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Wrap-Up
Our approach:
game theory+
evolutionary dynamics =
ultimate explanation for people’s puzzling preferences, beliefs, ideologies, and heuristics
Let’s start with a brief overview of the models we focused on:
Hawk-DoveCostly SignalingRepeated-PDCWOLCommon Knowledge
Hawk-DovePuzzle
Where do rights come from? Are they God-given, natural, absolute?
Model
Two players compete for a contested resourceEach can play Hawk, Dove, or Bourgeois (H if arrive first, D o/w)It is an equilibrium to attend to uncorrelated asymmetries
Key insight
Our sense of rights isn’t God-given, natural, absolute. Rather, it implements this equilibrium
Costly SignalingPuzzle
Why do North Indians find long fingernails beautiful? Why do we find white shoes beautiful? Where does our sense of beauty come from?
Model
Two kinds of senders: low/highCan’t convey quality; can send otherwise useless signals of different “strengths”Receivers decide whether to match w/ senders based on signalIt is an equilibrium for senders to send these wasteful signals
Key insight
We find costly signals beautiful
Repeated Prisoner’s DilemmaPuzzle
Why do we give so much, but “weirdly”?
Model
Can pay cost c to benefit other by b; c < bRepeat w/ probability δAny cooperative equilibrium has two traits: reciprocity and b/c > δ
Key insight
Altruistic preferences implement cooperative equilibrium; they exhibit these two traits
AND not other traits, like efficiency
Cooperating Without LookingPuzzle
Why are people principled?
Model (Envelope Game)
Low or high temptation chosenPlayer 1 chooses whether to look at temptationPlayer 1 chooses whether to cooperatePlayer 2 chooses whether to continueCWOL/Attend to Looking is a Nash equilibrium
Key Insight
People that don’t look can be trusted. Principles, taboos, etc. keep us from looking
Common KnowledgePuzzles
Why do we care so much about symbolic gestures?Why do we consider omission less bad than commission?Why do we use innuendos?Why do we have norms against chemical weapons?
Model
In game with multiple equilibria, can only condition behavior on events that are common p-believed (CPB; I.e. when there is ~CK)
Key Insights
Symbolic gestures create CPBDiscrete norms condition behavior on events that are CPBAn act of commission is CPB but an act of omission is notInnuendo is not CPB
We provided evidence for these explanations from a variety of sources
For example…
Animal evidence
Examples from history, current events, literature, media
Laboratory experiments
Field experiments
Simulations
Looking back on all these models, it is apparent how powerful the framework is…
Taught us about…
-rights-emotions-beauty-altruism-symbolism-ethics-communication
Not just posthoc explanation, but also…
-novel predictions-prescriptions-clarifies age old debates
Examples of new predictions:
The uncorrelated asymmetries we condition rights on have to be CPB (e.g., not size but who comes first)
We will care if people are “principled” when temptation is large but rare, and harmful
“Explicit speech while bus goes by” works differently than innuendos
Examples of new policy implications:
Taboos should not be respected in public policy
Domestic law should ignore omission/commission
Examples of debates the framework clarifies:
Is our sense of rights God-given, natural, absolute?
Is beauty completely culturally construed?
Why don’t we use efficient norms?
Can altruism ever be “authentic”? Or is it always self-interested?
In short…
game theory+
evolutionary dynamics =
awesome