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Document of The World Bank
Report No: ICR2539
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-42010 TF-90084)
ON A
CREDIT
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 37 MILLION (US$ 54 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
FEDERAL, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA
FOR A
RURAL CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT
December 20, 2012
Agriculture, Rural Development and Irrigation, Eastern Africa
Sustainable Development Department
Africa Region
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i
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2012)
Currency Unit = Ethiopian Birr (ETB)
ETB 17.82 = US$ 1.00
US$ 1.5176 = SDR 1.000
FISCAL YEAR
July8–July 7
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ADLI Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation
AGP Agricultural Growth Program
ARDPLAC Agricultural Rural Development Partners Linkage Advisory Council
ARTP Agricultural Research and Training Project
ATA Agricultural Transformation Agency
ATVET Agriculture Technical and Vocational Education and Training
BoA Bureau of Agriculture
BoARD Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development
BPR Business Processing Re-Engineering
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
DA Development Agents
DIG Development Innovation Grant
EAAPP East African Agricultural Productivity Project
ECX Ethiopian Commodity Exchange
EFY Ethiopian Fiscal Year
EIAR Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research
ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework FIF Farmers Innovation Fund
FRG Farmer Research Group
FREG Farmer Research Extension Group
FTC Farmer Training Center
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GoE Government of Ethiopia
GTP Growth and Transformation Plan
ha Hectare
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IA Implementing Agency
ICAS Interim Country Assistance Strategy
ICR Implementation Completion and Results
ICT Information and Communication Technology
IDA International Development Association
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute
IFR Interim Financial Reports
ISG Institutional Support Grant
ii
ISR Implementation Status Report
MoA Ministry of Agriculture
MoARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MoE Ministry of Education
MoFED Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MTR Midterm Review
M&E Monitoring and evaluation
NA Not applicable
NARF National Agricultural Research Fund
NARS National Agricultural Research System
NGO Non-governmental organization OS Operational Standard
PAD Project Appraisal Document
PASDEP Program for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty
PDO Project Development Objective
PhD Doctor of Philosophy
PMU Project Management Unit
RARF Regional Agricultural Research Fund
RARI Regional Agricultural Research Institute
RCBP Rural Capacity Building Project
SMS Subject Matter Specialist
SNNPR Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region
TA technical assistance
TF Trust Fund
TTL Task Team Leader
TTLM Training, Teaching, Learning Materials
TVET Technical and Vocational Education and Training
WoARD Woreda Office of Agriculture and Rural Development
Vice President: Makhtar Diop
Country Director: Guang Zhe Chen
Sector Manager: Tijan M. Sallah
Project Team Leader: Laketch Mikael Imru
ICR Team Leader: Achim Fock
iii
ETHIOPIA
Rural Capacity Building Project
CONTENTS
DATA SHEET
A. Basic Information
B. Key Dates
C. Ratings Summary
D. Sector and Theme Codes
E. Bank Staff
F. Results Framework Analysis
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
H. Restructuring
I. Disbursement Profile
1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design .................................................. 1
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .................................................. 6 3. Assessment of Outcomes .............................................................................................. 12
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ............................................................. 20 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ......................................................... 22 6. Lessons Learned............................................................................................................ 25
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners............... 26
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 27 Annex 2. Outputs by Component...................................................................................... 28 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ..................................................................... 37
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ................. 40 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results and Impact Evaluation .......................................... 42
Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ....................................................... 52 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................... 56
Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ........................... 60 Annex 9. Weighted Rating of Outcome Assessment ........................................................ 63 Annex 10. List of Supporting Documents ........................................................................ 64 MAP .................................................................................................................................. 65
v
A. Basic Information
Country: Ethiopia Project Name: Rural Capacity
Building Project
Project ID: P079275 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-42010,TF-90084
ICR Date: 12/20/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR
Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF
ETHIOPIA
Original Total
Commitment: XDR 37.00M Disbursed Amount: XDR 28.65M
Revised Amount: XDR 28.72M
Environmental Category: B
Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Agriculture
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: Canadian International Development Agency
B. Key Dates
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual
Date(s)
Concept Review: 01/09/2004 Effectiveness: 12/28/2006 12/28/2006
Appraisal: 04/10/2006 Restructuring(s):
12/12/2008
10/21/2011
06/14/2012
Approval: 06/22/2006 Midterm Review: 04/30/2010
Closing: 10/31/2011 06/30/2012
C. Ratings Summary
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial
Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Moderately
Unsatisfactory Government:
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision: Moderately
Satisfactory
Implementing
Agency/Agencies:
Moderately
Satisfactory
Overall Bank
Performance:
Moderately
Satisfactory Overall Borrower
Performance:
Moderately
Satisfactory
vi
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation
Performance Indicators
QAG Assessments
(if any) Rating
Potential Problem Project
at any time (Yes/No): Yes
Quality at Entry
(QEA): None
Problem Project at any
time (Yes/No): Yes
Quality of
Supervision (QSA): None
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status:
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Agricultural extension and research 76 72
Animal production 1 3
Capital markets 5 12
General public administration sector 8 5
Vocational training 10 8
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Environmental policies and institutions 14
Gender 29 10
HIV/AIDS 14
Managing for development results 14 10
Rural markets 10
Rural policies and institutions 20
Rural services and infrastructure 29 50
E. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Makhtar Diop Gobind T. Nankani
Country Director: Guang Zhe Chen Ishac Diwan
Sector Manager: Tijan M. Sallah Karen McConnell Brooks
Project Team Leader: Laketch Mikael Imru David J. Nielson
ICR Team Leader: Achim Fock
ICR Primary Author: Achim Fock, Sati Achath
vii
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The original development objective of the Rural Capacity Building Project (RCBP) was
to assist the Ethiopian Government to strengthen the agricultural technology system,
make it more responsive to clients' needs, and enhance the capacity of producers to select
economically viable technologies and practices.
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
The development objective as revised by the December 2008 project restructuring was to
assist the Ethiopian Government to strengthen agricultural services and systems and
make them more responsive to clients' needs.
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1 : Difference in income change of households between project and non-project
woredas.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at Appraisal;
Difference 1,138
(Project 5,290;
Control 4,152)
NA
10%
(percentage
point
difference)
Difference 1,301
(+14%)
(Project 4,944;
Control 3,643)
Date achieved 01/31/2010 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Values in ETB; "Baseline" from 2009/10 survey is relevant since only recent on-
the-ground progress; Actual Value Achieved from endline survey.
Increase in income difference is statistically significant.
Indicator 2 : Difference in productivity changes of main commodity between project and non-
project woredas.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at appraisal; values
from 2009/10 survey seem
non-comparable.
NA
15%
(percentage
point
difference)
Project:
- Teff = 12.82
- Maize = 16.91
- Sorghum = 10.90
Control:
- Teff = 10.34
- Maize = 15.27
- Sorghum = 9.66
Date achieved 01/31/2010 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Yield in quintal/ha; Actual Value Achieved from endline survey shows (16%)
higher productivity in project than control areas, though not statistically
significant.
Indicator 3 : Number of new agricultural activities adopted in project kebeles (administrative
villages).
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at appraisal; zero as per
definition of "new." NA
On average 2
activities in
each kebele
4 new agricultural
activities on
average per project
kebele.
viii
Date achieved 01/01/2007 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Target exceeded according to both, project-internal monitoring and impact
evaluation study; degree of attribution not fully clear.
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1: Change in % of clients satisfied with quality of employees recruited from
ATVET colleges.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at appraisal; 54% of
WoARDs report
“satisfied” according to
2008 survey.
NA 75%
Survey of
Agricultural Offices
(incl. Cooperative
Offices, Livestock
Offices): 100%
“satisfied.”
Date achieved 08/01/2008 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Completion survey from Tropical Consults; see report for more differentiated
results.
Indicator 2: Change in % of trainees’ (M/F) satisfaction with quality of education at
ATVETs.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at appraisal; 2008
survey trainees’ rating:
Good-10%,
Fair-80%,
Poor-10%
NA 75%
“satisfied.”
Survey of recent
graduates:
Good-70%,
Fair-27%,
Poor-3%
Date achieved 08/01/2008 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Completion survey from Tropical Consults; see report for more differentiated
results.
Indicator 3: Number of ATVET colleges successfully implementing strategic plans.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
Zero as per definition. Not explicit. 2 2
Date achieved 01/01/2007 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
2 federal ATVET colleges (Ardaita and Agarfa) have developed strategic plans
based on new TVET strategy and ATVET strategy document. Implementation of
strategic plans has led to a better learning-teaching environment.
Indicator 4: Change in % of households (M/F headed) expressing satisfaction with services
provided by Development Agents (DAs) in project versus non-project woredas.
ix
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at appraisal;
according to 2008 survey:
HS: M=15% F=14%
MS: M=40% F=34%
NA 50%
“satisfied.”
Farmers rating
DA's advice as
“very helpful”
01/01/2010: 72%
(non-RCBP: 57%)
endline: 52% (non-
RCBP: 60%)
Date achieved 08/01/2008 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Household survey showed a statistically significant and higher level of
satisfaction for project households during extension capacity building (midterm
survey), but a decrease in satisfaction in endline survey.
Indicator 5:
Change in % of households (farm and pastoralist) involved in the adoption and/or
development of new technologies and practices in project versus non-project
woredas.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at appraisal;
according to 2008 survey:
32.54%
NA 50%
Farmers having
tried new activities
demonstrated by
DAs
01/01/2010: 54%
(non-RCBP: 48%)
endline: 48% (non-
RCBP: 49%)
Date achieved 08/01/2008 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Higher adoption in RCBP areas during time of extension capacity building
(midterm survey), but some decline at endline.
Indicator 6: Change in % of women-headed households (farmers and pastoralists) adopting
new technologies and practices in project versus non-project woredas.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA NA 40%
Tried new
activities:
Project: M 50%, F
41%
Control: M 53%
F37%
Date achieved 01/01/2007 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
From mid- to endline, the percentage of female-headed households has improved
compared to male-headed; however, this improvement is less in project woredas
than control woredas.
x
Indicator 7: Change in number of new extension methods used by DAs.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
On-farm trials
Farm visits NA
At least one
new method
and one
modified
RCBP-promoted
new/modified
methods:
• FTC Training and
demonstration
• FRGs modified to
FREGs
• FIFs introduced
• Scaling-up of
farmers’ best
practices
Date achieved 01/01/2007 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Quantitative target exceeds target; effectiveness of new methods mixed.
Indicator 8: Change in % of households (M/F headed, farmers, pastoralists) having
participated in any FRG/FREG extension approaches.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at appraisal; Male
=3.4%; Female =3.1%
according to 2008 survey.
NA Male = 20%
Female = 15%
Total RCBP FREG
members:
M = 11,707 (0.14%
of households), F
(0.51% of
households)
Date achieved 08/01/2008 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Data refer to the total membership in FREGs; proportion of households
calculated as percentage of households in RCBP woredas in parentheses.
Indicator 9: Change in % of multi-disciplinary and/or multi-institutional research projects.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at appraisal; 30%
according to EIAR survey
in 2008.
NA 70% 72% according to
EIAR.
Date achieved 08/01/2008 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Target surpassed. Relevance and attributability of results unclear.
Indicator 10: Change in % of expenditures based on client's identified priorities.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at appraisal; 62.8%
according to survey in
2008.
NA 90% 100%
Date achieved 08/01/2008 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Actual value is based on judgment by PMU and EIAR on the basis of how
priority research problems are identified and funded. Relevance and
attributability of results somewhat unclear.
Indicator 11: Change in % of farmers (M/F) expressing satisfaction with the technologies
introduced.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at appraisal; 76.5%
according to survey in
2008.
NA 90%
75% modest and
11.5% high
satisfaction
xi
Date achieved 08/01/2008 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Preliminary findings from case study (Beyene et al.) suggest institutional
capacity building and reforms have not yet yielded results on the ground.
Indicator 12: Change in % of time taken from commencement of research to technology
release.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at appraisal; 5-7 years
according to survey in
2008.
NA 3-5 years
Years:
Annual crops, 1-3
Perennials, 4-10
Poultry and fish,
3-4
Hybrid breeds,15-
20
Feeds, 2-3
Forestry, 5-7
Soil and water,
2-5
Mechanization, 1-3
Date achieved 08/01/2008 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Results differ by type of technology; but technology shopping has markedly
reduced time for technology development/adaptation. Direct attributability to
RCBP unclear.
Indicator 13: Change in % of satisfaction of NARS partners with the system.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at appraisal; 15.8%,
as measured by
stakeholder survey in
2008.
NA 90% 100%
Date achieved 08/01/2008 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
All stakeholders have signed NARS coordination document and have expressed
satisfaction with the proposed system. However, system not yet implemented.
Indicator 14: Increased volume of trade in agricultural commodities through the ECX.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at appraisal; zero as
per definition as ECX not
yet active.
NA
10% of
marketed
surplus of
commodities
traded.
Corn: smaller 1%
Coffee: 90%
Sesame: NA
Pulses: NA
Oilseeds: NA
Date achieved 08/01/2007 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator lacks direct relevance to measure impact of RCBP interventions,
especially at this time (end of project is too early).
Indicator 15: Number of live animals exported after undergoing quarantine procedures in
Ethiopia.
Value
(quantitative or
qualitative)
NA at appraisal; zero as
per definition. NA 2,000 Zero
Date achieved 08/01/2007 01/01/2007 12/12/2008 06/30/2012
xii
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Actual refers to exports via Metema (and Humera). No results achieved since
investments have not been completed.
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
No. Date ISR
Archived DO IP
Actual
Disbursements
(US$ millions)
1 10/10/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00
2 04/13/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.50
3 08/11/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.50
4 11/08/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 8.50
5 01/24/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 8.50
6 07/16/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately
Unsatisfactory 8.58
7 01/14/2009 Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory 12.00
8 09/22/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 23.48
9 04/16/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 31.55
10 10/06/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 39.38
11 06/04/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 42.70
12 03/11/2012 Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory 43.07
13 07/11/2012 Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory 43.96
H. Restructuring (if any)
Restructuring
Date(s)
Board
Approved
PDO Change
ISR Ratings at
Restructuring
Amount
Disbursed at
Restructuring
in
US$ millions
Reason for Restructuring &
Key Changes Made DO IP
12/12/2008 Y MS MU 11.24 Strengthen M&E; simplify
design; reallocating funds
10/21/2011 MS MS 43.03 Extension of closing date;
reallocation of funds
06/14/2012 MU MU 43.96 Reallocation of funds
If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving
body) enter ratings below:
Outcome Ratings
Against Original PDO/Targets Moderately Satisfactory
Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets Moderately Satisfactory
Overall (weighted) rating Moderately Satisfactory
xiii
I. Disbursement Profile
1
1. Project Context, Development Objectives, and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal
Country and Sector Background: Ethiopia is one of the most populous countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and also one of the poorest. Although the country has abundant resources
and good potential for development, poverty has been endemic and often linked to
environmental and natural resource degradation. According to the 2004/05 Household
Income, Consumption, and Expenditure survey, approximately 38.7 percent of people fell
below the basic needs poverty line.
Already in the 1990s, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) had laid out its development
strategy for “Agricultural Development-Led Industrialisation” (ADLI) and started a
reform program aimed at poverty reduction through rapid economic growth and
macroeconomic stability. These efforts were continued in the 2000s and resulted in
important gains, especially in human development, transport, and the development of
small towns. Food security, however, remained a major concern and agriculture had
grown only about 2.6 percent annually between 1994/95 and 2004/05, with a wide
variation around trend due to rainfall. Growth had largely been driven by expansion in
land area. Even so, high population growth meant that the area cultivated per family was
declining over the longer term. At the time of the appraisal of the Rural Capacity
Building Project (RCBP) in 2006, agriculture contributed about 48 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) and employed about 85 percent of the population.
The government’s strategy. The GoE’s ADLI was also the basis for the GoE’s Program
for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) for the 2005-10
period.1 Many details of the strategy for agriculture had been developed in the GoE’s
2003 “Rural Development Policy and Strategies”. In short, it emphasized the central
place of agriculture in Ethiopia’s development strategy, and the role of the government in
guiding this process and providing services for smallholder farmers was assessed to be
crucial for achieving national growth and poverty reduction objectives.
When the RCBP was appraised in April 2006, Ethiopia was well on its way to
significantly expand key agricultural systems and services. Already in 2001, the GoE had
launched an ambitious program to train about 66,000 new extension workers, called
Development Agents (DAs). To achieve this training target, it had established 25
Agriculture Technical Vocational Education and Training (ATVET) colleges. The DAs
were deployed in the Farmer Training Centers (FTCs), planned for each of about 18,000
kebeles (administrative villages) in the country. The target was to have three DAs in each
FTC/kebele—one specialized in livestock production, another in crop production, and
another in natural resources management. Additional DAs specialized in cooperative
1 PASDEP emphasized rural development led by agricultural growth, improved governance, decentralized
service delivery, and the reduction of vulnerability. Relative to the previous poverty reduction strategy,
PASDEP placed greater emphasis on the commercialization of agriculture, diversification of production
and exports, and private sector investment to help farmers move beyond subsistence farming to small-scale,
market-oriented agriculture.
2
development and veterinary services were to serve several villages. While only a small
share of villages had a FTC at the end of 2006, a third batch of graduates left the
ATVETs in 2006, and the number of DAs had already expanded to about half the target.
The national agricultural research system (NARS) had also seen significant expansion
and change, partly through the Agricultural Research and Training Project (ARTP)
funded by the International Development Association (IDA) and International Fund for
Agricultural Development (IFAD). In particular, Regional Agricultural Research
Institutes (RARIs) had been established and the number of research centers increased;
additional research areas were started or expanded, including biotechnology research.
The linkages between research and extension had increased through new approaches,
especially the Research/Extension Advisory Councils and Farmer Research Groups
(FRGs). Finally, it is worth noting that significant efforts to establishing an Ethiopian
Commodity Exchange (ECX) had started before appraisal.
Rationale for Bank assistance. Within the context of the GoE’s continued emphasis on
agriculture and its significant expansion of agricultural services, the Bank was requested
to support this development process through a capacity-building project. The GoE had
prepared the initial proposal for this project and already expanded on the relevant
programs using its own budgetary resources. The RCBP built on the Bank’s long
experience in the country as well as its experience with capacity-building programs in
other parts of the world. The project complemented the Bank’s and other Development
Partners’ past, ongoing, and planned portfolio in the country. It fit well with the Interim
Country Assistance Strategy (ICAS),2 which aimed to support the GoE in developing and
implementing, in consultation with citizens, a strengthened program of institution
building and governance reform for accelerated pro-poor growth. A strengthened public
administration, the provision of basic services, and improved agricultural productivity
were three of the five key areas of the ICAS.
1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDOs) and Key Indicators
The original objective of the project was “to assist Ethiopia to strengthen agricultural
services and systems for improved agricultural productivity, make them more responsive
to clients' needs, and enhance the capacity of producers to become aware of and to adopt
economically viable and environmentally sustainable technologies and practices.” The
key indicators of the project were:
Percentage of client farmers who believe that they have gained useful knowledge or
other long-lasting benefits due to the provision of research and/or advisory services
under RCBP.
Percentage of farm households with increased income due to adoption of
technologies and practices attributable to project intervention in targeted woredas
(districts).
Area (in hectares) on which technologies or practices attributable to project
activities have been adopted.
2 Discussed by the Board in May 2006.
3
Volume of trade in agricultural commodities through the Ethiopian Agricultural
Commodity Exchange.
1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators,
and reasons/justification
The PDO as revised by a project restructuring in December 2008 was: “to assist Ethiopia
to strengthen agricultural services and systems and make them more responsive to
clients’ needs.” The Key Indicators were revised to:3
Difference in income change of households (male/female-headed) between project
and non-project woredas.
Difference in productivity changes of main commodity between project and non-
project woredas.
Number of new agricultural activities adopted in project kebeles.
1.4 Main Beneficiaries
The ultimate beneficiaries of the project were male and female agricultural producers,
mostly with holdings of less than two hectares each. These farmers (including
pastoralists) constitute an overwhelming majority of Ethiopia’s farming population. The
project supported some activities that targeted these beneficiaries directly, in particular
under its Agricultural Extension Component (Component 2). For most project activities,
however, the benefits to farmers were more indirect. Most directly, the project targeted
the providers—both the overall systems and their personnel—of key agricultural services
as its primary beneficiary, specifically:
The colleges for ATVET, including specific federal ATVET colleges.
The agricultural extension system, including extension within the Ministry of
Agriculture (MoA), the regional Bureaus of Agriculture (BoAs),4 agricultural
offices at selected zones and woredas, as well as the FTCs and DAs in about 2,500
kebeles.
The NARS, including the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR), the
RARIs, and selected research centers of these institutions.
The ECX and selected quarantine facilities for live animals.5
1.5 Original Components (as approved)
The RCBP was designed with six components:
Component 1 - Agricultural Technical Vocational Education and Training
(ATVET) Capacity Building (US$ 6.3 million). This component aimed to: (i) develop a
strategic plan for the future of the ATVET colleges and provide technical assistance for
the implementation of the plan; (ii) strengthen the capacity of those colleges under the
federal MoARD; and support the transformation of selected ATVET colleges into
training institutions with new mandates identified in the strategic plan.
3 The intermediate results indicators were also revised and their number significantly reduced.
4 During project implementation, MoARD was renamed the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and BoARDs
were renamed Bureaus of Agriculture (BoAs). 5 Under the original PDO—in other words, before the 2008 project restructuring—a broader range of
sanitary and phytosanitary institutions were targeted.
4
Component 2 - Agricultural Extension Services (US$ 29.0 million). This component
aimed at improving the effectiveness of the agricultural extension program as it scaled
up, particularly with regard to its capacity to respond to the expressed needs of farmers
(especially market-oriented farmers), to enhance women’s participation and gender
equality mainstreaming in all aspects of the extension system, and to support the
emergence of non–public sector agricultural services as an additional feature of extension
services in Ethiopia. It was designed to (i) strengthen the capacity of the government
system, including the federal, regional and woreda extension officers, subject matter
specialists (SMSs), and women’s affairs officers, through training and equipment; and to
provide short-term training to DAs; (ii) to equip about 2,500 FTCs; (iii) to introduce
institutional innovations, namely the Farmer Advisory Service Fund and the Advisory
Service Development Fund; and (iv) to support Research/Extension /Farmer Linkage
Advisory Councils and Farmer-Researcher-Extension Groups (FREGs).
Component 3 - Agricultural Research (US$ 22.3 million). The core objectives of this
component was (i) to facilitate institutional innovation of the NARS by enhancing the
participation of key stakeholders in priority setting, resource allocation, implementation,
and (ii) to reinforce NARS human and physical capacity, both for making the NARS
more efficient and effective in generating and disseminating client-demanded and
market-oriented technologies and information, and through activities such as a
competitive agricultural research fund and support for biotechnology and other priority
research areas.
Component 4 - Improving Information and Communication Systems within
MoARD (US$ 3.0 million). This component aimed at strengthening MoARD’s capacity
to coordinate, monitor, and evaluate initiatives in the agricultural sector by building
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) capacity at federal, regional, woreda,
and FTC levels.
Component 5 - Development of Agricultural Market Institutions (US$ 7.0 million).
This component aimed to support analytical work geared toward understanding and
developing practical solutions for market constraints. It also aimed to support the
development of an Ethiopian Agricultural Commodity Exchange. Finally, it aimed to
support the strengthening and development of sanitary and phytosanitary standards and
the institutions needed to utilize them.
Component 6 - Project Management (US$ 3.4 million). The component was to support
a Project Management Unit (PMU) and Focal Persons in the various Implementing
Agencies (IAs). They were to be directed by Federal and Regional Steering Committees.
1.6 Revised Components
The December 2008 project restructuring maintained the six components, but sub-
components and activities under all components except for Components 1 and 6 were
revised as follows.
5
Component 2 - Agricultural Extension Services. The Farmer Advisory Service Fund
and the Advisory Service Development Fund under Sub-component 2.3 Institutional
Innovation was replaced by a Farmer Innovation Fund (FIF) that aimed at supporting
small-scale innovations at the request of farmer groups.
Component 3 - Agricultural Research. Funding for region-specific research was
decided to be channeled through the National Agricultural Research Fund (NARF)
mechanism instead of establishing a separate Regional Agricultural Research Fund
(RARF) for each participating region.
Component 4 - Improving Information and Communication Systems within
MoARD. The component was to be completed after the installation of ICT equipment
that was under procurement. Other planned activities were proposed for non-project
funding and cancelled under the funding for this project.
Component 5 - Development of Agricultural Market Institutions. Sub-component 5.1
was limited to the support for Technology Solutions to the ECX; the activities for Market
Policy Support under this sub-component were cancelled. Sub-component 5.2 was
reduced to focus only on the support for a quarantine facility for the export of live
animals and would not include any activities related to phytosanitary standards.
1.7 Other Significant Changes
Based on the request from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED),
the project was restructured three times during implementation:
First restructuring: December 2008. The first restructuring was discussed during the
May/June 2008 supervision mission. It was triggered, above all, by the slow
implementation progress at the beginning of the project, the (related) complexity of the
project, and weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The main objective of the
restructuring was to strengthen the project’s focus by adjusting and simplifying its PDO,
its Results Framework, and the component design:
(i) The PDO statement was simplified. The revision clarified the project’s focus on
the strengthening of agricultural services and systems. The reference to agricultural
productivity and to the capacity of the producers (farmers) was removed from the
PDO. See Section 1.3 for the revised PDO.
(ii) The Results Framework indicators were reduced in number, better aligned with
the government’s own monitoring systems, and defined to ensure measurability and
establish a baseline. See Section 1.3 and Data Sheet F for revised indicators.
(iii) The project design was also simplified and a number of changes were made to
sub-components and activities. See Section 1.6 for details.
In addition, the sum of US$ 13 million was cancelled to allocate this amount for an
emergency Fertilizer Support Project to the Ethiopia-Food Crisis Response Program,
6
processed under the Global Food Crisis Response Program.6 This change particularly
affected Sub-component 3.2 Reinforcing NARS Capacity and Component 4. The
cancellation of resources was justified in the context of the emergency program and given
that the RCBP had disbursed little.7
Second and third restructuring: October 2011 and June 2012. Two smaller (Level II)
restructurings of the project were done to extend the project by eight months from
October 2011to June 2012 (to permit sufficient time for some specific activities)8 and to
reallocate funds between components (to reflect changes implementation progress and
costs).
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry
Project preparation took place over three-and-a-half years: Identification was in October
2002 and appraisal in April 2006. The project became effective in December 2006. The
core of the project design—namely, a focus on the three areas of agricultural vocational
education and training, agricultural extension, and agricultural research—remained
consistent throughout this period. Substantial changes were made, however, with respect
to the formulation of the PDO; the detailed design (including the addition of other
components); and the funding scope of the project, which varied from US$ 150 million at
the concept stage to over US$ 350 million at the time of the Quality Enhancement
Review (February 2004) and US$ 71 million at appraisal.
Adequacy of government commitment. During the rather long preparation period, the
GoE moved ahead with its ambitious program to expand agricultural information and
knowledge services. The GoE team, supported by the World Bank, involved key
stakeholders in the preparation, although mostly at the federal level; and this preparation
process also influenced the agricultural services as they were expanded and shaped. The
preparation process was clearly driven by the GoE and its strong commitment to
strengthen these services for the benefit of smallholder farmers in line with its
development strategies (see Section 1.1). The extent to which the GoE sought support
from the proposed project and from the Bank to strengthen its program of reforms and
service expansion varied, however.9 This variation could have arisen from different levels
of commitments and understanding within the government and some uneasiness on
behalf of the government with some of the approaches recommended by the Bank,
particularly stronger private sector engagement in agricultural services. In addition, the
6 In fact, Board approval for the project’s restructuring was part of the package for the Ethiopia Food Crisis
Response Program in December 2012. 7 The cancellation was also partly offset by Additional Financing available to the project due to the
appreciation of the SRD and the CAD over the US dollar and Ethiopian birr. 8 In particular: (i) further accompany the implementation of innovation grants under Component 1; (ii)
construction and equipment of livestock quarantine stations; and (iii) delivery of IT equipment to the ECX,
both under Component 5; and (iv) conducting the in-depth impact evaluation. 9 One indication is that the Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) preparation grant
(US$ 759,500), which was requested by the government and approved in November 2003, was little used;
it closed in June 2006 having expended only US$ 102,800 for a study on agricultural input markets.
7
GoE’s priorities for the project support evolved over time. Specifically, in response to the
GoE’s request, Components 4 and 5 were added only after appraisal was formally
completed.
Soundness of background analysis. The GoE, Bank, and other stakeholders, including
researchers, had done in-depth work on understanding the issues and developing the
strategy for the agricultural sector and the agricultural services to be strengthened by the
project.10
Moreover, the GoE and the Bank had worked for years on issues of capacity
building, throughout the long preparation period and under other tasks, particularly the
ARTP. Lessons from this joint experience, and experience from outside the country, were
reflected in the project design.
Assessment of project design. The overall technical design of the three core components
(Components 1–3) was adequate overall. It was based on strong government commitment
and consultation with key stakeholders, an in-depth understanding of the issues, and
intensive although not always smooth GoE and Bank engagement. The design provided
clear value added to the expanding GoE program by emphasizing: (i) the linkages
between ATVETs, extension, and research, through supporting strategies (Components 1
and 3) and activities such as the Advisory Councils and FREGs (Component 2); (ii) the
coordination of programs and institutions, including coordination between the federal and
regional levels; (iii) gender and other cross-cutting issues; and (iv) approaches to make
service delivery more demand-driven. The project design was, however, highly
ambitious–more commensurate with a much larger funding scope than available at
appraisal–and had some serious drawbacks:
Complexity. The design of the ATVET, agricultural extension, and agricultural
research components could have been simplified somewhat by focusing on fewer
sub-components and activities.11
More crucially, the late additions, Components 4
and 5, were hardly designed, did not fit within the overall concept and added
unnecessary complexity.
PDO, Results Framework, and M&E arrangements. The PDO was formulated
in a rather complex way, referring to objectives at the level of both service
delivery and farmers. For delivering services to farmers, the project aimed at a
rather high level of impact. The Results Framework had too many indicators, and
the M&E arrangements were not well developed. In particular, no baseline was
put in place and no targets defined.
Risk assessment. The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) had identified several potential
risks and spelled out mitigation measures deemed appropriate at that time. In hindsight,
some risks were underestimated and exacerbated by the design flaws. In particular,
10
Specific studies are referred to in Annex 12 of the PAD. With respect to the government’s strategy, see in
particular the “Rural Development Policy and Strategies” (2003). With respect to the Bank’s own work, see
the comprehensive report, Ethiopia: Policies for Pro-Poor Agricultural Growth (2006, unpublished). 11
Alternatively, for example, the project could have supported only one type of grant under Component
1.2; supported only one innovation fund under Component 2.3; or simply promoted a regional “window”
under the National Agricultural Research Fund (NARF) (as referred to in the PAD), rather than developing
and implementing Regional Agricultural Research Funds (RARFs) as agreed and reflected in the Financing
Agreement and Project Implementation Manual.
8
insufficient attention was paid to the continuity of staffing and the high risk of staff
turnover throughout the agricultural public service sector. The challenges of coordination
across the relevant institutions and levels of government were underestimated as well.
This was true for coordinating with the Implementing Agencies (IAs), including the
regions), but also included coordination with the MoE for the governance of the
ATVETs.12
2.2 Implementation
Project implementation was facilitated by an overall positive sector environment.13
The
GoE has maintained its commitment to agricultural development, as demonstrated by the
substantial national budget allocations for the sector (including AVETs, extension, and
agricultural research) and a continued focus and evolution in policies oriented toward
improving service delivery.14
The RCBP was seen as an important instrument for
supporting the agenda of expanding agricultural service delivery. Throughout
implementation, the agricultural sector in Ethiopia saw significant growth. Even so,
implementation was not without significant challenges:
Implementation of the project started slowly. By the end of 2008 (in other words, two
years after effectiveness), the use of IDA funds was still largely limited to funds from the
initial disbursement into the Designated Account, and Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) funds were used even more slowly. The long
implementation delays had two main reasons. First, it took substantial time to make the
PMU and the various IAs, including the Regional BoAs and WoARDs, fully operational.
For example, most PMU personnel were hired in the third quarter of 2007, and almost all,
including the coordinator, were new to the project and to managing any project of this
kind and scope. Staff turnover in MoARD and other IAs during and after preparation
(appraisal was in April 2006) led to coordination weaknesses and other implementation
challenges, as new staff needed time to understand the project’s many design features and
modalities.15
The second major reason for the slow start-up was the so-called Business Process Re-
engineering (BPR) exercise, a country-wide process to improve public service delivery
performance and efficiency. This process, led by the Ministry of Capacity Building, was
undertaken in all levels of the government, including all agencies implementing the
RCBP. Many organizations needed several years to complete the process. Whatever the
12
The creation of the PMU as well as the Steering and Technical Committees was a necessary but
insufficient means of responding to and mitigating these risks. More attention should have been given to
providing incentives for PMU staff and key employees throughout the system as well as to providing
stronger coordination mechanisms or developing a simpler design. 13
The macroeconomic environment was also positive overall. Inflation was at double-digit rates in all
implementation years but 2009 and 2010, however, with high peaks in 2008 and 2011. This situation
created uncertainties for project planning and significant cost variations. 14
Budget allocations for agriculture (excluding natural resources management) stayed relatively flat in real
local currency terms from 2006/07 to 20011/12, but decreased as a share of the total budget. For more
details see Annex 3. 15
On the Bank side, the Task Team Leader (TTL) changed immediately after Board approval and again
shortly thereafter, in late 2007.
9
merits of the BPR and the additional impetus it gave to administrative reforms, including
reforms in organizations in the agricultural sector, the process was time-consuming,
disruptive overall, and it accelerated staff turnover.
The project restructuring in 2008 was a timely reaction to the slow initial
implementation. Restructuring strengthened the focus of the PDO, simplified the Results
Indicators, and ensured that the baseline and targets were set. It also led to a revision of
components and reduction in the number of activities. Activities such as the Farmer
Farmers’ Advisory Service Fund and the Advisory Service Development Fund, which
lacked government ownership, were cancelled. Nevertheless, the restructuring could
arguably have been more forceful. In particular, the restructuring brought Component 4
to a rapid close but left its objective unchanged; and Component 5 remained, with a
simplified Sub-component 5.2 Development of Quarantine Facility for Live Animals and
an increase in total funding for Sub-component 5.1 Development of ECX. The
restructuring also prompted cancellation of US$ 13 million for reallocation to the
emergency Food Crisis Response Program. While the reallocation seemed justified, given
the RCBP’s lack of disbursement, the downscaling translated into unmet funding
potential toward the end of implementation.
The restructuring also did not fully resolve all weaknesses in project management,
including related to coordination, M&E, financial management, and procurement (see
Sections 2.3 and 2.4). However, a major underlying reason was the high staff turnover
occurring throughout the public administration and service sector. Staff turnover was also
a problem at the PMU, mainly due to insufficient remuneration of staff, and this problem
was alleviated when CIDA took over the payment of key PMU staff under improved
conditions; however, at that time the PMU also took on the additional responsibility for
the coordination in Ethiopia of the East Africa Agricultural Productivity Project
(EAAPP).
Nevertheless, after the restructuring the project got into full implementation and most
activities were implemented by the original closing date. This was further supported by a
Midterm Review (MTR) in June–July 2010 and two smaller (level 2) restructurings
toward the end of the project. The project was extended by eight months, but
performance during this time turned out to be unsatisfactory. The additional time helped,
however, to complete the survey work and data analysis for the impact evaluation as well
as a number of case studies assessing different project activities.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization
M&E design. As discussed previously in Sections 1.7 and 2.2, the PDO was defined in a
somewhat complex manner. The Results Framework indicators—36 in total—were too
numerous, and neither a baseline nor specific targets existed at appraisal. At the time of
the first restructuring in December 2008, the PDO was revised; the number of indicators
was reduced and refined, partly for better alignment with the government’s own M&E
systems; and a baseline was established and targets set for most indicators in 2008. A
complete baseline, including PDO indicators, was available only at midterm in April
2010, however, based on a household survey conducted in December 2009 and January
10
2010. Despite these efforts, some shortcomings remained. A particular shortcoming was
the disconnect between the wording of the PDO and its indicators, which the 2008
restructuring left at a rather high level of measuring impact at the farm level.
M&E utilization during project implementation. Weaknesses in the implementation of
the M&E system persisted throughout much of the project period. The PMU—and by
extension the Federal Steering Committee and Bank-CIDA team—did not always have
timely and reliable data and information to support effective oversight of the project’s
activities and progress. M&E, like other aspects of project management, suffered from
high staff turnover in the PMU and throughout the IAs. New staff required training in
collecting, using, and reporting data, which disrupted the project’s M&E activities.
Several efforts were made to improve M&E. Quite substantial information has been
generated, analyzed, and discussed at the end of the project to assess the project’s results.
Two household surveys were conducted before mid-term and at the end of a project
respectively and, on their basis, an impact evaluation was completed; and four case
studies were commissioned to assess specific aspects of the project’s achievements and
discuss next steps and sustainability. The case studies focused on the Agricultural and
Rural Development Partners Linkage Advisory Councils (ARDPLACs), ATVETs, DAs,
FREGs, and the research component; see references in Annex 10.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
Safeguard issues. The RCBP, a Category B project, had triggered OP 4.01
Environmental Assessment and OP4.12 Involuntary Resettlement. It had developed and
disclosed an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and a
Resettlement Policy Framework. The ESMF provided checklists for social and
environmental screening, and specific instruments were developed based on screening
results for sub-projects/interventions. Although application of the ESMF checklist
required constant reminders by the Bank, the project largely complied with the Bank’s
safeguard policies, and very few safeguard issues arose. The most significant of these
involved land acquisition for the Metema Quarantine Station, which affected 12
households. The construction of the quarantine station was put on hold until the
Resettlement Action Plan was prepared and fully implemented. Another issue involved
small-scale irrigation supported through the FREG mechanism in Benishangul-Gumuz,
where remedial actions were required to address environmental concerns.
Financial management. During the life of the project, the overall financial management
rating of the project ranged from moderately unsatisfactory to moderately satisfactory.
Particular challenges were related to internal audit oversight; delays in regions and
woredas submitting statements of expenditures (which caused a high level of failure to
settle advances to regions on time); and weaknesses in the control and monitoring of the
project’s budget at the federal and regional levels. A general problem was low financial
management capacity at the woreda level, mainly related to high staff turnover. Many
improvements were achieved during the life of the project, such as ensuring the timely
submission of reports (audited and unaudited); taking timely action on audit reports (all
11
reports, except for the second year, were qualified); and increased supervision during the
last years of the project. For more details see the Financial Management ICR.
Procurement. Apart from the initial two years of implementation, when procurement was
rated satisfactory, assessments ranged from moderately unsatisfactory to moderately
satisfactory. Procurement took place in the various IAs, including in the regional bureaus
and woreda offices of agriculture. Procurement weaknesses were an important reason for
delayed implementation. Key issues during implementation related to the number and
capacity of procurement staff and to planning, monitoring, and follow-up. At the regional
level, the BoAs’ purchasing divisions were generally understaffed. Woreda-level
procurement was done by finance office staff with often had inadequate procurement
skills. The PMU provided support to IAs, and the project invested in training, but high
staff turnover reduced its impact. The planning and monitoring of procurement activity at
the regional level was weak, and so were internal controls.
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
Transition arrangements. For the most part, arrangements are in place to follow up on
the project’s achievements. First, a number of activities that could not be completed due
to delays or insufficient funding are being implemented with other funding, especially
activities under Component 5 but also some of the long-term training and NARF/RARF
research sub-projects, and other activities. Second, the PMU remains operational, with a
focus on the EAAPP. Third, many innovations introduced by the project are being
institutionalized in regular government systems or have been taken up by other projects.
Probably most critical of all, the coordination mechanisms for the NARS can rely on the
Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA) as an independent actor to facilitate its
implementation.16
Follow-on project. No direct follow-on project to the RCBP is envisioned. The
Government, the Bank and other Development Partners continue to support essentially all
areas supported by the RCBP through various activities. It remains vital that the strategic
directions for and linkages between these knowledge systems receive adequate attention.
Mechanisms are, for example, the ARDPLACs or the Government/Development Partners
Sector Working Group for Rural Economic Development and Food Security.
Future impact evaluation. Given the absence of a direct successor project for the RCBP,
a further impact evaluation after two or three years of project closing would seem
important to assess the sustainability of the project’s achievements and the direction the
various institutional developments.
16
Future funding for new rounds of competitive agricultural research is not yet secured, but the research
system is actively pursuing this goal. FIFs and FREGs have been taken up as potentially useful methods for
disseminating agricultural technologies by the Agricultural Growth Program (AGP) and the EAAPP, and
they could also promote innovation among food-insecure communities under the Household Asset Building
Program of the GoE’s Food Security Program 2010-2014. ARDPLACs will also continue to be funded by
external (project) resources, mainly the AGP. ATVETs already receive follow-up and successor support
from the Dutch and German development agencies, while CIDA is exploring options to do so as well.
12
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
Relevance of objectives.17
The objectives of the project remain highly relevant and
important to Ethiopia’s social and economic development. Despite the significant
economic development that has occurred in Ethiopia, agriculture remains the country’s
most important sector. Similar to the situation at appraisal, it remains the main income
source for about 85 percent of the rural population and accounts for more than 45 percent
of GDP and about 85 percent of export earnings. Food insecurity remains high,
agricultural productivity has improved but is still at low levels, and the transition from
subsistence to commercial farming remains important for many years to come.
The importance of the sector in general and the key knowledge and information systems
specifically also continue to be fully aligned with the government’s current development
strategy and the Bank’s strategy. The Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP, 2009/10-
2014/15)18
has especially ambitious agricultural growth targets to “contribute to poverty
reduction,” which it mainly aims to achieve by focusing “on the transfer of improved
agricultural technologies” (GTP, p. 19f). The current Country Partnership Strategy for
Ethiopia19
recognizes the central role of agriculture (and industry) for growth and job
creation and aims for the following outcomes (among others): “increasing agriculture
productivity and marketing in selected areas” and “improving public service performance
management and responsiveness.”
Relevance of design and implementation: The core design of the project—focusing on
ATVETs, agricultural extension, and agricultural research—remains highly relevant. The
GoE and donors will have to continue to strengthen and evolve the technology
information and knowledge systems for many years to come, and they are doing so by
building on many RCBP achievements. The major drawback of the design is its
complexity. The linkages between agricultural vocational education, extension and
research are important, but they are achieved through specific activities under the various
component rather than the common project as such. 20
More importantly, while
agricultural marketing and sanitary and phytosanitary or food safety issues are of great
and increasing importance for Ethiopia, strengthening these systems should be done
through separate operations.
17
The discussion refers to the PDO both at appraisal and after the 2008 restructuring—that is, more
specifically to “strengthen agricultural services and systems and make them more responsive to clients'
needs” and thereby lead to greater producer/farmer capacity and ultimately increased agricultural
productivity and income. 18
As stated in Section 1.1, they are also clearly in line with the PASDEP, the previous development plan. 19
Dated April 2, 2008; Report No. 43051-ET. The objectives are also fully consistent with the 2008
Country Assistance Strategy, dated August 29, 2012; Report No. 71884-ET. 20
International experience shows high returns on simultaneous investment into both, research and
extension. The project achieves these through supporting demand-oriented strategies for ATVETs and the
NARS and specific activities fostering linkages such as ARDPLACs and FREGs.
13
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives: Moderately Satisfactory
The project has achieved–with moderate shortcomings–its objective of strengthening
agricultural services and systems and making them more responsive to clients’ needs.21
This Section firstly discusses the outcomes as measured by the PDO indicators related to
farmers’ technology adoption and agricultural productivity and income increase.22
It then
assesses the improvements of agricultural services and systems by component, based on
evidence from the Intermediate Outcome indicators (see Data Sheet F), outcomes (see
Annex 2) and the case studies references in Annex 10.
The project had positive impact on the ultimate beneficiaries, i.e., the farm households.
Solid evidence for this is provided by the impact evaluation that is based on two
household surveys, one taken in December 2009 / January 2010 and the other one at the
end of the Project. As implementation had effectively only started in 2009, the first
survey can serve as a baseline for farmer behavior and farm activities. Both surveys cover
the same households in both project and non-project (control) areas. The methodology
used to estimate impact is propensity score matching, combined with a difference in
differences.
The (agricultural) income difference between project and control households (PDO
indicator 1) increased by about ETB 163 from “baseline” to endline. This result is
statistically significant and exceeds the target. This positive outcome is backed up by
significant improvements observed for related indicators such as household assets and
labor. Measures of agricultural productivity (PDO indicator 2) were difficult to compare
over the two time periods, but productivity for main crops is higher in project than
control areas at the endline, though this is not statistically significant. The impact
evaluation shows that rather than yield increases in staples the more significant changes
in farming practices occurred through (statistically significant) increases in livestock and
a higher adoption of high-value crops.23
Finally, the project increased the number of new
agricultural activities in the project areas and the target of two per kebele was exceeded
(PDO indicator 3). While the more in-depth analysis also raises important questions
about the results and their sustainability (see Annex 5), the impacts for farmers in project
households are clearly positive.
There is also component-specific evidence that the project has largely achieved its
objective. In particular, Component 1 to 3 have strengthened the agricultural knowledge
and information services by facilitating important institutional changes and innovations
and a number of activities to improve the capacity of human and physical resources. But
not everything worked well and much was implemented late in the life of the project,
21
The ICR guidelines recommend that the project outcome should be assessed and rated against the PDO,
both before and after restructuring. For the purpose of this project, such approach yields only limited
additional information and is therefore presented only in Annex 9. 22
Section 2.3 already acknowledges a disconnect between these indicators and the wording of the (post
2008 restructuring) PDO. Nevertheless, these indicators serve as an important measure of the efficacy of an
improved agricultural services system, in particular agricultural extension. Jointly with the Intermediate
Outcome indicators they provide a balanced assessment of the project’s outcomes. 23
Some technologies were adopted rapidly. For instance, the introduction of potatoes in one woreda spread
and covered a significant share of the area at the end of the project.
14
remains fragile, and requires time for further improvement and evidence of impact.
Specifically:
Component 1 - ATVETs. The component has strengthened the ATVET system by
developing and implementation of a strategic plan for the future of the ATVET
colleges, even though this is approved only by MoA rather than broader stakeholders
and is not yet fully utilized; and by supporting the development of Operational
Standards and Assessment Tools, training in curriculum development and the
preparation of Training, Teaching, Learning Materials (TTLM). Moreover, the
Institutional Strengthening Grants (ISG) provided to four federal colleges (Agarfa,
Alage, Ardaita and Bekoji) and the Development Innovation Grants (DIG)24
provided
to two of them (Ardaita and Agarfa) have significantly contributed to enhance the
quality of their education. The improvements are reflected in an increased satisfaction
of both, the main employers recruiting from ATVET colleges, i.e., WoARD
recruiting DAs, and the students/graduates themselves.
Component 2 - Agricultural Extension Services. This component, by far the largest
(it used about 48 percent of project funds), has strengthened the agricultural extension
system through a wide range of activities including training of DAs, other public
employees and kebele administration members; capacitating about 2,337 FTCs;
supporting the development of 698 FIF groups and 877 FREGs; and multi-
stakeholder ARDPLACs at all levels of government. Moreover, as the agricultural
extension system is maturing, the advice provided to farmers has become more
responsive to the specific agro-ecological conditions and to scaling up best practices
from farmer to farmer; and the project supported these developments. Staff in the
extension system show overall satisfaction with the activities and the number of
extension approaches increased. Farmers’ were also more satisfied and adopted more
technology at the time of DA training and FTC capacitating–and this has led to
increased productivity and income over time (see above). However, at project
completion satisfaction and technology adoption rates had decreased, in particular for
female-headed households. This can be partly explained by positive spill-over and
non-project areas were “catching up” and implementing activities similar to that of
RCBP;25
but it also raises questions of sustainability (see Section 4) and requires
further investigation.
Component 3 - Agricultural Research. This component has strengthened the
agricultural research system, but many activities were implemented very late so that
their full impact is yet to be seen. The crucial mechanism to coordinate the
institutions responsible for agricultural research was agreed upon by all stakeholders
at the very end of the project.26
This mechanism is a crucial step in coordinating
24
The distinction between the ISGs and the DIGs was not obvious– all grants were used for priority needs. 25
The Government “off-set” project funding through changes in fiscal transfers to local governments, so
that project and non-project areas had the same financial resources. 26
Several earlier attempts at reaching agreement had been undertaken, but conflicting interests, especially
between EIAR and RARIs, continued for several years. The agreed NARS document was now signed by
relevant all constituencies and after being endorsed by the Prime Minister. It is referred to the Legal Unit of
15
research more effectively—arriving almost twenty years after the first research
centers were decentralized and came to be administered by the respective regional
governments. The prospects of effective implementation are positive, not the least
given ATA’s involvement as an independent actor and agency promoting private
sector involvement (e.g., for seed production). The component also supported the
development and implementation of a Gender Strategy, Action Plan, and Gender
Mainstreaming Guideline and Implementation Procedures; and of Planning,
Monitoring, and Evaluation procedures as well as a computerized management
system. While all these instruments have been adopted by EIAR, they can now be
brought to full use through the NARD coordination mechanisms. The component also
contributed to making research more demand-oriented, i.e. focusing on how basic
research impact agriculture, including through applied and adaptive research. The
introduction of technology shopping as well as the support of biotechnology
laboratories show some initial encouraging results in areas crucial for an effective
agricultural research system. So do the many training and physical capacity-building
activities, in particular for the emerging regions. Finally, the component set up a
competitive research fund and financed a total of 79 research projects under this
mechanism. Despite significant implementation challenges and delays, the
mechanism was working and transparent, and scientists were generally satisfied with
it. While it is premature to judge research results, dissemination and use downstream,
international experience suggests that competitive research funds are an effective
mechanism for developing usable outputs from time-bound downstream research. The
Intermediate Outcome indicators under this Component have been largely achieved.
However, the project has achieved little of its aims to improve information and
communication systems within MoARD (Component 4) and strengthen agricultural
marketing systems (Component 5):
Component 4 - Improving Information and Communication Systems within
MoARD. This small component equipped project WoARDs with information
technology and connected them to the internet. The strengthened ICT capacity is
benefiting the extension system, in particular, but the impact in terms of strengthening
MoARD’s capacity to coordinate, monitor, and evaluate initiatives in the agricultural
sector was very modest.
Component 5 - Development of Agricultural Market Institutions. Sub-component
5.1 supported the ECX, once it was established and commenced trading in April
2008. The financing of electronic display tickers in market towns and of a price
information system through interactive voice response and short message system have
helped to increase market transparency and the marketing of commodities through the
ECX. The project also supported an improved electronic Trading Application and
Support Center, but was only able to finance the hardware. The impact of this system
will be achieved only when the software is fully functional and ECX is pursuing this
the Prime Minister office as well as the Standing Committee in the House of Representatives for further
scrutiny for any legal implications it may have.
16
goal with non-project funding. While the ECX is today the market for trading
hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of coffee and other commodities, very little of
this can be attributed to the project.27
Sub-component 5.2 was restructured to focus on
the development of the Metema Quarantine Station. It financed the design study for
both Metema and a second quarantine station in Humera, but for various reasons did
not achieve its objective during implementation; the government has now taken over
the financing of establishing these stations. While the there is a strong likelihood that
the objectives under Component 5 will be achieved over time, only a relatively small
part can be attributed to the project.
3.3 Efficiency
Project costs were reasonable in comparison with recognized norms. For example, staff
training, one of the largest cost items under the project, was done relatively cheaply.
Long-term training occurred mostly at local universities and, if done abroad, was done
mostly in developing countries. Short-term training relied mostly on current training staff,
involved relatively large groups of trainees, and used facilities that were available
relatively cheaply. Trainees were supported with small amounts for subsistence/per diem.
The same cost-consciousness was evident throughout the project28
and is reflected in the
reasonable costs for most activities. 29
Project costs were also efficient in comparison with benefits. The project used only about
US$ 62.3 million (88.7 percent of the estimate at appraisal), because US$ 13 million of
IDA funds were cancelled, and only a small part of the cancelled funds was compensated
by government contributions and exchange rate gains. The project resources represent
only a fraction of the expenditure on agricultural service systems. Evidence from
international studies and some assessments in Ethiopia shows that investments in
agricultural vocational education, training, extension, and research yield high returns, and
Ethiopia’s investments in these areas remain quite modest, especially with respect to
agricultural research.
Project resources made important contributions to strengthening capacity; promoting
innovation; and building or developing institutions. The longer-term nature of the impact
of many of these investments, especially in vocational education and agricultural research,
make it challenging to quantify the impact for the project as a whole. Nevertheless, many
project activities have strengthened or are likely to strengthen the overall system and thus
improve the efficiency of the substantial annual expenditures. With respect to
27
The success is largely due to the GoE, a conducive policy environment (ECX was made the mandatory
trading venue for most of Ethiopia’s coffee), a strong management, and support from other Development
Partners. 28
In fact, the project might have underspent and reached a higher level of efficiency with higher costs for
an effort of smaller scope. Based on experiences with other projects it is likely that more expensive (and
higher-quality) training might have been a more efficient use of the funds, and the Bank team repeatedly
advocated such an approach. No such evidence for the training undertaken specifically for this project is
available, however. 29
A notable exception is the costs for some of the vehicles. Vehicles purchased in the first year of
implementation were exempted from tax, but the GoE required the project to pay full duties after that,
which was well above 200 percent in the case of vehicles with engines greater than 1,800 cubic centimeters.
17
investments in agricultural extension (about US$ 26.5 million, excluding FIFs and
FREGs), to which traditional measures of efficiency can be applied, calculations show an
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of about 28 percent and a Net Present Value (NPV) of
about US$ 24.5 million. For details, see Annex 3.
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating: Moderately Satisfactory
The project objectives remain fully consistent with the development framework and
priorities of the GoE and the Country Partnership Strategy of the Bank for Ethiopia.
While the project in its entirety has some design flaws, many elements remain highly
relevant and are already being adopted in other operations. The project also largely
achieved its objectives, with moderate shortcomings in most areas and major ones under
Component 4 and 5. Also, the impact evaluation convincingly shows clearly positive
results for farmers. At this early stage most accrue from agricultural extension and the
improved capacity of other service systems makes further benefits for farm households
very likely. Finally, the project achieved its results efficiently and, in fact, with resources
that were much reduced from the level considered during design and less than the level
planned during appraisal.
3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes, and Impacts
(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development
Poverty impacts. The project strengthened the capacity of agricultural knowledge and
information services and systems and made them more client-oriented, an achievement
that will benefit smallholder farmers. A significant share of the 85 percent of Ethiopians
living in rural areas is poor,30
and most of these people rely on agriculture as their main
source of livelihood. Achievements under the project will also benefit food consumers
and, in particular, the 33.6 percent of Ethiopia’s population regarded as “food poor.” The
extent to which these benefits play out will depend on the sustainability of the project’s
achievements and follow-up. As noted, results from the end-of-project household survey
are encouraging, showing increased agricultural productivity and agricultural income.
Gender and social aspects. The project was designed to address gender and HIV/AIDS
issues throughout all of its components and required the collection of gender-
disaggregated data for each component.31
The principle of mainstreaming gender as a
cross cutting theme is in line with that of the GoE. Some project interventions have
changed systems. For example, collaborative efforts by the PMU, the Women’s Affairs
Directorate (MoA), the ATVET Coordination Office (MoA), and Ministry of Education
(MoE) on the curriculum and occupational standards for gender resulted in making a
“Gender and Development” curriculum mandatory in ATVET colleges. Both the
30
About 30.4 percent of rural Ethiopians fall under the government’s poverty line, which is low,
corresponding to about US$ 0.60 per day (2010/11). 31
The mainstreaming principle was supported with mainstreaming guidelines that were disseminated
widely to implementers. Training on the mainstreaming principle (as it related to the principles and
objectives of the project) was provided to project personnel at all levels (federal, regional, woreda, and
kebele) and at many points during implementation. Along with the guidelines and the training, gender
equality specialists were hired at the federal and regional levels to follow up and support the
implementation of the two issues.
18
curriculum and corresponding TTLM have been developed and endorsed by the MoE,
and it has been taught in at least three ATVET colleges since the 2010/11 academic year.
Work with ATVETs, including parallel separate support from CIDA, has also been
instrumental in supporting two ATVETs (Ardaita and Agarfa) in developing gender
equality strategies, an interest that emanated from the colleges themselves. Other support
to ATVETs helped to reduce female dropout rates by offering tutorial classes as well as
guidance and counseling services; establishing and strengthening gender offices;
organizing income generation schemes to minimize the economic problems experienced
by female students; and supporting mini-libraries. Nationwide, the proportion of female
ATVET graduates increased from 9.3 percent in 2007 to 17.3 percent in 2011.
Under the agricultural extension component, the guidelines for FREGs and FIFs
required 30 percent of the participants to be women. Women’s participation was about
27 percent for FIFs and 28 percent f o r FREGs. In some regions, specifically Tigray
and Amhara, women-only FIF groups were established, and most were successful in
terms of technology choices and income generation. A special effort was also made to
achieve the training targets among women. As mentioned, the project supported a
diploma course for women when it became clear that an insufficient number of women
in the extension system were qualified to undertake the BSc course.
Work on gender under the agricultural research component also yielded positive results,
although cannot necessarily be attributed directly to the project. It is noteworthy, for
example, that the number of female staff in EIAR increased from 37 in 2007 (6.7
percent of total) to 80 (11.2 percent) in 2011. As these numbers indicate, Ethiopia still
has a long way to go to achieve gender equality, but that makes the project’s results on
gender all the more important.
(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening.
Institutional change/strengthening is at the core of the PDO, and the outcomes of the
project are assessed in Section 3.2.
(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) The RCBP produced outcomes and impacts in areas that it did not target. One example of
an unintended impact is that the ATVET curriculum and corresponding TTLM for gender
that was supported by the project is promoted by the MoE and given to all TVET colleges.
Another example is the geographic spillover under the Agricultural Extension
Component. Some farmers living close to areas where FIFs or FREGs were active
adopted the new technologies they promoted. The GoE has also replicated approaches to
agricultural extension supported by the project, either with its own means (particularly
through support from regional government) or through other donor-financed projects
such as the AGP.
These developments are believed to contribute to increasing agricultural productivity and
income well beyond the project area. Starting with the preparation phase, the project
19
aspired to broad impacts such as these, but the design did not include specific elements to
promote it.
The project can also point to specific stories of improved agricultural services that were
not planned or intended. The RARIs and research centers in the emerging regions used
the project’s capacity-building activities to engage with extension, farmers, and other
stakeholders for a seemingly very successful process of scaling up technology. Similarly,
the project supported training to treat livestock against ecto-parasites. While this effort
clearly falls within the project’s objectives and scope, it was not planned from the outset.
The training, which is beneficial for farmers and the leather industry, is being scaled up
with government resources.
Negative unintended impacts of the project arose mostly through staff turnover. To the
extent that researchers, officials in the extension system, and DAs trained with project
support leave not just their positions but the agricultural service systems, the value of the
training they received no longer contributes to the project’s objectives. Similarly, the
impact of the training on agricultural services is reduced to the extent that trained staff
work on activities other than the vocational education and training, extension, and
research services targeted. For example, DAs work on many issues other than agricultural
extension.32
3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops
Beneficiary surveys. The project conducted a number of surveys to assess the satisfaction
with and impact of different project activities among direct stakeholders, particularly the
institutions and employees providing agricultural vocational education and training,
extension, and research services. This work includes the original (2008) baseline, a
midterm, and an end-of-project survey coordinated by the PMU and involving the
ATVETs, administration and service providers for extension, and the NARS. It also
includes surveys related to specific activities, especially training. Key results from these
surveys are reflected in the intermediate outcome indicators of the Results Framework
(see Data Sheet F) and in the output indicators (see Annex 2). They also form an
important basis for the outcome assessments presented elsewhere in Section 3 (specific
findings are not repeated here). In general, the surveys show that the direct beneficiaries
in the agricultural service sectors have an overall appreciation of the project’s activities
and impact. Some specific results are presented in Annex 2. Their most important feature,
however, is that they can identify strengths and weaknesses during implementation and
provide valuable lessons for the future. Finally, Section 3.2 already referred to two
surveys targeting the ultimate beneficiaries—men and women farmers and their
households –one conducted in December 2009 and January 2010 and the second one at
the end of the project.33
They provide the basis for the PDO indicators on income and
32
Some of the (non-agronomic) skills they acquired under the project, such as skills related to participatory
planning or M&E, certainly help these DAs for their other tasks, such as facilitating the implementation of
other projects in their respective kebeles. For a discussion of the political dimensions of the agricultural
extension system see Berhanu Kassahun (2012); complete reference in Footnote 49. 33
This 2008 baseline referred to above also included a survey of farm household beneficiaries, but the DAs
served as the enumerators and the quality of this aspect is poor.
20
productivity, but also the overall impact evaluation that provides much more detail, some
of which is presented in Annex 5.
Stakeholder workshop. A project closing workshop held in June 2012 assembled MoA
participants, participants from IAs, and key stakeholders. The workshop provided an
opportunity to reflect on the strengths, weaknesses, achievements, and impacts of the
project and to identify and agree on follow-up action. In general, participants appreciated
the achievements of the project, but they recognized that much more work needed to be
done to ensure full project benefits and to continue to develop agricultural services and
systems, strengthen their capacity building, and make them more responsive to clients.
Examples of specific follow-up actions related to project components or activities include
the need for support to continue the transformation of ATVETs; a strengthened policy
framework and management plan for FTCs; further strengthening of the effectiveness of
DAs; and continued work on NARS coordination34
and M&E. A summary of the Minutes
that detail the discussions, lessons learned, and next steps agreed on are presented in
Annex 6.
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome: Significant
The GoE continues to have a firm commitment to the agricultural sector and to
supporting smallholder farmers through strong public services, including those related to
agricultural knowledge and information. It strengthened its ability to promote innovations
and develop and implement solution to constraints when it created the ATA in 2010 “to
serve as a catalyst for transformational and sustainable change.”35
Moreover, as already
indicated in Section 2.5 above, Development Partners are continuing its support to the
sector including essentially all activities supported by the RCBP.
Despite this overall very positive picture, there are significant risks that could forestall
full achievement of project benefits and further strengthening of agricultural services and
systems to become more responsive to clients. Arguably the highest risks stem from
persistent, high staff turnover throughout the systems and the weaknesses of the M&E
system. High staff turnover—a problem in Ethiopia for many years—greatly affects the
ATVET, extension, and the research systems, all of which require experienced staff to
effect sustainable changes and improvements. While the problem can be alleviated
through proper planning and handover arrangements, a significant improvement cannot
be achieved without addressing the inherent incentive problems for public employees.
The M&E system—which includes M&E related to budgets, inputs, outputs, and
impacts—has also been weak for many years, but these problems weigh more heavily
now that the services have expanded and are becoming more flexible and sophisticated to
respond to local needs.
The biggest risks to strengthening agricultural marketing systems in Ethiopia are related
to the GoE’s ability to develop a conducive environment for private traders and other
34
The NARS coordination mechanism had not yet been agreed and approved in June 2012. 35
The ATA works on strengthening the extension system (for example, by strengthening incentives for
DAs) and on supporting the Ethiopia National Agricultural Research System and specific aspects of applied
agricultural research.
21
private sector actors. Creating such an environment is primarily a question of regulation,
and it includes public institutions. ECX needs to play a constructive role as a market
competing with other markets, in particular for staples. Strengthening the sanitary and
phytosanitary systems includes the completion of specific quarantine stations, but also
many other steps including raising country’s low technical capacity in this area.
Aside from the more general risks discussed above, more project-specific risks could
affect the achievement of full project outcomes. The GoE is continuing work on most
project aspects, often with support from Development Partners, though risks remain.
Crucially, the reduced farmer satisfaction with the extension system observed by the
endline household survey requires further analysis of the different needs and expectations
related to the extension system over time. In addition:
ATVETs: The colleges’ ability to further implement and maintain the new teaching
learning systems supported by the project will depend on sufficient budget and
further strong support, including from Development Partners. This support is likely,
at least for the federal colleges that received most of the project support. In the
medium-term, the national ATVET strategy should be discussed further and revised
with the goal of achieving stronger overall support, including from the MoE.
FTCs: There is a need to review the standard for a functional FTC (depending on
the location); to develop a policy framework and plan for funding; and to further
strengthen management committees through various training activities associated
with the management aspects of FTCs. The MoA and the ATA are working on
these aspects, and FTCs are strengthened through government funds and donor-
financed projects such as the AGP.
FIF is still at an experimental stage. This extension approach needs continued
support under other projects to validate the current initial findings. Strict attention is
needed to follow up guidelines and focus on farmer innovation, including under
projects such as the AGP that have adopted the approach.
FREGs need to be further “mainstreamed” into regular extension work, including
(for example) by further strengthening the farmer-driven aspects and encouraging
the exit of public support. Importantly, clear exit strategies for the FREGs
supported need to be developed and implemented. The continuation of the work
from the GoE and donors supporting not just the approach but its further evolution
is needed.
ARDPLACs: While these councils continue under support from the AGP, they
need to be strengthened (see the RCBP-financed case study) and to become a core
part of the federal regional, zonal, and woreda plans.
NARS Coordination: Implementation of the NARS coordination mechanism (after
its final approval by the House of Representatives) will require strong, continued
commitment from government leadership and all other stakeholders. This includes
the strengthening of gender tools throughout the system and the implementation of
the planning and M&E mechanisms developed by the project. An additional
consideration is that staff turnover is particularly high in the agricultural research
institutions, and the need for strengthening the human resource mechanisms is
particularly strong.
22
NARF/RARF. The EIAR has developed a proposal for the establishment of the
Ethiopian Agricultural Research and Development Fund and the NARS, under its
new coordination mechanism, is committed to institutionalizing this mechanism of
competitive research funding based on the NARF/RARF experience.
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory
Project preparation was carried out with an adequate number of specialists who provided
the technical skill mix necessary to address sector concerns. The Bank provided adequate
resources in terms of staff weeks and dollar amount to ensure project preparation work.
The PDO–though formulated somewhat complex and vaguely – was highly relevant (and
remains so today). The project was consistent with the ICAS and government priorities in
the agricultural sector at the time. It incorporated lessons from previous projects in the
agricultural sector. To this extent, the Bank performance was satisfactory.
However, as mentioned in Section 2.1, the project design had some major drawbacks.
In particular, the design was overly complex, not the least by the Bank agreeing to
additional and poorly designed project components after the May 2006 Negotiations of
the project. Moreover, too little attention was paid to the institutional challenges and, in
particular, the continuity of staff responsible for coordination and throughout the IAs and
agricultural services systems. In light of these significant drawbacks, the Bank
performance at Quality at Entry is Moderately Unsatisfactory.
(b) Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory
Supervision during the first year of implementation was weak. The lack of continuity
from preparation to implementation and the changing of the TTL twice within one year of
Board approval led to weak supervision and support at a time when the PMU was only
being formed and had serious difficulties with the project start-up.
However, the quality of supervision was overall satisfactory starting from the second year
of project implementation. During this second year, the Bank worked with the GoE on
the restructuring, which reduced, though not eliminated, the design issues. The Bank
team–in close coordination with CIDA–continued to play an active and constructive role
throughout the implementation. Issues were raised timely and in a constructive manner
and followed up on. The Bank team itself was stable, with one more change in TTLs until
closing (both TTLs were based in the Country Office) and almost all other team members
serving the project until closing. The Bank with CIDA conducted regular supervision
missions, including a Midterm Review in July 2010; it focused on project results and
alerted the GoE and the PMU to problems with project execution; and facilitated
remedies in a timely manner, in conformity with Bank procedures.
Bank’s procurement and financial management staff worked closely with the PMU staff
to explain the rules and procedures to be applied during project implementation. The task
team also monitored safeguard and fiduciary compliances. The Implementation Status
23
Reports (ISRs) made overall realistic ratings of the project performances, both in terms of
achievement of development objectives and project implementation. During the last two
ISRs the team erred on the conservative side by rating the achievement of the
development objective Moderately Unsatisfactory because the impact evaluation (see
Annex 5) and the case studies (see Annex 10) were not yet available.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory The Bank performance rating is based on the ratings during lending phase and
supervision as discussed above, and overall Moderately Satisfactory outcome ratings.
5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory During preparation, the GoE
36 was strongly committed to the project and its objective, as
reflected in its overall strategy, its strategy for the agricultural sector, and the rapid
increase in public funding for, in particular, agricultural extension and ATVET colleges.
The initial proposal for RCBP was prepared by the GoE. Nevertheless, the GoE also
contributed to the design flaws by changing the (financial) scope of the project and
requesting additional and poorly designed components to be financed at the last moment.
As was the case for the Bank, the GoE is responsible for the lack of continuity after
completing the preparation process and the protracted start-up period.
During implementation, the GoE continued its strong support for the agricultural sector
and the project’s role in supporting it, yet the GoE is also responsible for several
developments that negatively affected the project’s achievements. In particular, the
government-implemented BPR process was highly disruptive and led to significant
implementation delays. The national civil service system causes excessive staff turnover,
which also hurts the agricultural service sector and project implementation. During the
2008 restructuring the GoE requested a project fund cancellation that, while
understandable given the crisis at the time, led to subsequent funding gaps that were not
adequately filled by the GoE. Finally, the “off-setting” of project resources to local
governments are justified by an objective of fiscal equalization and might have
contributed to a faster adoption of RCBP-activities in non-project areas, but it neutralized
the financial incentives that motivated woredas and undermined overall management and
coordination efforts.
The MoA and Federal and Regional Steering Committees, as well as the technical teams,
played an important role in guiding and supporting project implementation. Regular
meetings were held, progress reviewed, and actions agreed upon. However, coordination
weaknesses remained throughout the project, especially with external stakeholders. Given
the ambitious goals of this comprehensive project, even stronger and more timely
government guidance would have led to better results. Examples include closer
coordination with MoE on the ATVETs; a decision to maintain the Bekoji ATVET
36
While the role of the government and IAs is not clearly distinguishable, the approach taken in this section
is that “government” refers to all aspects related to preparation and the leadership provided during
implementation, whereas “IAs” refers to those parts of the government responsible for the day-to-day
implementation, in particular the PMU.
24
college in operation; adequate funding and earlier strong leadership in facilitating a
NARS coordination mechanism; an earlier allocation of additional funding to fill gaps
and ensure the institutionalization of innovations such as the ARDPLACs and NARF; or
a more decisive process to deal with resettlement, design, and funding issues for the
Metema and Humera Quarantine Stations. Finally, actions agreed upon during
Bank/CIDA supervision missions often took substantial time to be implemented.37
GoE regulations and MoA decisions also constrained the effectiveness of the PMU and
IAs, in particular at the beginning of the project. For instance, the PMU also had to
relocate its offices several times during implementation, which contributed to the
misplacement, loss, poor storage, and hence poor management of project documentation.
A lack of flexibly in the remuneration policy meant that staff turnover also happened in
the PMU. Staff were constrained through insufficient travel and communication
allowance or even their ability to procure office equipment or even stationery. While the
situation improved, some administrative rules continued to limited flexibility and
effectiveness.
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance: Moderately Satisfactory The project was implemented in a highly decentralized manner, and it was carried out
through several IAs and at the federal, regional, and woreda tiers of administration. The
implementation challenges were significant, given the many IAs and stakeholders, the
ambitious design, and factors external to the project, especially the high staff turnover.
Given such challenges, the roles of the PMU within the MoA and the focal persons in the
various IAs were crucial for project implementation.
The PMU and IAs faced staff turnover that led to the loss and relearning of knowledge
and meant that not all positions were filled continuously. The situation improved when
CIDA took over the payment of key PMU staff under improved conditions, but the PMU
then took on coordination of the EAAPP. Nevertheless, the PMU staff and the various
focal persons in the IAs, in particular, were dedicated and competent. They were also
committed to achieving the PDO and doing so by working closely with MoA
management and throughout the IAs. The PMU filled many functions beyond
coordination, and its active support to IAs in many project management functions was
instrumental for implementing the project within a shortened active implementation
period. The commissioning of various studies at the end of the project and facilitation of
discussions to ensure proper transitional arrangements are other positive examples of the
PMU’s focus and determination.
Nevertheless, there were some shortcomings in completing agreed actions on a timely
basis with respect to safeguards and fiduciary matters (see Section 2.4) and, most
crucially, to the quality and timeliness of reporting and the overall M&E system (see
Section 2.3). Finally, the eight-month project extension was used poorly; M&E was
37
One example is the time it took to halt construction of the Metema Quarantine Station after actions for
dealing with resettlement issues had been agreed upon; another is the development of a funding strategy for
the NARF.
25
strengthened, but important activities that had been planned, especially under
Component 5, were not completed.
(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance: Moderately
Satisfactory The Borrower performance rating is in light of the GoE’s and PMU’s performance as
discussed earlier, and given overall Moderately Satisfactory outcome ratings.
6. Lessons Learned
The project offers a broad and diverse range of lessons, many of which are identified,
discussed, and documented in the various case studies and implementation completion
studies commissioned by the PMU at the end of the project. Many of them are of
institutional or technical nature and relate to the many institutional reforms and
innovative activities supported by the project, including Operational Standards and
Assessment Tools, TTLM, etc. for ATVETs, ARDPLACs, FREGs, FIFs, the NARS
coordination mechanism, technology shopping, NARF/RARF, the gender tools, and
others. The uptake of basically all these project elements by the Government, the AGP or
elsewhere will ensure the continuation of the learning process. This ICR presents only a
few lessons that are deemed important for the sector and other countries:
Strengthening agricultural information and knowledge systems can yield significant
returns. While this only confirms a broad body of literature, the project showed that
the results can be achieved under difficult circumstances such as in the civil service
system and a weak implementation capacity. What is required, however, is
Government commitment and management, the promotion of linkages between
agricultural knowledge services, and strong coordination between various
stakeholders. The project strengthened linkages and coordination mainly through
promoting the right strategies and activities. Its management structure with a PMU
and focal persons in the IAs were also crucial, but the case for necessarily financing
research, extension, and vocational training jointly under one project is not strong.
The concept of “capacity building” incorporates both the strengthening of existing
systems and institutional reforms. While the former can be done relatively quickly,
institutional changes require a clear strategy, broad consensus, often periods of
testing and refinement, and therefore time. A project supporting such institutional
reforms therefore requires a clear design and direction, but also a strong element of
flexibility. Encouraging continuous learning and institutional evolution is crucial.
Moreover, capacity building activities must be planned in recognition of the fact
that capacity building is undertaken simultaneously with service delivery.
Human resource development is a key part of capacity building. Because in-service
training supported by projects is often not institutionalized and therefore does not
follow normal training parameters, it runs the risk of being implemented in such a
manner that the training is not effective or does not meet a required standard. For
example, in the early stages of RCBP implementation, training for DAs was carried
out in large classrooms with limited practical applications and no assessment of its
26
effectiveness. This practice was rectified, but it points to the need for giving
particular attention to putting pre-determined parameters in place for carrying out
project-supported training, seeking feedback from end-users on the effectiveness of
the training, and following up on such feedback with concrete actions so that
training is of the required quality.
To enhance women’s participation, affirmative action and gender disaggregation
can be a useful starting point. Nevertheless, there is a need to follow these steps
with tailored action based on assessments and a better understanding of social and
cultural factors that affect women’s performance. Some observations are that: (i)
the assistance and involvement of gender focal persons as interventions are planned,
and their active engagement during implementation, are key to improving women’s
participation; (ii) linking with women’s affairs structures and Woman Affairs
Directorates within IAs makes a difference; and (iii), where beneficiaries are
organized in groups, women-only groups often perform far better in terms of the
performance of women and encouraging women’s active participation.
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies
The Borrower provided comments on the draft ICR during a workshop on November 27,
2009 and many of them are reflected in this final version. No separate written comments
were provided. The Borrower’s own Implementation Completion Report–see Annex 8 for
the Executive Summary–gives higher ratings for the performance of the project (overall
rating: Satisfactory), but identifies many issues that are mirrored in this report.
(b) Cofinancier: Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)
CIDA has been a strong technical and financial partner of the GoE and the World Bank
during the preparation and, in particular, the implementation of the project. CIDA’s
assessment of the project as presented in Annex 8 shows broad agreement with the
assessment in this ICR. It also raises valid issues including related to the predictability in
the drawdown of CIDA financing and timely and reliable project planning and
monitoring of project activities.
(c) Other partners and stakeholders
NA
27
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in USS$ million equivalent)
Components
Appraisal
Estimate (USS
millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate
(US$ millions)
Percentage of
Appraisal
Component 1 : ATVET 6.20 4.27 68.79
Component 2: Agricultural Extension 26.50 29.78 112.36
Component 3: Agricultural Research 20.20 16.31 80.77
Component 4: ICT within MoARD 2.60 0.77 29.48
Component 5: Market Institutions 6.30 7.22 114.53
Component 6: Project Management 3.00 3.42 113.90
Total Baseline Cost 64.80 61.76 95.30
Physical Contingencies 3.20 - -
Price Contingencies 3.00 - -
Total Project Costs 71.00 61.76 86.98
Project Preparation Fund - - -
Front-end fee IBRD - - -
Total Financing Required 71.00 61.76 86.98
(b) Financing
Source of Funds Type of
Cofinancing
Appraisal
Estimate
(US$ millions
)
Actual/Latest
Estimate
(US$ millions
)
Percentage of
Appraisal
Borrower parallel 0.00 0.542
CANADA: Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) joint 17.00 18.58 109.29
International Development
Association (IDA) joint 54.00 43.18 79.96
Note: Borrower financing refers to federal government commitment in the amount of ETB 9
million (US$ 0.542 equivalent) toward the end of the project, to make up for the shortfall in
resources and complete the Metema Quarantine Station. About US$ 0.231 million equivalent of
this had been used as project closing.
28
Annex 2. Outputs by Component
Component 1. Agricultural Technical Vocational Education and Training (ATVET)
The component strengthened the ATVET system by developing and implementing a strategic
plan for the future of the ATVET colleges and by strengthening the capacity of selected colleges.
The MoARD commissioned an international consultant to draft a National ATVET strategy
document through a consultative process. The strategy document was completed through various
workshops and the efforts of a taskforce consisting of representatives of various federal and
regional stakeholders. A weakness of the strategy is that it is not specific with respect to all
directions for the ATVETs and instead lists options. It has been approved and adopted by
MoARD–though not by a broader set of stakeholders, including the MoE. Following its adoption,
the component supported the development of 51 Operational Standards and Assessment Tools, as
well as training in curriculum development and the preparation of Training, Teaching, Learning
Materials (TTLM). As a result, all ATVET colleges were able to implement the new teaching
learning system. The component has also enabled the colleges to design their gender and
HIV/AIDS strategies and plans; Training, Teaching, Learning Materials (TTLM) and curricula.
The Institutional Strengthening Grants (ISGs) and Development Innovation Grants (DIGs) have
contributed significantly to enhancing the quality of education within the targeted colleges and
other basic services for students, including services related to cross-cutting issues. Unfortunately,
one of the targeted ATVETs, Bekoji, ceased to operate shortly after implementing the ISG.
Nevertheless, overall the grants had positive results as is reflected in outcome indicators, such as
the increased satisfaction of employers recruiting from ATVET colleges and improved
satisfaction of the students/graduates themselves. The proportion of female graduates increased
from 9.3 percent in 2007 to 17.3 percent in 2011.
Output Indicators 1.1: National Strategic Plan developed and implemented
National Strategy on future of ATVET colleges prepared and put to implementation
Strategy developed and approved by MoA approval in October 2008
Operational Standards (OS) refined and 51 OS developed (curricula and TTLMs also
developed based on OSs)
ATVET college-level strategic plans developed, reflecting the National Strategy
Regional awareness workshops to promote the National Strategy (70 college deans and
instructors participated; 75 percent satisfied with the content of national strategy)
Strategic plans developed for 2 federal colleges (Agarfa, Ardaita); 9 other ATVETs
adopted the strategy
Gender mainstreaming document completed for all ATVETs
Gender strategy document prepared for Ardaita & Agarfa, with support from CIDA;
recommended by MoE for adoption in other TVETs and Police & Defense Colleges have
also adopted the document
Integration of HIV/AIDS in curriculum, in carried out as a course
Output Indicators 1.2: Capacity for services delivery of selected ATVETs improved
Institutional Strengthening Grants were implemented at four (4) federal ATVETs (Agarfa, Alage,
Ardaita, Bekoji);38
and Development Innovation Grants at two (2) of those (Agarfa, Ardaita)
38
Bekoji ATVET was transferred to Oromiya Region, but stopped being operational.
29
Key physical capacity-building indicators: equipment and facilities procured (details in files)
2 trucks, 3 tractors, 2 land cruisers, 2 pick-ups
Building rehabilitation/construction including 20 classrooms and 6 guesthouses (2 higher, 4
standard) at Ardaita
furniture and materials for offices, library, cafeteria, and various other equipment
Student retention rate at 3 RCBP-supported ATVETs:39
female male
Agarfa: 89% 99%
Alage: 86% 86%
Ardaita: 65% 71%
Output Indicators 1.3: Selected ATVETS establish new training /programming based on
the National Strategic Plan and build related capacity
New training / programming
OS and related curricula developed for 51subjects
Two (2) new training courses: gender & development; HIV/ AIDS & agriculture
Curriculum on gender developed and instructors recruited at 3 federal colleges (Agarfa,
Alage, Ardaita)
Number and type of employing organizations satisfied by the new ATVETs programs
Three at Woreda Agricultural Offices: Agriculture Offices, Cooperative Promotion Offices
and Livestock Marketing And Health Agencies
Component 2. Agricultural Extension Services
This component has invested in a range of activities at the federal, regional, woreda, and kebele
levels to improve the effectiveness of agricultural extension, including the capacity to respond to
farmers’ expressed needs and to enhance women’s participation. A significant number of
extension staff, including DAs, benefited from long- and short-term training. Feedback from
trainees suggests a strong increase of their capacity. For instance, as a result of the training,
Subject Matter Specialists (SMSs) were able to provide better technical and managerial support
better to DAs, and 78 percent of DAs were satisfied with the support received from the woreda
SMS. The short-term training helped DAs to acquire the capability to use different extension
methods.40
The component also provided basic materials and equipment, including furniture,
means of transport, and demonstration sites for about 2,337 FTCs in the project woredas; of these,
1,840 are considered to have a functional management committee. These achievements represent
about 94 percent of the target of about 2,500 FTCs, a significant improvement of physical and
managerial capacity and of the extension system’s ability to serve its clients. Sixty-two percent of
FTCs started demonstrating at least one improved farming technology or practice during the last
12 months of the project. Modular training was initiated in 62 percent of the equipped FTCs.
Seventy-seven percent of household heads and fifty-six percent of their spouses attended some
form of training at FTCs in the project woredas; more than ninety-five percent of participants
found the classroom and practical training at FTCs to be relevant.
39
This data refers to retention rates before project closing. The current retention rate is 100 percent, due to
new GoE regulation requiring colleagues to maintain students until they are fully capacitated. 40
Long-term training was done mostly at Ethiopian universities but included foreign university training
when local courses were unavailable. The level of training generally ranged from BSc to PhD degrees. A
specific Diploma course was made available for women employees lacking qualifications to pursue higher-
level courses. Short-term training was mainly modular and designed to strengthen the extension
methodology.
30
This component supported the development of 698 groups (115 percent of the target) that were
funded through the FIF (farmer innovation fund). Many FIF groups engaged in small ruminant,
beekeeping, and poultry enterprises (about 57 percent of FIF members), followed by vegetable
and garden plant production. The objective of the FIF was to promote innovative activities and
technologies through a group-based approached. This concept, innovative in itself, was developed
in the second year of implementing the RCBP.41
While some of the groups supported are highly
successful, the concept was not well understood everywhere, implementation varied widely, and
the overall impact is still unclear.
This component also supported 877 FREGs, about 3.5 times the original target. This high number
is partly the result of poor monitoring, especially early in implementation. It also reflects the high
demand for this kind of support from farmers as well as extension workers and researchers.
Unlike the FIF, the FREG approach built on a tested model, that of the FRGs; it simply expanded
the model by emphasizing farmer’s demands and the role of extension workers. Many FREGs
engaged in adaptive trials and other innovative research in their respective areas. The groups
organized various events at which they presented the findings of their engagement to the wider
community. Survey results show that FREGs had a positive impact in building capacity as well as
increasing productivity and incomes.
Across all of the regions where the project intervened, 164 rural councils were established or
strengthened, which is 66 percent more than the target. The concept of rural councils evolved
over the course of the project to reflect the aim of expanding membership beyond farmer
representatives, extensionists, and researchers to encompass private sector representatives and
others, including cooperatives and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The name of the
councils changed from Research-Extension-Farmer Advisory Councils to Agricultural
Development Partners Linkage Advisory Councils (ARDPLACs). In some regions and woredas,
these councils played a key role in influencing the agricultural development agenda, including the
research agenda. They are also recognized as successful platforms for raising emerging issues at
all levels, yet their institutionalization remains weak. When project funding stopped in the
Ethiopian Fiscal Year (EFY) 2004 (2011/12), no federal, regional, or zonal ARDPLAC meetings
were held, as the GoE had not allocated funds for this activity. ARDPLACs are receiving further
support and development through the AGP.
Output Indicators 2.1 Effectiveness of agricultural extension officers and SMS including
women affairs officers improved to provide technical support to DAs
On-the-job (short-term) training for SMS and/ or DAs in accordance to the need-based plan
Regional SMSs training (about events 5 per region): 211 participants (156 male, 55 female)
Zonal SMSs training (about 5 per zone): 362 participants (327 male, 35 female)
Woreda-level SMSs training (354 training events; based on 9 modular trainings): 5,725
participants (4,930 male; 795 female)
DAs training (608 training events; based on minimum of 4 modular trainings per FTC):
participation: 15,902 (13,739 male, 2,163 female)
41
The Farmer Advisory Service Fund and the Advisory Service Development Fund, which were
conceptualized during project preparation, were cancelled at project restructuring.
31
Long-term training at Ethiopian and foreign training institutions (status at end-of- project)
total (female in %) Enrollment Completed/Graduates Ongoing
Ph.D. 6 (0 %) 3 (0%) 3 (0%)
MSc 186 (14%) 120 (13%) 21 (24%)
BSc 772 (35%) 608 (33%) 63 (41%)
Diploma 32 (100%) 31 (100%) -
TOTAL 987 (31%) 739 (32%) 99 (63%)
Note: Enrollment minus graduates and ongoing are dropouts.
DAs’ extent of satisfaction by the services provided by SMS: 73%
SMS/ experts satisfaction of facilities: Transport: 54%; Computer: 47%; Internet: 85%
Output Indicators 2.2: FTCs developed into community-owned and -managed local hubs
for agricultural development activities
Number of DAs capacitated to respond to clients’ needs through training in accordance to the
need-based training plan, exposure visits and other technical advises: 22,063 (17,782 male; 4281
female)42
Number of FTCs furnished and functional with management committee
FTCs fully furnished and functional with management committee: 1,840
FTCs not fully furnished and functional with management committee: 72
FTCs fully furnished but not functional with management committee: 497
FTCs not fully furnished and not functional with management committee: 93
Extent of local community participation in the management of FTCs
57.14% (4 out of 7 committee members are from the community)
Kebele authority members trained in FTC management: EFY 2002 1,788 (38%)
(female in %) EFY 2003 1,575 (22%)
EFY 2004 1,769 (24%)
Total 5,132 (28%)
Output Indicators 2.3 Innovative extension service delivery arrangements supported
Number of FIF proposals to promote innovations amongst farmers group
Proposals submitted: 960
Proposal approved and funded: 698 (72.7% of submitted proposals; 115% of target)
Extent of FIF ownership by the kebele administration and farmers group
84% of the FIF members want to continue with group activities
59% want to continue with the all of the members
22% of the FIF members dropped out
4% new members joined
Share of the funded innovative activities that lead to increases in production and / or income of
participating (male/female) farmers and pastoralists: 49.50%
42
High numbers due to training of DAs after staff turn-over; and training of DAs at more than once.
32
Output Indicators 2.4: Institutionalized and strengthened research-extension-farmer
linkages council at federal, regional, zonal and woreda level
Councils established and/or strengthened that have all stakeholders’ as per guidelines
Total established /
strengthened
Meetings in EFY
2003
Meetings in EFY
2004
Federal 1 1 0
Regional 10 20 0
Zonal 17 42 5
Woreda 136 136 35
TOTAL 164 199 35
Stakeholders perceiving that councils are influencing research agenda at their respective level:
27%; of which for:
Technology generation for crop (85%)
Technology generation for livestock (40%)
Natural resource management (25%)
Socio-economic & policy research (5%)
Irrigation agriculture (5%)
Agro-mechanization (0%)
Output Indicators 2.5 Institutionalized and improved FREGs for implementing an impact-
oriented research agenda including gender mainstreaming, and improve its coordination
and support from councils
FREGs established or strengthened for undertaking on-farm research and extension activities
877, including 718 new FREGs and 159 existing FREGS strengthened FREGs
(350% of target)
Participation of women farmers in the FREGs (at least 30%) in mixed group and number of
women managed FREGs undertaking on farm research and extension activities
35 FREGs have more than 30% women (849 mixed FREGs with at least 20% women)
28 women-only FREGs
FREG proposals developed, funded and implemented through ARDPLAC system
Proposal presented =890
Proposal funded =877 (98.5% implemented)
Number of technologies and practices tested, adapted and scaled up by FREG
25 technologies, including 12 for crops, 6 livestock and 4 others
FREG members involved: 14,744 (11,707, male; 3,037 female (21%))
Component 3: Agricultural Research
This component was instrumental in development of the NARS coordination mechanism, through
continuous emphasis of its importance and the financing of various workshops, study tours (to
India), etc. It also supported the development of a Gender Strategy, Action Plan, and Gender
Mainstreaming Guideline and Implementation Procedures; of research Planning, Monitoring, and
Evaluation procedures as well as a computerized management system. Furthermore, the
Component introduced technology shopping by developing a framework for the process,
supporting visits to other countries, and financing the technologies deemed appropriate and their
adoption.
33
The NARS was further strengthened through activities to build capacity in human and physical
research resources. This component provided short-term training to 790 staff (representing 79
percent achievement of the target) and long-term training for 56 PhDs and 211 MScs (75 percent
and 161 percent of the target). These investments are expected to strengthen research capacity,
though high turnover limits the impact. Physical capacity-building included, among other
activities, purchasing books and journals (print and electronic) for libraries; equipping 10
research laboratories; establishing inter- and intra-institutional electronic connectivity; supplying
20 double-cabin pickup trucks, 15 tractors, and other equipment for research centers and farms
and for demonstrating technology to extension agents and farmers. Particular attention was paid
to emerging regions (Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and Somalia), and the resulting
technology scale-up (led by researchers and involving extension, farmers, and other stakeholders)
shows strong visible successes on the ground. RCBP also equipped and made operational one
central biotechnology laboratory43
and supported seven satellite biotechnology laboratories.
Finally, an important and innovative activity was the development and support of a competitive
research fund, which funded 40 research projects under the national window (NARF) and 39
under the regional window (the Regional Agricultural Research Fund, RARF).
Output Indicators 3.1: NARS management and coordination strengthened
NARS Coordination Document Developed and endorsed by all stakeholders and implemented
within 12 months after endorsement:
Document developed, signed and endorsed by most but not all stakeholders
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E) procedures developed and implemented for
improved decision making and knowledge management:
PM&E procedures developed by EIAR and sent to all NARS members to adopt
Only 33% of users are satisfied
Technology shopping procedures developed and implemented
Procedures developed and implemented : 1
Number and type of technologies acquired and released: 73 acquired, 2 released44
Time taken from acquiring to release: poultry (layers): 2 years; effective micro-organism
(improvement of compost making and environmental production): 2 years
Gender mainstreaming guideline and implementation procedures developed and utilized.
One document developed
Output Indicators 3.2: An expanded competitive Agricultural Research Fund with more
representative governance structure and transparent management procedures
operationalized
Number and Type of organizations represented in the NARF/RARF governing body
18 organizations: EIAR; 7 RARIs; 3 universities; 1 NGO; 1 professionals association; 1 co-
operative; MoA; Meteorology Agency; Ministry of Federal Affairs; gender representative
Number and type of national and regional high priority Agricultural Research and Development
Projects awarded and completed Awarded Completed
National 40 32
Regional 39 39
43
The central laboratory in Holetta currently focuses on developing tissue culture protocols for selected
species and on supporting the breeding program by screening sweet potato parental lines for resistance to
viral infections. 44
Technology shopping started relatively late (2010); more releases are expected.
34
Number and type of organizations participating (applying for and receiving grant)
Nb. Type Applications Funding
1 Higher Learning Institutes 93 20
2 RARI Research Centers 45 6
3 EIAR Research Centers 64 8
4 NGOs 5 1
5 Private 21 0
6 Other public organizations 22 5
7 Students 5 0
Total 255 40
Participatory and transparent management procedures mainstreamed for setting priorities,
evaluation and selection of NARF/RARF proposals
Advertised on 2 public newspaper and 3 private newspaper; 3 stages of evaluation;
members For each thematic committee: EIA; 7 RARIs; 2 Universities; 1 NGO
Number and type of organization contributing (supporting) and nature of their contribution to the
NARF
3 organizations (Research, Higher Learning Institutes, NGOs): contribution mostly logistics.
Output Indicators 3.3: Biotechnology supported research expanded
Number of central and satellite biotechnology laboratories equipped
Central: 1 (Holetta) (equipped and operational)
Satellite: 7 (Adami Tulu, Areka, Bahir Dar, Debrezeit, Jimma, Mekele, Melkassa)
Number of staff trained and placed in the biotech laboratories by the end of the project
Biotechnology: 3 PhD on course work; 2 MSc graduated
Plant Biotechnology: 2 PhD working on their thesis; 5 graduated with MSc
Number and Type of biotechnology supported technologies generated and services provided
4 crops protocols (coffee, pineapple, potato, sweet potato)
1 animal commodity: Embryo transfer (dairy)
Exit Strategy document for large scale (commercial) multiplication of seedlings finalized and
disseminated
Document on technology scaling up and fund raising strategy
Output Indicators 3.4 Capacity for ICT, biometrics, agro-meteorology and GIS services and
system enhanced
Computerized management systems introduced and made operational
finance, human resources, transport management, Planning, M&E System, management
Inter and intra-institutional electronic connectivity established and strengthened: 92
Number of libraries supported by books and journals (printed and electronic): 55
Biometrics, agro-meteorology and GIS services equipped: 1
Number of staff trained by type of short-term training:
Total 792 (male: 607; female: 185), type of training in files
35
Output Indicators 3.5: Capacity for priority research areas strengthened
Number of researchers trained (disaggregated by sex, Research Center, and priority area)
total (female in %) Enrollment Completed/Graduates Ongoing
Ph.D. 47 (26 %) 5 (17%) 38 (26%)
MSc and others 217 (14%) 150 (11%) 27 (4%)
TOTAL 264 (16%) 156 (12%) 65 (17%)
Number of vehicles and motorcycles procured
20 vehicles; 15 motor cycles; 15 tractors
Number of laboratories supported through procurement of equipment and supplies
10 laboratories in EIAR & RARIs research centers
Number of research farms supported through procurement of machinery and improvement of
farm facilities
12 of research farms (total of 13 farm implements)
Number of pre-extension frontline demonstrations in improved technologies
36 frontline demonstrations (mechanization: 8; crop: 13; fruit trees: 2; animal feed and
grasses: 12
Scaling out in Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella and Somali of different technology for
seed multiplication
Component 4: Improving Information and Communication Systems within MoARD
This relatively small component aimed to strengthen MoARD’s capacity to coordinate, monitor,
and evaluate initiatives in the agricultural sector by building ICT capacity at the federal, regional,
and woreda levels and—under the component as originally designed—FTCs. The component
relied on unrealistic assumptions about Ethiopia’s developing IT infrastructure in the country in
general, and within the targeted regions and woredas specifically, however, and was limited after
restructuring to focus on equipping WoARD offices with computers and printers, connecting the
offices internally, and (where possible) to the internet. The revised targets were largely achieved:
136 WoARDs were equipped (108 percent of the target), network installation was completed for
110 woredas (87 percent of the target), and of those, 80 are connected to the internet.45
This
strengthened ICT capacity is especially benefiting the extension system.
Output Indicators 4:
Number of WoARDs equipped with computers and printers and connected to WoredaNet:
136 WoARDs equipped
110 WoARDs have intra-office network
80 WoARD connected to internet
Extent of utilization of ICT system installed for data and information exchange by woreda SMS:
5 hours out of 8 hours per day
Component 5: Support to Market Institutions
The first sub-component supported the ECX through the financing of a price information
system through interactive voice response and short message system, a system that is
reaching about 10,000 subscribers. The project also supported the purchase of electronic
45
In most locations, internet services are down for a considerable time and staff report to have access only
about five working hours per day, on average.
36
display tickers, and 50 of which were operational in major market towns at the end of the project.
An additional 100 tickers were purchased and are expected to be fully installed before the end of
2012. Finally, the project financed the hardware for an improved electronic Trading Application
and Support Center; ECX is financing the complementary software development through other
means. The second sub-component supported design studies for quarantine stations in Metema
and Humera; it also financed the purchase of 6 pick-up vehicles, most for the MoA Department
responsible for sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulation. In addition, about US$ 0.5 million from
the sub-component was used to support the development and implementation of a specific
training activity related to ecto-parasite treatment for livestock; this training was highly
successful in terms of its impact among farmers and on the leather industry.
Output Indicators 5.1: Information technology solutions for ECX established to provide greater
access to commodity markets
Number and type of electronic systems established to support the exchange operations of the
exchange
Hardware for electronic trading application procured; software development ongoing with
non-project funds
Number of electronic tickers established in rural areas and made operational for dissemination of
real time market prices
50 display boards (out of 150 procured) started operation in major market centers
IVR/SMS services established and number and type of subscribers to these services
SMS service: 10,000 subscribers (Push/Pull) comprising Farmers (10%), ECX members
(30%), clients (30%), and general public (30%)
IVR service: up to 50,000 calls/day (it fluctuates – this is maximum)
Number of regional remote access trading centers established /capacitated
IT equipment to establish trading center software was bit purchased (shortage of funds)
Output Indicators 5.2: Quarantine Station for Live Animals
Metema animal health quarantine station strengthened to meet international standards
Metema quarantine station construction delayed and project transferred for GoE
funding (about 30% completion at project close)
6 pickup vehicles procured for MoA, of which one allocated for Metema
37
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis The economic and financial analysis at appraisal was based on a discussion of the various
approaches for such analysis and focused on the following: (i) a review of the returns to past
investments in agricultural research and extension projects in general, (ii) a presentation of the
economic importance of agricultural production in Ethiopia; (iii) the estimates for the economic
return of investments under RCBP–largely limited to investments into agricultural extension; and
(iv) a fiscal analysis of the RCBP. The ICR Team believes that this is an appropriate approach
and has updates the analysis with information obtained during implementation.46
Returns to Past Investments in Agricultural Research and Extension Projects. The literature
review undertaken for the appraisal in 2006 shows that returns on investment in agricultural
research and extension are general high; specific results fall within a large range depending on the
topic and methodology used. Since then, more research and analysis has been done and methods
of investigations have been refined. In general, more recent studies confirm the earlier findings on
high returns on investments in agricultural knowledge and information. For example, a recent
World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)47
meta-analysis examines the results of
agricultural impact evaluations around the world. While it underlines the still persisting
considerable weaknesses in impact assessment, it also provides an indication of the impact of
extension services. Of all intervention categories analyzed, extension has the highest share of
impact evaluations that are significant positive results: 13 out of 26 evaluations analyzed
(50 percent), 12 impact evaluations were not able to show significant results, one study showed
negative results.48
The relatively clear evidence on significant returns for agricultural research and
extension is reflected in the now quite broad recognition of a significant underinvestment by GoE
and Development Partners in these areas, especially in Africa.
Economic importance of agricultural production in Ethiopia. The PAD presents the
tremendous economic importance of agricultural production and the agricultural sector in
Ethiopia at the time of appraisal. Despite the significant economic developments since 2006 and
economic growth rates of about 10 percent annually, the relative importance of the sector is still
as high as before. It still account for almost 48 percent of GDP and about 85 percent of export
earnings. This reflects high overall agricultural growth during the project implementation
period.49
While there are some concerns about the reliability of the official figures, agricultural
growth has been significant. It has been well above population growth rates and also well above
agricultural land expansion, i.e. the flat trend for agricultural productivity still referred in the
PAD has clearly improved for the better. In short, agricultural development over the project
implementation period has been positive and the sector remains crucially important for Ethiopia.
Agriculture has remained the main livelihood of the 85 percent of Ethiopians living in rural areas,
and is key to food security and poverty reduction. A strengthened agricultural training and
46
The support to agricultural marketing services (Component 5) was not included in the economic and
financial analysis at appraisal and is neither discussed here, given that the project achieved very little in this
area. 47
IEG World Bank (2011): Impact Evaluations in Agriculture, An Assessment of the Evidence,
Washington, DC, 2011 48
With respect to agricultural research, a substantial amount impact evaluation work is collected at
impact.cgiar.org. A very recent study by Rao X. et al. (Sep. 2012) “Recalibrating the Reported Rates of
Return to Food and Agricultural R&D” shows lower–but still respectable–returns, using a modified
methodology. While huge amount of literature exists on the return on education, relatively little is specific
to agricultural vocational education. 49
Official figures for the period from 2005/06 to 2009/10 show 8 percent agricultural growth.
38
education, extension and research system is clearly an important factor for continuing the sector’s
development. And, as discussed above, this is strongly reflected in the government’s past and
current development strategies.
Estimated Returns on Investments under RCBP. The PAD (Annex 9) makes assumption about
the investments in the agricultural extension services to show that returns of US$ 4 per hectare
served would result in an Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of 13 percent. The table below shows the
same calculations with the actual project results, including:
- The project has capacitated about 2,337 FTCs (fully furnished and including training,
transportation, etc.); these serve about 13 percent of all kebeles (about 18,000) and crop
area, i.e., about 1.746 million ha (total crop area is about 13.448 million ha in 2010/11).
- Total investments into these extension services were about US$ 26.5 million (total costs
of Component 2, minus the grants for FIF and FREGs), i.e., about US$ 11,000 per FTC;
with investments over largely 3 years (2009-2011).
- The difference in agricultural household income between project and non-project areas
has grown from ETB 1,138 at the “baseline” December 2009/January 2010 survey (for
previous year) to ETB 1,301 at the end-of-project. This is an increase of ETB163 per
household or, if divided by the end-of-project farm size (for project woredas), ETB 84–
equivalent to about US$4.8 per ha.
On this basis, the calculations reflected in the table show an IRR of 28 percent; the NPV amounts
to about US$24.5 million. These positive results are based on conservative assumptions. The
increases in the differences in household assets (including livestock assets) between project and
non-project areas would indicate still larger returns on the investments under the extension
component.
Year
incremental
benefit/ha (US$)
Area
(ha)
Total benefit
(US$)
Costs
(US$)
Net benefit
(US$)
1 0 - - 8,833,333 - 8,833,333
2 4.8 291,001 1,397,150 8,833,333 - 7,436,183
3 4.8 873,004 4,191,450 8,833,333 - 4,641,884
4 4.8 1,455,007 6,985,749 6,985,749
5-20 4.8 1,746,009 8,382,899 8,382,899
IRR: 28%
NPV: 24,474,385
We do not have evidence of the impact of components other than extension on the ultimate
beneficiaries, i.e., smallholder farmers (and pastoralists). However, an efficient use of total
project investments is likely given that the agricultural income benefits under extension
component only, i.e. assuming zero benefits from all other investments, would still yield an IRR
of about 11 percent on the total project costs.
The PAD also calculates the overall productivity gains required to pay the total costs of project,
assuming also annual project costs and a 4 year time lags for the benefits with full benefits in
year 8. The appraisal results show that a 0.6 percent increase in the agricultural GDP (after
year 8) would lead to an IRR of 14 percent. This calculation has to be revised as the total project
costs were less than planned at appraisal. Moreover, if one assumes the agricultural GDP from
2010, i.e., when the benefits started to occur, rather than figure for 2005 used in the appraisal
39
estimate, the calculation shows that the project as a whole generates already an IRR of 14 percent,
if agricultural GDP due to the project increases only by 0.2 percent.50
Fiscal Analysis of the RCBP. The PAD (Annex 9) projects the fiscal impact based on estimates
of the recurrent costs the project investments create. It states that the investments for the ATVET,
extension and research components would lead to an increase in recurrent expenditure of US$7.5
million annually after completion, corresponding to about 16 percent of the annual base (2002)
expenditure for the sectors or 2.5 percent of the total GoE budget.
While the absolute amount of recurrent costs might be correct, the relative impact is smaller in
relative terms. GoE’s total budget (as well as GDP and including agricultural GDP) has continued
to grow in real terms; and government expenditure for agriculture was already larger in 2006 than
in 2002, i.e. the latest date available used in the PAD. Total expenditure for agriculture
(excluding natural resources management) was about ETB5.1 billion in the Ethiopian Fiscal Year
(EFY) 1999 (2006/07) or about US$590 million and increased to about ETB13.5 billion in
EFY2004 (2011/12) or about US$837million. Given high rates of inflation, it stayed relatively
flat in real national currency terms. The biggest share of the agricultural budget is for food
security, but an estimated about US$100 million annually is for agricultural extension including
ATVETs (about two thirds) and for agricultural research (about one third).51
Based on this, the
annual project-induced recurrent expenditures (US$7.5 million) make up only about 8 percent of
the budget for the agricultural research services supported, or about 1 percent of the agricultural
budget.52
Moreover, comparing Ethiopia internationally shows that the country’s expenditure on these
knowledge and information services is relatively low. For example, the data base of Agricultural
Science & Technology Indicators (ASTI, see www.asti.cgiar.org/data) shows for 2008, the latest
year available, that total public research and development spending was only about 0.27 percent
of agricultural GDP, lower than in 2002 or at the beginning of the project and lower than most
other countries.53
This suggests a continued underinvestment by Ethiopia into agricultural
research and development.
50
While no study to date has made an attempt to calculate measures of economic efficiency for the entire
extension system in Ethiopia, a number of studies have shown various aspects of the focus and impact of
the system. See, in particular, a joint IFPRI-McKinsey and Company study (Davis, K. et al. (2010): In-
Depth Assessment of the Public Agricultural Extension System of Ethiopia and Recommendations for
Improvement, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01041, December 2010); and two joint IFPRI and EDRI study
(Spielman, D. J. et al. (2011): Seed, Fertilizer, and Agricultural Extension in Ethiopia, Ethiopia Strategy
Support Program II (ESSP II), ESSP II Working Paper 020; Mogues, T., et al. (2009): Agricultural
Extension in Ethiopia through a Gender and Governance Lens, Development Strategy and Governance
Division, International Food Policy Research Institute –Ethiopia Strategy Support Program 2, Ethiopia.);
and Kassahun Berhanu (2012): The Political Economy of Agricultural Extension in Ethiopia: Economic
Growth and Political Control, Working Paper 042 for FAC Political Economy of Agricultural Policy in
Africa, May 2012. 51
Based on assumption of about 7.9 percent of agricultural budget for ATVETs and extension and about
3.7 percent for research (fiscal years 2003/04 to 2005/06 average). See World Bank (2008) Ethiopia:
Agriculture and Rural Development Public Expenditure Review 1997/98 – 2005/06, Washington, D.C. 52
Project investments into livestock quarantine stations were too small to result in significant follow-up
recurrent costs, though the building up and running of a quarantine system will require significantly more
resources. The investments into ECX are not expected to lead to any follow-up costs for the government
budget as ECX has become largely self-financing (from trading and membership fees, etc.) 53
The PAD (Annex 9) also shows the economic fiscal impact of scaling-up FTCs for different scenarios
and cautions as to the viability of a scale-up beyond 10,000 – incidentally about the number of FTCs
40
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Names Title Unit Responsibility/
Specialty
Lending
Abiy Admassu Temechew Procurement Analyst AFTPC
Almaz Teklesenbet Temporary AFTA1 Team Assistant
Arvil Van Adams Senior Advisor – Vocational Education AFTHD
Assaye Legesse Senior Agriculture Economist AFTA3
Azeb Fissha ET Consultant AFTS2
David Nielson Lead Agricultural Services Specialist AFTA2 TTL
Derek Byerlee Lead Economist AFTS2
Eamonn Darcy Consultant AFTS2 Vocational Education
Elizabeth Katzt Consultant AFTS2 Agriculture Extension
Eshetu Yimur Financial Management Specialist AFC06
Hammad Hundal Economic Analysis FAO / CP
Harit Wadhawan Consultant AFTS2 Project Management
Jacob Kampen Consultant AFTS2 Component 3
James Keough Analyst AFTS2
James Orehmie Monday Senior Environmental Engineer EASTS
Johannes Woelcke Senior Economist AFTAI2
Jonathan Pavluk Senior Counsel LEGAF
Laketch Mikael Imru Senior Rural Development Specialist AFTAI1
Laurence E. Darcy Consultant AFTS2
Madhur Gautam Lead Economist SASDA
Melissa Brown Economist AFTA2
Michelle Phillips Rural Development Specialist AFTS2
Samuel Haile Selassie Senior Procurement Specialist SARPS
Rahel Lulu Program Assistant AFCE3
Raj at Narula Senior Finance Officer LOAG2
Rohan Selvaratnam Sr. Program Assistant AFTS4
Wendy Wiltshire Operations Analyst AFTS2
Tim Bene Consultant AFTA2 M&E Specialist
Vincent A. Ashworth Consultant AFTS2
Supervision/ICR
Abiy Admassu Temechew Procurement Analyst AFTPE
Achim Fock Senior Economist AFTA3 TTL
Almaz Teklesenbet Temporary AFTA1 Team Assistant
Asferachew Abate Abebe Environmental Specialist AFTN1 Safeguards
Ashok Kumar Seth Consultant AFTA1 Component 3
Assaye Legesse Senior Agriculture Economist AFTA3
Desta Solomon ET Consultant AFTN1 Safeguards
Ethiopia has established as of today. However, this analysis does not inform about the specific investments
the project has made and that were limited to building the capacity of existing FTCs.
41
Edward Felix Dwumfour Senior Environmental Specialist AFTN1
Esayas Nigatu Consultant AFTA1 Component 5.1
Eshetu Yimer Sr Financial Management Specialist AFTME
Ingrid Marie Pierre Mollard Consultant AFTA1 M&E
Jeeva A. Perumalpillai-Essex Manager CSASB TTL
Jonathan Cook Consultant AFTAR Component 2
Jonathan Pavluk Senior Counsel LEGAM
Laketch Mikael Imru Senior Rural Development Specialist AFTA3 TTL
Lemlem Workalemahu Program Assistant AFCE3
Meron Tadesse Techane Financial Management Analyst AFTME
Mulat Negash Tegegn ET Consultant AFTME
Rahel Lulu Program Assistant AFCE3
Rajat Narula Sr Financial Management Specialist EASFM
Shimelis W/hawariat Badisso Procurement Specialist AFTPE
Tafesse Freminatos Abrham Consultant AFTMW Financial Management
Teklu Tesfaye Senior Agricultural Specialist AFTA1
Wendy A. Wiltshire Consultant AFTA1
Yasmin Tayyab Senior Social Development Specialist AFTCS
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Stage of Project Cycle
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
No. of staff weeks US$ thousands (including
travel and consultant costs)
Lending
FY02 0 2.72
FY03 22 165.92
FY04 30 402.94
FY05 31 119.48
FY06 67 294.73
Total: 150 985.78
Supervision/ICR
FY07 29 131.64
FY08 27 147.65
FY09 29 138.08
FY10 17 59.95
FY11 34 109.04
FY12 34 97.94
Total: 169 684.32
42
Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results and Impact Evaluation This Annex summarizes the results of the two farm household surveys undertaken around the
mid-term and at the end of the project. They surveys measure the impact on the ‘ultimate’
beneficiaries of the project, i.e., smallholder men and women households, rather than the ‘direct’
beneficiaries, i.e. institutions and their employees that are part of the agricultural services and
systems.54
These surveys have been combined to undertake an impact evaluation of some of the
project activities–primarily component 2. The analytical work–and the drafting on this Annex–
has been led by the World Bank’s Africa Regional Gender Practice – Gender Innovation Lab.
Context and methodology
The project commissioned two independent household surveys; the first one with field work in
December 2009 / January 2010 and the other one at the end of the Project. 55
Both surveys cover
the same sample of households in RCBP (project) kebeles and potential control kebeles which are
not part of the project. The methodology used to estimate impact is propensity score matching,
combined with a difference in differences. Specifically, the matching is tried with four different
specifications and the results discussed below (except where noted) are significant at the 10
percent level or better across all four specifications. In cases where the size of the effect differs,
this note usually discusses the lowest one in what follows.
Two things are important to note. First, the central problem of matching is that it is impossible to
deal with unobservable characteristics. In this case, if the project woredas were selected for their
agricultural growth over time in ways that are not captured by observable characteristics, then this
selection–rather than the activities of the project–could be driving the results.
Second, the “baseline” survey takes place mid-way through project implementation. At the time
of this survey a lot of the equipment for the farmer training centers, etc. had been procured,
though much of it had not yet moved to the end users. One way to assess the extent to which the
first survey was indeed a baseline is to look at the state of DAs at the time of the evaluation
baseline survey. The Attachment to this Annex provides some data from a survey of the DAs
carried out by the PMU. It shows no significant difference in the number of DAs in project and
control (non-project) areas. The project does seem to have started some activities, however: 75
percent of kebeles report at least one DA having short term training in the project areas against 58
percent in the control areas, a statistically significant difference. There is no difference in long
term training, or participation in project exposure visits. Nevertheless, parts of the DA survey are
inconsistent with the household survey. In particular, the frequency of contact with farmers, as
reported by the DA, is consistently lower in project areas relative to non-project areas, as are
some measures of farmer response (“positive response”) to extension services. These results give
support to quality concerns that are based on the methodology (DAs’self-reporting).
Results
The following presents the baseline summary statistics (and their difference across treatment and
control, with significant differences marked by an *), endline summary statistics (and their
54
The PMU also coordinated a number of surveys of these institutions, which are also the project’s IAs,
and their employees. The results of these surveys are reflected in the assessment of the outcomes
(Section 3) and are the basis for the intermediate indicators of the Results Framework (Data Sheet F) and
Output Indicators (Annex 4.) 55
The PMU had also surveyed households through the administrative systems and DA in 2008, but these
data were not usable for the evaluation. The 2009/2010 survey was technically led by IFPRI in
collaboration with the PMU and the World Bank; the endline survey was technically led by the World Bank.
43
difference) and the most conservative, statistically significant impact estimated by any of our
methods of propensity score matching.56
This last information (last column in the tables) is the
most crucial as it provides the propensity score matched difference in difference (i.e. the
difference in the trajectory between households in project areas and a statistically similar set of
households in non-project areas). Non-significant (for a majority of our methods) results are
indicated in this column with ‘n/s’. In addition to the results presented below, the significance of
gender differences across male- and female-headed households was explored. While the
coefficients are not shown here, when these results are of interest, they are discussed in the bullet
points following the tables.
1. Income and consumption
Baseline Endline Matching
sig. coeff. T mean C mean Diff T mean C mean Diff
People contributing to
income (#) 2.18 2.22 -.038 2.68 2.32 .358* 0.512
People working on
household farm (#) 3.60 4.10 -.496** 3.25 3.19 .065 0.397
Weekly expenditure on
food (ETB) 145 147 -1.39 166 176 -10.2 n/s
Weekly value of
purchased food that was
consumed (ETB)
86.1 80.5 5.6 124 133 -8.24 n/s
The project has significantly increased economic activity. An additional one half of a person
is contributing to the household income in project relative to control areas. In terms of farm
labor, there seems to be an overall decline for all households, but this decline is significantly
lower in project areas.
There is no significant change in household consumption as measured through food
expenditure.
2. Household assets including land under cultivation
Baseline Endline Matching
sig. coeff. T mean C mean Diff T mean C mean Diff
Access to electricity (yes=1) .094 .052 .041 .152 .088 .064 0.035
Access to piped water (yes=1) .163 .126 .037 .039 .013 .026** n/s
Number of Outbuildings 1.65 1.89 -.236 1.21 1.21 -.002 0.207
Value household assets (birr) 1,351 1,006 345* 2,513 1,798 715* 277
Total farm size (ha) 2.12 2.20 -.083 1.94 1.45 .486** 0.359
Plots (#) 4.45 4.51 -.055 4.35 4.19 .159 n/s
Access to electricity has increased in both, project and control areas, but significantly more in
project areas. The number of outbuildings appears to have gone down in both areas, but at a
significantly lower rate in project areas. Both results are difficult to explain.
Overall household assets (excluding housing and livestock) have gone up in both project and
control areas. While assets were significantly higher in program areas at baseline, they grew
at a significantly higher rate, thus indicating that the project increased household wealth.
The total size of all plots fell between the baseline and endline surveys for all households.
However, it fell at a significantly lower rate among project households – thus project
households have more farm area by the end of the project.
56
The most conservative estimate means that we chose the smallest positive coefficients and the lowest
negative coefficients.
44
3. Crops grown
Baseline Endline Matching
sig. coeff. T mean C mean Diff T mean C mean Diff
Number of Crops Grown 4.53 4.45 .078 3.53 3.40 .129 n/s
Intercrops (yes=1) .173 .237 -.064 .151 .183 -.032 0.051
Grows Teff (yes=1) .590 .699 -.109 .578 .641 -.063 n/s
Wheat (yes=1) .268 .423 -.155* .229 .359 -.130* n/s
Maize (yes=1) .604 .569 .035 .556 .567 -.011 n/s
Sorghum (yes=1) .419 .382 .038 .379 .368 .011 n/s
Haricot Beans
(yes=1) .072 .004 .067** .130 .157 -.027 -0.114
Sesame (yes=1) .121 .033 .088** .088 .015 .072** n/s
Enset (yes=1) .147 .007 .140*** .143 .005 .138*** n/s
Intercropping appears to have decreased across both project and non- project areas. However,
the rate of decline was significantly lower in project areas. This pattern (of the overall
decline) may be a sign of increased farming intensity – this is discussed further in the
conclusions below. The fact that project households are more likely to be intercropping is
driven by male headed households; female headed households are no more likely than the
control areas to be intercropping.
In terms of individual crop, there is one significant change–for haricot beans. Here the growth
in the cultivation of haricot beans has been higher in non-project areas than in project areas
and thus the project is associated with a decline in the cultivation of haricot beans. As with
intercropping, this seems to be driven by male headed households.
4. Growing higher value crops
Baseline Endline Matching
sig. coeff. T mean C mean Diff T mean C mean Diff
Grow somewhat high-
value crops (yes=1) .837 .841 -.004 .778 .709 .070 0.09
Grow high-value crops
(yes=1) .368 .225 .143** .304 .088 .216*** 0.091
Sell somewhat high-
value crops (yes=1) .816 .797 .019 .777 .695 .082* 0.078
Sell high-value crops
(yes=1) .275 .131 .144** .308 .076 .232*** 0.099
Value of sale of harvest
(ETB) 3,503 2,805 698 3,287 2,453 834 n/s
High value crops are defined as those which are marketed and somewhat high value crops as
those that are marketed but also consumed by households (this latter definition includes high
value crops).
In terms of somewhat high value crops, these are grown less at the time of the endline survey
than they were in the baseline. However, the rate of this decline is significantly lower in
project households and thus they are more likely to grow these crops at endline. A similar
pattern can be observed for the sale of these crops.
In terms of high value crops, there is also a decline in cultivation, but again, this is much
lower in project areas and hence households there are more likely to be growing high value
crops. In terms of sale of these crops, there is an increase in project areas and a decrease in
non-project areas. This yields a statistically significant and large increase in the sale of high
value crops among project households relative to control areas.
In terms of gender, it is of interest to note that in terms of growing somewhat high value or
high value crops, there is no significant difference across male- and female-headed
households, i.e., in terms of the cultivation of these crops, the project seems to have
45
benefitted men and women equally. There is, however, a significant difference is in terms of
the sale of these crops: Men who benefitted from the project are significantly more likely to
sell high value crops than women are.
5. Agricultural inputs, technology and technology adoption
Baseline Endline Matching
sig. coeff. T mean C mean Diff T mean C mean Diff
Tried new ag. activities
(yes=1) .532 .475 .058 .478 .494 -.016 -0.114
Tried new ag. activities
DA-demonstrated
(yes=1) (“DA=1”)
.588 .563 .025 .602 .633 -.031 -0.135
If DA=1, tried
crop/livestock techniques
(yes=1)
.893 .845 .049 .890 .832 .058 n/s
If DA=1,tried new
farming methods (yes=1) .868 .818 .051 .919 .878 .041 n/s
If DA=1,tried new
marketing approach
(yes=1)
.564 .438 .126** .632 .590 .042 n/s
There is a drop over time in all households in terms of trying new agricultural technologies.
However, this drop is significantly higher in project areas. Thus the program seems to be
leading to a drop in farmers trying new technologies.
While trying new activities may be declining, the fraction of households who are trying new
technologies and say the DA demonstrated it is rising over time. However, the rate of
increase for this is significantly lower among project households than those in control areas.
In terms of use of improved seeds, number of crops for which seedlings were used, and the
value of seedlings, there were no significant differences in changes over time between project
and control areas (results not shown here).
There were no significant differences in the rate of change of the use of irrigation, natural
fertilizer, chemical fertilizer, pesticides/herbicides/fungicides across project/control areas.
The same applies to those obtaining seeds from WOA or the FTC (results not shown here).
6. Livestock
Baseline Endline Matching
sig. coeff. T mean C mean Diff T mean C mean Diff
Total value of all
livestock (ETB) 7,722 7,876 -154 39,570 30,325 9,244 9,289
Total value of all non-
poultry livestock (ETB) 7,626 7,756 -131 38,575 29,543 9,032 9,164
Total value of all poultry
(ETB) 96.3 120 -23.9 1,048 882 166 n/s
There have been large increases in livestock value across project and non-project households
over time (note that these figures are in nominal, not real terms). The rate of increase in
livestock overall, and in non-poultry livestock in particular has been significantly higher in
project areas as compared to the control group.
These livestock increases are being driven entirely by male-headed households. Female-
headed households in project areas are not experiencing a significant increase in livestock
values.
46
7. Contact with extension services
Contact with Baseline Endline Matching
sig. coeff. T mean C mean Diff T mean C mean Diff
… DA at home/field
(yes=1) .738 .735 .003 .852 .864 -.012 n/s
… DA at another
location (yes=1) .599 .629 -.030 .951 .975 -.024* n/s
… WOA at home/field
(yes=1) .106 .113 -.007 .615 .770 -.154** -0.174
… WOA at another
location (yes=1) .124 .134 -.011 .794 .879 -.085* -0.158
… DA at home/field
(frequent=1) .538 .445 .093** .504 .576 -.071 -0.182
… DA at another
location (frequent =1) .393 .348 .045 .715 .756 -.041 -0.103
… WOA at home/field
(frequent =1) .049 .022 .027** .203 .309 -.106* -0.164
… WOA at another
location (frequent =1) .040 .015 .025** .242 .356 -.113* -0.182
Overall, this table shows a large expansion of both project and control households in terms of
exposure to extension.
With the exception of contact with the DA (yes/no), all of the indicators point to a
significantly lower rate of increase in program areas (the one exception to this is the
frequency of DA contact which seems to have slightly declined for project household heads
and increased for control heads). One thing to note is that some of these indicators (frequent
contact with the DA, frequent contact with WOA) were significantly higher (albeit by small
amounts) in project program areas at the time of the baseline survey. One interpretation of
these results could be that there was an initial push before the baseline and the endline result
is a reversion to the mean (this is discussed further below).
In terms of contact with WOA, this decline is being driven entirely by male-headed
households. Female-headed households, if anything, are more likely to have contact with
WOA in project areas. Female- and male-headed households experience roughly the same
decline in DA contact, however.
8. Satisfaction with extension services
Baseline Endline Matching
sig. coeff. T mean C mean Diff T mean C mean Diff
Model farmer's advice
"Very Helpful" (yes=1) .627 .497 .131** .535 .566 -.030 n/s
DA's advice "Very
Helpful" (yes=1) .716 .567 .149*** .524 .600 -.075 -0.185
WOA's advice "Very
Helpful" (yes=1) .459 .459 .000 .457 .496 -.039 -0.395
Advice from FTC
training "Very Helpful"
(yes=1)
.630 .532 .099* .389 .535 -.145 n/s
Advice from FTC
demonstration "Very
Helpful" (yes=1)
.662 .523 .139** .380 .326 .054 n/s
FTC Classroom
Trainings "Highly
Relevant" (yes=1)
.691 .543 .148*** .684 .721 -.037 -0.188
Rated FTC Practical .683 .558 .125** .670 .663 .007 -0.161
47
Baseline Endline Matching
sig. coeff. T mean C mean Diff T mean C mean Diff
Trainings "Highly
Relevant" (yes=1)
Rated FTC Field
Demonstration "Highly
Relevant" (yes=1)
.672 .545 .127** .655 .642 .013 -0.103
"Highly Satisfied" with
DA Availability (yes=1) .734 .601 .134*** .596 .633 -.037 -0.131
At baseline, heads of household in project areas were significantly more satisfied with their
extension services than those in control areas. This is in marked contrast to the DA’s reports
contained in the Attachment below.
As we look over time, heads of households in project areas seem to experience no increase in
satisfaction and two indicators, whether the DA’s advice was very helpful and being highly
satisfied with DA availability, show large declines. The latter variable (DA availability)
decline is significantly worse for female-headed households than for male headed households.
Indeed, looking at the regression results, for those variables for which we have significant
coefficients the change in project program areas is significantly lower than those in control
areas. Thus, the program seems to have led to a marked decline in satisfaction with extension
services during the two years between baseline and endline surveys.
9. Agricultural advice
Received advice from Baseline Endline Matching
sig. coeff. T mean C mean Diff T mean C mean Diff
… other household
member (yes=1)
.430 .472 -.041 .294 .264 .030 n/s
… friends/neighbor
(yes=1)
.432 .484 -.052 .475 .418 .057
0.096
… model farmer (yes=1) .363 .301 .061 .284 .263 .021 n/s
… follower farmer /
pastoralist (yes=1)
.079 .049 .029* .056 .041 .016 n/s
… farmer groups (yes=1) .206 .099 .107*** .157 .191 -.034 -0.166
… DA farm visit (yes=1) .796 .794 .001 .898 .927 -.029 -0.061
… NGOs (yes=1) .051 .066 -.015 .072 .025 .047** 0.057
… FTC course/training
(yes=1)
.424 .411 .013 .306 .381 -.075 n/s
… FTC demonstration
plot (yes=1)
.333 .240 .094* .210 .138 .071* n/s
… WOA (yes=1) .150 .173 -.023 .265 .260 .005 n/s
Other modes of advice show some more complex patterns. The first result to focus on is
whether the respondent received advice from a friend/neighbor. This has increased over time
in project areas, and declined in control areas. This leads to a significant and large increase of
this in project areas relative to control areas. A similar pattern appears with respect to advice
received by NGOs, this is growing at a significantly higher rate in project areas relative to the
control. Thus, the project seems to have increased farmer-friend and farmer-NGO advice
provision.
In terms of receiving advice from farmers groups, the opposite pattern appears. At baseline,
project farmers are significantly more likely to have received advice from farmers groups.
However, over time, this drops and the result is that the program leads to lower levels of
advice from farmers groups.
Advice from the DA on a farm visit is increasing for both treatment and control households.
However, it is increasing at a significantly higher rate for control households.
48
Conclusions
In summary, households in project areas relative to those in control areas are characterized by a
faster growth in income, in the number of people contributing to the income, and in the number of
people working on the farm. The assets of project households and, especially, livestock assets are
also growing faster than that of non-project households. These results in terms of upper-level
indicators are as expected. The magnitude of some of these results is surprising after essentially
only two years. Project households also show more area under cultivation, more area planted to
high value crops, and a higher rate of increase of intercropping.
The propensity score matched difference in difference for many lower-level indicators are more
puzzling. Farmers in treatment areas are less likely to have experimented with new agricultural
activities. There is no increase in DA contact, and a decrease in frequency of DA visits (with a
more pronounced drop for the WOA). And program farmers do not seem to favor the DA or the
FTC as a source of farming information or advice. However, they are significantly more likely to
be getting advice from friends/neighbors or NGOs.
One explanation for these results is that of methodological failure. As noted above, propensity
score matching does not deal with unobservable characteristics. Despite the lack of a clear
articulation as to how project woredas were chosen, it is possible that they were chosen for their
agricultural growth potential and hence the observed impacts are due to underlying unobservable
characteristics and not to the program. However, the methodology used combines matching
(where we statistically identify farmers in non-program areas who are as similar as possible in the
variables we do have) with a difference in difference approach (where we are subtracting the
control change in outcome variables over time from the change observed in the treatment group).
Hence, the areas would have had to been selected on time-varying, unobservable characteristics.
While we cannot rule this out, this would require substantial acumen on the government’s part –
recall that program areas were selected about 3 years before our “baseline” data was collected.
And what we are observing here is the changes over the last 2 years. It would also fly in the face
of any description by the government of how project areas were targeted.
The more likely explanation draws on the project implementation. At the time of the "baseline"
survey in December 2009 through the end of January 2010, funds had long been disbursed to
woredas for strengthening the capacity of FTCs and there had been significant investment in DA
training by this time. The "baseline" results provide some evidence that these activities have been
bearing some early fruit. While low relative to the endline, DA contact was frequent and the
households in the project areas had significantly more contact with the DA at home or in the field,
and with the WOA. In addition, project areas at baseline are significantly more satisfied with
extension services across a range of measures. Finally, at baseline, project households were
significantly more likely to have received advice from farmers groups and FTC demonstration
plots. Taken together, all of these baseline statistics suggest that there may have been significant
implementation by the time of the baseline survey.
If we accept this, then the endline impact results suggest that we are observing (two years later)
the farm-level and household welfare impacts of these improvements in extension. The increases
in growth of higher value crops, the increase in people working on the farm, the higher livestock
values, and the higher assets could all have resulted from the surge in provision of better
extension at the time of the "baseline" survey. A time lag from extension to adoption and increase
in productivity and income is fully consistent with experience with extension services.
49
What remains difficult is to explain the significantly lower satisfaction and contact with extension
of project households by the endline survey. This could be due to the fact that these farmers, now
that they have adopted higher value crops, have moved beyond agricultural extension services
and are now relying more on social networks. Their needs from and expectations for the
extension system has changed. The results show an increase in getting advice from
friends/neighbors for their information. However, more research is needed to support these
explanations.
Taken together, the results suggest that the project led to a surge in extension services and had
strong impacts on farming outcomes and household welfare. However, farmer’s use and
satisfaction with the extension services have declined at the end of the project, pointing to the
need for better understanding of the dynamics, needs of farmers, and the sustainability of the
extension system.
50
Annex 5 Attachment: Summary statistics baseline from DA survey
Note that this survey was self-administered by the DAs on request from the PMU; it was not
administered by the same firm which carried out the household survey)
RCBP Non-RCBP
N mean mean sig.
DA Characteristics
Average age 124 27.22 27.14
Number of DAs 124 2.45 2.33
Number of Female DAs 124 0.47 0.64
Field of study
Plant Science (# of DAs) 124 0.81 0.76
Animal Science/Health (# of DAs) 124 0.82 0.70
NRM (# of DAs) 124 0.81 0.82
Current responsibility
Specialist DAs (# of DAs) 124 0.67 0.03 ***
General DAs (# of DAs) 124 0.36 0.64
Both Specialist & General DAs (# of DAs) 124 1.42 1.67
At least one DA is head of FTC 124 0.75 0.91 *
Experience
Experience as DA, years 115 5.35 5.51
Experience as DA in this FTC, years 106 2.18 2.17
Extension Methods
Change in Extension methods last 2 years 124 0.97 0.91
Conduct Needs assessment 124 0.96 0.91
Plan extension with farmers 124 0.96 0.94
Monitor and evaluate extension with farmers 124 0.90 0.94
More group problem solving 124 0.90 0.94
Better use of extension materials 124 0.79 0.85
More demonstration sites 124 0.73 0.79
Positive response to needs assessment 124 0.95 0.94
Positive response to planning with farmers 124 0.87 0.94
Positive response to monitoring with farmers 124 0.85 0.94
Positive response to group problem solving 124 0.81 0.94 *
Positive response to use of extension materials 124 0.76 0.91 *
Positive response to use of demonstration sites 124 0.73 0.91 **
% of farmers contacted weekly 123 19.5 26.7 *
% of farmers contacted bi-monthly 123 29.6 36.6 *
% of farmers contacted monthly 123 37.8 51.7 ***
% of farmers contacted quarterly 115 42.7 68.9 ***
% of farmers contacted bi-annually 105 50.4 75.1 ***
% of farmers contacted annually 97 61.0 80.9 **
% of farmers never contacted 16 24.9 2.0
Research Contact
Visited by Researcher at least once a Month 124 0.09 0.15
Visited by Woreda SMS at least once a Month 124 0.77 0.48 ***
Visited by Zonal SMS at least once a Month 124 0.10 0.15
Visited by Regional SMS at least once a year 124 0.78 0.88
Visited by ATVET staff at least once a year 124 1.00 1.00
Visited by NGO staff at least once a year 124 0.96 0.97
51
RCBP Non-RCBP
N mean mean sig.
Training & Exposure Visits
Short-term training by RCBP (at least 1 DA) 124 0.75 0.58 *
Long-term training by RCBP (at least 1 DA) 124 0.25 0.24
Ever participated in RCBP exposure visits 124 0.20 0.27
DA Satisfaction with SMS Service
Woreda SMS has adequate skill & knowledge 124 1.00 0.94 **
Zonal SMS has adequate skill & knowledge 124 0.69 0.70
Regional SMS has adequate skill & knowledge 124 0.71 0.52 **
Woreda SMS planned training according to need 124 0.74 0.82
Zonal SMS planned training according to need 124 0.55 0.64
Regional SMS planned training according to need 124 0.56 0.42
DA Perception of community participation
Community participation in FTC is High 124 0.25 0.18
Community contributes to the FTC 124 0.73 0.73
Level of significance: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
52
Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results A RCBP Closing Workshop was held at the Melkassa Agricultural Research Center in Melkassa,
Ethiopia in June 2012. Participants included stakeholders and Implementing Agencies (IAs),
including from MoA; Regions and Woredas including FTCs; EIAR and RARIs including Federal
and Regional Research Centers; ATVETs; CIDA and World Bank; NGOs and invited senior
professionals. The following presents the Minutes of this workshop.
Agenda:
Session - I: Opening
Welcoming, Opening and Key Note Addresses
Session - II: Project Achievements, Best Practices and Lessons Learnt
ATVET Component
Agricultural Extension & Information and Communication Systems Components
Agricultural Research Component
Agricultural Marketing Component
Session - III: Project Impacts I
Impact of the ATVET Component
DA performance, ARDPLAC and FREGs Cost-Benefit Analysis
Session - IV: Project Impacts II
Performance of the Research Component
End-of-Project Impact Assessment
Project Implementation Completion Report
Session - V: Way forward
Sustainability of New Innovative Extension Approaches
General Discussion and the Way Forward
Background
The Rural Capacity Building Project (RCBP) of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) was one of
the most successful projects which was implemented by various actors with objectives of
strengthening agricultural services and systems and make them more responsive to clients’ needs
and enhance the capacity of producers to become aware of and adopt economically viable and
environmentally sustainable technologies and practices. The project was financed by the World
Bank and the Canada International Development Agency (CIDA) and it had five programmatic
components (Agricultural Education, Research, Extension, ICT and Marketing).
The project was implemented in all Regional States taking ATVET Colleges, Research Institutes,
Woredas and FTCs. In the process of implementation several innovative technologies, practices,
approaches, methods and tools were generated, promoted on pilot basis and finally scaled to serve
wider / direct beneficiaries and surrounding communities at grassroots. Key results of the project
were also aligned to contribute to the formulation of the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP)
of the country.
The project was used as one of the key enhancing factors to address agricultural strategic issues
stated in the PASDEP. The project was implemented in the past five years (actual implementation
was from March 2007 to June 2012). The total project cost was US$ 58 million plus ETB 9
million. Out of this sum, US$ 41 million is a credit from IDA and US$ 17 million is a grant from
CIDA plus 9 million Birr from the government (to fill the shortfall starting July 2011).
53
The implementing Agencies (IAs) were ATVETs; Agricultural Extension Directorate (AED)
(mainly through the Regional Bureaus of Agriculture (BoAs) and Woreda Offices of Agriculture
(WOAs); Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR); Regional Agricultural Research
Institutes (RARIs); Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX); Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Standards (SPS) of Animal and Plant Health Regulatory Directorate (APHRD) of the Ministry of
Agriculture (MoA). Extension component of RCBP was implemented in 9 Regions (in the
selected 136 Woredas) and one City Administration (Dire Dawa) within 2,506
Farmers/Pastoralists Training Centers (FTCs/PTCs).
Project Achievements and Impacts
Project achievements reported by PMU and from various case studies are summarized as follows:
ATVET Component: The MoA developed national ATVETs strategic plan by involving a
taskforce of representatives from various federal and regional stakeholders (Ministry of
Education, Ministry of Agriculture, Oromia Regional BoA, Algae ATVET, as well as Training &
Communication and Gender Specialists from PMU). Following the NSP development, 51 EOSs
set and 51 Assessment Tools developed as well as training provided on curriculum and TTLM
preparation. As a result all ATVET colleges could implement the new teaching learning system.
It also enabled the colleges to design Gender & Development and Agriculture & HIV/AIDS
curriculum and TTLM to address cross cutting issues.
Extension Component: Significant number of staffs benefited from the project supported long-
term and short-term trainings. The long term training opportunity was provided for about 966
BoA staffs at different levels (DAs, woreda SMS, regional SMS and staffs of the MoA). Out of
which 732 trainees already completed their studies (about 14 MSc trainees that had conducting
their training at Hawassa and are expected to be graduated are not included in the graduates
category as the University could not deliver their current status) while the training of 117 staffs is
on-going. The proportion of graduates and ongoing students taken together makes 88 percent
success rate compared to the plan. About 117 students quitted their education due to various
factors including academic inefficiency, illness and other personal factors.
Research Component: The project invested a lot to enhance the capacity of EIAR and RARIs.
EIAR developed an M&E procedures and distributed to the research institutions and centers and
higher learning institutes. However, the RARIs have not used the M&E procedure since it goes
with NARS establishment, which is not yet in place. One technology shopping procedure
developed and implemented; 73 technologies were acquired and two were released; gender
mainstreaming guideline and implementation procedure was developed and utilized; 41 NARF
and 39 RARF projects were selected and funded. The project selection procedure was transparent
and satisfactory. The thematic areas parallel the commodity based research organization.
ICT Component: The project provided necessary ICT equipment for 136 woredas so that they
would be able to access internet service. Network installation was completed for 126 project
woredas and 79 project woredas now have internet connection, which implies that the
achievement is more than the planned target of 50 percent. However, most of these internet
services are not providing full time service and works for an average of 5 working hours a day.
The envisaged networking of FTCs with woredas, region and MoA, however, was realized during
the project period due to external factors.
Market Development: This component primarily focused on ECX capacity building and
Metema quarantine construction in order to improve access to market. The project supported
IVR/SMS services and electronic tickers have significantly contributed to the increased
marketing of commodities through the ECX. The amount of four major commodities (coffee,
maize, sesame and pulse) traded through ECX increased more than double between 2008 and
54
2011. About 10,000 subscribers comprising of farmers (10 percent), members (30 percent),
clients (30 percent) and the general public (30 percent) sought for commodity price information
using the IVR/SMS service which is double of the project target.
Budget allocated and utilization: A total of US$ 58 million was allocated for the project. The
total expenditure stands at Birr 715,507,880 in June 2012. According to World Bank online report,
the project expenditure stands at 91.28 percent of the budget. The remaining balance is expected
to be spent during the grace period. The burning rate of the project increased progressively over
the project life.
The way forward
ATVET Colleges: Under this component, there is a need to finalize National Strategic Document
to provide guidelines for TVET strategy implementation in the context of agriculture.
Cooperative training with industries, agricultural representation on different channels from
federal to regional TVET institutions under the MoE Federal TVET Agency over sighted. As a
result, ATVET colleges under MoE Federal TVET Agency are highly affected with regard to
budget and other supports to implement the new teaching learning system as desired
ATVET Project Office of MoA has to take further actions to show the need for entry
requirements, future and technical assistance of regional ATVETs as well as retention of self-
generated income need to be addressed as in the TVET strategy and other TVET Colleges under
the MoE Federal TVET Agency. Momentum created for transforming federal ATVET colleges
need to be continued. Specialized training need further follow up and provision of clear directions.
In order to effect this recommendation, there might be a need to support ATVET Project in terms
of technique and finance.
Farmers Training Centers (FTCs): There is a need to prepare a general plan and policy frame
work for immediate and long term funding for the remaining FTCs. This could be funded through
project support for interim and gradual move to self-funding in longer term requires waiver for
FTCs to allow retention of funds and its management at Kebele level.
Strengthening management committee through various training associated to management aspects
of FTCs using existing pool of trainers is very crucial. Minimum standards for a functional FTC
need to be reviewed in terms of the number of DAs and demonstrations at FTC level depending
on the location. It is also good to revisit funding requirements of DA and FTC.
Development Agents (DAs): Implementation of DA career plan needs to be enhanced and the
associated problems should be reviewed and improved for all in transparent and accountable
manner across regions. Since there is a high DA turnover, there should be an immediate
replacement and training strategies. There is also a need for resources, i.e. transport, mobile
telephone, training materials, and operational costs. Budget to cover such costs may be obtained
from FTCs income. Improving DA salaries and other incentives should focus on work
performance. We need to think of alternatives to create environments for increased work
performance and identify our expectation from DAs in the years to come. An associated feedback
mechanism on DA performance needs to be created
Short-term Training: Strategy should be developed for in-service training (for career
development, for need based skills upgrading, etc.). During the project period a pool of trainers
were already established and this needs to be integrated within strategy for in service training.
The project guidelines for short-term training that are recognized as effective, i.e. small numbers
of trainees, number of days, balance between practice and theory, handouts and manuals
throughout the training areas.
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Farmers Innovative Fund (FIF): This is still at experimental stage and has to continue under
other projects to validate the current findings. However, strict follow-up is needed in order to
follow up guidelines and focus on farmer innovation. Long-term funding needs to be established,
e.g., through income generating FTCs. The size of grant, however, needs to be maintained or at
least kept in line with what a group could fund without a grant. Training/sensitization of DAs and
other stakeholders on fixed approach need to be ensured.
Farmers Research and Extension Groups (FREGs): are still not mainstreamed to the regular
extension work. Hence, FREG would continue with project support though such support is not
suitable for the long-term interventions. There is a need to facilitate their evolution from research
led to extension led and finally to farmer led activities with identification of problems primarily
by farmers at all stages; and FREG guideline should be modified in the context of this evolution.
There is a need to limit research input and general support that is given to a single FREG in the
course of evolution. Training/sensitization of DAs and other stakeholders is also important. There
should be better research extension collaboration for success of FREG. Approach and future
vision for its integration as standard method through extension system need to be developed.
Agricultural Development partners Linkage Advisory Council (ARDPLACs): Cannot be
continued to be project funded. Hence, it needs to be part of the federal regional, zonal and
woreda plans and secure budget from central treasury. To secure budget for ARDPLACS at
various levels there should be a review of the role and responsibilities of the stakeholders. Their
focus need to be reassessed, e.g. on results and dissemination instead of needs for research or
extension inputs. Besides, integrating ARDPLACs in the system is more important than
individual motivation to lead the task.
Research: Changes in relation to RCBP target in the research component were not achieved in
terms of NARS coordination and institutional set up for NARS/RARF while M&E procedures did
not satisfy RARIs. The technology shopping could not be achieved within short time because of
further adaptation and verification tests required. The other issue was turnover of the primary
investigators. This problem of turnover on NARF/RARF projects may be solved through
provision of incentives. While valuing effects of the long-term training, retention of the trained
staff members was found to be an issue and this issue needs designing mechanisms to retain the
trained staff is very important.
Laboratories were equipped through the project support but there are inadequate lab technicians
who can run the research work and maintain equipment. Hence, proper attention should be given
to the development/hiring of technicians. Budget allocation for high priority / focus areas like
gender needs to be reconsidered. Besides, the inadequate implementation of M&E limited data
storage system.
To be effective, the research pre-scaling up needs much closer involvement of extension.
Experience sharing visits were very useful but too expensive to be funded through the regular
budget. Hence, it should be replaced with media alternatives i.e. DVD, photo documentaries, etc.
Research-extension hand over shall be interpreted is such a way that hand over should not mean
immediate withdrawal of research. It should mean gradual withdrawal with research ensuring
extension can take up the work. Documentation of best practices from FTCs should continue and
be developed into a regular system to produce extension materials such as print, photos and
videos for dissemination of ideas.
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Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR The Rural Capacity Building Project (RCBP) was designed and launched in between of
indigenously crafted and dynamic successive five year development plan periods. Specifically it
was conceived and launched during the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End
Poverty period. During this period, the average annual growth rate of the agriculture sector has
been about 8.4%, while the overall economic growth was about 11%. Despite this performance,
the growth has not been high enough to tackle the problems of hunger and poverty to the
expectations of the government and development partners alike. This challenge continuous to put
a pressure on the government and its development partners to design multifaceted development
project, and RCBP is one of its kinds. RCBP is designed with a development objective to
strengthen agricultural services and systems for improved agricultural productivity and make
them more responsive to clients needs.
RCBP has five broad components: (i) Agricultural Technical and Vocational Education and
Training (ATVET), (ii) Agricultural Extension Services, (iii) Agricultural Research,
(iv) Information and Communication Systems, and (v) Development of Agricultural Marketing
Institutions. It is financed by the IDA and implemented by the MoA. The original total project
cost was USD 71.0 million. Out of this USD 54 million financed by IDA, USD 17 million by
CIDA. After the Mid-Term Review, the funding from IDA USD 13 million was cancelled and the
IDA source of funding reduced to USD 41 million (71%). Total revised project cost is USD 58
million, of which IDA loan is USD 41million and CIDA grant is USD 17 million. By the end of
the project period, till June 24, 2012, about USD 64 million was allocated and 91% utilized while
the remaining 9% is committed for varies activities.
RCBP’s objectives were relevant since they are partly the mirror images of the strategic
objectives of the agriculture and rural development sector of the economy. They fitted well in the
government’s plans to develop and strengthen the human capital and services needed for
improved productivity and the generation of sustainable incomes in rural agricultural and pastoral
areas.
RCBP implementation came to an end with a satisfactory performance despite some elements of
poor quality entry, design flaws and fragmented and pendulant implementation. Although
relevance was not that much of an issue these seem to diminish the performance of some
components and their drive towards achieving the project development objective (PDO).
As part of a design flaw one could raise the linkage problems among the various components of
the project. The project by design seems to give more weight to equity than returns to investment.
It would have been a highly successful project had it not been stretched to cover hundreds of
woredas and thousands of FTCs. At the initial design ADPLACs were to have members from the
private sector. This seems to be set aside during implementation by taking a simplistic stand that
farmers are also private. The fact that the project did not give room for support staff development,
specifically training, was also pointed out as a design flaw and a major constraint during
implementation.
A PDO which was subjected to modification after a year of project launch reflects the entry was a
bit blurred. This in turn seems to relate back to the reform laden thinking process which was
contained in an initially relatively big project, in terms of finance, which was subjected to scale-
down by government position. The project faced major restructuring within a year after the credit
agreement was signed in December 2008. During this restructuring some activities and the results
framework (RF) was revised and finance reallocated. It is difficult to assume that the reallocation
57
have had no impact on the depth and width of activities to be planned and implemented in the
initially agreed project components and sub-components. This was also further stiffened by
frequent changes of task team leaders from the major financers’ as well as project management
unit (PMU) side. Some of the executing agencies have had no role in the implementation despite
their expected role reflected in the project appraisal document (PAD). Information and
communication system is indeed a component which was implemented without responsible
implementing agency. Some of the executing agencies also became active players at early stage
and their roles in the component entirety or in some sub-components dwindled gradually. For
example, BOAs were enthusiastic to execute FREGS and ADPLACs at initial stage. It is in most
cases more than a year since many abandoned their lead roles to organize FREGs and ADPLAC
meetings partly because they are immersed in their regular score-able assignments, particularly
after the Business Process Reengineering (BPR) exercise. Another major implementation
challenge was exercising decentralized procurement. The lack of adequate local suppliers of
goods and services to be procured at local (woreda) level has been a formidable challenge for
some regional PMUs. The implementation of FREG was also controversial in some areas. Some
believe either that involved in FREG tasks were not well informed about what to do and achieve
or knowingly use it to introduce inputs rather than technologies with unplanned exit and
sustaining strategy of the input supply. The project M&E design was weak from the very
beginning. There was no effort to make M&E plans. Procurement activities data and information
were scanty partly because of procurement specialists’ change. The problem was further
aggravated with the weakness of the MoA Planning and Programing Directorate which was
supposed to take the lead to guide and also demand for a pragmatic M&E system for Projects
within the MoA including RCBP.
Despite the above problems and constraints and its dragged start up, the overall performance of
the project was satisfactory. Of course performance rating varies from component to component
as well as from sub-component to sub-component within a component. The ATVET, agricultural
extension and research components achieved satisfactory rating while the ICS and marketing
received a moderately satisfactory rating. Efficiency is rated moderately satisfactory while the
work done on the cross-cutting issue, Gender-HIV/AIDs, rated satisfactory. As indicated above,
some of the components rated satisfactory or moderately satisfactory has unsatisfactory and
satisfactory rated sub-components, respectively. For example, the agricultural research
component could deserve a highly satisfactory rating in terms of achievements made in the
capacity building sub-component, a satisfactory rating on the human resources development, and
a moderately satisfactory rating in the institutional innovation and NARS coordination activities.
Overall, it deserved a satisfactory rating. In the marketing component, the commodity market and
trade infrastructure sub-component was satisfactory while the SPS moderately satisfactory
(training satisfactory and quarantine station building unsatisfactory). In terms of efficiency,
finance utilization was highly satisfactory while procurement was unsatisfactory.
The satisfactory achievement of the project is accompanied with several risks to sustain project
induced changes. The following have their own shares of sustainability issues: (a) keeping up the
momentum of Change in ATVET; (b) sustaining RCBP supported types of short term trainings;
(c) sustaining the extension system positive changes; (d) organizing and running FREGs; (e)
sustaining development workers motivation; (f) continuing the linkages among FTC, FIF and
FREG; (g) sustainability in emerging research institutes; and (h) sustaining NARF and RARF.
The above listed risky areas could be tackled by mitigating measures inclusive of the desire to
work jointly, learning from the flexible and participatory approach of the RCBP management
team; undertaking a consolidated and focused intervention with a value for money approach;
institutionalizing project activities by integration in regular development programmes; believing
58
in technical support and advices; availing the possible incentive for staff at all levels of
development interventions undertakings; apt decision to procure goods and services including
trainings without compromising quality and substance; believing in supporting development
agents at FTC level as frontrunners for change and rewarding them according their innovative
performances; practicing multi-disciplinary team approach for development interventions
planning and M&E, and considering the establishment of a non-vanishing PMU within the MoA.
RCBP was not immune from being impartial to address all sub-sectors of the agriculture, pastoral
and agro-pastoral economy of the country. Like its predecessors and most on-going agriculture
sector development projects it remained crop-biased. It has been also weak in terms of enabling
FTCs to be vibrant and fully functional with strong demonstration farms, wherever the land for
this purpose was available.
The satisfactory achievements and the specific works started by the project can be sustained, and
all of the above weakness could be improved and turned to strength if the following are seriously
considered, studied and receive positive responses. These are the recommendations:
i. Consolidate development projects interventions to make a real and sustainable
productivity and income augmenting changes at grass roots level (kebeles) rather than
considering giving ephemeral community satisfaction. Invest with the principle of money
for economic value approach. Investment should be made in a regionally dispersed
manner but ensuring reasonable returns to resources incurred.
ii. Decide FTCs establishment with or without Development Funds and in the former case
the land size in areas with and without irrigation infrastructure.
iii. Refine the working modalities of ADPLAC and FREG. Continue strengthening these
instruments of the research and extension systems in a manner that further diminishes the
skirmish between the research and extension institutions (whether FREG or FRG) and
ensure their responsibility to make demand driven technology and service provision both
for public and private development actors.
iv. Provide a quick decision on the NARS coordination mechanism setting and the formation
of Council with the proposed structural and functional settings. But do not stop to work
on the mind-set of individuals and to enforce the agreement on those who may not
practice what is agreed formally. The past gives so many lessons to learn in this regard.
v. Ensure the linkage between development projects regular development programmes
starting at the design stage and continue with the annual planning and M&E process. This
is core in terms of institutionalizing and ensuring the continuation of work started by
projects like RCBP in post project periods.
vi. Ensure integration of marketing and ICS activities with the extension system with or
without projects.
vii. Minimize repeated and unnecessary discrimination of woredas on the basis of externally
funded projects as high potential versus low potential, food secure versus food insecure
etc., particularly the seemingly inherent livestock sub-sector excluding practice.
viii. In connection to vii above, minimize the bias against the livestock sub-sector in
agriculture and rural development projects designing and implementation whether a
project is for non-pastoral or pastoral and agro-pastoral areas.
ix. Establishing Project Management body within MoA, either within the Planning and
Programing Department or a separate one. It shall be destined to avoid several project
59
based PMU formations and instead create one strong project management body which
may change only the coordinator or coordinators but retain the staff working on finance,
procurement and M&E systems. This should be started with a well-studied structural and
functional setting and a pragmatic salary scheme. This recommendation can be
considered as a strategic institutional issue to be studied using the services of the
Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA) of MoA.
60
Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders
RCBP Design
As a Development Partner engaged in the project since its initial design stage, CIDA observes
that even though the approved project was of a much smaller-scale than envisaged during the
design process, the project remained complex. Objectives were very ambitious. While there was
merit in combining the first four components of the project – ATVET, Extension, Research and
ICT – within one project, in hindsight, more attention could have been given to ensuring that the
PMU had the required human resources to manage project implementation and facilitate the
linkages with partners. Furthermore, at the regional level, the mandate of the RCBP focal persons
was limited to overseeing implementation of the Extension component thereby limiting the ability
to promote collaboration between stakeholders involved in the other, separate, components. The
addition of the fifth component (SPS and ECX) made an already complex project even more so,
especially as the composition of the PMU staff did not include a dedicated resource to manage
this new component.
Development Partnership
Overall, CIDA considers the collaboration with the World Bank to have been good on the project.
Generally, CIDA personnel and their local advisors enjoyed a positive working relationship with
World Bank TTLs, PMU staff, and senior level officials at IAs. Being the sole bilateral donor on
a major initiative allowed more opportunities to have a voice on aspects of concern during project
implementation. However, it was observed on a number of occasions that IAs had limited
knowledge of CIDA’s role in the project. CIDA appreciated the efforts that the World Bank TTLs
made to ensure that IAs were aware of CIDA’s involvement, although more effort in this regard
during the early stages of the project would have been welcomed. CIDA also appreciated that
Bank TTLs endeavored to engage CIDA and its local advisors as much as possible in developing
recommendations for action items to resolve various project implementation challenges.
One issue faced by CIDA in the project was the unpredictability in the drawdown of its resources
from the Trust Fund. CIDA approved funding to the project approximately three months after
World Bank Board approval, with an understanding that CIDA funds were to be utilized over the
first three years of the project. This financial schedule did not materialize and CIDA resources
were not used for more than one year after approval. Delays in use of CIDA funds were further
compounded by the fact that disbursement of IDA credit resources appeared to be given priority.
CIDA funds started to be drawn down on a regular basis several months after the project
restructuring in late 2008. Fortunately, CIDA was able to accommodate meeting its financial
commitments to the project for its entire duration. However, more attention to ensuring
predictability in draw down of bilateral co-financing would help to strengthen future
collaborations.
Program Implementation and Supervision
Targets set out for the project were ambitious and could not always be reached during
implementation. In part, this was due to weak planning capacity by PMU and IA personnel. In
addition, unanticipated external factors such as the BPR and various national campaigns, limited
the ability to carry out planned activities. Another impact of weak planning capacity was the
consistent overestimation of how much could be accomplished in a given year. The project faced
this issue early on in implementation with annual plans projecting completion of considerably
61
more activities than feasible and continued throughout the life of the project. This was
compounded by the fact that subsequent annual plans typically did not factor in the backlog of
activities not completed from prior year plan(s).
Another issue was inadequate monitoring of outputs against planned activities. This resulted in a
number of IAs, at all levels (federal, regional and woreda) undertaking some project activities
without reviewing targets set out in the annual plan and/or budget. For example, targeting women
as participants or beneficiaries was not always carried out, thus contributing to fewer women
beneficiaries than planned. In addition, well-received project activities such as Farmer Innovation
Funds (FIFs) and experience sharing visits, were increased, in some cases, well beyond plan
numbers and available budget. As well, the construction of quarantine stations could not be
completed in a timely manner. This practice of inadequate monitoring led to some activities being
significantly oversubscribed while others were overlooked and resulted in budget over- or under-
utilization. Towards the end of the project, some difficult decisions had to be made regarding
budget allocations across components.
The quality of project monitoring by PMU personnel was significantly affected by several issues.
These included: high turnover of staff, particularly in the early years of the project; overtaxing of
staff, particularly after the additional responsibilities for EAAPP were assigned to PMU
personnel; insufficient financial resources to conduct regular visits, primarily because official per
diem rates were not sufficient nor were they regularly adjusted to match inflation rates.
World Bank-CIDA-Government of Ethiopia Joint Review and Implementation Support (JRIS)
missions were held semi-annually and were productive and positive exercises. CIDA staff and
local advisors were able to participate and contribute to the preparation of Aide Memoires.
However, missions were sometimes not planned sufficiently in advance, thereby limiting the
capacity of the mission team to review all components effectively. Key meetings did not always
materialize, and status reports from regions or the PMU were not always available. As the timing
of JRIS missions are usually known months in advance, more attention to planning and
scheduling could have increased the effectiveness of missions.
CIDA was able to contribute to mitigating some implementation constraints of the project
through support provided by a separate bilateral source of funds approved at the same time as
Canada’s core contribution to the project. While the resources were limited, they allowed the
engagement of both Canadian and Ethiopian expertise to facilitate project implementation. This
included: the provision of an Ethiopian consultant to help process a backlog of project statement
of expenditures in Year 2; the provision of a Canadian technical advisor to work on the M&E
system for the NARS in Year 3; the assumption of PMU personnel compensation (fees and travel
expenses) from Year 3 forward; and, the provision of an Ethiopian consultancy to support the
development of a Gender Strategy for ATVETs in the final year of the project.
Government Performance
While the government maintained a strong commitment to the agricultural sector in general,
performance varied across components in the project. Stronger support from senior levels of
government could have helped to foster a conducive environment for project implementation and
the institutionalization of results in a number of areas (for example, the ATVET strategy, the
completion of long-term training for personnel in both Extension and Research, the establishment
of the NARS, the completion of the construction of quarantine stations, and procurement and
installation of key elements under the ECX). Increased attention in this area could have fostered
and promoted linkages across the components earlier in the project. Generally, CIDA found the
62
Government to be responsive to issues arising from the joint reviews. However, more rigorous
attention to implementing agreed action items could have helped to improve project performance.
Conclusion
CIDA’s experience working with the World Bank and Government of Ethiopia on the RCBP
provided a unique opportunity to be engaged in a project that was truly national in scope since
this project was implemented in every region of the country. CIDA welcomed the opportunity to
comment and provide their insights and perspectives on the design of the RCBP, its
implementation performance, outcomes, and key lessons learned. CIDA concurs with the ICR
assessment of the RCBP, including the lessons learned and recommendations. From CIDA’s
perspective, lessons learned from the engagement on RCBP have been and will continue to be
applied by CIDA to other significant Bank-Government of Ethiopia-donor initiatives which
CIDA also funds in the agriculture sector in Ethiopia, such as the Productive Safety Net Program
(PSNP) and the Agricultural Growth Program (AGP).
63
Annex 9. Weighted Rating of Outcome Assessment For formally restructured project the World Bank’s (2006) Guidelines for Implementation
Completion and Results Report state that the project is to be assessed against both, its original
and its revised development objectives and that both ratings are to be weighted by the
disbursement share before restructuring and after the approval of restructuring. This approach is
summarized below.
As discussed in Section 2.2, the main reason for the 2008 restructuring was the slow
implementation progress. Only 16.5 percent of the original (IDA and CIDA) project funds had
been disbursed before the December 2008 restructuring, and much of these funds were still in the
Designated Account rather than being spent. Going through the restructuring process was
important as it provided more focus, simplified the design and strengthened ownership. The
changes to the PDO were modest, however. The PDO both, before and after restructuring had at
its core the strengthening of agricultural services and systems and making these more client
responsive. The restructured PDO dropped the references to agricultural productivity and
producer capacity to strengthen the focus and take account of the fact that most services would
not result in benefit for farmers within the lifetime of the project. At the same time, the revised
PDO indicators after restructuring remained at rather high level. The restructuring included
numerous changes to (and dropping of) Intermediate Outcome indicators. Again, the main
purpose was not a significant change in objectives, but to make to make them more specific and
measurable.
In summary, it seems reasonable to judge the project’s achievements against the original
objectives based on the information available, i.e., that related to the revised objectives and
stemming from the revised Results Framework indicators, the impact evaluation, the case studies
and other information. Such approach would lead to a Moderately Satisfactory rating of the
achievements of the project/PDO against the development objectives before and after
restructuring, and overall. A more stringent evaluation would assess the project against its
original development objective as Unsatisfactory, based on the fact that the original Results
Framework lacks baseline, targets and endline information. However, as little had been disbursed
(and implemented) before restructuring, the overall rating for the project would remain
Moderately Satisfactory. This is shown in the following table:
Against Original
PDO
Against Revised
PDO Overall
1 Rating Moderately
Satisfactory
Moderately
Satisfactory
2 Rating value 2 4
3
Weight
(% disbursed before
/ after PDO change)
16.5% 83.5%
4 Weighted value
(2 x 3) 0.33 3.34 3.67
5 Final rating
(rounded)
Moderately
Satisfactory (4.0)
Value for each rating: Highly Satisfactory=6, Satisfactory=5, Moderately Satisfactory=4,
Moderately Unsatisfactory=3, Unsatisfactory=2, and Highly Unsatisfactory=1
64
Annex 10. List of Supporting Documents
Project Appraisal Document for Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Rural Capacity
Building Project (RCBP) dated May 26, 2006 (Report No: 35457-ET)
MoARD, RCBP, Project Implementation Manual (original and revised)
Project Implementation Plans and Budgets
Project Progress Reports
Aide Memoires, Back-to-Office Reports, and Implementation Status Reports
IFRs, audit reports, procurement plans, Financial Management ICR
Various strategy documents, including ATVET national strategy; NARS gender strategy;
NARS gender mainstreaming document; NARS coordination, etc.
IFPRI (2010): Rural Capacity Building Project - Survey and Assessment for RCBP Mid
Term Review (MTR) Report, Report for MoARD, June 2010
World Bank, Africa Regional Gender Practice – Gender Innovation Lab (2012): RCBP
Impacts: Summary of interim results, 2 December 2012; Farmers Innovation Fund Impact
Evaluation Interim Results Note, 2 December 2012
Ministry of Agriculture (2012) End of Project Impact Assessment of Rural Capacity
Building Project; Report by HEDBEZ Business & Consultancy P.L.C., Addis Ababa,
June 2012
Ministry of Agriculture (2012): Implementation Completion Report; Report by Demese
Chanyalew, PhD, Addis Ababa, June 12, 2012
End-of-Project evaluation case studies:
Beyene Tadesse Economic and Social Consult (2012) Assessment of RCBP Research
Component, Report submitted to: RCBP, Ministry of Agriculture, Addis Ababa, June
2012
Haramaya University (2012) Performance of Agricultural Development Partners’
Linkage Advisory Councils; Report submitted to RCBP, Ministry of Agriculture, Addis
Ababa, June 2012
Haramaya University (2012) The Performance of FREGs supported by RCBP: Costs,
Benefits and Intervention Options for Improved Sustainability, Report submitted to:
Ministry of Agriculture, Addis Ababa, June 2012
Haramaya University (2012) Work and Motivation and Job Performance of
Development Agents, Report submitted to: RCBP, Ministry of Agriculture, Addis
Ababa, June 2012
Tropical Consults (2012) Report on Assessment of Achievements of the ATVET
Component, Report submitted to: RCBP, Ministry of Agriculture, Addis Ababa, July
2012
*including electronic files
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14°N
36°E 40°E 44°E
46°E 48°E
42°E32°E
34°E 36°E 38°E 40°E 44°E 46°E 48°E42°E32°E
12°N
14°N
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ETHIOPIA
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
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