarize themselveswith the doctrine development process and related terminology.Change all reference in the syllabus to reflect the proper jointterminology.
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College ofNaval
Warfare
1998 The competency and experience level of the student body varies greatlyand is not uniform across the various Services at the beginning of theJMO course e.g., a majority of students do not have a strong backgroundin theater strategy and campaigning (operational art).Inconsistency in documenting common learning area objectives indicatea need to review current curriculum development procedures to ensurePAJE standards are applied consistently throughout the entire course.
School Year CommentsArmed
Forces StaffCollege
Joint andCombined
Staff OfficerSchool
1998 Enhance individual lessons through more effective use of Bloom sTaxonomy by using the learning levels as the key verb in each lessonobjective. A desired outcome in the school s st rategic vision is to
Ensure 85% of the curriculum focused on specific tasks at or above theapplication level of learning. This will be much easier to manage anddocument if the verbs (know, comprehend, apply, analyze, synthesize,and evaluate) are used for every lesson objective. Lesson developmentand student comprehension of the desired learning outcome will be muchclearer if these six words are used in every lesson objective andappropriate verbs are used in the corresponding behavior samples.
ArmedForces Staff
College Joint andCombined
WarfightingSchool
1998 The College should develop a definition of performance standards thatwould apply to all student activities, and publish this information in theStudents Handbook.The College does not extensively use any modeling and simulationsupport in the exercises, to include the capstone exercise, PurpleReliance.Reevaluate the curriculum, critically appraising the taxonomy levelcontribution of each session toward learning objectives contained in theOPMEP. Utilizing the information ob