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DGD&D Shaping the Future Army to Fight and Win
The Command of British Land Forces inIraq, March-May 2003
Lt Col Jim Storr PhD
UK Directorate of Land Warfare
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DGD&D Shaping the Future Army to Fight and Win
Overview
- Introduction
- HQ structure and
process
- Missions, orders andintent
- Miscellaneous points- Summary and
conclusions
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DGD&D Shaping the Future Army to Fight and Win
Introduction
The Campaign
The Analysis
The Approach
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DGD&D Shaping the Future Army to Fight and Win
Headquarters Structures and
Processes
Structures
Process Effects
Overview
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DGD&D Shaping the Future Army to Fight and Win
Structure
Numbers
Ranks
Complexity
Staff Functions
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HQ Growth: Facts
HQ 7th Armd Bde Op TELIC about 650 all
ranks and 240 vehicles (2 identical CPs ofover 60 vehicles each.) HQ nominal roll
records 383 all ranks.
HQs 4th and 7th Armd Bdes in Op GRANBY:between 288 and 306 personnel.
This growth of 25% in 12 years is notaccounted for by changed functions.
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Staff Ranks
Add majors to brigade HQs
Add lieutenant colonels to divisionalHQs (and brigades)
But callers would not take no for ananswer unless it was personally fromthe COS
Captains reduced to tea-boys Excess planning
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Staff
Functions
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Staff Functions
G1/G4: add Equipment Support
watchkeepers and Medical LOs G5: CIMIC units, not G5 staff.
Deep Ops Cells? Info Ops
War is more complex today: but no
legal, no POLAD, no Info Ops atBrigade HQ
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Complexity: Brooks Law (1)
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Staff Numbers
TimeRequired
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Brooks Law (2)
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Brooks Law (3)
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Brooks Law (4)
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Process
Excessive Planning
Excessive Activity
Focus on Output not Outcome
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Effects
Orders too big.
Orders too late:
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Timeliness
5 FragOs about initial operations released by Div HQ on 21March.
Basra: Basra fell AM 6 April;
7th Armd Bde OpO dated 0600hrs 6 April: some of theevents in the order may already have taken place.
Div FragO, which said very little of substance, dated 0815hrs6 April.
Phase 4: Div OpO 4 issued on 21 Apr
British divisional orders invariably quite thick but too late.
1st Marine Division comment The planning cycle was waybehind the execution being conducted by the forwardcommanders. Div HQ was still producing lengthy OPLANS andFRAGOs that were too late for the commanders, as they had
already stepped off.
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Overview
HQs that are too large;
contain officers of inappropriately highranks
of overlapping functions And which plan too much, but produce
their plans too late.
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Overview: Quotes
Brigade HQ gives the impression that itcannot cope ... despite the large number ofstaff officers to hand.
From the experiences to date, any plans thatdo finally emanate from ... [brigade HQ] to ...
[this unit] will be half-baked, uncoordinatedand invariably running within an unrealistictimescale. (D + 6)
We are significantly ahead in our planningprocess in that the div was in bad order dueto .... and an overabundance of staff officers
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Missions, Orders and Intent
The Campaign Plan
Tactical Orders and Concepts ofOperations
Intent
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V (US)A
1 MEF
9~
Baghdad
Kuwait
C i Pl t T ti l
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DGD&D Shaping the Future Army to Fight and Win
Campaign Plan to Tactical
Mission
C i Pl t T ti l
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DGD&D Shaping the Future Army to Fight and Win
Campaign Plan to Tactical
Mission
Scope of 1 MEF
Mission to 1 (UK)
Armd Div
C i Pl t T ti l
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DGD&D Shaping the Future Army to Fight and Win
Campaign Plan to Tactical
Mission
Scope of 1 MEF
Mission to 1 (UK)
Armd Div
Hence Scope of 1
(UK) Armd Div
Mission to Bdes
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DGD&D Shaping the Future Army to Fight and Win
1 (UK) Armd Div Mission to 3 Cdo Bde
Phase III Stage A1 only
Ph III Stage A1 Seizure of AL FAW and UMM QASR Port. Attack:
i. Seize key oil infrastructure on the AL FAW peninsula in order to preventor mitigate its destruction and resulting environmental disaster.
ii. Clear and screen AL FAW Peninsula in order to enable CFMCC to clear
SLOC to UMM QASR. iii. BPT facilitate rearward passage of UNIKOM force to facilitate 1 MEF
offensive operations.
iv. Seize and secure the port of UMM QASR in order to enable humanitarianassistance operations.
v. Secure the KHAWR AZ ZUBAYR Naval base. vi. Secure key oil infrastructure on the AL FAW peninsula.
vii. Clear and screen the Al FAW Peninsula in order to enable CFMCC toclear SLOC to UMM QASR.
viii. BPT to execute TRAP within 6hrs of notification (Task allocated to 15MEU by 1 MEF).
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DGD&D Shaping the Future Army to Fight and Win
A typical battlegroup order:
Up to 12 tasks per subordinate (8 or 9on average)
No unifying purpose
Substantive tasks mixed with minordetail
Lack of clarity, and overall impression ofintent very difficult to ascertain.
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DGD&D Shaping the Future Army to Fight and Win
Length of
Orders
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DGD&D Shaping the Future Army to Fight and Win
Intent
Intent statement often simply repeated
the mission; Or excessively complex served to
reduce clarity of the order; Obvious need to clarify the concept of
intent and how it is taught.
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DGD&D Shaping the Future Army to Fight and Win
Miscellaneous
CIS
Concepts andDoctrine
After-Action
Reports
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DGD&D Shaping the Future Army to Fight and Win
Summary and Conclusions
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DGD&D
Questions?