XVI. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Policy Statement. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its increments [Sec. 1, Art. XIII]. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance [Sec 2, Art. XIII].

1. While the pursuit of social justice can have revolutionary effect, it cannot justify breaking the law. While the State is mandated to promote social justice and to maintain adequate social services in the field of housing, this cannot be interpreted to mean that “squatting” has been legalized. The State’s solicitude for the destitute and the have-nots does not mean it should tolerate usurpation of property, public or private [Astudillo v. Board of Directors PHHC 73 SCRA 15], ’

B. Labor. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between the workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth [Sec. 3, Art. XIII], ’ 1

1. In SSS Employees v. Court of Appeals, 175 SCRA 686, it was held that employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages to pressure the Government to accede to their demands. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124678, July 23, 1997, it was held that the ability to strike is not essential to the right to association! and that the right of the sovereign to prohibit strikers or work stoppages was clearly recognized at common law. In JMM Promotion and Management v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 319, the Supreme Court said that obviously, protection to labor does not mean promotion of employment alone.

C. Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform. Read Secs. 4-8, Art. XIII.

1. In Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, supra., the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law was upheld. In Maddumba v. GSIS, 182 SCRA 281, it was held that the GSIS may be compelled to accept Land Bank bonds at their face value in payment for a residential house and lot purchased by the bondholder from the GSIS; the value of these bonds cannot be diminished by any direct or indirect act, particularly since these bonds are fully guaranteed by the Government of the Philippines.

D. Urban Land and Housing Reform. “The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such programs the State shall respect the rights of small property owners” [Sec. 9, Art. XU], “Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with them and the

communities where they are to be located” [Sec. 10, Art. XIII]. Read also R.A. 7279 [Urban Development and Housing Act],

1. The constitutional requirement that the eviction of squatters and the demolition of their shanties shall be done in accordance with law does not mean that the validity or legality of the demolition or eviction hinges on the existence of a resettlement area designated or earmarked by the Government [People v. Leachon, G.R. No. 108725, September 25, 1998]. 2

2. In Filstream International, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 716, where the Supreme Court took judicial notice of the fact that urban land reform has become a paramount task of Government in view of the acute shortage of decent housing in urban areas, particularly in Metro Manila. Nevertheless, local government units are not given an unbridled authority when exercising this power in pursuit of solutions to these problems. The basic rules still have to be followed, i.e., Sec. 1 and Sec. 9, Art. Ill of the Constitution. Thus, even Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code imposes certain restrictions on the exercise of the power of eminent domain. R.A. 7279 provides the order in which lands may be acquired for socialized housing, and very explicit in Secs. 9 and 10 thereof is the fact that privately owned lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing.

3. In City of Mandaluyong v. Francisco, G.R. No. 137152, January 29, 2001, the Supreme Court reiterated that under RA 7279, lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered, abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declare Areas for Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement sites which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired, and (6) privately-owned lands. The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and (b) parcels owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition. a) Small property owners are [1] owners of residential lands with an area not more than 300 square meters in urbanized cities and not more than 800 square meters in other urban areas; and [2] they do not own residential property other than the same. In this case, the respondents fall within the classification of small property owners. 4

4. In Solanda Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123479, April 14, 1999, it was held that the urban tenant’s right of first refusal (pre-emptive right) under P.D. 1517, can be exercised only where the disputed land is situated in an area declared to be an area for priority development (APD) and an urban land reform zone (ULRZ).

E. Health. Read Secs. 11-13, Art, XIII.

F. Women. Read Sec. 14, Art. XIII. See Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Co. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997 (discussed in Sec. 14, Art. II).

G. People’s Organizations. Read Secs. 15-16, Art. XIII.

H. Human Rights.

1. The Commission on Human Rights. Composed of a Chairman and four members who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of the Commission shall be provided by law.

a) The power to appoint the Chairman and members of the Commission is vested in the President of the Philippines, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments /Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga, supra.].

b) The Commission on Human Rights does not enjoy fiscal autonomy. It does not belong to the species of constitutional commissions under Art. IX of the Constitution [Commission on Human Rights Employees Association v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004],

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2. Powers and Functions of the Commission. Read Sec. 18, Art. XIII.

a) In Carino v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991, on the question of whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over certain specific types of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights, the Supreme Court said that it does not; that “it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter”. It is conceded, however, that the Commission may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. “But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official; the function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking”. Having merely the power to investigate, the Commission cannot and should not “try and resolve on the merits” the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case 90775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed.

b) The Commission on Human Rights, not being a court of justice, cannot issue writs of injunction or a restraining order against supposed violators of human rights [EPZA v. Commission on Human Rights, 208 SCRA 125].

c) In Simon v. Commission on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117, the Supreme Court ruled that evicting squatters is not a violation of human rights. Also reiterated was the rule that the.CHR has no jurisdiction to issue the “order to desist” (a semantic interplay of a restraining order) inasmuch as such order is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicatory power it does not possess.

XVII. EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS Constitutional Law

A. State Policy: The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development [Sec. 17, Art. II].

1. Sec. 1, Art. XIV: The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.

a) In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 154 SCRA 730, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a requirement for admission to medical school. The NMAT does not violate the right of the citizens to quality education at all levels; in fact, it ensures quality education for future doctors, and protects public health by making sure of the competence of future medical practitioners. In DECS v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 534, the regulation that a person who has thrice failed the NMAT is not entitled to take it again was likewise upheld.

b) It is true that the Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation assumes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance. In this case, the

Professional Regulation Commission (Board of Medicine) observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings in the licensure examination were true only for Fatima College examinees. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative will [Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004],

c) In Philippine Merchant Marine School v. Court of Appeals, supra., the Court said that the requirement that a school must first obtain government authorization before operating is based on the State policy that educational programs and/or operations shall be of good quality and, therefore, shall at least satisfy minimum standards with respect to curricula, teaching staff, physical plant and facilities and administrative and management viability.

2. Constitutional mandate for the State to establish adequate and relevant education, free public elementary and high school education, scholarship grants and loan programs, out-of-school study programs, and adult education. Read Sec. 2, Art. XIV.

3. Constitutional objectives of education: Inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency [Sec. 3 (2), Art. XIV].

4. Optional religious instruction. Option expressed in writing by parent or guardian; public elementary and high schools; within regular class hours; by instructors designated or approved by religious authorities; without additional cost to the Government [Sec. 3(3), Art. XIV].

5. Educational Institutions.

a) Ownership. Solely by Filipino citizens or corporations 60% Filipinoowned, except those established by religious groups or mission boards, but Congress may increase required Filipino equity participation [Sec. 4(2), Art. XIV],

b) Control and administration. Vested in citizens of the Philippines

c) Alien schools. No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens, and no group of aliens shall comprise more than 1/3 of the enrolment in any school, except schools for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents, and for other foreign temporary residents [id.].

d) Tax exemptions. All revenue and assets of non-stock, nonprofit educational institution --- as well as all grants, endowments, donations and contributions — used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes, shall be exempt from taxes and duties [Sec. 4(3), Art. XIV].

6. Highest budgetary priority to education [Sec. 5, Art. XIV]. This provision has been construed to be merely directory; it does not follow that the hands of Congress be so hamstrung as to deprive it of the power to respond to the imperatives of national interest and the attainment of other state policies and objectives [Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221; Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, supra.].

B. Academic Freedom. Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning [Sec. 5(2), Art. XIV]. Colleges,

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publicly- or privately-owned, if they offer collegiate courses, enjoy academic freedom.

1. Two Views:

a) From the standpoint of the educational institution: The freedom of the university to determine “who may teach; what may be taught, how it shall be taught; and who may be admitted to study” [Sweezy v. State of New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234].

i) Thus, in Miriam College Foundation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127930, November 15, 2000, it was held that if the school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have the right to “freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula, and to continue their course therein up to graduation”, such right is subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.

b) From the standpoint of the members of the academe: The freedom of the teacher or research worker in higher institutions of learning to investigate and discuss the problems of his science and to express his conclusions, whether through publication or in the instruction of students, without interference from political or ecclesiastical authority, or from the administrative officials of the institution in which he is employed, unless his methods are found by qualified bodies of his own profession to be completely incompetent or contrary to professional ethics [Frank Lovejoy, Encyclopedia of Social Science, p. 384]. , i)

i) In Camacho v. Coresis, G.R. No. 134372, August 22, 2002, the Supreme Court upheld the action of the Ombudsman investigator in dismissing the administrative complaint against the professor on the ground of academic freedom. Dr. Daleon’s teaching style, which was validated by the action of the University Board of Regents, is bolstered by the constitutional guarantee on academic freedom. As applied in this case, academic freedom clothes Dr. Daleon with the widest latitude to innovate and experiment on the method of teaching which is most fitting to his students (graduate students, at that), subject only to the rules and policies of the University.

2. Limitations: [Kay v. Board of Higher Education of New York, 173 Miss 943]:

a) The dominant police power of the State; and

b) The social interests of the community.

3. Cases:

a) In Board of Medical Education v. Judge Alfonso, 176 SCRA 304, the Supreme Court sustained the decision of the Board of Medical Education in closing the Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine for being “inadequate”.

b) In Capitol Medical Center v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 493, the closure of the nursing school was upheld, after due notice to the DECS, when its teachers and students declared a strike, refusing to hold classes and take examinations. The school may not be forced to reopen at the instance of the striking students. In University of the Philippines v. Judge Ayson, 176 SCRA 571, the Court also sustained the closure of the U.P. Baguio High School, on the ground that U.P. was set up as a tertiary institution and that the High School was set up only as an incident to its tertiary functions.

c) In Non v. Dames, 185 SCRA 523, the Supreme Court reversed its ruling in Alcuaz v. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7, declaring that the “termination of contract” theory in Alcuaz can no longer be used as a valid ground to deny readmission or reenrolment to students who had led or participated in student mass actions against the school. The Court held that the students do not shed their constitutionally protected rights of free expression at the school gates. Cited with approval were the rulings in Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359, along with Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines, 135 SCRA 706;

Arreza v. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, 137 SCRA 94; and Guzman v. National University, 142 SCRA 699. Accordingly, the only valid grounds to deny readmission of students are academic deficiency and breach of the school’s reasonable rules of conduct. Be that as it may, in imposing disciplinary sanctions on students, it was held in Guzman (reiterated in Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, supra.) that the following minimum standards of procedural due process must be satisfied: (i) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of the accusation against them; (ii) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (iii) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (iv) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (v) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Held inapplicable to this case are the rulings in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 68 SCRA 277 [where the issue was whether a female lay student had the right to compel a seminary for the priesthood to admit her for theological studies leading to a degree], and Tangonan v. Pano, 135 SCRA 245 [where the issue was whether a nursing student, who was admitted on probation and who failed in her nursing subjects, may compel her school to readmit her for enrolment],

d) In Tan v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 212, which involved a bitter conflict between the administrators of Grace Christian High School and the parents of some students on matters of school policy, the Supreme Court said that the “maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperilled if, under the circumstances of the case, Grace Christian High School is forced to admit petitioners’ children and to reintegrate them into the student body.

e) In University of San Carlos v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 570, the Court held that it is within the sound discretion of the university to determine whether a student may be conferred graduation honors, considering that the student had incurred a failing grade in an earlier course she took in school.

f) In Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848, Resolution No. 105 of the Professional Regulation Commission prohibiting examinees for the accountancy licensure examinations from attending “any review class, briefing, conference or the like” or to “receive any hand-out, review material or any tip” from any school, etc., was held to have violated the academic freedom of the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming full-fledged public accountants.

g) In Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 402, the Supreme Court ruled that under the U.P. Charter, the power to fix admission requirements is vested in the University Council of the autonomous campus, which is composed of the President of the University'of the Philippines and of all instructors holding the rank of professor, associate professor or assistant professor. Consequently, the University Council alone has the right to protest against any unauthorized exercise of its power. Petitioners cannot impugn the directives of the Board of Regents on the ground of academic freedom inasmuch as their rights as university teachers remain unaffected.

h) In Cagayan Capitol College v. NLRC, 189 SCRA 658, it was held that while DECS regulations prescribe a maximum of three years probation period for teachers, the termination of the three-year period does not result in the automatic permanent status for the teacher. It must be conditioned on a showing that the teacher’s services during the probationary period was satisfactory in accordance with the employer's standards. The prerogative of the school to provide standards for its teachers and to determine whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance with academic freedom and constitutional autonomy which give educational institutions the right to choose who should teach.

i) In Isabelo v. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 591, it was held that academic freedom was never meant to be unbridled license; it is a privilege which assumes the correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. Thus, where the student’s expulsion was disproportionate to his having unit deficiencies in his CMT course, there is reason to believe the petitioner’s claim that the school’s

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action was strongly influenced by the student’s participation in questioning PHCR’s application for tuition fee increase.

j) In U.P. Board of Regents v. William, G.R. No. 134625, August 31, 1999, it was held that where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, the university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction conferred. This right of the university does not terminate upon the “graduation” of the student, because it is precisely the “graduation” of such student which is in question. Wide, indeed, is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom “is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion”.

k) In University of the Philippines and Alfredo de Torres v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 132860, April 3, 2001, the Supreme Court sustained the primacy of academic freedom over Civil Service rules on AWOL, stressing that when the UP opted to retain private petitioner and even promoted him despite his absence, the University was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in light of provisions of the Civil Service Law, the respondent Commission had no authority to dictate to UP or any institution of higher learning the outright dismissal of its personnel.

C. Language.

1. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino.

2. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English.

3. The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and shall serve as ancillary media of instruction therein.

4. Spanish and Arabic shall be promoted on a voluntary and optional basis.

5. The Constitution shall be promulgated in Filipino and English and shall be translated into major regional languages, Arabic and Spanish.

D. Science and Technology. Read Secs. 10-13, Art. XIV.

E. Arts and Culture. Read Secs. 14-18, Art. XIV.

F. Sports. Read Sec. 19, Art. XIV.

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