ECB-IMF Workshop on Money Markets, Monetary Policy Implementation & y y pMarket Infrastructures
Market Practitioner Presentation Collateral, the force that binds us...
25 October 2016Michael Manna, Head of Fixed Income Financing Trading, [email protected]
This Presentation has NOT been produced by Barclays’ Research Department Any views and commentary in this communication are short-term views of the Barclays Trading and/or Distribution desks, have not been produced by Barclays’ Research
Department and are not Investment Research, Non-Independent Research, Research Recommendations, personal recommendations or any other form of recommendation. For important disclosures relating to this communication, please see www.barclays.com/salesandtradingdisclaimer.
Themes
Setting the Scene
Regulation: Catalyst for new Relationships and Reliance on Repo
Collateral: What matters Cost or Quantum?Collateral: What matters - Cost or Quantum?
The Repo Desk: View from a Commercial Lens
European Repo Market: Depth, Breadth and Rigidity
Final Thoughts…
1
Setting the Scene……g
Then Now
Light Touch Regulation Prescriptive Regulation
Simple System Complex System
Light Touch Regulation Prescriptive Regulation
C diti l T tB d T t
No Shortage of Collateral Debate about a Possible Shortage of Collateral
Conditional TrustBased on Trust
Abundance of Liquidity Questioning Liquidity
Capital is Ample Capital is Never Enough
Cheap Financing Expensive Financing
“….the public perception of liquidity changed, from one based on assets (what you could sell) to one centred on
Liabilities (ease of borrowing)”(1)
Has the public perception of liquidity changed back to one based “on assets (what you could sell)” vs one “centered
on Liabilities (ease of borrowing)”?(1)
Something to think about….. Could also be akin to a monetary system moving from a ‘Gold
Standard’ to a ‘Fiat Standard’?
Something to think about….. If so, is the financial landscape gravitating away from one
based on a ‘Fiat Currency’ towards one based on a ‘Gold Standard’, underpinned by collateral?
___________________________1. A speech by Lionel Barber, Financial Times editor, at Hughes Hall, University of Cambridge, May 1, 2014.
2
Regulation: Catalyst for new Relationships and Reliance on Repo
Regulation: Catalyst for New Relationshipsg y p
Regulations and Improved Risk Mgmt places a focus on….
Counterparty Risk
There is now an incentive to reduce risk therefore collateralise exposure
Leads to an increased demand forUNECUMBERED high quality collateral
Stimulates connections in the financial system between Regulation has defined High Quality Collateral
Banks & Non-Banks Financial Markets & the Sovereign
Requires Cash Market Li idit
Sovereign Collateral is the largest Type
Low Volatility & Highly Rated by agencies
Relies on a Repo Market with depth and breadth
Leads to a need for more capital (balance sheet) to
Stable Governments with Prudent fiscal policies
Liquidity
Prudent fiscal policy results in
a smaller supply of
ll t l
Supported by a liquid repo market
support demandp collateral
Whilst simultaneously availability is contracting
3
Mandatory Swap Clearing: Catalyst for New Connectionsy p g yDodd-Frank and EMIR rules have created a requirement for banks and certain non-banks to centrally clear swaps activity. This has lead
to an increased need for both; initial and variable margin. This presents a real challenge for non-banks given how different this is to past practices.
CCPCCPClearingClearing Initial Margin (IM)
IR Swap
Cash or Securities
CCPCCPg
Bank (A)
gBank (A)
Non-BankNon-BankVariable Margin (VM) Initial Margin (IM)
Cash
VMVM Passes to the swap
counterparty
IM Remains with the CCP and becomes part of the
Assuming the pension fund has the right type of collateral in its portfolio to meet IM requirements,what options are available for meeting VM requirements?
default waterfall
Fund no longer uses derivatives
Hold a cash buffer – stay underinvested
Sell securities to meet VM margin calls
1
2
3
Stay fully invested, don’t sell any securities and borrow the funds, A.K.A perform “collateral transformation” / convert securities into Cash4
Choosing the 4th option is the catalyst for a new connection……Choosing the 4th option is the catalyst for a new connection……
4
Mandatory Swap Clearing:Two New Connections – Two Different Reasons
The preferred method for obtaining secure funding is through the repo market, Securities converted to cash, “Collateral Transformation”, in other words physical leverage. The requirement for funding and collateralisation creates two new connections: (1)
Bank and non-Banks, (2) CCP and Banks. Two different objectives both linked via the Repo market. In addition, this new demand creates a requirement to commit financial resources, i.e. balance sheet, to support this activity.
Cl iCl iIR Swap
B kB kCCPCCP
ClearingBank (A)
ClearingBank (A)
Non-BankNon-BankVM
ash
ater
al
IM (Securities)BankSwap
Counterparty
BankSwap
Counterparty
IM (Cash)
Cash IM
Ca
Col
la
CollateralBankBankTri partyTri party
12
Cash
BankB
BankB
Tri party systemTri party system
Collateral
Classical Collateral Transformation in Reverse
New demand from CCPs transforms cash to collateral in order to segregate the IM.
This collateral is not re-used; it becomes encumbered & thus loses “velocity”
5
Mandatory Swap Clearing:Participation Grows, Requirements Expand, Connections Increase – the System becomes more Complexy p
As central cleared swap volumes and/or volatility increase the requirement for transforming; securities into cash, cash into collateral and in some cases ineligible collateral into good collateral will also increase. Naturally, connectivity between banks, non-banks and the
CCPs will also increase. All these activities will also place an increased demand on banks balance sheet. The Basel 3 leverage ratio limits how much leverage one bank can facilitate for non-banks forcing them to diversify counterparties creating more connections.
LCH & CME Total Initial Margin Requirement (£ Bln)(1)
CCPCCP
Credit/Equity Collateral
GBank CBank C
“Good” Collateral is released
Requirement (£,Bln)(1)
Swap
Gov’t BondCollateral
Gov
’t bo
ndco
llate
ral
Credit/Equity C
ollateral
160
180
200
Bln
Non-Bank(Pension)Non-Bank(Pension)
Non-Bank(Pension)Non-Bank(Pension)
Clearing Bank (A)Clearing Bank (A)
IM C
ash
VM Cash
h BC
oral
IMp
Non-BankNon-Bank
Re-investmentRe-investment
Tri-partyTri-party
CashSecurity LendingSecurity Lending
Col
late
ral
80
100
120
140
160
VM C
as
Bonds
ollateralCol
late
r
B k BB k B
Cas
h
Bonds
MMk FundsMMk Funds
Cash
Tri Party
Tri Party
Cash0
20
40
60
Sep-15 Dec-15 Mar-16 Jun-16
___________________________1. Source: CPMI IOSCO Quantitative Disclosure from LCH and CME.
Collateral Bank B Bank B Party SystemParty
System
Collateral
http://www.lch.com/rules-regulations/regulatory-responseshttp://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/cpmi-iosco-reporting.html
6
Uncleared Derivatives Margin: Existing Connection,Demand for Collateral Increases – Velocity DecreasesyIn September 2013 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) jointly published a final framework establishing consistent global standards for margin requirements fornon-centrally-cleared derivatives.
The rules require one way VM posting but two way IM collateral posting. An important aspect is the fact that the collateral will be t d d t b d Thi ill h l ti ff t it il bilit d isegregated and cannot be re-used. This will have a lasting effect on its availability and price.
Bank T
Bank T
Balance Sheet Allocation
VM Cash
CCPCCPMandatory Central
ClearingBank
SwapsBank
Swaps
TreasuryTreasury VM Cash
IM Cash
Balance Sheet Allocation
IM Bond
VM Cash
Balance Sheet Transfer
BankCounterparty
Swaps Desk
Swaps Desk
Repo /Collateral Mgmt
Repo /Collateral Mgmt
CashBond
VM Cash
3rd party Segregated IMRequirement
Cas
h
Bon
dPu
rcha
ses
or b
orro
ws IM Bond IM Bond
External or Internal Sources
Mandatory non-cleared OTC IMBusinesses will gain a benefit though reduced capital requirements (RWA) but will be
introduced to new costs and the relationship between collateral and balance sheet, which unless they can increase revenue, will have a drag on their RoE
7
New Connections: I Have Cash, need Collateral….Monetary policy has created a large amount of excess bank reserves and at the same time non-bank cash reserves have grown. Regulation clearly defines what constitutes regulatory compliant liquidity. Some institutions are comfortable to commit to term
deposits but most are looking for a short term option (<1 month) to place their cash. Unfortunately as bank balance sheets shrink and they improve their funding composition to meet new standards, short term deposits become not only unattractive but also costly with
regards to returns on leverage balance sheet This forces cash rich non banks to seek alternative options
,
regards to returns on leverage balance sheet. This forces cash rich non-banks to seek alternative options.
Money Market
A US specific flow,Money Market Funds
have access to the FED Collateral
Dampens collateral“velocity”
Non regulatory compliant li idit
Money MarketFund via the RRP Creating a
connection between the Central Bank & Non-banks linked by repo
Banks have a natural advantage over non-banks given they have access to central bank deposit facilities, providing a home for
excess bank reserves but leavingUns
ecur
ed
Dep
osits
Non-Banks Central BankBank
liquidity excess bank reserves but leaving non-banks scrambling for options
U
Liability Asset
LeverageLeverage
Recent BoE policy decision
seeks to address
BankTri party systemTri party system
Collateral
Collateral
seeks to address this issue
8
New Connections: I Have Cash, need Collateral….,
% Cash Levels Held by Asset Managers (Non-MMK Funds)(1) On-Shore US Money Fund Assets ($Bln)(3)
14
16900
1,000
4
6
8
10
12
14
200300400500600700800
0
2
Jan-
00A
ug-0
0M
ar-0
1O
ct-0
1M
ay-0
2D
ec-0
2Ju
l-03
Feb-
04S
ep-0
4A
pr-0
5N
ov-0
5Ju
n-06
Jan-
07A
ug-0
7M
ar-0
8O
ct-0
8M
ay-0
9D
ec-0
9Ju
l-10
Feb-
11S
ep-1
1A
pr-1
2N
ov-1
2Ju
n-13
Jan-
14A
ug-1
4M
ar-1
5O
ct-1
5M
ay-1
6
Equity Hybrid Bonds
0100200
Oct
-13
Nov
-13
Dec
-13
Jan-
14Fe
b-14
Mar
-14
Apr
-14
May
-14
Jun-
14Ju
l-14
Aug
-14
Sep
-14
Oct
-14
Nov
-14
Dec
-14
Jan-
15Fe
b-15
Mar
-15
Apr
-15
May
-15
Jun-
15Ju
l-15
Aug
-15
Sep
-15
Oct
-15
Nov
-15
Dec
-15
Jan-
16Fe
b-16
Mar
-16
Apr
-16
May
-16
Jun-
16Ju
l-16
Aug
-16
Sep
-16
TREAS INSTIT MF GOVT INSTIT MF PRIME INSTIT MFGOVT RETAIL MF TAX EM MMFs
S&P 500 ex-Financials: Cash and Equivalents ($Bln)(2) International Money Fund Assets ($,€,£Bln)(3)
1,6001,800
400450
GOVT RETAIL MF TAX EM MMFs
200400600800
1,0001,2001,400
,
50100150200250300350
___________________________.Sources: 1. Investment Company Institute / Haver Analytics.
0200
Mar
-08
Sep
-08
Mar
-09
Sep
-09
Mar
-10
Sep
-10
Mar
-11
Sep
-11
Mar
-12
Sep
-12
Mar
-13
Sep
-13
Mar
-14
Sep
-14
Mar
-15
Sep
-15
Mar
-16
Sep
-16
050
Dec. 31, 2010
Dec. 30, 2011
Dec. 31, 2012
Dec. 31, 2013
Dec. 31, 2014
Dec. 31, 2015
Sept. 31, 2016
CRANE USD MMF INDEX CRANE EUR MMF INDEX CRANE GBP MMF INDEX
2. Barclays Research and FactSet.3. Crane Data’s Money Fund Intelligence.
9
New Connections: Banks, Central Banks, CCPs & Sovereign Bonds, , g
Regulation and unconventional monetary policy has increased connectivity further between banks, central banks and CCPs. In addition, these two forces have linked both entities to sovereign bonds and their presumed cash market liquidity which requires a repo market. What is also interesting is the expectation that banks use the repo market for the provision of liquidity before turning to the last
resort option. Finally, the CCP requires the use of both to manage a member default event.
G l C ll l
Borrow operations from the central bank effectively drains collateral
from the system in order to support cash market activity
A proportion of Bank Buffers contain high quality liquid securities which in a period of stress can either be sold
or used as collateral for repo operations
S
Bank
Central Bank General Collateral
Specific Bond Borrow “Specials”
Cash
Securities
Gov’t Bond Markets
Gov’t Bond Market Making
Desk
Repo Desk
Bank
Liquidity Buffer
€3Tln
Clients(Non Banks)
€3TlnEstimated Sovereign
bond Buffer exposure in Europe(1)
The prerequisite for liquid bond market is a mature repo market; Cost effect funding of inventory
The
Fire
Sal
e D
ebat
e
Cost effect funding of inventory Ease of short covering Support settlement and fails
management Enforceable legal framework Sufficient capital allocation
Repo MarketIn a default a CCP will require both the repo and cash markets to manage liquidity and close out positions
CCPCCP
___________________________.1. Company report and Barclays Research.
10
New Connections: Central Banks & Sovereign Bond Repog p
Central Bank Government Bond Holdings(1)
30%6,000%€Tln
10%
15%
20%
25%
2 000
3,000
4,000
5,000
0%
5%
10%
0
1,000
2,000
2004
Q1
2004
Q2
2004
Q3
2004
Q4
2005
Q1
2005
Q2
2005
Q3
2005
Q4
2006
Q1
2006
Q2
2006
Q3
2006
Q4
2007
Q1
2007
Q2
2007
Q3
2007
Q4
2008
Q1
2008
Q2
2008
Q3
2008
Q4
2009
Q1
2009
Q2
2009
Q3
2009
Q4
2010
Q1
2010
Q2
2010
Q3
2010
Q4
2011
Q1
2011
Q2
2011
Q3
2011
Q4
2012
Q1
2012
Q2
2012
Q3
2012
Q4
2013
Q1
2013
Q2
2013
Q3
2013
Q4
2014
Q1
2014
Q2
2014
Q3
2014
Q4
2015
Q1
2015
Q2
2015
Q3
2015
Q4
Estimated End of Program Purchases byProportion of ECB Purchases
Relative to Estimated Repo
QE in Europe & Repo Market End of Program Estimates (March 2017)
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Japan United Kingdom United States Euro Zone Japan % United Kingdom % United States % Euro Zone %
Country % Repo Activity Estimated Market Sizeg y
ECB Capital Key(€Bln)p
Market Activity
Germany 20.3% 1,092 357 33%
Italy 10.4% 559 245 43%
F 10 9% 586 280 48%France 10.9% 586 280 48%
Spain 5.9% 317 170 53%
___________________________.1. IMF, Sovereign Investor Base Dataset for Advanced Economies, as of Sept 15, 2016, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/Data/wp12284.zip2. ICMA Repo Survey, June2016, and ECB.
11
Connections……”the Tie that Binds”
New Regulation has….
…altered the financial landscape by increasing inter-connectedness and creating a system dependent on high quality collateral.
It links the relationship between
….in addition to central banks, defined what constitutes “Good” “Safe” or “High Quality Collateral”
By far the largest asset class which fits this description are sovereign bonds
…..created this, it also produced dependency on capital (balance sheet) in order for banks to act as principles distributing collateral and/or facilitating leverage for non-banks
It links the relationship between physical and synthetic leverage and promotes the use of leverage in non-banks
New connections have extended beyond banks and are now increasing
this description are sovereign bonds
Low volatility and assumed liquidity of the government bonds markets is the foundation
Has the Sovereign - Bank nexus evolved t b th S i Fi i l
The leverage ratio is the measure which is used to monitor, but also the measure used to calculate returns on capital
The measure is asset class and activity between banks and non-banks and in a few cases non-bank to non-bank (shadow banking?)
Increased inter-connectivity has lead to increased counterparty risk, mitigated with collateral
to become the Sovereign – Financial Markets nexus?
blind
Current calibration results in economics which may disincentive banks from increasing capital for Repo to meet future market demand
with collateral
12
Today’s Foundation, Tomorrow's Instability?y , y
Italian Economic Indicators
1400 5.04 7007(%) (%) (%) (Yld %)(Tln €) (Bp)
115
120
125
130
135
(3)
(2)
(1)
2.0
3.0
4.0
2
3
300
400
500
600
3
4
5
6
100
105
110
115
(6)
(5)
(4)
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Budget % GDP IT Debt/GDP
0.0
1.0
0
1
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
ECB Balance Sheet ECB Refi (RHS)
0
100
200
0
1
2
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
IT 10y Bond IT 5yr CDS (RHS)
The implementation of regulation is occurring against the back drop of ultra accommodative
What if you Removed the Influence of QE and Volatility Returned?
6
7
Budget % GDP IT Debt/GDP ECB Balance Sheet ECB Refi (RHS) IT 10y Bond IT 5yr CDS (RHS)
(Yld %)
p g g g pand unconventional monetary policy
These policies have now been in place for a prolonged period with no near term prospect for the situation reversing
The post 2008 financial system has been designed on the use of collateral as a way of mitigating counterparty risk
S i ll t l k th j it f l1
2
3
4
5
6
?
Sovereign collateral makes up the majority of volumes
Assuming that monetary measures have in some degree distorted pricing of sovereign risk and suppressed volatility
What are the system wide effects when some day this normalises?
(1)
0
1
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
IT 10y Bond DE 10yr Bond
___________________________.Source: Bloomberg.
13
Collateral: What Matters - Cost or Quantum?
Defining “Safe”, “Good”, “High Quality” & Availabilityg , , g y yRegulation and Central Banks have defined what are “Safe, High Quality Assets” Regulation and Central Banks have defined what are “Safe, High Quality Assets”
Example Central Bank Eligible Collateral Classifications
ECB Bank of England
Generic HQLA Definition
Cash;Category I Level A
Category II Level B
Category III Level C Securities
Category IV Level C Loan Collateral
1a
Cash; Central bank reserves able to be drawn down in times of stress; Liquid, marketable securities issued or guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks and certain international organisations and which qualify for a 0% risk‐weight under the Basel II standardized approach for credit risk; and Certain non‐0% risk weighted assets may also be included where these match an institution’sjurisdictional currency liquidity needs or operational requirements.
Category V ----j y q y p q
2aNon level 1a assets, these can be included subject to a minimum 15% supervisory haircut to their market value and are capped at 40% (post haircut) of the total buffer.
2bNon level 1a assets, these can be included subject to a minimum 25% supervisory haircut to their market value and are capped at 40% (post
Encumbrance of High-quality Collateral (US$ trillion)(1)Encumbrance of High-quality Collateral (US$ trillion)(1)
Owner Type HoldingsAmount
Encumbered Source of Encumbrance Unencumbered Supply
p y pp (phaircut) of the total buffer.
Governmental institution 8.9 8.9 Inability to engage in securities lending 0.0Commercial Bank 5.3 4.5 Liquid asset buffer or initial margin 0.8Insurance company or pension fund 5.7 0.0 5.7Central banks 4.4 4.2 Mostly lending against other government bonds 0.2Non-resident 11.5 11.3 Foreign exchange reserves 0.2Other 6 0 3 5 Various 2 6
___________________________.1. ECB, Official Journal of the EU, Annex: Table 1, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/oj_jol_2016_014_r_0006_en_txt.pdf
Other 6.0 3.5 Various 2.6Total 41.8 32.3 9.5Total post derivatives reform 33.3 8.5
Source: BIS, SIFMA, ECB, IMF. Numbers may not add up due to rounding.
2. BoE, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/money/eligiblecollateral.aspx3. BoE SWP#6 609, The Role of Collateral in Supporting Liquidity, Y. Baranova, Z. Liu, and J Noss. Page 5, Table #2, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Documents/workingpapers/2016/swp609.pdf
14
Availability & Mobility of Collateral: How Does it Work?The availability & mobility of high quality collateral is a function of the amount of leverage being deployed in the financial system, the capacity to ‘transform’ low quality collateral into Good collateral the availably of balance sheet needed to facilitate the movement and
re-use of collateral. The repo market being the primary facilitator of all of the above.
y y
Leverage AgentsLeverage Agents Demand for CollateralDemand for Collateral
Security Lending
BankHF
MMKFund
HQLAHQLAHQLA
CreditCreditCash Cash
Cash
Universe ofavailable,
not segregatedor encumberedGood Collateral
Bank Liquidity Buffer
Bank
CCP Treasury
HQLA
HQLAHQLA
HQLA
Cash
EquityCash
Cash
Leverage Real Money
Margin Requirements
Bank
Security Lending
HQLA
HQLA
HQLA
CashCashEquity
EquityCash
Lending
15
Collateral: Cost vs. Quantum may be the DriveryMuch has been written about the quantum of collateral which may be needed to support new rules regarding cleared and uncleared
derivatives. The analysis seems to omit how supply and demand translates into actual cost and eventually an economic impact which may have an influence on behaviour.
TreasuryTreasuryUnsecured IM
Cost of collateral measured by the spread between OIS and GC has a direct influence on the cost of carry in a derivatives book
Cost of collateral measured by the spread between OIS and GC has a direct influence on the cost of carry in a derivatives book
CCPCCP
BankSwap Desk
BankSwap Desk
Unsecured Cash
Bond
IM Bond
Balance Sheet transfer
Segregated IMRequirement
FI & CM Desk
FI & CM Desk
IM Bond
0 40
The OIS GC Basis “Cost of Collateral” The OIS GC Basis “Cost of Collateral” Cost of Carry for IM Cost of Carry for IM
0.00
0.20
0.40
40
50
60
As the spread widens, carry increases and may lead to spread widening to compensate the extra carry costs
As the spread widens, carry increases and may lead to spread widening to compensate the extra carry costs
(0.40)
(0.20)
Jan-14 Apr-14 Jul-14 Oct-14 Jan-15 Apr-15 Jul-15 Oct-15 Jan-16 Apr-16
DE GC O/N IT GC O/N
20
30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Unsecured OIS Secured
16
Cost of Collateral: Supply vs. Demand Dynamicspp y yEquity on-loan Value vs. Bund GC-OIS Basis Equity on-loan Value vs. Bund GC-OIS Basis
Equity dividend and script season creates a480500
5
10$BlnBps
Equity dividend and script season creates a higher demand to borrow equities from security lenders (beneficial owners)
Equity borrows requires a pledge collateral. The majority of security lenders stipulate sovereign collateral for the pledge. In Europe this is 360
380400420440460
(15)
(10)
(5)
0
5
specifically core-country issuers, which narrows the eligible collateral pool
Equity borrows are also subject to a haircut/over collateralization of 5-8%
Assume all factors remain equal These transient
300320340
(25)
(20)
Jan-
15
Feb-
15
Mar
-15
Apr
-15
May
-15
Jun-
15
Jul-1
5
Aug
-15
Sep
-15
Oct
-15
Nov
-15
Dec
-15
Jan-
16
Feb-
16
Mar
-16
Apr
-16
May
-16
Jun-
16
Jul-1
6
Aug
-16
Sep
-16
DEGC Basis On Loan Value ($Bln) 7 per. Mov. Avg. (DEGC Basis) Assume all factors remain equal. These transient events or ‘shocks’ present an excellent opportunity to measure how demand impacts the cost of collateral
Based on the evidence, we can observe;
Transient Shock Effect on Collateral Pricing Transient Shock Effect on Collateral Pricing
DEGC Basis On Loan Value ($Bln) 7 per. Mov. Avg. (DEGC Basis)
450 462450
500
The effect is a 7-8bps widening of German collateral (DEGC) basis (GC/OIS)
The market quickly absorbs the additional demand and reverts to normal
C l l ti th iti it lt i 0 8b(9) (9)
(11) (12)(15)(10)
(5)
349 355 369 375
300
350
400
Calculating the sensitivity results in a 0.8bp move in basis per €10bln of additional equity borrow demand
(16)(11)
(19)
(12)
(25)(20)(15)
Normal Dividend Normal Normal Dividend Normal
On Loan Value – Non-Cash ($Bln) DEGC / OIS Basis (Bps)
2015 2016
___________________________.Source: Datalend and Barclays.
17
Collateral Demand: Have we Considered Everything?y g
Inject a large cost to any product or service, without the ability to pass on a majority of the cost and two possibilities occur:
Stage 4Clients Adapt
Stage 5Innovation
1) Triggers a process of product or service evolution2) Start the path of product and service extinction
High costs supports investment in innovation
Industry trading
Stage 3Resource Allocation
Re-pricing
Stage 2Ed ti
Assess client overall franchise value
Concentrate available
Expand counterparty list
Direct trades which compliment a bank’s positioning / help net exposure
Industry trading behaviour evolves; bespoke products become more standardised
The more standardised a
Stage 1Housekeeping
Education
Concentrate available resources to key clients
Adjust Pricing strategy
Finally, increased execution and/or funding cost may make certain strategies obsolete
standardised a product becomes the greater the impact any investment in innovation will have
Standardised OTC products may move
Internally: Inform and and educate Sales and partners
Externally: inform clients, explain the
d
Adjust KPIs Eliminate “lazy products may move
to central clearingreasons and manage expectations
Give them time to adjust
Eliminate lazy trades”
Develop MIS Seek out efficiencies
18
Collateral Demand: Only Time will Tell……y
Product and Service EvolutionProduct and Service Evolution
Results in:
Activity levels decrease and/or innovation takes root
Both outcomes reduces the need for capital to support exposure and improves the return profile
L i l ll t li tiStage 2
Stage 3Resource Allocation
Re-pricing
Less exposure, requires less collateralisation
The reduced need to collateralise exposure leads to reduced demand for collateral
Deflationary pressure on collateral demand
So how accurate are the forecasts for collateral?
Stage 2Education
Stage 4Clients Adapt
Stage 1Housekeeping
Collateral Forecasting Collateral Forecasting
More
dp g
Stage 5Innovation
Col
late
ral D
eman
d
?
Projections Possible Actual
LessTime
19
The Repo Desk: View from a Commercial Lens
Assessing the Leverage Ratio: Blunt and Blindg gBasel III is actually very simple.
Everything is about CAPITAL, the good stuff, loss absorbing and expensive to raise. The amount of capital a bank holds will influence both the size and shape of businesses that can be supported. Businesses will be measured against their use of capital by both: how
much they need to support required leverage and/or the amount of risk it takes.
Capital Leverage
CET1CET1 Constraints CET1Total Exposure
Measure
CET1RWA
Constraints
CapitalRequired to Support the
Business
CapitalRequired to Support the
Business
Leverage ExposureRWA Return Leverage Exposure Return Measure
(RoLBS)
RWA ReturnMeasure
(RoRWA) Return Metrics
20
Repo Returns Under Capital (RoRWA)?p p ( )Assumptions
BCBS 270 Balance Sheet £1bln
PnL Flat 1YR Run Rate 100bp
How many RWA’s are produced with the given trade assumption?
RWA = EAD x CPRW EAD: £1bln x 7% = 70mCPRW: 100%RWA = 70m
RWA = EAD x CPRW EAD: £1bln x 7% = 70mCPRW: 100%RWA = 70m
Counterparty Risk Weight (CP-RW) 100%
FCCM Volatility Adjustment Haircut* 7%(2)
Hair Cut Applied to Client Trades 0%
How much capital do I need to support 70mln of RWA?
11% = 11% = X70m
£X = £7.7mX = £7.7m
Target RoE 12%
Operating Assumptions(2)
Cost / Income Ratio 55%
Tax Rate 35%
How much gross revenue do I generate?
£1bln X 100bp = £10m£1bln X 100bp = £10m
What is my NET revenue?
PBT: £10m – C/I Ratio = £4.5mPBT: £10m – C/I Ratio = £4.5m Net Income: £4.5m – Tax = £2.925mNet Income: £4.5m – Tax = £2.925m
What do my returns based on RWA exposure look like?Return on RWAReturn on RWA
Gross PBT NET
___________________________1 N t Fi ill t ti ONLY
Gross PBT
= 130%= 130%£10m£7.7m
= 58%= 58%£4.5m£7.7m
= 38%= 38%£2.9m£7.7m
NET
1. Note: Figures are illustrative ONLY.2. Source: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:176:0001:0337:EN:PDF Figure is a blended Rate to simply illustrate and example.
21
Repo Returns Under Leverage Returns (RoLBS)?p g ( )Assumptions
BCBS 270 Balance Sheet £1bln
PnL Flat 1YR Run Rate 100bp
How much capital does a bank need to support £1bln of Repo?
4% = 4% = X
£1blnX = £40mX = £40m
Target RoE 12%
Operating Assumptions(1)
Cost / Income (C/I) Ratio 55%
How much gross revenue do I generate?
£1bln x 100bp = £10m£1bln x 100bp = £10m
Tax Rate 35%
What is my NET revenue?
PBT: £10m – C/I Ratio = £4.5mPBT: £10m – C/I Ratio = £4.5m Net Income: £4.5m – 35% Tax Rate = £2.925mNet Income: £4.5m – 35% Tax Rate = £2.925m
What do my Repo returns on leverage balance sheet look like?
Return on Leverage Balance Sheet (LBS)Return on Leverage Balance Sheet (LBS)
= 25%= 25%£10m£40m
Gross
= 11.25%= 11.25%£4.5m£40m
PBT(2)
= 7.3%= 7.3%£2.9m£40m
NET
To achieve a 12% targeted return
___________________________
To achieve a 12% targeted returnIncrease revenue by £6.4m (+64%) Increase revenue by £6.4m (+64%)
= 12%= 12%£4.8m£40mReduce Balance sheet to £24.4bln (-39%)Reduce Balance sheet to £24.4bln (-39%)
1. Note: Figures illustrative ONLY.2. PBT = Pre Tax Profit.
22
European Repo Market: Depth, Breadth and Rigidity
European Repo Market: Depth and Breadthp p p Survey data indicates the European repo
market has become smaller since 2010, but roughly the same size over the last 3 years
European Repo market Breadth, How has it changed?European Repo market Breadth, How has it changed?
6
7Tln
69%
70%
6
7
%Tln
Reduction from BBB rated institutions seems intuitive as banks may be under pressure to reduce leverage or have higher funding costs thus makes them less competitive
1
2
3
4
5
6
64%
65%66%
67%68%
69%
1
2
3
4
5
6
GSIB designated banks reduced activity but are still a major player
The majority of banks that contribute to repo market activity in Europe are domestic but this number is on a d li i t d
0
1
Jun-
10
Dec
-10
Jun-
11
Dec
-11
Jun-
12
Dec
-12
Jun-
13
Dec
-13
Jun-
14
Dec
-14
Jun-
15
Dec
-15
Jun-
16
Total A/AA Total BBB
62%63%
0
1
Jun-
10
Dec
-10
Jun-
11
Dec
-11
Jun-
12
Dec
-12
Jun-
13
Dec
-13
Jun-
14
Dec
-14
Jun-
15
Dec
-15
Jun-
16
GSIB NonGSIB EU % Total
declining trend
Breadth? Repo market is less concentrated with the top-3 declining with top-5 and especially top-10 taking up a bigger proportion of the market.
European Repo Market, What about Depth?European Repo Market, What about Depth?
1601807
BlnTln
100%%
Depth? In the repo market, there is less flexibility to apply some simple assumption to assess balance sheet capacity, given sudden client flows/shocks or increased demand for collateral intermediation40
6080100120140160
2
3
4
5
6
20%
40%
60%
80%
collateral intermediation
New entrance provides breadth but how much depth in a stressed situation and what about their stability
How to measure?
020
0
1
Jun-
10
Dec
-10
Jun-
11
Dec
-11
Jun-
12
Dec
-12
Jun-
13
Dec
-13
Jun-
14
Dec
-14
Jun-
15
Dec
-15
Jun-
16
Depth (RHS) Size
0%
20%
Jun-
10
Dec
-10
Jun-
11
Dec
-11
Jun-
12
Dec
-12
Jun-
13
Dec
-13
Jun-
14
Dec
-14
Jun-
15
Dec
-15
Jun-
16
Top-3 Top-5 Top-10 The Rest
___________________________Data Source: ICMA Repo Survey, June 2016.
23
Balance Sheet Rigidity: Can we Identity any Evidence?
4 5000 6
$TlnBps
g y y y
FX Reserves and Repo GC SpreadsFX Reserves and Repo GC Spreads Brexit – Balance Sheet IndigestionBrexit – Balance Sheet Indigestion
1250 60
Px (Normalized)Rate (%)
3,500
4,000
4,500
0.4
0.5
0.6
105
110
115
120
125
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.55
0.60
2,500
3,000
0.1
0.2
0.3
90
95
100
105
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
Jan-16 Feb-16 Mar-16 Apr-16 May-16 Jun-16 Jul-16 Aug-16 Sep-16
1 000
1,500
2,000
(0.2)
(0.1)
0.0
Brexit was the catalyst for a sharp upward asset price revaluation, est. at 8-15% The move would have resulted in the requirement of more capital to support the
same positions, a simple estimation could be £36bln
SONIA GBPGC 10 yr gilt 1Jun=100 (RHS) 30 yr gilt 1Jun=100 (RHS)
0
500
1,000
(0.5)
(0.4)
(0.3)
Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16
same positions, a simple estimation could be £36bln Data suggests a £10bln increases results in a ~1.5bp increase in Gilt GC rates
Gross B/S Estimated Asset Delta
Simple Assumptions for leveraged UKT Balance sheet FootprintSimple Assumptions for leveraged UKT Balance sheet Footprint
Jan 12 Jan 13 Jan 14 Jan 15 Jan 16
DEGC Basis USGC BasisChina FX Saudi Arabia FX14 per. Mov. Avg. (DEGC Basis) 14 per. Mov. Avg. (USGC Basis)
Gross B/S Position
Estimated Asset Value Move (%)
DeltaImpact
UK LDI (Leveraged Pension Fund) £200Bln 15% (30yr) £30Bln
Dealer (GEMS) £30Bln 8% (10yr) £2.4Bln
Leveraged Asset Management £50Bln 8% (10yr) £4.0Bln
Total £280Bln £36.4Bln___________________________Source: Bloomberg and Barclays.
24
Cost of Balance Sheet: Evidence of Re-pricing? p g
Lending from UK MFIs to Various Client Bases(2)Lending from UK MFIs to Various Client Bases(2)European and US Bank Leverage(1)European and US Bank Leverage(1)
140GBP Bln
18x50x
60
80
100
120
140
13x
14x
15x
16x
17x
18x
30x
35x
40x
45x
50x
0
20
40
Jan-
11
Jul-1
1
Jan-
12
Jul-1
2
Jan-
13
Jul-1
3
Jan-
14
Jul-1
4
Jan-
15
Jul-1
5
Jan-
16
Jul-1
6
10x
11x
12x
15x
20x
25x
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
e20
17e
Spread Curve (Gilt GC to Sonia)(3)Spread Curve (Gilt GC to Sonia)(3) UK Gilt 30 year Swap Spread(3)UK Gilt 30 year Swap Spread(3)
Insurance Co Pensions Funds Fund Management
0.25
Bps
Europe (All), LHS US (Commercial Banks), RHS
8090Bps
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
203040506070
___________________________1. Barclays Research.
0.00ON 2W 1M 2M 3M 6M 12M
2016, 6 Oct 2015, 6 Oct 2014, 6 Oct
010
Jan-14 May-14 Sep-14 Jan-15 May-15 Sep-15 Jan-16 May-16 Sep-16
30yr Gilt Swap Spread
2. Data from Bank of England Statistical Interactive Database using codes: RPMB3V6, RPMB3W4, RPMTBVU 3. Barclays Data.
25
The Regulatory Pendulum: Direction of Travel?g yFollowing the events of 2008, there was little doubt that the regulatory pendulum would swing in the direction of a more
uncompromising application of regulation in order to promote macro prudential stability. New regulation was written against the backdrop of a caustic political environment, with the then available evidence and with no credible ability to fully assess its impact.
Eight years later, we have new facts, we’re starting to observe unintended consequences and regulators are asking questions.g y , , g q g g qIs there enough evidence to support delaying the regulatory pipeline and/or recalibrate existing rules?
Finalised European NSFR rules
Limitation on collateral re-use
Minim m HC & co nterc clical req irements Minimum HC & countercyclical requirements
The idea of “counterparty” agnostic lending
MiFiD 2 – Best Execution applies?
“….. The FPC sees merit in further work being
2008
undertaken domestically and internationally to assess changes in the repo market and their
economic consequences”(1)
“However, there are some indications that regulation and the leverage ratio in particular, is at least one of the drivers of change in funding and
Today
market liquidity”(1)
“Nevertheless, the FPC judges it appropriate to adjust regulatory measures where opportunities
exist to minimise their impact on the liquidity of core financial markets, without compromising their
positive effect on resilience and stability”(1)?“… there is no agreed theoretical framework for market liquidity, market making and regulation
which can be used to model the impact of introducing a leverage ratio requirement” 2)
___________________________1. Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, July 2016, Issue No.39.2. ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board, Preliminary investigation into the potential impact of a leverage ratio requirement on market liquidity, Oct2016, Section #5, p 19.
26
THANK YOU
27
Acknowledgements g
Individuals who assisted in creating this presentation:
Kristian Kaae: Barclays FIF Global Risk and Financial Reporting
Richard Comotto: University of Reading, Henley Business School, ICMA Centre Visiting Fellow
Tracey Kelleher: Barclays Presentations Services
Julie Flack: Executive Assistant
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