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Les Boatright, KCEM, CEM, CBCP, MEP
September 11, 2013
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
The world has become dependent on electricity…..
Self
Actualization
Esteem
Belongingness & Love
Safety
Physiological
BasicNeeds
• People get upset when the power is off…..
• People need it to survive – medical customers, etc.
• Industrial and Commercial customers rely on it to produce goods and services we consume
The world has become dependent on electricity…..
• Kids all over the world go to sleep with a light on (and maybe a few adults)
• People get upset when the power is off…..
• People need it to survive – medical customers, etc.
• Industrial and Commercial customers rely on it to produce goods and services we consume
The world has become dependent on electricity…..
• Kids all over the world go to sleep with a light on (and maybe a few adults)
• It’s tougher to get a snack out of yourrefrigerator without the light coming on whenthe door is opened
• How Electricity is Generated
• How Electricity gets to You
• Advisory/Regulatory Groups
• System Automation
AGENDA
• Big 3 – GMD, EMP, GIC
• Historic Events
• So What?
• Risk Management/Phases of Emergency Management
• Conclusion
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How Electricity is Generated
How Electricity Gets to You
Step‐Up Transformer
Step‐Down Transformer
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US Grid Model Average Transmission Line Length (miles)
US Grid Model Average Transmission Line Length (miles)
1,339 lines
445 lines
35 lines
Supply and Demand
• Department of Energy (DOE)
• Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)
• Edison Electric Institute (EEI)
• Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Advisory/Regulatory Groups
• Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
• North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
NERC Regions
SPPKCP&LEmpireWestar
SERCAmeren
• Develop rules and regulations that utilities have to follow for compliance
• Engaged as a think-tank
• Operate as lobbyists for the industry
Advisory/Regulatory
• Develop operations standards and reliability measures
• Create best practices among the participants
• Investigate system automation opportunities
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Utilities use a variety of computer automation to control their systems:
• Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
• Outage Management System (OMS)
• Outage Restoration System (ORS)
How Automation Aides a Utility….
• Outage Restoration System (ORS)
• Energy Management System (EMS)
• Dynamic Voltage Control (DVC)
• Network Automation
• Automated Meter Intelligence (AMI), Automated Meter Reading (AMR) and SmartGrid
SmartGrid
Before we start with the main point of today’s presentation, it is important that the audience understand this important rule:
Before we start with the main point of today’s presentation, it is important that the audience understand this:
Faraday’s Law
Before we start with the main point of today’s presentation, it is important that the audience understand this:
Audience Participation Portion of the Presentation!
Faraday’s Law
1. Geo-Magnetic Disturbances (GMD)
2. Electro-Magnetic Pulses (EMP)
“Big 3” Charged Issues Facing Utilities (pun intended)
3. Ground Induced Currents (GIC)
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CYBER
Bigger Item than GMD, EMP or GIC…
SECURITY
You AreHere!
Geo‐Magnetic Disturbance (GMD)
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) – a pulse of Electro-Magnetic Interference
• Are used in MRIs to scan the body
• Are the sound you hear when a Blackberry phone is too close to a speaker
Electro‐Magnetic Pulse (EMP)
too close to a speaker
• Are made up of electrons and Gamma Rays
Gamma Rays
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Gamma Rays
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) – a pulse of Electro-Magnetic Interference
• Are used in MRIs to scan the body
• Are the sound you hear when a Blackberry phone is too close to a speaker
Electro‐Magnetic Pulse (EMP)
too close to a speaker
• Are made up of electrons and Gamma Rays
• And obviously very easy to produce….
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) is described by three types of pulses:
1. E1 – short in duration, high in magnitude (Lightning strikes)
Electro‐Magnetic Pulse (EMP)
2. E2 – medium duration, medium magnitude
3. E3 – short duration, low magnitude
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) is described by three types of pulses:
E1 – short in duration, high in magnitude (Lightning strikes)
Electro‐Magnetic Pulse (EMP)
- Can destroy or cause malfunctions in electronic devices
- Can couple with antennas, equipment in buildings, computers
- Effects can be reduced by surge protectors and electromagnetic shielding
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) is described by three types of pulses:
E2 – medium duration, medium magnitude
Electro‐Magnetic Pulse (EMP)
- Has no known effect on components in a Bulk Power System
- Couples with vertical antenna towers and aircrafts with trailing wire antennas
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) is described by three types of pulses:
E3 – short duration, low magnitude- Can cause Ground Induced Currents in BPS
Electro‐Magnetic Pulse (EMP)
- Can cause Ground Induced Currents in BPS transformers
- Couples with long communication and long power lines
- Voltage collapse of the power grid due to transformer issues
- Damage to High Voltage and Extremely High Voltage transformers due to overheating
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There are three sources of EMP:
High Altitude EMP (HEMP) – Contains E1, E2 and E3 pulses Caused by an aerial Atom Bomb
Electro‐Magnetic Pulse (EMP)
Intentional Electro-Magnetic Interference (IEMI) – Contains E1 pulses only
Think of a very strong, focused microwave oven
Geo-Magnetic Disturbance (GMD) – Contains E3 pulses only
Solar Flares, Coronal Mass Ejection (CME)
High Altitude EMP (HEMP)
Height of Burst
30 Miles
120 Miles
300 Miles
Areas of Concern
Intentional Electro‐Magnetic Interference (IEMI)
A large number of test and analysis studies dealing with portions of the U.S. power grid and their vulnerability to high-level EM fields and voltages:
1. High voltage substation controls and communications
2 P ti f iliti2. Power generation facilities
3. Power control centers
4. Distribution transformers
5. Distribution line insulators
Intentional Electro‐Magnetic Interference (IEMI)
A large number of test and analysis studies dealing with portions of the U.S. power grid and their vulnerability to high-level EM fields and voltages:
1. High voltage substation controls and communications
2 P ti f iliti2. Power generation facilities
3. Power control centers
4. Distribution transformers
5. Distribution line insulators
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HEMP/IEMI – An E1 pulse generated can:‒ Cause malfunctions to electronic devices (positive relays
or SCADA remote terminal units)
‒ Cause distribution system insulator flashover (HEMP Only)
EMP Effects on the Bulk Power System
GMD – An interaction between solar flares and the earth’s magnetic field
‒ Cause a moving magnetic field across the earth’s surface
‒ Cause a voltage potential between any two distant points
‒ The potential causes ground currents to flow in the earth’s surface that mirror the GMD
GIC – A Direct Current (DC) caused by nature‒ High magnitudes of GIC can cause transformers to overload
‒ Causes heat, harmonics and increased VAR consumption
• Heat breaks down the transformer windings
Ground Induced Currents (GIC)
• Harmonics
• Volt Amperage Reactive
Ground Induced Currents (GIC)
The factors that increase the levels of GIC are:‒ More northern latitude (higher iron ore content in soil)
‒ High soil resistivity between the two points
‒ Strength of the GMD
The factors that increase the potential for damage to a transformer are:
‒ Transformer design
‒ Transformer loading at the time of the event
‒ Amount of heat generated
‒ Transformer age
•Electric grids and electric apparatus are grounded for safety and performance
•That same connection to the ground is where GIC enters the transmission system and travels through the neutral connection
Ground Induced Currents (GIC)
•The neutral wire is the path of least resistance, as compared to soil
•The grounded neutral wire of wye connected power transformers
•The excess current is what damages the higher voltage transformers
•Saltwater is another great conductor of GIC
•March 13 -14, 1989 – Quebec• Experienced a Geo-Magnetic Storm that collapsed the entire
Quebec Grid in 90 seconds
• The collapse stopped at the Quebec Interconnection and thus did not impact the rest of North America
H li d d d th ld f
Historic Events
• However, power anomalies were recorded around the world for another 24 hours
• A total of 21,500 mW of load and generation were lost
• A total of 21,500 mW of load and generation were lost
Historic Events
The average home’s energy use is1kW per hour or 1kWh
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• A total of 21,500 mW of load and generation were lost
Historic Events
One mW would provide energy for1,000 homes for 1 hour
If 21,500 mW of load and generation were lost, the homes in the following cities would go dark at the same time:
Historic Events
• New York, NY
• Los Angeles, CA
• Chicago, IL
• Houston, TX
• Phoenix, AZ
• San Antonio, TX
• 1921• A Geo-Magnetic Storm occurred that was 10 times the size of
the Quebec event
• If this were to occur today, it is estimated that 350 high voltage power transformers would be lost and the recovery period would take 4-10 years
Historic Events
would take 4-10 years
Power Transformers are highly specialized and built to specific electric grid specifications
• There are no industry standards – each system is unique
• Transformers are built overseas
So What – Just replace the bad order transformers and move on…..
• A lead time of 10 months plus currently exists
• Transformers travel by rail – no power, no rail
Power Transformers are highly specialized and built to specific electric grid specifications
• Utilities do not have the resources to have multiple spare transformers
So What – Just replace the bad order transformers and move on…..
• A typical power transformer costs $600,000 up to $3M plus – depending on its size
• Transformers cannot be “field fixed” – they must be sent back to manufacturer
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• A complete failure of the country’s electric grid:• Is estimated to take 4-10 years to restore
• Would cost $1 to $2 trillion to restore
• Multiple industries would be affected at the same time
Impact to Country Risk ManagementSpace Weather Forecasting
• Scientific space-based satellite assets andfacilities to assess the potential impact to earth
• Interface across organizations• Timing and expected impact duration• Historical data Alert Notification and Response
• K-Indices and other severitymeasurement scales
• Process to alert the industry• Role of organization• Timeframe for decision making
Training and Education• Awareness programs• Certification programs• Exercises• Outreach programs
• Timeframe for decision making
Modeling and Simulation• Existing or postulated data• GIC Impact• Equipment and System Vulnerabilities
Equipment Design• Design standards• EHV Transformers• Test and evaluation• Acquisition strategies• Protective components
System Operations• Pre, During and Post-event
operational protocols• Regulatory requirements• Emergency management procedures• Communications
Mitigation
Four Phases of Emergency Management
Preparedness
Response
Recovery
Equipment and System Design
• Assess vulnerability of equipment and protection systems
• Assess vulnerability of protection equipment
Mitigation
• Increase detection capability and share measurement data
• Design transformers to handle DC flow
• Utilize GIC measuring devices on system
Modeling and Simulation
• Develop GIC simulation
• Enhance wide-area monitoring of GIC
• Perform system risk assessment
Mitigation
Alert Notification and Response
• Improve GMD severity measurement scales
• Improve notification process
• Develop clear and precise operational protocols
Training and Education
• Enhance operator training
• Conduct industry awareness training
• Raise awareness among regulators and
Preparedness
government agencies
• Perform regular drills and exercises
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Preparedness (continued)
Example of a GMD Action Plan If notice of event is given from NOAA to NERC/ISO:
Long lead time (1-3 days)• Increase situational awareness• Safe system posturing
– Return outaged equipment to service– Delay planned outages
D f t (h i d )
Response
Day of event (hours in advance)
• Increase situational awareness– Monitor for unusual voltage and/or MVAR swings– Monitor for abnormal temperature rise/noise/dissolved gas in
transformers
• Safe system posturing• Selective load shedding• Manually start fans/pumps on key transformers• Start off-line generation
Day of event (hours in advance)
• System reconfiguration– Remove transformer(s) from service if overheating occurs
– Remove transmission lines from service
Response (continued)
• NOAA SWPC monitoring GMD based on realtime data from the
Boulder‐NOAA magnetometer
• NOAA notifies NERC Reliability Coordinators (RC) of predicted
GMD
GMD Notification (Space Weather Forecasting)
– Info available to the Midwest ISO (MISO), Eastern, Western, and ERCOT
Interconnections via a SPWC forecasting service.
• NERC RC issues notification to the TO when GMD is predicted to
have intensity of ≥ K‐7 (200 – 330nT/min)
• Reliable warning up to an hour in advance of a storm
• Return to normal operations 2-4 hours after last observe geomagnetic activity
• Assess damage to system
• Work with SPP on restoration procedures, grid impact etc
Recovery
impact, etc.
• Not a typical restoration event
• Low likelihood of a GMD
• High impact if an EMP/GMD incident occurred
• Critical infrastructure is old
Conclusion
• New equipment being designed and built to mitigate effects
• New monitoring equipment is available
• What isn’t available is manpower, time and financial resources to offset probability
• Other issues (Cybersecurity) are priority