x · ... (,Jury present) 19 THE COURT: Good morning members of the jury. 20 JURORS: Good morning, your Honor. ... He was a f ine man in that regard,

bsl McChristian - direct

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OJ:' NEW "YORK

3 ____________________________________ x

4 GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND,

5 Plaintiff,

6 v. 82 eiv. 7913 PNL

7 COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.,

8 GEORGE CRlLE, MICHAEL WALLACE and

9 SAMUEL A. ADAMS,

10 Defendants.

11 ------------------------------------x 12 February 6, 1985

13 10:00 a.m.

14 -------------

15

16 (Open court)

17 THE COURT: Cal1 the j u:!rY, plea.s"e.

18 (,Jury present)

19 THE COURT: Good morning members of the jury.

20 JURORS: Good morning, your Honor.

21 THE COURT: Let me make mention of my admiration

22 ano grati tude to all of you for getting heit;a promptly this

23 morning.! know the conditions made it difficult for a lot

24 of you, but it's very much appreciated.

25 I have a cou~le of notes from the jury. First,

SOUTHER.< OISl"RICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y .. - '91~1020

bsl McChristian - direct 8983

1 I was advised by the clerk that one of the jurors is not

2 feeling well and may want to ask for a recess from time to

3 time. Please do not be bashful about just raising your

4 hand or calling out, if necessary, and we will call a brea k

5 so that you can take a recess.

6 I have a note from the jury asking whether the

7 ju ry can be permitted to eat in the cafeteria because of

8 the bad weat he r, and there is a courthouse rule, as I guess

9 you have been told, that puts the cafeteria off limits to

10 the jurors, and the reason for that is so that the jurors

11 will not find themsel ves too close by to people who are

12 participants or interested persons in the case. It's part

13 of the business that I have explained to you in the past

14 about keeping t h e jurors quite separate, quite isolated

15 from all other persons connected with the case.

16 I am afraid under today's conditions I am going

17 to deny your request to use the cafeteria. The fact is

18 that the cafeteria is absolutely crawling with people who

19 are either participants in the case, as l awyers, witnesses,

20 parties, or are spectators, regular spectators, re porters,

21 press people covering the case on a daily basis, and it

22 would be virtually impossible, given the size of those

23 facilities, for the jurors to be isolated, and you might be

24 in a position in whi ch your conversations would be heard by

25 other persons or you would hear other peoples'

SOUTHER N DISTRICT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE

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1 conversations.

2 And s o, under today' s wea ther cond i tions, I

3 don't think the emergency situation is bad enoug h to

4 warrant relaxing that rule. It really isn't all that bad

5 out there . I am told they think the snow has about stopped

6 and it's not terribly cold .

7 If jurors do not want to go out, I think that

8 it's perfectly -- I think that it's easily possible to send

9 out for food. I th ink that there are a number of

10 cafeterias in the area that will send meals over by

11 messenger and maybe you can talk to the clerk about that at

12 the next recess .

13 If any of you want to stay in the jury room, I

14 am quite sure that the clerk knows the telephone numbe rs of

15 cafeteri,,~· 'd t can be called to deliver in at lunchtime.

16 I have another note _ ........ -"-- juror who

17 reasons is asking a lot of rather detailed

18 about when the trial will end, and I cannot

19 those questions now . I will take up your note with

20 c nsel and try to give you as firm answers as we can.

21 T will not be v ery precise answers, but maybe they can

22 you a little help. If you don't hear back from me on

23 please remind me to make sure it doesn't sli p

24 my

25 All right. You will be calling a witness, M~.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE

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1 Boies?

2 MR. BOIES: Yes, your Honor, the defendants

3 call as their next witness, General Joseph McChristian.

4 THE COURT: Members of the jury, if you recall

5 yesterday afternoon we interrupted the reading of the

6 deposition of Colonel Cooley and just for convenience,

7 rather than continue the reading of the deposition now, we

8 are going to proceed with the next live witnesses, General

9 McChristian, and the remainder of the deposition of Colonel

10 Cooley will be taken up at a later time.

11 JOSEPH ALEXA~DER McCHRISTIAN,

12 called as a witness by the defendants, having been

13 duly sworn, testified as follows:

14 THE COURT: General McChristian, that microphone

15 is on a swinging boom, so you don't need to lean forward to

16 go to it. You can sit back comfortably, if you keep the

17 microphone out a certain distance in front of you. Speak

18 out in a loud voice so you can be heard throughout the room.

19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, your Honor.

20 DIRECT EXAMIN ATION

21 BY MR. BOIES:

22 Q. General McChristian, how old are you?

23 A. Sir, I am a little over 70 years ole.

24 Q. How many years did you spend in the United

25 Sta tes Army ?

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1 A. Thirty eight.

2 Q. When did you enter the United States Army?

3 A. I enlisted as a private in 1933.

4 Q. Did there come a time when you entered the West

5 Point Military Academy?

6 A. Yes. I WdS enlisted for slightly over two years

7 and then I entered the United States Military Academy on an

8 appointment from Senator Trammell of Florida.

9 Q. ~hen did you graduate from West Point?

10 A. I graduated in June of 1939.

11 Q. Khen did you retire from the Army?

12 A. I retired in 1971.

13 Q. Of the thirty eight years you spent in the

14 United States Army how many of those years were spent in

15 military intelligence?

16 A. Approximately fourteen.

17 Q. Could you trace briefly your experience in the

18 Army from the time you graduated from West Point until you

19 were assigned to the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam.

20 A. Yes. I graduated in 1939. I selected infantry

21 branch out of choice and was fortunate to be assigned to

22 the 29th Infantry at Fort Benning, Georgia. I was there a

23 short while when an order came down to remove me and some

24 of my classmates, from the 29th and assign us to the 67th

25 Infantry Me dium Tanks, because at that time General Patton

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUS E

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1 was organizing the Second Armored Division, of which I

2 became a member of the original cadre.

3 I was a platoon leader of tanks. I commanded

4 the first platoon of medium t anks ever manufactured in this

5 country and s ent out to the Army.

6 I ran the recruit school for General Patton and

7 he personally gave me the instructions of what he wanted

8 done. He was a f ine man in that regard, and in every

9 regard that I knew him .

10 I then went from the 67th to become an

11 instructor in his we apons sc hool for officers. From there

12 I went to Pinecamp, New York in the cadre of the 4th

13 Armored Division, commanded a company, was aide-de-camp to

14 the division commander; was the commander of a provisional

15 battalion for a very short period of time; attended the

16 Command and General Staff School short course in Fort

17 Leavenworth and was ordered back there shortly after I had

18 graduated to be on the faculty .

19 I instructed in armor offensive -- all types of

20 armored operations at the time I was on the faculty at

21 Le avenwo rth and then I left there and went to the lOth

22 Armored Division at Camp Gordon, Georgia, where I was the

23 commanding officer of the 6l.st Armored Infantry Battalion

24 t ilat I trained there for some nine months and took it

25 overseas, and my division was a follcwup division that was

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COU RTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ 791 · 1020

bs1 McChristian - direct 8988

1 landed in Cherbourg Peni"nsula.

2 Shortly after being committed into operations, I

3 was taken out of my battalion and made the chief operations

4 officer of the division, referred to as the G- 3. I had

5 that job for a few months and during the attack on Trier,

6 which I had planned, our division headquarters was under

7 severe attack , had quite a few casualties, one of them

8 being our Chief of Staff, and I was then appointed Chief of

9 Staff of the lOth Armored division, a job which I r etai ned

10 until the end of combat in Korld War II, and shortly after

11 combat was over, General Patton took me out of my di v ision

12 and made me chief of intelligence of Third Army under him.

13 That was my first intelligence assignnent, other

14 than a very very minor one such as the intelligence officer

15 of one of the battalions in training back in Fort Benning,

16 Georgia.

17 I was his chief of intelligence until General

18 Patton was relieved of his command and then I moved with

19 the Third Army headquarters to Heidelberg where Lieutenant

20 General Keyes was the commander. I was his deputy there,

21 and he went on to Vienna to be tile high commissioner in

22 Austria and he took me witt him as the deputy director of

23 intelligence for the Unitej States Forces Austria.

24 I was in that job for a little over a year and

25 then I was transferred back to Kashington and I was

SOUTHER N DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK, N.Y. - 791.1020


1 assigned to the intelligence division, but I was only there

2 about two or three days when my assignment was cha nged and

3 I was made a commanding officer of the second battalion of

4 the Third Infantry, the old guard, as we called it, the

5 oldest regiment in the Army history, and they are our

6 national honor guard regiment in Washington, and I had a

7 lot to do with the organization of that regiment and I

8 commanded all of the honor guards wh en the President would

9 go out and meet incoming dignitaries and so forth.

10 From that assignment I was signed to Athens ,

11 Greece on the first joint United States Military Assistance

12 and Advisory Group during the Greek-Communist war.

13 Perhaps I s houl d state here for just a momemt

14 that in these various assignments that I had, for example,

15 in combat in Europe, I had a great deal of experience that

16 helped me later on in Vietnam. Example: Eisenhov.'er's

17 headquarters had issued what was called an automatic

18 arrestee list. This listed the various jobs in the Nazi

19 party, that if a person occupied one of those jobs he was

20 an automatic arrestee .

21 This was very similar to the Vietcong

22 infrastructure in the war in Vietnam where we f elt you had

23 to eliminate the leadership of the political party in order

24

25

to control that type of a war. I give this as an example.

hhen I went to Greece -- the Greek-Communist war

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COU RTH OUSE

FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N .Y. _ 791. 1020


1 has been referred to many times, and I feel in my own

2 judgment it is a pattern that was initiated by the

3 Communists as a wa r of national liberation, and the methods

4 they us ed to harass or to gain control of the local

5 population, to gain their support, and so forth, were the

6 beginnings of that type of war, which, of course, was

7 highly refind thereafter in -- by Ho Chi Minh and others.

8 From Greece -- I was there for a year in this

9 advisory group during that war, and from there I was

10 ordered back -- in fact, I was kept on an additional year

11 because the Greek government requested our government to

12 extend me to a fourth year.

13 I then was offered the command of any armored

14 regiment in the Army of my choice. They said I had done a

15 fine job and I could have it. And I said no, that's a

16 plumb, that would be great for my career, but I volunteered

17 to be assigned to command a regiment in the Armor Training

18 Center at Fort Knox , Kentucky , because it was my feeling

19 that at that time in the United States Army we were

20 bringing young men into the Ar~y for six months and

21 training them and then back to civilian live, so we had a

22 large number of people coming through, and this was the

23 ?lace within our army where we were indoctrinating the

24 fundamentals of soldiering to t he maximum number of our own

25 citizens.

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE

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1 I felt I could make a better contribution in

2 doing something like that. I felt that was something that

3 I would really be happy doing . So I volunteered for that

4 job and I received command of an armor training regiment,

5 but I only had it about a month until the major general and

6 brigadier general, who were demanding that training center,

7 were transferred out to other jobs, and being th e senior

8 colonel, I took over command of the center that had eleven

9 regiments in it and they let me keep that for a year.

10 I lucked into that . I was very fortunate to have such a

11 fine assignment .

12 I was then ordered from there to the Pentagon

13 into the office of the chief of intelligence . In that

14 assignment I was the colonel in charge of what was called

15 the We s tern Division . The Western Division was res?onsible

16 for production of intelligence as required on about 50

17 nations in the western world .

18 That gave me the opportunity, not only to be

19 kept abreast of the intelligence daily that was coming in,

20 but the intelligence t hat was being developed into studies

21 and estimates on that part of the world, and also, not to

22 the same extent , but world - wide; it put me in a job where I

23 had that op?ortunity .

24 At t hat time was the missle crisis in Cuba, and

25 I was selected to set up for the Department of Army a

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FOLEY SQUARE . NEW YORK. N.Y. _ ;91.1020


1 special task force to c~llect intelligence on and to be

2 able to report on the situation in Cuba, and it was then

3 that I kept insisting to my intelligence staff that we were

4 getting only little scraps of information , little bit here,

5 a little bit there. And I said every little scrap of

6 information to an intelligence officer is like nickels and

7 dimes to a banker. It takes a lot of it to make a profit,

8 to bring up something big, but you must account for every

9 piece.

10 You've got a tiger by the tail with that piece

11 of information. You must hold on to it until you confirm

12 it or you refute it.

13 Well, we just happened to get enough information

14 that I felt that the overflights that were being made over

15 Cuba to see if they could locate any missles in Cuba, that

16 I kept insisting , here's a part of Cuba that should be

17 photographed, but the planes never went there, and finally

18 I went to my chief and I sai d , "Sir, this is really beng

19 ignored. We s hould fly it here. We don't have proof of it,

20 but there's a good indication it may be something."

21 lie got the mission flown, and that was the

22 flight that discovered the missles in Cuba.

23 Shortly after that assignment -- or while I had

24 that assignment in Washington, I was selected for promotion

25 to brigadier general. I was assigned as the chief of

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORT ERS. U.S. coua THO USE

FOLEY SQUAR E. N EW YORK , N.Y. - 19 1.1020


1 intelligence for the United States Ar~y Pacific, located

2 with headquarters in Hawaii. I had that job in Hawaii for

3 two years.

4 During that time I was responsible for

5 intelligence of the United States Army in an area that

6 bordered on the borders of India and everything in between

7 there and North Korea.

8 So I had the mission, the requirement and the

9 great opportunity to travel throughout the entire Pacific,

10 to work in intelligence operations with all of our friends

11 from one aspect to another, some very close cookdination

12 and cooperation, some not quite so good. But I had an

13 opportunity to really get to know that part of the world

14 and the way people thought and the way they did as far as

15 intelligence throughout that part of Asia.

16 ~hile I was in Hawaii -- there a few things that

17 I think would be pertinent to my experiences there. One of

18 the first things that I did was say to my commander, "If I

19 may, I would like to see the war plans of the United States

20 Army Pacific. I would like to review them to determine, is

21 the intelligence force structure, the troops and all the

22 resour,:es, is that adequate to support that war plan if we

23 had to implement it?"

24 I had to learn a lot about intelligence force

25 structure. I had never gone to an intelligence training

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1 school per se, but I've certainly taken advantage of every

2 opportunity to learn it and to educate myself and to visit

3 every type of intelligence organization that we had,

4 wherever it may be in the world, and I visited them around

5 the world, sat down with the sergeants and everybody at

6 their positions and said, "Tell me how you do your job." I

7 said, "I will come back tbrough here and I will tell you

8 what impact it's having."

9 I really believe that on that job I had the

10 chance to educate myself, but I to ok the war plans and as a

11 result of developing the force structure that should

12 support them , two things I think were important to me for

13 future operations : One, I thoroughly learned all about

14 intelligence force structur e . Secondly, I was able to go

15 to the Department of Army, through my headquarters, and

16 request that an intelligence battalion composed of various

17 capabilities, organized the way I thought it should be, in

18 order to support our war plans, be activated, organized and

19 actually stationed in Hawaii, where the people could be put

20 on assignments in the various countries throughout Asia to

21 get to know the language, get to know the culture, get to

22 know what was t he re during the period of time of traini ng

23 and t hen come back to Ila waii and rotate back to some other

24 country so we would have a nucleus of people who were

25 indoctrinated on the area, who were all prepared if need be

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S, U.S. COU RTHOUS E

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1 to support our plans.

2 This battalion that I requested, we all thought

3 that the chances were very slight, but, 10 and behold, the

4 Army approved it. The organization was formed and it was

5 sent to Hawaii before I was ordered out on my next

6 assignment.

7 Also, while I was in this job, I reviewed my

8 missions. One of the missions that I had a directive on

9 was to produce intelligence on North Vietnamese Armed

10 Forces.

11 So I went to work right away. I 'Nent out to

12 Vietnam. I visited Vietnam . I traveled throughout the

13 country. I was very interested in what was going on in

14 interrogations and in captured documents and their

15 translation.

16 I am a firm believer that the greatest source of

17 intelligence in the world i s an indi vidual who's

18 knowledgeable on what you want to know, and you have access

19 to that indi v idual and you can get the information from

20 them if they are willing to give .

21 The second best is what he puts down out of his

22 brain on to a piece of paper and you get, so I was very

23 interested in those things. And the y are always available

24 on the battlefield if there is somebody to fight.

25 So I traveled allover the country with those

SOU THER N DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE

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bsl MCChristian - direct 8996

I things very much in .... . , .. nd when I would visi t Vietnam. .. -2 So I came back to Hawaii. I put in a

3 requirement for interrogation to be done, for documents, so

4 that the information would be sent to me from Vietnam,

5 where I could put it together, send it to the Defense

6 Intelligence Agency in Washington, because I was

7 responsible for doing that. But I learned -- the Commander

8 in Chief Pacific, Chief of Intelligence, called me o v er a nd

9 said, "We have this requiremen t that you have sent throug h .

10 Nothing doing. The command out in Vietn a m is not in combat.

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

They are . " 1 n ......

(Continued on next page.)

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McChristian - direct 8997

1 THE COURT: Let me just interrupt you.

2 THE WIT NESS: Yes, sir.

3 THE COURT: I think you're going a little beyond

4 the question.

5 Q. General McChristian, let me just follow up. ~

6 I correct that your next assignment after your position as

7 chief of intelligence for United States Army Pacific was to

8 go to Vietnam?

9 A. Yes, sir. After that assignment, I was two

10 years in the G-2 U.S. Army Pacific, and t hen I was

11 transferred to Vietnam to be t h e J-2 MACV .

12 Q. When did you become J-2 MACV in Vietnam?

13 .r; • On th e 13th of July 1965.

14 Q. I want to skip over that period and come back t o

15 i t in some detail, but first I would like to compl e te your

16 ex per i ence in the Army. When did yo u leave your p osition

17 as J-2 of M~CV?

18 A. On the 1st of June 1967.

19 Q. ..'hat position d id you assume follo",ing June of

20 1967?

21 A. I was the commanding general of t he Second

22 Armored Division in Fort Hood , Texas.

23 Q.

24 Division?

25 A.

A~d how long did you comm and t he Second Ar mo red

I had that j09 and concurre nt with it I als o was

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FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ ~91·I020


1 in command of the III Corps, which included the First and

2 the Second Armored Divisions, for a period of slightl y over

3 one year.

4 Q. How many men were included in the III Corps?

5 A. Including the two armored divisions, the corps

6 troop s, the other installations on the post, it was pretty

7 close to 50,000.

8 Q. What did you do after commanding the III Corps?

9 A. I was transferred to Washington to be the chief

10 of intelligence, United States Army, in the Pentagon.

11 Q. And did you hold that position until yo u retired

12 in 1971?

13 A. Yes, sir.

14 Q. Is the chief of intelligence of the United

15 States Army sometimes referred to as ACSI?

16 A. Yes , sir , ACSI, t he assistant chief of staff

17 intelligence.

18 o. And is that the chief intelligence officer for

19 the United States Army?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 o. And could you briefly describe what the duties

22 are of t he ACSI or chief intelligence o ff icer of the Army ?

23 A. The job of the chief intellige nce officer of th e

24 Arm y is primarily to see t ha t the intelligence force

25 str ucture of the Army is developed and trained and is ready

SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPOR TERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE

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1 to support the Army and also to prepare the various

2 estimates and studies that support the Army planners.

3 The intelligence that goes into those studies is

4 pre~ared by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The chief of

5 Army intelligence is not in the business of the preparation

6 or the development of that intelligence. That's done today

7 by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

8 Q. During your military career did you receive any

9 medals or commendations or awards?

10 A. Yes, sir.

11 Q. Could you give me some examples?

12 A. We ll, I have received two Distinguished Service

13 Medals, one for my job as t he chief of Army intelligence

14 and one as the J-2 MACV, I recei ved a Silver Star for

15 gallantry in action -- I commanded an infantry battalion in

16 a river crossing, the capture of a bridgehead, in World War

17 II -- I have the Legion of Merit, I have a Bronze Star wit h

18 three or four oak-leaf clusters, I have the Expert Infantr y

19 Badge, I have the Combat Infantry Badge, I have been

20 decorated by Vietnam with several decorations, I have been

21 decorated by Korea, I have been decorated by France, I h ave

22 the Medal of Metz, I have the Croix de Guerre with Bronze

23 Palm, I have the Croix de Guerre with Gold Palm, I have

24 been decorated by Spain.

25 Those are the primary ones t ha t I recall rig h t

SOUTHER~ DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COU RTHOUSE

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1 now.

2 Q. General McChristian --

3 THE COURT: Let me just interrupt to get a

4 couple of dates.

5 You say you left the position of MACV J-2 on

6 June 1, 1967?

7 THS WITNESS: Yes, sir.

8 THE COURT: Is that right?

9 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

10 THE COURT: What was the date, as closely as you

11 can recall, when you transferred from III Corps to the

12 position of ACSI?

13 THE WITNESS : As I recall, sir, sometime in '6 8 ,

14 earl y ' 68.

15 THE COURT: Can you be somewhat more precise?

16 When in '68 ? Did I understand you to say --

17 THS WITNESS: I would sa y it was probably around

18 August of '68, sir.

19 THE COURT: August of '68?

20 THE WITNESS: Yes .

21 THE CO URT: And so in between the time when y ou

2:! were J-2 of MACV, ending on June 1 of 1967, and August of

23 1968, when y o u took the position of ACSI, in between those

24 dates you were in command of an armored division?

25 THE WITNESS: Yes, s i r, and concurrent with it

SOUTH ERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTH OUSE FO LEY SQUARE. SEW YORK . N.Y. _ 49 1_ 1020

MCChristian - direct 9001

1 for most of the time of the corps also . I had two commands.

2 THE COURT: All right . Proceed.

3 BY MR. BOIES:

4 Q. Let me now focus your attention, General

5 McChristian, on the two years that you were MACV J-2 in

6 Vietnam. I believe you commenced that service in July of

7 1965, is that correct?

8 A. Yes, sir .

9 Q. Could you briefly describe what the functions of

10 . the ~ACV J - 2 were during the period of time that you were

11 there?

12 Yes, sir. The J stands for joint, and it

13 represents a command that is made up of Army, Navy, Air

14 Force and Marines, and as the J-2 the 2 stands for

15 intelligence -- I had the joint staff responsibility for

16 the supervision of Arm y , Navy, Air Force, Marine

17 intelligence in s upport of Gene r al Westmoreland's, my

18 commander's, mission.

19 Q. Was General Westmoreland the commander of MAC V

20 during the entire period of t ime that you were in South

21 Vietnam?

22 1\. Yes, sir .

23 c. Incidentally, am I correct that General

24 Westmoreland was also the 1\rmy chief of staff when you were

25 1\CSI?

SOUTH ERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COL.:R THOUSE

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1 A. That's correct, yes, sir.

2 Q. In connection with your work at MACV as the J-2

3 or chief intelligence officer did you have responsib ility

4 for preparing order of battle estimates?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Would you describe for me what the purpose of an

7 order of battle estimate is?

8 1\. Yes, sir. First of all, order of battle is the

9 military term that enco~passes about eight what we say

10 order of battle factors. These factors help us describe

11 the capabilities and the vulnerabilities of an enemy unit

12 or force.

13 These factors are basically -- o n e is strength

14 of the unit, the identification of the unit, the

15 composition, what's it made of, infantry, armor, the

16 disposition, where it is located, the training, w'lat

17 training has this unit had, its leaders h i p , its ~orale, its

18 logistics, what's it equipped with, what type of weapons,

19 what logistics can support it, can sustain it, that when

20 you gather information on all of these factors you are

21 really coming up with what is the quantity and what is the

22 quality of this enemy force that you are trying to evaluate.

23 So order of battle is gathering ever y bit of

24 information you can in those factors and then putting it

25 all together, collating it, evaluating it, and then in each

SOUTH ERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COUR THO L'SE

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1 of th e se areas I have talked about to get the best picture

2 of that enemy you can.

3 Order of battle brings this information together

4 into statistical studi es. For example, strength is so

5 important in this overall picture that most people get

6 wrapped up in just the strength on it, which is extremely

7 important, but it is one of those factors. The order of

8 battle then goes on to other people. It is the basic data

9 base of what is this force. It is not the estimate of the

o capabilities or the vulnerabilities, but that goes to t he

11 estimators, and they take many other thing s into

12 consideration to make the estimate of the enemy's

13 capabilities.

14 Q. Is it impo rtant t ha t an order of battle estimate

15 be based on the best, most honest intelligence a va ilable?

16 .r.. • ~bsolutely. The intelligence officp~ ~~st

17 always keep in mind that he is responsible to provide

18 timely, accurate, an ad equate amount of the bi g p icture,

19 and usable intelligence on the enemy , so that all

20 decision-makers, from the Commander in Chief in the l'1hite

21 House to the company commander on the battlefield, know the

22 facts concerning t he enemy, so that they may arrive at

23 sound decisions.

24 o. What role , if any, s hould political

2S considerations play in order of battle estimates?

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1 A. In my judgment, none whatsoe v er. The facts

2 should speak for themselves in order to give an honest,

3 true picture of the enemy.

4 Q. Why is that, sir?

5 A. In order to make a sound decision you sh o uld put

6 out the facts, and the entire facts, on the problem and let

7 those who must make t h e decisions on it eva l u a te their

8 responsibilities.

9 Q. While you were J-2 or chief intelli gence officer

10 at MACV, before you sent an intelli g ence rep ort to

11 Washington did you have to get prior approval of CI NCPAC?

12 1\.. No, sir.

13 Q. Co u ld you explain what CINCPAC was?

14 1\.. CINCPAC is the acronym t h at means Commander in

15 Chief Pacific. The Commander in Chief Pacific was one of

16 the immediate commanders to whom Genera l Westmoreland

17 reported. An d if you're talking about a normal command

18 responsibility, as I recall, our cables would normall y g o

19 to CINCPAC a nd t o the Jo i nt Ch i efs of Staff, unless it was

20 just a response to one or the ot h er for a specific question.

21 THE COU RT: Excuse me , ~r. Boies. I would like

22 to ask you to g o .::lack ov~r the previo\.:,;: q uestion. Your

23 question included the issue of wh ether a ? 9rOv a l of CH~CPAC

24 was ne e c e d before sending an intelligence report to

25 Washing t on. I wo u ld li ke to as k y ou to clear u p b y a

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1 question what you meant by to Nashington, .,hat the witness

2 meant by to Washington.

3 Q. During your tour of duty as MAC V J-2 did you

4 send intelligence reports to Washington?

5 A. Yes, sir.

6 Q. Could you tell me to whom in Washington those

7 intelligence reports were sent?

8 A. Now, we're talking about reports that I would

9 send through intelligence channels. I would send reports

10 the normal distribution would include in Washington the

11 Defense I ntell igence Agency and the other m i li tary and

12 civilian agencies in \'7ashington who had indicated a desire

13 to have that particular report, if it's a recurring t y pe of

14 re~ort.

15 o. At an y point during your tour as

16 THE COURT: Can you pursue that? Such as? Who

17 were some of the ones that were on the list, what was t h e

18 normal distribution of that kind of a list for the reports

19 that you were producing as J-2 MACV?

20 THE WITNESS: Let's take for example the monthl y

21 order of battle summary. As I recall, we published just

22 under 500 copies of that report that were sent out in

distribution.

Distribution in Washington would include the

Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelli g ence

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1 Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department

2 intelligence, the Army , Navy, Air Force, Marine

3 intelligence officers, and many others. But that would be

4 basically all of the intelligence services of our country

5 who had evidenced a desire to receive from us that type of

6 information.

7 Q. Now, at any point during your tour as J-2 or

8 chief intelligence officer for MACV did you ever have to

9 get approval from CINCPAC before you could send an order of

10 battle report or other intelligence report to the Defense

11 Intelligence Agency or the Joint Chiefs or the CI A or any

12 of the other intelligence agencies in Washington?

13 A. To my recollection, Mr. Boies, the only gui dance

14 on this is what came out of the intelligence conference in

15 Hawaii, which was held in February of 1967, and that

16 particular conference was concerned very much with criteria,

17 methodology and definitions, and they were also concerned

18 with the various documents that MACV issued that carried

19 this type of information in them.

20 So that conference recommended that if at any

21 time in the future, after that conference, that I as MACV

22 intended to change the cri 1:eria or the definitions that

23 were goin? to go in those s pec ific documents that I should,

before using that change in the documents, circulate those

changes to the intelligence community, not just to

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MCChristian - direct 9007

1 Commander in Chief Pacific, for their comments, not just to

2 DIA, but for comments on the criteria and methodology.

3 But as far as reports themselves, no. This is a

4 very, very narrow -- I should explain, perhaps, why that

5 was important, if I should.

6 Q. Go ahead, sir.

7 A. There had been some confusion on the great mass

8 of reporting that had developed over the period of time of

9 the war and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

10 wanted to be sure that there would be that this would be

11 looked into, and if there was any, to do away with it and

12 to set up procedures whereby in the future we could avoid

13 any errors from creeping back in.

14 So he said "Okay, on these some eight reports

IS that are being put out by MACV, if at any time you're going

16 to change a definition," he didn't say "you have to send a

17 report to us ," but "if you're going to change a definition,

18 a criteria or some methodology, get the viewpoints of the

intelligence community before you just come out and put it

on anybody, because here we have had a conference now to

get it all squared away."

So this is the only thing that I am aware of as

to where we had to get some -- and this didn't come through

command channels as an order for us to do it, but it came

out of the conference that we all agreed that that was a

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~cChristian - direct 900 8

1 good thing to be done as a coordination among the

2 intelligence agencies.

3 Q. If during the period of time that you were J-2

4 MACV you concluded that enemy strength had increased or

5 decreased did you have to get the approval or concurrence

6 of CINCPAC before notifying the agencies in Washington that

7 you have identified of that increase or decrease?

8 A. NO, sir.

9 o. You mentioned the Honolulu conference . That was

10 a conference that was held in Februar y of 1967, correct,

11 sir?

12 A. Yes, sir.

13 Q. And did you attend that conference?

14 A. Yes, sir.

15 Q. Was there any discussion of enemy strength

16 estimates at that conference?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 THE COURT: \'1ould you come up just a second,

19 please?

20 I don 't need th e reporter.

21 (At the side bar; discussion off the record)

22 (In open court)

23 BY MR. BOIES:

24 Q. During the time that you were J -2 at M~CV did

25 you from time to time send intelligence reports to the

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1 office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington?

2 A. Intelligence reports would be sent to the

3 Defense Intelligence Agency if they were being sent through

4 intelligence channels. If they were being transferred

5 transmitted through command channels, which they might have

6 been, they would be addressed to the JCS, the Joint Chiefs

7 of Staff.

B Q. And who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

9 Staff during the period of time that you were in Vietnam,

10 if you recall?

11 A. General Wheeler.

12 Q. Let me ask a couple of more questions about the

13 Honolulu conference, if I can, sir.

14 Was there discussion at the Honolulu conference

15 as to what categories of the enemy should be included in

16 the enemy order of battle?

17 A. Yes, sir.

18 Q. Did the representatives at the Honolulu

19 conference reach an agreement as to what categories of the

20 enemy should be included in the order of battle?

21 A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was that a unanimous agreement?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What did the rep resentatives at the Honolulu

conference conclude were the categories of the enemy that

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should be included in the enemy order of battle?

A. They included the combat forces, made up of the

3 maneuver forces and the combat support forces, the

4 administrative services, the irregulars, comnosed of the

5 guerrillas, self-defense and secret self-defense forces,

6 and the political order of battle.

7 Q. Was General Westmoreland informed of the

8 conclusions of the Honolulu conference?

9 A. When I returned from that conference I debriefed

10 the chief of staff on what had taken place at the

11 conference, and a copy of the report would be sent to the

12 chief of staff's office, and it was routine that the chief

13 of staff would keep the commander informed of these various

14 reports.

15 THE COU RT: Who was the chief of staff at that

16 time?

17 THE WITNESS: As I recall, sir, it was General

18 Rosson.

19 Q. There has been reference in this trial to

20 something called CICV or the Command Intelligence Center

21 Vietnam. You are familiar with that, are you not, sir?

22 A. Yes, sir.

23 Q. And was that or ganiz a tion created during your

24 tour of duty as MACV J-2?

A. Yes, sir. That was ref e rred to as CICV, C I C V,

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1 and it stood for the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam,

2 and I created that as part of an extensive organization of

3 combinad activities, and I created that almost within the

4 first week that I took over as the J-2 out of existing

5 resources that were available.

6 Q. What was the function of the CICV part of the

7 intelligence component?

8 A. Any intelligence operation must have an

9 extensive data base, files on the enemy that are being kept

10 up to date all the time. CICV was the data base for the

11 command not only on order of battle information, both

12 ground forces and political, but it was the data base on

13 area analysis, on all mapping, on all photography of the

14 country, on all studies of the terrain, all studies put out

15 to assist units in their planning for activities, it was

16 the research and analysis center, where you could get all

17 this information .

18 For example, thousands of reports ca~e into CICV

19 every week. It ran around the clock. In the daytime there

20 were over 500 people at work in it, in the evenings around

21 250. But as all reports came in, forgetting order of

22 battle for a moment and going down to the area analysis, or

23 the research part of CICV -- this is research other than

24 order of battle -- they would take the information and plot

25 it on over lays.

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1 On one overlay would be the sighting of all

2 units during a time frame. ~ dot would be placed with a

j date. ~nother overlay would have reports of all rice

4 cashes, where food supplies would be. ~nother one would be

5 of all hospitals, another one of all training centers,

6 another one of ambushes, every a~bush site. We went back

7 to the days of the French fighting Ho Chi Minh and we got

B all their past records. We plotted every place an ambush

9 had been conducted from histor ical records.

10 We took all these overlays in our research area

11 and we put them over a 1 to 50,000 scale map and then we

12 would see through a series of maybe eight overlay s certain

13 patterns.

14 It was as a result of this type of analysis that

15 we developed a system called the pattern analysis technique,

16 and with this technique we were able to say this particular

17 area here is one of their base areas, this is one of their

18 base areas for training, this is one of their base areas

19 for hospitalization, and so forth, and by doing this we

20 were able to report here are th e base areas throug ho ut t h e

21 country.

22 This in turn sent to the intelligence collectors

23 you don't have to collect intelligence on the entire

country for a certain type of operation, we can focus on

these base areas, if that's the type of operation we're

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1 after, which gave us what I considered the economy of

2 intelligence effort. Instead of looking at the whole

3 country we were able to boil it down to maybe 20 percent of

4 the country that we had to do certain collection in.

5 CICV, in my opinion -- I saw the intelligence

6 setups in World War II; I was Patton's chief of

7 intelligence and inherited all of the data bases and the

8 document centers and so forth at the immediate end of the

9 war in Europe -- I consider that CICV was one of the finest

10 supports of combat intelligence that was ever developed in

11 support of our forces in wartime and absolutely an

12 essential part of what we were doing.

13 Q. Du ring the period of time that you were chief

14 intelligence officer for MACV who on your staff would you

15 primarily go to for enemy strength estimates?

16 A. To the chief of my order of battle branch on my

17 staff, and that was Colonel Gains Hawkins.

18 Q. When you were MACV J-2 who was the person on

19 your staff that you considered to be the primary ex pert on

20 enemy order of battle?

21

22

23

11.. Colonel Hawkins.

Q. Did you work directly with Colonel Haw<ins?

11.. I did.

Q. Based on your exneriences working with Cclonel

Hawkins while the two of you were serving in Vietnam, did

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1 you form an opinion of Colonel Hawkins' abilities as an

2 intelligence officer?

3 A. I did.

4 Q. What was that opinion?

5 A. I considered him a highly qualified professional

6 officer in order of battle. I found that he was extremely

7 conscientious, paid great attention to detail, worked well

8 with his people. I had full confidence in him and I

9 t~ought .he did an outstanding job.

10 Q. During the period of time that you were MACV J-2

11 do you ever recall requesting officers in your current

12 intelligence branch to provide you with estimates of total

13 enemy strength?

14 . '1. No, sir, I don't recall that •

15 Q. Did the estimates branch at MACV J-2 produce

16 esti mates of total enemy strength while you were serving as

17 MACV J-2?

18 .... I didn't catch all of those words. Would yo u

19 please repeat it?

20 Q. Certainly, sir. Did the estimates branch at

MACV produce estimates of total enemy strength during the

time t~at you were the chief intelligence officer or J-2

officer of :-IACV?

A. They used the total estimate of enemy strena t h

in the production of what we referred to as the estimate of

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1 the enemy situation, which is the apex of all of your

2 intelligence activities. All of your reports, all of your

3 studies, go to your estimators . Your estimators have

4 access to all types of intelligence, whatever it may be,

5 and then they, taking into consideration the objective of

6 the estimate, come up with their estimative procedures.

7 If you wish, I could go into that estimate

8 objectives to clarify it, if you wish.

9 Q. Why don't you do so, briefly, sir.

10 A. The estimate starts out with a statement of the

11 commander's mission . This is very important. The

12 statement of the commander's mission.

13 Then the next part of the estimate lists those

14 enemy forces who have a capability to adversely affect the

15 accomplishment of the commander's mission. And I would

16 like to repeat that. It lists those enemy forces that have

17 a capability to adversely affect the accomplishment of the

JP :vmmander's mission .

19 Now, the intelligence officer is not only

responsible for the enemy, but he is responsible to report

on the weather and the terrain and the enemy. So the

estimate will also include things on those two, but I won't

get into it. The y aren't as germane.

Then he goes on, after those forces, and

discusses the various categories of those forces as to what

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1 are the capabilities of those forces and trying to

2 translate those capabilities into the enemy can attack this

3 position with a strength of two divisions within a matter

4 of 24 ~ours or tr ying to get specific with what

5 capabilities do they have or this force can do that or the

6 other.

7 And then it ends up with sa ying based upon all

8 of these, the most probable course of action that the enemy

9 is going to take is such and such, trying to ascertain --

10 now, maybe you are fortunate enough to have captured his

11 plans and you can say his plans are to do this and this and

12 he does have the capabi 1 i ty to do it or he doesn' t, and you

13 also highlight t h e weaknesses of the enemy that you might

14 be able to exploit.

15 Q. During the time that you were J-2 at MACV who

16 produced estimates of total enemy strength?

17 A. This was under Colonel Hawkins, and he recei ved

18 the input from the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam,

19 and he also obtained from the current intelligence and

20 indications center the highly classified information that

was not available at CICV and was able to use that either

through some f~rm of sanitizing that information or by a

supplementar y report that would go in under a different

classification.

Q. Some issue has been raised in this trial as to

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1 whether or not the MAC V enemy order of battle summary was

2 an "historical document."

3 At the time that you were MACV J-2 did you

4 consider the order of battle summary an historical document?

5 A. No, sir, I did not .

6 Q. Was the MACV order of battle summary a document

7 during the time that you were there that was updated on a

8 monthly basis?

9 A. Not only was it updated on a monthl y basis, it

10 was published on a monthly basis, it was updated by cable

11 daily if information warranted, and it was updated weekl y

12 by cable to put together everything that had happened

13 during the week, so that the people could keep their

14 monthly summary up to date without waiting for the next

15 hard copy to get around to them .

16 Q. And did Colonel Hawkins have the overall

17 responsibility for this?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You mentioned, General McChristian, in

connection with the Honolulu conference, the enemy's

self-defense and secret self - defense forces. While yo u

were MACV J-2 did you review intelligence information

regarding those forces?

A. Ye s, sir .

Q. And was it part of your duties as MACV J-2 to

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1 review that intelligence information relating to the

2 self-defense and secret self-defense forces?

3 A. Yes, sir.

4 Q. Did you form an opinion based on your experience

5 as MACV J-2 as to whether or not the enemy's self-defense

6 and secret self-defense forces belonged in the order of

7 battle?

8 A. Yes, sir.

9 Q. What was that opinion?

10 A. It was my strong conviction from the beginning

11 that they were definitely a force who could and who did

12 adversely affect the accomplishment of the commander's

13 mission and should be in the order of battle .

14 Q. Did that view ever change while you were in MACV?

15 A. It only became more convincing to me as more

16 intelligence became available and as it became apparent

n that we now had the resources and the organization and

18 everything in place to be able to collect much more

19 information as each month went by.

Q. Why did you believe that self-defense and secret

self-defense forces should be in t he enemy order of battle?

A. The self-defense and secret self-defense forces

were subordinate to the local political leadership i n the

village or the hamlet. They were organized into three-man

cells, and no one should e v er overlook the great

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1 disciplinary and psychological influence t~at a three-man

2 cell exercises over its members and it as a member of an

3 organization as far as a Communist structure is concerned.

4 It is throughout the Communist world.

5 They were organized into those three-man cells.

6 They had missions assigned to them that had to do with the

7 defense of their hamlet and village. That's where they

B stayed to carry out their missions.

9 Their missions also involved the interface

10 between the political Communist structure that was in

11 charge, t~at commanded everything, and the social parallel

12 front, the national front for the liberation of South

13 Vietnam, and both of these units, the political structure

14 and the parallel administrative structure of the liberation

15 front, existed from the national level all the way down

16 through the hamlet and down in the hamlet and the village,

17 which from the point of view of the enemy, t~at was their

18 real battleground, and the self-defense and secret

19 self-defense were an interface between the political

struggle of the enemy and the violence strug~ le of the

enemy.

They supported the activities. Maybe we use the

word propaganda. That was one of their missions,

propaganda. Harassment. Harassment can be something very

simple. If one man with a rifle in the evening-ti~e fires

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1 five or six rounds into a village the village chief has got

2 a dilemma. ~Ihat does he do? Is he expecting an attack?

3 Is he going to ask for some help? Does he ignore it? I,hat

4 happens? This is five rounds, not very expensive, not very

5 difficult. But that type of harassment could go on and

6 these people were very competent of that.

7 In the defense of their hamlets and villages

8 they constructed rUdimentary fortifications, they implanted

9 punji sticKs, mines, booby traps. We know for a fact these

10 were creating casualties among our forces, they were

11 inhibiting the movement of our forces through those

12 villages and hamlets .

13 But of greater concern to the ene~y, and from

14 their point of view, their object, their overall object in

15 the war was, number one, to extend their control over the

16 South Vietnamese people, number two, to reduce the control

17 of the government of Vietnam over these people, number

three was to to bolster the will of the South Vietnamese

people to support their cause and to persevere in a

protracted conflict, and number four was to undermine the

will of the American people to continue such a war. Those

were the announced objectives that the enemy was after.

So down in the hamlet and in t he village the

self-defense -- they weren't trained for offensive military

action. That wasn't their job . Their job was to carr y out

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1 these roles, these missions, down within the hamlets and

2 villages, and also they were looked upon as a training base

3 and a mobilization base to upgrade the local and the main

4 Vietcong forces.

5 So I was -- we knew that they were located

6 throughout the country, we knew that they were adversely

7 affecting our pacification program, we knew t hat it was our

8 job to provide an atmosphere of security, an environment of

9 security, in which the citizens and the legal government of

10 South Vietnam could operate without the harassment of the

11 enemy, and these self- defense and secret self-defense

12 forces had a capability , and one of the big objectives I

13 had was to improve our ability to give better information

14 on the capability of these forces . We knew that they were

15 there, we knew that they were adversely affecting it, but

let's get more information on them.

Q. During the period that y ou were in Vietnam did

the extent of your intelligence on the self-defense and

secret self-defense forces improve?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. By the time that you left Vietnam in June of

1967 did you ~now more about t he strength and composition

of the self-defense and secret self-defense forces than you

had known in 19667

A. Yes, sir.

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•

Documents

x · ... (,Jury present) 19 THE COURT: Good morning members of the jury. 20 JURORS: Good morning, your Honor. ... He was a f ine man in that regard,