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In a video aired on ABC Newsin June 2007, Aghan Talibancommander Mansour Dadullahis shown speaking to a group o
around 300 masked men. The men arepresented as suicide bombers about togo on missions in Western countries, inparticular to the United States, Canada,the United Kingdom and Germany. 1The video created considerable mediaattention, but was soon dismissedas jihadist bravado rather thanrepresenting a genuine threat. Two yearsater it was aired, the Aghan Taliban haveyet to put Dadullahs words into action.
The Aghan Taliban movement haschanged considerably since it was irstormed in southern Aghanistan in 1994,and it has been described by some scholarsas an integrated part o the global jihadistmovement.2 Aghan Taliban leaders
1 Inside the Taliban Graduation, ABC News, June 28,
2007.
2 Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The
requently use al-Qa`ida-style antWestern rhetoric, and insurgents havendorsed suicide bombing as a tacticphenomenon previously unknown iAghanistan. Moreover, the AghaTalibans most immediate enemies arthe United States and its allies, whthey claim have occupied their countrsince 2001. They do not shun attackinand killing oreignerscivilian as weas militaryinside Aghanistan. Is only a matter o time beore the AghaTaliban start engaging more directly iinternational terrorism?3
Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Aghanistan (London: Hurs
2007), p. 13.
3 As a starting point, it is essential to distinguish betwe
the various layers o the Aghan insurgency. The Agha
Taliban leadership (Mullah Omar and his shura counc
also reerred to as the Quettashura) gives general direction
and speaks on behal o the organization, while local com
manders in Aghanistan and in the tribal areas o Pakista
carry out militant activities in the Talibans name, ote
with a high degree o autonomy. Foreign militant network
such as the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qa`ida suppo
Are the Aghan Talian Involvedin International Terrorism?By Anne Stenersen
Contents
FEATURE ARTICLE
1 Are the Aghan Talian Involved in
International Terrorism?
By Anne Stenersen
REpoRTS
5 The Insurgent-Narcotic Nexus in
Helmand Province
By Catain Michael Erwin, U.S. Army
8 The Expansion Strategy o Al-Qa`ida
in the Araian PeninsulaBy Gregry D. Jhnsen
11 A Prole o Pakistans
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi
By Ari Jamal
14 The Failure o Sala-Jihadi
Insurgent Movements in the Levant
By Bilal Y. Saab
18 The Dangerous Ideas o the
Neo-Zarqawist Movement
By Murad Batal al-Shishani
20 The July 17 Jakarta Suicide Attacks
and the Death o Noordin Top
By Nr Huda Ismail
22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity
24 CTC Sentinel Sta & Contacts
SEPTEMbER 2009 . VoL 2 . ISSUE 9
Aout the CTC SentinelThe Cmbating Terrrism Center is an
indeendent educatinal and research
institutin based in the Deartment ScialSciences at the United States Military Academy,
West pint. The CTC Sentinel harnesses
the Centers glbal netwrk schlars and
ractitiners t understand and cnrnt
cntemrary threats sed by terrrism and
ther rms litical vilence.
The views exressed in this rert are thse the authrs and nt the U.S. Military Academy,the Deartment the Army, r any ther agency the U.S. Gvernment.
C o M B A T I N G T E R R o R I S M C E N T E R A T W E S T p o I N T
o B J E C T I V E . R E L E V A N T . R I G o R o U S
CTC SENTINEL
Aghan Taliban walk through a bazaar in Quetta, Pakistan in 2005. - Photo by Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images
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This article assesses the likelihoodo the Aghan Taliban carrying outterrorist attacks in the homelands oNATO countries that are militarilyengaged in Aghanistan.4 It argues thatwhile individual insurgent commandershave issued threats to attack the West,the senior leaders o the Aghan Talibanare currently uninterested in pursuingsuch a strategy. While this may bedue to a number o actors, this articlestresses that such a venture couldeasily jeopardize the Aghan Talibanleaderships sanctuaries in Pakistan.At the same time, it cannot be excludedthat such attacks could be carried out by lower echelons o the network or byindividual sympathizers, especially i the opportunity arises. The BaitullahMehsud-led action o the PakistaniTaliban has already shown willingness
to exploit such opportunities, makingthem a greater immediate terrorismthreat to Western countries than theAghan Taliban.5
Attacks on Westerners Inside Aghanistan
The Aghan Talibans insurgentcampaign uses a mixture o guerrillawarare and terrorist tactics. Mostattacks have targeted Aghan policeand security orces, international
the Aghan Taliban insurgency, but they typically have
wider agendas and carry out attacks in their own name.
Moreover, in this article it has been assumed that the o-cial views o the senior Aghan Taliban leadership are
those that are expressed through the ocial websites,
communiqus and spokesmen o the Islamic Emirate o
Aghanistan. Mullah Omar himsel stated in 2007: The
comments o the Islamic Emirate are those which are
released by our ocial spokesmen and our al-Emarah
web page. For more, see Mukhtar A. Khan, Quetta:
The Headquarters o the Aghan Taliban, CTC Sentinel
2:5 (2009).
4 For other studies discussing the internationalization
o local conficts, see shild Kjk, Thomas Hegghammer,
Annika Hansen et al.,Restoring Peace or Provoking Terror-
ism? Exploring the Links between Multilateral Military Inter-
ventions and International Terrorism (Kjeller: NorwegianDeence Research Establishment, 2003); Brynjar Lia
and shild Kjk, Islamist Insurgencies, Diasporic Support
Networks, and Their Host States - The Case o the Algerian
GIA in Europe 1993-2000 (Kjeller: Norwegian Deence
Research Establishment, 2001); Matthew Levitt, Could
Hamas Target the West? Studies in Conict and Terrorism
30:11 (2007): pp. 925-945.
5 For more on the European plot that allegedly involved
the Baitullah Mehsud-led Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,
see Fernando Reinares, A Case Study o the January
2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in Barcelona, CTC Sentinel2:1
(2009).
troops, and Aghan civilians. Foreigncivilians inside Aghanistan have alsobeen subjected to attacks. This includestargeted attacks on oreign diplomatsand NGO workers, but also terroristattacks against places requented byoreigners. The Aghan Taliban usethese attacks to achieve political andpropaganda aims and to support thewider insurgent eort. For example,the Aghan Taliban have claimed thatdiplomatic missions rom NATO statesare targeted because they have troopsstationed in Aghanistan. Ater the bombing o the German Embassy inKabul in 2008, a Taliban spokesman
justiied it by saying, The Germanshave orces in the north o Aghanistanand they are involved in the killing oinnocent Aghans. The spokesman alsothreatened that the Taliban will targetall those countries that have orces in
Aghanistan.6
The Aghan Taliban have also expressedenmity toward the West or otherreasons than the military occupationo their country. Countries that areperceived as insulting Islam or theProphet Muhammad, such as Denmarkand the Netherlands, have been directlythreatened.7 The Netherlands receivedseveral threats in 2008 ater a Dutchpolitician, Geert Wilders, released theIslam-critical movie called Fitna. TheAghan Taliban leaderships statements
encouraged all Muslims o the worldto take revenge against the insults.8At the same time, however, the Aghan
6 Two Dead in Explosion Near German Embassy,Der
Spiegel, January 17, 2009.
7 In 2005, a series o 12 cartoons representing the
Prophet Muhammad appeared in the Danish Newspaper
Jyllands-Posten, which sparked a wave o protests across
the Muslim world.
8 Islamic Emirate o Aghanistan, The Eternal Enemies
o Islam Have Committed Another Historic Crime!
April 1, 2008.
Taliban said these retaliations would be limited to attacking Dutch soldiersinside Aghanistan, and they alsoclaimed to have carried out actualattacks to this end:
On our part we pledge revengeAllah willingon these Dutchsoldiers with the value o theirskulls, who came to our land asoccupiers and where most arepresent in Uruzgan Province. Thekilling o two o them yesterdayand the destruction o theirtanks are a part o the series orevenge...9
Overall, there is little doubt thatthe Aghan Taliban are hostile tothe West and that they do not shunattacking oreignerscivilian as well
as militaryinside Aghanistan. Yet,attacking Western targets outside oAghanistans conlict zone is a dierentmatter.
Specic Threats and Plots to Attack in Western
Countries
Mullah Dadullah and his brotherMansour Dadullah were the AghanTaliban leaders who most explicitlythreatened to take the battle outsideAghanistan s borders. Mullah Dadullah,who was a member o the AghanTalibans shura council and commander
in southern Aghanistan, was killedin May 2007. He was succeeded byhis brother, Mansour Dadullah, whosubsequently appeared in a series ointerviews and propaganda videosMansour Dadullah, or instance, wasthe leader who threatened to dispatchsuicide bombers to Western countriesin June 2007. 10 Interestingly, MansourDadullah was sacked rom the Talibanin December 2007, oicially because hereused to obey the chain o command.11
9 Islamic Emirate o Aghanistan, Statement rom the
Shura Council on the Production o a Film Desecratingthe Quran by a Member o Parliament in Holland, March
30, 2008; Islamic Emirate o Aghanistan, Heavy Casu
alties Were Inficted on the Dutch Forces in Uruzgan (in
revenge or the lm Fitna by Geert Wilders), March 31
2008; Islamic Emirate o Aghanistan, Killing 8 Dutch
Occupiers, Including the Son o the Commander o the
Dutch Forces, in the Series o Revenge Operations in Re-
taliation or the Publishing o the Harmul Film Fitna,
April 21, 2008.
10 Inside the Taliban Graduation.
11 There was speculation that he was trying to establish
an independent power base with support rom his al-
SEPTEMbER 2009 . VoL 2 . ISSUE 9
The Aghan Taliban
leadership is probably
reluctant to carry out
actions that would
increase the pressure on its
sanctuaries in Pakistan.
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The exact nature o the relationship between the Dadullah brothers and al-Qa`ida is not known. 12 Mullah Dadullahsstatements, and those o his brotherMansour, have on several occasionscontradicted the oicial statements othe Aghan Taliban leadership. TheDadullah brothers were also known torun their own media campaign (througha local media agency called UmarStudio), indicating a certain desire to actautonomously. Ultimately, there wereew indications that Mansour Dadullahhad the actual will or capabilities toollow up on his threat. In the two yearsater the video was issued, no irm linkshave been established between arrestedterrorist suspects in Western countriesand Dadullah or the Aghan Taliban.
Another example o threats against the
West was a video aired on al-Arabiyain November 2008. 13 The video showeda local Aghan Taliban commandernicknamed Farouq, who claimedresponsibility or killing 10 Frenchsoldiers in an ambush in Kabul Provinceon August 18, 2008. He warned Francethat they should withdraw romAghanistan or they will hear ourresponse in Paris. 14
The local commanders threats to carryout attacks in Paris appeared to be bravado. In December 2008, however,
explosives were ound in a departmentstore in Paris, and a group callingitsel the Aghan Revolutionary Frontclaimed responsibility. In a letter, thegroup stated,
Send the message to your presidentthat he must withdraw his troopsrom our country beore the endo February 2009 or else we will
Qa`ida allies, and it was eared that he would become a
rival to Mullah Omar. See Dadullah Sacking Highlights
Taliban Rits,Janes Terrorism and Security Monitor, Jan-
uary 16, 2008.12 There are ew details o this relationship in open
sources. It can be noted, however, that besides Shaykh
Muhammed Yasir, Mullah Dadullah and his brother
Mansour are the only high-ranking Taliban members
who have been eatured by al-Qa`idas propaganda
agency al-Sahab.
13 Taliban Threatens to Carry Out Operations in Paris
Unless France Withdraws rom Aghanistan, al-Ar-
abiya, November 18, 2008; Taliban Video Warning to
France, Reuters, November 17, 2008.
14 Taliban Kill 10 French Troops in Aghanistan, Reu-
ters, August 19, 2008.
take action in your capitalistdepartment stores and this time,without warning. 15
It is not publicly known whether anymembers o the alleged group werearrested, but in any case there wereew indications that the group hadany organizational links to the AghanTaliban or al-Qa`ida. As analysts noted,the language in the letter as well asthe groups modus operandi seemed toresemble let-wing activists more thanmilitant Islamists.16 As ar as is known,neither the Aghan Taliban leadershipnor Farouqs group issued any urthercomments in the case. The ailureo the Aghan Taliban leadership topublicly reute Farouqs statement, orstatements rom the Dadullah brothers,is not necessarily indicative o their
tacit approval; the Aghan Talibanleadership generally avoids criticizingmembers in public to avoid uelingrumors o splits or disagreementswithin the movement. 17
Pakistani Talian a Dierent Case
The Pakistani Taliban, which is distinctrom the Aghan Taliban, has a record oinvolvement in international terrorism.Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), led by Baitullah Mehsud until his recentdeath, has made explicit threats toattack the West, and it has even claimed
responsibility or such attacks. Whilenot part o the Aghan Taliban, it isuseul to compare the TTPs claimswith those o Aghan Taliban militants.Some o the TTPs claims have beenunsubstantiated, such as in April2009 when Baitullah Mehsud claimedresponsibility or a irearms attackon a U.S. immigration center in NewYork State, carried out by a Vietnamesenational.18 A more interesting case isthe Barcelona plot, revealed in January2008, when a dozen Pakistanis andtwo Indians were arrested in Spain and
accused o plotting to attack Barcelonas
15 Explosives Found in Paris Store, BBC, December
16, 2008.
16 Explosives Found in Paris Department Store,Times
Online, December 17, 2008.
17 The ocial sacking o Mansour Dadullah by the Tali-
ban leadership in December 2007 was an exceptional
case.
18 Pakistani Taliban Chie Claims U.S. Shooting, Reu-
ters, April 13, 2009; FBI Rejects Mehsuds Claim or NY
Attack,Dawn, April 4, 2009.
public transportation system.19 In avideotaped interview released in Augustthat year, TTP spokesman Maulvi Omartook responsibility or the plot. He saidthat the men were under pledge toBaitullah Mehsud and indicated thathe attacks were motivated by Spainsmilitary presence in Aghanistan. 20
There were other indications o links between the arrested militants anthe TTP. Notably, one o the groupsmembers claimed to have receivedtraining in Waziristan and Aghanistanas well as having met with the TTPsleader.21
The Barcelona case indicates that theTTP leadership is willing to be associatedwith, and possibly also directly involvedin, international terrorist plots. Thisis in contrast to the Aghan Taliban
which have not yet been associated withany plots to launch attacks in Westerncountries.
Capailities and Opportunities
An important reason why the AghanTaliban leadership is not taking their battle to Western countries may bthe lack o capability. Unlike groupssuch as the Algerian Armed IslamicGroup (GIA) or al-Qa`ida, which haveboth staged a series o terrorist attacksin Europe, the Taliban do not havestrong and active support networks in
the West. Most o its oreign suppornetworks are believed to be locatedin the Gul region and in Pakistan.2
Nevertheless, they could theoreticallycoordinate with the al-Qa`ida networkor other oreign militants present inPakistan and Aghanistan to carryout attacks on their behal; it appearshowever, that they have decidedagainst this strategy. For example, theIslamic Jihad Union (IJU) has attractedvolunteers rom Europe who havecarried out operations in Aghanistanon behal o the Haqqani network. 2
In the most publicized incident, a
19 For a detailed analysis o this plot and its internationa
links, see Reinares.
20 NEFA Exclusives: Video Interviews with Top Paki
stani Taliban Spokesman Maulvi Omar, NEFA Foun
dation, August 29, 2008.
21 Reinares.
22 Talibans Foreign Support Vexes U.S., Wall Stree
Journal, June 1, 2009.
23 Einar Wigen, Islamic Jihad Union: al-Qaidas Key to the
Turkic World?(Kjeller: Norwegian Deence Research Es
tablishment, 2009).
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German national o Turkish origin,Cneyt Citci, carried out a suicideattack against a U.S. military base inKhost.24 The attack was commended by Jalaluddin Haqqani himsel,illustrating the direct link between theoreign militants and the local group. 25It appears that i the Haqqani networkwanted to send militants to carry outattacks in Europe, it would have enoughcandidates. Notably, the Sauerlandcella group o German nationals whoplotted to carry out terrorist attacks inGermany in 2006was said to have tieswith the IJU and had received trainingin North Waziristan.26 Still, there wereno indications that they were acting on behal o the Aghan Taliban or otherlocal groups, despite the act that theAghan Taliban have identiied Germanyas one o its main enemies.
It appears that while Aghan militantsmay use oreign volunteers to ight intheir local guerrilla war, they seemless interested in using them to carryout attacks abroad. When SirajuddinHaqqani was asked about the oreignershe trainedin particular the militantsrom the IJUhe stated that weare concerned with the war here inAghanistan, and preer them to carryout attacks here. 27 In another interviewhe was even more explicit, saying:
We have asked our allies whetherliving in Pakistan or any otherpart o the world to carry outattacks against Americans only inAghanistan and not in any othercountry. Our policy is that wewould not interere in the aairs oany other country whether it is anIslamic or non-Islamic country. 28
This also appears to be the policy o theAghan Taliban leadership. In 2008,the oicial spokesman o the AghanTaliban, Zabihullah Mujahid, stated
that the Mujahideen o the IslamicEmirate are based in Aghanistan, the
24 Germanys First Suicide Bomber in Aghanistan?
Der Spiegel, March 15, 2008.
25 Video: Aghanistan: Veteran Mujahadeen Dees
West, Adnkronos International, undated.
26 Petter Nesser, Lessons Learned rom the September
2007 German Terrorist Plot, CTC Sentinel1:4 (2008).
27 Interview with Taliban Commander Sirajuddin
Haqqani, NEFA Foundation, August 18, 2008.
28 Talibans Siraj Haqqani Shrugs O $5m Bounty,
APax Insider, July 4, 2009.
leadership is in Aghanistan, and ouractivities are inside Aghanistan. 29Notably, the Aghan Taliban havealso distanced themselves rom al-Qa`idas global terrorist campaign.In an interview in 2009, ZabihullahMujahid said, Taliban is one thing andal Qaeda is another. They are globalwe are just in the region. 30 It should be noted that the Aghan Taliban
leadership has not oicially denouncedal-Qa`ida or its activities, and they havestated that al-Qa`ida and other oreignMuslims are welcome to join theiright in Aghanistan.31 Nevertheless, itappears that the Aghan Taliban leadersthemselves do not wish to be associatedwith al-Qa`idas global jihadiststrategy.
One might argue that it is merely a
question o ideology and traditions.The Aghan Taliban leadership,however, is not static and unchangeable;the endorsement o suicide bombingas a tactic ater 2001 is one exampleo that. A more accurate answer may be ound by looking at the incentivesand disincentives the Aghan Talibanleadership may have or carrying out aterrorist attack in the West.
Incentives and Disincentives
A possible incentive or the AghanTaliban to plot attacks in the West would
be to create a Madrid eect. Thisreers to the terrorist attack carried outby militant Islamists in Madrid in 2004.The attack was executed shortly beorethe Spanish elections, and probablycontributed to the opposition partys
29 Interview with Taliban Spokesman Zabiullah Muja-
hid, NEFA Foundation, February 1, 2008.
30 Transcript: Aghan Taliban Spokesman Discusses
War, CNN, May 5, 2009.
31 Agha Jan Mutasim: The Struggle in Aghanistan and
Opportunities or Dialogue, al-Jazira, May 10, 2009.
victory because it had promised to pulSpanish orces out o Iraq. A documenwas circulated on jihadist websites priorto the attack arguing in avor o sucha strategy, and it is possible that thedocument had inspired the attackers. 32
Similarly, the Aghan Taliban leadershipis ully aware o the disagreementsand ault lines within NATO, and theyunderstand that in several Europeancountries there is low public supportor the war. The Aghan Talibanhave issued statements33 to Europeanaudiences encouraging them to stopsupporting their countrys politics andto stop serving Americas interests. 3
Nevertheless, one might wonder whythe Taliban have not sought to betterexploit NATOs weak points.
The answer may lie in the act thathe Aghan Taliban have strongdisincentives or carrying out attacksabroad. Although not stated directlythe Aghan Taliban leadership isprobably reluctant to carry out activitiesthat would increase the pressure on itssanctuaries in Pakistan. Since 2001the Pakistani government has beenallied with the United States in the waron terrorism, but at the same timeit is widely believed that the AghanTaliban have enjoyed unoicial supporrom within Pakistans territory. This
might explain why the presence oAghan Taliban leaders on Pakistansoil has been somewhat tolerated byPakistan since 2001, while a number oal-Qa`ida members have been activelypursued and arrested. In 2004, thePakistan Army started to crack down on
32 Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, Jihadi Stra
tegic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy Study Preced
ing the Madrid Bombings, Studies in Conict and Terror
ism 27:5 (2004): pp. 355-375.
33 It should be noted that the Talibans propaganda doe
not resemble jihadist strategic literature with its quasi
neutral analyses and specic strategy recommendationsRather, the propaganda aims at justiying the Aghan
Talibans actions in retrospect, and it quotes sources se
lectively to convey the impression that a Taliban victory
is inevitable.
34 The IJU and al-Qa ida have been even more explicit
encouraging people in Germany to vote or politicians in
the upcoming elections who want to pull German troops
out o Aghanistan, and also threatening actual attacks
For example, the propaganda uses the low public suppor
or the war in Germany as proo that NATO is about to
collapse; it is not written as an explicit recommendation
to its ollowers to carry out attacks inside Germany.
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It appears that while
Aghan militants may use
oreign volunteers to fght
in their local guerrilla war,
they seem less interested
in using them to carry out
attacks abroad.
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Pakistani militants in the tribal areas,initially because they were suspected ohiding international terrorists but morerecently because they have becomea security threat to the regime itsel.Today, Pakistani authorities are underincreasing pressure to do more aboutthe Aghan Talibans sanctuaries aswell, especially since these sanctuariesare seen as an impediment to the U.S.and NATO counterinsurgency campaignin Aghanistan.35
The Aghan Taliban have consistentlydenied having any organizationalailiation with the Pakistani Taliban,or to have any ambition outsideAghanistan at all. 36 Under the currentcircumstances, to start engaging ininternational terrorism would be toorisky or its overall strategy. As long
as the Aghan Taliban are experiencingrelative success with their presentstrategy, there is a lack o incentive toventure into new territory.
Anne Stenersen is a Research Fellow
and Ph.D. candidate with the Terrorism
Research Group at the Norwegian Deence
Research Establishment (FFI). She holds
an M.Phil. in Arabic studies rom the
University o Oslo and is the author o the
book Al-Qaidas Quest or Weapons oMass Destruction: The History Behindthe Hype. Her current research ocuses
on Islamist insurgencies in Aghanistanand Pakistan. She would like to thank Dr.
Thomas Hegghammer or his assistance
with this article.
35 Talibans Sanctuary Bases in Pakistan Must be Elim-
inated, RAND Corporation, June 9, 2008.
36 Interview with Taliban Spokesman Zabiullah Muja-
hid, NEFA Foundation, February 1, 2008.
The Insurgent-NarcoticNexus in HelmandProvince
By Catain Michael Erwin, U.S. Army
for the past four years,
there has beena rising level o collusion betweeninsurgents and narcotic powerbrokersin Aghanistans Helmand Province.Between 2002 and 2005, the AghanTaliban-led insurgency in southernAghanistan ocused its attentionprimarily in Kandahar and Uruzganprovinces.1 Coalition orces and AghanNational Security Forces (ANSF) largelylet the poppy ields alone in Helmand;in return, Helmand powerbrokersresisted opportunities to attackcoalition orces. Militants launched
sporadic attacks, but nothing similarto the level o violence in Helmandtoday. The violence and casualty ratesin Helmand currently surpass any otherprovince in Aghanistan.2 Moreover,despite the highest international trooppresence o anywhere in Aghanistan,the drug trade originating in Helmandis still a leading source o revenue orthe insurgency in the southern part othe country.3 With a limited numbero troops and resources, the hope orHelmand Province, and indeed theentire region, rests on the ability to
break down this relationship, known asthe insurgent-narcotic nexus.
This article will briely outline theproblems caused by past eorts o poppyeradication, relay recent successulcounter-nexus operations in HelmandProvince, and deine the challengesahead. Furthermore, it will explainthe signiicance o undermining theinsurgent-narcotic nexus to improvethe prospects or mission success inAghanistan.
A brie HistoryThe irst step to analyzing the currentstate o the insurgency in HelmandProvince is to identiy the provincesthree primary regions and theirassociated powerbrokers. In the north,
1 Personal discussion, MSG Tristan Schlientz, Kanda-
har, Aghanistan, August 2006.
2 Paul Waugh, 1,000 Killed or Wounded in Aghan
Confict,London Evening Standard, August 17, 2009.
3 Karen DeYoung, U.S. and Britain Again Target Pop-
py Crop, Washington Post, August 2009.
Rais Baghrani largely controls thecourse o the 100 mile-long valleystarting just north o Musa Qaladistrict.4 Sher Mohammed Akhundzadaand his ailiates exert the mostinluence in the central region, whereapproximately 75% o the provincespopulation resides. The historicallycorrupt Baluchi tribe controls a majorityo the provinces southern region.Together, these distinctly dierenregions o Helmand are responsibleor growing more than hal the worldspoppy. 7 These leaders and other narcopowerbrokers in Helmand have ormeda synergistic relationship with Talibaninsurgents where they work together toplant, protect and harvest poppy ieldsand then transport the product to druglabs and out o the country; in exchangethe Taliban tax the armers and also
earn money when the drugs exchangehands in neighboring countries. Mosmajor narcotics leaders have ties to thegovernment, whether at the nationaor local level, and thereore coalitionorces cannot target them eectively.
Until 2006, minimal coalition presencein Helmand clearly signaled to HelmandAghans that their livelihood o growingpoppies was secure. This changed inthe summer o 2006 when coalitionorces entered the province in sizeablenumbers and were accompanied by a
4 Rais Baghrani ought against the Russians in the 1980
and was ormerly a high-ranking member o the Taliban
in the 1990s under Mullah Omars leadership. In 2005
ater eluding coalition orces or more than three years
Baghrani accepted amnesty and abandoned the Taliban
movement. He still controls the Baghran Valley, howev
er, which is responsible or growing a signicant amoun
o poppy. He is clearly involved in the drug trade, but h
is no longer an ideological member o the Taliban move
ment.
5 Sher Mohammed Akhundzada is married to Presiden
Hamid Karzais sister. He was the ormer governor o
Helmand Province but was removed rom oce by Presi
dent Karzai under pressure rom the United Kingdom ohis role in narcotics; an estimated nine tons o poppy was
discovered in the basement o his house in 2005. Since
his departure rom governorship, violence has skyrock
eted in Helmand Province.
6 The Baluchi tribe numbers an estimated 120,000 in
southern Helmand and controls the southern-most dis
tricts, most notably the area called Baram Cha, which i
the gateway or drugs moving to Pakistan and weapons
ammunition moving into Aghanistan.
7 U.S. Aims to Deprive Taliban o Drug Revenue by
Promoting Alternate Crops to Opium, Associated Press
June 27, 2009.
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signiicantly more aggressive poppyeradication eort.8 The eradicationprogrambacked by both the Aghangovernment and coalition orcescultivated within the provincialpopulation intense eelings o mistrustand disdain or the government, Aghansecurity orces and coalition troops. 9While poppy eradication achievedrelative success in Nangarhar Provincein 2005, Aghans who stand against thenarcotics industry in Helmand are otentargeted with violence that extends totheir amily and tribe. 10 Indeed, sinceaggressive poppy eradication beganin 2006, narco-powerbrokers haveworked much closer with the Talibanthan ever beore. 11 Consequently,progress in Helmand Province will notcome quickly.
Needed Departure rom Eradication EortsThe irst meaningul step towardprogress occurred in June 2009 whenthe government and coalition orcesannounced that they would no longersupport poppy eradication. 12 As stated by the U.S. envoy to Aghanistanand Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke,eradication is a waste o moneyand has only worked to drive Aghanarmers to the Taliban. 13 The implicationo this decision means that insurgentand narcotic leaders can no longer usepoppy eradication as a rallying cry to
recruit more insurgents.
This does not mean, however, that theAghan government and coalition orceshave abandoned the eort to reduce theprovinces poppy production. Instead,ocus and resources have shited totargeting narcotics in the consolidation
8 This inormation is based on the authors personal ac-
count rom his deployment in 2006 and 2007.
9 Personal discussions, Special Forces soldiers deployed
to Helmand Province, Kandahar, Aghanistan, 2006,
2007, 2009.
10 Poppy eradication has achieved more success in Nan-garhar Province than in Helmand. One reason is that
Nangarhar has a more manageable number o poppy
elds located more closely together; this is not the case
in Helmand. Despite this success story, the lack o
government support and alternative crops has let many
armers rustrated in Nangarhar.
11 Gretchen Peters, Seeds o Terror: How Heroin Is Bank-
rolling the Taliban and al Qaeda (New York: St. Martins
Press, 2009).
12 U.S. Aims to Deprive Taliban o Drug Revenue by
Promoting Alternate Crops to Opium.
13 Ibid.
and transportation phases by raidingdrug laboratories and interdictingnarcotics convoys. This change o policywill lead to more large-scale poppyinterdiction without directly aectingarmers livelihood.
The insurgent-narcotic nexus isthe biggest obstacle to progress inHelmand. Breaking down their abilityto cooperate reely is the key to success.While maintaining a signiicant numbero troops deployed to the provinceis essential, sending more orcesspeciically to Helmandespecially atthe expense o other provinces in the
southern region which are all under-resourcedis not necessary. As oneSpecial Forces oicer who served inHelmand rom January-July 2009explained,
75% o Helmands populationlives in the central portion o theprovince; we need to do more withless throughout the province, but especially in this area. Wecan accomplish this by ocusingour targeting eorts against highpay-o targets at the right timeor in other words, aggressivelyattacking the nexus and keepingthe pressure on both componentsuntil they turn on each other. 14
In his statement, the oicer accuratelyconveyed that there is a solution, butit revolves around targeting the nexusmore eectively and reraining romtargeting the armers crops.
Beore the policy shit regarding poppyeradication was announced, coalitionorces achieved enormous successin February-May 2009. This period
14 Personal discussion, Major Mark Smith, Bastion, Hel-
mand Province, Aghanistan, February 2009.
witnessed the most eective targetingo the insurgent-narcotic nexus inHelmand to date. Amid several othersigniicant counternarcotics operationsU.S. Special Forces conducted OperationSiege Engine during a period o iveweeks in April and May that interdictedmillions o dollars worth o poppyprecursor chemicals, weapons andammunition. It was not an eradicationeort, but an operation to attack thenarcotics industry where it is mosvulnerable: in its consolidation phases.1
The operation prevented approximately$4.3 million rom reaching the hands oinsurgent commanders. 16
While the amount o seized material isstaggering (39,000 lbs o wet opium300,000 lbs o poppy seed and anestimated 120,000 lbs o precursor
chemicalsammonium nitrate, sodaash, activated charcoal and AcidicAnhydride), these operations served anequally signiicant role o exposing thestrength and depth o the relationship between the Taliban-led insurgencand the narcotics world.17 Not only didcoalition orces uncover large quantitieso improvised explosive devices (IED)mortars, rockets, blasting caps andexplosives on each o the counternexusoperations, but every raid against thetargets also witnessed an aggressiveinsurgent response where they launched
attacks against coalition orces in anattempt to minimize destruction o theirnarcotics, weapons and ammunition. 1
Several o these missions uncoveredTaliban inirmaries and rooms whereinsurgent leadership met to plan utureattacks against Aghan security orcesand coalition orcesurther prooo these targets signiicance to theinsurgency.
Success has come at a price, howeverFueled by narco-powerbrokers undsinsurgents have ought especially ierce
in Helmand during the summer o2009 against the Aghan governmentANSF and coalition orces comprisedo the British, Danish and the newlyarrived U.S. 2 nd Marine ExpeditionaryBrigade. The insurgent-narcotic nexus
15 A month later, Ambassador Holbrooke announced
this policy shit.
16 Personal discussions, Drug Enorcement Administra
tion, Kandahar, Aghanistan, May 2009.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
SEPTEMbER 2009 . VoL 2 . ISSUE 9
By moving away
rom government and
international poppy
eradication eorts,villagers and armers are
less likely to support the
insurgency.
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7
is combining their eorts to maintaincontrol over the most ertile provincein the country because insurgents andnarcotic warlords, especially those withties to Sher Mohammed Akhundzada incentral Helmand, understand that losingtheir grip on the province means losing
money and inluenceand an indication
o progress or the government andcoalition orces. 19 As the summer drawsto a close, it is almost assured that theinsurgent operational tempo will remainhigher in Helmand Province thananywhere else in the country, preciselyor this reason.
Corruption Remains a block to Progress
One o the most signiicant obstaclesto progress in Helmand Province is
corruption within the government andAghan security orcesat the nationaland district levelswhich is directlytied to the poppy trade. As numerousinterviews with Aghans reveal, thesentiment many people in Helmandeel toward the government is evidentrom a single sentence spoken by a businessman in Helmands Musa Qaladistrict: The Taliban were not good, butthese people nowthe governmentthey are thieves and killers.20 Lastingsuccess in Helmand requires thegovernment and its security orces to
signiicantly reduce their connections(and protection) to the narcotics trade.
National and local level governmentand ANSF consistently accept bribesrom narco-powerbrokers to acilitateinstability and the booming poppy
19 M.J. Stephey, Stan McChrystal: The New U.S. Com-
mander in Aghanistan, Time Magazine, May 12, 2009.
20 Kathy Gannon, The Taliban Shadow Government,
Associated Press, August 18, 2009.
business. 21 There have been severalinstances in 2009 where IEDs haveexploded on coalition patrols betweentwo ANSF checkpoints only 600 metersapart.22 Aghan National Police (ANP)have allowed poppy shipments to passthrough their checkpoints, or worseyet use their government vehicles totransport the poppy themselves.23Failure to curb the rampant corruptionduring the past three years has enabledthe insurgent-narcotic nexus to expandand strengthen. In a country wherecorruption and bribery are widelyaccepted as part o day-to-day lie,this task is much easier said thandone. Although the current Helmandgovernor, Gulav Mangal, is struggling toreduce the provinces narcotics output,he continues to encounter resistanceand corruption and cannot reorm the
province on his own.
On the heels o the elections and inconjunction with the increase o coalitionorces in the province, the people oHelmand need to witness improvementin their government and security orces by early 2010; otherwise, the people oHelmand may permanently lose hopein their governments and coalitionorces ability to bring stability to theprovince.
Conclusion
The biggest overarching obstacle tostability in Aghanistan remains thevolatile southern region. Enhancingsecurity in the south requires progressin numerous areas, but reducing theinsurgencys rampant unding is anessential part o the equation. A largeportion o the insurgencys monetary backing originates in Helmand(estimates range rom 40-70% 24). It isused to pay or weapons and ammunitionand is distributed to locals who helpight Aghan government and coalition
21 There are numerous powerbrokers at the local levelthat bribe ANSF and government ocials, but the most
notorious is Abdul Rahman Jan (ARJ) who was the
ormer Helmand provincial chie o police. He has ties to
numerous leaders within ANSF and works with them to
ensure the movement o drugs.
22 Personal discussions, SFC Charles Rodriguez, Kanda-
har, Aghanistan, February 2009.
23 Ibid.; Numerous Aghans have made these assertions
to soldiers in the unit.
24 In Seeds o Terror, Gretchen Peters claims the number
to be at 70%; recent gures claim 40% with the remain-
ing unds originating rom patrons in the Gul states.
orces. This money uels the insurgencyand helps to expand its inluence.
The Taliban-led insurgency and theAghan narcotics trade rely on eachother; a weaker counterpart wouldsigniicantly hinder the othersmovement. Reducing the insurgencyslinks to the narcotics trade withinHelmand Province during the course othe next 18 months is critical to the uturesuccess o this objective. Moreover by moving away rom government andinternational poppy eradication eortsvillagers and armers are less likely tosupport the insurgency.
Working independently, the Aghangovernment, its security orces andcoalition troops are not strong enoughto undermine the insurgent-narcotic
nexus in Helmand Province. I theseentities work in concert, however, theAghan people and the internationacommunity will achieve progress andpreserve hope or Aghanistans uture
Captain Michael Erwin is currently enrolled
in the Ph.D. program at the University o
Michigans Psychology Department. Captain
Erwin was the senior intelligence oice
(S2) or 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces
Group rom June 2006 to August 2009
This assignment included two deployments
to southern and western Aghanistan as the
Special Operations Task Force-31 S2. Herecently returned rom his second rotation
in July 2009. In his previous assignment
Captain Erwin was the Tactical Intelligence
Oicer or Task Force 2-7 Cav during
Operation Iraqi Freedom II that included
participation in the battles o Falluja an
Naja in 2004. He is a graduate o the U.S
Military Academy at West Point with
Bachelor o Science degree.
SEPTEMbER 2009 . VoL 2 . ISSUE 9
Focus and resources
have shited to
targeting narcotics in
the consolidation and
transportation phases by
raiding drug laboratories
and interdicting narcotics
convoys.
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8
The Expansion Strategy oAl-Qa`ida in the AraianPeninsula
By Gregry D. Jhnsen
during the past year, the United Stateshas grown increasingly concernedabout the dangers o instability inYemen. This ear has translated into asharp increase in aid to the ragile state.It also helps to explain the slow butsteady trickle o oicial U.S. visitorsto the Yemeni capital, Sana`a. GeneralDavid Petraeus, or example, traveledto Yemen on July 26, 2009, bringingwith him both oicial conirmation othe uptick in aid along with the warningthat the United States would expect asigniicant return on its money.
The extra unding is largely a resulto a resurgent al-Qa`ida threat in thecountry. In less than our years, al-Qa`ida in Yemen has transormed itsel rom a ractured and ragmented groupo individuals into an organizationthat is intent on launching attacksthroughout the Arabian Peninsula. Thedevelopment o al-Qa`ida into a regionalorganization, known as al-Qa`ida in theArabian Peninsula (AQAP), has beenquick but methodical as the group hasarticulated and then attained each goal
set or itsel. AQAP is increasinglyestablishing roots in Yemen, allowing itto plan and execute attacks across theregion.
Take Two in Mari
A large part o Petraeus visit wasdevoted to counterterrorism. Duringthe meeting with President AliAbdullah Salih, Petraeus pressed himto take the ight to al-Qa`ida. Salihdutiully responded by dispatchinghis nephew, `Ammar Muhammad,who is the principal deputy with the
National Security Bureau, to the easterngovernorate o Marib, which has beenthe center o al-Qa`ida activity in recentyears. `Ammar negotiated the terms othe oensive with local shaykhs, but theoperation our days later did not go asplanned. First, a Yemeni supply truckgot lost and was subsequently captured by al-Qa`ida ighters. Second, Yemenicounterterrorism orces mistakenlyshelled a tribal house rather than an al-Qa`ida sae house. Their error sparkeda ireight with tribesmen and a handul
o al-Qa`ida ighters opposing themilitary.
The Battle o Marib, as al-Qa`ida isnow calling the incident, illustrates thedangers and pitalls o attempting tonavigate the murky and multiacetedconlict that ighting al-Qa`ida inYemen has become. Al-Qa`idas budding alliance with some tribes inthe region means that any ight thatis designed to be a two-sided aair between the government and al-Qa`idawill not remain that way. The logic othese conlicts will evolve in a waythat increasingly incorporates moreactors, as tribesmen and other ightersare brought into the ight not out oany ideological loyalty to al-Qa`ida, but rather as a way o reacting againstgovernment action and aggression. 1
In the end, the Battle o Marib costthe military ive tanks, a number odead and wounded as well as sevensoldiers captured, at least accordingto a statement released by AQAP.2The Yemeni government disputed thestatement, but a video about the battlewas subsequently released by AQAP,showing the seven captured soldiersand urther conirming al-Qa`idasclaims.3 The video also backed awayrom the claim made in the initialstatement that al-Qa`ida had shelled
the Republican Palace in Marib while`Ammar Muhammad was in the building. Instead, al-Qa`ida used thevideo to modiy its earlier statement,saying only that oicers were in thepalace when it was shelled.
The clariications and runningcommentary throughout the video byQasim al-Raymi,4 one o al-Qa`idas
1 Tribes in this region o Yemen have oten accepted
money and assistance rom a variety o sources, which
they use as leverage against the central government in
Sana`a.2 Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, Statement on the
Battle o Marib, August 1, 2009.
3 Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, Video on the
Battle o Marib, September 8, 2009.
4 Qasim al-Raymi graduated rom one o Yemens reli-
gious institutes in the late 1990s beore traveling to A-
ghanistan where he met Usama bin Ladin and spent time
in an al-Qa`ida training camp. He comes rom a amily
o ghters. One brother, Ali, is currently in Guantanamo
Bay and another, Faris, ought in Iraq and Aghanistan
beore being killed in mysterious circumstances in June
2007. Al-Raymi was one o the 23 men who escaped rom
military commanders, is a calculatedattempt by the organization to seizethe moral high ground in Yemen. In acountry where many are oten distrustuo government spokesmen and oiciastatements, al-Qa`ida is attempting toshow that its statements are groundedin act. This was most orceully
illustrated in the video by ootage oYemens minister o inormation, Hasanal-Lawzi, discussing the governmentsversion o the events in Marib, whichwas then ollowed by al-Raymissuggestion that people are beginning toturn to jihadist web orums or a moreaccurate accounting o events.
In addition to brand protection, alQa`ida also utilized the capturedsoldiers to its advantage, portrayingthem as pawns duped into obeying anun-Islamic regime. At the end o the
video, al-Qa`ida announced that iwould not execute the soldiers, as thiswas not permitted, but that i the soldierswould not ight with the mujahidin thenneither should they ight against them by assisting the tyrants. The soldierswere eventually released as a resulo tribal mediation, which `Ammarwas orced to rely on ater his unitsembarrassing perormance.
In many ways, the Battle o Marib andthe events leading up to it were eerilysimilar to another series o incidentseight years earlier. In that casePresident George W. Bush pressuredSalih to arrest three al-Qa`ida membersduring a November 2001 visit toWashington. The ensuing operation inMarib by Yemeni Special Forces was adisaster. The target o the attack, AbuAli al-Harithi, escaped along with a
a Yemen Political Security prison in February 2006.
SEPTEMbER 2009 . VoL 2 . ISSUE 9
Al-Qa`ida frst wanted
to rebuild in Yemen, and
then it aimed to make
itsel relevant within the
country. Now that it has
accomplished both goals,
it is taking the next step by
expanding regionally.
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9
comrade, while local tribesmen tookseveral Yemeni soldiers hostage. Tribalmediators later secured the release o thesoldiers, but not beore the governmentwas warned against a heavy ootprint inMarib. Al-Harithi was killed less thana year later by a U.S. unmanned aerialdrone.
Yet this is not 2001, and Yemen is lessinclined toward seeing U.S. prioritiesas its own. It has other securityproblemsa civil war in the north 5 an dcalls or secession in the souththat itdeems more pressing than the al-Qa`idathreat. Moreover, it has learned thatthe United States and its allies can beinconsistent when it comes to rewardingrisk.
Estalishing Roots
Both the statement and the videoabout the Battle o Marib express somesurprise that the Yemeni governmentwould even carry out an attack in thegovernorate. In the video, al-Raymiexplained the military operation bysuggesting that Salih is a slave to Saudiriyals and American dollars. Al-Qa`idais increasingly viewing Marib and someo the surrounding governorates, mostnotably al-Jaw and parts o Shabwa, asits own sphere o inluence where thegovernment has no role.
With a ew exceptionsthe two suicideattacks in March 2009 6 and the Battle oMaribal-Qa`ida has been largely silentsince its attack on the U.S. Embassy inSana`a on Ramadan 17, 2008. 7 Yet thissilence does not equate to inactivity.Instead, al-Qa`ida has been buildinga durable oundation or the uture.Speciically, it has been actively working
5 The sixth and most violent round o ghting to date be-
tween the government and the Huthis began on August
11, 2009. This sporadic confict has been ongoing since
2004 and continues to be a drain on both the govern-
ments political and military capital.6 A suicide bomber killed our South Korean tourists and
their local Yemeni guide on March 15, 2009. On March
18, a convoy o the victims relatives along with South
Korean investigators was targeted in another suicide at-
tack, although only the bomber was killed in the second
incident.
7 The date is signicant, as was pointed out in a later is-
sue o Sada al-Malahim, as the anniversary o the early
Islamic Battle o Badr. It corresponds to September
17, 2008. The recent attempted assassination o Saudi
Prince Muhammad bin Nayi is the beginning o some-
thing new or al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula.
to establish links and put down rootswith the tribes in Marib, al-Jaw andShabwa governorates.8 Most notably, itis accomplishing this by attempting tomarry into the local tribes. The personalpiety o many al-Qa`ida members alsoresonates strongly with tribesmen as docell phone videos o the ighting in Iraq.At the moment, al-Qa`ida is in the earlystages o a budding alliance with someo the tribes in these governorates.Despite early concerns immediatelyater September 11, 2001, al-Qa`ida hasnot traditionally had a strong alliancewith the tribes in Yemen. There have
been cases o al-Qa`ida members beingprovided reuge by tribes, but oten thiswas an issue o a tribesman who was also
a member o al-Qa`ida playing on histribal identity to receive reuge. What ishappening now is entirely dierent.
Said Ali al-Shihri, the deputy commandero AQAP, recently brought his wie andchildren to Yemen rom Saudi Arabia. 9Not only did this put them beyond thereach o the Saudi government so it couldnot exert the same sort o pressure onhim as it did on Muhammad al-`Awi,10
8 Much o the analysis in this section is based on the au-
thors recent trip to Yemen in July and August 2009. The
author is indebted to the help and generosity o many Ye-menis who shared their views and thoughts with him.
9 Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, Statement o
Congratulations, Sada al-Malahim, No. 9, May 2009.
10 Muhammad al-`Aw, a ormer Guantanamo detain-
ee, was one o the our individuals eatured in the video
that announced the merger o the Yemeni and Saudi
branches o al-Qa`ida into the unied al-Qa`ida in the
Arabian Peninsula in January 2009. One month later, al-
`Aw turned himsel in to Saudi authorities. It is widely
believed that Saudi Arabia used a variety o dierent
tacticsincluding pressuring the women in his amily
to orce his surrender.
but it also indicates al-Shihris comorlevel in the country. Al-Qa`ida is not onthe run in Yemen, but rather is largelyree to do what it wants in certain areasAl-Shihris move is also indicative o agrowing attempt by al-Qa`ida to becomepart o the local scene by integratingitsel into the entire community in away that a single man is unable to do.
Speciic details on individuals marryinginto particular tribes is diicult toacquire, but anecdotal evidence receivedin Yemen combined with some speciiccases indicates that it is part o alQa`idas long-term strategy. In the latestissue oSada al-Malahim (Echo o Battles), orinstance, al-Qa`ida congratulated oneo its members, Muhammad al-`Umdaon his marriage. 11 It is unclear rom thestatement who al-`Umda married, bu
the belie in Yemen is that he marriedinto one o the tribes and that his actionis being replicated by other ightersrom both Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Thisdevelopment is both new and worryingbecause it has the potential to turn anycounterterrorism operation into a muchbroader war involving Yemens tribes.
The Perception and The Reality
Another worrying indicator or theuture o counterterrorism operations inYemen is the general apathy toward alQa`ida in the country. There is a culture
o passivity and victimhood withinthe government. Nearly every sectoro society has bought into this ideaarguing that the al-Qa`ida problem isreally a oreign problem, an outgrowtho the wars in Iraq and Aghanistan. 1
This is not the case, and by ailing toacknowledge the problem Yemen hasnever adequately addressed it.
There is silence rom major clerics whocould speak out against attacks rom alQa`ida. The shaykhs and clerics who dopreach against al-Qa`ida do not have the
intellectual weight or popular ollowingto counter al-Qa`idas arguments. Thishas essentially ceded the ield o debateand discussion within Yemen to al
11 Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, Statement o
Congratulations, Sada al-Malahim, No. 10, July 2009
Al-`Umda is one o three escapees rom the February
2006 prison break still at large.
12 This conclusion is based on a number o interview
and conversations the author conducted with ministers
parliamentarians, journalists and tribesmen in July and
August 2009 in Yemen.
SEPTEMbER 2009 . VoL 2 . ISSUE 9
Al-Qa`idas budding
alliance with some tribes in
the region means that any
fght that is designed to be
a two-sided aair between
the government and al-
Qa`ida will not remain that
way.
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10
Qa`ida. The United States has beencomplicit in this ailure by neglectingto seize opportunities to counter theorganizations propaganda in anymeaningul way.
The United States, or example, hada unique opportunity to go on theoensive in August 2009 when itreleased Muhammad al-Muayyad andhis assistant rom U.S. custody.13 Th ecase has been a contentious domesticissue in Yemen since 2003, witheveryone rom the president to al-
Qa`ida calling or the pairs release.The United States could have easilyplaced an Arabic op-ed in the oicialdaily, al-Thawra, explaining its rationaleor the release. 14 Articulating that like
every country the United States makesmistakes but that it also attempts to learnrom those mistakes would have went along way toward repairing the tatteredimage o the United States in Yemen.Al-Qa`ida has used al-Muayyads caseas a powerul piece o propaganda oryears, but when he was inally releasedthe United States was silent and did notbeneit. U.S. public diplomacy in Yemenis all deense and no oense.
13 In January 2003, the United States lured al-Muayyadand his assistant to Germany as part o a sting operation
in which they were promised money or groups such as
Hamas and al-Qa`ida. The men were arrested and extra-
dited to the United States where they were convicted in
2005 o supporting Hamas but cleared o charges related
to al-Qa`ida. Al-Muayyads popularity in Yemen stems
not only rom his role as a religious gure, but also rom
his charity work. He is oten reerred to as the Father o
orphans in the Arabic press.
14 The author asked a Yemeni ocial about the diculty
o placing such an op-ed, and he assured that such an op-
ed would have no problem getting printed.
Public diplomacy is not the only U.S.problem in Yemen. There is a righteningmix o ignorance and arrogance when itcomes to U.S. policy toward Yemen aswell as among many o those tasked withimplementing this policy. The UnitedStates must learn that its insistence onseeing everything through the prism ocounterterrorism has helped to induceexactly the type o results it is hopingto avoid. By ocusing on al-Qa`ida tothe exclusion o nearly every otherchallenge, and by linking almost all o its aid to this single issue, the UnitedStates has ensured that the issue willnever be resolved. There is growing earin Yemen that the country would beorgotten and neglected in the absence othe threat rom al-Qa`ida; this causes thegovernment to prolong the conlict. 15
This short-sighted and narrow ocus bythe United States has translated overtime into a lack o inluence within thecountry. The United States is not themost important player on the domesticYemeni scene. During the past severalyears, Washington has not spentnearly enough money in nearly enoughdierent places in Yemen to haveits desired diplomatic leverage. U.S.perceptions o its own importance andinluence within Yemen are inlated anddo not square with reality.
The Recruiting GroundWhile the United States and Yemen have both been distracted by other, seeminglymore pressing issues in recent years, al-Qa`ida has been working single-mindedlyto create a durable inrastructure thatcan withstand the loss o key leadersand cells. It has done an excellent jobo tailoring its narrative or a localaudience.16 With the exception o suicideattacks within Yemen itsel, much othe groups message is broadly popularwithin the country. As one Yemenisaid, I can no longer tell the dierence
between al-Qa`ida in the caves and al-Qa`ida in the mosques, illustratingjust how popular the groups rhetoric ison many issues. 17
15 This is based on the authors interviews and conversa-
tions with government ocials, as well as his own analy-
sis o the situation in Yemen.
16 This is particularly evident rom the groups videos
and issues o Sada al-Malahim, where al-Qa`ida uses
popular grievances to criticize the regime.
17 Personal interview, a Yemeni who requested ano-
nymity, Sana`a, Yemen, August 2009.
SEPTEMbER 2009 . VoL 2 . ISSUE 9
The organization is also beneitingrom other government mistakes. Theoverreaction o governments suchas Yemen, largely as a result o U.Spressure, o arresting nearly everyonesuspected o harboring sympathy oral-Qa`ida in the atermath o September11 and periodically since then is notreducing radicalization; instead, it ishaving the opposite eect. Young men areleaving Yemens security prisons moreradical than when they were initiallyincarcerated. The countrys revolvingdoor prison policy is compoundingthe problem as more young men spendsigniicant time in prison. In a sensemany o these young men have beenprepared or recruitment by their timein prison. The initial groundwork isbeing laid not by al-Qa`ida but rather bythe governments actions, which makes
these men tempting recruitment targetswhen they are eventually released.
Yemen reuses to allow monitoring o itssecurity prisons, which is a major causeor concern. Many o these men are beinghoused together, which only acilitatesa sort o mutual encouragementand strengthening as more radicamembers are able to inluence youngerindividuals.18 The various clerics andreligious shaykhs who visit the prisonsto preach also appear to be playing arole in the radicalization process. 1
Al-Qa`idas potential recruitingpool in Yemen is not drying up but isexpanding.
AQAPs Growing Amition
Since its reemergence in Yemen in2006, al-Qa`ida has shown itselto be an ambitious but temperedorganization, methodically taking thesteps needed to rebuild and expand. Theattempted assassination o Saudi PrinceMuhammad bin Nayi is part o theorganizations shit in priorities sincethe January 2009 merger o the Yemen
and Saudi branches o al-Qa`ida intoa single regional ranchise. The attackwas an early attempt by AQAP to matchaction with rhetoric.
18 Yemen does allow monitoring o its central prisons
but these are dierent rom the countrys many security
prisons.
19 Personal interviews, various Yemeni journalists and
ocials amiliar with the security prisons in the country
Sana`a, Yemen, July and August 2009.
By ocusing on al-Qa`ida
to the exclusion o nearly
every other challenge, and
by linking almost all o its
aid to this single issue, theUnited States has ensured
that the issue will never be
resolved.
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Following the merger, al-Qa`ida hasprioritized attacks in Saudi Arabiaand other Gul states20 in an attemptto make itsel regionally relevant. Foral-Qa`ida, this is the logical extensiono its development to date in Yemen.Al-Qa`ida irst wanted to rebuild inYemen, and then it aimed to make itsel relevant within the country. Now that ithas accomplished both goals, it is takingthe next step by expanding regionally.
This process has ollowed a amiliarpattern: each new phase o activity begins with al-Qa`ida announcingits rather ambitious goals and thenworking to meet those goals. The attackon Muhammad bin Nayi was an earlyattempt to accomplish this, but it isunlikely to be the last. AQAP currentlyeels little pressure in Yemen. It has
both the time and space to plot andlaunch attacks throughout the regionrom its base in the country. This isnot to say that the organization will nolonger carry out attacks in Yemen, butrather that these attacks are no longerits top priority. Al-Qa`ida has reachedthe point where it is no longer satisiedwith local activity. It has its sights seton something bigger.
Gregory D. Johnsen, a ormer Fulbright
Fellow in Yemen, is currently a Ph.D.
candidate in Near Eastern Studies at
Princeton University. He is also the co-author o the Yemen blog, Waq al-Waq.
20 AQAP has not yet been ound responsible or attacks
in other Gul states. Its statements and some circumstan-
tial evidence, however, imply that it is plotting such op-
erations.
A Prole o PakistansLashkar-i-Jhangvi
By Ari Jamal
lashkar-i-jhangvi (lj) is one o theworlds most secretive terroristgroups. Little inormation exists onthe organization, even though it is anal-Qa`ida ailiate that is regularlyblamed or terrorist attacks in Pakistan.Although the LJ was ormed as thearmed wing o Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan(SSP), it has morphed into the collectivearmed wing o various Deobanditerrorist groups. Statements about theLJ rom the Pakistani government andmedia suggest that the group is the mostdeadly Islamist terrorist organizationin the world outside the Indian-controlled state o Jammu and Kashmir.This description, however, is notcompletely accurate, and it has served both the handlers o jihadist groups inthe Pakistani military as well as otherIslamist terrorist groups who beneit byblaming the LJ or most terrorist attacksin Pakistan outside the tribal areas.
The LJ does exist as a dangerousorganization, but not in the orm otenportrayed by the Pakistani media andgovernment. Most terrorist attacksblamed on the LJ were in act carried out
by several Deobandi1
terrorist groups,o which the LJ is only one. Researchinto 40 terrorist incidents in Pakistan between September 11, 2001 andSeptember 2007 show that police andother sources were quoted in variousnewspapers oten attributing a terroristattack to multiple Deobandi terroristgroups. During this period, it wasnot uncommon or the same terroristact to be blamed on the SSP, the LJ,Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam, Jundallah,or another Deobandi group.2 Dierentauthority igures blamed dierent
1 Deobandis are a sub-sect o the Hana sect, which in
turn is one o the our major Sunni schools o jurispru-
dence in Islam. The other major sub-sect o the Hana
sect are the Barelvis who represent more mystical Islam.
Deobandis can also be described as the politicized Hana
sub-sect as they came into being in mid-19th century Brit-
ish India. Their principal objective at that time was to
puriy Islam o the accumulated bid`a or religious inno-
vation to gain reedom rom the British colonial power.
2 This inormation is based on the authors accumulation
o press reports rom Pakistani newspapers and media
during the stated period.
groups. Moreover, Pakistani policewere unable to dierentiate between thegroups. In many cases, one militant hadoverlapping allegiances and belonged tomultiple groups at one time.
This article will discuss the LJsoundation, ideology, and organizationastructure. It will also show why the LJis blamed or a disproportionate numbeo terrorist incidents in Pakistan.
The Creation o the LJ
To understand the ormation o the LJ, iis necessary to outline the creation andideology o Sipah-i-Sahaba PakistanIn 1984, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvia irebrand and astute Deobandi clericrom the Punjabi town o Jhang anda member o Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam(JUI), ounded Anjuman-i-Sipah-i
Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP). Inspired bythe Islamist and jihadist policies o
General Zia-ul-Haq, Jhangvi createdthe group to ight the growing inluenceo the Iranian revolution among bothSunni and Shi`a youth. Jhangvi dreamedo uniting all Sunni sects under one banner to oppose Shi`a Muslims anIran; his goal was to establish a Sunnistate in Pakistan and later in the rest othe world.
For almost a year, the ASSP ailedto attract attention to its cause. Itsmembers spent their time writing graitsuch as Kafr, kafrShi`a kafr (Shi`a areinidels), and the group largely stuck topromoting this slogan. A shrewd clericJhangvi soon understood that he wouldnot succeed unless he ound supportersin Islamabad. By 1985, he had renamedthe group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan(Soldiers o the Companions o theProphet) and became a regular visitor toIslamabad. In Islamabad, he requented
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During the mid-1990s,
the SSP decided to create
an underground terrorist
group that would take
orders rom SSP leaders
but operate independently.
This group became
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi.
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Arab embassies, particularly those oIraq and Saudi Arabia. 3 He ailed toconvince Iraqi diplomats that his groupcould ight an Iraqi proxy war againstIran in Pakistan, but he did succeedin winning over the Saudis to do thesame.4
At the time, there were not manyWahhabis among the Pakistanipopulation, so the Saudis patronizedDeobandi parties and groups as theirproxies. Nevertheless, none o thesegroups were prepared to ight a proxy waragainst Iran in Pakistan. The Saudis wereparticularly interested in establishingSunni terrorist inrastructuresuchas military training campsalong thePakistan-Iran border so that terroristscould carry out attacks inside Iran toincite the Sunni population against the
Shi`a regime; ater conducting attacks,they could lee back across the borderto their sanctuaries in Pakistan. TheSaudis even invited some Kashmiricommanders rom Indian-controlledKashmir to Saudi Arabia and oeredthem large sums o money to abandonjihad in Kashmir and establish terroristinrastructure in Baluchistan onthe Iranian border. 5 None o thesecommanders, however, accepted therole as a proxy army or the Saudis. 6
The SSP, however, did accept the
role, and became one o the irstterrorist groups to establish sizeableinrastructure in Baluchistan. 7 Th eSaudi money gave the SSP a shot inthe arm and allowed it to establishterrorist inrastructure.8 As a result,
3 Personal interviews, Arab diplomats, late 1980s.
4 One reason or this ailure is that Iraqi diplomats were
sensitive ater the Z.A. Bhutto government raided the
Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad in the mid-1970s and uncov-
ered arms and ammunition. The weapons were allegedly
or Baluch rebels. The Iraqis did not want a replay o the
same incident. The Saudis, on the other hand, emerged
as close allies o the Pakistani military, which was man-aging the anti-Soviet jihad in Aghanistan with U.S. and
Saudi money.
5 Personal interview, Kashmiri Sala-jihadi commander
who had participated in several discussions with Saudis,
September 17, 2000.
6 Ibid.
7 During visits to Baluchistan since the mid-1980s, the
author observed that the SSP had a visible presence in
most villages along the Pakistan-Iran border. One o t he
SSPs avorite tactics was to write anti-Shi`a and anti-
Iran grati on the trains that went in and out o Iran.
8 Personal interviews, Arab diplomats, Islamabad, Pak-
the SSP achieved tremendous growthin both numbers and inluence duringits early years. By 1990, it had plottedto assassinate Iranian diplomats alongwith Pakistani Shi`a Muslims. The SSPtried to kill Iranian diplomats in Lahore,Karachi and Multan.9 SSP memberssuch as Riaz Basra 10 and Shaykh HaqNawaz Jhangvi (not to be conusedwith its ounder) gained notorietyater they succeeded in killing Iraniandiplomats.11 Their operations did notcome without resistance. For example,the SSPs ounder, Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, was gunned down in 1990,allegedly by Shi`a militants. Moreover,a group o Shi`a militants created theirown terrorist group in the mid-1990sknown as Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan(SMP)and began retaliating againstDeobandi Muslims in Pakistan. The
SMP assassinated various Deobandiclerics.
The SSPs killings o Iranians in Pakistanbrought tremendous embarrassment andpressure on the Pakistani government.General Zia-ul-Haq had died, and anelected government was in power inIslamabad. The Benazir Bhutto-ledgovernment began to apply pressure onthe SSP. The SSP at the time was alsoplaying a role in electoral politics andwanted to use parliament to urtherits agenda. Yet it could not accomplish
this because its involvement in terroristoperations barred it rom becoming alegitimate political party.
Thereore, during the mid-1990s theSSP decided to create an undergroundterrorist group that would takeorders rom SSP leaders but operateindependently. This group becameLashkar-i-Jhangvi.
LJ Splinters rom the SSP
As part o the SSPs strategy, the LJ wasestablished in the mid-1990s with the
objective o executing terrorist attacksagainst Shi`a Muslims and Iraniannationals. Its early leaders included RiazBasra, Akram Lahori and Malik Ishaq.The real leader o the group, however,
istan, April 1990.
9 These incidents were widely reported in the Pakistani
media during the time.
10 Riaz Basra was involved in hundreds o sectarian ter-
rorist attacks, including the murder o Iranian diplomat
Sadiq Ganji in December 1990.
11 Ibid.
was Maulana Alam Tariq, the brother oMaulana Azam Tariq, the latter o whomlater became the head o the SSP and anelected member o parliament. 12 The LJwas named ater the SSPs martyredounder, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi.
The LJ established a training camp inAghanistans Sarobi district. They alsotrained in the Harkat-ul-Mujahidin(HuM) training camp Khalid BinWalid in Aghanistan. Among the LJsleaders, Riaz Basra 13 emerged as one othe most ruthless terrorist operativesHe was allegedly responsible or mostanti-Shi`a terrorist attacks. Basra wasalso responsible or making threateningphone calls to police oicers chargedwith investigating the LJs terrorisacts.14 The calls were eective, andpolice oicers became reluctant to
investigate the LJs terrorist acts ouo ear o reprisals. When authoritieswould interrogate an SSP or LJ terroristthey concealed their identities with acemasks to prevent possible LJ retaliationa trend that continues to this day. TheLJ made it a policy to assassinate policeoicers who investigated terrorist acts orinterrogated their members. One o themost signiicant o these assassinationswas the senior superintendant o policein Gujranwala, Ashra Marth, whowas gunned down in May 1997 ater heinvestigated the LJs inrastructure.1
Investigations into the SSP and LJ werehalted ater his death. 16
The SSP continued to kill Shi`aMuslims under the name o the LJduring the second hal o the 1990s. 1
12 Personal interviews, SSP leaders, Jhang, Pakistan
December 2001. Maulana Alam Tariq resuraced to take
over the leadership o the SSP when his brother was as
sassinated outside Islamabad. He lost the power struggle
however, to Maulana Ludhianvi.
13 Riaz Basra was killed on May 14, 2002. Lahori suc
ceeded him.
14 Many police ocers told the author that they had received threatening phone calls rom individuals calling
rom public phones and claiming to be Riaz Basra.
15 Ashra Marth was gunned down in the city o Gujran
wala as he came out o his ocial residence to go to his
oce.
16 Personal interview, senior police ocer who investi
gated the murder, Islamabad, Pakistan, July 2003.
17 The SSP never claimed responsibility or these kill
ings; the purpose o creating the LJ was so that the SSP
could deny involvement in terrorist attacks. This inor
mation is based on the authors various interviews and
investigations into the SSP and LJ.
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To gain resources rom the Pakistanimilitary, the SSP/LJ also joined the jihad in Kashmir. The date o thisdecision is not known, but accordingto one interview the LJ had lost morethan 100 ighters in the Kashmirconlict by the late 1990s. 18 By joiningthe jihad in Kashmir, SSP/LJ militantsreceived signiicant military trainingand expertise rom dierent Deobanditerrorist groups, particularly romHarkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam and Jaysh-i-Muhammad. These actors raised theproile o the SSP/LJ signiicantly andthe group curried avor with Pakistansmilitary establishment. 19
Post-Coup Period
General Pervez Musharras October1999 military coup posed one o the biggest challenges to the SSP/LJ.
The organization was aced with thedecision o continuing to kill Shi`aMuslims, which would have destabilizedMusharras military regime, or remainpeaceul under the new government.
The hardliners such as the LJs Basraeven though they supported the militarycoupwanted to continue their missiono killing Shi`a in Pakistan. A smallergroup led by the LJs Qari Abdul Hayyewanted to restrain their sectarianviolence to achieve their larger interestso building an organization that could
eventually take power in the countryby cooperating with the military. Thesedierences caused a split in the group in2000. One action was led by hardlinerRiaz Basra. The other, more moderateaction was led by Qari Abdul Hayye(also known as Qari Asadullah, orTalha), who was the amir o the trainingcamp at Sarobi.
The Basra group maintained the policyo killing Shi`a even ater GeneralMusharra took power. Governmentsupport, however, was not orthcoming.
The killings o Shi`a in the earlyperiod o General Musharras regimedestabilized the government, and itultimately cracked down on the LJsactivities. In what was a replay o Prime
18 Personal interview, an SSP leader, Peshawar, Paki-
stan, April 2001.
19 Since the 1970s, the military has used various Isla-
mist groups to achieve political goals, and in this case the
military used militant Islamist parties to destabilize the
democratically-elected government o Prime Minister
Nawaz Shari in the post-Kargil period.
Minister Nawaz Sharis eorts to rein interrorists, Musharras interior minister,Lt. General Moinuddin Haider, visitedAghanistan in March 2001 to extraditesome LJ terrorists back to Pakistan.The Taliban reused. They also reusedto sign any extradition treaty with
Pakistan. This came as a surprise to themilitary; they expected the Taliban to bemore compliant considering they helped
install the regime to power in Kabul.
The links between the SSP and the LJonce again came into the open whenthe SSP ran a campaign in February2001 to save LJ terrorist Shaykh HaqNawaz Jhangvi, who was to be hangedor murdering an Iranian diplomat. Jhangvi conessed to the crime in spiteo pressure by the SSP to plead notguilty. Jhangvi reused to lie beore thecourt and was hanged. The SSP resortedto widespread violence across thecountry, with SSP workers storming the
streets in several urban centers. Theydestroyed public and private property.
Despite this violence, relations betweenthe Musharra regime and the SSPremained positive. The Musharraregime, or example, rewarded the SSP by helping to elect SSP chie MaulanaAzam Tariq to the National Assemblyin the 2002 elections. 20 MaulanaTariq returned the avor by casting
20 The 2002 general elections were rigged and ma-
nipulated in several ways, beore and during the elec-
toral process, to bring in Islamists to counter the demo-cratic political orces, particularly the Pakistan Muslim
League (Nawaz) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP).
Although General Musharras regime had ormally
banned the SSP and LJ beore the 2002 general elections,
the group was allowed to unction reely under a dier-
ent name. As the democratic candidates were disquali-
ed to run or elections, Islamists were encouraged to
unite and replace them. The bulk o the Islamists were
elected under the umbrella o Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal
(MMA). The SSP reused to join the MMA and decided
to contest elections as a separate party and sent Maulana
Azam Tariq to parliament.
his crucial vote in avor o GeneraMusharras candidate or the oice oprime minister, Mir Zaarullah Jamaliwho won by one vote. Later, MaulanaTariq boasted that only his supporsustained General Musharras primeminister in power. When Member othe National Assembly Maulana AzamTariq was assassinated in October 2003 just outside Islamabad, the Musharraregime reused to support anotherSSP candidate in the by-electionsit was exasperated with the groupsblackmailing.
Post-9/11 Period
In the atermath o the terrorist attackon September 11, the LJ aced anotherdilemma: whether or not to supporGeneral Musharras decision to join theUnited States in its war on terrorism.
Like most jihadist groups, the LJhardliners led by Basra again chose tooppose General Musharras decisionThe hardliners in other Deoband jihadist groups such as Harkat-u Jihad-al-Islam, Jaysh-i-Muhammand Harkat-ul-Mujahidin also opposedthe Pakistani military.
The post-9/11 situation orced the SSPLJ and other Deobandi jihadist groupsto orge closer cooperation, such as inthe killing o the Wall Street Journals DaniePearl.21 The unity among Deoband
terrorist groups led to unprecedentedviolence in Pakistan. Most terrorist actin Pakistan since 9/11 have been carriedout by Deobandi or quasi-Deobandterrorist groups, together or alone, buthe LJ has almost always been blamed.
I the government were to blame jihadist groups such as Harkat-u Jihad-al-Islam and Jaysh-i-Muhammador violence in Pakistan, it would bringa bad name to the jihad in Kashmir, andeventually discredit the governmentsoten-used policy o using jihadists
as an instrument o policy. It is mucheasier or the Pakistani government toscapegoat the LJ or most terrorist actsin Pakistan outside o the tribal areas.
21 A prominent case o cooperation among Deobandi ter
rorist groups was the kidnapping and murder o Wal
Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl. Terrorists rom
several groups were involved in the operation. Along
with Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam and Jaysh-i-Muhammad
terrorists, Qari Ataur Rehman (also known as Naeem
Bukhari) o the LJ was implicated in Pearls murder.
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The post-9/11 situation
orced the SSP/LJ and
other Deobandi jihadist
groups to orge closer
cooperation.
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From the LJ to the TTP
Today, the LJ is still involved in terroristattacks in Pakistan. Little is knownabout the groups current activities, andit is not completely clear how the twoactions o the LJthe Basra group andthe Qari Hayye grouphave evolved.Both actions likely still exist, althoughdierent leaders are in charge. TheBasra group, or example, is now parto Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) andcontributes to its jihadist operations. LJoperatives probably help acilitate theTTPs terrorist acts in Punjab Province,where the LT/SSP has an establishedbase.22
In act, a similar paradigm is nowoccurring with the TTP. The Pakistanigovernment blames the TTP or nearlyevery terrorist attack in Pakistan, some
o which likely had little to do with theorganization. Yet just like the LJ, it iseasy to scapegoat the TTP rather thanreveal the true extent o jihadist violencein Pakistan and the many groups andactors involved.
Ari Jamal is a visiting scholar at New York
University and author o Shadow War:The Untold Story o Jihad in Kashmir.
22 Hassan Abbas, Dening the Punjabi Taliban Net-
work, CTC Sentinel2:4 (2009).
The Failure o Sala-JihadiInsurgent Movements inthe Levant
By Bilal Y. Saab
it is remarkable that the Levant, asub-region plagued by internal andexternal crisis conditions that aregenerally conducive to terrorism andpolitical violence, has been ree romany insurgent 1 Islamist group withveriiable material ties to al-Qa`idascentral leadership.2 The two ambitiousattempts by Arab Salai-jihadis to createinsurgent orces in the Levant occurredin Lebanon in May-September 2007when Fatah al-Islam 3 violently emergedin the northern part o the country, andon August 15, 2009 in Gaza when Jund
Ansar Allah4
declared war on Hamas.These two attempts sought to radicallychange the existing socio-politicalorders in Lebanon and Gaza through theuse o religiously-inspired insurgentviolence. Both attempts ailed, however.Although al-Qa`ida has been tied to
1 The emphasis on the word insurgent is deliber-
ate and used to dierentiate rom the word terrorist.
While there are a number o analytical and practical di-
erences between an insurgent group (or insurgencies)
and a terrorist group (or cell), this article only ocuses on
our: one, insurgent groups enjoy a certain level o sup-port rom a segment o society, whereas terrorist groups
usually work alone and do not need indigenous sup-
port; two, insurgent groups are usually bigger and bet-
ter armed than terrorist groups; three, insurgent groups
work overtly, whereas terrorist groups operate most e-
ectively in a clandestine ashion; our, insurgent groups
nd it essential to seize territory or the realization o
their revolutionary objectives, while terrorist groups
generally do not.
2 Very ew comprehensive studies have been written on
al-Qa`idas presence and infuence in the Levant. For a
commendable paper on the subject, see Hassan Mneim-
neh, The Jihadist International: Al-Qa`idas Advance in the
Levant (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Insti-tute, April 8, 2009).
3 Fatah al-Islam is a militant Sunni Islamist group that
is inspired by al-Qa`idas ideology. Its members are
mostly Arabs rom various Middle Eastern countries. It
emerged in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian reugee camp
in Lebanon in November 2006. Its goals are unclear but
include the establishment o an Islamic state in northern
Lebanon.
4 Jund Ansar Allah was ounded in southern Gaza in
November 2008 as an armed Sunni Islamist group with
strong Sala-jihadi credentials. Its goals include the es-
tablishment o an Islamic state in Gaza.
terrorist plots in the Levant, it does notappear responsible or interested in theew Islamist insurgent movements thahave arisen in the region. 5
This article assesses why the Levanhas been a less attractive place orglobal Salai-jihadis and a morechallenging environment or them tomobilize and conduct operations. Itattributes these ailures to the existenceo well-established mainstream Islamicmovements in the Levant that see theviolent and extreme Salai-jihadisas a threat to their interests; thedistinct historical and socio-politicacircumstances in the Levant that make itless hospitable to Salai-jihadi ideologythe relative success o the regionssecurity and intelligence services toprevent the Salai-jihadi threat rom
inlating; the subduing eect o Iransdominant inluence in the Levant; andinally the lack o material support romal-Qa`idas central leadership to Salaijihadi insurgent groups in the region.
Al-Qa`idas Lack o Allies in the Levant
Other than Jund al-Sham6 and Fatah alIslam (and the now crushed Jund AnsarAllah), al-Qa`ida does not have alliesin the Levant that could eectivelyhelp project its inluence and ideologyinto the region and to serve its variousstrategic objectives.7
Jund al-Shams lack o organizationacoherence, discipline, and ightingcapabilities make it an unreliable partneror al-Qa`ida in the Levant. 8 Far rom
5 No hard evidence on direct material ties between thes
two groups and al-Qa`idas central leadership has ever
emerged, even though they appear to share the same
ideological agenda.
6 Jund al-Sham is a title claimed by several Sunni Islami
extremist entities, all or none o which may be connected
These entities mostly operate in Lebanon, Syria and Jor
dan, and their goals include the establishment o an Is
lamic caliphate throughout the Levant.7 For instance, without the Taliban in Pakistan and
Aghanistan or the Salast Group or Preaching and
Combat in Algeria, al-Qa`ida would have ound it ex
tremely dicult, i not impossible, to expand and oper
ate in South Asia or the Maghreb. More examples where
al-Qa`ida relied on local support to expand its infuence
and pursue its goals in various regions around the world
include al-Shabab in Somalia, al-Qa`ida in Iraq, and th
Abu Sayya Group in the Philippines.
8 There are three groupsHizb al-Tahrir, Jaysh al-Is
lam, and Jaysh al-Ummain the Palestinian Territories
that claim to be inspired by al-Qa`idas ideology, but they
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being an al-Qa`ida ranchise in theLevant, Jund al-Sham is a title claimed by several Sunni Islamic extremistentities, all or none o which may beconnected. More like a movement, Jund al-Sham, whose alleged link tothe late al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) leaderAbu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi stems romreports that he had arranged trainingor the groups ighters at al-Qa`idacamps in Aghanistan, has a presencein Lebanons Palestinian reugee camps
and in Syria (possibly in Jordan too). 9 Jund al-Sham members have beendescribed by terrorism analysts andArab counterterrorism oicials as jihadist reelancers who are only tiedtogether by ideology and a desire toviolently deend a radical Islamic order.Many Islamic ighters tied to Jund al-Sham in Lebanon merged with Fatah al-Islam during its rise and all, while therest went into hiding and took reuge inthe Palestinian camp o Ain al-Hilwah. 10Lebanese press reports indicate that
one o the