The Politics of the Good Samaritan.Christian roots in the responsibility to Protect.

Author: Aron Nordmark.

Linköping University. .

Master Thesis In international and European Relations.

Supervisor: Per Jansson.

Words: 24 574. Excluding bibliography, dedication, abstract, table of content and footnotes.

Date: 2014-08-25

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Abstract.

This thesis addresses the ideological heritage of the emerging norm known as Responsibility

to Protect (R2P). I argue that R2P can better be understood by taking into account a potential

Christian heritage in its key ideas. Hence I undertake to compare the key ideas of R2P and

Christianity by comparing them on three areas of interests in international politics, the

legitimacy of government, the legitimate cause for the resort to armed force and the guiding

ethic of international politics. My research demonstrates that important similarities exists

between the normative ideas of R2P and Christian tradition and that Christianity may be

understood as part of the spectrum of ideas that have shaped R2P.

Keywords; Responsibility to Protect, R2P, Christianity, Religion in world politics, Just War

Tradition.

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Dedication.

I wish to sincerely convey my thanks to some people who, in different ways have been

enormously important for this thesis. I am sincerely grateful to my supervisor, Per Jansson for

his constructive criticism and helpful guidance. I also wish to thank Charlotte Fridolfsson for

many helpful comments and important insight.

Finally, I am indebted to my wonderful Lilly for all her patience, support and kindness.

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Table of content. Chapter 1: Introduction..........................................................................................................................1

Chapter 2: Problem and aim...................................................................................................................3

2.1 The problem of causality..............................................................................................................3

2.2 Identifying central ideas in R2P....................................................................................................4

2.3 Aim and purpose..........................................................................................................................6

Chapter 3: Background...........................................................................................................................7

3.1 The study of religion in IR.............................................................................................................7

3.2 The secularization thesis...............................................................................................................8

3.3 The religious turn in IR..............................................................................................................10

3.4 Conclusion..................................................................................................................................11

Chapter 4: Previous research...............................................................................................................12

Chapter 5: Methodology and material.................................................................................................15

5.1 Hermeneutics and interpretation...............................................................................................15

5.2 The non-intentional strand of interpretation.............................................................................17

5.3 Four sources of Christian ideas...................................................................................................19

5.4 Material......................................................................................................................................21

Chapter 6: The Responsibility to protect..............................................................................................22

6.1 The development of R2P............................................................................................................22

6.2 Contrasting R2P and Pluralist international society....................................................................24

6.3 The legitimacy of governments in pluralist international society...............................................25

6.4 The legitimacy of governments in R2P........................................................................................27

6.5 Legitimate use of force in pluralist international society............................................................29

6.6 Legitimate use of armed force in R2P.........................................................................................30

6.7 Ethical foundations of pluralism.................................................................................................32

6.8 Ethical foundation of R2P...........................................................................................................34

6.9 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................36

Chapter 7: Christianity and international politics.................................................................................38

7.1 The Christian view of government authority and legitimacy......................................................38

7.1.1 The Old Testament..............................................................................................................39

7.1.2 The New Testament.............................................................................................................41

7.1.3 Later Christian tradition.......................................................................................................43

7.1.4 The Contemporary Christian debate about R2P..................................................................44

7.2 The legitimate Use of Armed Force................................................................................................48

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7.2.1 Old Testament.....................................................................................................................48

7.2.2 New Testament...................................................................................................................50

7.2.3 Later Christian tradition.......................................................................................................51

7.2.4 Contemporary Christian debate about R2P.........................................................................56

7.3. Christianity and the ethics of care and responsibility....................................................................58

7.3.1 Old Testament.....................................................................................................................59

7.3.2 New Testament...................................................................................................................60

7.3.3 Later Christian tradition.......................................................................................................61

7.3.4 The contemporary Christina debate about R2P...................................................................63

7.4 Conclusions.....................................................................................................................................65

7.4.1 Christianity, R2P and the state................................................................................................65

7.4.2 Christianity, R2P and the use of armed force..........................................................................67

7.4.3 Christianity, R2P and the ethics of international affairs...........................................................68

Chapter 8: Analysis and final conclusions.............................................................................................70

8.1 The case for Christianity as one source of inspiration for R2P....................................................70

8.2 The benefits of a religious awareness.........................................................................................73

8.2.1 R2P and its cultural context.................................................................................................73

8.2.2 Widening the spectrum of ideas..........................................................................................76

8.2.3 The turn to Moral questions................................................................................................77

8.3 Final considerations....................................................................................................................79

9: Bibliography.....................................................................................................................................80

9.1 Articles........................................................................................................................................80

9.2 Books..........................................................................................................................................82

9.3 Speeches.....................................................................................................................................84

9.4 Web Pages / Internet Sources....................................................................................................85

9.5 Working, research & conference papers....................................................................................86

9.6 Statements and documents of organizations.............................................................................86

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Chapter 1: Introduction.

Few world phenomenon have in recent years provoked such debate as the proper response to

mass violations of human rights. Particular the genocide in Rwanda, the horrors of ethnic

cleansing in Bosnia and Kosovo have shocked the conscience of the world. One particular

response to horrors like genocide and ethnic cleansing has been the development of a set of

ideas and responses called Responsibility to Protect (R2P). This proposed norm was

formulated by an independent commission, known as the International Commission of

Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 and partly endorsed by the UN World

Summit in 2005.

The central idea of R2P is that the central responsibility of the state is to protect its citizens

from large scale human rights abuses. R2P argues for sovereignty as responsibility, which

essentially means that sovereignty is no longer understood as a state of control, where the

state is sovereign because it controls territory and can maintain international relations and can

count on non-intervention in its internal affairs. Rather sovereignty is a state of responsibility

and also accountability towards a certain group of people, the citizens and to the international

community, the United Nations (UN).1

R2P is a set of ideas and tools to ensure that sovereignty is responsibly executed in

accordance whit this view of statehood. Its central idea is that there is an absolute duty to

protect human beings from mass atrocity crimes like genocide or ethnic cleansing. If the state

should fail to do so then the international community has a duty to do so in its stead and if

necessary, despite the wishes of the state and in some cases using armed force. 2 Hence non-

intervention is no longer guaranteed for states that are peaceful towards other states but

maintain regimes of terror.

1 ICISS. (2001). The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the international commission on intervention and state sovereignty. Retrieved from: http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISReport.pdf. Accessed 2014-02-06. 132 ICISS, 13-14

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This conception of sovereignty essentially means that states can forfeit their right to

sovereignty by manifestly failing to protect their population from massive violations of

human rights. This changing definition of statehood thus has fundamental implications for the

use of force in international politics, for the implications of state sovereignty and for the very

ethics of international politics. Plainly R2P represents a radical break with the Westphalian

idea of sovereignty that has been prevailing in Europe since the peace of Westphalia in 1648.

The Westphalian notion of sovereignty entails that the state should be free to organize its

internal affairs in whatever way it sees fit, free from external involvement.

Since it challenges many of the key assumptions of how international politics ought to work it

can reasonably be argued that the development of R2P represents one of the major

developments of contemporary international politics. But, how is one to best make sense of

what these ideas represents?

There are several ways of understanding R2P. One approach attempts to better understand by

studying what ideological heritage can be found in R2P. Obviously several ideologies can be

argued to have influenced the development of R2P. It might for instance represent a sinister

new form of imperialism, in another the triumph of liberal internationalism or the

continuations of ideas with deep roots in European colonialism and imperialism.

In this study I will attempt an investigation into the roots of R2P from a different direction; I

will seek to present similarities between the key normative ideas of R2P and some central

doctrines of Christianity.

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Chapter 2: Problem and aim.

2.1 The problem of causality.

Given the major implications for some of the key norms of international politics R2P entails it

is not surprising that it has been the object for much scholarly investigation. As I mentioned

previously, important work has already been undertaken in discussing R2P: s relationship

with such disparate schools of thought as liberalism or imperialism, its importance for the

conception of statehood as well as its practical problems of implementation.3 There has also

been considerable investigation into the views or attitudes of various states in relation to the

problems of R2P.4

Studying the political and legal background, as well as the practical implementation and state

attitudes to the R2P is of great importance. By merit of previous research the IR community

knows a great deal about the practical challenges of implementing it. Also, the political ideas

that have shaped R2P have been extensively studied and have contributed much to our

understanding of the spectrum of ideas that shape R2P. This thesis attempts to add to this

understanding of R2P by studying some ideas that may have shaped the core normative

principles expressed in R2P. I argue that Christian doctrines can be seen as part of the

spectrum of ideas that have shaped R2P.

3 See for instance Håkansson, P (2011), The United Nations Reformed, Responsibility, Protection and the Standing of States. Linköping University Electronic Press or Focarelli, C (2012). Ahead to the past? Responsibility to Protect and the global system. Groningen Journal of International Law. Vol 1 (00), 01-10.4 Pethiyagoda, K (2013). India’s approach to humanitarian interventions and the Responsibility to Protect. (working paper). Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and armed conflict. Retrieved from http://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/downloads/pethiyagoda%202013.pdf. Accessed 2014-04-05

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Luke Glanville has argued that the idea of states having a positive responsibility to intervene

in the affairs of other states is an idea with deep roots in Christian Scriptures and has

concluded from this that R2P has some deep roots in Christianity.5 Does this infer that it is

possible to establish a direct link between the normative ideas of R2P and Christianity? This

is hardly the case. It would be very difficult to establish such a direct connection. Rather, my

aim here is not to prove that Christianity has been the direct and immediate source of

inspiration for the formulation of R2P, rather my aim is to first establish what perspectives on

a number of key issues in international politics exists within a particular programmatic

expression of R2P, the ICISS report. Following this I will undertake an investigation to see if

corresponding ideas can be found within Christianity. If such ideas do exist I will undertake a

discussion about the nature of the relationship between R2P and Christianity. I do not argue

that I will be able to show a direct casual connection between Christianity and R2P, but, if

ideas similar to those of R2P exist in Christianity I argue that one could understand

Christianity as one source of inspiration for the development of R2P.

2.2 Identifying central ideas in R2P.

Ideas in politics are in a continuous state of flux, change and development. It would therefore

be erroneous to claim that I have identified a set of ideas that are continuous or permanent

aspect of R2P. Rather, what I have done is to identify one programmatic expression of R2P

and studied the central ideas contained in it. So, when I discuss the normative ideas of R2P it

should be understood as the central ideas contained in the ICISS report concerning R2P (I will

return to this in my chapter on material).

I have decided to specify three issues that I argue are of central importance to the field of IR.

What perspectives does R2P have on these issues, and can similarities to earlier Christian

ideas be found?

5 Glanville, L (2012) Christianity and the Responsibility to Protect. Studies in Christian ethic. Vol 25(3), 312-326.

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The first problem concerns the understanding of the state. What is the task of the state? Can it

lose its legitimacy by its domestic policies? Should it be responsible only to its own people or

also super-national authority? Under what conditions can a state lose its sovereign right to

non-intervention?

The second issue concerns the role of the legitimate use of force. Any normative framework

for internationals society should be able to provide an understanding of when force is

legitimate. For example, should self-defense be the only reason to resort to force? What

standards should be used to determine the legitimacy of armed force? Is human suffering a

legitimate reason to use force?

Thirdly, any approach of international politics should also be supported by a particular ethical

philosophy. What should be the ethical basis for how people, and ultimately states interact

with each other? Is tolerance and non-intervention the proper foundation for international

affairs? Should certain values be treated as objective standards? In short, what kind of ethic

ought to guide international affairs?

In order to see how, and if, R2P poses a stark challenge to the current order of international

politics it is necessary to contrast it with the normative ideas underpinning international

pluralist society. This is also important to appreciate the importance for any study of R2P, if it

does not significantly challenge the normative structure of pluralist international society it

becomes a great deal less important to study.

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2.3 Aim and purpose.

This does not entail that I argue that Christianity is the only influence on R2P or that one can

only understand R2P as the application of Christian ideas on world politics. I do not argue

that, even if such similarities exists that Christianity owns R2P or that it should somehow be

understood as a hidden attempt to use the UN for evangelical purposes. But if I can show that

these ideas, central to R2P, are very similar to views found in the Christian tradition this

might contribute to our understanding of the spectrum of ideas that form the foundation of

R2P by adding to it a a religious source of inspiration.

The essential purpose of my thesis is therefore, to investigate if Christian principles can be

argued to constitute part of the antecedents and inspiration to the normative principles of

R2P.

In my investigation I am guided by the following research questions.

What are the normative views of pluralist international society on the issues specified above?

What perspectives to the same issues can be found in R2P?

Can ideas similar to those of R2P be found in the Christian tradition?

In what way might Christian principles have served as an inspiration to R2P?

If so, what does this mean for future academic study of R2P?

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Chapter 3: Background

Before embarking on my study of R2P and Christianity I think it necessary to undertake a

brief discussion about the relationship between religion and IR. This will place my study in a

particular development of the field that has been going on in recent years. This section is also

intended to dissuade any notions that IR studies remains, or should remain, separate from the

study of religion.

3.1 The study of religion in IR.

It is hardly controversial to argue that the religious aspects of world problems have not been

sufficiently addressed by the IR community. In fact the study of religious ideas in IR is a

comparatively new phenomenon. As the noted IR scholar Vendulka Kubalkova argues, “IR

has been a field regarded by definition as par excellence secular; in IR, religion did not or,

indeed, could not figure as a subject of concern.”6

This state of affairs is less due to wilful neglect then to the historical circumstances that has

shaped the discipline. IR as an academic discipline, separate from political science, history

and philosophy, took form following the First World War. The conventional story of IR

essentially argues that the first years of the discipline was marked by a considerable amount

of utopian thoughts, some of it inspired by religious ideals, perhaps best represented by

professor Alfred Zimmern and some by liberal idealism represented by Woodrow Wilson.7

6 Kubalkova, V (2013). The “Turn to Religion” in International Relations Theory. Avalable at http://www.e-ir.info/2013/12/03/the-turn-to-religion-in-international-relations-theory/. Accessed 2014-06-267 Heath, A (2007). Re-examining Core Concepts of Classical Realism: E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau and the Realist agenda, paper presented to Sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference, University of Turin, 12.15 September 2007. 6-7

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The conventional history of IR further tells of how E H Carr, the committed realist, swept

away this idealistic notion replacing it with a scientific approach based on materialistic

concerns like the balance of power.8 The science further developed after the Second World

War as positivist scholars focused on systems theory and rational action, issues well suited to

the bi-polarity of the cold war. In the conflict between the democratic liberal west and the

communist east religion and religious ideas were, at best, subservient factors. The other major

occurrence in the post war years, the collapse of colonial empires and the extension of

national sovereignty to former colonies also contributed to demote the study of religion in

international politics as third world nationalism, along with great power struggle, was seen as

the main force of international politics. The process of excluding religion from politics

essentially unified political elites across the world to such an extent that “Circa 1960, perhaps

the only thing the U.S. State Department, the faculty of the Harvard Government Department,

the Communist International, and the leaders of the Bandung Conference agreed on is that a

society can be successful only insofar as its government and its citizenry keep religion from

exercising a substantive influence on its politics. No secularity, no modernity”.9 The world

was divided along distinctly secular terms, and the goal of the liberal west, the newly

independent states and the socialist countries was the achievement of material development

and that required the separation of religion and politics.10

3.2 The secularization thesis

Another reason for the lack of attention paid to religious issues in the IR community in the

west was the acceptance of the idea called the secularization thesis, in fact from the 1950:s

and onward this ideas was the paradigm in sociology concerning the role of religion in

society. The straightforward idea of this thesis was: as a society became more modern the

citizens are sure to become, gradually but steadily, more secular, less religious and less

8 See, Cox, M (ed) in Carr, EH (2001 editon). The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 1919-1939, Xxxix-xl9 Shah, T & Philpott, D (2011). In Snyder, J (ed). Religion and international relations theory. Columbia University Press, 46.10 Ibid, 44-45

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influenced by religious ideas.11 Peter Berger, one of the early proponents of the idea defined

that modernization "consists of the growth and diffusion of a set of institutions rooted in the

transformation of the economy by means of technology."12 It is important to note here that

secularization in this sense does not simply mean the separation of church and state or that

those institutions once run by religious organizations become state owned. It is the claim that

“in the face of scientific rationality, religion´s influence on all aspects of life – from personal

habits to social intuitions – is in dramatic decline”.13 It might be appropriate consider that the

idea that religion in general is losing its hold over mankind is not new. Indeed, the more or

less imminent demise of religion has been predicted since the early 19:th century by

prominent intellectuals such as Voltaire.14

However, as Berger, Stark and others have pointed out, the predictions of a secular world

have not turned out to be accurate. Indeed several of its underlying assumptions are highly

questionable.15 It would be erroneous to say that the secularization thesis has been universally

discarded. However, it has come under substantial and sustained critique from various

scholars. Some arguing that the thesis has been outright falsified, some arguing that the thesis

can be softened and still be used as a useful analytical tool. But even those who hold to a

revised secularization thesis acknowledge the continued importance of religion and religious

perspectives in world politics.16

Of course one cannot say that there never will be a world in which religious ideas have lost

their importance. Indeed, as earlier proponents of the secularization thesis can attest to, the

making of stark predictions is a risky business. What I do feel confident in asserting is that as

for the foreseeable future, religious ideas and the movements they inspire will continue to

play an important role in human affairs, not excluding world politics. 11 Stark, R (1999). Secularization R.I.P. Sociology of Religion. Vol 60 (3), 249-273, 25112 Berger, B. Berger, P and Kellner, H (1974). The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness . Penguin, 15.13 Swatos, W, & Christiano, K (1999). Secularization theory: The course of a concept. Sociology of Religion, Vol 60(3), 209-228, 21414 Micklethwait , J & Wooldridge , A (2009). God is back: How the global rise of faith is changing the world. The Penguin Press, 3215 Ibid, 219-220 and Stark, 255-256 and 260-26316 For the first view, see Berger, P (2008). Secularization falsified. First things : a monthly journal of religion and public life., Vol 180, 23-27. For the later view see Chapter 1 of Norris, P & Inglehart, R (2004). Sacred and secular. Religion and politics worldwide. Cambridge University Press.

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3.3 The religious turn in IR.

The softening or discarding of the secularization thesis has been paralleled by an increasing

attention to religious issues in mainstream IR research. One indication of the risks of ignoring

the potential of religion to affect politics was the Iranian revolution in 1979. Other indications

of the continued importance of religious ideas and movements could be found in the role of

religious groups in the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe.17

However, despite the importance of religions ideas and movements in such disparate events as

the Iranian revolution, the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and the fall of communism the study

of religion was not seen as a task of mainstream IR. As Petr Kratochvíl contends, “Only after

the 2001 terrorist attacks did the mainstream academic circles, in the United States and

elsewhere, come to the conclusion that ignoring religion as a major international force was no

longer possible.”18 The continued war on terrorism, the causes and problems US policy in

Iraq, the ongoing conflict in Palestine are, among other, issues that show the continued

importance of religious ideas in international politics.

Religious ideas and groups remain potent forces in politics. Religiously inspired political

movements continue to win adherents and formulate political visions that they argue to be in

line with their religious outlook. The impact religious movements and ideas have on world

politics might be more or less obvious, but one might consider the current (and so far

successful) Christian mobilization against US intervention in Syria as one example of

Christian civil society activism that concerns international politics.19 Religion is not only a

17 For an example of the role of the protestant church in bringing democracy to the German Democratic Republic see Kuhnle, L (2008). Re-conceptualizing religious space in the German Democratic Republic: The role of Protestant churches in the formation of a political opposition. Working paper series, 14. The Canadian Centre for German and European Studies. 18 Kratochvíl, P (2009). The Religious Turn in IR: A Brief Assessment. Perspectives. Review of international affairs. Vol 17 (2), 5-12, 519 Dann, C (2013). America's Christians mobilize against Syria strike ahead of hill votes. Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/americas-christians-mobilize-against-syria-strike-ahead-hill-votes-

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guide towards the next life but also a roadmap for this life, providing morality and ethics to its

followers. To quote Madeline Albright, former US secretary of state, “Religion is a large part

of what motivates peoples and shape their views of justice and right behaviour. It must be

taken into account”.20

3.4 Conclusion.

In this section I have attempted to place this thesis as a small part of a broader turn in IR, one

that gives the religious dimensions of world problems the attention they deserve. So, whilst I

do believe there is still much work to be done in introducing religion into the IR field it is not

a particularly controversial idea that religious dimensions are important to world politics.

Investigation the links between religious and political ideas is in fact something that can be

found in the early days of the academic field of IR, so one might argue that the religious turn

in IR constitute a return to the roots of the discipline.21

Chapter 4: Previous research.

f8C11108308 2014-04-1420 Albright, Madeline (2006). The mighty and the almighty: reflections on America, God and World affairs. Harper Perennial, 28521 See for instance, Zimmern, A (1939). Spiritual values and world affairs. Oxford University press.

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Above I have situated my thesis in the broader context of the religious turn that is arguably

occurring in IR. I have also given a sketch of the importance attached to the developing norm

of R2P. Since my aim is to provide an understanding of the Christian roots of the central

normative ideas of R2P my thesis is situated between two wider fields of study, the study of

R2P as well as the study of the role of religion in international relations.

An important contribution to the study of religion in the field of IR is Jodok Troy´s Christian

approaches to international affairs. Troy argues that the supposedly secular science of IR

theory is greatly influenced by religious and spiritual thinking and can be enriched by

integrating such perspectives. For instance he argues that by understanding the religious

dimensions of IR theories, especially classical realism and The English Schools we can

improve our understanding of their underlying worldviews. His work has been a great

inspiration for me to undertake an investigation in order to see how R2P can be better

understood if an analysis of its underlying religious heritage in undertaken.

It is debate waging about how the key ideas of R2P is to be understood that serves as the

background and context of my thesis. One study that has motivated me into studying the core

ideological heritage of R2P is Peter Håkanssons The United Nations Reformed,

Responsibility, Protection and the Standing of States. Håkansson argues that R2P has a

considerable heritage from various forms of anti-pluralist thinking and poses a great challenge

to the current state system and to sovereign equality. There is indeed a wide variety of

scholarly works attempting to get at the heart of what R2P really is, and how it is practiced.

Alan Kuperman perceives of R2P as “the most recent innovations of institutional liberalism in

international politics”.22 Alan Toumayan attempts to provide a philosophical case for R2P by

formulating is as the implementation of noted French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas

thoughts about ethics and otherness.23 Mark Kersten has argued that R2P represents nothing

less than liberal cosmopolitanism and is undermined by the pervasiveness of power politics in

22 Kuperman, A (2009). Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect. The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations. Vol 10, (1), 19-29 23 Toumayan, A (2014). The responsibility for the other and The Responsibility to Protect. Philosophy & Social Criticism. Vol 40 (3), 269-288.

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in the UN.24 Others have shown that R2P can be understood as a realist method to circumvent

international norms that protect weaker state, R2P might in fact be the tool of the strong.25

These are only some examples, but the debate of how R2P is to be understood is clearly

vibrant and encompassing many diverse perspectives. But most academic studies about the

intellectual heritage in R2P focus on secular sources or schools of thought. There are however

some examples of studies about the relationship between Christianity and R2P that has served

to guide me towards the purposes in this thesis.

An investigation into Christianity and R2P, but one that has considerable different staring

points and purposes than mine is Raphael De Vietris Christian perspectives on the

Responsibility to protect in international law. De Vietris has undertaken an interesting study

of the similarities between certain legal thinking that emanates from Christian authors like

Hugo Grotius and Sammuel Puffendorf. 26 Like this investigation he also briefly touches upon

the contemporary Christian debate about R2P. It should be stated clearly that I have

considerable objections to De Vietris’s methodology and conclusions. In my view he draws

rather stark conclusions but base these on surprisingly little empirical material. For example,

he claims to undertake an analysis of the Christian pacifists approach to R2P but does so

whiteout actually referencing any document or statement by pacifists that actually discuss

R2P.27 Rather he confines his analysis to a very narrow extrapolation of earlier pacifist

positions without actually taking the unique nature of the pacifist contribution to the debate

about R2P into account. Rather than actually investigating one of the positions he claims to

have identified he accepts the assertions about them made by the supporters of R2P. Rather

than a careful assessment of various contemporary Christian positions on R2P, de Vietris

makes rather grand assertions about Christian thinking based on a very limited material.

24 Kersten, M (2012). A Fatal Attraction? The UN Security Council and the Relationship between R2P and theInternational Criminal Court. (Draft paper).25 Schütte and Kübler (2007) J. The Responsibility to Protect. Concealed Power-Politics or Principled Policy? HumSec Occasional Paper Series.26 Hugo Grotius’s thinking on the nature of sovereignty has been more thoroughly discussed in Keene, E (2002). Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics. Cambridge University Press27 De Vietris, R (2011). Christian perspectives on the Responsibility to protect in international law. University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review. Vol. 13, 1-13.

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Further, De Vietris makes no use of Biblical material, something I argue to be fairly central to

Christian doctrine and will make extensive use of.

Another academic work in the same field is Rick Hankins dissertation Confronting Genocide:

Christianity and the Responsibility to Protect. Despite the similarity in title Hankins work

differs from mine in some key respects. Hankins attempt to make a case that Christians;

especially Christians in the United States ought to support R2P and argues for how the

practice of R2P can be improved. He is making a case for what kind of political activism

Christians in the US should undertake in order to strengthen R2P, such as making the US sign

the Rome statue. Whilst I do share Hankins principled support for R2P as such my main focus

is not to advance the development of any particular political movement in support of it, and I

do not attempt to improve the practices of it in any way.

Finally Luke Glanville has argued that R2P has some deep roots in Christian scripture and

tradition, particularly focusing on the thinking of Ambrose of Milan and the protestant natural

law tradition.28 It is my intention to expand on this theme and to conduct a more exhausting

study of the core ideas of R2P and the ideas contained in the Christian tradition. His work

serves as the most immediate inspiration for me and shows that the idea of R2P having

religious roots is not as controversial as it might first appear.

Due to these previous works in the same general field I argue that the idea of studying R2P in

relation to Christianity is a reasonable endeavour. The research undertaken in the area has

proven to be productive but it is limited enough to allow for new studies.

Chapter 5: Methodology and material.

28 Glanville (2012), 312

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Below I will first present and discuss my interpretivist methodology. This will explain my

core methodological assumptions concerning the proper way to interact with the material.

Then I will present the material I will interpret and then discuss what criteria I will use to

ensure the achievement of a set of valid conclusions.

5.1 Hermeneutics and interpretation.

The study of IR encompasses various forms of methodological as well as theoretical

traditions. Indeed much of the history of the discipline has been shaped my debates about the

proper methodological approach. The so called Second great debate occurred in the 1960:s

and pitted scholars favoring a more hermeneutical and interpretivist (or as they described it,

“classical”) methodology of IR against those who argued for a methodological approach more

akin to those practiced in the natural sciences.29

My task is to study a number of ideas that underpin R2P but are not necessarily directly stated

in the available documents. So the first task is to identify a number of ideas in a clear way.

Secondly, I must make a connection between these ideas and a much older tradition that

concerns the same normative problems but does not address it in the same language or

context. This requires a particular way to make use of the texts that the ideas are contained in.

This focus on texts directs me towards a hermeneutical approach. Hermeneutics concerns the

study of texts and has its origin in the study of the Jewish and Christian scripture. The goal of

biblical hermeneutics was and is to extract further meaning than the text might, on the surface

seem to contain.30 The idea is that texts and actions carry meanings that may not be obvious

29 See for example Bull, H (1966). International theory: The case for a classical approach. World Politics, 18(3), 361-377.30 Marsh, D., & Stoker, G (ed) (2002). Theory and methods in political scienc. (3 ed.). Palgrave Macmillan, 131

20

to the reader/observer but that can be understood using interpretation of the meaning ascribed

to the activity by those who partake in it. One example from the Christian tradition might be

the practice of the Eucharist. Mere observation of the actual activity is less than fruitful if one

is to understand it. Rather, one ought to study the meaning of the Eucharist by considering the

meaning of it for those who take part in it, a holy ritual that connects them whit the last supper

of Christ, or one can study it from the outside and argue that the Eucharist serves as a group

marker, a ritual to ensure cohesion among the believers and serves to create a sharp

distinction between we and them. The actual purpose of the activity is thus relativity

independent from the eating of bread and wine, but is rather a ritual action that carries

meaning.31 Texts are treated in a similar way, as carriers of meaning that one might not always

understand by simply reading the words.

5.2 The non-intentional strand of interpretation.

There are two strands of the hermeneutical approach; they can be described as the intentional

and non-intentional strand. The intentional mode of interpretation is primarily concerned with

assessing the true intentions of the author of the texts. In this view the author is the supreme

authority on his or hers statement, so if one is able to place oneself in the author shoes one can

be able to understand his or hers true meaning. This metrology can be very useful in attempts

to recover the actual intended meaning of texts that are often used as prof-texts for later

ideas.32

There is also the non-intentional strand where the object of inquiry is the text itself. The

central argument there is that the reader is not just a recipient of a clear-cut message that is

dependent on the author’s intention. Rather, the reader is vital to constructing the meaning of

the text. The reader might exist in radically different circumstances than the author and have a 31 For an example of a Christian approach to the hermeneutics of Eucharist practices see Collin, P. (2008) The Eucharist as an Interpretative Framework for the Inter-relation between Divine and Ecclesial Koinonia. Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai-Theologia Catholica Latina (1). 3-2432 See Skinner, Q. (1969). Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas. History and Theory, 8(1), 3-53.

21

cultural outlook that enables a different understanding of the text than the author might have

intended.33 A reader places texts in a framework that provides understanding of their meaning

that could not have occurred to the authors. Reader interprets ideas expressed and read in

meaning in the text and thus become an active interpreter rather than a recipient. The meaning

of texts and ideas are therefore constructed rather than received.

Thus ancient texts can be interpreted as meaningful in relation to modern phenomenon even if

the author had no such intention. Great texts of antiquity can be used to better understand our

modern conditions. For instance, passages in Thucydides History of the Peloponesian war

have been employed to understand how the international state system worked during the Cold

War. In relation to the Christian Scriptures it is hardly radial to claim that their message is not

bound to the historical circumstances in which they were written. The continued practice of

Christian religion activity is predicated on the idea that these texts have a continually relevant

meaning. One can summarize this position that “the primary objective of interpretation

becomes to gain a deeper understanding of what texts and actions are about, or what they

speak about, rather than what their author/originator intended to say or do”.34

My hermeneutic is a process in two steps. My first task is to recover a set of unstated

normative ideas from the ICISS report. Once these are identified I will undertake an analysis

of Christian texts to see if I can recover corresponding ideas from them. The ICISS report

does not contain any acknowledgement of religious influences. But I argue that it would be

unwise to assume that an author is always aware or explicit about the system of idea that he or

she is influenced by. Naturally the Biblical material and most of the Christian documents I

will study does not directly refer to R2P. Nor do they refer to institutions like sovereign states

or international politics. But, they might well refer to ideas concerning the proper role of

governing authorities or espouse a particular ethic for how individuals should interact that can

be extended to concern international relations.

33 For an example of this methodology see Lebow, R, (2003) The tragic vision of politics. Ethics, Interests and Orders. Cambridge University press. 34 Håkansson, 15

22

My task is, by necessity, not to study all Christian thinking on issues like the proper role of

violence. Rather it is to search for the existence of a tradition of thought that closely

resembles and might have influenced the normative foundations of R2P.

It is up to me as the reader to attempt to attain a fuller view of the meaning and key ideas of

the material, as well as attempt to show in what way the ideas contained in Scripture and in

later Christian tradition might be argued to correspond to the central ideas in R2P. Hence my

conclusions, as is generally the case in any analysis of ideas, will be an argument, hopefully a

sound and well-reasoned argument rather than a definite assertion of facts, as hermeneutical

analysis generally is.35

Obviously the sovereign state in any kind of modern sense did not exist in the time the Old or

New Testament was written, nor did a world community like the UN. Hence, one could argue

that between R2P and Christianity are only accidental. I do not take this view. Even if the

nature of governing authorities have changed I can conduct an analysis to how Biblical

passages discusses the legitimate tasks and roles of the legitimate authority of the day, be they

religious leaders, tribal leaders, Roman vassals or the Roman Empire. Similarly the nature of

warfare may have changed but the underlying normative problems, when is it morally right to

kill, (to put it very starkly) poses the same challenge. Ultimately the problem of R2P concerns

deeply ethical and moral problems. Such concerns of the proper way to interact with other

people are not solely the territory of political philosophy but have also been answered by

religious sources. It therefore strikes me as reasonable and worthwhile to investigate whether

or not the ICISS may have been inspired by older Christian ideas.

The three issues will serve to guide me in the massive material of Christian tradition. I do not

argue that R2P as such can be found outlined in Scripture but that the core ideas that serves as

its foundations could conceivable have their roots in Christian tradition.

35 Beckman, L (2005). Grundbok I idéanalys : det kritiska studiet av politiska texter och idéer. Santérus förlag, 50

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5.3 Four sources of Christian ideas.

Christianity is a deeply divided religion that includes thousands of groups with diverse ideas

and varying heritages. It would be futile to claim that any one position on political issues

could encompass all these groups. Documents like the Old and New Testament are also

eminently open to different interpretation. Also, the history of Christianity contains such a

vast numbers of thinkers and writers that it is impossible for me to engage them all.

So, whilst my search is guided by the three issue areas above, it is important for me to device

some criterion for where to look. I have determined that there are four types of sources that

could help me find Christian ideas that can have served as inspiration for R2P.

Firstly, I will search the Old Testament for views that can be interpreted as sources of

inspiration to the ideas in R2P about the legitimate role of authority, force and international

ethics. The Old Testament serves to provide Christian with an understanding of how God has

acted in human affairs true agents like Moses, Aaron or Joshua and it is there one can find the

laws given to the chosen people. Therefore, if there is a Christian body of ideas that mirrors

the ideas of R2P they could conceivably be found in the pages of the Old Testament, possibly

in the form of commandments or saying (the Old Testament is in part made up of so called

Wisdom Literature like Proverbs or Psalms) or in the form of examples of actions that are in

line with the normative ideas contained in R2P.

I will then proceed to study the New Testament. The Christian understanding of the New

Testament is that it tells of how God himself entered human history, no longer acting with

human agents like in the Old Testament but acting himself, in human form as the son, a full

member of the divine trinity. But the New Testament is also the story of the first disciples and

their trials and tribulations as well as a composition of letters, mainly by Paul the Apostle.

The New Testament thus spells out the central doctrines unique to Christianity (the Old

Testament is in various compositions also held sacred by Jews and Muslims). If there are

24

Christian ideas that may have served to inspire R2P it seems reasonable that they might have

their foundation in the New Testament.

Thirdly I will search for ideas similar to those contained in R2P in later Christian tradition.

This is by far the vaguest and most encompassing source but I do think it necessary not to

limit my study to a study of Biblical material. Rather, I will study later Christian tradition

about the three issues under scrutiny to search for traditions of thought that mirror the views

expressed in R2P. I will study various statements of faith such as catechism or statements by

religious leaders (the Pope being the most obvious example).

It is possible that the existence of such later thinking is much more important than Biblical

material. Few people are biblical scholars but rather receive some religious heritage by other

means, such as Sunday school, the occasional visit to Church or by some of the other means

that Christian faith permeates society. So if there is such a later tradition to be found among

later Christian tradition it is entirely possible that the ICISS might have encountered ideas that

served to inspire them there, rather than by careful scrutiny of the Old Testament.

These three sources are intended to give me material to make an analysis concerning the

possibility of Christianity as part of the inspiration to R2P. I will then introduce a fourth

source, the contemporary Christian debate about R2P.The idea is to use this as a tool to ensure

that my understanding of the commonality between the central ideas of R2P and Christianity

is in line with the views of at least some Christians today. In such a debate it might be

possible to find an opposing case, that R2P does not truly represent a Christian philosophy for

any number of reasons.

5.4 Material.

25

I approach the ICISS report as the best expression of the core ideas of R2P. This reliance on

the ICISS report might be seen as problematic. First of all since the ICISS report is not in fact

an official UN document. Rather the ICISS was a commission sponsored by the Canadian

government and its report has never been endorsed by the UN General assembly.36 However,

since this is a study of the core ideas of the concept of R2P, not of its expression in UN policy

I argue that it is reasonable to study these core ideas in the documents where they are most

extensively presented. Since the purpose is to study the core ideas that serves as the

foundation of R2P and compare them with previously existing Christian thought the official

status of the documents are of less importance than the fact that they spell out the central ideas

and that these ideas are gaining traction within the international community. Hence I will

analyse this report extensively to be able to identify the core ideas of R2P.

In order to gain insight into the Christian debate about R2P I rely on statements of policy

made by a wide variety of actors. Official statements by Christian organizations or groups of

organizations have been of considerable interests. I have chosen to also include statements by

individuals who express a Christian point of view in regard to these questions without being

representatives of any organizations. Further I have included not only official statements of

policy but also documents from seminars or workshops held by various Christian groups to

discuss the issues of R2P. This choice of material reflect my purpose, since I am effectively

searching for ideas and perspectives it would be erroneous to assume that such ideas could

only be found in official statements of large organizations. I have limited the material to such

articles, speeches or books in which the authors formulate their opinions about R2P from a

clear Christian perspective. This would include for instance a Christian speaking against R2P

as a form of imperialism whilst arguing that imperialism as such is anti-Christian. But it

would exclude an argument made by a person of faith (or even one holding a Church office)

that is not made from an expressly Christian perspective.

Chapter 6: The Responsibility to protect.

36 For a brief history of the ICISS see Bellamy, A (2009), 35-65

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6.1 The development of R2P.

In considering the development of new norms one should be very conscious of the fact that

norms develop in particular historical circumstances and in response to concrete problems.

The essential problem R2P is intended to address is how to overcome the tension between two

ideas, the first being the proposed need for intervention in case of massive abuses of human

rights, the second being the continued need for state self-determination.

In terms of historical circumstances I would argue that R2P emerged following the failure of

some hopes. After the end of the cold war much hope was placed in the potential to the UN to

act in a world no longer divided by super power rivalries. The successful UN operation to

repel the Iraqi attack on Kuwait in 1991 was one indication of such new potential. The abject

failures of the UN to act effectively in a series of crises in the early and middle 1990: ths,

particularly in Rwanda and Bosnia, did much to shatter these hopes and prompted a fierce

debate about the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.37 It was in relations to this debate

that Kofi Annan, then Secretary-General of the UN, posed a question to the international

community; “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty,

how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of

human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?”38

This challenged spurred the formation of the ICISS which would propose a way to overcome

the supposed contradiction between human rights enforcement and state self-determination..39

The 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

(ICISS) is the founding document that first spells out the idea and formulates the concept of

there being an international responsibility to protect. This report is the longest and most in-

depth document expounding on the idea. The ICISS views R2P as going beyond the issue of

military intervention, stressing instead that it is to be seen as a comprehensive response to 37 Vrdoljak, A (2009). The Responsibility to Protect Reexamined. Independent studies paper, University for peace. Available at http://www.monitor.upeace.org/pdf/Andrija.pdf. Accessed 2014-06-30. 23-2438 United Nations, (2000). We the people. The role of the United nations in the 21st century, 48. 39 Bellamy, 35-36

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large scale humanitarian crisis. Therefore they divide R2P into three separate responsibilities:

Responsibility to prevent, which calls for timely measure such as developmental aid or other

forms of assistance to avoid situations of grave breaches of human rights.40 Responsibility to

react, stressing the right and duty of the international community to respond to grave breaches

of human rights in order to stop them, if necessary by military force. This might be the most

contentious, since it most expressly legitimizes military intervention for humanitarian

purposes. Responsibility to rebuild finally calls for active peacebuilding measures after an

intervention in order to guarantee a stable and durable peace.41

In 2004 the Un High Level Panel on Threats, challenges and change presented their report A

more secure world: our shared responsibility. This report endorsed R2P and discussed the

problems of armed intervention at length.42 In the 2005 report, In Larger Freedom, then

secretary-general of the UN, Kofi Annan called for the upcoming world summit to endorse

the concept of R2P. In 2005 the United Nations world summit passed an outcome document

that in part addressed the issue of R2P. Articles 138-140 endorse the application of measures

under chapter VII of the UN charter.43 This is of importance since chapter VII spells out the

authority of the UNSC to undertake armed actions.44 The UNSC itself has since then made use

of R2P in several resolutions. In its 2006 resolution 1674, concerning the protection of

civilians in armed conflicted it stated its reaffirmation of articles 138 and 139 of the 2005

World summit outcome document.45 A significant example of R2P put into action could be

seen in the UN sponsored intervention in Libya in 2011. In relation to this the UNSC passed

resolution 1973, a resolution that authorized military intervention in Libya in order to protect

civilians, noting that the Libyan authorities who the resolution stated had the primary

40 ICISS, 1941 Ibid, 29 and 39 42 United Nations (2004). Secretary general´s high level panel of threats challenges and change. A more secure world, our chared responsibility. Available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/602/31/PDF/N0460231.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed 27 June 2014. 43 UN General Assembly, (2005). World Summit Outcome : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/44168a910.html. Accessed 27 June 2014. 30. 44 United Nations (1945). 45 United Nations (2006). Security Council resolution 1674. Available at http://www.r2pasiapacific.org/docs/R2P%20Key%20Documents/POC%20Resolution%201674.pdf. Accessed 27 June 2014.

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responsibility to do so, had manifestly failed in this duty and thus this responsibility ought to

be carried out by other states.46

6.2 Contrasting R2P and Pluralist international society.

I argue that R2P is best understood as an emerging norm of international politics that

recognizes the existence and importance of an international society but also calls for a

deepening of the proper role of international society. This view of the world is in line with the

outlook of the international society school, a theoretical approach to IR that rests on the

assumption that states share and work together in an international society that rests on a

number of commonly agreed upon norms..47 Below I will demonstrate that the normative

ideas of R2P challenge a number of the norms that underwrite current international society,

what I will from now on term pluralist international society.

Below I will present the normative ideas of pluralist international society and R2P on the

three issue areas I have specified. The intention is to demonstrate that R2P poses a significant

challenge to pluralism, hence it is important to study the sources of the ideas that guide this

emerging norm. Ones understanding of the key ideas of an emerging norm should be

improved if it is contrasted with the current paradigm. By such a comparison I will be able to

draw attention to differences between R2P and pluralist international society and to clearly

contrast them.

6.3 The legitimacy of governments in pluralist international society.

46 United Nations (2011). Security Council resolution 1973. Available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4d885fc42.html. Accessed 27 June 2014.47 Also described as the English School. For an overview of the International society approach se Jones, P (2010). The Ethics of international Society. In In Bell, D. (ed) Ethics and world politics. Oxford University Press. 111-129

29

The basic structure of pluralist international society is said to have its roots in the peace of

Westphalia in 1648.48 The ideas said to have emerged there included the idea of sovereign

equality and non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. Following the Second World

War the essential principles of pluralism where enshrined in the UN charter, although there

was also an inherent tension in the relationship between the respect for sovereignty and the

need for the maintenance of human rights.49

The pluralist international society has at its core one particular understanding for the role of

governing authorities and their essential source of legitimacy. One of the core pluralist

principles is the principle of sovereign equality between states entailed that all states were

considered to be of equal stature, no state was inherently superior to another and no state

could be legitimately be commanded by another. No state had the right to interfere in the

internal affairs of another state. At the time of Westphalia this limited the power of the Holy

Roman Empire over the German states and allowed for a measure of religious self-

determination.50 These two principles thus strived to ensure that the internal political or

religious order of a state was not to be a legitimate cause for conflict. The governments of the

individual states became the final authority for the citizens.51

Following the end of World War 2 the Westphalian/pluralist order can be said to have become

global. In the Charter of the United Nations fundamental aspects of the Westphalian system,

like the respect for territorial integrity and the principle of non-intervention were enshrined.52

48 One might question how much this description resembles the actual peace of Westphalia and how much is later creation of the IR community. See Osiander, A (2001), Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth. International Organization Vol 55(2), 251–287 or Croxton, D (1999), The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty. International History Review. Vol 21(3), 569–591,49 Bellamy, 8-9 and Håkansson, 69-72. 50 This is not to be confused with religious freedom, rather, the ruler of a state might determine if his state was to be Catholic, Lutheran or Calvinists and those citizens who did not wish to change their faith were only afforded the freedom to leave the state. 51 Jackson, R (2000), The Global Covenant. Human conduct in a World of States. Oxford university Press, 165-16752 Annan, K (2088). Remarks on accepting the peace of Westphalia prize. Available at http://kofiannanfoundation.org/newsroom/speeches/2008/10/kofi-annans-remarks-accepting-peace-westphalia-prize-0. Accessed 2014-06-30

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Also the collapse of European colonial empires extended sovereignty to peoples previously

held under colonial yoke. During the cold war period states jealously guarded their

sovereignty and outside interventions, even in situations where mass atrocities were

committed by governments against their own population, cases like Cambodia under Pol Pot

were strongly condemned, governments remained legitimate despite their internal policies and

could only legitimately the overthrown by their own people.53 It might be a bit extreme to

argue that governments under the pluralist system are free to do as they please and retain their

legitimacy; defenders of the pluralist system certainly endorse certain common standards.54

The conduct of governments could be cause for domestic and international concern but the

source of government sovereignty and right of non-intervention was the fact that it controlled

and administered a certain territory. This view is not only found during the cold war, as late as

2004 Pakistan argued against humanitarian intervention against the government of Sudan,

since it, despite its human rights violations, continued to be the legitimate government of

Sudan and thus privy to non-intervention.55

Pluralism is intended to provide negative freedom, the freedom from outside intervention and

the freedom to determine domestically what kind of government a state is to have.56 Hence the

legitimacy of government could not be derived from how well it corresponded to some

standard set by another state or group of states.57 Rather, the governments of states are

legitimate governments since they do in fact govern.

6.4 The legitimacy of governments in R2P.

53 For a history of supposedly humanitarian interventions during the cold war, see see Wheeler , N. J. (2003). Saving strangers: Humanitarian intervention in international society. Oxford University Press. Chapters 2-454 Jackson, 40855 Bellamy, 1156 Ibid, 40957 Jackson, 407-408

31

The ICISS report, The Responsibility to protect, argued that development of human rights

law, as well as concrete state behavior and attitudes pointed to a changed understanding of the

source of legitimacy for governments, an understanding that entailed that the legitimacy of

governments rested on their respect for human rights.58 They termed this view sovereignty as

responsibility.59 The ICISS, possibly to placate concerns about limitations being placed on the

sovereignty of states, that “There is no transfer or dilution of state sovereignty. But there is a

necessary re-characterization involved: from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as

responsibility in both internal functions and external duties”.60 This is the normative principle

that guides the ICISS in their views about the nature of state legitimacy.

The argument of the ICISS is that states are sovereign, legitimate holders of power and

authority, in order to protect the basic human rights of the citizens, and if the state should

manifestly fail in the responsibility it no longer enjoys sovereign status, it no longer carries

any right to demand non-intervention. Rather it is in dereliction of its core duty and other

states then have a reasonability to ensure that protective duties be carried out, if necessarily

over the objections of the involved state.61 So the understanding of the normative role of the

state, in the perspective of the ICISS, is that the essential normative function of the state, its

source of legitimacy is its responsibility for, and capacity to uphold human rights and not a

license to do whatever the state wants to its citizens. The state is responsible for the welfare of

its citizens and should the state fail the international community has a responsibility to ensure

their welfare.62

Contrasting the ideas of R2P on the issue of the normative role of government to the classic

views of pluralist international society shows a very stark contrast. In my analysis the ideas of

the ICISS in relation to the legitimacy of authority can be summarized as being:

1 The legitimacy of a government is directly derived from its ability to deliver certain

essential goods, chiefly life and liberty for the citizens. The legitimacy of government is

maintained as long as it continues to deliver these essential goods. 58 ICISS, 8.59 Ibid, 860ibid, 1361 Ibid, 1362 Ibid, 7

32

2 If the state should fail to do so it is no longer a legitimate holder of authority and can expect

no protection from principles of non-intervention.

3 The state is accountable both to its own population, who need not consider it a legitimate

agent representing them if it should manifestly fail to do so, and to the international

community, who need no consider it a legitimate member and if it should fail to live up to its

responsibilities.

4 The responsibility of other states is not to back of or remain non-involved in situation when

states are in dereliction of duty. Rather, in the event of mass violations of human rights there

is a positive duty to act.

This state of responsibility and accountability is somewhat meaningless however if not

backed up by a set of tools that enables the international community to apply forceful means

to hold governments to account and ensure the protection of civilian populations. Hence I

now turn to a second principle of R2P, the proper use of armed force.

6.5 Legitimate use of force in pluralist international society.

The present world order is marked by a very peculiar phenomenon. For most of history the

power to make legitimate use of armed force was firmly in the hands of the rulers of the

individual states, or other political units like empires, tribes etc. To make use of force with the

intention to aggrandize the state were not considered to be illegal or even necessarily odious.

But, following the outrages of the first and second world wars the need for a different

approach to the legitimate resort to armed force. Indeed in the UN charter the states of the

world recognized the need for a robust system of collective security. Hence the UN Security

council (UNSC) was invested with the power to legitimately undertake armed action if states

where considered to pose a threat to international peace and security.63 The fact that the UN

63 United Nations, (1945), Chapter VII. Available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml. Retrieved 2014-05-20

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Security council, a super-national organ, wields the power to legitimately resort to armed

force, with the exception of internal conflicts or in self-defence is truly a remarkable incursion

into what was once one of the core privileges of state, the right to use armed force. The UN

Charter states that the UNSC is to work towards the maintenance of, and avert threats to

international peace and security.64 Exactly what constitutes a threat to international peace and

security is determined by the UNSC. During the cold war the UNSC generally argued that the

domestic conditions of states did not constitute threats to international peace and security, this

followed from the views of sovereignty and non-intervention I discussed above. Conflict

between states and foreign involvement in the domestic affairs of states on the other hand

could be considered to be threats against peace and security and thus fall within the purview

of the UNSC. This is essential to the legitimate use of force in the pluralist international

system, states are free to live their own lives as long as they do not threaten other states. The

use of force is supposed to serve to ensure the continuance of pluralist international society,

hence it is primarily understood as a tool of self-defence.

During the cold war arguments that violations of human rights constituted a risk to

international peace and security generally fell flat in the UN.65 Rather, it was self-defence

against military aggression (sometimes self-defence assisted by another power) that was

regarded as the legitimate reason to resort to armed force. The essential purpose of force is not

to impose change in government of the aggressor but rather to end the aggression as such.

One example of this can be seen in the first Gulf War, Kuwait’s independence was restored

but the government of Saddam Hussein’s remained in power.

6.6 Legitimate use of armed force in R2P.

64 UN (1945), Chapter V. 65 Wheeler, 67

34

In the report of the ICISS there is a clear affirmation that violence is unfortunate as well as

undesirable, that non-military means are far more preferable than the use of force, and that

armed force should be a last resort.66 And the ICISS does not wish to do away with the

UNSC:s prerogative to determine when and how legitimate armed force might be used.67

However, they do seem to wish to widen the understanding of what constitutes a threat to

peace and argues that the practice of the UNSC indicates that violations of human rights now

may be treated as in themselves constitute threats to peace.68

The ICISS perceives R2P as a set of responses, pre-emptive, preventive, reactive and

reconstructive, most of whom does not involve the use of armed force.69 But, in extreme cases

the ICISS argues that the international community, after considering a number of pre-

cautionary principles, might legitimately resort to armed force, over the objections of the

country towards which they are intervening. But such armed intervention should only be

resorted to in order to in situations that threaten “Large scale loss of life, actual or

apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state

action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or B. large scale ‘ethnic

cleansing’, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of

terror or rape.70 This constitutes what the ICISS describes as a Just Cause, governments that

commit or tolerate such events are in violation of its responsibilities and deserve to have the

protection of the non-intervention principle suspended.71 Plainly this understanding of just

cause goes much further than limiting the use of force to defensive operation in case of

aggression. I would argue that the essential goal of the use of force in the view of the ICISS is

the restoration of just condition and to punish governments, who violate, fail to prevent or

tolerate violations of the basic human rights of their subjects.

Whilst the ICISS reinterprets the idea of a just cause to include the prevention of mass

atrocity crimes and thus widens the meaning of a threat to pace it also states a number of

criterions intended to guide decision and to ensure that military intervention is undertaken for 66 ICISS, 2967 Ibid, 49. 68 Ibid, 1669 ibid, XI. 70 Ibid, XII 71 Ibid, 32

35

right reasons and using proper means. These are right intention, last resort, proportional

means, reasonable prospects and right authority.72

It does seem clear that they argue that the essential normative role of the use of force is to

bring about conditions of justice in places where the governments are in violation of their

responsibilities. This long term commitment to building structures of good governance and

respect for human rights is known as the responsibility to rebuild.73 The intention of an

intervention must be more long ranging than merely the immediate end of violations. Rather,

the goal of military intervention is to ensure the restoration of justice and to end the reign of

government’s who have caused the intervention to be necessary.

I would summarize the normative principles guiding the ICISS in relation to the use of force

as

1 Violations of human rights within states constitutes a just cause for armed intervention,

even if the government does not threaten any neighbour. Sovereignty is not a shield from

outside intervention if the rights of the people in that state are threatened.

2 Force is an undesirable but sometimes necessary tool of international politics.

3 Due to its destructive nature and in order to ensure support, the use of force the decision to

resort to force must be guided by a number of precautionary criterions.

4 The goal of military intervention is long-ranging. Not only the actions that necessitated the

intervention, but also the power structures that permitted them must be removed.

So, if R2P does not have a more liberal or permissive view of the use of force in international

politics it does have a distinctly different understanding of for what purposes force is to be

used, one that goes much further than the traditional pluralist view. To understand the roots of

this changing conception of the role of force I will now turn to the third issue under

72 ICISS, XII73 Ibid, XI

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investigation. This concerns what kind of ethic ought to inform the actions of international

society.

6.7 Ethical foundations of pluralism.

To say that the international society that developed after the Second World War and was

codified in the charter of the United Nations rests on pluralism is to claim that there is a

particular normative view of how states ought to behave in relation to other states. As

mentioned one of the core norms of pluralism is non-intervention. I would argue that this can

be interpreted to mean an ethic of tolerance.

The core idea of pluralism is that states ought to have a great degree of respect for the

differences between states in terms of political or economic system. This is because the good

life must be lived within the state so the population is that state ought to be free to design it.74

It would be a mistake to identify this approach to international politics as a state of

indifference or callousness. Rather it should be analyzed as an attempt to provide states with

enough self-determination to live their own particular version of the good life. Also, non-

intervention was constructed primarily as a defense of weak states in relation to stronger ones.

Humanitarian concerns had been a frequent excused used to motivate intervention into the

affairs of weaker states by great powers.75 Especially nefarious was the claim by Adolf Hitler

that his invasion of Czechoslovakia was motivated by humanitarian concerns about the

security of the ethnic Germans.76 The pluralist international society was designed to ensure

progress, peace and stability by giving states a considerable freedom. So if the system has

been criticized for failing to ensure a particular moral standard of state behavior it should also

be recognized as having been designed to cope with other threats to human freedom and

dignity.

74 For a defense of the ethics of pluralism see Jackson, 406-41175 For a history of the reasons for intervention in international politics see Finemore, M (2004). The Purpose of Intervention. Changing beliefs about the use of force. Cornell university press. 76 Bellamy, 17

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At the heart of pluralism one might detect a degree of relativism, what is good for one state

and one people might not be good for another, but exactly how far this relativism is to be

taken is a disputed issue. Nevertheless, the essential duty of states is one of non-interference

into the affairs of other states. This understanding of the ethical foundation of international

society calls for a thin conception of international society, one that does not generally

interference in domestic affairs but strives to ensure toleration, stability and non-intervention.

6.8 Ethical foundation of R2P.

R2P is intended to deal with problems concerning the prevention of human suffering, an issue

of enormous moral and ethical importance. . Hence it is not surprising that one can detect a

different understanding of the proper ethical foundations for international politics in R2P. In

the understanding of the ICISS the key goal of international politics is to ensure tolerable

conditions for human beings, to put them in the center of world politics. As they put it “it is

certainly becoming increasingly clear that the human impact of international actions cannot be

regarded as collateral to other actions, but must be a central preoccupation for all

concerned.”77 Thus R2P puts the traditional task of pluralist international society on its head.

Hence, the responsibility of international society is, in extreme cases, not tolerate the

existence of certain conditions within other states. The basis for this approach is that certain

behaviors, like gross violations of human rights are not acceptable and that there is no moral

defense for standing by and permitting them. Hence, it is not a right to sometimes intervene

but a responsibility and a duty, it calls for a very active international society with clear

humanitarian goals.

The ICISS uses the language of human security to motivate a transition towards an

international order that is chiefly concerned with the wellbeing of persons rather than states. It

argues that development of international human rights tribunals and other institutions 77 ICISS, 6

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increasingly entails the existence of an international state of accountability. And it argues that

state practice and the existence and development of human rights legislation entails that there

is an emerging consensus around the idea that sovereignty entails responsibility.78

The essential principle for the ICISS is that there is a duty to act if there is a major threat to

the life’s and dignity of people. Firstly the responsibility falls to the state, being the most

effective agent for action. But it the state fails then there is a duty for other states to ensure the

human rights of citizens in other countries.79 This extents the responsibility of the state. The

role of the state, as we saw above is in the view of R2P to ensure respect for human rights

domestically. In that regard one might say that R2P deepens the responsibility of the state.

It also extends this responsibility to include responsibility for conditions in other countries.

R2P thus entails an extension of responsibility for the wellbeing of citizens in other states. No

longer is the essential normative role of international society to tolerate differences but to

forcefully strive for certain common objectives.

The ICISS are clear about their commitment to the equal worth of all people.80 But the ICISS

does not use any particular philosophical line of argument for their position. Equal worth of

all people are assumed, and so are the nature of human rights that apply to all. The moral

dimension of R2P is mostly disused at a tool to achieve political will for action. 81 The ICISS

does not formulate an explicit case for the normative foundations of human rights and the

duties of R2P. Rather they argue that the norm of R2P already exists due to state practice and

the emergence of human rights laws. States reconceptualises the meaning of their sovereignty

by actions like signing the UN charter or the declaration to prevent genocide.82 This combined

with developments like the foundation of the ICC means progress towards a state of “justice

whiteout borders”.83 However, even if they are unstated the core moral principles of R2P are

discernable. The underlying idea that motivated R2P, and one of the most morally attractive

aspects of it, is the idea that there exists a responsibility to care for people for no other reason

78 ICISS, 15-1779 Ibid, XI80 Ibid, 7581 Ibid, 7182 Ibid, 1383 ICISS, 14

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than that of a shared humanity. This introduces an ethic of care to international policy, the

idea that there is a global duty to care about, and to rectify conditions that lead to the

sufferings of people. A state of moral universalism where boarders and differences between

cultures, political systems or faith does not serve to prevent action. Rather, R2P calls for

solidarity between peoples who are very different. It calls for sacrifice in order to help people

with whom one might have very little in common.

The essential normative foundation of R2P is that human beings have certain inviolable rights

that apply to everyone. So, the responsibility to protect is universal and the human rights that

are to be defended are universal. This of course leads to problematic implications. Some states

have very different conceptions of the exact nature of human rights than the western liberal

model.84 The ICISS are not explicit about whether or not human rights are objectively right as

such or only consequences of particular historical developments that the ICISS authors

happen to agree with. The thrust of the argument of the ICISS is that human rights and cross-

border responsibility are increasingly treated as a central concern for international politics and

that this represents a positive development.85 But they do treat human rights as an essential

objective good, so I would argue that one can discern from the report a belief in the objective

nature of a minimal set of human rights. My conclusion is that the normative ideas of R2P in

this context are:

1 There is a universal human responsibility for the wellbeing of other human beings, and there

exists also a common minimal standard.

2 Human rights and liberties are so clearly enshrined in international law and state practice

that they can effectively be regarded as objective.

3 Respect for such rights are essential for a just and peaceful world order.

84 For one example see Organization of the Islamic Conference (1990), Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3822c.html. Retrieved 2014-04-25. 85 ICISS, 14

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4 States have a responsibility to care for the citizens of other states as well as their own,

despite differences in religious, political or cultural outlook. The responsibility to care and act

is universal.

6.9 Conclusions.

A problem that confronts any study of R2P concerns how to best define it. Is it a doctrine,

norm, emerging norm or legal principle? I have chosen to describe it as an emerging norm

that rests on a number of normative ideas, some of which I have presented above. I describe it

as an emerging norm since it has been endorsed by a UN world summit and clearly has a

degree of acceptance from the community of states. On the other hand its practical application

is contested. It is hardly practiced in all places where it, by the standards of the ICISS report

ought to be practiced. It does not have the power of habitual obedience we might associate

with a full norm or legal principle of international politics. 86

This emerging norm rests on a number of normative ideas for how the world ought to

function. The relevant ideas in this context essentially describe the state as a conditional

custodian of its population. It is only protected by the non-intervention principle if certain

conditions are fulfilled. It regards the resort to armed force in international politics as

legitimate in certain conditions, including but not limited to self-defence. Finally, it is guided

by a particular understanding of what ethic international society ought to be guided by, an

ethic that places responsibility and the duty to care and protect people worldview as the

central task of international society. These views stand in stark contrast with the normative

views of pluralist international society.

86 For a fuller discussion about the important differences between various terms see Bellamy, 4-7

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Chapter 7: Christianity and international politics.

As I discussed above R2P rests on a number of normative ideas concerning how international

society ought to act in certain situations. I now turn to investigate if there are ideas

corresponding to these views to be found in the Christian tradition. The idea if course is to see

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if such ideas exist, and if so, might be argued to form a part of the spectrum of ideas that help

shape R2P.

7.1 The Christian view of government authority and legitimacy.

As I argued above the ICISS holds power to be a state of responsibility. Those who hold

authority does so in order to fulfil a particular set of obligations. In this section I will see if a

comparable Christian tradition concerning the nature and legitimacy of the power of

authorities.

7.1.1 The Old Testament.

In the very first book of The Bible one finds that mankind is created in the image of God to be

custodians of the earth and all that lives in it. Mankind’s role is specified to be ruler and

custodian of creation. As such they are imbued with a clear responsibility to guard and protect

it.87 But in the early chapters of the book of Genesis the people do not live in a distinct

political unit. Not until the Israelites leave Egypt to the chosen people start to maintain a

distinctive political order.

One of the earliest and most clear examples of the role and limit to authority is the case of

Moses and the Egyptian Pharaoh found in Exodus. The exodus narrative tells of how the

Israelites were called out from the rule of the Egyptian Pharaoh who was subjecting them to

all manner of abuses, forced labour and a policy of child killing tantamount to genocide.88

87 Genesis, 1:26. All Biblical references are from Barker, K (ed) (2004). New International Version Study Bible. Zondervan. Due to the wide array of Bible translations and editions, available in printed and online form I have decided to specify Chapter and verse numbers whilst not specifying page numbers. This is the usual way of Biblical referencing and most suited to enable the reader to easily follow references. 88 Exodus, 1:1-22

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In response these outrages God spoke to Moses, saying “I have indeed seen the misery of my

people in Egypt. I have heard them suffering out because of their slave drivers, and I am

concerned about their suffering.”89 Interestingly, God later, in Exodus 6:5-6 states that he has

heard the sufferings of his people and remembered his covenant with them. So in this

narrative, God is not only acting out of a general moral outrage but also from a position as a

partner of a mutual covenant, a covenant between a people and their deity that specified his

task as being their protector and defender. As Old Testament scholar Christopher Wright puts

it, “Yahweh is a God who sets himself against injustice and oppression, initiating the exodus

expressly to put them right.”90 The power of Pharaoh is overturned due to the brutal policies

he conducts and after a series of gradually worsening plagues the Israelites are set free The

Exodus narrative can be interpreted as affirming the principle that power is an essentially

conditional state that might be overturned if it is abused.

This idea that rulers must conform to a moral standard set by divine will, least they lose their

power is re-occurring thought the Old Testament. As Psalm 82:3-4 puts it, those who claim

absolute power ought to “Defend the weak and the fatherless; uphold the cause of the poor

and oppressed. Rescue the weak and the needy; deliver them from the hand of the wicked”

There are also several prophetic expositions on the proper exercise of power, for instance

Isaias injunction against those who use their power to exploit the weak and powerless,

assuring that they will be judged by their action.91 There is also the speech of Jeremiah,

where he, speaking prophetic words from the lord, lays down the essential tasks of the

powerful, “Rescue from the hands of the oppressor the one who has been robbed. Do no

wrong or violence to the foreigner, the fatherless or the widow, and do not shed innocent

blood in this place”.92 The chapter goes on to a comparison between the righteousness and

justice of the former kings and the hardship befallen the rulers of the day who had fallen into

wickedness and consequentially experienced a severe punishment.93

89 Exodus, 3: 790 Wright, C (1990). The people of God and the State in the Old Testament. Themelios. Vol 16 (1), 4-10. 591 Book of Isaiah, 10:1-3 92 Book of Jeremiah. 22:393 Ibid, 10:15-17

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In one interesting prophet the Prophet Daniel addressed Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon,

saying that he held his power by divine authority. But that his continued abuses would result

in divine judgement and the ends of his power.94 Power bestowed was also power

accountable.

These episodes in the Old Testament demonstrate the existence of a particular view of earthly

authorities. One where the rulers hold power by the will of the creator and are his custodians,

but they are also responsible, and accountable to him for their actions. Their power over their

peoples may be denied them if they violate the moral order God has set up. Either by direct

divine intervention and liberation of the oppressed, as in Exodus, or foreign states will be

used as the divine instrument to bring down the offensive rulers, as in the Babylonian

conquest of Israel told in the Book of Isaiah.

7.1.2 The New Testament.

None of the four gospels record Jesus laying out a particularly clear program about the proper

role of government. This is not to be interpreted as a lack of engagement whit authorities.

Rather, at least one of the most well-known sayings or stories of The New Testament are in

fact about the necessity of protecting the weak against the actions of unjust authorities. I am

specifically referring to the story of how Jesus protects a woman from a mob, led by the

political and religious elite among the Jews, who wished to stone her.95 He himself acts to

protect someone persecuted by those authorities who ought to uphold the law but manifestly

fail to do so. There is also the passage in the gospel of Matthew that states that everyone must

do what one can to protect people who are weak or vulnerable and the failure to do so will

result in judgment. This is not directly aimed at any government but it can be interpreted as a

general moral principal, not only is protecting those who need it the right thing to do, but

94 Book of Daniel, 4:27, It might be noted that a prophet in the Old Testament sense is not exclusively someone who speaks of things to come but a person who conducts divinely inspired social criticism. 95 The Gospel of John, 8:2-11.

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failure to do so will have severe consequences, it is Christian duty.96 This ethic of protection

can reasonable be understood as including those who are in positions of authority.

It is important to note that this example indicates that Jesus understood the authorities to be,

in principle, legitimate, as evidenced by the assertion to give to the emperor what belonged to

him, but to also give to God what belonged to him.97 Similar messianic movements of the

time preached rebellion against authority, not so Jesus who apparently saw authorities as

having legitimate claims to obedience, as long as they did not claim possession of what

belonged to God.98

For a more comprehensive statement of the New Testament approach to government I turn to

Paul the Apostle. Given his personal history it is not surprising that he should have dedicated

some thought to the problem of the relationship between the rulers and the subjects. Paul

originally belonged to the political and religious elite of the Jewish people and took part in the

persecution of the followers of Jesus, most notably his participation in the judicial murder of

Stephen, the first Christian Martyr. His later conversion and leadership in the church, as

portrayed in the Acts of the Apostles and his epistles, frequently brought him into conflict

with the worldly authorities, both among the Jewish elite in Palestine and the Roman

authorities in Asia Minor, Greece and Rome.

The most extensive discourse on the proper role of, and relationship between the governing

authorities, the people and the moral order can be found in Pauls Epistle to the Romans. The

passage, chapter 13:1-5 reads “Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there

is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been

established by God. Consequently, whoever rebels against the authority is rebelling against

what God has instituted, and those who do so will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers

hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free

from fear of the one in authority? Then do what is right and you will be commended. For the

one in authority is God’s servant for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for rulers do 96 See The Gospel of Matthew, 25:35-40.97 Gospel Of Mark, 12:13-12:17. 98 See Horsley, R (2005), A peoples history of Christianity. Christian origins. Fortress press. 28-29 and 47.

46

not bear the sword for no reason. They are God’s servants, agents of wrath to bring

punishment on the wrongdoer. Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities, not only

because of possible punishment but also as a matter of conscience.”99

There are two possible readings of the text. One can read the text to encompass an

endorsement government in all possible situations and requires acceptance of any government

policy. By this reading it would be unacceptable for Christians to ever oppose governments

and certainly to endorse military action to prevent any government policy. If this is the correct

reading then Christianity is not the antecedent to sovereignty as responsibility but rather an

inspiration for policies like cold war non-interventionism.

But other New Testaments passages hardly support this understanding of Paul as endorsing

total power of government. On the contrary, leading members of the early Jesus movement,

including Paul are depicted as challenging unjust authorities.100 These examples show that

Paul himself and the early apostles did not understand the proper attitude towards earthly

authorities to be one of unquestioning submission.

Paul repeatedly refers to sovereigns as servants to a higher purpose, as 13:4 puts it “to bring

punishment to wrongdoers” and is very clear that authorities are not to be a menace to “those

who do right”. So, one can also read Paul to mean that governments are instituted to serve a

particular purpose, the maintenance of a moral code as set by God. And that, given free will

and the sinful nature of mankind they may fail to abide by this function. Should they fail to

exercise their function to uphold a moral order that rewards moral behavior and punishes

wrongdoing they are no longer fulfilling the purpose they have been instituted in. American

evangelical Christian Jim Wallis argues that Paul’s view is in fact that not that the

government must always be obeyed but that “the purpose of government, according to Paul, is

to protect and promote. Protect from the evil and promote the good”.101 This understanding of

99 Epistle to the Romans, 13:1-5. 100 Acts of the Apostles, 4:1-20, 5:29 and 23:1-11, 101 Wallis, J. Caring for the Poor is Government's Biblical Role. Available at http://sojo.net/blogs/2012/08/30/caring-poor-governments-biblical-role. Accessed 2014-04-30

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Paul is not a novel approach, rather as Elisabeth Ferris so aptly writes “There have been many

times when Christians, because of their faith, have resisted authority.”102

7.1.3 Later Christian tradition.

One authoritative source for later Christian views on authority is the Catholic Church, whose

catechism dwells extensively on the role of authority. It is very clear on the need for a

legitimate authority but “Authority does not derive its moral legitimacy from itself. It must

not behave in a despotic manner, but must act for the common good”. 103 It also gives the

Catholic view to be that: “Authority is exercised legitimately only when it seeks the common

good of the group concerned and if it employs morally licit means to attain it. If rulers were to

enact unjust laws or take measures contrary to the moral order, such arrangements would not

be binding in conscience” And further states that “authority should ensure by morally

acceptable means the security of society and its members.”104 The source of authority of

political authority is the providing of the common good for society, this includes both

material necessities and extensive human freedom.105 The world’s largest Christian

denomination understands the Christian attitude towards government to mean that

governments are in a state of responsibility. The source of their legitimacy is to be found in

how well they fulfill their essential task, to provide for the common good.

7.1.4 The Contemporary Christian debate about R2P.

My earlier presentation of how various Christian documents discuss sovereignty should to be

interpreted as inferring that all Christians have at all times opposed the Westphalian

102 Ferris, E (2007). A faithful case for interventions. In Steenland,S et al (ed). Pursuing the Global Common Good: Principle and Practice in US Foreign Policy. Centre for American Progress, 22103 See Catechism of the Catholic Church. (1993 ed). Part 3, Chapter 2, Article 2. Paragraph 1897 and 1902Available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM. Retrieved 2014-05-11. 104 Ibid, Paragraph 1903 and 1909. 105 Ibid, Paragraphs 1921-1922 and 1924-1925.

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conception of sovereignty. In discussion and study documents preceding their endorsement of

R2P the World council of Churches, WCC, (an organizations of protestant and orthodox

churches representing some 500 million members) has affirmed its historic support for the

doctrine of sovereignty as outlined in the UN charter (the WCC forcefully protested against

the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 for instance), but also stressed the changing nature

of humanitarian law as well as changing world conditions, thus opening up for a possible

change of policy towards sovereignty.106 In the same document the central committee of the

WCC also state their view about the role and purpose of government, an understanding quite

similar to the one found in the Catholic Catechism (this is significant since the Catholic

Church is not a member of the WCC and one might well expect a different outlook from the

mostly protestant churches in the WWC). They write that institutions like governments “must

guarantee the protection of the innocent, the poor, the weak, the minorities and the oppressed;

not only within domestic societies, but within any other society affected by these policies and

actions.”107

In its declaration of 2006 the WCC general assembly endorsed R2P, stressing idea of

sovereignty as responsibility towards it citizens and stressing the positive aspect of placing

“citizens at the centre of the debate” and endorsed the international communities “duty to

assist peoples and states, and in extreme situations, to intervene in the internal affairs of the

state in the interests and safety of the people”.108 Here we can see that an organization that

previously maintained a strict interpretation of the UN charter changing its outlook in relation

to the development of R2P.

Other Christians have also discussed R2P and the proper role of authority and non-

intervention, perhaps most prominently former Pope Benedict XVI. In his address to the

General Assembly of the UN in 2008, Pope Benedict XVI forcefully endorsed R2P, arguing

that human dignity, the idea that he said underwrote R2P, applies to everyone due to “the

common origins of the person, who remains the high-point of Gods creative design” and by

virtue of “natural law inscribed on human hearts and present in different cultures and

106 World Council of Churches (2001). The protection of endangered populations in situations of armed violence: toward an ecumenical ethical approach. 107 Ibid, paragraph 45. 108 World Council of Curches. (2006), Vulnerable populations at risk. Statement on the responsibility to protect.

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civilizations. Hence, it is not up to the individual state to sovereignly determine what they

count as human rights, there is an absolute standard. And if the state fails to protect the rights

of their citizens Benedict argued that the international community “must intervene” and that

such interventions should not be seen as “an unwarranted imposition or a limitation of

sovereignty. On the contrary, it is “indifference or failure to intervene that do (sic) the real

damage”.109 Thus Pope Benedict endorsed another potentially controversial aspect of R2P, the

changing nature of sovereignty, in clear and unequivocal terms.110 Reverend Dennis

Holtschneider argued that the endorsement of R2P in of Pope Benedict’s speech “undercuts

the inviolability of national boundaries and even their government’s claims to non-

interference”. Further arguing that Benedict’s endorsement constituted “a theological and

moral justification of this new responsibility and a call for the world community to accept and

enact its provisions.”111 Hence the then head of the Catholic Church, the single largest

Christian denomination viewed the notion of R2P fundamentally in line with Christian moral

thinking and, in the words of Rev Holtschneider “Benedict put the worldwide Catholic

Church behind this idea called the responsibility to protect”.

In 2005 the WCC held a seminar in Geneva to discuss how to relate to R2P. One of the

participants, Hugo Slim, made several comments in response to a talk held by Gareth Evans,

(a member of the ICISS) in regards to the Christian understanding of sovereignty and R2P. He

argued that R2P rests on two core ideas, firstly the protection of victims and secondly calling

authorities to their responsibility, arguing that that Jesus’s dealings with authorities showed

that “God expects power to be used lovingly and responsibility in the interests of everyone

and especially of the poor and weak”.112 And he states that “Here too the gospel is in accord

109 Benedict , XVI, (2008). Meeting with the members of the general assembly of the united nations organization address of his holiness benedict xvi. Retrieved from: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2008/april/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080418_un-visit_en.html 2014-04-01. 110 Ibid. 111 Holtschneider, J. (2008). The responsibility to protect. Address by the rev. Dennis Holtschneider to the Church-State breakfast forum at the Chicago Union League Club. Available at http://offices.depaul.edu/president/speeches-and-communications/2009/Pages/responsibility-to-protect.aspx Retrieved 2014-03-02112 Slim, H (2005). The Christian responsibility to protect. A response to Gareth Evans and Konrad Raisner. WCC experts seminar on the Responsibility to Protect. Geneva, 21-23 April 2005. Available at mercury.ethz.ch/.../Files/.../The%2520ChristianResponsibility.pdf. Retrieved 2014-02-21. Also partially reprinted in Asfaw, S, Kreber, G, Widerud (Eds) (2005), The Responsibility to Protect: Ethical and Theological Reflections. World Council of Churches.

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whit R2P”.113 He further argued that R2P serves as a necessary “mitigation of the harshest

doctrine of sovereignty. Sovereignty and self-determination must be respected but not at any

price.”114 He also argued that the Church has a particular task in calling authorities to live up

to their responsibilities, such action being a continuation of Jesus’s personal action, “He never

forced anyone to change but rather called them to change or helped them directly when they

asked for it. This gospel call to responsible personal sovereignty and assisted self-

determination can be applied internationally by the church.”115

Among those Christians who oppose the concept of R2P there is a clear stance towards the

problem of sovereignty. Those who oppose R2P, mainly from the pacifist tradition and

collectively known as Historic Peace Churches are clear on that “national sovereignty has

never been a “sanctified concept” for them.” 116 The Canadian Friends Services Committee

also have stated their opposition but welcomed “the change in emphasis from “state as

absolute power” to “state as responsible for the protection of its citizens” that is evident in the

concept of Responsibility to Protect”.117 J.J Fehr, a leading German Mennonite and principled

pacifist, argues that R2P can be found in the heart of the Christian faith.118 This is not to be

understood as an endorsement of R2P but rather as an affirmation that Christians have a

responsibility to protect that requires effective action. Since opponents of R2P are in

principled agreement about the need for protecting innocent can hardly allow for the option of

non-action. And indeed, they also argue that protecting is the right thing to do, but have

serious differences about the legitimate means and tools. Rather, they emphasize that the

objectives of interventions must be the welfare of individuals and that this objective precludes

the use of force, but not action by the international community. Indeed the British Quakers

have stated their agreement with the idea that sovereignty should legitimately be overridden

113 Ibid.114 Ibid115 Ibid116 Enns, F (2007). The Responsibility to Protect- International Ecumenical Consultation. Evangelische Akademie Arnoldshain November 16 – 18, 2007, .From “humanitarian intervention” to “responsibility to protect”: peacemaking and policing – the view of the historic peace churches. Available at: http://overcomingviolence.org/fileadmin/dov/files/iepc/expert_consultations/Fernando_-_R2P_Arnoldshain_2007-11.pdf0. Retrieved 2014-04-05. 2117 Canadian Friends Service Committee, (2007). Summary of Quaker discernment on “The responsibility to protect 2006-2007. Available at http://quakerservice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/summary-of-discernment-R2P.pdf. Retrieved 2014-02-11. 2118 Fehr, J. J. (2008). The responsibility to confront evil: a pacifist critique of R2P from the historic peace churches [online] Available at: http://www.dmfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/Responsibility to Confront Evil.pdf. Retrieved 2014-04-02.

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as a last resort to avoid humanitarian disasters even if they oppose military action as part of

such a suspension of sovereignty.119 So, even among those groups who object to or

fundamentally disagree with certain aspect of R2P argue that it is a Christian duty to intervene

to protect those who need protecting if the state does not fulfil its duty to protect them.120

There are indeed a third group, Churches who oppose the suspension of national sovereignty

in relation to R2P. What is particular in their way of arguing is that they do not ground their

arguments in scriptural doctrines but rather in the historical experiences of imperialism or

problems of unaccountability or by a fear that R2P might lead to a greater permissiveness

about the resort to violence.121 There is no claim that the doctrine of sovereignty as presented

in R2P is incompatible with the understanding of the responsible use of authority that can be

found in scripture or in the Christian tradition.

7.2 The legitimate Use of Armed Force.

As I argued above the ICISS holds an essentially negative view of violence, arguing that the

use of force must be mitigated by the application of a number of precautionary criterion. But

that they also view state violations against their own citizens to be a legitimate cause for war.

119 Religious society of Friends (Quakers) In Switzerland. (2009) Statement adopted by Yearly Meeting of The Religious society of Friends (Quakers) in Switzerland. In Religious Society of Friedns (Quakers) in Brittain. The Proceedings of the Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain 2009. Vol 2. 14 120 Church and Peace International office, (2011). Press release. Struggle for God´s Shalom to continue, even after the end of the ecumenical decade to overcome violence. Retrieved from http://www.church-and-peace.org/fileadmin/downloads/Pressemitteilungen/PR_CaP_E_05.11.2011.pdf. 2014-05-13121 For a variety of such views see United Church of Canada.(2008) Responsibility to protect – Background paper. Retrieved from http://www.united-church.ca/files/peace/protect_background.pdf. 2014-05-13

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What is the source of these criteria? And how do they correspond to Christian philosophy on

the appropriate role of violence? And, perhaps more important, is there a Christian

philosophy that could have served as the inspiration for this of more expansive view of Just

Cause.

7.2.1 Old Testament.

One of the first Biblical narratives concerning the legitimate use of armed force by larger

groups occurs in Genesis. The story tells of how the patriarch Abraham rescues his cousin

Lot. Lot and all his people had been taken prisoner by invading armies and carried away into

slavery. Abraham (or Abram as he was still called at the time) intervened and decisively

defeated Lots enemies and set his people free.122 Contrary to what might perhaps have

expected Abraham did not continue to plunder the lands of the kings who attacked Lot and

reaps no vengeance of their people. Rather he ceased military engagements after the freedom

and property of Lot and his people has been restored and return to peaceful life. Abraham

went to war, despite not having been attacked himself, in order to rescue both Lot and a

number of other people. It might be a bit anachronistic to describe this as the first

humanitarian intervention (especially since the event in all likelihood never took place) but it

does illustrate the presence in the old Testament of a philosophy of violence that regard the

liberation of the enslaved and the protection of innocents as a worthy and laudable cause for

the resort to force.

Following the exodus from Egypt the Israelites are given instructions to embark on warfare in

order to secure their own safety as well as to capture the Promised Land from those who

inhabit it. They also receive instructions on how to conduct this war. One line of instruction

refers only to those people who dwell in the Promised Land and is very harsh. These cities are

to be totally destroyed along with all people found in them.123 This is put into practice in the

siege of Jericho where all people, with the exception of one family, are killed.124

122 Genesis, 14:12-17. 123 Deuteronomy, 20:16-17124 Book of Joshua, 6:22-25

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However, there are also more general instructions for how is to be waged outside the

immediate context of the conquest of Canaan. These instructions are considerable less brutal.

First of all cities must be offered terms of surrender before they are attacked. And even if they

refuse to surrender and are conquered the general population are not to be massacred are

women may not be raped.125 There are also instructions not to despoil natural resources,

specifically orchards.126 So, whilst there also are stories of battles that result in total

destruction of the enemy, there are injunctions intended to limit the destructiveness of war.

This arguably is the first step of a longer tradition that accepts the necessity of the use of force

but also makes deliberate attempts to limit it use. There are also examples of the use of force

for other reasons than self-defence, such as the rescue of enslaved populations.

7.2.2 New Testament.

The exact nature of the attitude towards violence expressed in the New Testament is deeply

contested. Several of statements had been interpreted as calling for an attitude of total non-

violence. The Gospel of Matthew chapters 5-7, commonly known as the Sermon on the

Mount is often cited in relation to Jesus’s view on violence. In 5:21-22 “You have heard that it

was said to the people long ago, ‘You shall not murder, and anyone who murders will be

subject to judgment. But I tell you that anyone who is angry with a brother or sister will be

subject to judgment”. In verse 5:38 Jesus states “You have heard that it was said, ‘Eye for

eye, and tooth for tooth.  But I tell you, do not resist an evil person. If anyone slaps you on the

right cheek, turn to them the other cheek also.” Further, in 5:43-44 “You have heard that it

was said, ‘Love your neighbor and hate your enemy.’ But I tell you, love your enemies and

pray for those who persecute you”. This and other statements about the use of force have been

interpreted by some Christians as a total ban on the use of violence.127 Later proponents of this

pacifist approach claim that this understanding of Jesus was the totally dominant Christian

view until Christianity became the favored religion of the Roman Empire.128 Those who favor

different attitudes to violence argue that this is a considerable simplification since many

125 Deuteronomy, 20:10-15 and 21:10-14126 Ibid, 20:19127 For an extremely early example of Christian pacifism See Tertulian. Christians and military service. In Holmes, A (Ed) (2005). War and Christian ethics. Baker Academic. 43-47128 Yoder, J. (2010). Nonviolence. A brief history. Baylor University Press.50

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Christian are said to have been serving in the Roman army before the Roman Empire

embraced Christianity.129

In Paul’s letters to the Romans one can read that “rulers do not bear the sword for no reason.

They are God’s servants, agents of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer”. Hence one

can deduce that Paul argues that it is in fact legitimate for authorities do undertake armed

action in order to prevent or stop wrongdoing. This of course might be argued contradict the

supposed pacifism of Jesus.

There is no unanimity about how these statements in the New Testament are to interpreted.

And I would not argue that the New Testament as such has served as an inspiration for the

ICISS in their view of force. However, the view of force found in the Old and New

Testaments have stimulated a considerable debate and lead to the formulation of the just war

tradition that I will discuss bellow.

7.2.3 Later Christian tradition.

The debate about how to best translate the commandments in the New testaments

commandments, in particular to love ones enemies, has however resulted in considerable

debate and a rich tradition known as the Just War Tradition (JWT, sometimes Just War

Theory or Theology). JWT developed after Christianity emerged as the dominant religion of

129 Charles, D (2005). Between pacifism and jihad. Just war and Christian tradition. InterVarsity Press. 36

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the Roman Empire and was, up until about the seventeenth century, a very vibrant tradition. It

has since then reemerged, particularly in the post-world war two period.130

The development of JWT is a complex story. As mentioned there is a strong presupposition

against violence in the New Testament. And the just war tradition seeks to reconcile the use of

force with the ethics of Jesus. This tradition emerged in the fourth century AD as Christianity

became the state religion of the Roman Empire.131 What position the earlier Christians took to

violence is somewhat disputed. Some authors argue that previous to the development of the

just war tradition pacifism was the totally dominant Christian point of view. 132 Others have

argued that this is a considerable simplification since many Christian are said to have been

serving in the Roman army before the days of Constantine’s conversion.133

The foundation of the traditional was originally developed by bishop Ambrose of Milan and

bishop Augustine of Hippo. Thomas Aquinas contributed significantly to the idea as well and

later important contributors included the Salamanca school, a group of Spanish theological

headed by Francisco de Vitoria. Later important contributors have included Paul Ramsay and

James Turner Johnson.134

The Just War tradition does not attempt to connect to the kind of holy war undertaken by

Joshua in the capture of Canaan, rather it attempt to connect the Old Testament rules for

warfare, Paul’s understanding of authorities with the commandment to love ones neighbor.

One of the key aspects of the just war tradition is its determination to overcome the, according

to them, simplistic description of Jesus as a pacifist. The Just War Traditions aims to specify

under what conditions Christians may justly resort to or partake in war. It is these conditions,

or criteria that have been embraced by the ICISS. Rather than to investigate the nature of

130 Rengger, N (2010). The Ethics of war. The Just War tradition In Bell, D (Ed.), Ethics and World Politics. Oxford University Press, 293131 The fascinating transition from persecuted sect to a recognized and favored faith is discussed at length in Leithart , P (2010). Defending Constantine: The Twilight of an Empire and the Dawn of Christendom. IVP Academic.132 Yoder, 50133Charles, 36134 For a wide variety of thinkers of Just war see Holmes, A (Ed), (2005)

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every criteria I will focus on the nature of just cause. The goal is to see if the understanding of

Just Cause as something more or other than purely defensive use of force in face of

aggression can be detected in Christian tradition.

Perhaps the most well-known element to this tradition is its precautionary criteria for when a

war might be justly undertaken. These are, just cause, right authority, right intent,

proportionality of ends, last resort, reasonable hope of success and right aim of peace.135 As

we can already see these criterions are essentially the same as the ones put forward by the

ICISS.136 Indeed, this in an occasion when it is clear that, as Gareth Evans of the ICISS put it,

“The criteria in question owe their primary intellectual origins to Christian just war theory”.137

It is important to note however that the just war tradition also has more secular versions and

proponents, perhaps most famously Michael Waltzer.138

I will not undertake to expound on the Christian understanding of every single criterion of the

tradition. Rather I will search the JWT for a particular issue, the widened definition of a Just

Cause. As mentioned Just Cause is one of the criterions of the JWT as well as a key concern

for the ICISS. They offer an understanding of Just cause that moves beyond self-defense and

introduced the prevention of mass violations of human rights as a legitimate Just Cause for

armed action. What has the understanding of Just cause been within the JWT?

Since the earliest days of the Just War Tradition the idea of the Just Cause has been central.

Augustine, one of the earliest proponents of this tradition argued that killing in defense of

oneself was not permitted but that the resort to violence in defense of others was

permissible.139 He also argued that no statement in the New Testament was intended to guide

personal moral attitude and not to “make us neglect the duty of restraining men from sin”.140

This line of argument is still the essential argument for Christians of the Just War Tradition.

135 Rengger, 297-298136 ICISS, 32137 Asfaw, 7138 See Walzer, M (1977). Just and unjust wars. 1st ed. New York: Basic Books139 Augustine. Epistle 47:5, To Publicola. Available at http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1102047.htm. Retrieved 204-04-27140 Ibid,

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They argue that a strict distinction must be made between those statements of Jesus that are

intended to guide private as opposed to public morality. Turning the other check is in this

view a fundamentally private matter.141 One might well turn one’s own check if attacked but

deciding to turn away from an attack on another person is significantly less noble.142 Hence,

violence is allowed in response to certain conditions.

But what does then, in the Just War Tradition, constitute a Just Cause? There are two essential

views of this. Firstly one can understand a Just Cause as a response to aggression. This view

corresponds well to the UN Charter and its assertion of the “inherent right of individual or

collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”.143

This understanding is mirrored in the Catechism of the Catholic Church that in article 2309 it

states that for war to be permissible it must be intended to defend against aggression. 144 It is

arguable that this has been the mainstream view of the Just War Tradition for the last two

centuries as well as the charter of the UN and mainstream international law, that self-defense

(of the state) is the essence of Just Cause, a position at odds with the view of the ICISS.145

However, there is also a second perspective on Just Cause, one that has far greater similarities

with the essential view of the ICISS. This view, going back to Thomas Aquinas, defined Just

Cause as “those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of

some fault”.146 This goes well in hand with the description of authorities found in Paul’s

Epistle to the Romans, in which Paul’s describes the role of authority to act as agents of

heavenly wrath to bring punishment to wrongdoers.147 The view was forcefully articulated by

Francisco de Vitoria in his writings concerning the rights and duties of the Spanish in relation

to the conquest of the Indians. He argued that the Spanish could not make war upon the

Indians because of their different religious practices. But, he also argued that if certain

141 Charles, 97142 Lewis, C. S. (1965). Why I am not a pacifist. In Hooper, W (Ed.), The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses. Macmillan. 49-50143 United Nations (1945), Article 51144 Catechism of the Catholic Church. Part three, section two, chapter two, article 2309. Available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a5.htm. Retrieved 2014-05-21145 Luban, D. (2011). War as Punishment. Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 11-71. 146 Aquinas, T. Summa Theologica. Question 40, war. Article 1. Available at http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3040.htm. Retrieved 2014-07-02147 Epistle to the Romans, 13:4

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barbaric practices, such as cannibalism or human sacrifice did occur the Christian ought to

intervene with enough force to end such nefariousness, if necessary by the imposition of new

rulers, whom perhaps not surprisingly, ought to be Christians.148

In the theology of Augustine the punitive nature of war, as opposed to the understanding of a

Just War as essentially defensive, is also central. As he wrote on the nature of warfare, “wars

should be waged by the good, in order to curb licentious passions by destroying those vices

which should have been rooted out and suppressed by the rightful government.”149 This

understanding of Just War as a response to moral wrongdoing, and not as something

necessarily defensive can also be seen in several protestant thinkers like Luther, and Calvin.150

Perhaps most famously this model of Just Cause was presented by Hugo Grotius. He argued

that the right to punish perpetrators of crimes where not restricted to the immediate victims.

Hence rulers had the right to take actions “even if neither the sovereign himself nor the

citizens within his jurisdiction have been injured by the violation in question.”151 And, since

Grotius was very clear that violations that merited punishment included domestic practices

that he considered to be barbarous violations of the natural law, punishment could

legitimately be undertaken by another state to prevent such practices, even if it itself had

suffered no violation at the hands of the offending state.152 Grotius founded his philosophy on

a supposed objective natural law that he assumed to be given by God but still would be valid

even if there was in fact no supreme deity.153 But nevertheless his philosophy of the right to

punish those political entities (states, tribes and so on) that violated certain objective moral

codes closely mirrored earlier, more expressly Christian thinkers like Augustine and Thomas

Aquinas. His firm assertion was that sovereign powers had a right to resort to punitive wars

against states if their domestic conditions constituted a violation of the laws of nature.154

148 Tuck, 73-74149Quoted in: Lagan, J (1984). “The Elements of St. Augustine’s Just War Theory,” Journal of Religious Ethics 12, 19-38, 24-25150 Luban, 18151 Straumann, B (2006), The Right to Punish as a Just Cause of War in Hugo Grotius’ Natural Law. Studies in the History of Ethics. Vol 2, 1-20, 10152 Tuck, R (2001), The Rights of War and Peace. Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant. Oxford University Press, 102-103153 Ibid, 100-101154 Håkansson, 29

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It seems to me that there exists a relationship between the Christian JWT and R2P. The

criterion to be considered before undertaking any armed action are directly grounded in JWT.

Both share the idea that a just cause does not necessarily entail defensive operations but that

the domestic conditions of a state might warrant military intervention. This perspective,

armed action as a proper response to internal tyranny has not been the dominant view of the

JWT in recent years but has deep roots within the tradition.

7.2.4 Contemporary Christian debate about R2P.

In the ongoing Christian debate we could previously observe a general support of the idea of

sovereignty as responsibility. In relation to the idea of the legitimate use of force the situation

is quite different. I have found no parties in the debate that question R2P as a legitimate form

of the Just War Tradition, however I have found a substantial criticism form the members of

pacifist inclined Churches who question the very idea that one in fact can legitimately resort

to force.

Christians of the pacifist tradition argue that it is in fact not compatible with the proper

Christian attitude to fellow human to ever resort to force against them. By this logic they

argue that any attempts to limit the use of violence whilst keeping it as an open option is

futile. Rather they argue that the Just War Tradition does not in fact help to avoid but is rather

legitimizing the resort to violence and that R2P represents one such attempt to solve problems

with violence that should properly be solved by peaceful means.155 Hence, Christian pacifists

do not question whether or not R2P is well in line with JWT thinking, but rather they question

the validity of the JWT itself, arguing that the acceptance of the use of force guarantees that

force will continue to be used.156

155 Enns, 4156 Canadian Friends Service Committee, (2007). Summary of Quaker discernement on “The responsibility to protect2 2006-2007. Available athttp://quakerservice.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/summary-of-

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The essence of this argument concerns the general validity of the JWT. Since Jesus tells his

followers to be loving resorts to force cannot be proper. The counter-argument from the JWT

school is that “where the enforcement of an ordered community is not effectively present, it

may be a work of justice and a work of social charity to resort to other available and effective

means of resisting injustice: what do you think Jesus would have made the Samaritan do if he

had come upon the scene while the robbers were still at their fell work?”.157 Hence, it is a

fundamental work of Christian neighborliness and love to defend those who need it.

What is interesting here is that Christian pacifists argue against R2P from the understanding

that it will serve to legitimize violence rather than to help mitigate human suffering. Rather

they offer different solutions than the implementation of military aspects of R2P.158 From this

material I disagree strongly with De Vietries assertions that pacifism leads to passivity.159 It

does not since Christian pacifists in fact advocate and undertake a great deal of activities

aimed at prevention and protection of civilian populations in situations of armed conflict.

Rather I would argue that Christian pacifism offers a demanding and challenging re-

conception of how R2P could be understood and how it could be reformed.

It would be erroneous to say that appeals to JWT have been an important part in the

contemporary Christian debate about R2P. But there is certainly an awareness of the

importance of the JWT criterion for R2P.160

In regards to the rightfulness of the resort to force the statement of the World Council of

Curches is quite opaque. The argue that “The prohibition against killing is at the heart of

Christian ethics (Mt 5:21-22). But the biblical witness also informs us about an anthropology

that takes the human capacity to do evil in the light of the fallen nature of humankind (Gen.

discernment-R2P.pdf Retrieved 2014-02-11157 Ramsey, P (1968). The Just War. Charles Scribner’s Sons. 142-143. Quoted in Johnson, J (2002). Paul Ramsey and the Recovery of the Just War Idea. Journal of Military Ethics, vol 1 (2), 136-144, 138 158 Canadian Friends Service Committee, 3159 De Vietris, 6. 160 Asfaw, 30

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4.)The challenge for Christians is to pursue peace in the midst of violence.”161 Since the WCC

in the same statement endorses R2P one can deduce that this pursuit of peace in the mist of

violence might in fact require the application of armed force in order to prevent further

violence. The United Church of Canada are more explicit about human suffering as Just

Cause, arguing that “Taking up the sword as a response to the cry of vulnerable people that

oppressive and murderous violence inflicted upon them be halted is not to be ruled out

because it contravenes one of God’s clear commandments”.162 Rather they argue that acting in

such a way is sinful but nevertheless within what may be forgiven. They also explicitly

endorses the ICISS understanding of what a Just Cause may be, as well as the other

criterion163 In the debate about R2P within the WWC Sturla Stålsett articulated a critique of

pacifists within the WWC based on Martin Luther’s theology. In this view force may be

legitimate for the sake of others, and that not using armed force in order to protect those who

need it is immoral.164 Thus human suffering can be described as a Just Cause.

The attitude of those who favors the application of R2P does hold the waging of war and

taking of life to be a very serious sin. Nevertheless, support idea that the internal domestic

conditions of a state can be a legitimate cause for war, and the similar but wider idea that the

use of armed force need not be a response to aggression in order to be legitimate, can be

found in the Christian debate about R2P. In general the debate does not focus in particular on

the rightful nature of JWT but rather focuses, as I presented above, on sovereignty as

responsibility. But, there still exists an understanding of the importance of JWT for the

development of R2P and a support of the core idea of Just Cause, even if it is not the central

focus of the debate.

7.3. Christianity and the ethics of care and responsibility.

161 WWC (2006), 2162 United Church of Canada (2008). Responsibility to Protect Policy—Background Paper. Available at http://www.united-church.ca/files/peace/protect_background.pdf. Retrieved 2014-08-10163 United Curch of Canada (2008). United Church Social Policy Positions. Responsibility to Protect. Available at http://www.united-church.ca/beliefs/policies/2008/r266. Retrieved 2014-08-10164 Asfaw, 51-53

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As I argued previously R2P rests on a particular understanding of how people, and states,

ought to relate to and interact with each other. I described it as an ethic of universal care and

responsibility. Bellow my aim is to discover whether or not one can discern clear similarities

between this ethic and the ethics advocated by Christianity. Naturally the Christian ethic is

mainly aimed at guiding the personal lives of the believers, not necessarily presented as

doctrines for state behavior. But I will attempt to see if there are such guidelines for personal

behavior that might be understood as precursory to the ethic of state behavior found in R2P.

7.3.1 Old Testament.

In the third chapter of Genesis we find the story of how Cain murders his brother Abel. When

God inquires about Abel’s whereabouts Cain famously responds that he does not know and

denies responsibility, saying “Am I my brother’s keeper?”165 God’s response, cursing Cain

and forcing him to leave his lands is a clear indication that the answer to that question was

yes. The surface meaning of the story can be understood to infer a responsibility to care for

one’s immediate family, but by extension one can understand it to imply a general

responsibility to care for other people.

The same doctrine can be seen in the commands in Leviticus. Perhaps most clearly expressed

in the commands to “love your neighbour as yourself”.166 This could and should be interpreted

as a command to show a particular kind of care for those of ones own people, and the laws of

Leviticus are particular laws for the Jewish people (containing laws governing everyday

activities, moral laws and priestly laws). But, Leviticus also extends the commands to

foreigners. “When a foreigner resides among you in your land, do not mistreat them. The

foreigner residing among you must be treated as your native-born. Love them as yourself, for

you were foreigners in Egypt”.167 This Old Testament passages formulates a case for the

existence of a responsibility to treat foreigners with the same manner of honesty and caring

one would treat one’s own people.168

165 Book of Genesis. 3:9. 166 Leviticus, 19:18167Ibid, 19:33-34168 There are also passages, especially in the Old testament that are, more or less correctly, interpreted as legitimizing violence towards other cultures. For a Christian understanding of these passages see McDonald, M. (2004). God and Violence: Biblical Resources for Living in a Small World. Herald Press, Copan, P (2011). Is

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Finally, in Book of Proverbs, 24:11-12 one can find an appeal to “Rescue those being led

away to death; hold back those staggering toward slaughter.  If you say, “But we knew nothing

about this, does not he who weighs the heart perceive it? Does not he who guards your life

know it? Will he not repay everyone according to what they have done?” These verses can

surely be said to poetically summarize an ethical outlook of caring and responsibility that

mirrors the understanding of R2P very well. There is a moral foundation for a sense of

universal responsibility found and espoused in the Old Testament even though the command

to love ones neighbors is intended to apply to neighbors and not all men generally.

7.3.2 New Testament.

In the New Testament one can find a somewhat different approach to the ethic of care. I think

it would be erroneous to say that there is discontinuity, rather that the understanding of the

duty to care for other people from other cultures or peoples are developed and extended. One

of Jesus’s sermons addresses this issue with excellent clarity.

In response to the question of what commandments are the most important Jesus responds that

the most important are to love God and to “love your neighbour as yourself”.169 He is then

challenged to specify who the neighbour is. This leads to the well-known parable of the Good

Samaritan. The story tells of how a Jewish man has been attacked by robbers and is helped by

a Samarian man. The Good Samaritan helps him to a hostel and pays the costs for his care. In

this parable Jesus offers a new way of thinking about neighbourliness. The radically of this

story might not be self-evident, but the relationship between Jews and Samaritans where one

of hostility and even hate. Jews of that time simply did not consider Samaritans to be

God a Moral Monster?: Making Sense of the Old Testament God. Baker Books. 169 Gospel of Luke, 10:25-37.

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neighbours but enemies.170 According to this radical reconceptualization of the idea of

neighbourliness everyone is your neighbours. In fact the moral of the story is not predicated

on the idea that one must share the same spiritual or cultural values to care for one another

since Samaritan and Jews worshiped different Gods. There is so duty to care for only those of

a particular ethnic or religious group but a universal human responsibility.

In another well-known discourse Jesus clearly spells out the responsibility to care for the

weak, poor, dispossessed and vulnerable, affirming that failure to undertake such actions is

tantamount to a violation against God himself.171 This understanding of the positive duty to

undertake action is a particularly important dimension of the Christian ethic in this context.

Not only is it the right thing to do, but a duty and failure to live up to that duty will result in

punishment.

So, in the New Testament one can observe a clear extension of who ought to be treated with

the love and care one would afford a neighbour. The use of the word love sets a very high

standard for how one ought to relate to other people, it points to the need for an ethic of

profound care for the wellbeing of other people. An ethic that is extended to be all-

encompassing rather than an ethic of care that is limited to the confines of tribe or religious

group. This is arguable one of the most famous Biblical passages and is a key message of the

Gospel. It is also a doctrine that is well in line with the extension of state responsibility that

R2P calls for.

7.3.3 Later Christian tradition.

The Christian Scriptures affirms the universal duty to care for other people and ensure their

safety and dignity. In order to investigate how the doctrine of the universal duty to care and

170 Forbes, G (2000). The God of Old: The Role of the Lukan Parables in the Purpose of Luke's Gospel. Sheffield Academic Press, 63-64171 Gospel of Matthew, 25:31-46.

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love others have been translated into Christian philosophy in later times I will turn to an area

of Christian thought that ought to reveal this, the social doctrines of the later Christian

tradition. This ought to show if there is a later Christian philosophy about issues like universal

human rights that are similar to the understanding of the nature of human rights present in

R2P. The Christian understanding of human rights differ in some key aspects from the

secular-humanist understanding of the same we might find in the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights. The UNDHR is a secular document since there is no affirmation of a higher

power; it understands human rights as the proper foundation for “freedom, justice and peace

in the world” that that disregard for them has caused abundant misery.172 They are not

founded by divine decree but are rather essential goods that states have agreed on in signing

the UNDHR.

Obviously Christians understand human rights in a different way. By this perspective the

reason human beings are infinitely valuable and are endowed with equal rights since they are

all divine creations.173 The source of human rights is super-natural rather than founded on

state declarations, as the Catholic Church states “The ultimate source of human rights is not

found in the mere will of human beings, in the reality of the State, in public powers, but in

man himself and in God his Creator.”174 By this perspective human rights are objective, it

does not particularly matter if one state, or even if all states where do have a different view,

divine law must be understood as still being true even if no one should believe in it. One of

the most important declaration on the Christian perspective on ethics and their political

implementation is pope John XXIII encyclical Pacem In terries. It clarified the Catholic

position on ethics and human rights. The encyclical claimed than any proper understanding of

divine law must view mankind as possessing a wide array of political, social and cultural

rights mirroring those expressed in the UNDHR. It also stated clearly that any just and

peaceful world order must be founded on the universal respect for these rights.175 Since

172 United Nations (1948), The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. Retrieved 2014-05-22. For an argument that the UNDHR itself has been influenced by Christian values see Golebiewski, D (2007). Christian Traditional Values Prefiguring the Development of Human Rights. Available at http://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/03/christian-traditional-values-prefiguring-the-development-of-human-rights/173 Schirrmacher, T (2001), Human Rights and Christian Faith. Global journal of classical theology. Vol 3 (2). Available at http://phc.edu/gj_schirrmacherv3n2.php. 1. Retrieved 2014-05-20174 Catholic Church (2004), Compendium of the Social Doctrines of the Church. Article 153.175 Catholic Church (1963) Pacem In Terris Encyclica of Pope John XXIII On Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity and Liberty.

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Protestantism is a much more fractured religious tradition its approach to the ethics of care

and responsibility and its practical implementation is more difficult do summarize. But there

is also an equivalent protestant understanding of the universality and objective nature of

human right, founded on the need for an ethic of caring and responsibility.176

From this, primarily Catholic social teaching I can deduce that there exists a continuous

Christian philosophy that attempt to translate the particular etch of global care and

responsibility into concrete policies that closely mirror the human rights as defined in the

UNDHR. That Catholic social doctrines in particular stress the idea of responsibility to

actively defend human rights in their entirety.177

There does seem to exist a Christian tradition that stresses the importance of human rights and

liberties as prerequisites for world peace. Further, this understanding seems to view human

rights as beyond the purview of the individual state. Rather, there is an emphasis on the

universal nature of these rights.

7.3.4 The contemporary Christina debate about R2P.

In the discussion within the WWC prominent Christian intellectual Hugo Slim outlined his

support for R2P as being in line with the core teachings of Christianity. He argued, based on

the Good Samaritan parable (among others) for his position that the problem facing Christian

in relation to R2P is not to determine what is the will of God, since Christians can be certain

God favours protecting people, but to determine the practical aspect of what action to

undertake.178

176 World Council of Churches (1999). Together on the Wayofficial report of the eighth assembly. Article 5.8 .Statement on human rights. Available at http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/assembly/hr-e.html. Retrieved 2014-07-10 177 Catholic Church (2004), Article 154. 178 Slim, H (2007). The responsibility to protect. Scope and challenges for churches. International Ecumenical Consultation Evangelische Akademie Arnoldshain. Available at http://overcomingviolence.org/fileadmin/dov/files/iepc/expert_consultations/Hugo_Slim_-_R2P_WCC_Talk.pdf, Retrieved 2014-06-01. 1

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Similar ideas have been expressed by the US National Council of Churches. They motivated

their support for R2P by pointing to the similarities between the central ideas of R2P and the

example of the Old and New Testament, in particular the notion of being one’s brother’s

keeper. They also endorsed the view of R2P as the moral order among individuals properly

extended to nations.179

Catholic theologian Tobias Winright has discussed the problem of how to translate the etichs

of the Good Samaritan into practical policy by posing the question how Christians “who are

called to be like the Good Samaritan” are to respond to violence against civilians. He argues

that it is in line with an ethic of caring and responsibility to responds with force to such a

situation, comparing it with a situation of domestic law enforcement.180 The parable has also

been used in the general discussion about just war in a very similar way. Paul Ramsey has

argued that “where the enforcement of an ordered community is not effectively present, it

may be a work of justice and a work of social charity to resort to other available and effective

means of resisting injustice: what do you think Jesus would have made the Samaritan do if he

had come upon the scene while the robbers were still at their fell work?”.181 By this

understanding of the Good Samaritan ethic it is a fundamental work of Christian

neighborliness and love to defend those who need it. Guided by the ethic of universal

neighborliness and love for other Christian ought to responds positively to R2P.

So, those Christian who support R2P clearly argues that it constitutes a legitimate

understanding of the ethic of caring and responsibility that can be found in Scripture as well

as in later Christian tradition.

There is also an interesting criticism Christian of R2P that points to one of its key limits, how

it fails to live up to its own ethic. The Canadian Quakers criticizes the idea of R2P by stating

179 National Council of Churches (2007). Resolution of the Responsibility to Protect. Adopted by the Governing Board of the National Council of Churches USA. Available at http://r2pcoalition.org/cotent/view/75/1/. Retrieved 2014-06-02180 Winright, T (2011). Just Policing and the Responsibility to Protect. The Ecumenical review. Vol 63(1), 84-95, 94 181 Ramsey, P (1968). The Just War. Charles Scribner’s Sons. 142-143. Quoted in Johnson, J, Paul Ramsey and the Recovery of the Just War Idea. Journal of Military Ethics, Vol 1 (2), 136-144. 138

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“by setting a limit to oppression after which other countries can intervene, it suggests that up

to that limit, it is allowable.” 182 By this logic if one accepts R2P one in fact accepts certain

forms of oppression, effectively giving a blank check up to a certain point. This might be

considered to set an unrealistic demand on what R2P can hope to accomplish. But, it can also

be understood as a very poignant critique of an inherent flaw of R2P. The ethic of R2P views

human rights as essential goods and argues that rights and freedom ought to be defended. But

also argues that states ought not defend them unless they are extraordinarily horrifying. If

human rights are absolute human rights should be violated and no oppression should be

tolerated. If one accepts the observes human rights abuses but does not deem the worthy of

intervention critics of R2P argues that one becomes morally culpable for legitimizing certain

oppressive actions. Interestingly this critique is not aimed at the ethic of responsibility and

care as such, but rather argues that R2P represents, at best, a half-hearted translation of the

idea of universal responsibility. I have not been able to detect any Christian criticism of the

basic ethical ideas of R2P as such, rather opposition to R2P among Christian is firmly rooted

among pacifists who cannot accept any idea that allows for the use of force. Among those

who favor R2P there is a clear affirmation that the ethics of R2P are well in line with some of

the key ethical ideas in Christianity.

182 Canadian Friends Services committee. (2007) 2-3

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7.4 Conclusions.

7.4.1 Christianity, R2P and the state.

Given the results presented above I feel confident in asserting that there exists some similarity

between the view of state legitimacy and sovereignty found in R2P and the Christian view in

regards to earthly authorities.

In the Christian tradition we can see a conception of earthly authorities that is different from

the pluralist conception; a view is which the authorities are, by divine command, responsible

for the maintenance of pre-set moral conditions and only legitimate if they do so. In the

discussion about what forms sovereignty ought to take, it is beneficial to understand that there

have been different views about sovereignty in the past and indeed that there might be a need

to envisage different conceptions of what it means to be sovereign. Christian thinking on

sovereignty as a status entailing responsibility to work towards legitimate goals and using

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legitimate ends is one very different conception from the Westphalian order where the state is

in principle allowed to institute whatever system it pleased.

This Christian tradition on holds that authorities exist to ensure the compliance with a pre-

given moral order. This order has been instituted by God and that calls for the protection of

the weak and vulnerable.183 If the authorities stray from this order they are no longer seen as

fit or legitimate to hold power and may consequently be denied the right to rule. So whilst

there is a clear ethos, especially in Paul’s letter to the Romans, on the importance of

respecting earthly authorities there is also a legitimate way out of such obedience, if the rulers

neglect their charge.

The contemporary Christian debate about R2P shows a similar understanding. No Christian

thinker I have encountered during my inquiry has argued that the pluralist understanding of

the role of the state is the proper translation of Christian principles into state practice.

The ICISS seems to understand power in much the same way. As something instituted for the

protections of human beings, something that’s very purpose is the maintenance of just

conditions. They do not share the realist/ Machiavellian understanding of power for powers

sake. Sovereignty as responsibility entails that power is conditional, exercised for the welfare

of the people and that it might legitimately be denied to those who use power to violate

certain precept of human rights. Naturally there are great differences between this Christian

tradition of conditional power and the ICISS. It could hardly be otherwise given the

differences in time and purpose of the texts. Obviously the ICISS does not argue that states

are accountable to a supreme deity. Nor that such a deity is responsible for the construction of

the moral order.

Despite such differences I would argue that the Christian tradition I have accounted for above

and R2P share an understanding of power as entailing responsibility. And that abuse of said

183 See for instance Exodus 22:20-26 or Isaiah 1:17

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power might result in a loss of said power. The idea of sovereignty as responsibility might be

argued to have some of its antecedents in Christian thinking.

7.4.2 Christianity, R2P and the use of armed force.

In regards to the use of force there exists a clear and coherent Christian tradition, JWT, whose

views are well in line with the ideas expressed in R2P. The precautionary criterion for when

force may be justly undertaken have their original source in JWT. This is a direct example of

Christian tradition influencing R2P, but given the richness of JWT and the influence the

tradition has had on secular thinking it is perhaps not entirely surprising. But it does

demonstrate that ideas that have their original roots in Christian tradition can be found in R2P

and that the ICISS has demonstrated an awareness of this. Grounding R2P:s legitimacy in

JWT is not the main Christian argument in favour of the doctrine. But there is certainly an

awareness of the influence of JWT on the pre-cautionary criterion espoused by R2P. Also,

R2P as a new form of JWT is a point of criticism levelled at it from Christian pacifists. These

critics argue from their principles pacifism in much the same way that they argue against

other types of JWT based thinking. Hence there seems to be an awareness among both

Christian critics and proponents of R2P of its similarities between R2P and JWT.

The idea that force may be justly undertaken in order to punish the rulers of states for certain

moral wrongs, not only in self-defence, is a thought that can be found within Christian JWT.

Obviously the nature of what moral wrongs might constitute Just cause differs from JWT and

R2P, the later seeks to limit it to situations that are, or risks leading to large scale loss of life,

JWT has included other types of just cause, the punishment of human sacrifice for instance.

Nevertheless I would argue that there exists a clear similarity between the views on violence

expressed in JWT and R2P, both recognizes the occasional need for, but seek to minimize the

resort of force. They view Just Cause as going beyond state-defence and see violence as one

of several tools to achieve just conditions. This view does infer that fairly far-reaching

interventions into the internal affairs of states are legitimized. As Francisco de Vitoria argued

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it might be necessary to impose new, Christian, rulers over peoples who’s previous rulers

violated the natural order. R2P argues that one important dimension of any armed intervention

is a long-term commitment to building structures of good governance and democracy. Despite

differences this does mean that R2P and a particular strand of JWT shares the view that

certain forms of government are better than others and that ensuring the existence of such

governmental structures.

7.4.3 Christianity, R2P and the ethics of international affairs.

My argument is that R2P rests on a particular ethic for how states ought to interact, and that

there are Christian ideas about how individuals ought to interact that can be applied to the

ethics of the state system. And that there seems to be commonalities between the Christian

ethic and the moral principles of R2P. Both endorse an ethic of caring for people that

transcends state, religious and ethical boundaries. Both argue that caring for ones fellow man

is not just a right or a prerogative but a positive responsibility. Both share an essential

commitment to ensure that certain ethical principles guide national as well as international life

but neither one seeks to erase national or cultural differences. What both the Christian ethics,

as exemplified in the Good Samaritan story and the ethic that inspires R2P seem to be

committed to is ensuring that such national, religious or cultural differences do not serve to

legitimize disregarding human suffering.

Obviously the compelling reason, or source for this kind of ethic of responsibility and care

differ. The ICISS stresses state behaviour and declaration like the UNDHR act he essential

source of human rights and international ethic. By this understanding one could argue that

R2P in fact endorses a kind of relativism in regards to international ethics. That if one or more

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states should withdraw their commitment to the UNDHR or to their membership in the UN

then their responsibility to ensure the rights of their subject should vanish. But I think this is

an unwarranted interpretation. The ICISS are not explicit about the objective nature of certain

rights but they certainly seem to treat them as such. This is of course a difference from any

Christian understanding of ethics, which treats rights and duties as given and objective. But

for all practical purposes R2P does seem to treat rights and responsibilities as objective

institutions, making the differences from a Christian ethic much less apparent.

Both understand human rights as something beyond the purview of the individual state. Both

stress the universal duty and responsibility of others to ensure the safety and dignity of other

people. This idea, going beyond a mere right to a positive duty is one of the aspects that has

previously been identified as an indication of a Christian heritage in the ideas of R2P.184 I

would argue that later Christian tradition on ethics of care and responsibility well mirror and

might well have served to inspire the formulation of R2P. The ethics of R2P can very well be

argued to constitute the ethics of the Good Samaritan as applied to international politics.

The Christian debate concerning R2P is somewhat peculiar in this regard, whilst there is some

opposition to whether or not R2P is a correct translation of Christina pricniples into practice

the criticism seems to focus on the inherent limitations of R2P, that it does not take protection

far enough. So it seems to me that most Christians agree that the ethics of caring and

responsibility are proper Christian principles, but disagree on whether or not R2P is effective

enough to be understood as a properly living up to this ethic.

To conclude I would argue that I have managed to show that there exists clear similarities

between Christian tradition and the ideas present in R2P concerning the issues under

discussion. Since it is, for all practical purposes, impossible to definitely say which ideas has

inspired the authors of R2P I will limit my empirical conclusion to say that there exist definite

similarities between the relevant ideas of Christianity and R2P. There also seems to exist

some evidence that Christian tradition, JWT to be precise, has influenced the views on force

prevalent in R2P. Below I will undertake a discussion concerning the likelihood of Christian 184 Glanville (2012), 326

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influence on R2P and the implications for such possible heritage. This discussion is based on

the similarities between R2P and Christian tradition I have detected. However, as mentioned I

do not argue to have proved any kind of casual relationship. Nevertheless I will argue below

why it is reasonable to suppose that Christianity serves as part of the spectrum of ideas that

shapes R2P.

Chapter 8: Analysis and final conclusions.

8.1 The case for Christianity as one source of inspiration for R2P.

My argument is that R2P rests, in part, on certain Christian principles. Exactly how Christian

philosophy has, and indeed if, influenced the ICISS is difficult to conclude. The ICISS report

as such contains no affirmation of any religious inspiration. I would argue that assuming that

authors are always aware of their sources of inspirations is erroneous. My argument is not that

the ICISS have simply taken their ideas from Christian tradition but I would argue that

Christian traditions I have accounted for above concerning the relevant issues might have

influenced the thinking of the ICISS. As I demonstrated above there is a long-running

Christian tradition of thought about the proper role of authority, the legitimate resort to

violence and the ethics that ought to guide human behaviour that well corresponds to the ideas

expressed in R2P. At least one Christian tradition, JWT, can also have been seen to be directly

present in R2P given that the precautionary principles of JWT have been included in the

doctrine.

Whilst I do think it relevant to be aware of the deep roots in scripture for Christian doctrine

concerning these issues I do recognize that it is not necessarily from these sources Christian

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inspiration to R2P emanates. What I have found interesting is that a Christian philosophy

concerning the role of government, armed force and international ethics are living tradition,

part and parcel of the doctrines of widespread Christian denominations. It is therefore

something one might encounter if one is engaged in international aid work or political

coalitions in with Christian organizations take part. Hence members of the ICISS might well

have been inspired by such teachings without any direct study of Biblical material.

Another possible way for Christian ideas to have influenced R2P, and a reason to believe that

this is the case is that ideas of a Christian origin are deeply imbedded into Western Culture.

Hence, it is possible that the authors behind the ICISS report where not aware of the Christian

origin of some of the ideas. Rather they may have considered a certain set of ideas to reflect

universal values without considering their background. It can, for example, be argued that

certain ideas, like sovereignty as responsibility, in fact have their roots in a Christian tradition

even though one can support them without faith in the supposedly divine source of these

doctrines. Studying the similarities between the ideas espoused by R2P and the Christian

tradition might be one way to recover and appreciate the Christian roots to a number of ideas

we do not generally regard to be Christian.185

It is true that Christian faith have suffered a crisis in Western Europe in terms of adherents

and believers. But, Christianity remains part of the foundations of western culture and thus

continues to influence political thought that should not be overlooked. Arguing that R2P has

been influenced by the Christian heritage that permeates our society is almost impossible to

prove. But I do think that, given the existence of continuous ideas in Old and New

Testaments, later Christian tradition that mirrors the ideas expressed in R2P, as well as the

present Christian debate that largely affirms R2P as being in line with Christian philosophy it

is reasonable to conclude that R2P and Christianity are well in line with each other, and that,

given the cultural impact and pervasiveness of Christina ideas in the West (where R2P

emerged), R2P might well have been influenced by Christianity.

185 For a history of the Christian rots of Western Liberalism see Siedentop, L. (2014) Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism. Allen Lane.

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Exactly what this Christian heritage in western culture entails and how it should influence

politics and identity is contested and problematic. It does mean that ideas from Christian

tradition permeate society and that persons not necessarily are aware of their Christian roots.

It is possible that this is the reason Christian ideas may be part of the inspiration to R2P, these

ideas are part and parcel to a particular cultural milieu and need not be considered to be

religiously exclusive. This may help us consider the implications for R2P:s conception,

having emerged by a panel sponsored by a western government and who’s members included

a majority of members from counties with a Christina heritage.186

It is of course also possible that the ICISS undertook a more direct study of religious ideas

concerning problems they sought to resolve. Encompassing such material in a wider study

would make a great deal of sense. R2P is intended to address some of the most challenging

moral problems in the world, how to properly respond to genocide. Thinking about political

and ethical problems is hardly exclusive to political philosophy or international law. Religious

authorities and sources are deeply concerned with moral problems, as most religions (and

Christianity most assuredly) are intended to give at least some manner of instruction for how

the believers are to life their life. Hence it would make sense to study the moral and ethical

considerations of one or many religious traditions to ensure that solutions to political

problems are in line with the moral principles they espouse. It strikes me as reasonable that

particular insights and wisdom might be recovered from such a study and influence the

development of ideas like R2P.

As I mentioned before I argue that it would be simplistic to say that there exists a definite,

provable and causal relationship between the Christian ideas and the ideas in R2P. This is

hardly surprising. The norm is intended to reflect universal values and a discernible religious

heritage would hardly improve the standing of the norm. Nor does R2P articulate any

particular philosophical foundations outside international human rights legislation like the

UNDHR and state practice. It seems likely to me that this silence is part of the reason for the

vast scholarly interest paid to discerning the ideological roots of R2P. Such interests have

focused on its political and legal roots. Naturally inquiries into intellectual roots of any set of 186 For the membership of the ICISS see ICISS, 77-79

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ideas seem to share certain limitations in terms of provable results. It is hardly possible to

prove beyond a doubt that interventionist liberalism, or Christian tradition serves as the

inspiration to R2P. What is possible is to determine is if R2P shares a common set of ideas or

values with any tradition of legal and political thought. I would argue that I have managed to

establish such a relationship between R2P and Christianity. It is also possible to argue that,

given the Christian heritage that permeates Western societies, it ought to be reasonable, but

hardly provable, that, in light of the demonstrated similarities, such influence or inspiration

has likely occurred

8.2 The benefits of a religious awareness.

8.2.1 R2P and its cultural context.

The ideological heritage one detects in R2P in may have implications for how one

understands it. By arguing that R2P can best be understood as an expression of a particular

idea we also introduce the history and implications of those ideas. This is intended to better

understand what R2P really represents, what the meaning of the doctrine is beyond the stated

intentions in reports and documents.

In the discussion about R2P it is generally regarded as a recent invention. It is often dated to

1996 and the publication of Sovereignty As responsibility. Conflict management in Africa.187

Although some critics have attempted to place the date of the development of the idea to the

16:th and 17:th century.188 Of course the age of the idea is not the interesting aspect. Rather,

the problem is to determine in what intellectual context or historical moment the idea of

sovereignty as responsibility emerge. By placing its emergence around 1776 one can place it

187 See for example Etzioni, A. (2005) Sovereignty as responsibility. Orbis.(50) 1. 71-85. 188 See for example Glanville, L. (2011). The Antecedents to “Sovereignty as responsibility”. European Journal of International Relations. 17(2), 233-255

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in the liberal-humanist tradition, as expressed by the American Declaration of

Independence.189 This would entail that the ideological inspirations of the idea are to be found

in enlightenment philosophy. I agree that the American declaration of independence can be

understood as a document endorsing a form of sovereignty as responsibility. But I also argue

that similar ideas can be traced as permeating the Christian tradition. In fact the Declaration of

Independence is one indicator that this is so, specifying as it does the source of human rights

to be the will of the Creator.

By comparing R2P to the thoughts of natural law theorists like Hugo Grotius or Emer de

Vattel one can place likewise place R2P in a particular context, one in which the natural law

tradition can be understood as the precursor to anti-pluralist discriminations to states that have

different conceptions than those of the dominant powers.

If one takes Christianity as part of the ideological background to R2P, what does then this

entail for our understanding of it?

I argue that it more clearly shows show R2P is bound to a particular cultural/political milieu.

R2P is, by this understanding, very much a particularistic product of a heritage common to

what might be called the west. I argue that it shows just how deep some religious ideas are

implanted in our society and how various ideas can be traced back to a shared Christian

heritage. Such awareness helps us understand the limitations to any supposedly universal

norm by showing how particular cultural heritages contribute to the values such ideas

espouse.

One of the most problematic aspects of the idea of a religious heritage in R2P is the problem

of universality. R2P is intended to function as a universally acceptable norm of state

behaviour. This might be one of the reasons why the ICISS have not specified what

philosophical foundations they have worked from in formulation its normative ideals.

Expressly basing a norm on a political or religious philosophy may invite dissent and

189 Bellamy, 20

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disagreement. In particular if one bases it on a particular religious heritage which would not

be universally acceptable to all people.

Hence my argument that R2P rests on a Christian foundation might have some deeply

problematic implications for the legitimacy of the norm. If a norm is claimed to represent

universal values but can be argued to, in part, have been inspired by a particular religious

tradition this would certainly weaken its claim to universality. Of course it is entirely possible

that the same method as mine could be applied to other religious traditions to see if a broader

religious unity exists in favour of the doctrine. Potential religious inspirations to R2P deserve

more scholarly attention. Even if the ICISS have been influenced or inspired by Christian

tradition this does not mean that this Christian tradition is incompatible with perspectives

found in other world religions. It does mean that the IR community should pay more attention

to the problem of whether or not R2P really does represent universal values. One way of

discerning this might be to compare some of the central ideas of the major world religions to

R2P as see if there is a degree of agreement. Of course this introduces another problem that

has far-reaching implications, if a religious or political value-system denies that protection of

human life and liberty should be the focus on world affairs does such a value system have any

moral force?

It is important to distinguish between the particular debates surrounding the emergence of

R2P as a proposed norm. In this sense universality and state practice are very important,

perhaps more so than the moral force of the values imbedded in a set of ideas. From this

perspective any affirmation of a particular religious or political heritage in a norm is divisive

and dangerous. But, in the debate surrounding the normative ideas of R2P it might be

fallacious to attempt to motivate R2P by the universal nature of its values; rather, R2P can be

motivated by the moral force of those values. In such a debate it is very important to

discussion whether or not R2P is in line with political and religious value-systems and hence

legitimate in the eyes of vast numbers of people.

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8.2.2 Widening the spectrum of ideas.

Imperialism or liberalism can be and have been argued to be part of the ideological roots of

R2P. My argument is not that such influences are less important than a Christian influence.

The IR community can understand R2P as a product of liberal interventionism or as a product

of solidarist efforts to deepen the role of international society. But also that beyond these

political ideas there might well be a considerable Christian tradition that has contributed to the

emergence of this particular norm. I argue that an increased awareness of the continued

influence of religiously inspired ideas in international politics is important. It might not

revolutionize the IR:s community’s understanding of the emerging norm of R2P but a

recognition of the possibility of a Christian heritage found in R2P does have the potential to

widen the spectrum of ideas in which we might analyze to improve our understanding of the

historical roots of the normative ideas of R2P.

Christian ideas are, as I mentioned, a central part of a common intellectual heritage of the

western world. So studying its intellectual history we can find precursors to supposedly

modern ideas, this makes us aware of a longer tradition espousing ideas very similar to

sovereignty as responsibility. Identifying the existence of such a tradition casts the emergence

of sovereignty as responsibility in a different light, less as a radical re-conceptualization of

sovereignty and more as a return to the historical understanding of earthly authorities are

carries of moral responsibilities to its subject. In regards to the use of force an understanding

of the Christian inspiration to the idea of violations against the moral order also makes the

current notion of non-intervention seem less the natural order of things and more like a radical

doctrine in need of a moral justification. In regards to international ethics it makes the idea of

states having a universal responsibility to care for citizens seem like a natural extension of the

kind of ethics that ought to guide individual lives.

One benefit of searching for similarities and possible antecedents to supposedly new ideas is

to show how they, in this example, might be said to mirror much older ideas and values.

From this perspective R2P can be understood as a return to older views concerning authority,

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armed force and ethics rather than as a new and groundbreaking idea. It reminds us that

currently dominating ideas about these issues are products of a particular historical

circumstance that is by no means fixed and determined. There is always a danger that one

identifies the currently dominating norms and values as obvious or permanent rather than

viewing the status quo as a result of historical circumstances. By identifying an older tradition

of ideas that mirrors the views put forward in R2P one can demonstrate that it is by no means

necessary to imagine international society as working in the way pluralist international society

works. Rather, R2P might be understood to reflect a tradition of thought that has been an

important part of religiously influenced philosophy for centuries and reflect some of the core

values of western civilization.

This is not to say that this tradition of ideas is necessarily inherently good. But this wider

spectrum of ideas also enables the IR community to then undertake research to see the

historical record of the results of a particular philosophy concerning the use of force. Perhaps

such inquiry can be used to show that R2P represents ideas who´s applications in the past

have led to significant conflict and abuse.

8.2.3 The turn to Moral questions.

I would argue that another of the chief benefits of introducing a religious dimension into the

background of R2P is to better appreciate the moral dimension of the emerging norm. In IR

ethics are not as a rule ignored but significant theoretical traditions of the discipline, realism

and neo-liberalism for example, might be said to have scant appreciation for the importance of

moral elements in world problems. Christianity and other religious traditions on the other

hand are steeped in moral and ethical consideration.

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R2P is intended to confront some of the most fundamental moral problems there is. In search

for answers and perspectives on such moral issues it might well be reasonable to turn to

religious sources for answers on how people ought to justly interact with each other.

By applying a political perspective the questions we face when considering R2P might regard

its feasibility and practicality. A religious perspective has the ability to focus attention to

different issues and problems. A religious/moral perspective leads to questions like “is it right

to undertake interventions” rather than “is it politically manageable to undertake

interventions”. So an awareness of religious heritage in R2P leads to different, but relevant

and important questions being posed. It might also guide IR scholars to important

contributions of Christian philosophy concerning ethics, morality, human nature and other

issues possibly valuable to the study of R2P. An awareness for the moral and ethical

dimensions of R2P might be especially important in the political debate surrounding R2P

where moral and value based arguments may well be more important to the general public

than cost/benefit analysis or arguments considering the latest development of international

human rights law. This also points to another important field of research I have already

touched upon, the study of how R2P corresponds to particular systems of values, religious

systems being one. This is particularly important if R2P is to be considered to be legitimate in

circles of people who do not base their political outlook on developments of international law.

8.3 Final considerations.

Finally I think that the ultimate problem raised by religious heritage in R2P concerns the

nature of values. This of course is not a question resolved here, nor might it in fact be

resolvable by academic study as such. The problem concerns the problem of objective versus

subjective values. As I have tried to indicate R2P does not directly base itself on objective

values, but on the other hand seem to treat certain values as inherently right. From a political

perspective this seeming endorsement of a set of universal values might be troubling. On the

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other hand, how far is it reasonable to take value relativism? Is a set of moral values that does

not endorse the protection of human life and dignity really something to respect and adjust to?

In essence, are all moral philosophies equally valid? In this sense I argue that thinking about

the possibility of religious heritage in R2P directly leads us into important moral problems,

perhaps not resolvable by any other approach than personal introspection concerning what

kind of moral values a truly just and secure world ought to rest on

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Collin, P (2008). The Eucharist as an Interpretative Framework for the Inter-relation between

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Croxton, D (1999). The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of

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De Vietris, R (2011), Christian perspectives on the Responsibility to protect in international

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Evans, G (2008). The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come … and

Gone? International Relations. Vol 22 (3). 283-298

Etzioni, A (2005). Sovereignty as responsibility. Orbis.Vol 50 (1). 71-85.

84

Focarelli, C (2012). Ahead to the past? Responsibility to Protect and the global

system. Groningen Journal of International Law., 01(00) 1-10

Glansville, L (2011). The Antecedents to “Sovereignty as responsibility”. European Journal

of International Relations. Vol 17 (2), 233-255

Glanville, L (2012). Christianity and the Responsibility to Protect. Studies in Christian ethic.

Vol 25(3).312-326.

Johnson, J (2002), Paul Ramsey and the Recovery of the Just War Idea. Journal of Military

Ethics, Vol 1 (2), 136-144

Kuperman, A (2009). Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect. The Whitehead Journal of

Diplomacy and International Relations. Vol 10, (1). 19-29

Kratochvíl, P (2009). The Religious Turn in IR: A Brief Assessment. Perspectives. Review of

international affairs. Vol 17 (2).5-12.

Lagan, J (1984). “The Elements of St. Augustine’s Just War Theory,” Journal of Religious

Ethics. Vol 12 (1). 19-38.

Osiander, A (2001), Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian

Myth, International Organization Vol 55(2): 251–287

Schirrmacher, T (2001), Human Rights and Christian Faith. Global journal of classical theology. Vol 3 (2).

Skinner, Q (1969). Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas. History and

Theory, 8(1), 3-53

Stark, R (1999). Secularization R.I.P. Sociology of Religion, Vol 60 (3), 249-273.

Straumann, B (2006), The Right to Punish as a Just Cause of War in Hugo Grotius’ Natural

Law. Studies in the History of Ethics. Vol 2. 1-20

Swatos, W & Christiano, K (1999). Secularization theory: The course of a concept. Sociology

of Religion, Vol 60(3), 209-228.

Wright, C (1990). The people of God and the State in the Old Testament. Themelios Vol

16(1). 4-10.

Toumayan, A (2014). The responsibility for the other and The Responsibility to Protect.

Philosophy & Social Criticism. Vol 40 (3). 269-288.

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9.2 Books.

Albright, M (2006), The mighty and the almighty: reflections on America, God and World

affairs. Harper Perennial.

Asfaw, S, Kreber, G, Widerud (Ed) (2005), The Responsibility to Protect: Ethical and

Theological Reflections. World Council of Churches.

Barker, K (Ed) (2004), New International Version Study Bible. Zondervan

Beckman, L (2005). Grundbok I idéanalys: det kritiska studiet av politiska texter och idéer.

Santérus förlag

Bell, D (Ed) (2010). Ethics and World Politics. Oxford University Press

Berger, P, Berger, B and Kellner, H. The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness .

Penguin, 1974, 15.

Carr, EH (2001 ed). The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International

Relations, 1919-1939. Palgrave Macmillan

Charles, D (2005). Between pacifism and jihad. Just war and Christian tradition. InterVarsity

Press

Copan, P (2011). Is God a Moral Monster?: Making Sense of the Old Testament God. Baker

Books.

86

Finemore, M (2004). The Purpose of Intervention. Changing beliefs about the use of force.

Cornell university press.

Forbes, G (2000). The God of Old: The Role of the Lukan Parables in the Purpose of Luke's

Gospel. Sheffield Academic Press.

Holmes, A (Ed.) (2005). War and Christian ethics. Baker Academic.

Hooper, W (Ed.). The Weight of Glory and Other Addresses. Macmillan.

Horsley, R (2005). A peoples history of Christianity. Christian origins. Fortress press

Håkansson, P (2011). The United Nations Reformed, Responsibility, Protection and the

Standing of States. Linköping University Electronic Press

Jackson, Robert (2000). The Global Covenant. HumanConduct in a World of States. Oxford

University Press.

Keene, E (2002). Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World

Politics. Cambridge University Press

Lebow, R (2003). The tragic vision of politics. Ethics, Interests and Orders. Cambridge

University press.

Leithart, P (2010). Defending Constantine: The Twilight of an Empire and the Dawn of

Christendom. IVP Academic

Marsh, D & Stoker, G (ed). (2002). Theory and methods in political scienc. (3 ed.). Palgrave

Macmillan

Micklethwait, J & Wooldridge, A (2009). God is back: How the global rise of faith is

changing the world. The Penguin Press

McDonald, M (2004). God and Violence: Biblical Resources for Living in a Small World.

Herald Press

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R (2004). Sacred and secular. Religion and politics worldwide.

Cambridge University Press.

Snyder, J (ed) (2011). Religion and international relations theory. Columbia University Press.

87

Steenland,S et al (ed). Pursuing the Global Common Good: Principle and Practice in US

Foreign Policy. Centre for American Progress

Tuck, R (2001), The Rights of War and Peace. Political Thought and the International Order

from Gortious to Kant. Oxford University Press

Walzer, M (1977). Just and unjust wars. 1st ed. New York: Basic Books

Wheeler , N (2003). Saving strangers: Humanitarian intervention in international society.

Oxford University Press.

Winright, T (2011). Just Policing and the Responsibility to Protect. The Ecumenical review.

63(1). 84-95

Yoder, J (2010). Nonviolence. A brief history. Baylor University Press

Zimmern, A (1939). Spiritual values and world affairs. Oxford University press.

9.3 Speeches.

Annan, K (2088). Remarks on accepting the peace of Westphalia prize. Available at

http://kofiannanfoundation.org/newsroom/speeches/2008/10/kofi-annans-remarks-accepting-

peace-westphalia-prize-0.

Benedict , XVI, (2008). Meeting with the members of the general assembly of the united

nations organization address of his holiness benedict xvi. Retrieved from:

http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2008/april/documents/hf_ben-

xvi_spe_20080418_un-visit_en.html 2014-04-01.

Holtschneider, J. (2008). The responsibility to protect. Address by the rev. Dennis

Holtschneider to the Church-State breakfast forum at the Chicago Union League Club.

Available at http://offices.depaul.edu/president/speeches-and-communications/2009/Pages/

responsibility-to-protect.aspx

Slim, H (2005). The Christian responsibility to protect. A response to Gareth Evans and

Konrad Raisner. WCC experts seminar on the Responsibility to Protect. Geneva, 21-23 April

88

2005. Available at mercury.ethz.ch/.../Files/.../The%2520ChristianResponsibility.pdf.

Retrieved 2014-02-21

Slim, H (2007). The responsibility to protect. Scope and challenges for churches. International

Ecumenical Consultation Evangelische Akademie Arnoldshain. Available at

http://overcomingviolence.org/fileadmin/dov/files/iepc/expert_consultations/Hugo_Slim_-

_R2P_WCC_Talk.pdf, Retrieved 2014-06-01. 1

9.4 Web Pages / Internet Sources.

Augustine. Epistle 47:5, To Publicola. Available at

http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1102047.htm.

Aquinas, T. Summa Theologica. Question 40, war. Article 1. Available at

http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3040.htm

Dann, C. (2013). America's Christians mobilize against Syria strike ahead of hill votes.

Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/americas-christians-mobilize-against-

syria-strike-ahead-hill-votes-f8C11108308 2014-04-14

Enns, F. (2007), The Responsibility to Protect- International Ecumenical Consultation.

Evangelische Akademie Arnoldshain November 16 – 18, 2007, .From “humanitarian

intervention” to “responsibility to protect”: peacemaking and policing – the view of the

historic peace churches. Available at:

http://overcomingviolence.org/fileadmin/dov/files/iepc/expert_consultations/Fernando_-

_R2P_Arnoldshain_2007-11.pdf0.

Fehr, J. J. (2008). The responsibility to confront evil: a pacifist critique of R2P from the

historic peace churches. Available at:

http://www.dmfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/Responsibility to Confront Evil.pdf

Golebiewski, D. (2007). Christian Traditional Values Prefiguring the Development of Human

Rights. Available at http://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/03/christian-traditional-values-prefiguring-

the-development-of-human-rights/

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Kubalkova, V (2013). The “Turn to Religion” in International Relations Theory. Avalable at http://www.e-ir.info/2013/12/03/the-turn-to-religion-in-international-relations-theory/.

Schaff, P (2009). Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. Series 1, Volume 2. Christian Classics Ethereal Library; 1.1 edition Available at http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102.pdf

Wallis, J (2012). Caring for the Poor is Government's Biblical Role. Available at http://sojo.net/blogs/2012/08/30/caring-poor-governments-biblical-role

9.5 Working, research & conference papers.

Kuhnle, L (2008). Re-conceptualizing religious space in the German Democratic Republic:

The role of Protestant churches in the formation of a political opposition. Working paper

series, 14. The Canadian Centre for German and European Studies.

Heath, A (2007) Re-examining Core Concepts of Classical Realism: E.H. Carr, Hans

Morgenthau and the Realist agenda, paper presented to Sixth Pan-European International

Relations Conference, University of Turin, 12.15 september 2007. 6-7

Luban, D (2011). War as Punishment. Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research

Paper No. 11-71.

Kersten, M (2012). A Fatal Attraction? The UN Security Council and the Relationship between R2P and the International Criminal Court. (Draft paper).

Vrdoljak, A (2009). The Responsibility to Protect Reexamined. Independent studies paper,

University for peace.

Pethiyagoda , K (2013). India’s approach to humanitarian interventions and the

Responsibility to Protect. (working paper). Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and armed

conflict.

Schütte, R and Kübler, J (2007). The Responsibility to Protect. Concealed Power-Politics or

Principled Policy? HumSec Occasional Paper Series.

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9.6 Statements and documents of organizations.

Canadian Friends Service Committee, (2007). Summary of Quaker discernment on “The

responsibility to protect 2006-2007.

Catholic Church (1993), Catechism of the Catholic Church.

Catholic Church. (2004), Compendium of the Social Doctrines of the Church.

Catholic Church (1963) Pacem In Terris Encyclica of Pope John XXIII On Establishing

Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity and Liberty.

Church and Peace International office (2011). Press release. Struggle for God´s Shalom to

continue, even after the end of the ecumenical decade to overcome violence.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001). The Responsibility to

Protect. Report of the international commission on intervention and state sovereignty.

Organization of the Islamic Conference (1990), Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam,

Pew Forum (2012). The Global Religious Landscape.

Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain (2009). The Proceedings of the Yearly

Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) in Britain 2009. Vol (2).

United Church of Canada.(2008) Responsibility to protect – Background paper.

United Church of Canada (2008). United Church Social Policy Positions. Responsibility to

Protect.

United Nations, (1945). Charter of the United Nations,

United Nations, (2000). We the people. The role of the United nations in the 21st century.

United nations (2004). A more secure world, our chared responsibility.

United Nations, (2005). World Summit Outcome : resolution / adopted by the General

Assembly.

91

United Nations (2006). Security Council resolution 1674.

United Nations (2011), Security Council resolution 1973. 

World Council of Churches (2001), The protection of endangered populations in situations of

armed violence: toward an ecumenical ethical approach

World Council of Churches. (2006), Vulnerable populations at risk. Statement on the

responsibility to protect.

World Council of Churches (1999). Together on the Way; official report of the eighth

assembly.

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