ARGUMENT

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MS. COBBS HAD NOT

BEEN SUBJECTED TO A CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION BECAUSE THERE

WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THE FACTORS COMPRISING THE TEST

COURTS APPLY TO DETERMINE WHETHER A CUSTODIAL

INTERROGATION HAS TAKEN PLACE.

Ms. Cobbs endured a custodial interrogation because there is sufficient evidence under

the factors that courts use to determine if a custodial interrogation has taken place showing that

she was indeed in custody for Miranda purposes. Furthermore, under the second prong of the test

used, a reasonable person in Ms. Cobbs’s place, given the circumstances presented under the

factor test, would have felt that she was not free to stop the interrogation and leave.

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution mandates that “No person shall…be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself…” U.S. Const. Amend. V. The

landmark Supreme Court opinion, Miranda v. Arizona, established that once an individual is

sufficiently restrained by law enforcement in an interview or interrogation predicament, they

must be informed of their rights under the Fifth Amendment. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,

478-479 (1966). These are part of the “prophylactic procedural rules” that law enforcement must

adhere to when a custodial interrogation occurs. The test for whether an interrogation has

occurred revolves around whether a person is in custody. “Custody” is a term of art entailing

circumstances which give rise to a serious danger of coercion on the part of law enforcement that

would cause a person to self-incriminate without being advised of their rights, in violation of the

Fifth Amendment and the precedent set forth in Miranda. Howes v. Fields 132 S.Ct. 1181, 1189

(2012).

Courts have developed a two-pronged test for analyzing whether a person is in custody

for the purposes of a Fifth Amendment violation. First, a totality of the circumstances test

examines five factors: 1) the location of the questioning; 2) the duration of the questioning; 3)

statements made during the questioning; 4) presence or absence of restraints; and 5) whether the

interviewee was released after being questioned. Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1189. The fifth factor is not

at issue in this case because Ms. Cobbs was in jail at the time of her questioning, so she could not

be formally released at the end of her interrogation; she was simply released back into the

general jail population.

The second prong of the analysis involves an objective inquiry as to whether “in light of

the objective circumstances of the interrogation” (Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322-

323, 325 (1994)) would “a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate

the interrogation and leave” (Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)). The subjective

viewpoints of both the questioning officer and the interviewee are irrelevant. Id. Thus, it is

always true that if a defendant is found to be in custody under the totality test, and a reasonable

person in her shoes would not have felt free to leave, a violation of her 5th

Amendment rights has

occurred, and any statements obtained during the questioning at issue are inadmissible. Miranda,

384 U.S. at 476.

In this case, Ms. Cobb’s endured a lengthy, isolated interrogation where officers shut her

inside a small room within the jail and interrogated her for hours, failing to communicate directly

to her that she was free to leave, made coercive statements towards her, and left an officer by the

closed door with his hand on his holster to keep her from getting up. This not only meets the

totality of the circumstances case, but a reasonable person in Ms. Cobbs’s place would not have

felt free to leave. Therefore, the statements made during the questioning of Ms. Cobbs should

have been suppressed.

A. The trial court erred in holding that Ms. Cobbs was not subjected to a custodial

interrogation because there is sufficient evidence to show that Ms. Cobbs satisfies the

totality of the circumstances test for determining whether an individual is in custody.

1. Ms. Cobbs satisfies the “location” factor of the totality test because the room she was

interrogated in was small, windowless, and in general reflective of the “jailhouse” type of

rooms implicated in Miranda.

Because Ms. Cobbs was locked away into a small, windowless room where she was

interrogated for hours, she satisfies the “location” factor of the totality test. The location of

questioning establishes whether there was a restraint on the freedom of movement on the person

being questioned such that a custodial interrogation may be taking place. Maryland v. Shatzer,

130 S.Ct. 1213, 1224 (2010). The court in that case reasoned that a typical situation where a

custodial interrogation may be taking place is one where a person is taken from their normal life

and placed in isolation in a police-dominated environment while being questioned. Id at 1220-

1221. Furthermore, in Miranda the Court held that interrogation in an “unfamiliar”, “police

dominated” environment where the defendant was held “incommunicado” gives rise to the

inference that the defendant is in custody, and thus under the umbrella of protections that

Miranda mandates under the 5th

Amendment. Miranda, 86 S.Ct. at 467.

For example, in Miranda the defendant was held incommunicado in a room at the police

station where he was questioned by police officers, detectives and a prosecuting attorney. The

Court found that such a location implicated a custodial interrogation because the defendant was

separated from the outside world and his normal life. Miranda, 86 S.Ct. at 445. However, the

Court in Miranda also held that custodial interrogations may occur when a defendant’s “freedom

of action” is curtailed “in any significant way.” Id at 436. This is demonstrated in cases where a

police domination occurs even in a person’s home, such as when police enter a defendant’s

apartment and hold him at gunpoint, subsequently restraining his movement with weapons

lowered. U.S. v. Fautz, 812 F.Supp.2d 570, 619 (D.N.J. 2011). In that case, the court found that

the defendant’s freedom of action was sufficiently curtailed by police actions to such an extent

that custodial interrogation was implicated because the armed officers prevented the defendant

from moving at all. Id.

In contrast, police do not have to issue Miranda warnings during routine traffic stops

because the public nature of the stop imposes less of a coercive atmosphere on an individual.

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-438. The court there reasoned that because a motorist

is typically able to continue on their way after a brief stop, and they are in view of the public

rather than restrained in an incommunicado manner or held in a highly restrictive manner, they

are not in custody for purposes of a Miranda inquiry. Id.

In this case, the location of the interrogation took place in the “break-out room”, which

was an 8x8 foot room with no windows and a flickering light. (R-13, ll. 11-14). This is like the

“jailhouse” setting in Miranda, where a defendant feels the coercive effects of a police

interrogation more readily, and contrasts sharply with a routine traffic stop in view of the general

public, such as that in Berkemer. Furthermore, the fact that Ms. Cobbs was outnumbered by

armed police, one of whom had his hand on his holstered weapon, makes her situation similar to

the defendant in Fautz, and the court there found the defendant was not free to leave even when

he was in his own home. Ms. Cobbs’s situation sufficiently meets the location factor because she

was taken into a small interrogation room where she was outnumbered by armed officers. Thus,

custodial interrogation was implicated because Ms. Cobbs’s freedom of action was limited in a

significant way due to the location she was placed in.

2. Ms. Cobbs was held for a sufficient duration to satisfy the “duration” factor of the

totality test because she was held for several hours in the room she was questioned in.

The “duration” factor is satisfied in this case because Ms. Cobbs was held for what

appears to be many hours during the period of questioning. Courts have determined that longer,

jailhouse-type interrogations that are demonstrated in Miranda are more conducive to an

interrogation than an encounter which only lasts a few minutes. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.

420, 437-438 (1984). This characterization helps to determine whether a person may be in

custody for the purposes of a Fifth Amendment inquiry. Id.

For example, a routine customs inquiry that lasts fifteen minutes is too short a duration to

be considered in the totality test. U.S. v. Pratt, 645 F.2d 89, 91 (1st Cir. 1981). In that case, even

though the questioning had some other circumstances that could have implied a person was in

custody, the duration of the questioning on its own was too short for the court to consider it a

factor in its analysis. Id. On the other hand, “at least an hour” appears to be long enough to

consider an in custody for the purposes of a duration analysis. U.S. v. Garcia, 496 F.2d 670, 672-

673 (5th

Cir. 1974). In that case, the defendant was detained for an hour or more during a border

crossing stop by border patrol agents. The court found that her being detained for as long as she

was constituted a border patrol search that was not routine, and reasoned she was in custody. Id.

Furthermore, in Howes the defendant was held for five to seven hours in a prison setting, in a

separate room similar to the one Ms. Cobbs was held in. Howes, 132 S.Ct. at 1193. The Court

reasoned that because the defendant was held for such a long time, the possibility that he was

under custodial interrogation was implicated. Id.

In this case, Ms. Cobbs was held in the room she was questioned in for well over an hour.

Officer Reynolds stated it was not “brief”, and went from the afternoon to well after the dinner

hour. (R-13, ll 34-36). This easily fits within the framework offered by the Fifth Circuit in

Garcia. Moreover, she seems to have been held for several hours, rather than simple “at least one

hour”, similar to the defendant in Howes, and the Court there reasoned that the defendant had

been held long enough to implicate custodial interrogation. Thus, Ms. Cobbs has sufficient

evidence to satisfy the duration factor of the totality test.