WorldMUN2009, Security Council, Study GuideA

Dear Delegates,

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to the 18th Session of Harvard World Model United Nations! My name is Tim Kalimov and I am the Secretary-General of WorldMUN 2009. The Harvard team has been working hard in cooperation with the host team from Radboud University to put together an in-credible conference and I hope you are looking forward to March 22nd as much as I am.

This study guide is the product of a lot of hard work by the director of your committee, and it should be used as a launching point for all of your hard work. Preparation is the single most important factor for excellence in Model UN. I urge you to spend a significant amount of time conducting further research into the issues that will be debated in your committee as well as your country’s position in order to prepare. This year, we have renewed our focus on excellence in committees all across the board by including an additional committee session at conference, greater training for our Directors and Assistant Directors, and increased use of the world-class technology available at the World Forum.

I am sure that all of you are also interested in what will take place after commit-tee sessions, but do not worry, as the United Netherlands team has been spend-ing countless hours preparing incredible social events for the duration of the con-ference. I was lucky enough to travel to The Hague earlier this year and visit all of the social event venues; after this, I could not be more excited for our evenings together! As we get closer and closer to March, we will be adding information about all of the thrilling events that we have planned both on our website (www.worldmun.org) and the host team’s website (www.worldmun2009.org) to get you excited for the conference!

Enjoy reading this study guide and be sure to make the most of it. I look forward to seeing you in The Hague in March!

Best Regards,

Timur [email protected]

H A R V A R D W O R L D M O D E L U N 2 0 0 9

T I M U R K A L I M O VS e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l

V I C T O R I A P H A ND i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l

C R I S T I N A O R T I ZD e p u t y S e c r e t a r y -

G e n e r a l G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y

K E L LY D I E PD e p u t y S e c r e t a r y -

G e n e r a l E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l

C o u n c i l

A M I N A S HD e p u t y S e c r e t a r y -

G e n e r a lS p e c i a l i z e d A g e n c i e s

H E AT H E R F U R M A ND i r e c t o r o f

A d m i n i s t r a t i o n

P R AT H A M A N A B ID i r e c t o r o f B u s i n e s s

D I D I X I ED i r e c t o r o f

Te c h n o l o g y

J E S S E K A P L A ND i r e c t o r o f F i n a n c e

March 22 - March 27 2009

Dear Delegates,

It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the Specialized Agencies! My name is Ami Nash, and I am delighted to be your Deputy Secretary-General. I am cur-rently a junior at Harvard studying Organizational Behavior and Economics. I grew up just outside of New York City, but true to my Indian roots, I enjoy not just spicy food, but conversation and controversy, which probably explains my passion for Model UN, and the Specialized Agencies in particular! This year’s slate of Specialized Agency committees stands out as a particularly fascinating mix of historical turning points and current crises, each laced with international intrigue.

By the time you arrive at The Hague, your director and assistant directors will have spent untold hours to ensure your simulation is as realistic and engaging as possible. The Specialized Agencies are generally considered to be the most excit-ing and challenging committees at Model United Nations Conferences, and only the best delegates have the opportunity to join these small but powerful simula-tions. The SA’s average committee size is 16 delegates, so opportunities for each attendee to participate, negotiate, and problem-solve abound.

But success on the SA will not come easily. You will need to be extraordinarily diligent in your preparation, and flexible and innovative at the conference, since the typical rules of parlimentary procedure may not apply in your committee. This study guide should serve as the launching point for your own more targeted research into the positions of the country or character you will be portraying. Whether you play the role of judge, general, politician, or nation, you will have the power (for six days at least!) to shape the course of history. I have no doubt that each of you will rise to the challenge.

I am incredibly excited to meet and get to know you this March, and in the meantime I wish you the best of luck in your preparations. Please do feel free to contact me if you have any questions or concerns.

Sincerely,

Ami Nash Deputy Secretary-General, Specialized Agencies [email protected]

H A R V A R D W O R L D M O D E L U N 2 0 0 9

T I M U R K A L I M O VS e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l

V I C T O R I A P H A ND i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l

C R I S T I N A O R T I ZD e p u t y S e c r e t a r y -

G e n e r a l G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y

K E L LY D I E PD e p u t y S e c r e t a r y -

G e n e r a l E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l

C o u n c i l

A M I N A S HD e p u t y S e c r e t a r y -

G e n e r a lS p e c i a l i z e d A g e n c i e s

H E AT H E R F U R M A ND i r e c t o r o f

A d m i n i s t r a t i o n

P R AT H A M A N A B ID i r e c t o r o f B u s i n e s s

D I D I X I ED i r e c t o r o f

Te c h n o l o g y

J E S S E K A P L A ND i r e c t o r o f F i n a n c e

March 22 - March 27 2009

Security Council

S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l D i r e c t o r :A l e c B a r r e t te m a i l @ w e b s i t e . c o m

I N T R O D U C T I O N

H I S T O R Y O F T H E C O M M I T T E E

T O P I C A : T H E S I T U A T I O N I N I R A N

T O P I C B : R E V I E W I N G T H E W O R K O F T H E C O U N T E R -T E R R O R I S M C O M M I T T E E

P O S I T I O N P A P E R S

C L O S I N G R E M A R K S

B I B L I O G R A P H I C E S S A Y

A P P E N D I C I E S

Dear Delegates,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to WorldMUN 2009! I am very happy that you will be joining our dais

staff and me in March for what is sure to be a week full of exciting and fun debate as you simulate the most

prestigious body of the United Nations. As you embark on your research into our two topics, The Situation

in Iran and the Counter-Terrorism Committee, I hope you will find these to be both thought-provoking and

innovative. The situation in Iran is widely covered by international media, and is a long-standing situation

that has yet to be resolved. The Counter-Terrorism Committee is not itself a problem, but represents a major

institutional challenge that the United Nations – and, at its helm, the Security Council – must address to

avoid many serious consequences in the future. I hope you will find that both topics raise broader theoretical

questions about the core role of the Security Council in the world.

Let me tell you a little about myself. Originally from New York City, I study both Government and

History at Harvard. I am a big fan of the outdoors, especially biking and kayaking, and I am an avid frisbee

player. I love maps and traveling, and Europe in particular – this will be my 9th trip to the continent – but

my first time to The Netherlands. I look forward to exploring all that The Hague and the surrounding area

have to offer with you and the rest of our committee.

I have participated in Model United Nations since high school, and I was the captain of my school’s team

my senior year. In college, I have worked on two Harvard Model UN conferences, but this will be my first

year at WorldMUN. Outside of Model UN, I am involved in Harvard’s Institute of Politics and intramural

sports teams. I enjoy following politics – which was very easy this fall with such an exciting election in the

United States.

Both as a delegate and a staff member, I have always enjoyed the intellectual and social experience of

Model UN. As much as you may read and research, debating and defending your positions on these topics will

teach you more than any book, and I am confident that you will bring great energy, experience, and enthusi-

asm to the WorldMUN Security Council. Each of you, whatever country you represent, will play a vital role

in arriving at a realistic and viable solution to the problems I have presented to you.

Most of all, I look forward to meeting and talking to you all. I am confident that we will have a lot

of fun during our week together. I strongly believe in the importance of learning from people from other

backgrounds and with different points of view. At WorldMUN, making friends from other countries is just

as important as learning about the work of the United Nations, and I am so excited for the fantastic time we

will have together. I wish you all luck with your preparations for conference. I would be happy to answer any

questions you might have about our committee, our topics, or life at Harvard.

Signed,

Alec Barrett

Director, Security Council

[email protected]

C O N T E N T SMarch 22 - March 27 2009

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harvard WorldMun 2009 Security council 4

INTRODUCTION The first topic the Security Council will address is the suc-cess of the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Commit-tee (CTC). Created in 2001 and revised in 2005, the CTC is the UN’s highest-level terrorism-fighting organization. As a committee of the Security Council, the CTC is responsible for gathering information about individual countries’ counter-terrorism procedures and has attempted to standardize those practices across countries. During this review of the CTC, the Security Council must consider not only whether the CTC has fulfilled its mandate, but also whether its continued exis-tence is the most appropriate and effective counter-terrorism measure for the Security Council. As the only UN body with the ability to produce resolutions with binding force, the Se-curity Council should carefully consider the options available to it not just for the sake of fighting terrorism, but in order to maintain the UN’s relevance in this critical and unprecedented age of global terrorism. The second topic the Security Council will address is the situation in Iran. Since the adoption of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the creation of the IAEA, the international community has faced attempted violators of these crucial international regulations. Even after the end

of the Cold War and years of nuclear arms reduction, there remain countries that attempt to flout international standards by pursuing nuclear technology. The single most prominent case in recent years has been Iran, whose express desire for nuclear energy has translated into a suspected pursuit of nuclear weapons. Time and time again, deals for other coun-tries or the international community to monitor Iran’s nuclear facilities have fallen through, while the country’s extremist regime has generally failed to appeal to rationality. The Secu-rity Council must decide what measures are warranted today – should Iran be monitored more stringently? Do they deserve the benefit of the doubt? Underlying this discussion are Iran’s tensions with other countries in the region, particularly nearby Israel and the United States, which currently occupies neighboring Iraq. It is up to the Security Council to maintain a world of nuclear peace using all appropriate tools.

HISTORY OF THE COMMITTEE The most public of all the bodies of the United Nations, the Security Council is charged with the highest responsibility of any global entity: to maintain international peace and security. The committee is made up of fifteen members, including five permanent members – China, France, Russia, United King-

The Security Council, made up of fifteen members, is charged with maintaining international peace and security.Source: www.un.org

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dom, and United States – who are also endowed with the power to veto any resolution that comes to a vote. The other ten members are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. Endowed by the UN Charter, the Security Council is the only UN body that can impose legally binding resolu-tions on any and all member states. Accordingly, the Security Council has in its toolkit the power to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions, deploy peacekeeping forces, and even deploy military forces. Most history of the Security Council is not terribly interesting. At the UN’s founding shortly after World War II, the five permanent members (at the time, the Republic of China, or Taiwan, held the seat now occupied by the People’s Republic of China; Russia’s seat once belonged to the Soviet Union) were assigned seats on the Council because they were the victors of World War II. Shortly thereafter, however, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union became strained as competition and mistrust led the two into the Cold War. During this time, the Security Council was relatively unaccomplished. Many resolutions were passed, but the resolutions were rather unremarkable, as anything that the United States, China and the Soviet Union all agreed upon was, inevitably, quite straightforward. To be more accurate, all the permanent members did not have to agree, but they could not disagree so much that one would use their veto; whenever a somewhat controversial point was to be agreed upon, the United States or Soviet Union would often abstain from the vote.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council has had a few noteworthy achievements. In 1991, the Security Council voted to deploy forces against Iraq in what would be known as the Gulf War. Iraq had invaded Kuwait and the inter-national community intervened on behalf of a state whose sovereignty had been violated. In 2001, the Council formed a counter-terrorism committee in response to the attacks of 11 September of that year. The committee has regularly imposed sanctions on other countries, and oversees all of the ongoing UN peacekeeping missions around the world, in ad-dition to several committees and commissions, which operate under the Council’s jurisdiction.

TOPIC A: THE SITUATION IN IRAN

Statement of the Problem It is forbidden by international law to build or acquire nuclear weapons, and yet all countries have the right to use nuclear power for electricity. It is up to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify that countries with nuclear technology are pursuing the latter, but never cross the line into building weapons. This creates a problem in coun-tries that either refuse to admit IAEA weapons inspectors, or are believed to be building nuclear weaponry, despite interna-tional agreements. Iran is one such case. In recent years the country has threatened to pursue nuclear weapons technology and has not allowed international inspectors to fully verify that it is not. The technical difference between nuclear weapons and nuclear energy is a relatively small one, but politically, the difference is vast. Iran has repeatedly reaffirmed its right to pursue nuclear energy, and on the occasion that it has ceased this research as a gesture of goodwill, the pause has not lasted long. To some, Iran appears to be stalling for time as the international community fails either to appease Iran or to act decisively to stop them. In recent years, extensive negotiations facilitated by the European Union, represented by the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and the United Nations, have made some progress. However, both domestic and international political shifts, most notably with the 2005 election of hard-liner Mahmoud Ahmedinejad as President of Iran, have set back diplomatic progress. Though both sides have offered their own proposals, neither side has yet found a fully accept-able proposal from the other side. The question of whether Iran should, for the time being, halt its allegedly peace-ful nuclear ambitions is a major point of contention; Iran regularly reaffirms its right to pursue nuclear energy, though freezing its program would be seen as a sign of its willingness

Major Dates in the Security Council’s History

1946: Security Council holds its first meeting. 1950: Security Council endorses military action to defend South Korea from the North. 1965: The number of non-permanent members on the Security Council increases from six to ten following amendments to the UN Charter. 1971: The permanent seat of the Republic of China is transferred to the People’s Republic of China. 1991: Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the USSR’s seat is transferred to Russia. 1994: After the collapse of the apartheid govern ment in South Africa, the Security Council lifts sanctions on the country. 2001: Counter-Terrorism Committee created.

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to cooperate with Western diplomats. Iran has never constructed nuclear weapons, and remains a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, by which it agrees not to pursue nuclear weapons and to allow IAEA inspection of nuclear facilities. However, the concur-rent development of conventional weapons and military technologies in Iran, which might be used alongside a nuclear warhead, appears suspicious to some.1 The Iranian situation poses both theoretical and practical challenges. The international community—particu-larly the Security Council—has been hard pressed to force Iran to comply with inspectors, though Iran has yet to openly develop or test an actual nuclear weapon. In the short term, Iran’s nuclear ambitions may jeopardize the structure of the non-proliferation system as much as international security itself. Were Iran to develop a nuclear weapon, however, they might significantly destabilize the Middle East and the global oil market, pose a grave threat to the national security of Israel, and use their force as leverage to seek further conces-sions from the West, such as the removal of economic sanc-tions or the creation of a global market for peaceful nuclear technology (which, while legal in theory, is still a source of discomfort for some in the West)2. No country may be permitted to obtain or build nuclear weapons, but Iran continues to invoke its right to nuclear power as it pursues its ambiguous nuclear goals. The peaceful purpose of its program must be verified, and if it cannot be, then some other measure must be devised to stop them from gaining a nuclear weapon. If Iran were to have nuclear capability, few options would remain short of engag-ing them in what would surely be a devastating and costly conflict with long-lasting consequences.

History of the Problem

NUCLEAR WORLDIn August 1945, the United States brought World War Two to a decisive close with the defeat of Japan in the Pacific the-ater, directly incited by history’s only use of nuclear weapons in warfare. The United States had been the first country to develop the nuclear bomb, but the Soviet Union and Brit-ain followed suit within a matter of years, and at least six countries were believed to have nuclear weapons by the late 1960s.3 During the height of the Cold War, nuclear weapons proliferated both among and within countries. South Africa, India, and Pakistan all built nuclear weapons during this time, and Israel is believed to have built them as well, though the government has never acknowledged their program. South Africa later renounced their program, and nineteen other

countries at some point have had nuclear weapons programs but abandoned them.4

One major reason for the global decrease in the pur-suit of the nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, created in 1968, is a major piece of international law governing weapons of mass destruction. When it was first adopted, sixty-two countries signed the treaty, but over the last forty years, nearly every country in the world has signed the NPT.5 It says that only the countries that had nuclear weapons at the time of its passage—United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France—be allowed to have nuclear weapons, and that all other countries are forbidden to develop, pursue, or otherwise obtain them.6 The treaty also addresses two important points that remain highly relevant today: the role of the Interna-tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the right of any country to develop nuclear energy. The IAEA is empowered to verify “the fulfillment of [each State’s] obligations as-sumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.”7 At the same time, the treaty states that its non-proliferation measures would not interfere with a country’s right to nuclear power, which is explicitly permitted and even encouraged by the treaty.8

Map of Iran Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/ir-map.gif

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Other treaties have been passed since the NPT gov-erning the development and testing of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, but the NPT remains one of the most important international treaties governing peace and security in the world today. There are currently 8 countries with known nuclear weapons capabilities, and one – North Korea – that has recently tested weapons and may or may not still have an arsenal. In recent years, the threat of nuclear terrorism has drawn more attention than interstate nuclear conflict.9 Even today, the NPT has neither universal participation nor adherence.

A BRIEF LOOK AT IRAN Iran’s government is a theocracy established in 1979 by the Iranian Revolution, which overthrew the Shah. The coun-try has a President and a parliament, but is ultimately ruled by a Supreme Ruler, who has final say over all government decisions.10 The country is oil-rich, with the state-controlled petroleum industry responsible for most of the country’s wealth. Despite significant oil revenues—a GDP of almost US$200 billion11—the country does not have a particularly strong economy, arguably due to government controls on the economy.12 Iran suffers from both high inflation (officially 18%) and unemployment (officially 15-17%) rates, though both official figures are believed to be grossly underreport-ed.13 Finally, in spite of the relatively high level of university education in Iran, many of the country’s best educated leave the country, at rates of up to 200,000 a year.14

Fast Facts about Iran • Proven oil reserves of 133 billion barrels of oil, and

production of 4 billion a year15 • 60% of Iranians between 30 and 49, and 40% of

the total population, live in poverty16 • Literacy rate 90% among Iranians under 3017

• Population estimated at 66 million18

Iran has a long history of compliance with the nuclear non-proliferation system. Under the Shah, a Western-backed dic-tator, in the nineteen fifties, sixties, and seventies, Iran began pursuing a nuclear energy program that was fully sanctioned by the United States; a German company was contracted to build Iran’s first nuclear reactors at Bushehr.19 In fact, the Shah at one point expressed his hope for an eventual Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East.20 Nonethe-less, nuclear power offered great promise for Iran’s growing energy needs, and in 1978, an agreement on nuclear energy was made with the United States.21 The Iranian Revolution

the following year, and a diplomatic falling-out between Iran and the United States effectively ended U.S. support for Iran’s nuclear program. President Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005, in the last of a series of conservative victories in national elec-tions. The neo-conservative movement in Iran is a populist movement that emerged as a third party to the traditional Reformist and conservative parties.22 In 2004, the party was victorious in Parliamentary elections, which some attribute to influence by the Guardian Council, the country’s highest decision-making body. Among the initiatives forwarded by these conservative lawmakers was to decelerate the process of negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, including by refus-ing to ratify the Additional Protocol, and by passing measures to impede the diplomatic process.23 The position articulated and practiced by Ahmadinejad was one of aggression and confrontation toward the West, and a round rejection of the diplomatic, dialogue-focused Reformers of the previous gov-ernment.24 Iran currently faces a series of problematic economic and political questions to which nuclear energy may hold some answers. The country’s rapidly increasing population amounts to a 6-8% annual increase in electricity needs.25 Within the country, Iran is not fully united behind its nuclear ambitions, but the government has used the nuclear issue as a means to assert both the country’s independence and tech-nological maturity.26 A domestic tension remains between movements toward youthful, revolutionary change and the institution of theocratic conservatism, which the current government hopes to fight with the nationalizing and unify-ing effect of nuclear power.

TO ARMS? At the core of the conflict over a nuclear Iran is not whether Iran should be allowed to develop and use nuclear energy, but rather whether it is actually concealing a program to develop nuclear weapons. More than any concrete evidence to that end, Iran’s covert behavior toward its nuclear program has made other countries suspicious.27 In 2005, an Iranian nuclear negotiator said, “Psychologically it is as if we have a nuclear bomb now and [the West] treat us in accordance with that belief.”28 A large, often-cited clue is Iran’s history with missile testing. At one point, Iran developed missiles with help from North Korea,29 but has since succeeded in devel-oping its own ballistic missile technology.30 In the summer of 2008, Iran tested rocket technology expressly intended for satellites, but which the United States noted could be used for missiles as well.31 Their current arsenal is extensive, and includes the Shabab-3 missile, capable of reaching as far as India or Eastern Europe.32

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An analysis from the BBC details Iran’s missile capa-bilities:33 • Shahab-3: potential to strike at least 1,300 kilometers away, possibly farther; classified as a medium range ballistic mis-sile (MRBM), based on the technology behind North Korean No Dong missiles; potentially capable of carrying nuclear warhead • Shahab-1 and -2: hundreds assumed to be in Iranian arsenal; based on scud technology used by Iran in Iran-Iraq war and Gulf War by Iraq; maximum range of 500 kilometers • Zelzal: shorter range, approximately 400 kilometers; previ-ously used against Iraq; supposedly supplied to Hizbollah militia group in Lebanon • Fateh: up to 170 kilometer range; less threatening with respect to Israel, but considered a potential threat to targets in Afghanistan Much concern about Iran’s military inten-tions, and especially its nuclear ambitions, con-cerns Israel. Especially in the eyes of the United States, Iran poses a significant threat to Israel, and Ahmedinejad has contributed to this belief with comments like his suggestion that Israel be “wiped off the map.”34 Because of the proximity (less than 600 miles) between the two countries, Israel has expressed concern about the possibility of an Iranian missile attack, and has worked to develop anti-missile technology that could respond to a WMD missile attack.35

PAST NEGOTIATIONS One of the biggest breakthroughs in EU-Iran negotiations was the 2003 Paris Agreement, which resulted in Iran’s adoption of the Additional Pro-tocol in exchange for fully recognize Iran’s rights under the NPT.36 Other measures, like a mutual commitment to fight international terrorism, and progress on Iran’s bid to join the World Trade Organization, demonstrated the goodwill implicit in this agreement.37 Iran continually expressed its desire to end its special treatment by the IAEA, and in turn disregarded subsequent IAEA reports calling for more cooperation from Iran.38 Around this time, Iran demonstrated inconsistent and unreliable behavior that ultimately resulted in a lack of trust from the EU.39 Around this time, domestic political developments in Iran also made diplomatic progress difficult.40

Discussion of the Problem

NUCLEAR ENERGY VERSUS NUCLEAR WEAPONSPolitically, producing nuclear energy and building nuclear weapons fall on opposite ends of the spectrum, but the pro-cesses toward each are actually quite similar. Both processes entail the same mining and processing of uranium to pre-pare it for fission, which will produce plutonium that can be used for either weapons or energy.41 Fission is the process by which atoms are split to produce energy but this can only take place with a certain kind of isotope. Naturally occurring uranium does not contain sufficient quantities of the required isotope, uranium-235, so the uranium is enriched to become more fissile. In nature, 235U is about 0.7% of uranium, and

Estimated Ranges of Current and Potential Iranian Ballistic Missiles Source: www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif97/pg28.gif

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about 4% is required for a nuclear reactor.42 Weapons-grade uranium, known as highly enriched uranium (HEU), by contrast, is about 90% uranium-235. Enrichment is a long and expensive process for most coun-tries, while low-enriched uranium (required for nuclear power plants) can be acquired legally from outside sources. However, the same processes are used to enrich uranium to different levels.43 In most nuclear reactors, the energy from the fission process is used to heat water, which generates steam that powers an electric turbine.44 A nuclear weapon, by contrast, uses the unharnessed fission of a large amount of enriched uranium in a short period of time, usually catalyzed by a conventional weapon or chemical reaction, that produces the large amount of energy that comprises the initial blast (as opposed to the lingering radiation).45 Nuclear energy is already widely used around the world (see map on following page). There has been little increase in the number of reactors in the world over the last decade, probably in part due to two infamous accidents at nuclear power plants, one in Chernobyl, Ukraine and one in Three Mile Island, in Pennsylvania, United States. None-theless, the approximately 450 reactors around the world have nonetheless steadily increased their operating capacity, measured in gigawatts electrical (GWe).46 Moreover, with ris-ing oil prices and the visible consequences of climate change, governments are increasingly looking to nuclear power to off-set carbon emissions. A meaningful offset, however, would

require a five-fold increase in the production capacity of the world’s nuclear energy, and thus the appropriate safeguards and political climate, such as stable and cooperative govern-ments, to safely execute this task.47

THE IAEA As the world’s nuclear regulatory body, the IAEA is charged with the responsibility to “establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable material and other materials…under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose,” according to its Statute.48 The IAEA has two primary documents that govern its relationship with NPT parties. First, each country has a safeguards agreement with the IAEA that permits the agency to monitor its nuclear material and activities to verify that they are solely for peaceful means.49 This agreement is mandated by the NPT, and is the basis upon which the IAEA carries out inspections around the world; in 2001, the IAEA reported that it was safeguarding nearly 1000 nuclear facilities around the world.50 In the last decade, it was determined that the original safeguards agreement left out several important factors that would help facilitate IAEA inspections, leading to an Additional Protocol, which attempted to fill the gaps left by the original. These increased powers include the right to demand more information from states, the right to inspect more facilities and sites and arrive on shorter notice, and the right to use more advanced techniques such as environmental

sampling to assess the facilities.51 Iran has an active safe-guards agreement with the IAEA, and in 2003, signed an Additional Protocol.52 In 2006, however, Iran withdrew from that agreement in response to a decision by the IAEA Board of Governors to refer Iran to the Security Council.53 Iran has yet to reinstate its Additional Protocol, and has since been the subject of several IAEA reports detailing progress on Iran’s compli-ance with the IAEA. A 2007 report stated that, following a meeting between the IAEA and Iranian of-ficials, a number of understandings had been reached, and that some previously unavailable information had been ascertained. To this end, the report stated that many of the facilities previously suspected of pursuing illegal activities were not

Nuclear fuel cycle. Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/nucfuelcycle.gif

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doing so, and the inspectors were able to “verify the non-diversion of the declared nuclear materials at the enrichment facilities in Iran and has therefore concluded that it remains in peaceful use.”54 Two subsequent reports in 2008 have con-firmed essentially the same information, though there remain some gaps in the information, including those that would be filled under the terms of the Additional Protocol. The effectiveness of the IAEA has been questioned because in the past, the organization has been unable to com-plete its verification of nuclear activity in countries like Iran. An internal report on the IAEA said the IAEA was “unable to make progress” because it lacked the legal mechanisms to allow it to carry out its inspections; in this 2006 report, the Director-General claimed that the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol were insufficient.55 However, a more widely recognized challenge is the IAEA’s lack of legally bind-ing force, requiring the agency to defer to the UN Security Council for the enforcement of its measures.56 A former executive of the IAEA has suggested that the issue deficit be remedied with a Security Council resolution prescribing con-sequences for countries that fail to comply with the IAEA, but no such resolution has ever been adopted.57

THE KOREAN PARALLEL As the only other modern state considered by the West to pose a nuclear threat, the situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) [North Korea] can be a useful case study. (India and Pakistan’s arsenals are understood to be very much intended as leverage against the other in the

perpetual stalemate between the historic rivals; neither they nor any analyst indicate even the remotest possibility that each country’s nuclear weapons might threaten any country but the other.) The US/EU-led negotiations to re-establish relations with North Korea and deter them from building and using their nuclear weapons offers several lessons for dealing with Iran. However, it is first important to note several key differences between the two cases: • North Korea has built and tested nuclear weapons; if it ex-ists, Iran’s nuclear weapons program is still in nascent stages and Iran denies its intention to build one.58 • North Korea withdrew its signature from the NPT, and has a long history of non-compliance with the IAEA. Iran is still a party to the treaty, and only in the last few years became the subject of international concern. • East Asia is not nearly as volatile as the Middle East. With stabilizing forces like China and Russia around North Korea, the threat of a North Korean attack is far less than that of one by Iran. • Negotiations with North Korea have focused on six-party talks involving the U.S., China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan. Negotiations with Iran have focused on the EU-3: France, Germany, and the U.K. The cases are, however, similar enough to warrant comparison. Both countries, for example, have well-known regional archrivals (Israel and South Korea, respectively) in addition to their opposition to the United States. The two were, perhaps unjustifiably, grouped together by U.S. Presi-dent Bush’s characterization of the “axis of evil”59 and have

States Building Nuclear Reactors

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thus been treated with a similar attitude by some Western policy-makers. The situation in North Korea has been evolving for over fifteen years, but accelerated more recently when, in 2003, the DPRK announced their withdrawal from the NPT. Though in early 2005, the country appeared committed to “increase its nuclear arsenal”, several months of intensive negotiations resulted in a statement committing to abandon its nuclear weapons program in exchange for an assurance that the United States would not attack the DPRK.60 The next year, however, North Korea test-fired several missiles, to which the Security Council responded with an arms embar-go61 [Resolution 1695 (2006)].62 This apparently did not dis-suade North Korea from testing a nuclear weapon in October 2006, much to the dismay of the international community, and provoking another set of sanctions from the Security Council.63 In June 2008, however, North Korea destroyed a cooling tower at a nuclear power plant as a symbol of the ending of its nuclear weapons program, though they have not rejoined the NPT.64 Since the test of devices in 2006, there is no evidence to suggest that any nuclear arsenal exists in the DPRK. North Korea has continued to perform confidence-building measures, such as disclosing documents relating to its nuclear program.65

THE CURRENT SITUATION In August 2007, Iran and the IAEA agreed upon a docu-ment entitled “Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues” (see Appendix). The agreement set timetables and deadlines for the IAEA to pose questions to Iran and Iran to answer them, with the goal of all outstand-ing questions on various aspects of Iran’s nuclear program to be resolved within eight months.66 An IAEA report issued in February 2008 (GOV/2008/4) indicated that most of these milestones had been reached, but noted that the is-sues of Iran’s acquisition of uranium metal from Pakistan in 1987, and those of Iran’s experimental pursuits had yet to be resolved.67 With regard to the latter, the IAEA report cited “the green salt project, high explosives testing, and the mis-sile re-entry vehicle” as outstanding sources of suspicion.68 Though these activities are potentially related to Iran’s nuclear activities, information about them has only been provided by individual member states, and has never been endorsed by the United Nations or the IAEA.69 As of February 2008, the IAEA was seeking more information from Iran to elucidate this area of misunderstanding. A similar report in May 2008 (GOV/2008/15), the most recent such update from the IAEA, cited the “implementation of Iran’s Additional Proto-col,” “alleged studies,” and “R&D activities of military related

institutes and companies that could be nuclear related” (paragraph 14) as areas with outstanding questions. In other areas, the IAEA was still evaluating the information Iran had provided, but that more information, which could be of help to this end, might exist but had not been provided by Iran (paragraph 23). Finally, while Iran had allowed the IAEA ac-cess to inspect its nuclear material, the outstanding questions cited above, and continued non-compliance with Security Council demands to discontinue enrichment, were sources of concern (paragraphs 26-29).70 A recent exchange of proposals to motivate Iran to suspend its enrichment programme has proven unsuccessful, and while a fourth round of sanctions is on the table for the Security Council, no clear incentives or consequences have been presented to Iran for suspending their uranium enrich-ment.71

Past UN Actions In addition to work by the IAEA, the Security Council has passed several resolutions on Iran’s nuclear activities. Here is a brief summary of the text and significance of each:

Resolution 1803 (2008)72: • Imposes travel ban on individuals involved in Iranian nuclear program • Expands measures in Resolution 1737 to apply to more individuals Imposes embargo of dual-use technologies (those with both peaceful and military applications) on Iran• Calls states’ attention to the risk of supporting nuclear ac-tivities when entering into financial agreements with Iran • Calls on states to inspect air and sea cargo from Iran if it is suspected to contain embargoed material • Endorses efforts by the EU Foreign representative to continue to negotiate with Iran on behalf of the EU3, China, Russia, and the United States • States that past embargoes and restrictions on Iran will be removed if it complies with Security Council and IAEA resolutions

Resolution 1747 (2007)73: • Imposes embargo on any arms or military equipment from Iran • Discourages sale of conventional military equipment to Iran • Discourages financial institutions from engaging in agree-ments with Iran • Encourages compliance by Iran with IAEA requirements in exchange for restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and international community

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• States that past embargoes and restrictions on Iran will be removed if it complies with Security Council and IAEA resolutions • States that if Iran does not comply with Security Coun-cil resolutions, further sanctions or other measures will be adopted

Resolution 1737 (2006)74: • Decides that Iran must suspend enrichment activities and construction of nuclear reactors, to be verified by the IAEA • Imposes an embargo on materials related to enrichment, reactor construction, or fuel reprocessing, to Iran (some ex-pressly listed, others subject to each State’s judgment) • Requires states that transfer certain other non-restricted material to verify its end-use and, in some cases, inform the Security Council or IAEA about the transfer of those materi-als • Imposes an embargo on dual-use and conventional military technology from Iran • Calls on states to report to the Security Council about the movement of individuals involved in Iran’s nuclear pro-gramme • Requires states to freeze financial assets of individuals and organizations involved in Iran’s nuclear programme • Decides that the IAEA may not provide technical support to Iran for activities that may be proliferation-related • Creates a committee of the Security Council to oversee the implementation of the above (as is typical when sanctions are imposed)

Resolution 1696 (2006)75: • Demands that Iran suspend enrichment-related activities • Discourages transfer of materials to Iran related to enrich-ment or missile programmes • States that if Iran does not comply with this resolution, sanctions will be imposed, but that if it does, no such mea-sures will be imposed

Proposed Solutions

THE MILITARY OPTION For a long time, the United States and other Western coun-tries have weighed the possibility of an aerial attack or an invasion of Iran in order to destroy their nuclear facilities and prevent their development of a nuclear weapons program. Inevitably these discussions mention Israel, not just as a proponent of such a solution, but as a participant—perhaps the sole participant.76 The final days of the Bush Administra-

tion are unlikely to hold such a drastic foreign policy move, but a hamstrung United States might be just the stage Israel needs.77 Iran, however, has not hesitated to threaten severe consequences for such a move, recently suggesting that an attack by the United States or Israel would result in a “world war”.78 • Pro: Circumvents bureaucratic negotiations; highest prob-ability of ending Iranian nuclear program • Con: Drive Middle East into chaos with consequences for global economy; might provoke retaliation against United States, Iraq, Israel, or elsewhere; Iran might not have a nuclear weapons program

SANCTIONS Further sanctions are another option. The Security Council Committee on sanctions pursuant to Resolution 1737 has met regularly to review progress on their implementation; the lat-est meeting report revealed compliance and success reported by many countries. Some members of the Security Council,

Mahmoud Ahmedinejad (center), President of Iran Source: www.president.ir

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however, revealed concern about Iran’s failure to meet its obligations to the IAEA. Some also mentioned violations of the sanctions that had occurred, and resolved to work to prevent any further violations.79 • Pro: target resources and individuals affiliated with nuclear program; legal and legitimate • Con: Will not engender goodwill from Iran; are not fool-proof; already being used

FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS Many countries advocate for further negotiations with Iran. Since the height of Iran’s nuclear program, progress to this end has been made, including the re-establishment of some diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran.80 Arguably responsible for much of the progress thus far made between the international community and Iran, the P5 – the permanent members of the Security Council – and Germany (“P5 + 1”) have historically played a leading role in negotiat-ing with Iran. This has oftentimes resulted in Iran delaying its responses to proposals by the P5 + 1 and using theatrics to buy time, only to respond with its own different proposal.81 • Pro: peaceful, multi-lateral solution; has seen positive re-sults in the past; guarantees moral high ground • Con: no guarantee of success; could be used by Iran to buy time; difficult to arrive at resolution

Questions A Resolution Must Answer

• Should the Security Council adopt a legally binding resolu-tion to enforce participation in and compliance with the NPT

and IAEA safeguards? What specific measures should such a resolution include? • How can countries be stopped from leaving the NPT? For those that remain parties to the treaty, how can they be held to fulfill their obligations? • With regards to both the Iranian situation and future hypothetical situations, are positive incentives more effective at preventing nuclear proliferation than the threat of punish-ment? • In what cases, if any, is unilateral action permissible? Is the United Nations responsible for protecting every member state against a nuclear threat from any other state? • Some sources suggest that within a couple of years, an active Iranian nuclear weapons program could produce a useable weapon. Should a timetable for increasingly severe consequences to Iranian non-compliance be set?

Bloc Positions United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia: These countries comprise part of the “EU3 + 3” (absent Germany) which have collaborated extensively on addressing the Iranian nuclear situation. Their individual attitudes toward Iran’s nuclear program and Iran’s government differ, but they have shared their approach of diplomatic pressure and incentives to convince Iran to end its nuclear pursuits. These countries all have legal nuclear weapons programs, and would all be threatened, to varying degrees, by a nuclear Iran. For the US, UK, and France, Iran is a direct foe; for Russia and China, a nuclear Iran would seriously destabilize the central Asia region where both countries are currently most influential.

Belgium, Italy, Croatia: These countries do not have much of an independent relationship with Iran, but would follow the basic outline of the EU-backed proposed solutions. These countries, like much of Europe, would be probable targets if Iran finished developing and deployed nuclear missiles, and the consequences of an attack on one country in Western Europe would surely be felt throughout the continent.

South Africa, Costa Rica, Panama, Burkina Faso, Vietnam: These countries are largely divested from the Iranian problem specifically, as they neither have a substantial relationship with Iran nor would be seriously threatened by a nuclear Iran.

Indonesia, Libya: These countries form their own bloc because they are heavily Muslim countries, making them more

Some nuclear experts believe Iran has already produced enough low-enriched uranium to make an atom bomb with added purification. Source: www.bloomberg.com

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similar to Iran than any of the other countries on the Security Council. Libya, moreover, has had its own experience with a nuclear program, which it was dissuaded from pursuing by the United States in what was considered to be one of the most successful exercises of soft power in the interest of non-proliferation.

Suggestions for Further Research • The United Nations Security Council (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/) • IAEA and Iran from the IAEA (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml)• Nuclear Basics 101 from the U.S. Government (http://www.eia.doe.gov/basics/nuclear_basics.html)• Technical Aspects of Nuclear Proliferation from the Federation of American Scientists (http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/ota/934406.pdf)• Managing the Atom at the Kennedy School of Government (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/project/3/managing_the_atom.html)• Iran coverage from the Council on Foreign Relations (http://www.cfr.org/region/404/iran.html)• Iran Special Weapons Guide from GlobalSecurity.org (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/index.html)

TOPIC B: REVIEWING THE WORK OF THE COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE

Statement of the Problem Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United Nations had no centralized mechanism for fighting terrorism. Terrorism had been seen as an isolated regional threat usually carried out by separatists or those seeking to undermine their government or an occupying force. High-profile acts of terrorism in the late twentieth century were executed by groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland, Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) in Spain, Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Israel. A few major international terrorist acts occurred, where the perpetrators were either states or closely affiliated with national governments. Accordingly, the United Nations responded through the established means of maintaining international peace and security: the Security Council imposed sanctions, and the governments were held accountable. In 2001, the al Qaeda organization committed a major act of transnational terrorism against the United States of America, killing nearly 3000 people and causing

destruction with far-reaching economic and political consequences. The United States and NATO retaliated against the Taliban government of Afghanistan, which had been responsible for harboring and supporting al Qaeda, and successfully removed the Taliban from power. Despite this operation, in the years that followed, a handful of terrorist attacks were perpetrated – and an unknown number more were attempted – against Western governments by terrorist groups with no clear objectives or regional interests. These groups were not associated with or even based in a single country, and operated through cells even in countries with liberal democratic governments. Non-state actors like al Qaeda often thrive not because of governments that support them, but because of the lack of a strong state to prosecute them. Countries that lack a strong law enforcement system can be ideal breeding grounds for terrorist organizations, and the effects of globalization – easy international travel and trade – allow terrorist plots to be planned and set into motion from afar. Operating outside the simple framework of interaction between states, which are relatively accountable, has created a new set of challenges for the United Nations. There are two weaknesses in the current global counter-terrorism system: states that lack the capacity to successfully combat terrorist activity within their borders, and states that willfully permit terrorist activity within their borders. The latter are sometimes referred to as state sponsors of terrorism; there is a clear precedent for dealing with such offenders. The CTC, and its administrative branch, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), were created to address the problem of countries that would work to stop terrorism if they were equipped with the necessary financial, technical, and legal resources. Along with the creation of the CTC, the Security Council imposed a set of legally binding obligations on all member states, requiring them to take a number of steps to strengthen their national counter-terrorism capacities. Even after years in operation, the CTC still faces major challenges. The CTC, the Security Council, and even the United Nations do not have the resources to equip every country with state-of-the-art counter-terrorism training and resources. Therefore, the CTC must rely on donor countries to help their peers meet the standards set out by the committee, so that process has been steady but slow. Moreover, it is up to the CTC to review hundreds of mandatory reports submitted by the member states profiling their counter-terrorism capabilities, but there are no universal standards to determine whether a country is really adhering to both the spirit and the letter of its legal obligations. Finally, there remain states that are not fulfilling their obligations, but

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there is no clear procedure for either punishing these states or otherwise enforcing universal compliance. Much progress has been made since 2001, but many of the legal obligations of UN members set out after the September 11 attacks still have not been met, seven and a half years later. It is the Security Council’s responsibility to help all member states achieve the maximum counter-terrorism potential that the Council demands of them.

History of the Problem

WHAT IS TERRORISM? One of the most commonly debated terms in political science, terrorism is easy to identify but hard to define. The challenge of describing it is demonstrated by the aphorism, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” In other words, the tactics that might generally be described as “terrorist” – hijacking, hostage-taking, suicide bombing, to name a few – have been used in the past by well-established political groups to try to achieve clearly defined ends, such as independence or self-determination. Ultimately, understanding terrorism and how it works in a modern context are more important than its definition. Commonly, terrorism today is the product of a conflict between the Islamic world—primarily the Middle East and South Asia—and liberal democracies like the United States and the countries of Western Europe. Western politicians believe that a lack of democracy and economic freedom in the Islamic world has produced a deep, hateful resentment of Western values.82 Groups like al Qaeda and others inspired by it also seem motivated by the cultural divides that separate Islamic culture from the West. Accordingly, these groups are limited in their political aims, but pursue targets only with the intent to cause maximum destruction.83 The Counter-Terrorism Committee deliberately does not have a definition of terrorism, because of the controversial nature of defining the term.84 This has, at times, made the task of promoting counter-terrorism efforts difficult, especially in the Middle East, where political groups have often been labeled “terrorist” by Western governments. For example, Hamas, the current ruling party of the Palestinian people, is considered a terrorist organization by the United States, so other countries that support Hamas might be reluctant to engage in American or European notions of counter-terrorism.85 The question “What is terrorism?” is nonetheless relevant to bear in mind because many governments use the

label “terrorist” to persecute opponents and achieve political aims; the label, which literally describes a tactic, is sometimes assigned a political connotation. In theory, counter-terrorism is a purely positive effort, but in some cases has been associated with violations of human rights and civil liberties.86 This is a common criticism of the CTC, which is mandated to support all countries in fighting terrorism, but leaves open the possibility that governments might interpret that task in different ways. It has been suggested that the UN formulate a definition based specifically on the acts of terrorists, which are common, and not on their aims, which may be disparate.87 However, no official UN definition of the term exists.

TWENTIETH CENTURY TERRORISM Most acts of terrorism in the twentieth century reflected regional conflicts. In some cases, like that of the Palestine Liberation Organization, states supported the organization from a distance; in the 1970s Libya staunchly supported the PLO based on their common Arab identity and perceived common enemy of Israel.88 More commonly, these terrorist organizations were small and centrally located – the IRA and ETA each comprise an estimated several hundred members – rather than part of a larger network.89 (However, the IRA in particular was also linked to Libya, but Libya’s state sponsorship of terrorism would become more overt in later years.)90 This is not to suggest that these groups were not harmful; during the height of its operations, the ETA was responsible for dozens of deaths per year, and has killed over 820 people since 1968, according to the Spanish government.91 Though the ETA is still in operation, political developments, like ceasefires in Ireland and a change of

Cockpit of Pan-Am 103 (bombed over Scotland) Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/ff/PA-103cockpit4.png

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Palestinian leadership, have decreased the use of terrorist tactics by these small political groups. During this time, a regional problem required a regional solution. Beginning in the 1970s, the European Community developed a series of counter-terrorism measures to conform each country’s individual mechanisms to a common standard.92 Included in these measures were the adoption of several European conventions and the creation of a collective police force.93 Meanwhile, at the UN, the General Assembly was the main facilitator of counter-terrorism policy during this time. In spite of Cold War political obstacles that hamstrung the Security Council, the General Assembly passed resolutions and conventions beginning in the 1960s – including a noteworthy response to the killings at the Munich Olympic games in 1972.94 Prior to 2001, the General Assembly passed thirteen counter-terrorism resolutions, and created the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to address illicit activities that are often closely related to terrorism.95 In the 1990s, however, the Security Council did address three cases of international state-sponsored terrorism with sanctions. In these cases, states were believed to be directly in support of the terrorists, if not involved in the actual act of terrorism. The first concerned the bombing of two planes – a Pan Am flight over Scotland in 1988 and a UTA flight over Niger in 1989 – that were found to have involved Libya.96 In response to Libya’s failure to meet

demands set out by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, including a demand to extradite the individuals responsible for the bombings, the Security Council imposed sanctions in Resolution 748 (1992). The resolution banned international flights to or from Libya, restricted military trade and assistance allowed with Libya, and imposed restrictions on Libyan diplomatic corps abroad.97 The resolution turned its requests, laid out in a previous resolution, into demands, and required Libya to “promptly, by concrete actions, demonstrate its renunciation of terrorism.”98 Several years later, Libya came to comply with modified demands, and the sanctions were removed.99 Libya is now considered to be in fair standing in the international community. A second case, involving Sudan, followed the attempted assassination of then-Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Sudan refused to extradite the suspects of the attempt, and similar sanctions were imposed on Sudan: demands that Sudan comply with previous requests, and a travel ban on Sudanese officials.100 Later, flights to and from Sudan were also banned.101 The Security Council executed these sanctions less stringently, in part due to a lack of firm follow-through; nonetheless, the diplomatic message the sanctions, one of disapproval for state-sponsorship of terrorism, was considered symbolically important.102 The sanctions were removed in 2001 after a perceived increase in cooperation by the Sudanese government.103 Sudan fell even more out of favor in 1998, when the United States carried out air strikes against Sudan in retaliation for the bombing of American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. However, the greater culprit in these attacks, and therefore the more forcefully punished, was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The al Qaeda terrorist group, based in Afghanistan, was believed to be responsible for the attacks; following U.S. investigations of the bombings, sanctions were imposed on the Taliban for their support of al Qaeda, and the Security Council demanded that the government extradite Osama bin Laden, the founder and leader of al Qaeda.104 A further round of sanctions was imposed, but these did not affect a noticeable change in the Taliban’s behavior; the country was already relatively isolated from the international community and self-sufficient. The Taliban regime was removed from power by an American-led invasion in 2001, but the sanctions against the Taliban and al Qaeda remain in effect.105

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 The attacks of September 11 on the United States caused the greatest loss of life and damage of any terrorist attack in modern times. Operatives of various nationalities, all associated with and trained by Al Qaeda, carried out the

Osama bin Laden, the leader of the Al Qaeda organization, is wanted for the 9/11 terrorist attacks.Source:http://i.cnn.net/cnn/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/images/main.bin.jpg

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attacks.106 Using rudimentary weapons, nineteen attackers hijacked four American commercial airplanes and diverted them to targets in New York and Washington; one crashed en route to Washington. As the United States was targeted, the attacks also had long-term economic and political consequences, including in the form of retaliatory military action against the Taliban government. Airline security procedures around the world were heightened considerably, and rigid legislation was enacted in the United States to strengthen intelligence gathering and law-enforcement powers. In some cases, this legislation was criticized for its invasion of personal privacy and civil liberties, especially when it was used as the premise for widespread arrests and detentions, circumventing due process of law, a right protected by the American Constitution.107 In the days following the attacks, the American president was also granted broader war powers.108 The aftermath of the attacks and their effect on everyday life in many Western countries can still be felt, manifested in heightened security in airports, greater police surveillance in major cities, and a yet unfinished war in Afghanistan, despite a functioning democratic government there. In each country affected by the September 11 attacks (citizens from over 90 countries were killed in the attacks)109 the repercussions can be felt in different ways. When Spain in 2003 and the United Kingdom in 2005 suffered equally jarring terrorist attacks, they, too, augmented their national security efforts. The September 11 attacks also prompted, for the first time, significant universal changes, and the development of a robust counter-terrorism mechanism within the UN.

RESOLUTION 1373 Resolution 1373, passed on September 28, 2001, was unprecedented in the scale of binding obligations it imposed on all member states.110 Its three main components addressed the financing of terrorism, the support of terrorism, and legal methods to fight terrorism. The first measure, articulated in a legally binding clause, requires states to make the funding of terrorism illegal, freeze assets of terrorist or organizations related to terrorists, and prevents individuals from providing any sort of financial services to individuals who are involved in terrorist activities. The second clause mentions “suppressing recruitment” and “eliminating the supply of weapons” to terrorists; exchanging information with other states about potential terrorist attacks; denying sanctuary to terrorists; prosecuting terrorists, and assisting other countries in their prosecution of terrorists; and stopping the movement of terrorists. The third clause consists of further recommendations, including strengthening

intelligence capacities, joining bilateral and multilateral agreements to fight terrorism, joining the relevant counter-terrorism conventions, and ensuring that political motivation is not used to excuse acts of terrorism.111 The resolution not only imposed legally binding measures on all states, but it also set the stage for an international counter-terrorism effort using legislative tools and other cooperative, peaceful means.112 Finally, the resolution establishes the Counter-Terrorism Committee to oversee the implementation of the above requirements. Resolution 1373 required reports from each country on the status of their implementation of their obligations under the resolution; adherence to this requirement was a mixed blessing for the CTC. Within six months, 117 reports had been submitted, and 175 were submitted within the first fourteen months.113 With hundreds of reports submitted, however, the CTC suffered from a backlog of paperwork to assess; they were capable only of responding to these reports, but limited in their ability to take more aggressive measures.114 In particular, this was a result of the small number of consultants contracted to carry out the committee’s work.115 Within a matter of years, it became apparent that the committee was in need of more resources – staff and finances – and more flexibility to fulfill its mission.

RESOLUTION 1535 In 2004, the Security Council took steps to address this problem. In Resolution 1535, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) was created. CTED filled several important roles. It established a permanent staff of twenty experts not only to more quickly evaluate country’s

The United States has taken its security upgrades seriously, notably in airports.Source: media.2news.tv/images/airport%20security5.jpg

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needs, but also to carry out on-site evaluations of existing counter-terrorism measures in countries in need of particular attention.116 Additionally, the CTC now has an annual budget of 8 million USD, considerably larger than any related committee of the Security Council.117 CTED has worked to develop a set of best practices and means for sharing them among member states, and continues to work on a set of standards to evaluate countries’ progress.118 Finally, CTED has played a constructive role in coordinating the work of the CTC with existing committees of the Security Council, most notably the committee governing sanctions imposed on the Taliban and al Qaeda in 1998, and the committee on Non-Proliferation.119 These committees each involve an aspect of counter-terrorism strategy, but the CTC is the primary body for carrying out the Security Council’s work in that area.

Discussion of the Problem

NON-STATE ACTORS Unlike most acts of international terrorism in the 20th century, and even including the attacks of September 11, 2001, would-be terrorists today are rarely associated – or even supported – by a state or government. Instead, they are characterized by a broad category known as non-state actors. This category theoretically includes any player on the international stage that is not a country; companies, regional bodies, and large NGOs might fall into this category. However, the term is commonly used to refer to terrorist organizations that act independently of states, but thrive where the rule of law is too weak to restrict them. They

pose a significant problem when it comes to legal regulations. Companies are governed by laws in the country or countries in which they operate. However, if an organization is already illicit, there is sometimes little a government can do about it without a strong law-enforcement system. Furthermore, an organization that is united by a “transnational” (N.B. : “Nation” here refers strictly to a political entity, namely, a state) quality, such as a religion or ethnicity, is not bound to its original location; it is flexible and adaptable to changes in the political climate. Specifically, illicit non-state actors are likely to go to countries or regions within countries where the state has very little control, such as a semi-autonomous region. Groups like al Qaeda are there-fore especially hard to target because they are not bound to an international system, like the market or international law.120 If these groups are not obligated to abide by laws or conven-tions, then any government that cannot – or will not – pros-ecute them has created a loophole in the international system.

INSTRUMENTS FOR FIGHTING TERRORISM There are sixteen international legal instruments (conventions and treaties) that address different aspects of fighting terrorism. 121 Following the list in chronological order, one gets a good sense for the ever-expanding threat of terrorism, and especially the new forms in which terrorism tends to appear. The following full list includes each convention’s full name, shorthand name, date signed, and date of entrance into force, if applicable: • Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft [Aircraft] (signed 1963, entered into force 1969) • Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft [Unlawful Seizure] (signed 1970, entered into force 1971) • Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation [Civil Aviation] (signed 1971, entered into force 1973) • Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (signed 1988, entered into force 1989) • Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents [Diplomatic Agents] (signed 1973, entered into force 1977) • International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages [Hostage Taking] (signed 1979, entered into force 1983) • Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear

This image shows former Soviet missile silos; many are now located outside of Russia in countries without the capability to properly secure them.Source: http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/planphoto/images/planphoto1.gif

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Material [Nuclear Material] (signed 1979, entered into force 1987) • Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (signed 2005) • Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation [Maritime Convention] (signed 1988, entered into force 1992) • Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (signed 2005) • Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf [Fixed Platform] (signed 1988, entered into force 1992) • Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (signed 2005) • Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (signed 1991, entered into force 1998) • International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings [Terrorist Bombing] (signed 1997, entered into force 2001) • International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism [Terrorist Financing] (signed 1999, entered into force 2002) • International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism [Nuclear Terrorism] (signed 2005, entered into force 2007)

CTC’S ACHIEVEMENTS First in its consultative role, and later through the hands on work of the CTED, the CTC has made some progress. By reviewing the reports submitted by member states, the committee was able to suggest constructive improvements for proactive, cooperative states. For example, in the area of eliminating terrorist financing, the CTC has helped countries develop legislation to complement existing money laundering legislation, which were once believed to be sufficient on their own.122 Similarly, while regulations may have successfully restricted terrorist funding through traditional financial channels, the CTC has helped countries increase their control over “informal banking systems”.123 Finally, simply due to the attention and urging of the CTC, some states have strengthened their border controls.124 One area in which the CTC has seen remarkable progress is in the increased participation by member states in counter-terrorism conventions. Prior to the adoption of Resolution 1373, only two member states were party to all

counter-terrorism treaties; now, more than seventy are.125 In 2002, the increase in the number of signatories to six counter-terrorism conventions was well above the annual average; most of the other conventions had already reached near-universal participation.126 The CTC’s work is faced with many obstacles. A measure or provision on paper – even a legally binding one – cannot be fulfilled if a country lacks the resources to pursue it. Resolution 1373 places relatively high technical and administrative demands on member states.127 The CTC, is eager but ill-equipped to provide all of the technical assistance needed around the world; the committee has received requests for help from over 100 countries.128 Instead, the CTC depends upon donors to provide help where it is needed. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the IMF, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and members of the G-8 have been responsible for much of the support; sometimes these contributions are coordinated through the CTC, but often they are carried out bilaterally.129

MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR THE CTC Though the CTC has seen unprecedented levels of success and compliance from member states,130 the body is far from perfect. Moreover, what momentum it once had thanks to the energy and fervor of a world recently rattled by terror has diminished over the years.131 Though this in part may reflect a successful global counter-terrorism strategy that has – thankfully – prevented another major terrorist attack, a loss of commitment to the UN’s counter-terrorism efforts is, for some, a cause for concern. One of the logistical challenges the CTC faces is its heavy demand of reports from member states. A panel sponsored by several foundations involved with the UN noted that the amount of reporting demanded by the CTC was “excessive” and “abusive” of member states.132 Moreover, the reports, this panel noted, provide relatively little information compared to vastly more useful site visits, both saving the host paperwork and affording the CTC a more detailed look.133 Though the CTED has taken small steps to address this problem, there is still a blatant lack of criteria by which to evaluate states and their progress toward fulfilling their obligations under Resolution 1373. Presently, there is no clear end goal for states to look forward to, creating the appearance of a never-ending process of self-improvement. Because there is no anticipated date of completion, states may work less quickly to reach that point.134 Another condition slightly alleviated by the CTED but still prevalent is the duplication of efforts among UN bodies and especially committees of the Security Council.

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For example, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime has a Terrorism Prevention Bureau that is primarily charged with technical assistance, but has also worked with member states to address legislative counter-terrorism efforts, thus overlapping with the CTC’s work. Similarly, the Security Council committee on Taliban/al Qaeda Sanctions (created in 1998 by Resolution 1267135) and the committee on Non Proliferation (created in 2004 by Resolution 1540136) each perform similar tasks to those encompassed by the CTC’s work. In the case of the former, both committees investigate terrorist financing and sanctions, such as embargos and travel bans, used against terrorist organizations.137 In the case of the latter, the CTC and the so-called “1540 committee” both address the problem of terrorist pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); moreover, the two committees do not necessarily share philosophies or strategies in pursuit of a common goal.138 As discussed earlier, despite willing commitment from many member states, the CTC faces copious challenges which make countries that neglect their obligations that much more of a problem. So far, the CTC does not keep track of states that have not met their obligations; if they did, the Council would presumably have to punish them. A panel of the Secretary-General recommended that a schedule of sanctions be prepared for states that are able but unwilling to meet their obligations. At the same time, because of the necessary cooperation implicit in a global counter-terrorism strategy, some suggest that incentives, not punishments, are appropriate measures to deal with non-compliant states.139 For example, development programs and assistance can be offered as encouragement for cooperation with the CTC.140 A lack of enforcement measures is also dangerous because it leaves a member state’s level of compliance open to interpretation by other member states. In other words, if the Security Council refuses to arbitrate whether a state has met is obligations, other states might take that opportunity to judge for themselves, and perhaps pursue the appropriate punishments for perceived non-compliance.141 It is therefore in the hands of the Security Council and the CTC to see that their requirements of UN member states are duly met. Finally, the work of the CTC – and especially the provisions of Resolution 1373 – have been criticized as overstepping the bounds of the UN. By imposing such broad and vast demands on all member states, the Security

Council was perceived by some to have acted not as an international forum but as a legislative body.142 Especially by having circumvented the traditional legal process of the UN – by which the General Assembly typically produces treaties, conventions, and other legally-binding instruments – the Security Council asserted more authority over its member states than ever before.143

Past UN Actions The only major past reform of the CTC system was in 2004, in the passage of Resolution 1535, discussed at length above.

The CTC is a relatively young organization, so in the sometimes slow-moving UN, the Committee has had little opportunity to undergo major reforms. There is no lack of scholarly commentary on the CTC’s performance, however, so in spite of a lack of past action on this issue, there is great potential for work in the Security Council on the modification and improvement of the CTC.

Proposed Solutions There is a broad consensus that in order to maximize the potential of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, changes must be made to its strategy, capabilities, and practices. What is not easily agreed upon is the nature of these changes. On the one hand, some

might advocate for the deletion of the CTC – either in favor of another global organization, or in deference to independent national and regional counter-terrorism efforts. If the CTC continues to exist, as it most likely will, it could be endowed with greater powers or resources than it currently has; it could also be scaled back to play a less ambitious part based on its level of success in recent years.

GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM ORGANIZATION Some scholars have proposed the creation of a global counter-terrorism organization to assume the vast responsibilities that have been taken up by – yet arguably exceed the capacity of – the CTC. Such an organization could take a number of forms, including as a UN program or as an independent, treaty-based organization.144 This would relieve the Security Council of the work that it arguably lacks the resources to properly conduct, and would allow a full-time organization to devote itself to counter-terrorism work.

Mike Smith is the current Executive Director of the CTC’s administrative branch - the CTED. Source: http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/images/msbkm1.jpg

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TRUST FUND The idea of a trust fund has been proposed in several different forms. Primarily, it has been proposed either as a conventional monetary trust fund, or as a “technical assistance fund”. The latter trust fund would be used to share support and expertise, including from smaller donors that possess some, but not all, of the technical resources needed by other countries. The fund has been suggested in coordination with the UN Development Programme (UNDP), as well as with the World Bank. A panel of the Secretary-General has also endorsed this idea.145

SANCTIONS SCHEDULEAs previously mentioned, one way to try to achieve universal compliance would be to create a sanctions schedule that would apply universally to any country that deliberately failed to fulfill its obligations. This would likely follow a similar model to other sanctions regimes, though the Council would have to take caution not to undermine by way of sanctions the very counter-terrorism capabilities they hope to strengthen. In the past, sanctions have only been applied to state sponsors of terrorism, but it can be argued that negligence and passivity in the face of the global threat of terrorism has the same effect as actively promoting it.

Questions A Resolution Must Answer• Does the CTC remain the most effective framework

for global counter-terrorism efforts? What system, if any, would be more effective?

• To what extent is it the responsibility of a government to regulate non-state actors within their borders?

• What changes should be made to the CTC to make it more efficient and effective?

• How should the CTC respond to states that fail to comply with their legal obligations?

• Does the CTC/CTED require more resources to conduct its work to the best of its ability? Should these resources be allotted?

• At what point, if any, should the Security Council consider a definition of terrorism?

• Is there a way in which remedies for the root causes of terrorism can be incorporated into the CTC’s work? Is it within the CTC’s mandate to address these issues? Should it be?

• Are the UN’s various departments dealing with counter-terrorism inefficiently organized? Is the duplication of efforts harmful or undesirable? If so, how should counter-terrorism responsibilities be better distributed or better defined?

• Has the CTC made a significant difference in global counter-terrorism efforts?

Bloc Positions United States, United Kingdom: These countries have taken the harshest stances against international terrorism. Both in their unilateral policies and their efforts in the international arena, they have pressed for the highest standards of security and the greatest efforts by others against terrorist activity in their borders. Within their own borders, they have taken strong anti-terrorism measures, the legality of which has, at times, been questioned, both under national constitutions and international law.

Belgium, Italy, Croatia, France: These countries, members (and in Croatia’s case, candidate country) of the European Union, are generally united in their counter-terrorism policy. Europe has experienced acts of terrorism before, though these countries have not in recent years been hit. Rather, their efforts focus on a cooperative approach involving the sharing of information and resources. The ease of travel between countries in the European Union has caused some concern, and so a number of continent-wide crime-fighting measures have been put in place in recent years.

South Africa, Costa Rica, Panama, Burkina Faso: These countries are relatively safe from the plight of terrorism. Though they do, in some cases, face their own separate national security challenges, both terrorist

International terrorism has not only plagued the US and Western Europe. Mourning relatives of the Oberoi Trident hotel’s manager who died during the November 2008 at-tacks on Mumbai, India Source: www.reuters.com

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organizations and acts of terrorism have been largely absent from their territories. They are largely supportive of internationally-orchestrated counterterrorism efforts, though these countries in particular may lack the means to adhere to the highest standards of the international community.

Indonesia, Libya, Vietnam, China, Russia: These countries have a wide range of experiences with terrorism – from Libya, which has been accused of sponsoring it, to Indonesia and China, which have been victims – but they share the common thread of taking a conservative approach to fighting it. These countries would rather work independently to control the situations within their own borders than subscribe to an international framework, especially when the latter would appear to imply collaboration or dependence on the untrustworthy West.

Suggestions for Further Research • The Counter-Terrorism Committee from the Security Council (http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/) • Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change from the Secretary-General (http://www.un.org/secureworld/)• Terrorism from the Council on Foreign Relations (http://www.cfr.org/issue/135/)• UN Action to Counter Terrorism from the UN (http://www.un.org/terrorism/)• Al Qaeda/Taliban Sanctions Committee from the Security Council (http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/index.shtml)

POSITION PAPERS Position papers are required at WorldMUN because they are helpful for countless reasons. They are helpful to you, because they will motivate you to do important research about your country’s position on these topics, and to think and write as the representative of your country. They are helpful to us because we can see what sort of ideas might be brought to the table, even before the conference has started. They also give us a sense of the level of preparation to expect from you. Hopefully, as you go about your research, you will begin thinking of ideas that you would like to propose and discuss at the conference. Your position papers should have the following format. Each position paper should have a heading that lists the Delegate’s Name, Country Represented, School, and Topic being covered. Each position paper should be no longer than one single-spaced page, and you should write one position paper for each of our two topics. I do not

feel strongly about the internal structure of your position paper; those of you experienced at writing them may have a preferred format. However, if you are unfamiliar with writing position papers, or if you would simply like a suggestion, I recommend this arrangement: A.) History of the problem as it relates to your country and past actions your country has taken to address it. If your country does not have any specific experience with the topic, feel free to discuss past experiences that you think are similar or relevant, and might inform your country’s policy on the topic at hand. B.) Solutions your country proposes to solve this problem. Again, consider not just the topic itself, but similar cases that might be closer to home to help flesh out your country’s policies. C.) Anticipated challenges to your proposals, both logistically and by other countries. In other words, please discuss any weaknesses you see in your country’s position, and try to surmise what alternatives other countries might bring to the table. This does not mean that you need to research any other country’s position; I simply would like you to begin to think about how you will defend your country’s proposals, so use what you know about other countries on the committee to imagine what they might say to your ideas. Thanks in advance for taking the time to write your position papers. From my experience as a delegate, I know writing position papers is not always fun, so I hope this will be as quick and painless as possible for you. Remember to keep them short and to the point!

CLOSING REMARKS Congratulations on finishing the study guide! I hope it was enlightening to read and got you thinking about how your country might respond to some of the problems presented here. Our topics are not designed to be easy, but should produce some very exciting debate. The security that is taken for granted in many developed countries is not present everywhere in the world. The threat of international terrorism and – even worse, nuclear war – is a serious concern for many countries, and in the age of ever greater globalization, could potentially affect all of us. The Security Council, specifically intended to address matters of peace and security, is the only body capable of taking some of the necessary steps to address the challenges described here. I hope this guide will prove to be a useful jumping off point for your research. At WorldMUN, and especially on the Security Council, we hope delegates will arrive at the conference not with just a vague understanding of the topics, but prepared to fully engage each other in a weeklong debate

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about these issues from the standpoint of your country. The WorldMUN Security Council is guaranteed to be both exhilarating and a lot of fun. I hope you are as excited as I am. We strongly encourage you to do further research in preparation for conference. Use the internet and your school’s library resources to explore these issues in greater depth, and especially to familiarize yourself with the specific views of the country you will be representing. If, during the course of your research and conference preparations, you come across any difficult questions, if there is something in the guide you do not understand, or if you would simply like to introduce yourself, feel free to get in touch with me. Having been a delegate at Model UN before, I know what it is like to try to make sense of complex topics involving slightly esoteric concepts in international relations. If I can help you prepare for this committee in any way, do not hesitate to let me know. I am confident that we will enjoy our time together in March. Best of luck until then!

ENDNOTESTopic A1 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7566804.stm2 Ansari, Iran under Ahmedinejad 493 Allison 34 Allison 35 Allison 36 http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/7 Bahgat 1658 Bahgat 1669 Allison 510 CIA World Factbook11 de Carmoy 2812 CIA World Factbook13 de Carmoy 2814 de Carmoy 2815 de Carmoy 2816 de Carmoy 2817 de Carmoy 2818 CIA World Factbook19 Afrasiabi, Iran Needs Nuclear Power 1920 Bahgat 2121 Afrasiabi, Iran Needs Nuclear Power 1922 Ansari, Modern Iran 33523 Ansari, Modern Iran 33624 Ansari, Iran under Ahmadinejad 4625 Afrasiabi, Iran Needs Nuclear Power 1926 Afrasiabi, Nuclear Modernity And Identity In Iran2327 Chubin 45

28 Chubin 4529 Chubin 4630 Chubin 4731 http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/ukfs_news/hi/new-sid_7560000/newsid_7567600/7567639.stm32 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7499601.stm33 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7499601.stm34 Mafinezam, 3935 Chubin 4736 Afrasiabi, Iran’s Nuclear Populism 537 Afrasiabi, Iran’s Nuclear Populism 638 Chubin 69

39 Chubin 7140 Ansari 4841 http://www.neis.org/literature/Brochures/weapcon.htm42http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/intro.html43http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5278806.stm44http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/intro.html45 http://fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm46 Bunn, Safety, Security, and Safeguards47 http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Bunn_Nu-cEnergy_PreventTerrorism.pdf48 IAEA Statute49 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/Eng-lish/S1_Safeguards.pdf50 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/Eng-lish/S1_Safeguards.pdf51http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IAEAProtoco52 http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2003/iranap20031218.html53 http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/02/06/iran.inspections/index.html54 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-48.pdf55 Goldschmidt 13156 Goldschimdt 13157 Goldschmidt 13158 Chubin 1759 White House Press Release, 29 January 200260 Lee 12261http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6032525.stm62 Resolution 169563 Resolution 171864 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/28/world/asia/28korea.html65 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/01/AR2008070102847.html

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66 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19553&prog=zgp&proj=znpp67 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19967&prog=zgp&proj=znpp68 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/reports/gov2008-4.pdf69 http://articles.latimes.com/2007/feb/25/world/fg-usiran2570 http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-15.pdf71http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7538524.stm72 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/257/81/PDF/N0825781.pdf73 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/281/40/PDF/N0728140.pdf74 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/681/42/PDF/N0668142.pdf75 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/450/22/PDF/N0645022.pdf76 http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/ukfs_news/hi/new-sid_7480000/newsid_7486900/7486971.stm77 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/magazine/10wwln-lede2-t.html78 http://www.khaleejtimes.com/darticlen.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2008/August/middleeast_Au-gust549.xml&section=middleeast&col=79 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N08/380/21/PDF/N0838021.pdf?OpenElement80 http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1002762.html81 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/03/world/middleeast/03iran.html

Topic B82 Hamilton viii 83 Millar and Rosand, 284 Cortright et al, 2585 Cortright et al, 4486 Cortright et al, 2787 Stanley Foundation 4688 McNamara 8589 Oudraat 15290 Oudraat 15491 http://www.mir.es/DGRIS/Terrorismo_de_ETA/ultimas_victimas/p12b-esp.htm92 Bures and Ahern 18893 Bures and Ahern 19094 Millar and Rosand 1095 Cortright et al, 2796 Oudraat 154

97 Oudraat 15498 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/011/07/IMG/NR001107.pdf99 Oudraat 155100 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/107/86/PDF/N9610786.pdf101 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/214/20/PDF/N9621420.pdf102 Oudraat 156103 Oudraat 156104 Oudraat 157105 Oudraat 157106 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9803E4DD143BF93AA3575AC0A9659C8B63107 http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/usa-release-or-fair-trials-all-remaining-guantánamo-detainees-20080502108 http://news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/terrorism/sjres23.es.html109 http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/September/20060911141954bcreklaw0.9791071.html110 Cortright et al, 23111 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf112 Cortright et al, 23113 Oudraat 162114 Cortright et al, 26115 Millar and Rosand 17116 Millar and Rosand 17117 Millar and Rosand 12 (table)118 Cortright et al, 32119 Cortright et al, 42120 Oudraat 158121 http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/page5.html122 Millar and Rosand 17123 Millar and Rosand 17124 Cortright et al 25125 Millar and Rosand 17126 Peterson 190127 Cortright et al 35128 Cortright et al, 34129 Cortright et al, 35130 Cortright et al, 23131 Cortright et al, 27132 Stanley Foundation 48133 Stanley Foundation 48134 Cortright et al 32135 Cortright et al 41136 Millar and Rosand 13 (table)137 Millar and Rosand 27

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BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

Topic AAfrasiabi, Kaveh L., and Mostafa Kibaroglu. “Iran’s Nuclear

Populism.” Brown’s Journal of World Affairs (Fall 2005).

Afrasiabi, Kaveh L., Mohammad Sahimi, and Pirouz Mojta-hed-Zadeh. “Iran Needs Nuclear Power.” Interna-tional Herald Tribune 14 Oct. 2003.

Afrasiabi, Kaveh L. “Nuclear Modernity And Identity In Iran.” Asia Times 25 Aug. 2005.

Allison, Graham. “Global Challenges of Nuclear Prolifera-tion.” Nuclear Proliferation : Risk and Responsibil-ity. By Graham T. Allison, Herve De Carmoy and Therese Delpech. Brussels: Trilateral Commission, 2007. 1-25.

“America’s Israeli option on Iran.” BBC News. 28 Aug. 2008. 30 Aug. 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/ukfs_news/hi/newsid_7480000/news-id_7486900/7486971.stm>.

Ansari, Ali. Iran under Ahmadinejad : The Politics of Con-frontation. New York: Routledge, 2008.

Ansari, Ali M. Modern Iran : The Pahlavis and After. New York: Longman, 2007.

Bahgat, Gawdat. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East. New York: University P of Florida, 2007.

Bunn, Matthew. “Expanding Nuclear Energy, Preventing Nu-clear Terrorism.” Energy & Security Search Seminar. Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, MA. 13 Mar. 2008. Belfer Center of Science and Interna-tional Affairs. 30 Aug. 2008 <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bunn_nucenergy_preventterror-ism.pdf>.

Bunn, Matthew. “Safety, Security, and Safeguards: Enabling Nuclear Energy Growth.” Global Nuclear Future Workshop. Kennedy School of Government, Cam-bridge, MA. 5 May 2008. Belfer Center of Science and International Affairs. 30 Aug. 2008 <http://

belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bunn_safety_secu-rity_safeguards_08.pdf>.

Choe, Sang-Hun. “North Korea Destroys Tower at Nuclear Site.” 28 June 2008. The New York Times. 23 August 2008. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/28/world/asia/28korea.html>.

Chubin, Shahram. Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.

Chung, Min Lee. “East Asia and Weapons of Mass Destruc-tion in North Korea: Strategic Drivers, Future Paths, and Nonproliferation Dynamics.” Nuclear Prolifera-tion : Risk and Responsibility. By Graham T. Allison, Herve De Carmoy and Therese Delpech. Brussels: Trilateral Commission, 2007.

De Carmoy, Hervé. “Iran Case Study: Is There a “Plan B” for Iran.” Nuclear Proliferation : Risk and Responsibil-ity. By Graham T. Allison, Herve De Carmoy and Therese Delpech. Brussels: Trilateral Commission, 2007.

Feldman, Noah. “Buildup to the Next War.” 8 Aug. 2008. The New York Times. 30 August 2008. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/10/magazine/10wwln-lede2-t.html>.

Goldschmidt, Pierre. “Challenge of Deterring Nuclear Prolif-eration.” Nuclear Proliferation : Risk and Responsi-bility. By Graham T. Allison, Herve De Carmoy and Therese Delpech. Brussels: Trilateral Commission, 2007.

IAEA Safeguards: Stemming the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. Vienna: IAEA Information Series, 2001.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Rep.No. GOV/2008/4. Board of Gover-nors, International Atomic Energy Agency. 2008.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Rep.No. GOV/2008/15. Board of Governors, International Atomic Energy Agency. 2008.

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Rep.No. GOV/2007/48. Board of Governors, International Atomic Energy Agency. 2007.

“Introduction to Nuclear Power.” Energy Information Ad-ministration. Department of Energy. 23 Aug. 2008 <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/intro.html>.

“Iran launches satellite carrier.” BBC News. 17 Aug. 2008. 23

138 Millar and Rosand 28139 Cortright et al 33140 Cortright et al 46141 Oudraat 163142 Cortright et al 28143 Millar and Rosand 15144 Millar and Rosand 55145 Cortright et al, 36

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Aug. 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7566804.stm>.

“Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards.” 18 Dec. 2003. International Atomic Energy Agency. 23 Aug. 2008 <http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2003/iranap20031218.html>.

“Iran tells IAEA to remove cameras.” CNN.com. 7 Feb. 2006. 23 Aug. 2008 <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/world/meast/02/06/iran.inspections/index.html>.

“Iran.” The World Factbook. 21 Aug. 2008. Central Intel-ligence Agency. 23 Aug. 2008 <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html>.

“Iran’s arsenal of missiles.” BBC News. 10 July 2008. 23 Aug. 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7499601.stm>.

“Iran warns any attack would start ‘world war’” Khaleej Times / AFP. 30 Aug. 2008. 30 Aug. 2008 <http://www.khaleejtimes.com/darticlen.asp?xfile=data/middleeast/2008/august/middleeast_august549.xml&section=middleeast&col=>.

“Israel warns on Iran nuclear aims.” BBC News. 2 Aug. 2008. 30 Aug. 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7538524.stm>.

Kessler, Glenn. “Message to U.S. Preceded Nuclear Declara-tion by North Korea.” 2 July 2008. The Washington Post. 30 August 2008. <http://www.washington-post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/01/AR2008070102847.html>.

Mafinezam, Alidad, and Aria Mehrabi. Iran and Its Place among Nations. New York: Praeger, 2007.

Meeting Record 5909. United Nations Security Council. New York, 13 June 2008.

Murphy, Kim, and Bob Drogin. “U.N. Calls U.S. Data on Iran’s Nuclear Aims Unreliable.” 25 Feb. 2007. Los Angeles Times. 30 August 2008. <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/feb/25/world/fg-usiran25>.

“No Answer from Iran on Day of Informal Nuclear Dead-line.” 3 Aug. 2008. The New York Times. 30 Aug. 2008 <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/03/world/middleeast/03iran.html>.

“North Korea claims nuclear test.” 9 Oct. 2006. BBC News. 23 Aug. 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6032525.stm>.

“Nuclear envoy begins Iran talks.” BBC News. 18 Aug. 2008. 23 Aug. 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/ukfs_news/hi/newsid_7560000/news-id_7567600/7567639.stm>.

“Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons.” 31 Aug. 2004. Nuclear Energy Information Service. 23 Aug. 2008

<http://www.neis.org/literature/brochures/weap-con.htm>.

“Nuclear Weapon Design.” 21 Oct. 1998. Federation of American Scientists. 23 Aug. 2008 <http://fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm>.

Office of the Press Secretary. “President Delivers State of the Union Address.” Press release. 29 Jan. 2002. The White House. 23 Aug. 2008 <http://www.white-house.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>.

“The 1997 IAEA Additional Protocol At a Glance.” Jan. 2008. Arms Control Association. 23 Aug. 2008 <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/iaeapro-toco>.

“Q&A: Uranium Enrichment.” BBC News. 1 Sept. 2006. 23 Aug. 2008 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/5278806.stm>.

Ravin, Barak. “U.S. to station diplomats in Iran for first time since 1979.” 17 July 2008. Haaretz. 30 Aug. 2008 <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1002762.html>.

Resolution 1695. United Nations Security Council. 15 July 2006.Resolution 1696. United Nations Security Council. 31 July 2006.Resolution 1718. United Nations Security Council. 14 Octo-ber 2006.Resolution 1737. United Nations Security Council. 27 De-cember 2006.Resolution 1747. United Nations Security Council. 24 March 2007.Resolution 1803. United Nations Security Council. 3 March 2008.Squassoni, Sharon. “Iran’s Plan for Nuclear Compliance.” 6

Sept. 2007. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 30 Aug. 2008 <http://www.carnegieendow-ment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19553&prog=zgp&proj=znpp>.

Squassoni, Sharon. “Take Two: Iran’s Plan for Nuclear Compliance.” 5 Mar. 2008. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 30 Sept. 2008 <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19967&prog=zgp&proj=znpp>.

“Statute of the IAEA.” International Atomic Energy Agency. 23 Aug. 2008 <http://www.iaea.org/about/stat-ute_text.html>.

“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.” 2002. UN Department for Disarmament Affairs. 23 Aug. 2008 <http://www.un.org/depts/dda/wmd/treaty/>.

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Topic BAmnesty International. “USA: RELEASE OR FAIR TRI-

ALS FOR ALL REMAINING GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES.” Press release. 2 May 2008. Am-nesty International. 30 Sept. 2008 <http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/usa-re-lease-or-fair-trials-all-remaining-guantánamo-detain-ees-20080502>.

Bures, Oldrich, and Stephanie Ahern. “The European Model of Building Regional Cooperation Against Terror-ism.” Uniting Against Terror : Cooperative Nonmili-tary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat. Ed. David Cortright and George A. Lopez. New York: MIT P, 2007.

Cortright, David, George A. Lopez, Alistair Millar, and Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf. “Global Cooperation Against Terrorism: Evaluating the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee.” Uniting Against Terror : Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat. Ed. David Cortright and George A. Lopez. New York: MIT P, 2007.

“Counter-Terrorism Committee.” Counter-Terrorism Com-mittee. 2008. United Nations. 30 Sept. 2008 <http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/page5.html>.

De Jonge Oudraat, Chantal. “The Role of the Security Coun-cil.” Terrorism and the UN : Before and after Sep-tember 11. By Thomas G. Weiss. Ed. Jane Boulden. New York: Indiana UP, 2004.

Hamilton, Lee H. “Foreward.” Uniting Against Terror : Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat. Ed. David Cortright and George A. Lopez. New York: MIT P, 2007.

Johnston, David. “TWO YEARS LATER: 9/11 TACTICS; Official Says Qaeda Recruited Saudi Hijackers to Strain Ties.” The New York Times 9 Sept. 2003.

McNamara, Thomas E. “Unilateral and Multilateral Strategies Against State Sponsors of Terror.” Uniting Against Terror : Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat. Ed. David Cortright and George A. Lopez. New York: MIT P, 2007.

Millar, Alistair, and Eric Rosand. Allied Against Terrorism. Rep.No. Century Foundation. New York, NY: Cen-tury Foundation P, 2006.

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2004.S. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).The Stanley Foundation. Capturing the 21st Century Security

Agenda. Rep.No. The Stanley Foundation. The Stan-ley Foundation, 2004.

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APPENDICES

Appendix Collection (Topic A)

1) Iran’s Plan For Nuclear Compliance (See Next Page) 2) Iran’s IAEA safeguards agreement: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf 3) IAEA Document on Resolving Outstanding Issues with Iran, August 2007: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf

Appendix Collection (Topic B)

1) Resolution 1373: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf (Created the CTC – seminal document) 2) Work Programme of the CTC (7/08-12/08): http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/431/17/PDF/N0843117.pdf (Useful to get a sense of what the CTC’s up to) 3) Sample Country Reports, pursuant to Res 1373: Kenya: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N04/266/85/IMG/N0426685.pdf Spain: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N04/415/14/PDF/N0441514.pdf UAE: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N05/509/20/PDF/N0550920.pdf NB: these are good examples to compare levels of compliance and responsiveness; however, these are each very long, so they don’t need to be included in the guide itself, but maybe could be added as extra links on the web-site.

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Appendix 1 (Topic A) - Iran’s Plan For Nuclear Compliance