World Focus February 2016xaam.in.pdf

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WORLD

FOCUS INDOCENTRIC FOREIGN AFFAIRS MONTHLY JOURNAL

Volume XXXVII Number 02 February 2016

WORLD FOCUS takes up every month one

ternational issue and gives an analysis of its various

pects by persons well known for their

ecialisation in the subject. The issues covered are

pical or near topical, but of an abiding interest.

he analysis is simple enough to interest even an

itiate to world affairs, but without sacrificing depth.

he aim is to present an Indocentric view on a

articular issue currently facing the world.

pinions expressed in the articles are personal views

f the author and in no way reflect the opinion of

World Focus. The author is solely responsible for e contents in his/ her article and the World Focus

kes no responsibility in this regard.

he Contents of this magazine cannot be reproduced

any form with out prior permission from World

ocus. Any legal issues pertaining to World Focus

ill be settled in NCT region of Delhi only.

nsolicited articles will not be returned or

knowledged. World Focus reserves the right to

dit articles for brevity and clarity before publication.

dited, Owned, Published and Printed byKishore Babu from B-49 (Ground Floor), Joshi Colony, I.P.

xtension, Delhi-110092 at Meenakshi Press, 4857/24, First

oor, Ansari Road, Dariyaganj, New Delhi - 110002

tal no. of pages 140, including Covers

opy Right : World Focus

ur Address:

orld Focus

-49, (Ground Floor) Joshi Colony,

P Extension

elhi - 110092, India el. / Fax : 22246905, Mobile No. 8130754555mail: cnfworldfocus@gmail com

This issue on Terrorism and Geopolitics presents some uni

cases and challenges. It shows us that terrorism has been o

resorted to in the contemporary world and the nation states

finding it as a menace that is spiraling out of bounds. While

method of terrorizing innocent citizens anywhere in this wor

deplorable, the frequency with which the attacks are taking p

presents all the more challenges. Dealing with it has been onminds of all the policy makers and extra efforts are being

forward to handle the situation when the terror strikes occu

While terrorism itself is quite appalling, carrying it in the nam

God and religion is one of the most absurd things that is happen

around the world. We all have been taught since our childh

that peace brings happiness and multiple advantages. It prom

universal brotherhood, harmony, goodwill and faith, thus mak

it one of the most required and most sought after virtu

Therefore, attacks on humanity, especially in the name of Gand religion, seem not only illogical but also unwarranted. Th

is a good old adage: life is an echo, give the best and the b

gets back to you. Similarly, love begets love, peace begets pe

and hate begets hate.

The region of West Asia has been under a constant turm

Differences of all sorts exist in this region. At the same time

region offers profound opportunities and gains; it is oil rich

shares its resources with the world and is one of the most sou

after regions for forging meaningful relations. It is to be nothat it has been battered with internal differences between

members and have become prone to extra-regional interferen

Syria and Iraq present a grim picture of horrific incidents

have been against humanity.

It is the time the world unites against the unwanted elem

that terrorise people and try to bring governments under t

control through dreadful means. There is need for be

coordination amongst members so that these dreadful incid

do not proliferate and harm people further. The resultant eff

of the disturbances in this area stunt not only their democr

growth but also hurt their economic well-being and culture.

in the best interest of the region and the world if it rema

peaceful and progressive.As the world is moving ahead, w

we need is not violence. All we need is peace and its perman

existence. The geopolitics of the West Asian region poses m

challenges. It is for the world to make a united forum and add

this menace and settle it once and for all. Religion should

used to bring peace, not war and violence.

G . Kishore BabuEditor

Bhabani DikshitManaging Editor

Stuti S. MandalaAssociate Editor

EDITORIAL


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Terrorism & Geopolitics

Violence and Terrorism in West Asia: Implications for India’s Security

rof. A.K. Pasha.....................................................................................................................5

Central Asia: Problems and Struggle to Escape Being ISIS Target

rof. R.G.Gidadhubli...............................................................................................................11Terrorism and Geopolitics in West Asia

Anil Kamboj, Inspector General (Retd).....................................................................................17

Navigating Terrorism Labyrinth

rof. Snehalata Panda............................................................................................................24

Terrorism and International Order

rof. Manas Chakrabarty.......................................................................................................30

SIS: The Geopolitics of Terrorism

rof. Rajesh Dogra................................................................................................................35

Recent Indo-Pak Engagement on Terror and the Pathankot Attack :mplications for India

Dr. Sabita Harichandan..........................................................................................................43

Changing Geo-Politics of Central Asia: It’s Susceptibility to Terrorism

Dr. Alok Kumar Gupta...........................................................................................................51

Understanding International Terrorism: Geopolitics and Beyond

Dr. Arunoday Bajpai..............................................................................................................60

Understanding Terrorism and Geopolitics in West Asia

Dr. Sudhanshu Tripathi..........................................................................................................66

The Rise of Islamic State and Evolving US StrategyDr. Monish Tourangbam and Aersh Danish..............................................................................73

Geography, Politics and Terror at Play: Case of Northeast India

Dona Ganguly........................................................................................................................79

Pathankot Airbase Attack and India’s Fight Against Terrorism

Dr. Deepak Yadav..................................................................................................................85

ndo-US Cooperation on Countering Terrorism: Zero – Tolerance

Dr. Sanghamitra Patnaik .........................................................................................................90

Geopolitics of Counter-Terrorism in Afghanistan: SCO’s Strategy is in QuestionDr. Bawa Singh......................................................................................................................97

Reflecting on the Dynamic Geopolitics of Northeast India:

A Contemporary Perspective

Bipasha Lakra......................................................................................................................104

Analysis of the Growing Strategic Threat of ISIS Rebellion in Iraq and Syria

Dr. Chanchal Kumar .............................................................................................................110

Misconception of Islamic Terrorism in the World: A Case of Da’esh

Dr. Saleem Ahmad ................................................................................................................117

Nuclear Terrorism in the Indian Subcontinentouradeep Sen...................................................................................................................123

i O i C i C i A i i

Contents


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Violence and Terrorism in West As

Implications for India’s SecurProf. A. K. Pa

In contemporary West Asia, terrorism

ormally brings to our attention the mindless violence

ommitted by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS]

nd elsewhere in the region and beyond. In addition

omb blasts in Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,

Yemen, Libya, Turkey, and growing violence in Syria

nd Lebanon remind us of indiscriminate terrorism.

Many have condemned terrorist attacks on US and

rench marines in Lebanon in the early 1980’s when

eace keeping forces from these and other countries

were stationed in and around Beirut soon after theraeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982. Lebanese

resident Basher Jamayil and Lebanese Minister

lias Hobeika and others were killed in 1980’s as

so Rafik Harriri former Lebanese Prime Minister

nd many Lebanese journalists and leaders. Other

mportant leaders in West Asia like UN

epresentative Count Bernadette, King Abdullah of

ordan, King Feisal of Saudi Arabia, Anwar Sadat of

gypt and Yitzhak Rabin of Israel have also beenictims of terrorist violence. Many such violent

ttacks targeting prominent people and large number

f innocent civilians can be cited as evidence for

revalence of terrorism in West Asia.

In the context of contemporary West Asia,

ne has to honestly address the legitimate anger and

enuine political despair which provide fertile ground

or terrorists to exploit. US approach to West Asia

specially due to US support to Israel which has beenonsistently rejecting UN Resolutions on the issue of

withdrawal from occupied Arab lands and expecting

ull compliance/strict implementation of UN resolution

y Iraq, Libya, Iran, Sudan and other Arab/Islamic

ates as also threat of unilateral military action for

ny defiance. It should also be noted that “the ability

f the US to persuade peoples and governments in

West Asia to effectively reject terrorism has been

gnificantly undermined”.

To throw more light on thissue one has to look at the recent past history of the

egion and recall that the West perceived Arab

1950’s and 1960’s “as the primary destabili

political force in the region (West Asia) and vie

Islamic groups, especially those supported by frie

governments as more desirable and more stabilizi

Israel viewed PLO as a threat to its security

encouraged Islamic groups in Gaza and West B

which led to the emergence of Hamas and Isla

Jihad, which have used violence on a bigger s

compared to the PLO. Many in West Asia, how

see the operations of Hamas, Hezbollah and Isla

Jihad not as terrorism but as acts of national liberaThe aim of the Palestinian groups is viewe

legitimate i.e. liberation from Israeli occupat

especially from the clutches of an enemy which

vast military capability. Thus, suicide bombi

terrorism is seen as a powerful weapon of the w

desperate, and helpless facing a far stronger

vicious enemy.

The suicide bombings as a method of poli

violence did not materialize at the push of a bu

It took several years before it was put to freq

use. Its genesis can be traced to the failure to

the Israeli military to redeploy its military fo

stationed in Palestinian territories – a key failur

the 1993 Oslo Accords. The Palestinian Author

(PA) failure to secure the redeployment an

guarantee Israel’s security demands led to poli

factions opposed to negotiations and disposed tow

suicide bombings gaining popularity. Under artiof the Oslo accords, the PA was allowed to estab

“a strong police force”, while Israel would cont

to carry “the responsibility for overall securit

Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their inte

security and public order”. Although the sharin

security responsibilities between Israel and the

was working well with minor problems until A

Sharon of the Likud Party became Israeli Pr

Minister in February 2001, but faced with moun problems even the US (CIA) intervention coul

make the mechanism work The creation of


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with a mandate in Palestinian populated area (Areas

A) of the West Bank has been irrevocably

ndermined. Similarly, the territorial division of the

West Bank that resulted from the Oslo process – the

reation of Areas A, B and C – is no longer relevant

o the reality in the West Bank and Gaza. Thus, there

only one area and that area is controlled by the

DF without Palestinian intermediaries. The Sharon/

etanyahu governments determined that Yasser Arafat and the structures he represented – PLO and

he PA - are no longer diplomatic or security partners.

Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas failed to play the role

utlined for them, and so they are no longer

relevant”. As Haaretz reported on April 14, 2002,

he logic of Sharon’s plan was this : a military defeat

would convince the Palestinians and the international

ommunity to leave these security zones, including

major population centers, under effective Israeli

ontrol for many years.”

The establishment and expansion of Jewish

ettlements led to widespread violence against the

ettlers. Since the Oslo accords, successive Israeli

overnments continued to build new Jewish

ettlements and expand existing ones where the

umber of Jewish settlers doubled since 1993. The

0 largest settlements in West Bank and Gaza in 2002

ad 138,660 settlers. Also the 20 smallest settlementsn 2002 had 2,261 settlers. By 1993 there were

2,750 housing units in the Jewish settlements

ompleted since 1967 when Israel captured these

alestinians lands from Egypt and Jordan. Since the

slo accords, according to one study 20,371 new

ousing units have been constructed representing a

2% increase in eight years from what had been built

ver roughly a quarter century. About 10 lakh ie one

million Israeli settlers now live in some 300 settlementshat dot the occupied Palestinian lands and are linked

o one another by means of 450 kms of highway and

bypass” roads which also serve to isolate Palestinian

opulation centers from one another turning them

nto Bantustan- like little islands. The rapidly

ncreasing Jewish settler colonies strengthened the

olitical power of those Palestinians who rejected the

slo Accords. Israel expected full cooperation from

A irrespective of their colonial/expansionist policies

nd what effect these negative policies were havingn popular Palestinian support for PA. Whereas the

enormous time to resolve the thorny Palestinian-Is

dispute, the new Bush administration since 2

adopted a ‘hands-off’ approach and wanted both

parties to resolve their problems bilaterally. But t

was a crucial difference. Whereas Clinton w

talk to Yasser Arafat and other Palestinian lead

along with the Israeli leaders, George W Bush ign

Arafat and built up close ties with Israeli Pr

Minister Ariel Sharon. The Bush administraappeared to side with Sharon who argued that Is

would not talk to the PA until there is a “comp

cessation of violence”. The September 11, 2

attacks on World Trade Center and the Penta

gave Israeli leaders a unique chance to win

support for their war against the Palestinians. Sh

was hopeful that he would make Israel a partner

the US in the war against international terrorism

The US administration very quickly real

that Israeli PM Sharon tried to take advantage o

9/11 events to push forward his own agenda aga

the Palestinians. Colin Powell made it clear

“Israel will not be part of any anti- terror mili

action” against Afghanistan or elsewhere. The

administration realized the significance of Arab sup

in its war against terrorism. To win over the A

Islamic world and the Palestinians US President B

called for the establishment of a Palestinians with East Jerusalem as its capital in September 2

More and more Israeli leaders began to fear tha

US is getting closer with the Arab states and

Palestinians in the anti-terror war with Israel b

seen as a burden or ignored. This led to strain in

Israeli ties and ultimately Sharon had to express re

for provoking this public row.

Whereas Bush invoked international juto justify the war in Afghanistan but the same stan

of justice to the Palestinians was not applied. E

though Yasser Arafat was the first Arab leade

denounce the September 11 attacks but when A

faced Israeli attacks the US squarely blamed the P

leader for his predicament as “largely of his

making” and openly ignored/sidelined him and ca

for the election of new Palestinian leadership.

result its Arab/Muslim allies in West Asia find t

ability to delegitimize terrorism undermined. Ahave seen earlier, soon after the 9/11 events the


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he Al Qaeda net work with its attack on Afghanistan.

Although Al Qaeda appears to have been disrupted

s its members were either killed, imprisoned or they

ed to safer places, but terrorists means have

ncreasingly become legitimate and popular in the

erceptions of most people in West Asia. It is

nteresting to note that those carrying out terrorist

cts in West Asia and elsewhere (not just Al Qaeda)

re claiming to do it in the name of Islam. If seenbjectively Islam is not central to the terror issue,

though one cannot say that religion plays no role.

ome groups in the West Asian region may be

angerous not because of their Islamic character but

ue to their violent methods and intolerant ends. The

ctions of a few (misguided) radical Muslims should

ot be seen as a general phenomenon flowing from

lamic faith. It is interesting to note that Hezbollah,

amas and Islamic Jihad were treated by the US as

ocal movements fighting against occupation, and not

s part of the global terrorist networks like the Al

aeda and so not included in the list of 27 terrorist

rganizations whose assets were frozen by the US

ongress. Early resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian

sue is crucial to avoid the specter of terrorism

preading worldwide. Here it must be mentioned that

US state Department reports had identified that West

Asia was not the leading region in the number of

rrorist incidents throughout the 1990’s. It was alsoot the leading area as far as the number of attacks

gainst US targets was concerned. Five years before

he 9/11 incidents terrorism in West Asia had

gnificantly declined every year and by 2000 West

Asia had emerged as a region with the fewest terrorist

ttacks of any around the world except North

America. This global trend must be kept in mind to

ounter the futile attempt to link Islam with terrorism.

Since the secular groups could not recruit

he number of members as the Islamic groups did, no

wonder they began to emulate the suicide method.

The suicide bombing phenomenon has thus become

ecularized.” This is born out of the hopelessness

nd humiliation at the hands of Israeli and other

ppressors. Since the Islamic doctrine prohibits

uicide, the perpetrators and their sympathizers may

ave used religion to suit their ends. It must also be

ressed that suicide bombing are not confined tolamic groups in West Asia. Suicide bombings have

by the Japanese in the Second World War and by

Tamil tigers in Sri Lanka and elsewhere.

Dilip Hiro in his book War without End

the ongoing war on terrorism “is a war without e

He emphasizes the need to go to the root caus

terrorism, and argues that US threats to Iraq

established government amounts to terror. Accor

to him, “Americans always blame others, nthemselves. Whatever happens to America, it is

own fault. Americans won’t like to hear that.

war (on terrorism) will go on because of the defin

Bush has put on it. He himself is threaten

established governments:” so long as anybod

terrorizing established governments, there need

be a war”. More and more people in West Asia

believe that their governments due to the authorita

nature of the political system and also under

influence cannot do anything to relieve t

humiliation and improve their lot. Hence

emergence of more radical Islamic groups w

employ suicide bombings. Moreover the sec

groups also follow this strategy under popular sup

According to one writer, “suicide bombings take

because they free the desperate from the nee

rely on governments. Rather than being spons

by states, this form of violence challenges sta

Lack of democracy and suppression of poliopposition driver people to join groups and repres

alone cannot eliminate terrorism. “Any succe

counter terrorism strategy must thus address

the opportunities available to militants and the l

of their motivations”.

Undoubtedly movement towards democ

reforms, new innovative methods for econo

cooperation and evenhanded policies on the AIsraeli conflict and towards the WANA region

whole would go a long way to turn people away f

terrorism and violence as it will inspire hope f

better future as the region has witnessed revoluti

coups, several wars, unprecedented viole

insecurity and instability for several decades du

external interventions and internal mismanagem

despotism. Hence state terrorism and cou

terrorism have become vicious cycle with action

reaction before Israel and the Palestinians and gradually spreading to other parts of the world.


8/140

ndian interests in West Asia: For India, West

sia and North Africa in general and the Gulf region

n particular are important for a number of reasons.

irst, nearly 80 per cent of India’s oil and gas imports

ome from the region and the demand for it is growing

8-10 percent annually with domestic oil production

radually declining. India annually imports oil and

roducts to the tune of billions of dollars. Any

isruption of supplies or increase in prices due toncertain security situation in the region will/has

dversely affect Indian economy both in the short

nd long term. Secondly, nearly seven million [70

kh] Indians are gainfully employed in the Gulf region

who send over $50 billion dollars annually as

emittances. Not only this foreign exchange is

gnificant but the Indian workers safety and security

of prime importance to India. Indian labor is

rowing in GCC States. Thirdly, the region is

mportant in terms of trade especially exports (over

8 percent of India’s total) which fetch us valuable

oreign exchange [over $200 billion]. Fourthly, the

WANA region is also becoming increasingly important

or India’s food security due to large imports of

hemical fertilizers, phosphate especially from Jordan,

Morocco, Oman, Egypt and other countries of

WANA. Besides these factors investments from the

egion both official and private are significant for the

ndian economy. Also a large number of Indian public-rivate companies are engaged in lucrative joint

entures and in building various projects and their

rofits are important. Therefore, not only for the above

easons, but also security and stability in the entire

WANA region is very important for Indian interests.

It must be noted that US/Western and Israeli

olicies in the region and also growing differences

mong the regional states are creating instability and pposition groups are increasingly using violence and

error groups are growing due to US-Israeli

omination of the area through its military/naval

resence as also control of oil resources and blind

upport to Israel. In countries like Egypt, Jordan,

audi Arabia and other GCC states such policies are

ncouraging religious extremism and many people are

mbracing terrorism and groups may resort to greater

iolence/terror in future not only against the US/West/

rael but also against US friends in the area. Sinceulk of the Indians live and work in GCC states which

where US influence is predominant, hence s

Indians are likely to be influenced due to moun

extremism preached by certain groups.

The large scale purchase of arms by oil

states in the Gulf region would not only lead to pres

on India’s defense budget but also may lea

presence of foreign military advisers especially f

Pakistan in these states and probable transfeweapons to states hostile to India. According

recent US report there has been a shift of focus

terrorism form West Asia to South Asia. Altho

there has been open cooperation with Israel in

field of agriculture now there is growing tendenc

talk more openly about defense/security coopera

As part of the Make in India project, the N

government has eased restrictions on defe

manufacturers especially foreign who are willin

set up R&D and factories in India. Many Israeli f

like Aerospace Industries and Rafael are intere

in setting up manufacturing units in India. The

proposal to build Barak air missiles to be exporte

foreign countries. Israeli defense minister visite

the first time in 2015 for air show in Bangalore. T

is no doubt about Israeli technological lea

agriculture, water and cancer treatment, sp

research and defense but trade which was $

million in 1990s has increased to about $4.5 billio2014-15 as compared with over $200 billion with o

WANA states. In 2016 there is even talk about Is

PM Netanyahu and PM Modi visiting each oth

also to accelerate the FTA and push trade to

billion in future. It has also become obvious that

Israel and the Palestinians are incapable of reac

a solution to their conflict, which very often threa

peace and security in the WANA region. More

other regional problems and contentions issuesgetting interlined with this problem thereby po

greater danger of terrorism acquiring a much la

regional dimensions, and perhaps transnati

dimensions as well. Since India has come to estab

good relations with the US, UK, Russia, France, I

and other countries, it has become imperative to

an external solution to the vexed Israeli-Palesti

conflict. Any delay in the resolution of this con

has the potential to adversely affect peace, secu

and stability in the WANA region with conseqimplications for India.


9/140

Although India has had historical ties with

yria/Iraq and now vital interests in the Gulf region,

ny support to new US military adventure against

yria/Iraq would in the short run only make the US-

UK-Israel happy but in the long run have adverse

onsequences both on India’s domestic and foreign

olicies as also alienate India from the masses in the

WANA region. Our support to Egypt during the 1956

uez Crisis is still fondly recalled by Arabs all over he region. India must be with the people of the region

nd support their aspirations for greater participation

n the decision making process and the broader issue

f democratic reforms and also safeguard our vital

nterests. India must work with the secular/democratic

orces in the region as also the dominant world powers

which have vast stakes in the region to maintain

ecurity and stability so very essential to protect our

ital interests and also to prevent the spread of

iolence and terrorism from this volatile region to

ndia in future. Hence India needs to enhance its

nteraction with the countries in the WANA but Gulf

egion especially to seek greater role in cooperation

with the states vital to our interests especially to

nhance our oil security. With its abundant oil and

water and human resources and strategic location,

hese states were well on their way to becoming a

major Arab powers, much to the dislike of Israel.

ut since the last 25 years they have suffered mmensely due to war and poor leadership. In the

vent of division of Iraq, the strategic benefits to

rael-Water and Oil will further enhance its power/

nfluence in the region. This scenario apart from

tering the status quo in a fundamental way would

so increase anti-Americanism (which is already

widespread in the region) but in the absence of any

enuine democratic transformation in the Arab world,

espite US promises (in 1991 US promised democraticeforms in the region but did not deliver) to work

eriously for political reforms, political discontent and

eligious extremism may create an explosive situation

n the area as frustrated and angry people feel they

ave been let down by their own rulers. The pretense

emocracy electoral process and rubber stamp

onsultative Assemblies which now exist are no longer

ken seriously by Arab people as they have lost hope

n the ability of the present autocratic rulers to bring

bout genuine democratic change. Saudi Arabia themost conservative Arab country — a close ally of

perhaps the most vulnerable to US manipulation

the post-Iran plus P5+1 nuclear deal scenario of

2015. The US has identified Saudi Arabia as

breeding ground for religious extremism in the re

and the Saudi rulers are apprehensive that the

will keep them in focus until it undergoes b

transformation to satisfy US concerns. No wo

the Saudi rulers have now (after 9/11) taken initia

for democratic transformation in the Arab woFormer Saudi King Abdullah proposed a chart

reform the Arab condition which called for an “

to the silence that has gone on for too long” and

urged “internal reform and enhanced polit

participation (which are essential steps tow

building Arab capabilities and providing condition

comprehensive Arab revival”. If the Arab reg

are reformed, modernized and genuine poli

transformation takes places through which peop

participation in the decision making proces

guaranteed under constitutional supervision, then

regimes can avoid the incoming cataclysmic cha

and effectively marginalize the extremists relig

elements and hence terrorism. In the absenc

this, there could be an upsurge in terrorism not

in the West Asian region but also in South Asia

the West. India should actively encourage the pro

of political change and modernization because o

the Arab regimes become democratic and responto popular demands, not only their legitimacy w

be enhanced but also more significantly t

dependence on outside states especially the US

Russia would come down and this may lea

reduction in outside military and political interven

which has periodically undermined peace, secu

and stability in the region thereby adversely affec

India’s interests as well.

Genuine political reforms would give

politically oppressed people a stake in the runnin

the political system as also much needed poli

stability and smooth transition. The abundan

resources could then be used to advance econo

development so as to engage the Arab people in

process of political and economic progr

Undoubtedly for India the threat of relig

extremism and terrorism from the West Asian re

would be contained it this democratic process tshape. Along with these steps towards democ


10/140

raeli issues would also be debated, discussed, at all

orums thereby allowing Arab countries to take

nitiatives for meaningful steps along with serious US-

raeli steps (which are very essential) to tackle the

rab-Israeli dispute. Both these steps would reinforce

he momentum for change and India could then look

orward to greater peace, security and stability in West

sia in the future. It is far easier to control terrorism

nd religious extremism in liberal democratic politicalystems which have high level of legitimacy and strong

omestic control than the present political set up where

he rulers want to remain in total control of all state

ffairs. The long overdue change has now become

inevitable but if it is not coming soon internal/ regi

terrorism may be directed against such autoc

regimes unwilling or unable to initiate reforms

seen earlier, instability, religious extremism

terrorism in West Asia could spill over into South

as security and stability in both the regions

mutually interlinked through a number of factors.

most credible option to tackle these twin men

which are posing a new challenge to India’s compculture, liberal democratic structures and also nati

security is to adopt a political course that prev

alienation of any segment.

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Central Asia: Problems and StruggTo Escape Being ISIS Targ

Prof. R. G. Gidadhu

Declaration by ISIS that the Central Asian

tates (CAS) will be one of the targets has been amatter of great concern not only for these concerned

ountries but also for those which are closely politi-

ally and economically linked with Central Asia.

ence several questions arise. Why are the CAS

argets of the ISIS and what are the problems facing

he CAS due to this declaration by the ISIS? What

olicy measures are taken by the state authorities of

he CAS to deal with this situation? What are the

erspectives and challenges?

roblems Facing CAS

here are several factors which are contributing to

he interest of ISIS in the CAS. There are five states

n Central Asia which were formerly part of the

ormer Soviet Union-Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

ajikistan,Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. These are

lamic states having close geographic proximity to

yria. While Tajikistan has Persian ethnic identity,l other four CAS are of Turkic ethnic identity.

The CAS have been facing several problems

which are contributing to the prevailing situation.

irstly, a major problem facing the CAS has been

hat these countries have witnessed recruitment of a

arge number of youth who have joined ISIS forces

n Syria and Iraq. Even youth below 18 years are

ttracted to join ISIS, which is a great advantage for

his organization. Hence according to Kyrgyz offi-

al sources the number of its citizens might exceed

00 fighting with extremist militants. A large number

f youth are recruited from other CAS as well. For

nstance, the Kazak foreign minister Idrissov has

ated in September 2015 that an estimated 200

Kazakh nationals were fighting in Syria.

As stated by a Central Asia expert, the Is-

amic State (IS) militant group is notorious for re-

ruiting, training, and exploiting children and teenag-

die waging jihad are especially praised by Isla

groups in Syria. Majority of those recruited are pared to give their life for Jihad.

Secondly, the CAS are witnessing a dee

ing divide in the society between those suppor

secular forces, and those in favour of conserva

section and radical groups. For instance, seeing

rise of Islamic State and other extremist group

recent years, the Tajik authorities have done their

to eliminate outward displays including type of dkeeping type of beard etc. what they see as dan

ous and imported aspects of Islam in recent ye

At the same time, as candidly stated by some

lysts including John Heathershaw, any repressive m

sures could encourage radicalization. It means th

who do not want to be in line with the state-s

tioned guidelines, might go underground and bec

militants.

Tajikistan has been the worst sufferer of m

tancy, civil war and terrorism during the afterma

the breakup of the former Soviet Union, as more

100,000 Tajik citizens have been killed. As opine

Helene Thibault a specialist on Central Asia a

University of Montreal in Canada the situation i

entirely stable even at present. According to

“There are always some fault lines, some regi

where political antagonism, regional antagonism

still there.”

Thirdly, the CAS have been facing m

socio-economic problems after the breakup of

former Soviet Union. For instance, economic co

tion of the CAS has worsened during the last

years. In the case of Tajikistan the growth in G

Domestic Product (GDP) slowed to 6.7 (pc) per

in 2014 from 7.4 percent in 2013 and that it c

drop to 3.2 percent in 2015. Kazakh economysuffered significantly due to decline in oil prices


12/140

015 while it enjoyed high growth rates of 8-9 pc a

ew years back. There is significant decline in indus-

ial and agricultural production. Due to economic

ecline, unemployment has been increasing which is

ne of the major factors used by leaders of IS to

ecruit the unemployed youth. As per some reports,

ne among six persons cannot find job in Central Asia.

n fact a large number of youth from CAS particu-

arly from Tajikistan and Kyrgyz republic were get-ng jobs in Russia during the last about two decades

nd sending money to family members for their main-

nance. A Central Asia analyst Mirzoev has opined

hat due to economic recession in Russia itself, many

ave returned back to Central Asia which has wors-

ned economic and social conditions for a large sec-

on of the population. Denied of jobs many are at-

acted by the IS which not only promises jobs but

so high remuneration for joining the IS.

But in reality contrary to promises made to

he youth, there are reports by some of those who

ave returned from Syria that they were not properly

aid. Their experience might be far from happy as

old to a correspondent by Saidmurat from Jalalbad

n Kyrgyz Republic in September 2015. He became

nvalid as he was badly injured in the fight and is now

ecuperating in a hospital. He is disillusioned as hewas not paid hard cash that he was promised before

oining the IS to fight on the battlefield alongside

abhat al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. More-

ver, living condition was far from satisfactory as

hey were forced to live in cold and dark rooms and

here was not much to eat. He met several persons

om Central Asia and Chechnya. This statement has

een further supported by the head of the Kyrgyz

tate Committee for National Security Kanzharbek

okoev, who has made candid statement ‘that those

who had been recruited to Syria are victims of fraud’.

Fourthly, ISIS has been interested in recruit-

ng not only fighters but also highly qualified persons

om Central Asia. For instance, as reported by

Khusan Mamurov, an analyst with Uzbekistan’s Na-

onal Security Service (SNB) in September 2015 that

S militant group had been recruiting doctors, engi-

eers from the CAS including Uzbekistan. They wereromised high salary ranging from $ 20, 000 to $ 30,000

trolled territory which meant that they will be a

able for long period. But the situation seems t

pathetic. As reported by journalist Jenan Mouss

threatened to confiscate the property of doctors

pharmacists who have left. The SNB analyst

mated that 500-600 people from Uzbekistan are

fighting alongside IS even as reliable data was

available.

Fifthly, indoctrination has been a major

tor in attracting the youth. There are organizat

and also some religious heads that have succe

in this task of indoctrination in the name of Jihad

also reported that some youth from Central Asia

indoctrinated in Chechnya and other Islamic reg

of Russia.

Sixthly, the CAS are also victims of intesecurity threats. For instance, Tajikistan has be

victim of civil war during which several thousand

people were killed. Subsequently there were insta

when few political leaders and officials used

position to acquire wealth by corruption and drug

ficking directly or indirectly supporting criminal

antinational groups threatening the stability of

country. As opined by some analysts, the cas

former Deputy Defense Minister Abduha Nazarzoda was unique since he managed to g

many as 100 armed supporters of the Islamic

naissance Party of Tajikistan (IRTP) and fled to

rugged Romit Gorge area east of the capital

wanted ultimately to overthrow the government

this issue IRTP leader Kabilri who is self-imp

living in exile has refuted these allegations and c

cized Tajik government by skillfully elimina

Nazarzoda. Similarly, Ghaffor Mirzoev was ano

government ally who in 2004 was arrested and

cused of accumulating a large amount of weap

with the purpose of staging a coup d’etat.

Policy Measures by the CAS

The authorities of CAS are taking several po

measures to deal with the problems facing th

Firstly, being worried about recruitment of their

zens, they are taking serious measures including

tencing those found guilty of joining ISIS and puthem for several years in jail. For instance, on


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ational on charges of recruiting youth for ISIS. As

er reports he belonged to the banned Katibat al-

mam al-Bukhari group and he was detained at the

sh airport since he was about to travel to Turkey. A

pokesman for the Kyrgyz State Committee for Na-

onal Security (UKMK) Rakhat Sulaimanov, told on

7th July 2015 that the militants were planning sev-

ral terrorist attacks in the country, including one

gainst the Russian-led Kant military base, inKyrgyzstan’s north, and another targeting mass Eid

-Fitr prayers in Bishkek, thus justifying strict policy

measures to prevent such terrorist acts.

Similarly, on the 30 th September 2015

Kazak’s regional court sentenced 30 year old

razbek Apakashev who was found guilty of being

member of the Tablighi Jamaat group which is

anned in Kazakhstan. Some Islamic groups haveeen under increased scrutiny from the Kazakh au-

horities since a suspected Islamist militant carried

ut the country’s first-ever suicide bombing in the

orthwestern city of Aqtobe in 2011.

Tajik government facing similar problems has

anned its citizens to join extremist groups fighting in

yria and Iraq. In July 2015 as per official sources

20 cases were filed in court against the citizens join-ng the ISIS. Tajik government has serious concern

ecause it has admitted that the number of Tajiks

ghting in Syria and Iraq has grown during

he last couple of years to over 500 as stated by the

nterior Minister Ramazan Rakhimzoda in June 2015.

Tajikistan has become a victim of terrorism

nce in September 2015 there were armed attacks

n the capital. As opined by some analysts, subse-

uently the Tajik government banned the IRPT and

lacklisted by the Court and arrested its leadership.

ut on this issue there seem to be differences as

ome analysts contended that in recent past IRTP

was a moderate Islamic section of society and ban-

ing it might not be proper. A Central Asian analyst

odizoda has been candid in opining that they might

o underground and would be more radical. But on

his issue disagreeing with the views of analysts, the

ajik President Rahmon has been quite frank in ar-uing that rolling back Islamic influence in Tajikistan

lamists and security and stability interest of the c

try. In fact it is appreciable that the Tajik governm

has proposed to give amnesty to those returning f

Syria who have informed the ‘atrocities’ they f

which might deter others joining the IS.

Secondly, authorities in Central Asia have

posed to take serious policy measures being conce

by threats of radicalized youth who ordered to pr

gate to overthrow the elected governments. Fostance, in the first week of December 2

Tajikistan’s regional court of Khatlon sentenced s

youth up to 27 years of imprisonment for being g

of supporting ISIS and publicly calling to overth

the Tajik government. Similarly, the Uzbek auth

ties are concerned about extremist attacks in th

termath of acts of terrorism in many parts of the w

As stated by Bruce Pannier in November 2015 m

than 160 people were detained in Uzbekistan on picion of involvement with the ISIS.

Thirdly, it is a matter of serious concern

the authorities in Central Asia that some officia

high levels have been found to be involved in a

national activities and supporting these terrorist gro

For instance, in July 2015 a former Kyrgyz lawm

belonging to Ak-Jol (Bright Path) party was suspe

of supplying weapons to militants linked to thlamic State group. He was detained while attemp

to fly out of the country.

In Tajikistan also there are a few cases w

Tajiks at high level have joined Islamic State ha

resigned from their official positions in the gov

ment and political parties. For instance, the Tajik

terior Ministry’s Special Forces, Gulmurod Halim

appeared in a video clip saying he had joined th

lamic State extremist group to protest

government’s ban on Islamic dress in schools

offices. Even a more serious case is that of for

Deputy Defense Minister Abdulhalim Nazarzoda,

resigned from his position and actively participate

Islamic State activities against the government

was killed in police operation. He was also allege

be a member of IRPT party which has been ban

in the country.

As stated by Central Asia analysts, the IR


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war, which left tens of thousands dead and more than

million people displaced. It was the only officially

egistered Islamic party in the former Soviet Union,

nd was represented in the Tajik parliament for 15

ears until it failed in elections in March to meet the

hreshold for parliament. But as per official state-

ments due to several alleged terrorist acts committed

y members of IRPT, the government had to take

rong measures on this organization. In fact the de-sion of the court in September 2015 forced the clo-

ure of the IRPT’s Najot (Salvation) newspaper and

anned the distribution of any video, audio, or printed

materials related to the party’s activities. The per-

eption of some international agencies on this issue

eems to be different. For instance, as per reports onnd October 2015 UNHCR expressed reservation

ver Tajikistan’s banning the IRPT and this UN refu-

ee agency has expressed concern over the risk of ncreasing human rights violations in Tajikistan.

Fourthly, the CAS are concerned about cer-

ain political groups that are involved in extending fi-

ancial support to the extremist organizations. For

nstance, as stated officially by the Kyrgyz state,

Ak-Jol party is suspected of financially supporting

members of the Islamic State group targeted in

ounterterrorism raids and providing them with at leastwo Kalashnikov assault rifles. There is a similar case

n Tajikistan where a political unit known as the New

ajikistan movement was found to be involved in fi-

ancial irregularities including support to antisocial

ements. Hence as per reports it was crushed in

013 and the founder of the party has been given 29

ears of imprisonment on charges of financial crimes.

Fifthly, there is genuine concern on the part

f the authorities that some sections of religious heads

n Central Asia are active in propagating extremist

cts. In several cases they are being convicted for

oing so. For instance, on 7th October 2015, a court

n the Osh region of Kyrgyz state found Imam Rashod

ori Kamolov guilty of inciting religious discord and

he possession and distribution of extremist

materials and hence sentenced him to five years in

rison. It is reported that Kamolov, a 37-year-old eth-

ic Uzbek, is the imam at the As-Sarakhsi Mosque inhe Kara-Suu district.

Sixthly, for almost 20 years, authoritie

Turkmenistan have tried to isolate the country

constantly referring to its UN-recognized status

‘neutral country’. But as the country propose

celebrate the 20th anniversary in October 2015,

to worsening security conditions, its policy of “p

tive neutrality” was undergoing a change. Th

mainly due to the fact that events both regionally

globally have started to erode this strategy and crwere appearing. Hence the definitions of “pos

neutrality” needed to be revised.

For instance in October 2015 the situatio

northwestern Afghanistan, in the areas adjoi

Turkmenistan particularly Faryab Province was

ting from bad to worse. In fact since the last

year or so security condition was getting worse

in May 2014 three Turkmen body guards were kiThere was realization of security concern since

Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are not members

military bloc and hence cannot depend upon any c

try for their external security threats. In term

defense capability Turkmenistan is worse

Uzbekistan since the Uzbek leadership started bu

ing up its military shortly after becoming inde

dent. But being exposed to threat in 2014 Turk

authorities have been working to build up the arforces and strengthen the presence along the f

tier with Afghanistan. As per some reports from

USA, in March 2015, the Turkmen expressed a

sire to acquire U.S. military equipment and tech

ogy to address threats to their security from Afgh

stan.

Contentions and Contradictions

The state authorities and opposition groups and

ics have differences on security related issues

on activities of organizations. For instance, it is

tented by some critics that there is discontentm

over the increasingly authoritarian style of govern

which is potentially more dangerous since that m

be partly contributing to recruitment for ISIS.

alleged that there is widespread unhappiness

the dire socio-economic situation in Tajikistan a

from lack of political freedom. The Tajik Presi

Emomali Rahmon, who has led Tajikistan since 1has been criticized for his authoritarian-style rule


15/140

the case so far as Uzbekistan is concerned But the

fficial position in Tajikistan is that security and sta-

ility of the country is important and policies are taken

o safeguard national interest. The Tajik government

while allowing religious freedom does not want ex-

rnal elements to influence their citizens. It is con-

nded by some analysts, the president has controlled

lam by keeping the nominally independent Muftiat

which appoints Muslim clerics. Majority of the Tajiksre followers of Hanafi Islam and any other Sunni

ects are considered by the government as detrimental

o social cohesion. Hence as opined by Sojida

jakhfarova the Salafi (Wahhabi) sect of Islam is

fficially prohibited in Tajikistan. The rise of IS and

he recruitment of Tajiks to its ranks has provided

ew opportunities for Tajikistan to link certain brands

f Islam, particularly Salafism, with the IS group and

herefore also with threats to national security. Hences opined by some specialists the government be-

eves that Wahhabis plan to destroy Tajiks’ funda-

mental beliefs of Hanafi Islam and the foundations

f the secular state.

Similarly, as opined by some critics, the Uzbek

overnment had earlier banned Islamic group Hizb

t-Tahrir linking it to Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

MU) and now linking it to ISIS. In the 1990’s inzbekistan the case of Mullah Abdullo was signifi-

ant who formed IMU, which has been designated

y several countries as a terrorist organization. Hence

he Uzbek authorities have taken strong measures

gainst suspected terrorists when 160 people were

rrested having links with this banned groups sup-

orting the cause of the ISIS. But some analysts are

andid in stating that this is overreaction and many of

hem might not belong to the IS. But contrary to the

ate official position, as opined by some analysts Hizb

t-Tahrir has sought to create an Islamic caliphate

ut disavows the use of violence to achieve this goal.

ut from the perspective the national interest the

zbek president Islam Karimov wants to take pre-

entive policy measures. Hence for security reasons

n the spring of 2015, the Uzbek law enforcement

gencies conducted a series of exercises in

zbekistan’s section of the Ferghana Valley, which

a very sensitive region in Central Asia.

In the aftermath of the Uzbek independ

in the 1990’s IMU was one of the oldest organ

tions with aggressive ideology in Central Asia a

also highly controversial. Overtime the leadersh

IMU has changed and according to some analy

has become weaker during the last about a dec

Moreover, the location of IMU has changed f

Uzbekistan to Afghanistan and subsequently to P

stan. Apart from that as opined by analysts there been change in its alliance s from Taliban to ISI

Perspectives and Challenges

In the background of what is stated above, it is wo

while considering perspectives so far as efforts

made to find solution to terrorism and security thr

facing the CAS. Firstly, Council for Security Tr

Organization (CSTO) is a regional organization

by Russia concerning security related issues omember countries. Considering the fact that Tajik

witnessed several terrorist attacks recently an

September 2015 when more than 20 people w

killed including police officers threatening stabili

the country, Vladimir Putin has assured Russian

and support to ensure that Tajik armed forces w

“successfully dealing with the problems that ar

In fact at the CSTO Summit Putin expressed his

cern for likely spillover of violence from Afghaninto Tajikistan and other CAS. As a part of its

port in October 2015 Russian officials have annou

plans to increase the number of troops statione

Tajikistan to 9,000 over the next five years an

provide more military equipment through 2020.

sian media have reported that Moscow is also

pared to grant Tajikistan $1.2 billion in military

over the next few years.

Similarly, at the CSTO summit meeting

in the Tajik capital city of Dushanbe in the sec

week of September 2015 during which the head

Tajikistan and Kazakhstan discussed the need

greater economic cooperation and signed a new “

tegic partnership”. This shows that efforts are b

made by the regional leaders to find solutions to

intraregional differences and problems facing t

including threats to security by terrorist organizati

Similar efforts are being made by the Shanghaioperation Organization (SCO) to deal with the s


16/140

hallenge for both the CSTO and SCO which have

een in existence after the Soviet breakup, to effec-

vely resolve persisting intraregional issues and solve

he security threats facing the CAS at present. On

he 21st December 2015 leaders of CSTO and EEU

met in Moscow during which the Russian presiden-

al aide Yury Ushakov stated that adopting a state-

ment on the fight against terrorism will an important

em of agenda, which is an evidence of the serious-ess of the problem facing all the member countries

ncluding the CAS.

Secondly, it is a matter of great geo-political

gnificance that on the 16th of October 2015, leaders

f the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

gned 17 agreements including a statement on

ombating international terrorism and also an

greement on military cooperation. This is particularlyelevant for the CAS. But CIS has a major challenge

o revive itself and ensure that agreements signed

ecome effective in reality to solve problems facing

he CAS. It is appreciable that during the conference

eld in Kazakhstan, the Russian president Vladimir

utin specifically mentioned that the situation in

Afghanistan is critical and one of the goals of Islamic

rrorists is to penetrate the Central Asian region.

ajikistan and Kyrgyz being neighbor of Afghanistanould be the worst sufferers. But the position of

Uzbekistan is somewhat different. As per reports,

peaking in Tashkent on 1st September 2015 at a

eremony marking the 24 th anniversary of

Uzbekistan’s independence, Islam Karimov was

andid in stating that the Uzbek armed forces will

ever be involved in any military activities abroad.

Karimov’s statement comes five days after the United

tates said it had asked Tashkent to join the

multinational coalition against the Islamic State group.

his assumes significance since the country needs

he support of USA and other powers to contain

rrorist threats for its security. Hence it is to be seen

whether there will be change in the policy of the

overnment as situation changes for worse affecting

he security of the country.

Thirdly, while the CAS are coming close to

ussia, they are moving away from Western countriesnd in some cases closing the military bases which

conflict arising from Afghanistan in the afterma

26/11 attack in New York. For instance, Germ

has to close its base in Termez in Uzbekistan, in 2

USA closed its Kyrgyz base in Manas so also Fr

closed its base in Dushanbe in Tajikistan. This c

be partly because the term of contract was over

partly due to pressure from Russia. But under

prevailing circumstances, it will be a challenge

the CAS to bring about policy revision with regathese military bases by the West from

perspectives of their own security.

Fourthly, the Kazak president Nazarb

during his meeting with Putin in October 2

reiterated the need for a united front against terror

He has also been supportive of the role of Eura

Economic Union (EEU) in dealing with economic

other related issues. “We are proposing the creaof a forum on Islam against Terrorism, and if

receive support this will be the right action to ta

the Kazakh leader said. For the EEU which has b

formed only recently focusing on issues of econo

cooperation, it will be a formidable task and chall

to be an effective organization to deal with tas

combating terrorism in Central Asia.

Lastly, Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister EIdrissov has urged world leaders to unite effor

combat the threat posed by the Islamic State

group. On this issue the Kazakh president Nazarb

has made historic speech at the UN in Septem

2015 highlighting the need to create a Global A

Terrorist Coalition to defeat the threat to the w

He asserted that the conflict in Syria is the gre

challenge which needs to be resolved by

international community. A political settlement in S

is the only way to stop the violence and that the

need to develop universal, anti-terror l

instruments. He reminded the recent UN Secu

Council Resolution on Foreign Terrorist Figh

cosponsored by Kazakhstan. This has to be achie

even as it is a major challenge. It is very impor

that both Russia and the Western powers

particularly the USA have to compromise

collectively take policy decisions, which

challenging task. But there is no alternative to sthe problem of terrorist threats posed by the ISI


17/140

Terrorism and Geopolitics in West AAnil Kam

ntroduction

il has been a major driving force behind foreignnterests, regional and domestic balance of power,

nd territorial conflicts in the West Asia. As a result

f the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks debates on oil and the

United States’ security agenda have significantly

hifted. If on one side, those opposing US military

nterventionism have argued that the ‘war on terror’

rovided one more convenient cover for a renewed

mperialist oil grab’ in this region; on the other, links

etween oil and terrorism pointed at problems of

overnance in oil-producing countries. As the ‘war

n terror’ became justified as a ‘war of liberation’

gainst oil-funded dictators, the US portrayed its

oreign policy as shifting from ensuring free access

o oil for the world market, to ensuring that oil is

elivering ‘freedom’ to local populations. Although

ngaging the crucial issue of oil governance, there is

et little evidence given the number of war victims

nd potential vested interests that a US policy shift

om ‘free oil’ to ‘freedom oil’ is genuine and viable.

The geopolitical and the security environment

n West Asia have undergone dramatic changes

uring recent years. Before the Arab uprisings,

Afghanistan and Iraq were considered the centre of

he crisis in West Asia, however the Arab movements

d to the emergence of new focal points of crisis in

arious countries of the region, from Syria to Bahrain,

gypt, Libya and Yemen. Great powers and regionalctors not only have not been able to manage these

rises but also have pursued a strategy with zero-

um results. Therefore, the new developments have

nprecedentedly increased tensions between regional

owers.Strategic surprises or unexpected events

ave taken place which had remarkable impact on

he distribution of power at international or regional

vels. For instance, the collapse of the Soviet Union

nd 9/11 can be seen as strategic surprises in theistory which had impact on foreign policy of number

of countries. During the last four years, number

strategic surprises have occurred in the West Aregion, including the Arab uprisings, the civil w

Syria, the rapid domination of ISIS over vast territo

in Syria and Iraq and the Saudi Arabian invasio

Yemen. As this list indicates, recent years h

witnessed many more strategic surprises than

time in the past and have changed the geopoli

situation of the region. Today, it is non-state ac

who have become the main sources of strat

surprises in West Asia in the form of pop

movements or terrorist groups. The change in

sources of strategic surprises has made cr

management much more difficult than the past

has an impact on other parts of the world. Ano

emerging development in the West Asia secu

environment is the rapid and frequent changes in

status quo of the actors which can be call

“changing status.” In other words, the regi

balance of power has become more unstable

earlier periods. The primacy of regional actorapidly becoming unstable and winners are becom

losers. With this in mind, regional actors, facing

increasing fluctuation of balance of power, will

their geopolitical positions unstable. Needless to

preserving the geopolitical interests in the f

balance of power is much more costly than in st

conditions.

Tension in West AsiaThe Sunni-Shiite tension in the Middle East has b

on the rise since the civil war in Iraq that follo

the US-led invasion in 2003. Next were the cla

between Sunni and Shiite militias in Lebanon in 2

while the Shiites in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia step

up their campaign for more political and cultural ri

in the two Sunni-ruled monarchies. To be s

historical animosities do play a part, but contempo

sectarian tension in the Middle East is driven prim by inequality. It typically thrives in environm

h li i h i i


18/140

ave – privileged access to government, wealth or

lace in a nation’s cultural life. The Shiites in Bahrain

want equal access to senior government positions,

while the Sunni minority in Iraq feels side-lined by

he Shiite-dominated central government. But this is

nly one side of the story. Growing level of sectarian

nsion is also closely linked to the regional cold war

etween the Sunni Saudi Arabia and the Shiite power

an: to mobilize regional support, Riyadh presentsself as the protector of Sunni communities, while

ehran seeks allies among the Shiites in Lebanon in

aq.

The wave of anti-government protests that

egan in 2011, known as the Arab Spring, only

xacerbated these fault-lines. Not because the Arab

pring protests were religious in nature, but because

hey threatened to shatter the existing political ordersn the Middle East. This alarms both Saudi Arabia

nd Iran, and Arabs living in mixed Sunni-Shiite areas

nd themselves between a hammer and the anvil.

rouble Spots in West Asia

ahrain: Majority Shiite at 65-70% being ruled by

he Al Khalifa, a Sunni royal family. Most senior

ositions in government and the security apparatus

re reserved for the Sunni minority. The Arab Springas given new life to the mostly Shiite anti-government

movement. Backed by Saudi Arabia, Bahraini

overnment has crackdown on the uprising, accusing

an of inciting the Shiite majority. Bahrain’s largely

hiite opposition continues its struggle against the

unni royal family, even though it has met little

nternational support. Here are reasons why crisis in

ahrain won’t go away:

In response to protests demanding greater

emocracy that began in February 2011, the ruling

l-Khalifa family promised constitutional reform

ut little has been delivered. Even reform-minded

oyals, such as Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al

Khalifa, fear that a rush to democratic reform would

e a start of a slippery slope, allowing the opposition

o one day dispense with the system as a whole. The

l-Khalifa do not claim absolutist, divinely inspired

uthority like the Saudi royals, nor do they presidever a Syria-style one-party system. Bahrain has multi-

remains a highly authoritarian state where ele

legislative bodies hold little control over narrow r

elite. The fact that senior government posts

positions in the security apparatus seem alm

exclusively reserved for Sunnis has always add

distinct sectarian dynamic to Bahraini politics. Fo

part , the government consciously encoura

suspicions of protesters’ alleged loyalties to the S

Iran. Bahraini rulers lack the luxury of abundanreserves to keep the masses happy with mas

welfare programs and cosy government jobs.

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has pledged

billion in budgetary support, but ongoing unre

deepening.

The regime may maintain dialogue

moderate opposition parties, such as al-Wefaq

there is no short fix for income disparities and growsocial tension. The principal safety valve of Kh

rulers is the staunch support from Saudi Arabia

other GCC members who sent troops to Bahra

March 2011 to quell the unrest. The wealthy

monarchies simply cannot allow one of their ow

go down, while the US is reluctant to poke at the

bastion of pro-American rulers in the Middle E

Unfortunately for Bahrainis, the future of their cou

has become firmly embedded in the regional riv between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Bahraini and S

governments have long claimed Iran’s han

domestic unrest, although we have yet to see

solid evidence of that.

Iraq: Sunni Arab minority approximately at 2

Kurds and others 20% are being governed by maj

Shiite Arab (around 60%). Central governme

dominated by Shiite parties, causing resentm

among Sunni Arab groups which controlled the I

state under ex-leader Saddam Hussein. Attack

Iraqi security forces and indiscriminate targetin

Shiite civilians have mushroomed since the withdr

of US troops in December 2011. Extremist S

groups affiliated to Al-Qaeda are trying delibera

to reignite Sunni-Shiite violence to destabilize

state.Al Qaeda in Iraq operates under the umb

of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), a coalition of mil

groups that boast a long track record of fightingUS troops. The worst days of violence in Iraq


19/140

estabilizing factor for Iraq and the wider region. Al

aeda in Iraq is based in the country’s north-west,

n area populated predominantly by Sunni Arabs, who

eld top government positions under former president

addam Hussein. ISI thrives on local resentment of

he Shiite-dominated government in the capital

aghdad, blamed for lack of economic development

nd jobs in this part of Iraq. ISI’s traditional base is

mall Sunni towns in the Anbar province, but itsnofficial capital is now Mosul, Iraq’s third largest

ty. Since late 2011, ISI has been extending its

perations from Anbar into neighbouring Syria.

ISI has its roots in the Sunni Islamist

nsurgency that emerged after the US-led invasion

f Iraq in 2003, when dozens of armed groups

eclared a jihad, a holy war, against the new Shiite

overnment and all foreign troops. Indiscriminatettacks on Shiite civilians triggered a de facto civil

war in mixed Sunni-Shiite area. Main Sunni jihadist

roups formally joined forces under the ISI umbrella.

Although not all of these groups were affiliated with

Al Qaeda, ISI leadership under the notorious Abu

Musab al-Zarqawi (killed 2006) swore its allegiance

o Osama bin Laden, making the militant coalition an

fficial Al Qaeda branch in Iraq. US troops

uccessfully recruited leading Sunni Arab tribes intohe so-called “Awakening Councils” to fight against

Al Qaeda, after religious extremists alienated the local

opulation with their brutality and fanaticism. ISI lost

round in the Anbar province and became increasingly

eliant on foreign jihadists. Iraqi security forces won

he war against the militants, but many Sunnis now

eel side-lined by the government. ISI is tapping into

his discontent, linking new recruits with old militant

etworks under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-

aghdadi.

ISI wants to establish an Islamist state

ncompassing all of Iraq, based on Al Qaeda’s strict

nterpretation of the Sunni doctrine. ISI’s more

mmediate and more realistic objective is to regain its

ormer strongholds in Anbar province and establish

ear territorial control with parallel government

ructures. To this end, it tries to reignite sectarian

onflict and destabilize the Iraqi state. Research byAND National Defense Research Institute in late

from selling stolen goods, including construc

equipment, generators, and electrical cables. Loo

and extortion is also being carried out. Besides

now that it has captured number of oil fields,

selling crude oil and earning millions of dollars.

The media outreach has a strong secta

tone, posing ISI as a protector of Iraqi Sunnis ag

both the Shiite Iran and the US. This gives ISI (Isla

State of Iraq) a distinctly local brand, althoughgroup still threatens to strike at targets in the

Europe and other parts of the region. Violence

increased sharply since the withdrawal of US tro

in December 2011, with at least one large-s

attack per month. ISI is systematically subduing l

government structures in its north-eastern strongh

while trying to discredit the central governmen

orchestrating regular bombings in Baghdad.

Islamist group appeals to low-income Shiites wnetwork of charities. Its armed wing has fou

against the government forces, rival Shiite gro

and against Sunni militias.

Kuwait: Kuwait is ruled by a Sunni royal fam

where the Sunnis consist of almost 70% of

population and rest are Shiites. Sunni-Shiite relat

are markedly better than elsewhere in the Per

Gulf, although Shiite politicians complain of anti-S prejudice. Shiites form part of the merchant elite

have their representatives in Kuwait’s v

parliament. Fortunately, in Kuwait sectarianism

always been a non-starter. Though aware of secta

differences, these were never highly politicized.

Shias in Kuwait has been an integral part of soc

before there was even a polity to speak of. T

make up roughly one half of the country’s merc

class. Unlike in Bahrain, the Shia hold h

government positions and 9 of Kuwait’s 50 ele

members of parliament are Shia. Although s

neighbourhoods are becoming more homogeno

Shiite, contrary to the situation in Bahrain, the

majority of Sunnis and Shia live beside each othe

and have for decades as houses generally stay w

families. Simply put, the Shias are fully Kuwaiti

have long been regarded as such by the governm

and Kuwaiti Sunnis.

There are two issues for which talking h


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nd loyalty. Polemical comments about shiites have

layed into deliberate othering tactics in efforts to

rive a wedge between Sunni and Shiite communities,

nd have unfortunately been picked up by the masses.

etting aside the historical fact that many Kuwaitis

f Arab origin are Shia and Kuwaitis of Persian origin

re Sunnis; many programs are propagating an idea

hat Shia have Iranian origins and are thus an alien

resence.

Anti-Shia sentiment has come at a time for

he Shia in Kuwaiti national politics, as they must juggle

heir relations with the populous and the government,

who are themselves at odds. The ruling family, with

whom they have a very good relationship, continues

o front a very unpopular prime minister, leading to

ountless stalemates within parliament. Although

hiite MPs are now in solidarity with those who wisho oust the “corrupt” prime minister, the initial

eluctance of some to do so (and potentially jeopardize

elations with the ruling family) was identified as proof

hat the Shia does not really want what is best for

Kuwait. Kuwait will not become Bahrain in terms of

utright violence, but if media in Kuwait continues to

raw lines in the sand between the sects, these lines

ould very well become perforations over time and

erhaps more quickly if tensions in Bahrain continueo escalate.

ebanon: In a country where the Shiites consist of

40%, Sunnis 20% of the total population and Small

Alawite community which has settled in the northern

ty of Tripoli. (Though no official census since 1932

as been conducted), top positions in government are

ivided strictly along the confessional lines. Shiites

re only entitled to the position of the parliament

peaker, but they control by far the strongest armed

militia (Hezbollah). The uprising in Syria has greatly

xacerbated sectarian tension in Lebanon. Lebanon’s

unnis sympathize with, and in some cases aid, the

argely Syrian rebels, who are setting up a base in

orthern Lebanon. The Shiite Hezbollah is allied to

he Syrian regime and is backed by Iran. Violence

as flared in Tripoli between Sunnis and a local Alawite

minority which sides with the Syrian regime.

The impact of the Syrian uprising on Lebanon

No other two Arab countries have their destinie

closely intertwined, and no country in the region

divided on the issue of the Syrian uprising as Leba

Overwhelming support for Syrian government co

from the close alliance between Assad and Hezbo

the main Lebanese Shiite party. Vast majorit

Lebanese Sunnis sympathize with the largely Su

led uprising in Syria. The Christians are div

between political parties that rely on Assad’s supand those strongly opposed to Syria’s influenc

Lebanon. The stakes are high for Hezbollah w

controls the largest and best-equipped armed f

in Lebanon. Meanwhile, Syrian refugees, a

deserters and rebel groups stream to the largely S

northern Lebanon, where they can count on substa

local support. But pro-Assad Lebanese groups

unlikely to sit back and watch the area becom

rear base for Syrian rebels, making northern Lebaa proxy battleground of the Syrian conflict.

Saudi Arabia: The Shiite minority about 10-

populates the oil-rich Eastern Province. All po

rests in the hands of Al Saud, a Sunni royal dyn

The government is cracking down on largely peac

Shiite protests for greater religious and cult

freedom and better access to governm

employment. State officials blame Iran for the unalthough there is yet no evidence of Tehr

involvement. It is the richest State in the region

Syria: The majority is of Sunni Arab (around 7

and the Alawite are in minority (10-15%). Ru

Assad family belongs to the Alawite minority

offshoot of Shiite Islam. Alawites control top posit

in the army and the intelligence apparatus. A

core, the civil war in Syria is not a religious con

The dividing line is one’s loyalty to the Ass

government. However, some religious commun

tend to be more supportive of the regime than

others, fuelling mutual suspicion and relig

intolerance in many parts of the country.

Syria is an Arab country with a Kurdish

Armenian minority. In term of religious identity, m

of the Arab majority belongs to the Sunni branc

Islam, with several Muslim minority groups assocwith the Shiite Islam. The Christians from diffe


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opulation. The emergence among the anti-

overnment rebels of hardliner Sunni Islamist militias

ghting for an Islamic state has alienated the

minorities. The outside interference from the Shiite

an and the Sunni Saudi Arabia makes matter worse,

eeding into the wider Sunni-Shiite tension in the

Middle East. President Bashar al-Assad belongs to

he Alawite minority, an offshoot of Shiite Islam

pecific to Syria (with small population pockets inebanon).

The Assad family has been in power since

970 and although it presided over a secular regime,

many Syrians think Alawites have enjoyed privileged

ccess to top government jobs and business

pportunities. After the outbreak of the anti-

overnment uprising in 2011, the vast majority of

Alawites rallied behind the regime, fearful of iscrimination if the Sunni majority came to power.

Most of the top rank in the army and the intelligence

ervices are Alawites, making the community as a

whole closely identified with the government camp

n the civil war. A majority of Syrians are Sunni Arabs,

ut they are politically divided.

True, most of the fighters in the

pposition Free Syrian Army come from the Sunnirovincial heartlands, and many Sunni Islamists don’t

onsider Alawites as real Muslims. The armed

onfrontation between largely Sunni rebels and the

Alawite-led government troops has led some

bservers to see Syria’s civil war as the conflict

etween Sunnis and Alawites. Most of the regular

overnment soldiers fighting the rebels are Sunni

ecruits (though thousands have defected to the

pposition), and Sunnis hold leading positions in the

overnment, the bureaucracy, the ruling Baath Party,

nd the business community.Some businessmen and

middle class Sunnis support the regime because they

want to protect their material interests.

The war in Syria has attracted number of

ountries. Russia and Iran are supporting President

ashar al-Assad. The US is supporting the Sunni

ebels. To create more confusion, Germany, France

nd Britain are fighting and trying to destroy the ISIS.ussia says that it is also fighting against the ISIS

rebels. ISIS has been created out of the Sunni re

in Syria and Sunni rebels from Iraq with its le

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. They have been joine

highly radicalisededucated and technically qualif

trained youth from different countries. These per

are motivating, brain washing and radicalising

youth from all over the world through their so

networking and propaganda, to join the IS in S

for what they call as Jihad. Large numbers of yfrom all over have been joining the IS. Most surpri

was that the Muslims from European countries h

joined the IS. About 1200 trained fighters f

Columbia have travelled from such far off count

join the IS. We can say that while communica

technology has done wonders, it has also ena

terrorist networks to encrypt their communicat

effectively. Due to the fighting in Syria thousand

Syrian have fled the country and have entEuropean countries as refugees creating a big c

and economic crisis in Europe.

Yemen: Zaydis, a Yemeni offshoot of the S

Islam, form around 45% of the population, the

are Sunni. Political alliances are built primaril

regional/tribal loyalties and commonality of inter

rather than religious affiliation. Religious differe

never played a central role in Yemeni politics.long-serving President Ali Abdullah al-Saleh

himself of Zeydi extraction. However, a rebe

against the state by a Zeydi clan, the Houthis,

the menace of Al Qaeda-affiliated Sunni extrem

has the potential to exacerbate religious fault-li

This rebel has attracted number of countries

have jumped into the fight. Iran is supporting Hou

with arms equipment and other aid. Whereas

Sunni dominated countries like Saudi Arabia

supporting the Sunni clans with all the aid

equipment. India and number of other countries h

pulled out their citizens from Yemen. This has

attracted number of radicalised Islamist groups

have also jumped in. People have been fleeing f

Yemen to other neighbouring countries.

Global Fight Against Extremism

During 2015 Islamist terrorist activities has been

and grim. In any given month, people have been kin the name of a pernicious ideology. This sprea


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he Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; it has become a

lobal problem. For that reason, the international

ommunity needs a comprehensive strategy to defeat

lamist extremism—one in which force, diplomacy

nd development work together to achieve a more

able world. The most urgent pillar of this strategy is

ismantling the Islamic State, which must be

iminated not just in Syria and Iraq, but also in Libya

nd everywhere else. All the countries must do whatnecessary to defeat a group that has seized territory

n five countries and declared a new state ruled by

anatical ideologues

Documents

World Focus February 2016xaam.in.pdf