WRG Armies & Enemies of Ancient China

7/21/2019 WRG Armies & Enemies of Ancient China

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~ h 6 Apmi6s anel En6mi6sofAnci6nt Ghina

Chinese, Hsiung.nu, Kushan Indian, Bactrian, Ferghani",l, Sogdian, Korean , Tu Chueh,Tokharian, Kuchan, Islamic, Tibetan, Nepalese, Khitan, QaraKhitan, Jurchen , SeljukTurk, Mongolian , Japanese, Mountain Tribes , Vietnamese , Burmese.

1 0 2 ~ B.G.-1286A.D.b ~ JohnR Gp66P

A WARGAMES RESEARCH GROUP PRODUCTION

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DEDICATIONThis, my first, to my wife GailMy inspiration, fellow Society member, and a wargamer ; To Dr. Joseph Chen, Faculty OrientalHistory , Califomia State University at Northridge, who introduced me to the histo ry of China,provided translations, and gave me mu ch advice and encouragement in the writing of this book, ilndto Da vid Court, who spent many hours proofreading my manusc ript and who gave this work

continuity.


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nd

THE ARMIES AND ENEMlES OF AN ClENT CHINA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTIONA. Pronuncialion KeyB. Chronological TableC. Map of China and the Eastern World

n. BRIEf HISTORY , ORGANIZATION, TACTICS AND TRAININGA. Chinese ArmiesB. Enemies of China

III. MAJOR BATTLES OF THE PERIOD

IV. WEAPO NS AND UNIFORMSA. Chinese SoldiersB. Enemy Warriors

v. BIBLIOGRAPHY

VI. APPENDICES

Copy right john P. Greer and Wargames Research Group.

Pages44,50, 7, 8

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INTRODUCTIONll1is book continues the series on the armies of the ancient world. The intention of this series is toprovide background information for students of military and art history, miniature modellers andillustra tors.This parti cular book is the first known attempt in English to compile a chronological re cord of theChinese military systems, with a view to on ly these systems, seg regated from economical-sociologicalinfluences. It is not a military history of China, bu t rather a documented study of the Chinese so ldierand his enemies.Tn contrast to the previous puhlications in this series, this is the first book tha t does not concentrateon the Occidental world. The manuals and histories extant of the west arc abundant when comparedto those of the Oriental \\'orld. As military historians, we are indeed fortunate that, when recordswere kept , they were very precise and detailed. In addition. the Oriental passion for artisticendeavors provide us with a wealth of frescoes , reliefs, and funerary stelae, many of which aremilitaristic in theme.Wh en dealing with the ancient world and it 's military systems, the mili ta ry historian should have asecondary discipline: art history. It is in art objects and artifacts that we can see what is merelyindicated in literature or historical records. These two disciplines, when utilized sid e by side, proveinvaluable to a researcher of this period and subject.Another difference between this work and those preceding is the time period covered. We are nowdealing with a period of approx imately two thousand years. DUring this period of time, numerOuspeoples migrate, develop. and expand. I have chosen to concentrate on the Chinese Army development , portraying each of China's enemies in a somewhat secondary role, only showing theirdevelopment when they came in contact with China_An exception to this, of course, is the Mongols. With the rise of the Jenghis Khan , we see the birth ofa military system that easily equals in importance anything that China produced.As the title of this work deals with China, I will docliment the Mongols only to the point of theJapanese invasions of the late 13th century. As that time, China was already under the MongolianYiian Dynasty, practically all of Asia was under Mongolian rule, and their eyes turned towards thewest and Europe.As with the rest of the Research Group series, reliance has been placed on ancient authors andexcavation report s, with emphasis on monumental and archeological evidence. TIle ancient authors ofthis period seldom adequately describe armor types or weapons, therefore archeological evidence isneeded. Thi s the Orien ta l world provides in funera ry reliefs and wall pa intings. As Art Hi sto ry is myprimary academic discipline, I will recognize archeological artifacts or visual evidence as the decidingfactor, when the literary evidence and the physical evidence do not co incide.FelT students starting a journey into the world of Chinese military history, there are a few volumesthat are truly invaluable.Sun Tzu's The Art of Wa r, translated by S.B. Griffith is an excellent introduction 10 the ChouDynasty. In addition to the doctrine included. this edition is by far the most readable and enlertaining.The Shih Chi by Ssu -ma Ch'ien , (B. Wat son, translator) and the History of the Furmer Han Dynastyby Pan Ku (I I. Du bs, translator) provide an excellent start for the Han Dynastic period , along withthe multivolumed wO lks on the Han Administration by M. Loewe.

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.-\ \'ery interesting work is Rome and Chinn by F.1. TeggarL This describes the illterrelationships.; f (WO great empires, and how one's actions ultimately affected the ot her. The great ChineseC3J11pa igns again 51 the Hsiung-nu resulted in the barbarian invasions of the west , the creation of theTurks. Tartars. Huns, and Mongols, the destruction of the Indian Empire (via the Ku shan), and thefill of Parthia and Persia.Truly excellent works on the Mongols and their empire are offered by, of cOlITse. lhe primary initialSoHJ rce. TIl e Rook of Ser Marco Polo, in Iwo volumes, translated by Colonel Yule; H, Howorth's five.,Iume History of the Mongols; and nle Ri se of Chinghis Khan and His Conquest of No rthern Chinaby H .Martin provide two additional valunblc sources .I should note that many of the ancient accounts of battles have not been named. I have had to;:


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PRONUNCIATION OF CHINESE NAMESThe following is prov ided as a gu ide for the pronunciat ion of the Ch in ese names in th is book. h isbasica ll y a modification of the WadeG il es system. and I am indebted to Dr. J. Trabold for it's use inthis work.Vowel Equivalents


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The Liao (Khitan) Dynasty (907 - 11 25 A.D.)Northe rn China

The Sung Dynasty (960 - 1279 A.D.)Northern SungSouthern Sung

The Chin Dynasty ( 1115 - 1234 A.D .)Northern China (The l urchen)

The YUan Dynasty (1260 - 1368 A.D.)Mongolian rule

5

960 - 1117 A.D.1127 - 1179 A.D.


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THE CHOU DYNASTYThe periods prior to the advent of the Chou Dynasty (ca. 1027 B.C.) are still shrouded in mysteryor in unsubSlanriated information. Archeological finds suggest a great cultural history of the ShangDYnasty (directly preceding the Chou) and possibly indicate an even earlier Hsia Dynasty. It is onlywhen we get to great historians like Ssu-ma eh ' jen and his histories that we can stand on fairly firmgro und. For this reason this work begins with the Chou.Exactly when or wh y the Chou descended "from Shansi and Kansu to the Szechuan Plain is not known.It ma y have been the result of a "domino" movement originating in Western Asia by the Aryans, bu tacco rd ing to Chinese traditi on thi s was not so. Umi1 we learn more the Chou will be , as the Shang,still a mystery. Within 20 years the Chou conquered all of the Shang territory , includin g all 50 states.Dur in g the period of the early (Western) Chou (ca. 1027 - 771 B.C .) a strong central governmentpreva iled. Liege lo rds paid tribute to the king, and all was relatively stable. In 77 1 B.C., the Duke ofShen employed Hsiung-nu mercenaries, overthrew the government and killed the king. From thisl ime to the end of the Chou and the unification of the Empire under the Ch' in, China was reduced toprinc ipalities under a feudal system with much power lying in the northern states.The period of middle (Eastern) Chou , commonly called the Spring and Autumn Annals (ca. 722 -480 B.C.) saw the life of the great sage K'ungfutzu (Confucius), the Five Classics, the Book of Tao ,the Four Books of Philosophy, and the Suntzu (Art of War).The period of the Warring States (ca. 480 - 221 B.C.) saw the growth of strong states such as Ch 'u in

lower Yangtze Valley , and the dynamic state of Ch' in in the north and west. The "spartan" Ch' instate would ultimately put an end to the Chou Dynasty which had , in reality , dissolved in power yearsbefo re .ORGANIZATIONThe Sun-tzu or Art of War provides mu ch of the Chou military organization and tactic. It is no tknown wh o wrote the Ar t of War or if Sun-tzu were his name. Over the years of Chinese history, weare fortunate 'that the Sun-tzu was maintained and military criti cs of later years would add theircom ments on applications of the Sun-tzu's principles, "flavoring" their critiques with insights intothe ir own military systems. The Art of War remains today as a classic of military writing.The principle weapon of the Chou was the quadriga, or four-horse chariot. The infantry servedmerely to support this main shock weapon. Until rather late in the Chou period , cavalry\vere sadlynegle cted as an offensive weapon - - it took the lessons of nomadic warfare to introduce the cavalryarm to the Chinese way of fighting.The chariot unit, according to the Li-Ki and also Ssu-ma Fa (ca. 700 B.C.) consisted of the mainveh icle , foot soldiers , and attendants. The Li-Ki , as translated by Friedrich Hirth , calls for one threeman war chariot to be supported by 25 armored infantry and 72 unarmored men , thus forming ananc ient equivalent to the medieval "lance", or to Kautilya ' s Mauryan Indian "unit" of elephant ,cha riot , archers and infantry.Ssu-ma Fa calls for a " company" of 100 ; three in the chariot , 72 foot soldiers and 25 auendants withthe baggage cart. Obviously , this translation by S. Griffith , is quite different from the Li-Ki. The 25ext ra footmen and their duties were mistranslated by one of the authors. Friedrich Hirth is o ftenquo ted , bu t I have found glaring errors in his works , probably due to a misunderstanding o f militaryma tters or nomenclature. Therefore , Mr. Griffith may be closer to the correct translation. and the 72infantry would consist of both armored and u n a ~ m o r e d types. It is probable that a very slllali numberof the company would be blessed with any kind of armor whatsoever. In fact , another source suggest stha t the only armor allocated lO these footmen was in the form of a shield.

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kno wledge of the Sun-tzu. The Art of War was required reading for all generals and many stratagemsand dictums stated were frequently used in battle. An example of what is covered in the Sun-tzll isthe note in Chapter V, Section 31. It states that to a surrounded enemy you must leave a way ofescape- for if the enemy sees that there is no hope of escape, you will change a routed foe into acornered tiger. Five centuries later , in another part of the world, a certain Julius Caesar will writeprecisely the same dictum.Approximate Composition of the Chou Dynasty Army

x i m u m percentages of types within the total force employed:Untrained , armored infantry 20%Untrained , unarmored infantry: ; : 70%After 387 B.C. , the above could be considered to be trained.Charioteers 10%, of which half were war chariotsUnarmored cavalry 5%Crossbow armed infantry 20%

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THE CH'IN DYNASTYTIle fareastern equivalent to Greece's Sparta was the state of eh'in. In a period of great fluxunder the Chou, the Ch'in were scorned by their Chinese neighbors for la cking culture and emulatingtheir northern barbarian neighbors, the Hsiungnu. Thus segregated from their Chinese kinsmen , theCh ' in sought to improve themselves and overlooked no opportunity to build their military might andtactical expertise. Discipline iI)., both civil and familial matters ensued, as the government followed thestructure of the earlier Shang- 'creating order where there was chaos.By 318 B.C., the Ch'in were strong enough to take the Szechuan Plain, the most fertile and productivefoodproducing area then in China . By 222 B.c. , the Ch'in had conquered all rival states and nowreigned supreme. This was truly the first time that the Chinese were completely united, for in 238B.C . all fiefdoms were abolished. Great work was done for the people by the Ch'in ruling house,including a Grand Canal nearly 100 miles long that was cut across Shensi Province to enrich the soil.An irrigation system, reputedly begun in 300 B.C ., has banished serious flood s in Szechuan for 22centuries. The people were di sarmed , but given property rights for the first time in Chinese history,subject only to taxation. Nobility was no longer a gift of birth, but rather a gift from the state inreturn for service. Not only was the country unified in purpose and government, bu t also culturallyand administratively. Customs, writing,laws, weights and measures were now uniform by Imperialdecree and supervision.TIle Emperor Ch'in Shih-huangti, in 220 B.C ., ordered a network of roads to be built across theEmpire . The northern sectional defences were united to form the Great Wall. With all of the assetsShihhuangti brought to this first Chinese Empire, he also brought the term tyrant.Fearing that too many things were "threats" to the Ch' in state and his own power, he graduallydegenerated into a despot. Paranoia soon overtook him , and he felt assassination so prevalent a threatthat he sought to abolish the chance of it. He ordered aIr bronze vessels, sculpture, and weapons to beconfiscated and destroyed. Many members of the "literati" were executed and much ancient literaturewas burned , for these could cause his death, or incite others to cause it , or remind the people ofanother way of life , other than that dictated by the state. The only books to survive the burningswere those on medicine , divination, farming , arboriculture and his own geneology.This "intellectual purge" was coupled with a breakdown of morality and the military system. Soonthe Empire was being drained of all it's resources just to supply Shih-huangti's regime. But thissupply did not satiate the despot's desires. Sadness and poverty soon grew into rebellion anddisorder. It was time for a change.THE CH'IN ARMYThe primary importance of the Ch'in military system I


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Pri soners and convicts were frequent ly used in the army. in two capac itie s. The comIllon labor troopswere convicts merely serving ou r a p rison sentence. They performed the menial rasks around thecamps. dug ditches and latrines. bu ilt fortificatio ns and the like. and. much to their chagrin. served as" cannon fodder" in battle. How ever, the Ch ' ih-hsing were amnestied convicts . serving ou t theirsentence in the combat arm of the army . These frequent ly were very fierce fighters. not hamperedwith too much military !raining.Pio nee rs we re no t engineers or the like. as we migh t call them today. They were the sta ti c garrisonsthat manned the Ch inese limes and the Great Wall. These troops were mainly armed fa rmers. andactually cuh ivated the areas around thei r posts when not on duty, much like their 4t h and 5thcentury Rom an counterparts.In add ition to the above. there were several specialized units in the Han Army. brough t to light byChao Ch 'unghuo's campaign aga ins t the rebe llious Western Ch'iang in 61 B.C. It is here that we firsthear of the " Voluntee r Expert Marksmen". wh o distinguished themselves by their uncannymarksmanship . These opera ted as a jager or Rifle Brigade type in battle, but as to whether they werearmed with a bow o r crossbow the histories do not tell us. The "Winged Forest Orphans" were anelite body of armored infant!)'. all of whom we re orph aned as a di rect result of their fathers' dying inba ttle. The" Liang Chia-tzu" were elite nob le-born cavalrymen, and more than likely. armored.Finally. the "Yung-kan" archers are ment ioned but no t elaborated upon.The Han were noted for their use of ar t illery and long-ranged crossbows. These weapons dearly gavethem an advantage as they gene rally ou t -ranged any weapons their enemies possessed.TA CTICSAs is evide nt in the ba tt l e narra ti ves of the Han period . not much in the W3.y of stra tagems andinnova ti ons were igno red by Han generals. TIl ey learned much from Sun -tzu and applied his p rincipleswe ll.Basically, muc h attention was focused o n the missil e weapon as the ma in arm. and the crossbowsimply out-classed any opponent's weapon. On repeated occasions (Battlc of Sogdia na. 38 B.C. , LiLin g. 90 B.C.. for examples) the crossbows were formed up in ranks protected by the armoredinfan try who ca rr ied large shields and lo ng spea rs. Even the armo red cavalry at times were equippedwiih these crossbows, fo rmi ng a kind of "selfpropelled artillery".The chariots we re used for the fina l blow. afte r the bO\\.os had done the real work. Cavalry was usedfo r the shock assault if the ground wasn' t su itable for the cha riots. Genera lly . the cava lry arm wasused in twO ways- - one. as a reconn aissa nce and pursuit fo rce. and two. if a h igh ly mob ile force suchas the Hsiung-nu we re involved as an enemy in ba ttl e, the Han caval ry aHempted to p in the enemycava lry. a ll ow ing the infant ry and chario ts to cl ose.TRA ININGIn th is category, th e Han Army was fa r supe ri or to any previo us Ch inese Army and Illost of herenemi es.Dur ing the early Han, all ma les between the ages of 23 and 56 were conscripted for two years activese rvice. During the years 155 - 74 B.C., the age was reduced to 20 for conscript ion. At the age of 56.all low ranking infantry and marines were classed as " elderly and dec rep it" and were "made c ivil ia ns" .Tr ai ning was not lef t in boot camp either. Every year. on the eigh th month . the enti re army. no ranksOr arms excep ted , was involved in a General Inspect ion and testing program. All un its were graded on

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performance.


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Arm ored . untrained infantryUnarmored. untrained cavalryUnarmored . untrained in fantryTrained unitsSouthern:

40%40%60%10%Armored. poorly trained cavalry 50%Completely :.mnored (cataphract)trained cavalry 10%Unarmored . poorly trained cava lry 30%Armored. poorly trained infantry 6000Unarmore d . poorly trained infantry 50%

Of the last two ca tegories. 1 f;" could be armed with crossbowArtilleri sts 5%

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THE T'ANG DYNASTYAfter three and a half centuries of disunion , the Sui Dynasty finally succeeded in uniting China onceagain. But at the turn of the 7th century A.D., China was once again plunged into IUfmoil.Unrestrained Imperial luxury and widespread governmental corrup tion led the Empire into ope nrevolt . It just doesn't seem that the pampered Chinese nobility ever learn.The "King Arthur" of the time was Li Shih-min (later to become the ran g Emperor T'ang ra iTsung), who, after conquering every other contestant, founded the Tang Dynasty in 6 18 A.D. Underthis dynasty China was to extend her Empire to further limits than any other dynasty, even the Han.Trade was exhalted to a height never before known. A never-ending stream of caravans traversed thesilk route, ca rrying Chinese exports throughout the known world. By 733 A.D . the Imperial Censusreported 43,090,000 people living within the Tang Empire.ORGANIZA TIONThe organization of the Tang Army began with the six field armies ChUn. The se were divided inlOtwo wings each, the left (senior) , and the right , each consist ing of three arm ie s. Ea ch wing wasco mmanded by a general , the left wing commander being senior. A Chief of Staff and a cavalrycommander (Ssu-ma) completed the army's co mmand positions.The army was divided into infantry regiments responsible direct ly lO army hea dq uarters, while cavalryregiments were br igaded into divisions subordina te to army headquarters. Infantry organization ca.744 A.D. allowed for regiments of 800- 1200 men. The main body of infantry , the tvtilitia, had some600 regiments.The cavalry were grouped in 4 ,000 man divisions and regiments of 500 and 1,000 men. Squadrons of200 and 300 men have been identified as independen t spuadrons, not subordinate to a regiment. butra ther subordinate directly lO army command .The Imperial Guard provided twelve regiments , six cavalry and six infantry to guard the Emperor , andth re e of each to protect the Crown Prince .In add ition to the above regula r" units, the T'ang made much use of allied auxiliaries. In 617 A.D. ,the Western Tu Chueh (t he Ta-nai tribe) were allied with Li Shih-min in his bid for power with theSui Chinese. During the period 630-682 A.D., the Eastern T u Chueh allied with the Tang to fightthe Western Tu Chueh and the Kuchan. In 644 , the Uighur Tu Chueh also allied to fight the Kuchan.and in 64 9 , 1,200 Tibetan armored cavalry and 7,000 Nepalese infantry were called in to fight KingAlanashan of India at Chapra on the Ganges Ri ver.In 617 A.D., command organization for the State of Tang was as follows. As is obvious, the organiza tion will remain the same into the Empire, with the exception of positional chan ges.

GeneralissimoLeft Wing (Senior)Right WingChief of StaffCavalry Commander (Ssu-ma) =

The Duke of T angThe Duke of Lung-hsi, Li Chien-ch'engThe Duke of Tunhuang , Li Shih-minP'e i ChiLiu Wen-ching

There were several units that distinguished themselves during the Tang period. One was Li Shih-min'sbodygua rd of 100 armored cavalry, other units were the " Flying Horse" unarmored cavalry, and the" Yu-men" squadron of 300 armored cavalry lancers. The last two units were probably independentformations .

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Seige artillery for the Tang included numerous large catapu lts. and large "multiple crossbows"(similar to ballistae?). capable of discharging eight bo lts in repeating fire at a range of 500 paces.TRAININGTIle bulk of the early Tang infantry and even the cavalry were conscripted. TIle cavalry were allconsidered elite when compared to the infantry. Because of this cavalry-oriented philosophy, the in-fantry of the Tang seldom ever left the farmer-soldier status. It was the heavy cavalry that won LiShih-min's great victories such as that at Ssushui in 620 A.D. TIle discipline, esprit de co rps, andtactical expertise of these units provided the ferocity in battle that could annihilate a far superiorforce. Indicative of the degree of training and indoctrination , the elite shock troops of the Tang werecalled "Leapers and Agitators".Once the campaigns started to be lost , disintegration quickly followed both in training and administration. The numerous rebellions of the 9th century broke the back of the army , and the Chineselooked to their farmer-soldiers for support that never materialized.TACTICSAgainst nomadic tribes, the Tang sought to capture their flocks and occupy their wells rather thanto fight or to pursue a much faster foe across the Steppes. The Tang also set ou t to disrupt their foesvia diplomatic means. By setting one tribe against another , a fighting force could lose all cohesivenessand crumble before the slightest Chinese opposition . When Qadir Khan , in 622 A.D. , entered Chinawith a force of 150,000 T'u Chueh, the Chinese managed to subdue this massive army piecemeal (seeT'u Chueh).TIle Tang favoured pinning down an enemy frontally , then w o r ~ i n g their way around the enemy'sflanks. This was used against the Koreans, who had little if any heavy cavalry as a mobile reserve withwhich they could counter this move.Of course , the T'ang were not above any deed if it would ensure victory, or even the chance of it , asmay be seen in the unorthodox method of disrupting an enemy described in the narrative, "TheBattle of Kansu".As a general, Li Shihmin ranks with the alltime greats. He used the stratagem of displaying morestandards that units in his anny to imply more units than were actually present. Also, whenconfronted with impossible odds as at Ssu -Shui , he was not above splitting his force, leading a tinysquadron out of position and confusing and demoralizing him , and then lashing out with a highlytrained and motivated army on his terms.Hannibal's trek across the Alps was equalled under the Tang by General Kao Hsien-chin, who, in747 A.D., took a 10,000 man cavalry army and advanced over a wilderness area , across the PamirMountain range at Baroghil (elevation 12 ,400') and the Glacier Darkhot (elevation 15 ,400') descending finally into the Yasin Valley, there defeating a Tibetan-Arabic allied army, after a gruelling journeyof over 700 miles'Approximate Composition of the T'ang Dynasty ArmyMaximum percentages of types within the total force employed before 885 A.D.

Chinese trained, armored cavalryChinese trained , unarmored cavalryChinese conscripted, poorly trainedspearmen and bowmenChinese Guard or trained armoredinfantry

=

20

50%, of these, 10% were elite20%50%10%


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Tribal aux iliary unarmored cava lry,armored cava lry . or sk irmishers = 30%In 885 A.D ., the army degenerated into regiments of 1,000 men. Th e army theoretically had 54 ofthese. The cavalry fell into disuse , and poorly trained armo red infantry constituted the bulk of thelater T' ang Army. This was the case unt il the Empire's fall.

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THE SUNG DYNASTYEven with the great prosperity of the rang , disaster and collapse lurked behind the Imperial

throne. As was the case in the past is now true also: the government needed or desired morefunds. Fo r many cen tu ries, the peasants had borne the chief burden when it came to taxation. Anattempt was made in 76 6 A.D. and 780. [0 transfer paIl of this burden to the wealthier landowner s. But. as thi s was administe red by local officials and rampant co rruption ensued, this"'remedy" failed.Internal discontent, co rru ption of high officials and gene ral dissillusion finally brought thegovernment of the T ang to an end. As was generally the case, politica l chaos fo\l0wed the dissolutionof .he T'ang.Between 907 :md 11 25 A.D .. the Khitan horde overran northern China and established the LiaoEmpire. Absolute anarchy and chaos prevailed throughout the remainder of China. as band it s pillagedand sacked. back and forth, over th e south lands.The inclusive dates of approximately 800-960 A.D. are known to the Chinese historians as the periodof the Five Dynasties and Ten ln dependant States, which explains rather succinct ly, the state ofaffairs over this period of time.When the last "emperor" of the southern confusion died in 959 A.D. , Chao K'uang-yin became regentof the largest principality in thi s chaotic "'nation". After a brief, successful campa ign against theKhitan in the north , by 97 9 A.D .. China was once again united , with the exception of the northernmost kingdoms. the Khitan (Liao) and the Hsi-Hsia (due west of the Liao).From 960- 1279 A.D . his Empire . he Sung. prevailed. This preca rious empire managed to hold ou 'for all of these years with many th reatening enemies vi rt ua lly ringing them. To the north were theKhi'an (Liao) . he lu rchen (Chin) afler 1125 and un.il 1234, and then .he Mongols. n ,e TangUlTibetans in the west menaced the Sung border , wh ile the southern nank was threatened by the Annamand Nan Chao kingdoms.In 11 27. the lurchen threw the Sung boundaries to south of the Yangtze Ri ve r. This Empire, nowtermed the Southern Sung. enjoyed existence until they violated rvlongolian terri tory in an attemptto break our. This gambit resulted in the Mongolian campaign against the Sun g. that commenced in1273 and lasted but six years. terminating in the total destruct ion of the Sung. The fo llowing rulewas Mongol. termed the Yuan Dynasty . that lasted unti l 1368 A.D. , when the Ming Dynasty seizedpower away frol11 the weakened Mongols- the Chinese were once again in power.ORGANIZATIO. 'According to Chang Vii, a mili tary cr itic and commentator of the Suntzu during the Sung era , theSung had a high degree of military organization. Five men constituted a s q u a d ~ two squads, a section;five sections, a platoon; two platoons , a company: two compan ies. a battalion: two battalions . aregiment: two regiments. a group; two groups. a g a d e ~ and two b rigades, an army. Therefore , anH army" would consist of , at pape r strength, 3,200 men.At the beginning of the Sung period: there were three distinct divisions \\'ithin the army: the ImperialGuards. the Militia. and the Labor Corps. A professional. standing army 0[200.000 was maintainedfor .he flrs. 80 years of .he empire, whereafter i. grew '0 1,400,000. However, the larger .he armygrew. due to insufficient training and equipment. the weaker it became.In 1050 A.D . Shen Tsung attempted to reestablish a well-trained. small professional army , backed upby a vast militia. Hi s organization called for units of 10, 50 and 500. Thi s is the type of armyorganization that preva iled until the final co llapse in 1279.

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TACTICSIn the Sung period, much reliance was placed on the infantry , supported by artillery. Cava lry ,although highly regarded , was simply not available to the Sung, as they had lost their horse-breedingareas to the Tartars. The Chinese use of natural barriers such as rivers and rice paddie s, coupled withan astute knowledge of fortifications and seige warfare , left them a near inaccessable foe, hardlyworth the trouble to attack.Rockets and fire ca tapults had been known for quite a few years. If not in common use prior to thisperiod, the Sung made much use of them in both field and seige warfare. The Sung used rocketsagainst the Mongols and the Khitan (Liao). When Sung Ch in a fe ll , the Mongo ls " drafted" manyChinese artille rists into their armies. TIlereafter , all of the Mongol's enemies "be nefited" from Chinesemilitary technology .Approximate Composition of the Sung Dynasty ArmyMaximum percentages of types within the lora I for ce employed:

Armored cavalryUna rmored cavalryArmored infantryUnarmored in fantryArtillerists

l 'J

10%10%90%70%25%


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THE HSIUNG-NU"The Hsiungnu move on the feet of sw ift horses,and in their breasts beat the hearts of beasts.They shift from place to place as swiftly as aflock of birds, so that it is extremely difficultto co rner them and bring them under contro l .It would not be expedient to attack the Hsiungnu. Better to make peace with them."

Han Ankuo, Minister to theHan Emperor ChingHereditary enemies of the Chinese, the Hsiung-nu harassed , defeated, and were defeated by , theChinese time after time.As is common with the Steppe cultures, the Hsiung-nu were a confederation of tribes, the number andspecific tribes varying. It should be noted that several historians have differing op inions over thebeginnings and ultimate displacements of these tribes. The term " Hun" is used generically for thesepeople, as is " Tartar". The Chinese historians add to our co nsternation by referring, at times, toanyone north or northwest of their border as the Hsiung-nu. Hsiung-n u is , after all, a Chinese name.The suffiX "nu" incidentally , is a characteristically derogatory term for these people. It means "slave".It is generally agreed that the YUeh-chih were a western border "horde" of the Hsiun g-nu , althoughcons istently were at odds with them. The Wu-sun tribe of this " horde" were notable due to theircomplexion. which was fa ir-haired and blue-eyed (see Tokh arians) and also because they were

f r ~ q u e n t l y allied with the Chinese and at odds with th eir kinsmen.With all of these tribes allied , neutral and enemy , it is no wonder that a leader such as Mao-dun(ca. 209-1 74 B.C.) was of such importance.He is the first known leader to unite the Hsiung-nu under one banner into a cohesive fighting nation.From this time on , the in cessa nt Hsiung-nu and Tu Chueh pressures will fo rce Chinese interventionand elaborate defences against this threat. The major breath of the Great Wall was constructed on theHsiungnu border.ORGANIZAnONIn the early days of the Hsiungnu , before the introd uct ion of the caval ry arm , tribes such as the Tiand Run g were composed entirely of poorly armed infantry. To the time of the great leader Mao-dun ,we know little of any organizational or administrative details.Wh en Mao-dun consolidated the tribes of the Hun-yli , Ch' li-she , Ting-ling, Ko-k 'un and the Hsin-li,into the confederated Hsiungnu , a st ri ct de cimal organization was inst ituted.The leader of the Hsiungnu was called a Shanyii. The confederation was divided into " left" and"right" (east and west?) provinces, each co mmand ed by a T'u-ch'i. The " left" (west?) provincecommander was the heir presumptive . following the Hsiung-nu prin ciple of assigning the left as pointof honor and rank.Ea ch of the se T'u-ch'j had , as subordinates, a left and right Ku-li. Army commanders subordinate tothese were called Tang-ku. This organization changed little from the lime of it' s inception , to thetake-over by the Mongols_

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Unlike most Steppe cultures, the HSiung-nu leaders did not always follow along hereditary lines. Theseleaders we re, for the most part . chosen by a vote of the tribal chiefs.Although fast moving cavalry was the main arm of the HSiung-nu Army right in to the Eu rop eancontacts with the Huns , some infantry were, at times employed. This can be documented in at leastthe period of 36 B.C . to 73 A.D.In 73 A.D., the infantry were organized into 300 man unitsTACTICSThe Hsiung-nu learned most of their tactics and horsemanship from the Indo -A ryans , the Bactrians ,Scythians and hereditary predescessors, whomever they may have been. This is the generally statedtheory of the Hsiung-nu and their development. It is still a mystery as to who exactly and when ,introduced the cavalry way of fighting to the Hsiung-nu. What is known, is that the progression ofcavalry fighting went from Middle Asia and travelled east. The Chinese only started to raise cavalryunits after many defeats by the hands of the fast moving Hsiung-nu.The bow,javelin and shie ld were primary weapons as the "hordes" struck fast and hard , only todisappear in an instan t.Raids were superstitiously only planned du ring the cycle of the waxing moon. The waning moonalways would recall raids and the Hsiung-nu would remain dormant during these times. Naturally , itdidn't take the Chinese long to figure out this recurrent cycle and use it to their advantage.Time after time, the Hsiung-nu used another stratagem that almost invariably worked. In fact , itworked so we ll , that many other eastern nations copied this tactic, including the learned Chinese!Picked units, renowned for their tenacity, would engage the very centre orthe enemy line. Putting upa savage fight, on signal, they would feign defeat, and nee in "abject terror". The speed by whichthese "routed" troops fled would outdistance most pursuers. Now, thinking that the cream of theHsiung-nu were now put to rout, the enemy would chase them- to put an end to the entire Army!Lurking on the flanks of these "routing" troops were the Hsiung-nu reserves. On signal , the "routing"troops turned around , and recharged the enemy, with the reserves hitting the bewildered pursuer'sflanks , and enveloping the enemy.Approximate Composition of the Hsiung-nu ArmyMaximum percentages of types within the total rorce employed:ca . 700- 350 B.C.

350 B.C. and on

Light Infantry or leather armored infantry = 100%Light cavalry = no more than 5%Ligh t Cavalry = 100%Light or leather armored infantry , as skirmishers or batt le-line troops = upto 20%

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THE KUSHANAc cording to the Chinese h i s ~ o r i a n s the Kushan were relatives of the Yueh-chi, a barbarian tribeof the west. They were also the \Yu-sun, displaced to the south. The ancient name of this tribe, againconjecturally. is the " Tukhara" . If the se are the " Tokharoi" of Greek record (when Alexander's menwere in Bactri a) , then we have them pinned dow n. For these are also of record , known as the YiiehChill , an lndo-scythic people, from the area of Bactria. And this completes the circle , as it co ncurswith the ancient Chinese historians.Mu ch about the Kushan is shrouded in mystery_ Or rather , I shou ld say, co nfusion. The majorproblem existing today , with regards to the Kushan , is the da tin g sys tem used to chronicle the reignsof the early Ku shan Kings. In fact , it is so much a prob lem , that Chinese dates beco me confused everytime in their history the y came in contact with the Kushan!The extent of the Kushan Empire would , at it's height , encompass Afganista n, Turkestan , Bukharaand parts of Russ ian Turkestan.The on ly contact Kushan India had with China, is related in the Battle Narrative section, "Pan eh'ao'sVi ctory Over the Kushans".

ORGANIZA iONIt is known that the Kushan utilized many Scythi c tactics (which is not unusual , conside rin g that theyare of the same ancestral stock) therefore , we can assume that basica lly those two armies were notvery dissimilar.Unarmored cavalry would dominate , there wou ld be a proportion of armored cavalry to support the" lights" , and a number of Bactrian camels.A coin minted by the first Kushan King, KujulaKadphises, portrays a Bactrian camel on the obverseside of the coin. This reflects their heritage , ancestral lands and common beast of burden.After the northern Indian subjugation by the Kushan , which is prior to the Chinese contact , wecould expect a number of native Indian in fantry, cavalry , chariotry andelephants to join the Kushanarmy as auxiliaries.Kushan organization was, like most of the Steppe cultures, and the eastern nations, decimal.We know that chariotry was st ill ta ught under the reign of Kaniska (ca. 144 A.D.) so we can assumethat cha riotry played some part in the Kushan army , if perhaps only to ferry officers around.Approximate Composition of the Kushan ArmyMaximum percentages of types within the total force employed :

Unarmored cavalryArmored cavalryUnarmored camelryUnarmored skirmishersArmored infantryCharioteersElephant riders

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BACTRIA, FERGHANA , AND SOGDIANA:These three prin cipa liti es occupied the reg ion of Central As ia presently represented by upper Sink iangProvince and Russian Uzbek, Tadzhik. Kirghiz. and eastern Kazakh. Sit uated north and west of theTarim River Basin . these kingdoms connected the west with the east geographically and culturally.I is a recurring coincidence that the Bacrrian and Sogdian people were recorded by Chinese historiansas having reddish hai r and green eyes. The similarities to the Kushan and Tokharian people surely 10 aC0l111110n source - - perhaps the Aryan invasions?Important not only for its strategic location between cast and wes t, these areas also were richproducers of ores and horses - - bOth of which were necessary fo r the nomads and Chinese alike.In later times. with the arrival of the silk caravans and the famous "s ilk route". these art!as greatlyadvanced in importance. The most direct route to the Mediterranean from China was straight throughthe Tarim Basin and these kingdoms.The importance levied on Sogdiana (Kang-gu) can be seen in regards to Chilt-chih's inrerference in thenarrat ive ..Bau le of Sogd iana".The Ferghanian horses so sough t after by all easte rn peoples were the reason for two Ch inesecampaigns under the Han - - both of which were successful. In both 102 B.C. and 103 A. D . theCh inese defeated these small kingdoms and drew many horses from these lands to stock Chinesestab les.As the years progressed and Chinese rule left these areas. the Hsiungnu. T u Chueh. and othernOllladic tribes moved in and estab lished these horse-breeding areas for their own use.THE CENTRAL ASIAN ARMIES :Possibly inheriting their sense of tac tics and mode of warfare from the Aryans, the ea rly Bactrians(and their Scythic ancestors) utilized war char iots and cavalry to a maximum. Camelry (the Bactriancamel) was also developed to support the mounted armies of this area. Alexandrian Hellenisticinfluence is shown in Bactrian reliefs in Persepolis. but amazingly little in the way of ~ c i d e n t a lwarfare rubbed off on the province.The com lllon ties with the nomadic tribes developed the decimal system of mili tary organiza tion.This system remains constant in the Steppes of Asia virtually throughout th e periods covered in thisbook.The horse archer, the main element of each of these kingdom's armies. developed into the welltrained and mobile Hunnic armies. The Scyths developed the tactic of firing volley after volley ofarrows into an enemy. feigning defeat and goading him into rash pursuit only to be smashed by afresh reserve. This stra tagem was handed down to their successors and continued throughout As ianwarfare.Approximate Composition of the Central Asian Armies:Bactrian and Sogdian Armies:Maximum percentages of types with in the lOtal force employed:

Unarmored horse archersCharioteersUnarmored cameleers

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THE KOREANSThe Chinese have had a colonial interest in Korea since 346 B.C. when they first established dominance in that area. This dominance however. should 1101 be mis construed. The Koreans have always hada strong national spirit. and China"s history of "occupation" and wars with the Koreans. call them"mop -up operations". or "police ilctioIlS" or whateve r. would fill a volume in itself.Forced to send consc ri pted infant ry 10 fight the IIsiu ng-nu . as wcl1may be expected . these foughtwilh something less than vigor.Uproars begun in the 4th - 6 th centuries A.D.. eru p te d inlO 10tal war by the 7th cCl1lL1ry. According(0 Ch inese histor ians. the Army assembled against the Chinese at An Shih Ch'eilg. was l,'omposcd ofover 200,000 men . This rebellion was quelled by the grea t Li Shihmin.The Liao (Khit an) dominance followed. subsequent ly by the Jurchcn. From 121 8 A.D. to it' s end in1132 when the Kin g was forced to nee to Kanghwa is land. the Koreans vainly fought the o n g o l s .With the Mongol defc


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TACTICSUnfortunately. little can be said here. The only battle narrative that has any embellishment whatever,simply implies that the infant ry formed the center (possibly leather armored, shield and spear armed)with missile troops supporting on the flanks and rear ranks. The light cavalry served as a mobilereserve.Approximate Composition of the Korean Army

~ h x i m u m percentages of types within the total force employed:Prior to 346 S.C: Lightly armored infantry skirmishers = 100%

Light Cavalry = 5%346 B.C. - ca. 300 A.D.: Lightly armored and unarmored archers or spear bearers = 90%Light Cavalry Horse archers = 10%ca. 300 A.D. - ca. 1200 A.D.: Lightly armored infantry skirmishers andunarmored archers = 80%Unarmored crossbowmen = 10%Ugh t cavalry horse a,rchers = 15%Armored cavalry and Cataphracts combined = 10%ca. 1200 - 1232 A.D.: Lightly armored skirmishers and unarmored archers = 60%Unarmored crossbowmen = 20%

Mongol Domination:

Guardsmen = 10%Ligh t cava lry horse archers = 20%Armored cavalry and Cataphracts combi ned = 20%Armored infantry = 10%Ligluly and unarmored skirmishers and archers = 80%Light Cavalry horse archers = 50%Armored Cavalry, some with partially armored horses = 20%

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THE TU CHUEHAs with the Hs iu ng-nu, modern historians disagree on these people's history.The traditional Chinese account says that the T'u Chueh (who are generically called "tu rks") aredescended from a tribe of the Hsiungnu who were forced to flee west after being defeated by anotherHsiung-nu horde. This tribe jn question, then migrated to the Altai Mountain range district and settledaround a large , "helmet" shaped hill. This area was extremely rich in iron-ore deposits, and the "turks"soon became quite adept at ironwork. Their ironwork and the shape of the dominant geographicalfeature of the area led to their name, for T'u Chueh or T u r ~ " il) di.ffering languages , means"helmet". In 545 A.D. , Tumen Khan forced these groups to into east and west branches. TheEastern Tu Chueh occupied an area stretching into the Gobi Desert , the Western stemming intoCentral Asia, later to become the Ottoman Turks. A subbranch , the T'uyuhuns occupied northeastern Tibet.I would draw the reader to the narrative of The Battle of Sogdiana. In about 38 s.c. ,Chil,chih'stribe drives of f the Wusu n, as the beginning of his illfated quest for power. As the Wusun were atthe time, situated northeast of Sogdiana- it will be seen that ju st south and a little west will be foundthe Altai Mountain range.The Wusu n were known to be a fairhaired and blue/green eyed people- foreign complexions to theHsiung-nu.The T'o-pa Turks of the Eastern Tu Chueh, the duminant tribe of the branch, had a succession ofyellowbearded Kings.lust perhaps, Chih-chih's actions had an ultimate detrimental effect on his sworn enemy , the Ch inese .For , in about three or four hundred years after Chihchih's death , the Chinese Dynasties fall to theT'o-pa Turks, and the Wei Dynasty, a nonChinese Dynasty begins.It is my own hypothesis, but perhaps Chih-chih's drive on the Wusun ult imately made the Wusun theforebearers of the T'u Chueh.ORGANIZATIONThe earliest organization found for the T'o-pa T'u Chueh is ca. 540 A.D . This is specifically for theTabgatch horde, but other tribes in and around the area would also follow this organization, as partof the T'opa.The titular Khan or the equivalent , possibly even Shan-yu denotes the overall commander. Units wereorganized in strict decimal progressions. A commander of 10,000 was a Yabghu; of 1,000, a Shad; of100, a Tekin; and of 10, a Tudun.The bodyguard of the leader was called "Fuli", or "woIr'. The Western T'u Chueh had a 200 manbodyguard for their leader.These units , although composed largely of heavily armored cavalry, unarmored light cavalry andcameiry, seem to have been poorly disciplined , ill-trained and rather inept. In an encounter in 622A.D. , against the T'ang Chinese, the Qadir Khan , leading an Army of 150,000 in 10,000 man d i v i s i o n ~suffered 5,00 0 casualties in a battle and the entire Arm y went into rout due to the incident. Thesecasualties represent but 3.3% of the total Army strength.A partial answer to this lies in the fact that seldom were all tribes loyal to their own Branch , andseldom were Branches loyal to each other. T'ang China was particularly adept at diplomatic endeavors,

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as, from the period 630- 682 A.D., the Eastern T'u Chueh were employed as enthusiastic mercenariesin China's attacks on the Western Tu Chueh.Also, in 649 A.D. , the Uighur Turks (under their leader Djigin), occupying an area just west of theAltai range , provided 50 ,000 men to the Chinese war effort.By 841 A.D. , the Kirghiz Turks are the dominant tribe in the confederacy. Under their red standardsand led by their Aye! , they vied with the Khitan for power in the Central Steppes. Notably, theseKirghiz were tall , had reddish hair . were white , tanned in complexion , and had greenish eyes. Thesemen had a curious custom of tattooing only their hands.By the time of the Khitan Empire (Liao)ca. 900-1100 A.D., the Ghei tribe enter into alliance withthese new "Chinese" conquerors. The Ghei are unique for this area and time , in that their totalst rength lies in foot archers and unarmored cavalry.TACTICSThe average Tu Chueh cavalry man was armored , and it is with the se sold iers that relian ce in battlewas placed. Camels, (of which there were a considerable number) were used in reserve to disrupt amounted enemy.The superstition of the moon's cycle persist s. Raids are still only conducted during the cycle of thewaxing moon.Approximate Composition of the T'u Chueh ArmyMaximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

Unarmored light CamelryArmored CamelryArmored CavalryUnarmored Cavalry

20%5%60%40%Ghei allied Unarmored infantry archers 50%Ghei allied Unarmored caval!)' horse

archers ; 50%

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THE ISLAMS AND TIDETANSThe caliph successor to Muhammad sent Arab mercenaries to aid Li Shih-min in his take over inChina. Thus, an uneasy alliance now existed between the Islamic and Chinese worlds.In 674 A.D. Sa ssanid Persia, then also an ally of T'ang China, sent urgent word to the T'ang Emperorrequesting aid against invading swarms of Islamic cavalry.This plea fell on deaf ears as no help was sent. Sassanid Persia was overrun as was Bactria and Sogdiana,both of which had also requested aid.From 707-713, the Arabs were content with consolidat ing their power on the western borders ofChina and in the Tarim Basin. By 7 12 A.D. when the Islams under MuhammadbinQasim wereattacking another of the Oasis Kingdoms and India's King Dahir, the Bact rians and Syrian s wereallied with the Arabs.After 7 13 A.D., the Arabs began to push the Chinese Empire east , thu s expanding their ownboundaries. Along the way they picked up Tibetans (T'utan) as allies.TItis alliance was challenged by the Chinese General Kao Hsienchih who , a a Hannibal , crossed thePamirs and arrived behind the Arab-Tibetan Army . This was only a stalling move , however , as theKhitan also turned on China at this time. By 75 1 A.D. the Khitan had defeated the Chinese at theLiao Ri ver while the Arabs subdued them in 752 A.D. at the Talas River.ISLAMIC AND TIBETAN ARMIES:The Islam ic arm ies consisted of a moun ted force of unarmored horse archers and came leers, armoredcava lry , and artillery with a small portion of infantry.Islam ic su ltanates provided most of the fighting force while auxilaries such as Syrians and Bact rian swere sometimes ca lled in.The decimal system again prevailed as a unit of ten men was called a sari-khalid (after the commander);a unit of 100, a sipahsalar; of 1,000 , an amir; of 10 ,000, a malik. In MuhammadbinQasim's army of712 A.D. were 6,000 camels and a baggage train of an additional 3,000 camels.Islami c infantry were completely secondary to the cavalry. Although armed with bow and swords,they se ldom were used for anything but support. The cavalry reigned at first , though in the laterSeljuk period supported infantry would dominate.The Ti be tan forces remain a bit of a mystery at lower level organization , although the decimel systemseems likely. In 773 A.D . the Tibetan forces were grouped into four armies or "horns". The Chinesehistorians calculated that the one horn facing the Chinese border consisted of 200,000 men.The Tibetans relied almost exclusively on their armored cavalry while their long-time ally Nepalprovided bow armed infantry.In 1270 A.D. the Tibetans fell to Kublai Khan - - not by defeat but by diplomatic upheaval. KublaiKhan declared the Tibetan monarchy dissolved, and installed the Abbot of Sakya Monastery, whohappened to be quite popular and proMongol, as sovereign.The Mongol Empire had a new and powerful ally.

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Approx imate Co mp os ition of Islami c, Tibetian, and Nepalese Armies~ - t a x i m u m percentages of lypes within the tOlal force employed:Islami c Armies:Unarmored horse archers = 40%Armored Cavalry = 40%Infanny = 20%Anillerisls = 570Cameleers = 30%Aux il iary unarmored cava lry = 30%Tibetan Armies:Armored cava lry = 100%Leather armored cava lry = 20%Nepalese: Unarmored archers 50%(of the Tibetan-Nepalese Army)

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THE KHITAN (LIAO)The Liao Dynasty, occupying much of northern China, was established by the Khitan. The Khitan, apre-Mongol Steppe culture, swarmed out of what would now be southeastern Mongolia and smashedthe P'ohai Kingdom of the Liao-tung peninsula.This period , the early 10th century A.D. , was already the scene of the disintegration of the T'angDynasty , therefore, when the Khitan moved south, there was not much opposition.In 946 A.D. , they sacked the capitol of the Five Dynasties Kingdom of the Later Chin. This broughtdirect contact with the Sung Dynasty, for in the II th century , the Sung were forced to pay ahumiliating tribute to these Khitan for an unsteady peace.The Khitan Empire , which was 10 occupy most of Mongolia and Central China , in addition toNorthern China , was known as the Liao Empire.ORGANIZATIONThe Liao Army was based on the use of cavalry almost exclusively. The Ordo was the basi c unit oforganization, and from this word we can trace a term we are all familiar with. The Chinese term forthe Ordo - "wo-Iu-to", and the Hunnic "ou-1'o" meaning King , give us the source for the Khitan word"Ordo". It is how "Ordo" is translated into our western languages that is highly significant. In Polish ,Portuguese and Spanish, Ordo becomes horda. In Swedish, it is hord. In German and Danish we havethe familiar English word, horde.A typical Ordo under the Emperor T'ai-tsu (i Oth centuty A.D.) , constituted of Bodyguards andretainers; P'o-hai POW's; resettled Chinese and Khitan Armored cavalty shock troops; and a fewconscripted levies from the occupied territories.Sizes of these ordas varied from time to time, and only "paper-strengths" are known. The Khitanshock troops are the only reliable soldiers in the ordo- the other prisoners and retainers seldomfought with the ordo.In 95 I A.D. , an ordo consisted of 2,000 armored cavalty; by 983 A.D. , 3,000; in 1031 A.D., 5,000;and by 1125 , 6,000.In addition to the basic ordas, the Liao Army maintained certain allied tribal auxiliaries. For example,in 986 A.D. , the'lurchen joined the Liao after suffering a defeat at their hands. It is probably at thistime that the l urchen learn of the Liao art of warfare, and retain enough to defeat them later. Thesetribal allies were organized as were the Liao , with the exception that the best fighters were groupedin an elite unit.The Militia constituted the final portion of the Liao Army, and were the bottom of the heap. In theMilitia were found the Chinese and conscript Khitan infantry, the crossbowmen, and the artillery.TIlese were used mostly for the "d irty work" of seiges and the like. When utilized in combat, theywere usually the "cannon fodder" to preserve the cavalry.The basic unit organization of the ordo was the regiment or battalion of 500-700 men, divided intocompanies of 100.Ten regiments constituted an Ordo or Column. Ten columns (ordos) would create an Army or Side.The vanguard for a typical army would be 3,000 unarmored cavalry.

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It is not known whether ordos were combined or composite-arm organizations, or whether they wereexclusively armored cavalry formations. A description of an ordo in battle leads me to believe thatwithin an ordo there would be three regiment s of unarmored light cavalry four regiments of armoredcava lry , and three regiments of armored cavalry on partially armored horses.The following is a list of the twelve ordos of the Emperor T ai -tsu. The first name is the commander'sname, or whom the ordo is delegated to protect (much like " The Queen's Own"). After this is thename of the ordo, the English translat ion of the name , and then the number of cavalry in the Ordo.I. Tai-tsu; Suan; (The Emperor's Own); 6,0002. Empress Ying-t'ien P'u; P'u-su-wan; (Development); 5,0003. T'ai-tsung; Kuo-a-lien; (To rule the Country): 5,0004. Shih-tsung; Yeh-Iu-wan; (Prosperity); 8,0005. Mu-tsung; To-Ii-pen; (To Pacify); 2,0006. Ching-tsung; Chien-mu; (To Transmit); 10,0007. Empress Dowager C h ' ~ n g - t ' i e n ; Ku-wen; (Jade); 10,0008. SMng-tsung; Nti-ku; (Gold); 5,0009. Hsing-tsung; Wo-tu-wan; (Propagation); 10,00010. Tao-tsung; A-ssii; (Extensive); 15,00011 . Tien-tsu; A-Iu-wan; (To Assist); 10,00012 . Hsiao-wen; Ch'ih-shih-tf-pen; (Filial Piety); 5,000TRAININGThe Liao were trained in units of five or ten men , and , like the later Mongols , they were warned thatshould any member of the unit be guilty of misconduct or worse, the entire unit would be punishedequally. This naturally creates a very strict and quite harsh discipline. The system must havedegenerated for the lurchen to have conquered them so easily.The units were well-trained in their combat roles , and all were instructed in logistical self-support. Theunique tactic of relieving fatigued front line troops with fresh troops was practised incessantly so thatthere might never be a foul-up in battle.TACTICSA typical deployment of the Liao Army, was to have the Ordos arranged rather like the Roman Legionformation of Simplex Acies, or, Ordas in battle line, with intervals or spaces between each ordo.Flanks would be relegated to the auxiliary cavalry. In order of battle, the unarmored cavalry wouldform the van , followed at 100 yards distance by the armored cavalry on unarmored horses, followedat 100 yards distance by the armored cavalry on partially armored horses. To the rear of this forcewould be found the Chinese engineers, artillerists , and the Militia , ready to be marched up throughthe intervals if necessary.When deploying and manuevering , pre-arranged code names were shouted to bring units into theirproper places in the battle line. Three rolls of the "great Drum" signalled the advance, a blast of thetrumpets indicated halt , and a clash of gongs and conch shell s- the charge.The Liao followed the time-honoured Scythic tactic of volley upon volley of arrows, followed byclose support and exploitation by the armored cavalry.The tactic of relieving fatigued front line troops with fresh tTOOPS , gave an incessantly attacking frontline of fresh troops that almost invariably reduced her enemies to defeat.Another reason for the Liao Army's great success in battle, is that most of her foes-the surroundingtribes or Chinese Kingdoms- consisted mainly of light cavalry horse archers, not much of a foe for the

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THE QARA- KHITANEa rly in the 12th century. the Liao Empire was attacked by her one-time ally. the Jurchen. Thel urchen Army had learned mu ch from the Liao, and the Liao power was crushed. Aid ing thelu rchen in their campaign, lasting from 1114 A.D. - 11 25 A.D .. were the Chinese of the SouthernSung Dynasty, Liao's southe rn neighbor. TIle lu rchen then es tablished in th is area the ChinDynasty , friendly and allied to the Sung. The Chin Dy nasty. in turn. would fall to th e in123 4 A. D.This was not to be the final chapter on th e Khitan (Liao) Dynasty. however. After the fall of theLiao to the lu rchen. a group of liao tribes managed to flee westward and established the nation ofthe Qara-Khit an. aha known as the "Black Khitan" .TIlcse Khitan tri besmen. a constant annoyance to the t\'longo lian tribes. managed to last from1143 - 12 11 A.D . and were finally subdued by the Jenghi s Kh an.QARA- KHITAN ORDOTh e army. as would be expected. was ve ry similar 10 the ir "paren ts" . the Liao.Organization was exact ly like the Liao ordo. but with a higher proportion of unarmored . and notas many armored. cavalry.By this time. the Ordo was stab ilized al 10.000 men each. Batt alions o r regiments of 500- 700 menwere st ill the rule. but there were now a few at 1.000.An army fo r th e Qara-Khit ans. however. was but th ree ordas.Some Khitan infantry wou ld st ill be present. but on ly for minor tasks and for the occasional se ige.Approximate Composition of the Qara-Khitan ArmyMa x imum percentages of types within the lOtal force employed:

QaraKhitan unarmored caval ryQara Kh itan armored cavalryQara-Khitan armored cavalry onpartially armored r s e ~

Militia infantry

39

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=

60%35%SlkIS 'll.


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THE JURCHENIt was very difficult to decide precisely where these people should be placed, for they are neitherMongolian , Khilan , nor Hsiung-nu. They occupied the area just east of the lands of the Hsiung -nu ,what is present day northern Manchuria.The l urcheD were never really a threat to anyone, though small border wars occurred sporadicallyover the centurie s until the 12th century A.D.With the Khitan (Liao) Empire established, delusions of grandeur followed, and ultimately the Liaoinvasion of lurche D ands resulted in a ferocity unencountered by the Khitan to that time.Perhaps there were an incredible number of lu rchen soldiers, perhaps the Liao military system hadbadly degenerated; it is not known. The lurchen warriors smashed into Khitan-held land s andextinguished the Liao Dynasty.The Qara-Khitan fled to the west, tile l urchen "Chin" Dynasty fo llowed until the lu rchen were, inturn, absorbed by the lenghis Khan and his Mongols.ORGANIZATIONVery little can be gleaned from any source concerning the lu rchen military system. Probably thebest so urce to date is by lin g-shen tao. This article gives a cursory insight into lu rchen organization.The rank or title of Po-chi-Iieh is a rank above a Meng-an (a commander of 1,000) but just howmu ch higher is not mentioned. A Mou-k 'e commands a unit of between 100-300 men .The paintings we have only show heavily armored l urchen warriors, but lightly armored cavalryprobably accompanied these.Approximate Composition of the lurchen ArmyMaximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

Armored cava lrymen on partiallyarmo red horsesUnarmored camelryArmored cava lrymen on unarmoredhorsesUnannored cava lryme n on un armoredhorses

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10%10%90%20%


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THE SEUUK TURKSThe 13th Century dawned in Russian Turkestan still under the influence of the Islamic sultanates ,then called "Khorezm". This principality of the Seljuks, along with the Caliphate at Baghdad, fellin a brie f three year campaign that incorporated the Tigris-Euphrates Valley and all land east intothe Mongolian Empire under the Khanate of IIKhans. Over the years since the Islamic invasions ofthe 8th Century A.D. , the armies had degenerated on this eastern front. By 1219, when the legionsof the Jenghis Khan advanced on the Empire of Khorezm (after defeating the QaraKhitan), theMongol Army simply out-classed in every way this remnant of past glories.ORGANIZATION:To date , information on the Seljuk and Islamic army organization has been very sketchy. RecentlyPhil Barker happened upon a copy of a translated Arab military manual and published an articlein the Journal of the Society of Ancients ( # 55 , September, 1974, pages 13-16) entitled " AMedieval Arab Military Manual".This article is an extremely informative one and details the organization and tactics of the Arabicarmies.Ideally , the organization began with a unit of 16 spearbearers or 8 archers, termed a saff al-magatir.The usbah consisted of 32 men; a miquab had 64, a kurdus, 128; a jahfal, 256; a kabkabah,512; a zumrah, 1,024; a taifah , 2,048; a jash, 4,096; a khamis, 8,192; and an al-askar al-azam,16 ,384.Another mentioned form of organization , possibly of the cavalry arm, was of a khamsah of 5cavalry; an ashrah of 10- 20; a tabIikhanah of 80; and an alf of 1,000. Katibahs of infantry (500-800 men) and faylag (5 ,000 men) are also mentioned.The organization of Muhammad-bin-Qasim, ca 712 A.D. , called for a straight decimal system inwhich 10 men formed a sar-i-khalil similar to the ashrah; and an amir - - identical to an alf, eachof 1,000.I agree with Mr. Barker in that the elaborate system of 64, 128, 256 , . . . . etc . was perhaps neveractually used. The second part of the organization mentioned - - that of Khamsah, ashrah , alf,and so forth , was probably the organization practiced. An hypothesis made in the article by Mr.Barker that I cannot verify but seems logical postulates that standard units employed in battle werethe katibah of infantry and the jahfal of cavalry, with independent squadrons (kurdus) Ofunarmored cavalry used in a supporting role.TACTICS:The army deployed in battle order in five lines. Infantry occupied the initial line, (divided intounits of 1,000), supported by the cavalry, (divided into units of 3,000), in the second line. Thethird line contained the baggage and guards. The fourth consisted of the unarmored cavalry andguarded the rear of the baggage line. The fifth line guarded the entire army's rear and probablyconsisted of cavalry. "F1ying wings" of unarmored cavalry units would protect the flanks of thearmy.

In the advance, the infantry bore the brunt of the enemy missiles thus serving to preserve thecavalry . When the enemy routed, the Arabs were careful in the pursuit , halting and observing thefleeing enemy rather than pursuing blindly. Interestingly enough, it seems these were one peoplethat identified the eastern "feign defeat and lure into pursuit" tactic and responded sensibly to it.The infantry's front ranks consisted of the spear armed troops with the archers in the rear tosupport the initial ranks with massive archery fire.

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Night and pre-dawn attacks on enemy camps we re favo rite tactics of these ea rl y armies and anelaborate system of disrupting enemy com munications and demoraliza tion of enemy units waspracticed. .Approximate Composition of the Seljuk Turkish Army:Maximum pe rcentages of types within the tolal force employed:

Arm ored riders on part ially armoredhorsesArmored cava lr yUna rmored cava lryLeathe r armored in fantryUnarmored archers or ski rmishinginfantryUnarmored cameleersElephants

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THE MONGOLSThe nomadic tribes of the Steppes over the years had caused the Chinese much concern only whenthey had banded together under one leader - - such as the Hsiung-nu had done.By the end of the 12th century there were three major tribes within the Mongol nation , each of whichdespised the others . The need for an able leader was obvious - - the Tangut to the west and theJurchen (Chin) to the east hardly considered the Mongols a threat. In 1204 A.D. a leader emerged . Theson of Yesugai of the Yakka tribe, Temujin smashed opposition and soon had the majority of theMongol tribes under his banner. In 1206 A.D. , he was proclaimed the Jenghis Khan - - 'Emperor ofthe Seas", "Prince of Conquerors", "World Conqueror" are all translations of the title.

As a youth, Temujin had served as an auxiliary to the Khitan -Liao whose ta ctics and organization hestudied . In 1205 A.D. he defeated the Tangut, in 1209 A.D. he moved on the Jurchen. The walledcities of the Jurchen-Chin proved too tough for the still young Mongol Army . In 1215 A.D. Yenching(today's Peking), then capitol of the Chin fell and was put to the torch.The Mongols continued under Jenghis Khan 's command to take Korea , penetrate to the Crimea andIran , and continue fighting in and about China.In 1227 A.D. the Jenghis Khan returned to finally subdue the Tangut - - a campaign in which thegreat Khan died.Oggodai , his third son, continued as successor and re-opened hostilities in 1231 against the Sung. Agrand pincer movement was executed with Oggodai heading down the Yellow River and his brotherTuli (the fourth son) penetrating the province of Szechuan and encircling much of Sung territory.Subotai, perhaps the best Mongol general, took Kaifeng in 1233 despite Sung explosive bombardmentfrom the city.By 1234 A.D . all Chin and Sung provinces north of the Yellow River belonged to the Mongol Empire .Content to allow the Southern Sung to remain , the Mongols made no attacks against them.Instead of accepting this grant of hiatus. the Sung, in a delusion of grandeur, assaulted Mongol citiesand towns in an effort to re-establish their lands. A massive retaliatory campaign followed - - andput an end to Chinese rule even in the south until 1368 A.D.In 1260 A.D. , Kublai Khan, grandson of the Jenghis Khan through the line of Tuli , proclaimedhimself Supreme Khan.

At first there was dissention , but soon Kublai was established. Several of the outlying provinces led bylesser princes of the Mongols still resisted Kublai's assumption to the throne vacated by the JenghisKhan 's death.Kublai's nephew, Caidu, was one of these and the initial battle in 1268 A.D. was only resolved in1286 with Caidu's submission.The Mongol General Uriangkatai, son of Subotai, drove deep into Annam (Vietnam), down into theTonkin Plain and sacked Hanoi in 1257. In 1258, Annam fell completely to the Mongols. Champa(Southern Vietnam) submitted politically to the Mongols when their leader surrendered. The peopletook to the jungles and hilIs and conducted guerrilla operations against the Mongo ls for many years.The Japanese invasion of 1274 saw a fleet of 150 vessels land in Hakata Bay on Kyushu Island. Theinvasio n force laid waste to Tsushima and Iki-shirna but could not reduce Fortress Mizuki. TheJapanese counter-attacked and drove the Mongols out.

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Strategically and tactically the Tulughma was favored. This was the Mongol "standard sweep" inwhich the enemy's flanks were turned inward and attacked simultaneously from front and rear.In battle array, the Mongols set a "buffer zone" of POW's and auxiliaries in front to bear the brunt ofenemy missiles and harassing troops. Directly following these were the Mangudai or suicide troops.These elite veterans were volunteers who would charge the enemy and attempt to goad them intohasty pursuit. This tacti c, of course, was not original but evidently was still used to effect (see HsiungnulBehind the Mangudai followed the main body of Mongols supported on the flanks by the mosttrustworthy auxiliary cavalry. The main body was formed in five ranks , heavily armored to the frontand lighter armored to the rear.In the rear of all of these were the Chinese artillerists , closely guarded by Mongol officers.When the preliminary harassing actions were completed, and the Mongols themselves about to becommitted, it must have been a horrible experience to the enemy but a beautiful sight to see,Upon the direction of the general, the army would advance at ajogtrot - - in utter silence. Commands were given only by motions of the standards. At the precise moment , the Great Naccara wassounded - - it was important that no sound be uttered before so that the emphasis was on the GreatDrum's pounding beat. At that moment, the charge was sounded all along the line - - every Mongollet out with his most diabolical shrieks and screams. It would take quite a bit of discipline to holdtroops and make them face this foe - - especially after the preliminary "propaganda assault".When feigning rout they also kept firing with their bows behind them just as did the Scythianscenturies before. This tactic se ldom had to be employed against their enemies - - the Tulughmaseldom failed.TRAINING:A philosophy taken directly irom the Jenghis Khan's mentors, the Khitan, was the emphasis ondiscipline and training.Training in manuever, combat and the like was virtually constant in the Mongol Army. When theyweren't involved in warfare , they practised and honed their talents for it.Discipline and an effective way of maintaining order was also inherited from the Liao-Khitan. Everyarban was held to account for actions of any member within it. Equal punishment was dea lt to everymember of the arban should any member warrant it.The practical training and experience gathered from years of conquests naturally made virtuaUy eachMongol cavalryman a veteran member of a very elite corps - - the Mongol Army.Approximate Composition of the Mongol ArmyMaximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

Mongolian Armored CavalryMongolian Unarmored CavalryMongolian Armored InfantryMongolian Unarmored InfantryAuxiliary Armored Cavalry

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Auxiliary Unarmored CavalryAuxiliary Armored InfantryAuxiliary Unarmored InfantryChinese Artillerists

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THE JAPANESEKarnakura Jap an was under a semb lance of control by the shogunate HOjo family for over a centuryafter the Sh6kyu War. It 's power was on ly seriously threatened by the Mongo ls under Kublai Khan.In 1266 the Mongols sent envoys to Japan demanding submission and tribute to the Khan. Reasonablyenough, the Kyoto court feared Mongol invasion but the regent Tokimune, in the great tradition ofChih-chih of the Hsiung-nu and King Narathihapate of Burma, sneered at the Mongol demands.In 1274 the first invasion by the Mongols wiped out the defenders on the islands of Ike and Tsu shima .The land ing at Hakala Bay in northern Kyushu, however, was not so successful, as the Jap anesesucceeded in holding the Mongolian force at bay on the beach. That night the Mongols re -embarkedand returned to the Korean ports.In 1281 a larger invasion for ce again stru ck at Hakala Bay. This time a see-saw battle had raged foralmost two months when a "d ivine wind", a typ hoon, de stroyed all landing craft and the in vas ionarmy was cut to pieces.ORGANIZAnON:Feudal Japan in the late 13th cent ury was much like her European counterparts . Little existed in theway of a national standing army. Feudal lords (daimyos) paid for and maintained an "army" - - allsupposed ly ready to provide the Shogun or dictator with a combined army in time of nationalemergency.The samu rai warriors were employed by these feudal lords and were the equivalents of the Europeankni ght. Each samu rai employed a number of retainers or chugen which might also cont ain a numberof poo rer sa murai or"squires".The se retainers, although constituting the majority of the Japanese feudal army, were mostly ill orunrrained warriors armed with a variety of weapons. Needless to say . they were held in little moreregard than the grooms of the samurai's horse.Ac cording to contempory histories, the sam urai apparently commanded his own body of troops(chugen) in battle. Standa rd "units" of sam urai and units of trained and equipped infantry weresupposedly not to come into effect until the early 16th century A.D. Here we have a con tradiction -for in the Mongol Invasion Scrolls themselve s we see uniformly equipped and dressed infantry anddefinite bodies of samurai grouped under a single banner and commander.I feel that a military organization of some kind existed in th is period of Japan (the Mongol invasions),and that the feudal system was "modified" to combine chugen and samurai into uniform fightingunits - - not simply independant "bands". The size of such units is completely up to conjecture butthere are some likely poss ibilities. We know that Ch inese influence in Japan had always been great,especially during the T'ang period. Perhaps the Japanese adopted the T'ang or Sung organizations.Unfortunately. to date this has not been substantiated.Approximate Composition of the Japanese Army:Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

Armored cavalry, samuraiArmored cavalry , chugenLeather armored and unarmoredinfantry (untrained chugen)Armored infantry

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THE VIETNAMESEThe kingdoms of AIln3m (northern Vietnam) and Champa have bounced between foreigndo m ination and independence virtually th roughout their history. Occupa tion of northern Vietnambegan with the Chou and ranged to the Yuan when the Mongols occupied the entire COUnIry.Whenever the government of the Vietnamese fell. the standard operating procedure (S OP) was for thearmy to fall back into the jungles and mountains . cond uct guerrilla operations and harass the enemyuntil the time was ripe for an overthrow. Unfamiliarity of terrain. hostile cnvirOIllllenL and weatherforced most occupy ing nations to forego pursuit of Vietnamese guerr illas and fortify coastal areas.Thi s type of warfare was conducted against the Han and the T' ang Dynastiesjust prior 10 the empi re 'sco llapse. It 's interesting to note that this form of warfare. almost 22 cen turies old. is still effectivetoday. The country is very aptly suited to hit and run tactics.Totally infantry. the military organization was probably not standa rdized but rather an amalgamationof what was locally avai lable. If any organization was used it could have been styled after their Chinesemaster's organizations.Approx imate Composition of the Vietnamese Army :Maximum pe rce ntages of types within the [Otal force employed:

Unarmored sk irmishersBamboo. oxhide armored in fantryPrimitive crossbows

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100%10%25%

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THE BURMESEThe kingdom of Mien , or Burma, was one of the last kingdoms in the east to fall to the Mongols. Afterevery other surrounding country had fallen , the Mongol emissaries, as was customary , were sent toKing Narathihapate's court to demand tribute. As noted in the battle narrative "Battle ofVochan",the somewhat unbelievable King had the emissaries beheaded for nO( removing their shoes fast enoughor often enough in his presence. Thus asking for war, his a r ~ i e s met the Mongols at the Plain ofVachan in 1272 and were defeated. In 1287 all of Burma was vassalized and incorporated into theMongolian Empire.The Burmese relied heavily on their multi-manned war elephants but had a strong infantry andcavalry army to support them. At the Battle of Pyedawthagyun in 1084 A.D., the Burmese Armyemployed units of 1,000 men. It is probable that this remained {he case through this period as nochanges are recorded in military organization.Aung's A History of Burma states that there was a "sprinkling of cavalry" in the Burmese army. butYule's translation of Marco Polo states that there were 10 ,000 cavalry and 50 ,000 infantry. That iscertainly more than a "sprinkling". As Marco Polo was there , I am inclined towards his figures.Approximate Composition of the Burmese Army:Maximum percentages of types within the total force employed:

Elephant ridersArmored cavalryUnarmored cavalryArmored infantryGuardUnarmored infantry

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\1aodun utilized his favorite tactic and Han Kao-tzu took the bait. Feigning a rout , the HSiung-nuwithdrew rapidly with the Chinese infantry in full and disorderly pursuit , led by the Chinese Emperor.Thi s. of course , is exact ly what Maodun wanted, as the trap was sprung , encircling the Chinese andcutting off escape. The Chinese held out for several days but the si tu ation was hopeless. Bargainingwith Maodun and his wife, the Chinese Emperor managed to buy his way out of the predicament.This is deemed one of the turning points in Chinese history. as Han Kao-tzu was to carve out one ofthe largest and dynamic empires in history - - the Han Empire.166 B.C. THE GREAT WALL OF CHINAThe Hsiungnu, again cha llenging the Han, were led this time by Giyu, son of Maodun.Leading his army of 140 ,000 light cavalry , he broke through the Great Wall and was threatening theChinese inrerior lan ds. The fo rce sent to stop this intrusion was composed of 100,000 infantry ,100.000 cavalry, and 1,000 war chariots , but only succeeded in chas ing Giyu with his army back ou tthrough the Wall.199 B.c. THE BATTLE OF THE SANDSTORMThe Hunnic power in the northern Gobi Desert was broken when the Chinese , under Wei Tsing ,soundly defeated the Hsiungnu at this battle.

Of an invading force of 140 ,000 cavalry , the Hsiung-nu returned to their lands with only 30,000.Additionally , their leader, the ShanyO, was dead.On this occasion, the Chinese employed a major cavalry force , augmented by their customary warcha riots. During the encounter a huge sandstorm blew up, confusing all participants.Wei Tsing saw the 0pp0rlunity to encircle the Huns in a huge enveloping maneuver which proved sosuccessful that , when the storm subs ided , the Hun s were attacked from all sides resulting in 80- 90,000dead.103 B.C. CHAO P'O- NU'S DILEMMAAmong the many campaigns waged against the Hsiung -nu , a peculiar occ urrence at this particularbattle resu lte d in quite an embarrasing situation for the commanding officer. In the midst of the furorof battle, the commanding general. Chao P'o-nu , was thought to have fallen. In actuality, he was at adistant part of the field , but his whereabouts were unknown to his junior officers.Chinese military law of this period decreed that should a commanding general die on the field , allreturning subord inate generals would also lose their lives.Therefore , when reasoning that their commander had perished and they would die if they returned,the entire army surrendered to the incredulous Hsiung-nuUnderstandably, Chao P'o-nu did not return to China and, like his subordinates, gently drifted intooblivion.90 B.C. THE BATTLE OF MONGOLIAAnother concerted attack against the Hsiung-nu found Li Ling in command of 5,000 infantry andchariots, sent into Mongolia to pin down a larger Hunnic host. Thi s was a diversionary action to divertthese Hsiung-nu from a larger action currently in progress. A temporary camp was constructed for hiscontingent, located in a valley. All carts and chariots were used for the defensive perimeter, as thechariots could not function efficiently in this terrain.

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Sogdiana straddl ed the Silk Route and dominated the fe rtile va luable Tarim Basin. and Chihchih nowruled supreme. Th at was the last straw. Ch'en tang, the assoc iate Protectorate to Kan Yen-shall knewtha t Chih-ch ih the madman must be crushed. An expedit ionary force of 40,000 me n in two wings,was sent after Ch ih-ch ih.Driving his meager army back to his capitol. Chih-chih was cornered.

The city's defenses cons isted of an earthen wall. a double wooden palisade, a moat , and towers forarchers. There was a small force of Hunnic cavalry ou tside of the walls. and the Sogdian relief wasnotified of the Chinese advance. Approximately 20 0 armored men were guard ing the city's gates.These armored men were Roman Leg ionai res. survivors of Crassus' defeat in 54 B.C., reloca tcd toSogdiana by the vic torious Parthians. and now were defending Chih-chih's cap ito) Losers all, at th isbattle !The Ch inese mult itude of crossbows easily repulsed the initial l-l unnic cava lry charge. These bows alsoout-ranged the defender's bows. so all archers were dr iven from the walls.TIle Chinese drained the moat and advanced with "great shields" and long spears in front andcrossbows to the rear.The Chinese then set fire LO the wooden palisade. During the missile exchange, Chih-chih, escorted byhis personal harem. was in one of the towers firing furiously at the Chinese. In front of his manywives. Chih-chih was hit by a crossbow bolt in the nose .The Sogdian cavalry relief force arrived and attempted to break the seige from withou t. This fa iledmiserably. TIle breach and ensu ing combat resulted in Chih-chih's death and 1.5 18 heads taken.Among the prisoners were 145 Romans and 1.000 Sogdians. The Sogdians were handed over to theChinese auxiliaries as new recru its. and the Romans were reloca ted to Li-ch ien in Kansu Province.73 A.D PAN CH'AO'S TARIM BASIN CAMPAIGNThe Chinese Generals Ten Ku and Keng Ping led a hugh army that defeated a very large I-Isiung -nuforce in a colossal baltle that would qu iet the northern front for a wh ile.During this bailie. a subordinate cavalry commander. Pan Ch'ao, was ordered by General Ten Ku tolIt1ack the I-Iuyen. a tribe of the Hsiung-l1u.Pan Ch'ao easily accomplished this task and was sent with a cavalry army to advance as far as possible[Q the west. This expedition was to expand the I-Ian Empire to it's furthest western bOllnd


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WEAPONS AND UNIFORl'l1SCHINESE SOLDIERSI. Light Archer of the Chou DynastyThis figure is taken from a hu (pottery vessel) rubbing dating from the Late Chou period and is in theJannings Collection in Peking. He would compose only a small port ion of the Chou ligh t infantry. Hisrobe would be of a solid color, with probably no uniform co lors within a unit. Bows were coveredwith green silk , and commanders would have the ir bows ornamented with ivory. There is also reasonto be lieve that Chou period bows and arrows were painted red. Quivers were frequent ly covered withtiger skin.Alternat ively , this figure cou ld be armed with javelins (mau) four to six feet in length, and also a smallbuckle r.Re corded at the battle of Ma Ling, in 341 B.C. , the Ch'i state virtually annihilated the Wei, by the useof many crossbows. Any of the figures numbered 1- 3 cou ld be armed with such a weapon .2. Light Spearman of the Chou DynastyThe long flowing robe with its characteristi c voluminous sleeves is shown here . Th is may have beenpadded with layers of cloth , and. by the time of the Ch' in, treated animal hide corselets wlil be wornove r this robe . He co mpletes the light infantry component of the Chou or Ch'in Army .He carries the "dagger axe" sometimes re ferred to as a ko. This weapo n, clearly a predecessor of thehalberd, is made of bronze. The length of thi s weapon was either eighteen or nine feet, and the bladeis depicted in two distinct shapes, one as shown in this figure and the other as shown in figure 9.Infantry of the Chou period relied entirely on the bow for missile support. The javelins carried werenot hand-hurled , but rather used for close comba t. De fensive armament could include a rectangularshield of bamboo or ox or rh inoceros hide.This figure is derived from a wall relief rubbing of

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WRG Armies & Enemies of Ancient China