World Bank Document · Document of The World Bank Report No: ... (from Project Appraisal Document) ... contain numeric targets for this indicator given

Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR00001289

Implementation Completion and Results Report (IDA-38160, TF-53490)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 40.5 MILLION

(US$55.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

FOR A

THIRD SOCIAL ACTION FUND (FAS III)

March 24, 2010

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective December 15, 2009)

Currency Unit = Kwanza (AOA)

US$1.00 = 85.80

FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA Administration Agreement CDC Community Development Component CDD Community-Driven Development CDF Capacity Development Framework CF Consultative Forum CIVA Conflict Impact and Vulnerability Assessment DCA Development Credit Agreement DfID British Department for International Development EC European Commission ERR Economic Rates of Return FM Financial Management GoA Government of Angola HR Human Resources ICR Implementation Completion Report IDA International Development Association ISM Implementation Support Mission IFAL Instituto de Formação da Administração Local (Local Administrations

Training Institute) LDP Local Development Program MA Municipal Administration M&E Monitoring & Evaluation MAT Ministério de Administração Teritorial (Ministry of

TerritorialAdministration) MDC Municipal Development Component MINPLAN Ministério do Planeamento (Ministry of Planning) MIS Management Information System MTR Mid-Term Review NGO Non-governmental Organization OPSC Operations Policy Sub-Committee PA Project Agreement PDO Project Development Objective PDP Provincial Development Plan PM&E Project Monitoring & Evaluation

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QER Quality Enhancement Review SIFAS Sistema de Informação do FAS (FAS Management Information System) TA Technical Assistance TF Trust Fund TTL Task Team Leader UNDP United Nations Development Program UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union

for the Total Independence of Angola) USAID United States Agency for International Development

Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Luiz A. Pereira da Silva Country Manager:

Sector Director:Eleotério Codato Yaw Ansu

Sector Manager: Task Team Leader:

Lynne D. Sherburne-Benz Sabine Cornelius

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I PROJECT CONTEXT, DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN

A. Context at Appraisal

B. Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

C. Revised PDO

D. Main beneficiaries, original and revised components

E. Original components

F. Revised components

G. Other significant changes

II KEY FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES

A. Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry

B. Implementation

C. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

D. Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

E. Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

III ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES

A. Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation

B. Efficiency

C. Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

IV. ASSESSMENT OF BANK AND BORROWER PERFORMANCE

A. Bank Performance

B. Borrower Performance

V. LESSONS LEARNED

ANNEX 1. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING

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ANNEX 2. OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

ANNEX 3: ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

ANNEX 4: BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT SUPERVISION PROCESSES

ANNEX 5: QUALITY ENHANCEMENT REVIEW

ANNEX 6. BENEFICIARY SURVEY RESULTS

ANNEX 7: SOCIAL VULNERABILITY GUIDE ANGOLA (INTRODUCTION)

ANNEX 8: STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP REPORT AND RESULTS

ANNEX 9: BORROWER’S IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT IMPLEMENTATION MEMORANDUM REPORT PREPARED BY FAS III PROJECT TEAM

ANNEX 10. COMMENTS OF CO-FINANCIERS AND OTHER PARTNERS/STAKEHOLDERS

ANNEX 11. LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

ANNEX 12. PERSONS CONSULTED DURING ICR PREPARATION

ANNEX 13. MAP OF ANGOLA

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A. Basic Information

Country: Angola Project Name: 3rd Social Action Fund (FAS III)

Project ID: P081558 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-38160,TF-53490

ICR Date: 03/24/2010 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA

Original Total Commitment:

XDR 40.5M Disbursed Amount: XDR 40.4M

Revised Amount: XDR 40.4M

Environmental Category: B

Implementing Agencies: Fundo de Apoio Social (FAS) Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: European Commission UK Department for International Development (DFID) UNICEF United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Chevron B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: Effectiveness: 03/15/2004 03/15/2004

Appraisal: 05/21/2003 Restructuring(s):

Approval: 07/29/2003 Mid-term Review: 01/23/2006 01/23/2006

Closing: 06/30/2008 06/30/2009 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Satisfactory

Risk to Development Outcome: Moderate

Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

Borrower Performance: Highly Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings

Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Highly Satisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Moderately Unsatisfactory

Implementing Agency/Agencies:

Highly Satisfactory

Overall Bank Moderately Satisfactory Overall Borrower Highly Satisfactory

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Performance: Performance: C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance

Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)

General education sector 30 45

General water, sanitation and flood protection sector 30 16

Health 10 6

Other social services 25 27

Sub-national government administration 5 6

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)

Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 22 27

Municipal governance and institution building 22 17

Other social protection and risk management 22 22

Participation and civic engagement 23 23

Rural services and infrastructure 11 11 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Callisto E. Madavo

Country Director: Luiz A. Pereira da Silva Darius Mans

Sector Manager: Lynne D. Sherburne-Benz Dzingai B. Mutumbuka

Project Team Leader: Laura L. Rose Wim H. Alberts

ICR Team Leader: Sabine Cornelius

ICR Primary Author: Sabine Cornelius

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F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The PDO was "to achieve improved, expanded, sustainable utilization of basic social and economic services and to support a governance system where local government and communities can gradually become mutually accountable." Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The PDO was not revised. (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : Increased number of people using health facilities; number of out-patient services

Value quantitative or Qualitative)

Baseline Value: N/A 2006 Value (actual): 100,000*

PAD did not contain numeric targets for this indicator given Project's demand-driven nature.

Target Values were not formally revised. Target Value of 110,000 was recommended at Mid-Term Review.

2009 End of Project Value not available. 2007 Value (actual): 105,000**

Date achieved 12/30/2004 03/15/2004 01/23/2006 06/30/2009

Comments (incl. % achievement)

* Value was intended to serve as baseline data but it is included here as actual 2006 value because it was not collected until almost mid-Project and no counterfactual data was available. **2007 Value based on 2007 beneficiary survey.

Indicator 2 : The population number without access to improved water source decreased


Baseline Value: N/A 2006 Value (actual): 10,000*

PAD did not contain numeric target for this indicators given Project's demand-driven nature.

Target Values were not formally revised. Target Value of 6470 was recommended at Mid-Term Review.

2009 End of Project Values not available. 2007 Value (actual): 7,000**

Date achieved 12/30/2004 03/15/2004 01/23/2006 06/30/2009



Indicator 3 : Percentage of the population with a positive perception of the services quality, access and sustainability.

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Baseline Value: N/A 2006 Value (actual): 80%*

PAD did not contain numeric targets for these indicators given Project's demand-driven nature.

Target Values were not formally revised. Target Value of 100% recommended at Mid-Term Review.

2009 End of Project Values not available. 2007 Value (actual): 84%**

Date achieved 12/30/2004 03/15/2004 01/23/2008 06/30/2009



Indicator 4 : Percentage of times that the beneficiary communities participate in Monitoring and Evaluation actions


Baseline Value: N/A 2006 Value (actual): 54%*


Target Values were not formally revised. Target Value of 100% was recommended at Mid-Term Review.

2009 End of Project Values not available. 2007 Value (actual): 80%**

Date achieved 12/30/2004 03/15/2004 01/23/2008 06/30/2009



Indicator 5 : Number of Consultative Forum meetings within each Municipality


Baseline Value: N/A 2006 Value (actual): 6* 2007 Value (actual): 8


Target Values were not formally revised. Target Value of 8 was recommended at Mid-Term Review.

8

Date achieved 12/30/2004 03/15/2004 01/23/2008 06/30/2009 Comments (incl. % achievement)

* Value was intended to serve as baseline data but it is included here as actual 2006 value because it was not collected until almost mid-Project and no counterfactual data was available.

Indicator 6 : Number of Municipal Administrations with good performance level as perceived by the communities


Baseline Value: N/A 2007 Value (actual): 8 2008 Value (actual): 11 11

PAD did not contain numeric targets for these indicators given Project's demand-

Target Values were not formally revised. Target Value of 9 was

11

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driven nature. recommended at Mid-Term Review.



Indicator 7 : Number of municipalities with improved local development planning competencies, practices


Baseline Value: N/A 2006 Value (actual): 2* 2007 Value (actual): 12 2008 Value (actual): 12


Target Values were not formally revised. Target Value of 9 recommended at Mid-Term Review.

12



Indicator 8 : Level of participation by communities in the Strategic Planning Process


Baseline Value: N/A 2006 Value (actual): 45%* 2008 Value (actual): 58%


Target Values were not formally revised. Target Value of 60% recommended at Mid-Term Review.

58%


* Data intended to serve as baseline data but included here as actual 2006 values because not collected until almost mid-Project and no counterfactual data was available.

Indicator 9 : 80% of participating municipal administrations achieving highest level (8) of performance by end of Project (40% by Mid-Term Review).


Baseline Value: N/A 2006 Value (actual): 55%* 2007 Value (actual): 60% 2008 Value (actual): 60%

80% at end of Project (40% at Mid-Term Review)

Target Values were not formally revised.

95%



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(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline Value

Original Target Values (from

approval documents)

Formally Revised

Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Indicator 1 : at least 115 health sub-projects implemented

Value (quantitative or Qualitative)

N/A

115 (This figure was a beginning-of-Project estimate, given that subprojects were demand driven and exact number could not be predetermined.)

Target Values were not formally revised. Target Value of 85 recommended at Mid-Term Review based on Project's demand-driven nature and challenging expansion into nine 'new' provinces.

188

Date achieved 12/30/2004 03/15/2004 01/23/2008 06/30/2009


While the number of water subprojects was lower than anticipated, 445 education and 201 economic/productive sector subprojects were completed. Total number of completed subprojects (1,575) surpassed target recommended during Mid-Term Review (1,565).

Indicator 2 : at least 930 water and sanitation sub-projects implemented


N/A

930 (This figure was a beginning-of-Project estimate, given that subprojects were demand driven and exact number could not be predetermined.)

Target Values were not formally revised. Target Value of 690 recommended at Mid-Term Review based on Project's demand-driven nature and challenging expansion into nine 'new' provinces.

380

Date achieved 12/31/2004 03/15/2004 01/23/2008 06/30/2009


While the number of water subprojects was lower than anticipated, 445 education and 201 economic/productive sector subprojects were completed. Total number of completed subprojects (1,575) surpassed target recommended during Mid-Term Review (1,565).

Indicator 3 : 100% participatory mechanisms used at the Municipal level

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N/A 100%

Target Value not formally revised. Target Value of 100% recommended at Mid-Term Review

100%


Indicator 4 : At least 80% of pilot municipalities have elaborated their Strategic Development Plans


N/A 80%

Target Value not formally revised. Target Value of 80% recommended at Mid-Term Review

100%


G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 05/28/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.00 2 11/30/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 14.96 3 05/10/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 26.39 4 11/23/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 41.83 5 05/25/2006 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 48.63 6 03/30/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 55.97 7 12/28/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 57.78 8 06/09/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 58.88 9 12/30/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 60.03

10 06/30/2009 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 60.14 H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable

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I. Disbursement Profile

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I PROJECT CONTEXT, DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN

A. Context at Appraisal 1. At the time of appraisal, Angola was slowly beginning to recover from the devastating effects of over 40 years of armed conflict,1 including war-torn society, destroyed or damaged social, economic, and transport infrastructure, and widespread mistrust in public institutions.2

The country’s key institutions were fragile and lacked capacity and legitimacy. Angola ranked 161 out of 173 countries in UNDP’s 2002 Human Development Index. More than two-thirds of the population lived in poverty (below US$2/day), and one-fourth was extremely poor (below US$0.75/day).3

2. In order to address the challenges referred to above, the Government of Angola (GoA) identified key social development priorities: (i) reduce poverty; (ii) enhance coverage and quality of basic social services; (iii) reduce vulnerability; and (iv) promote social reintegration and rebuild social capital.4 The Third Social Action Fund (FAS III) was seen as one of GoA’s most important instruments to implement these priorities and fight poverty at the community level, based on FAS’ strong track record.5 Through the implementation of two previous Projects (FAS I and II), FAS had established a reputation as a dynamic, credible, and effective provider of basic social and economic services to about 2.4 million people living in poor communities despite persisting human, administrative, and logistical challenges posed by the post-conflict environment.6

3. While FAS I and II focused on providing basic services to poor communities in the nine coastal provinces, FAS III aimed to expand to Angola’s nine less-developed provinces to achieve more equitable geographic coverage. These more remote and underserved provinces were not only ‘unchartered territory’ for FAS but they had also received very little social investments in the past 30 years and were characterized by weak social capital and intergroup relationships.

1 The independence war (1961 to 1975) was followed by the civil war (1975 to 2002). 2 Some 750,000 Angolans (7 percent of the population) died from conflict-related causes, including famine or disease; over 5 million people were internally displaced and 440,000 became refugees. Among the most vulnerable social groups were the rural population, female heads of households, children, persons with disabilities and UNITA ex-combatants. 3 According to Angola’s Development Strategy, 62 percent of the households live below the poverty line of US$ 1.70 per day (94 percent in rural areas and 57 percent in urban areas), and 15 percent are in a situation of extreme poverty (less than US$0.75 per day). Life expectancy is 42 years. About 70 percent of the population is illiterate. One in four children dies before his/her fifth birthday, making Angola’s child mortality rate the second worst in the world. Cholera is endemic and malaria affects one-third of the population. Only 38 percent of Angolans have access to safe drinking water (compared with about 55 percent in Sub Saharan Africa) and 44 percent have access to adequate sanitation services. GDP per capita has grown rapidly, reaching US$1,980 in 2006, but inequality remains very high, with the Gini coefficient estimated to be 0.62. 4 PAD, pp. 5-8. 5 FAS III was designed to support GoA’s efforts to: (i) increase the sustainable utilization of basic infrastructure by building upon FAS’s positive track record and name recognition; (ii) mobilize community support to vulnerable groups aimed at fostering social reintegration; (iii) rebuild social capital in Angola through its demand-driven, participatory and community-empowering approach; (iv) prepare the grounds for decentralization and promote accountability and empowerment of local government structures; and (v) enable local governments to play their new role through a combination of human, organizational, and institutional development activities (PAD, pp. 5-9). 6 In light of FAS’ renowned performance and achievements, FAS III benefited from the financial support of other development partners, including the EC, Chevron, UNDP, DfiD and UNICEF, among others.

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4. FAS III was “considered a cornerstone of a selective [Bank] lending program that aimed to help promote national reconciliation, improve public expenditure management, [and] expand domestic capacity for service delivery.”7 FAS III was aligned with the Bank’s Transitional Support Strategy by: (i) “improving and expanding the sustainable use of essential social and economic services to war-affected and other vulnerable groups,” and (ii) “promoting a governance system where local government and communities are mutually accountable, and through the transparent, efficient, and credible use of its resources.”8

B. Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

5. FAS III’s original development objective was “to achieve improved, expanded, and sustainable utilization of basic social and economic services and to support a governance system where local government and communities can gradually become mutually accountable.”9 Similar to other Projects prepared at the time, FAS III’s PDO in the PAD differs slightly from the PDO in the Development Credit Agreement (DCA).10 Given that the PDO in the PAD captures the Project’s development objective more accurately both in substance and in the underlying theory of change, the ICR team adopted the PAD as its basis for analysis.11

6. The Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for the PDO cited in the PAD12 included: (i) primary school enrollment increased by x percent, (ii) access to and usage of health services increased by x percent, (iii) access to and usage of water and sanitation facilities increased by x percent, (iv) number of vehicles on repaired roads increased by x percent and travel time reduced by x percent, (v) number of Consultative Forums (CF) created and functioning, (vi) 80 percent of participating municipalities achieving highest level (8) of performance by the end of the Project (EoP) and 40 percent by Mid-Term Review (MTR), (viii) number of municipal staff skills, competencies, and practices improved, (viii) number of communities making use of FAS supported mechanisms to hold municipalities accountable, and (ix) x percent of beneficiaries satisfied with services provided by the Project.13

7 PAD, p. 4. 8 Ibid.9 PAD, pp. 2. 10 FAS III’s PDO in the DCA was “to assist the Borrower in achieving improved, expanded and sustainable utilization of basic social and economic services through: (i) the provision or rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure at the community level; (ii) capacity development at the level of communities, Implementation Partners, local governments, and FAS; and (iii) strengthening and improving networks to facilitate collective action among community members, including vulnerable groups (DCA, Schedule 2, p. 17). 11 As described in great detail in the PAD, the Project focused on the nexus between community and municipal development. However, the PDO in the DCA only refers to the one of the Project’s key areas of intervention, i.e. community development; it makes little reference to the Project’s intended positive impact on municipal development and local governance. 12 While the PAD included Outcome/Impact indicators, the Project Agreement (PA) listed the following Output indicators and targets values (PA, p. 17): (i) number of social promoters trained (54 by MTR and 110 by EoP); (ii) number of Subproject Committees trained (210 by MTR and 500 by EoP); (iii) number of education infrastructures completed (355 by MTR and 710 by EoP); (iv) number of health infrastructures completed (65 by MTR and 130 by EoP); (v) number of water and sanitation infrastructures completed (700 by MTR and 1250 by EoP); (vi) percentage of beneficiaries satisfied (90 percent by MTR and 95 percent by EoP); (vii) percentage of highly performing Project municipalities (50 percent by MTR and 80 percent by EoP). 13The KPI in Annex 1 of the PAD (p. 34) includes an additional outcome indicator, i.e., “Revenues of market vendors increased by x%.” The PAD did not include numeric target values for the KPIs. It is worth noting that at the time of Project design it was common, at least in the case of social funds, for KPIs not to have specific numeric

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C. Revised PDO 7. The PDO was not revised.

D. Main beneficiaries, original and revised components

8. FAS III expected to serve specifically targeted communities, municipal administrations, and civil society organizations in the continuum of rural and peri-urban areas, with a special focus on vulnerable households (PAD, p. 13).

E. Original components

9. The Project consisted of two interlocking and complementary main components: a Community Development Component (CDC) and a Municipal Development Component (MDC). The total Project cost at the time of appraisal was US$120 million, of which IDA pledged to contribute US$55 million, GoA US$8.25 million, the European Commission (EC) US$50 million, and bilateral agencies US$6.75 million.14

10. Component I: Community Development (CDC) (US$87.5 million). The CDC comprised two subcomponents:

11. Subcomponent I(a): Subprojects. This subcomponent aimed to “expand and improve access, management, and sustainable use of basic social and economic infrastructure, improve governance and build social capital.”15 In accordance with a Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach, this subcomponent intended to build or restore small-scale community-based social and economic infrastructures damaged or destroyed during the war. These subprojects were envisaged to be identified, prioritized, co-implemented, and maintained by communities.16 The subcomponent would expand FAS intervention from the nine so-called ‘old’ provinces where FAS had been present since its inception in 1994 to all of the country’s 18 provinces. In order to foster a meaningful dialogue between communities and local governments and to enable community members to make informed choices, this subcomponent also included capacity development efforts.

12. Subcomponent I(b): Conflict Impact and Vulnerability Assessment (CIVA). This subcomponent aimed to investigate, on a pilot basis, in a total of 10 communities “how the particularity of the post-conflict context constrains or fosters social capital building” in Angola.17 Depending on the outcome of this assessment, FAS management and IDA were going to jointly decide whether a subproject window should be made available for pilot interventions in support of the vulnerable groups identified (PAD, p. 11 and DCA, p. 17).

targets by subproject type, given that subproject investments were demand driven and determined through a participatory planning process; hence, the number of subprojects and their sectors could not be accurately predetermined at approval. 14 The total Project cost at the end of the Project (EoP) was US$132.6 million, including IDA (US$60.2 million), GoA (US$33.7 million), EC (US$37.7 million), Chevron (US$0.26 million), UNDP (US$0.57 million), and UNICEF (US$ 0.08 million). 15 PAD, p. 10. 16 Subproject investments were expected to include the construction and/or rehabilitation of: (i) basic infrastructure for health, education, and water and sanitation; and (ii) small-scale productive and communal infrastructures like public markets, public parks, and sports facilities, as well as (iii) environmental upgrading, such as, solid waste management, reforestation, etc. (DCA, p. 17). 17 PAD, p. 11.

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13. Component II: Municipal Development (MDC) (US$10 million). The MDC aimed to strengthen the capacity of municipal governments, including municipal administrations and municipal forums,18 to become gradually proficient and accountable in the provision of public services and goods to communities. Municipal investment portfolios were to be identified according to municipal development plans (MDP) jointly prepared by municipal administrations and civil society representatives.19 Based on a pilot graduation scheme and competitive eligibility criteria, the MDC would provide eligible municipalities with: (i) funds to co-finance investments prioritized in the MDP, which would then be operated and maintained by the respective municipal administration;20 (ii) capacity development support tailored to the municipal administrations’ needs, learning timing and tasks they were required to perform;21 and (iii) administrative grants to cover the operating costs of the established Forums.22 The ultimate goal of this graduation scheme was to enable municipalities to gradually take on the role of public goods and services providers within the context of a municipal development plan and based on participatory processes (DCA, p. 17).23

F. Revised components

14. Components were not revised.

G. Other significant changes

15. Reallocation of Funds. In October 2006, the Bank granted its no-objection to a reallocation of IDA Credit as well as the EC Trust Fund24 proceeds to: (i) decrease the number of larger-scale subprojects in the new provinces in response to beneficiaries’ demand for small subprojects,25 (ii) reflect the cost savings resulting from IDA and FAS management’s joint decision to establish satellite offices instead of, as initially planned, permanent offices in four new provinces, and (iii) the EC’s request that its grant proceeds be used primarily to finance subprojects and goods.26 The reallocation of funds enabled FAS to better respond to requests for small-scale infrastructures in the most remote areas where the price of construction materials was significantly higher than in other parts of the country. In October 2008, a second reallocation of IDA Credit proceeds was approved in order to provide additional financing for small-scale subprojects.

18 These civic “forums” aimed to provide direct channels for citizen participation in public expenditure management and facilitated empowerment (see PAD). 19 PAD, p. 12. 20 DCA, p. 17. 21 See the menu of capacity development activities in Annex 2. 22 PAD, p. 12. 23 This “learning by doing” process was expected to facilitate a gradual transfer of FAS’ know-how to eligible municipalities, in accordance with the achievement of benchmarks specified in the graduation scheme, in order for FAS to start assuming the role of a financing and local development agency. With sufficient time and resources municipalities and Forums were also hoped to develop the ability to establish the necessary mechanisms for knowledge management and institutional coordination to ensure a more coherent and efficient resource allocation at the local level (PAD, p. 12). 24 The Administration and Co-financing Framework Agreement for this trust fund was signed in 2004 between the European Community, represented by the Commission of the European Communities (the Commission) and the International Development Association (IDA). The trust fund will henceforth be referred to as EC Trust Fund (EC TF). 25 See Memo from former TTL Wim Alberts of November 10, 2006 in the Project file. 26 Interview with FAS management on November 4, 2009.

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16. Amendments of IDA Credit DCA and EC TF Agreement. The DCA was amended in March 2004 to reflect updates on the compliance with the conditions for effectiveness, that is, the appointment of a financial internal auditor and a technical internal auditor, and the pending actions on the appointment of a certified accountant and publishing approval of the DCA in its official gazette.27 In addition, the amendment was needed to: (i) convert a condition of effectiveness into a dated covenant because Angola required more time to comply with one of the conditions of effectiveness; and (ii) add an additional legal remedy to the list of remedies embedded in Section 5.01 of the DCA. The EC TF Agreement was amended in July 2005 to clearly define eligible expenses under the “Operating Cost” Category.28

17. Extension of Closing Dates. The Project closing date was extended twice: (i) from June 30, 2008 to December 31, 2008 in order to allow GoA to mobilize additional resources required to complete all subprojects under implementation;29 and (ii) from December 31, 2008 to June 30, 2009 in order to allow the necessary time for IDA and GoA “to assemble outstanding reports required to allow financing of the withdrawal applications for expenditures submitted by the GoA after the closing date of the administrative agreement (AA) between IDA and the EC (December 31, 2007).30

II KEY FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES A. Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry

Key Elements of Project Design

18. At the outset, FAS III’s design benefited greatly from its nine years of accumulated experience, an established reputation, and lessons learned from the two previous Projects, FAS I and FAS II. The key lessons incorporated were the need to: (i) support effective policy and program coordination at the national and provincial levels to ensure consistency, complementarity, and sustainability of investments financed by FAS; (ii) strengthen the exchange of knowledge at the national and local levels to promote a participatory local development processes; (iii) cultivate a transparent, consultative decision-making environment at the local level for better resource allocation and management; (iv) standardize subproject documents, technical designs, and unit costs; (v) monitor environmental safeguards; and (vi) devise an upfront strategy to ensure the maintenance of investments by community groups and local institutions.

19. The Project’s design also complemented other Bank-financed operations in support of GoA’s post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts, such as the Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program and multilateral poverty alleviation programs.31

27 See March 15, 3004 Amendment Letter from Johannes Zutt to Minister of Planning. 28 “Operating Costs meant the incremental expenses incurred on account of Project implementation, management and monitoring, including office supplies, vehicle and equipment operation and maintenance, utilities expenses, rental expenses, transport, travel, per diem, supervision costs, communication and insurance costs, salaries of locally contracted employees, but excluding salaries of officials of the Recipient’s civil service, and reasonable bank charges related to the operation of the Special Account” (DCA, page 16). 29 See December 30, 2008 ISR. The IDA Credit proceeds had been almost fully disbursed by the original closing date, i.e., June 30, 2008. The reasons for this extension were related to delays in the completion of EC Trust Fund-financed activities due to a funding shortfall following the unanticipated partial cancellation of the grant proceeds (see paragraphs 78-80). 30 June 30, 2009 ISR. 31 PAD, p. 13.

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Another value-added during Project preparation was FAS III’s anticipation of the needed support to local government structures in preparation for GoA’s envisioned decentralization process.32

20. It was advantageous that the TTL at the time of FAS III preparation had also been the TTL during the implementation of FAS II. The design of FAS III benefitted substantially from this continuity in the form of a better understanding of the local context and familiarity with the key stakeholders and partnering institutions.

Assessment of Project Design

21. Project Development Objective (PDO). The Project Development Objective of “achieving improved, expanded, and sustainable utilization of basic social and economic services and to support a governance system where local governments and communities can gradually become mutually accountable” was highly relevant to the country’s post-conflict context and reality on the ground. While the objectives of FAS I and II successfully focused on physical capital building within an in-conflict context, FAS III’s twin objectives adequately captured the rapidly changing post-conflict context and the country’s shift toward a paradigm of participatory development.

22. Project Components. Despite the difficult circumstances, which severely constrained the Project preparation team’s ability to conduct field visits in the ‘new’ provinces, the activities under both Project components were on the whole articulated and implemented satisfactorily throughout the Project’s life, largely due to the decentralized implementation arrangements adopted and the experienced team in place. The two components supported the Project’s twin objectives in a concerted fashion by addressing the shortcomings in the service delivery system at the community, local government, and policy levels. The main new features of the Project design per component are as follows:

• Community Development Component (CDC) – Component I:

Component Ia: Subprojects. As evidenced by the successful implementation of FAS I and FAS II, using physical infrastructure as an entry point and means to promote civic engagement in service delivery proved to be a promising concept in post-conflict Angola.

Component Ib: Conflict Impact and Vulnerabiilty Assessment (CIVA). The CIVA highlighted FAS’ commitment to inclusive decision making and to equitable access to services.33 The assumption that it would provide FAS and partners with an in-depth understanding of vulnerability and with a practical tool to seize opportunities and address constraints to promote social cohesion in Angola’s post-conflict context was appropriate.34

• Municipal Development Component (MDC) - Component II. The MDC approach and methods replaced FAS’ previous community needs-based criteria, which used to rely on subproject cycles, to one that sought strategic objectives and improved results through a geographical and poverty-based allocation of resources. In operational terms, the shift from a mainly Community-Driven Development–type of allocation modality to one that was predicated on the municipal development investment cycle was reasonable.

32 PAD, p. 9. 33 PAD, page 47. 34 This study was particularly relevant as it revealed the context in the nine largely underserved ‘new’ provinces characterized by dilapidated or destroyed basic services, eroded social capital, and very weak local governance.

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• Capacity Development Framework (CDF). FAS III’s overarching CDF was regarded at the time of appraisal by OPCS as ‘cutting-edge,’ given that it departed from the prevailing thinking of capacity ‘building’ as training toward a comprehensive framework which, for the first time in Angola, integrated the human, organizational, and institutional aspects of capacity strengthening.35

23. Institutional and Implementation Arrangements. The Project’s institutional framework contained innovative elements that played a key role in its effective execution. First, the Project was managed by an experienced team responsible for the implementation of FAS since its inception in 1994.36 Second, provincial committees were established by the Project to ensure effective sector coordination, compliance with technical standards, availability of complementary inputs (e.g., teachers and school books, in the case of education subprojects), and a clear assignment of maintenance responsibilities to ensure the sustainability of subproject assets financed under FAS III. Third, the decentralized FAS offices in most provinces allowed for a strong local expert presence, and the timely articulation of Project activities on the ground.37 Fourth, a prudent strategy was adopted to address the institutional fragility in the country’s post-conflict context through the gradual transfer of FAS’ service delivery expertise and functions to municipal officials and local partners. Finally, the role assigned to FAS as a liaison between local authorities and civil society entities38 to facilitate dialogue and institutionalize community engagement in decision making was appropriate.

Adequacy of government’s commitment

24. FAS III enjoyed GoA’s strong commitment and ownership throughout Project design and preparation. The Project was prepared with broad participation by all FAS provincial teams, government officials, experts, and partnering institutions (i.e., EC, UNDP, UNICEF, DfID, Adra, DW).39 These allowed for effective institutional coordination and a solid foundation as well as speedy Project preparation, given that it was completed within 10 months.

Assessment of risks 25. At the time of Project design, the main risks identified in the PAD included: (i) FAS being used as a political tool, particularly prior to the 2008 elections; (ii) insufficient financial and human resources to maintain the investments; (iii) delays in instituting a legal decentralization framework; (iv) difficulty establishing a system of mutual accountability and transparency; (v) limited capacity of municipal administrations and partners to effectively respond to community demands; and (vi) financial management risk due to decentralized Project implementation.40 Upon reflection, the risk associated with the expansion into “unknown territory” and the risk of

35 Capacity development activities were designed as cross-cutting/integral parts of both components as opposed to FAS’ previous approach, which entailed a self-standing component focused only on human capacity enhancement. For details see Annex 11 of the PAD. 36 FAS’ hands-on experience in implementing other Bank-financed operations proved to be invaluable to a consistently satisfactory management performance. 37 This proved to be a particularly important design aspect at the time of peace consolidation when differences were marked among the provinces particularly in regards to their post-conflict reconstruction and community rebuilding needs. 38 These include Núcleos Comunitários (community-based subproject committees) and Forums (advisory bodies to the municipal administrations comprised of civil society representatives). 39 Development Workshop (a NGO). 40 PAD, pages 30-32.

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institutional inertia – the time required for key partners and FAS teams to embrace a rather novel way of doing business – were underestimated perhaps because FAS’ participatory approach to basic public service delivery at the local level was unprecedented in Angola at the time (PAD, p. 30).41

B. Implementation

26. The Project implementation period spanned from June 27, 2003 through June 30, 2009, including two six-month extensions of its closing date. The major highlights and challenges faced during implementation are as follows:

Highlights

27. Government’s continuous support. GoA maintained its initial high interest and provided support to the Project throughout its implementation, as reflected in the US$33.7 million in total counterpart contribution, four times the US$8.25 million agreed at the time of appraisal.

28. Implementation Capacity of FAS. The experienced staff of FAS, the implementing agency, satisfactorily fulfilled the planning, management, and fiduciary functions of the Project. Unlike many other social funds that have generally been created as short-term institutions, FAS has been in existence for 15 years due to their effectiveness and complementarity with other GoA efforts toward poverty alleviation.42

29. “Brand recognition” of FAS. FAS’ continuous presence and solid track record have been highly regarded across the country and stakeholders. According to the beneficiary assessments and impact evaluation, beneficiaries living in the Project areas expressed appreciation for its investments in physical infrastructures.43 FAS has also been regarded as a “Government NGO” that: (i) operates based on the principles of participation, community organization and empowerment, and accountability; and (ii) is committed to developing local-level capacity, creating job opportunities, and transferring skills and knowledge. The “FAS brand” has been recognized beyond Angolan borders.44 In recognition of FAS’ approach to promoting a culture of participatory governance, FAS methods have also been replicated by development partners, such as the Municipal Development Program financed by USAID/Chevron, and implemented by Development Workshop and CARE.

30. Evolving from a ‘Doer’ to Successful ‘Change Agent’ of National Policies. The MDC pilots exceeded expectations and informed the revision of the 1999 Local Administration Decree and the incorporation of civil society in decision making in the new Local Administration Law

41 The identified risks were realistic and the risk mitigation measures adopted were appropriate. Mitigation measures included: (i) a strong emphasis on capacity development activities to enable the respective stakeholders to understand and play their assigned roles; (ii) establishment of clear “rules of the game” such as enhanced financial management procedures to increase transparency and accountability; (iii) a strong focus on vertical and horizontal coordination, close collaboration and shared responsibilities for investments financing and maintenance; and (iv) public disclosure of “user friendly” information required for meaningful civic participation. 42http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/ANGOLAEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21918434~menuPK:322496~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:322490,00.html 43 FAS has been commended on ‘getting things done’ in a timely fashion, that is, a six-month subproject cycle for building/rehabilitating small-scale infrastructure, even in remote municipalities and when faced with market price fluctuations. 44 FAS management was invited, for example, by the Government of Guinea-Bissau to assist in the preparation of its first CDD-type Project and set up a MIS system modeled after FAS’ SIFAS system (Interview with FAS management on November 4, 2009).

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02/07 approved in 2007. Based on the experience and lessons of MDC pilots, FAS assisted the Parliamentary Commission for Local Development in assessing the progress made toward participatory municipal planning and GoA’s legal decentralization framework.45 Strong relations have also been established with the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MAT), responsible for the decentralization policy in Angola, and its Institute for Local Administration Training (IFAL).46 In 2006, MAT invited FAS to become a formal member of its decentralization working group and jointly prepare the curriculum and course to be delivered by IFAL to all municipal administrators in accordance with the MDC implementation manuals. Finally, all 12 pilot municipalities have reported their appreciation for their municipal development plans, which have allowed them to better negotiate their priorities with provincial governments and coordinate development and financing efforts.47

Challenges

31. The Project faced the following main challenges: (i) initial delays in the expansion to ‘new’ provinces due to logistical, human resource, and political constraints encountered by FAS in opening new provincial offices and composing subproject portfolios;48 (ii) increased size and complexity of subprojects as a result of a shift toward more ‘integrated’ investments (e.g., teacher’s housing, a health post, and an energy facility in addition to a school building); (iii) high cost of doing business in most “remote” provinces (e.g., the price of cement in Luanda Norte was about four times higher than in Luanda;49 and (iv) initial delays in the graduation of the first MDC pilot municipalities from stage 1 to 2 due to limited capacities and experience at the local level. These challenges were addressed in a timely, creative, and collaborative way by FAS management and the IDA task team as further discussed in the implementation section below.

Mid-Term Review (MTR)

32. At the Mid-Term Review,50 a total of US$55.7 million had been disbursed, of which US$45.4 million from IDA Credit (about 76 percent of the Credit), US$9.3 million from the EC Trust Fund (about 17 percent of the original Trust Fund amount). The Project completion rates at MTR were as follows: (i) under the CDC, 697 subprojects completed (44.3 percent of the EOP target value agreed-upon during MTR) and US$31.5 million (36 percent) of funds disbursed; and (ii) under the MDC, all nine selected pilot municipalities completed the second stage (out of five) of the graduation scheme.51

45 Interview with FAS management on November 4, 2009. 46 IFAL is in charge of research and capacity enhancement of sub-national officials and staff. 47 FAS III Baseline Survey and interview with FAS management on November 4, 2009. 48 The planned expansion to all 18 provinces would have required a larger time horizon, especially given that some of the provinces were not easily accessible and construction materials were not readily available (AM, November 23 – December 5, 2006, p. 3). 49 Aide Memoire, November 23-December 5, 2006, p. 3. 50 The MTR was carried out in two parts: (i) a visit of FAS management to the Bank HQ in January 2006; and (ii) a visit of the IDA team to Angola in March 2006. The first part of the MTR focused on: (i) fiduciary and safeguard aspects; (ii) thematic and sectoral advisory meetings with Bank experts; and (iii) the QER. The second part focused on: (i) implementation and strategic challenges as outlined in a MTR issues paper prepared by the IDA task team and in the QER report; and (ii) field assessment of the Project design in relation to the PDO (May 12, 2006 BTOR). 51 The graduation scheme was the planning methodology used by FAS to program the allocation and monitor the use of the resources provided by FAS III to the pilot municipalities. The scheme comprised five stages, namely: (1) Process Structuring, (2) Municipal Profiles, (3) Envisioning and Local Development Plan, (4) Municipal Investment Program Execution, and (5) M&E and start of new cycle.

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33. The main agreements reached during the MTR were:52 (i) no significant changes in the design of the Project were proposed, given the Project’s overall satisfactory implementation performance to that date; and (ii) the importance of continued close monitoring the Project activities to ensure the effective application of its approach and methods by all provincial teams and partners. A detailed timetable was agreed upon to ensure the timely completion of all subprojects and pilots prior to the Project closing date.53

Quality Enhancement Review (QER)

34. The QER panel’s main conclusion was that “FAS staff and Bank team should be congratulated on the high quality of documentation, clear and focused nature of the operation and the technical depth of the QER discussion.” According to the QER report, FAS has seized opportunities in Angola to deepen and expand its impact, not only on improving poor communities’ access to services, but also on the institutional framework of the country. FAS III’s focus on bringing local governments closer to communities as well as on strengthening civil society capacity to engage in decision making was highlighted by the panel as key to having an institutional effect beyond the immediate subproject cycle activities. “FAS should declare victory and seek to document as much as possible this best practice experience” (see QER Report in Annex 5).

35. The QER panel recommended for FAS management and the Bank’s team to: (i) clarify FAS’ overall targeting strategy and reconcile the geographical targeting goals of the CDC ‘poor communities’ and the MDC ‘champion municipalities’; (ii) consider expanding the subproject window to better include vulnerable groups, such as internally displaced persons and unemployed ex-combatants; (iii) finalize as quickly as possible the planned national expansion; and (iv) focus on ensuring the analytical basis for impact evaluation and the measurement of key Project outcomes. Recommendations of the MTR and QER were taken into account by FAS management as noted in the succeeding Aide Memoires.

C. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

36. Results Framework. The results framework was designed at a time when the country began to emerge from a long history of civil war. Nine out of the country’s 18 provinces had not been under GoA control in nearly 30 years and were not readily accessible due to the widespread destruction of transport infrastructure and landmines. FAS, hence, was expanding into literally unknown territory. Household surveys were not available due to the lack of national statistical data collection; existing national data was incomplete and its quality highly questionable. A household survey, the first of its kind in Angola, was conducted in 2009, and its results will be

52 The MTR assessment of each component provided the following lessons. In the case of the CDC (Component I), the need to: (i) systematize the subproject processes and methodologies in order to inform partners; (ii) mainstream these processes into provincial and municipal administrative practices; and (iii) prepare the ground, through learning by doing and piloting, for the devolution of service delivery to municipal administrations was emphasized. Regarding the MDC (Component II), the importance of: (i) continuing to provide FAS management with the necessary expertise to ensure timely technical support to the provincial teams and partners; (ii) continuing to assess the overall understanding of concepts and processes at government and community levels; and (iii) tailoring the concepts and processes as well as technical assistance to the specificities of each province and municipality was noted. 53 MTR Aide Memoire, March 6-17, 2006.

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available in early 2010.54 Due to these constraints at the time of Project design, no baseline indicators,55 control or meaningful counterfactual data were available and could, thus, not be included in the Project’s results framework in the PAD.

37. The Results Framework evolved as part of an iterative process as more information became available particularly about the ‘new’ provinces, in accordance with the legal Project Agreement, which stated that indicators were “subject to modification by agreement between the Borrower and the Association.”56 The Project’s performance indicators were modified based on the actual experience of implementing a Project in a rapidly changing post-conflict context.57

38. Monitoring. While the absence of reliable national data was beyond the Project’s control, the M&E system (SIFAS) adopted by the Project proved to be functional and captured the implementation of Project activities accurately and in a timely manner. The system recorded technical, physical, and financial progress per province, investments location, sector, contract, and amounts allocated and disbursed. The revision and fulfillment of goals established in the annual working plan (AWP) were adopted upfront by FAS. The system was rated Moderately Satisfactory (MS) throughout implementation, given its focus mostly on outputs, and subsequently upgraded to Satisfactory (S) in the last supervision mission given its emphasis on results. According to the QER report (Annex III, AM, MTR), the Project had a best practice M&E system—particularly regarding outputs.

39. Impact Evaluation. In the absence of reliable quantitative baseline, control, and counterfactual data to evaluate the Project’s outcomes, FAS chose a “second best” option for the collection of qualitative data to measure the impact of the CDC by conducting beneficiary assessments with smaller samples.58 FAS carried out beneficiary assessments in 2003 and 2006 and commissioned a Project impact evaluation in 2008.59 The survey analyzed child anthropometrics and assessed health and education outcomes in the Project areas (see paragraph 54). To monitor and assess the impacts of the MDC pilot approach and applied methods and in accordance with the component’s learning-by-doing focus, FAS contracted a specialist who systematically monitored the implementation of each stage of the graduation scheme and assessed the related results, impacts, and lessons learned from each pilot municipality. This

54 In addition, national censuses are expected to be conducted in 2010 and 2011. These data are expected to inform the correlation between social indicators in FAS-supported communities versus control communities. 55 Data that had been intended to serve as baseline only became available in 2006, almost mid-way through the Project’s implementation. In addition, no control or counterfactual data was available to indicate to what extent these 2006 values already included Project effects. 56 See Project Agreement, p. 17. 57 It is important to note that subproject investments were determined through a demand-based, participatory planning process. Hence, the number of subprojects and their sectors could not have been accurately predetermined at approval. The changes in the targets that occurred during the mid-term review were therefore to be expected. This flexible approach was supported by the QER panel which recommended adjusting the End of Project (EoP) targets during the MTR (see p. 13 of the MTR AM, March 6-17, 2006). Nevertheless, the legal documents were not amended to reflect those modifications throughout the Project life. 58 FAS III ISRs pointed out the importance of establishing outcome-level baseline indicators, which were considered “the backbone for a robust M&E system” (i.e., ISR, May 10, 2005); however, they failed to take into consideration that robust data were not available. During the MTR, FAS III M&E framework was assessed in detail, and a decision was made to carry out an impact evaluation. 59 The 2008 impact evaluation consisted of two parts: (i) a ‘baseline survey;’ and (ii) a follow-up survey one year later. However, the consultancy delivered only the report related to the first survey.

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continuous assessment was instrumental in informing FAS management and the Bank team for action and fine-tuning the MDC activities in a timely fashion throughout implementation.

D. Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

40. The Project was assigned a ‘B’ environmental classification. Two safeguard policies were triggered, namely: Environmental Assessment and Involuntary Resettlement. The respective safeguard frameworks (ESMF and RPF) were prepared and disclosed in the country and in the Bank’s InfoShop according to Bank policy.

41. While designated Bank supervision team members monitored the Project’s safeguards compliance on a regular basis, the supervision missions did not include environmental or social safeguards specialists until 2008 prior to Project closing. The Bank's environmental specialist assigned to review FAS III’s compliance with safeguard policies conducted a rapid field assessment in districts located in the outskirts of Luanda as well as a desk review of a small sample of subprojects. Preliminary findings from the field visit and desk review indicated weaknesses in the application of the safeguard tools by the visited provincial teams. Given the small size of the sample, it was agreed that FAS would prepare a photographic assessment, if possible, of all subprojects financed under FAS III. This task was still in progress in December 2009.60

42. A November 2009 review of more than 20 infrastructures financed by FAS I, II, and III conducted by the Bank safeguards specialist in Angola’s southwestern province of Namibe noted good siting and infrastructure construction in all instances. However, the review also observed significant gaps in understanding of the purpose and use of the project's safeguard tools by project staff.

43. Based on these findings, FAS management and the task team in charge of the preparation of FAS III’s follow-on operation (namely the Local Development Program) have agreed on a set of pro-active measures to ensure that the safeguards tools are user-friendly and fully integrated into the activities of the new program. With the support of environmental and social specialists, FAS is revisiting its safeguards manuals and is preparing a training program to be delivered to the provincial teams and partners throughout the implementation of the new program.

Financial Management (FM)

44. Financial Management. All Financial Management functions were carried out by FAS including reconciliation of accounts, inventories of Project assets, contracting of external audits and procurement processing. FAS was staffed with a team of experienced financial management and accounting specialists who had worked in the two previous Projects. The Project maintained proper internal controls, including the distribution of fiduciary responsibilities, and provided adequate oversight throughout implementation. The management of Project funds, including management of bank accounts, maintenance of supporting documentation for Project expenditures, and production of interim financial reports, were rated Satisfactory throughout implementation.61

60 The photographic catalog compiled to date indicated that the majority of FAS III infrastructure investments were implemented successfully and did not reflect (on the surface) any of the faulty construction or siting identified in the subprojects developed on the outskirts of Luanda. 61 Financial Management was rated Satisfactory throughout implementation, and erroneously downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU) in the final ISR due to the unsatisfactory performance of another Project

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45. Disbursement. The Project disbursed 99.8 percent of Bank proceeds and 64.4 percent of the EC Trust Fund (35.5 percent or US$15.86 million of the TF were cancelled). IDA disbursements followed a regular pattern, with two peaks, one in 2004 and another in 2005 of Project execution. Disbursement slowed down in 2007 and 2008. Average yearly disbursements amounted US$10.7 million (16.6 percent of the funds).

46. Audits. Audit reports were submitted to the Bank annually, and with the financial statements generally received on time or within a month thereafter. All Project audits were unqualified and no major issues were identified by the auditors throughout implementation.

Procurement

47. FAS hired an independent procurement specialist to assist with tender documents and contracts as well as capacity enhancement for the provincial teams. No misprocurement was found by the Bank. As in the case of FM (see paragraph 2.4.4), procurement processes were rated Satisfactory (S) throughout implementation, and downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU) due to the unsatisfactory performance of another Project incorrectly attributed to FAS in a draft Bank Internal Audit Report. Thus, despite the final MU rating for Procurement, the closing Procurement ISR rating for the Project is Satisfactory (S).

E. Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

48. Operation and Maintenance: FAS established operation and maintenance agreements with respective provincial and municipal authorities as well as with user groups for each subproject built or rehabilitated under the Project. According to FAS management, about 95 percent of the infrastructure investments funded under FAS III are functioning and being maintained. After field visits to Project sites in four provinces, the August 2009 ICR mission concluded that the majority of subprojects were operational.62

49. Institutionalization of FAS III tested Approaches and Methods. As discussed in paragraph 30, the MDC’s participatory approach and methods have been institutionalized in the new Local Administration Law 02/07. With FAS support, the Parliamentary Commission for Local Development assessed the progress made toward participatory municipal planning and GoA’s legal decentralization framework. The Ministry of Territorial Administration (MAT), responsible for decentralization policy in Angola, has adopted FAS III methods through its decentralization

incorrectly attributed to FAS in a draft Bank Internal Audit Report (subsequently revised to correctly reflect that there were no significant FM issues related to FAS in the final draft Bank Internal Audit Report submitted to the Africa Region’s Vice President). Because the final report was delivered (and this issue clarified) only after the closing of FAS III, the last ISR had been archived and it was not possible to correct the last FM ratings to reflect the continuously Satisfactory (S) performance of the Project. Thus, despite the stated MU rating for FM, the closing FM ISR rating for the Project is Satisfactory (S). 62 For example, the report of the August 2009 field visits to Benguela and Kwanza Sul states that 97 out of 112 subprojects are operational.

Box 1: Testimonies from FAS III beneficiaries

[the subprojects] are bringing s of happiness to us …we l great joy because our work been uplifted as some of our

ncerns are being addressed by S... (Deputy Administrator Benguela).if one day something bad re to happen to our school,

will all pitch in ... to ntribute and get things done. f the rain damages the school will all join hands to repair

at is ours (Trader, nguela).

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working group and the revision of the curriculum of the Institute for Local Administration Training (IFAL). All completed Municipal Development Plans financed by the Project were negotiated and co-financed by the respective provincial governments. Furthermore, acknowledging FAS as an effective vehicle for participatory development planning and service delivery and in light of their limited capacity to provide services in remote areas, the provincial governments (e.g., Cabinda and Huambo) provided funding for FAS provincial offices aimed to achieve greater coverage and to reduce intra-provincial disparities in the distribution of investments.

50. Follow-on Operation: In 2007, GoA expressed interest in a follow-on operation and presented an outline to the Bank. In 2009, GoA pledged about US$60 million in counterpart funding. The Bank is currently assisting the Minister of Planning and FAS in the preparation of this new operation, the Local Development Program (LDP).63 It expands FAS operational scope by further-extending basic services into Angola’s most remote or underserved municipalities. It also scales up and institutionalizes the MDC’s tested approach and methods. Lastly, as part of this geographical approach, the LDP broadens the extent of the work done and incorporates economic and quality dimensions to service delivery.

III ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES 51. The following assessment of the project’s outcomes is based on its intended objectives and key performance indicators.64

A. Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation Rating: Satisfactory

52. The PDO continues to have high overall relevance considering its quest for delivery of basic public services to the poor in an inclusive and accountable manner in Angola – a priority of GoA’s Economic Growth And Long-Term Development Strategy. The Project design and implementation also offered Angolan policy makers and experts the opportunity to test mechanisms for improved provision of basic public services in a rapidly changing context. GoA’s request for a follow-on operation that aims at scaling up the innovative approaches and mechanisms tested during FAS III shows its commitment to mainstreaming the FAS approach. The Project’s conceptual and technical innovations also inspired the strategies and investments of other partnering institutions in Angola.

63 The LDP, which will be managed by FAS, is in line with the country’s long-term development vision (Angola 2025) and addresses the following key priorities: (i) the need for redressing both spatial asymmetries and social disparities in accessing basic public goods, (ii) the importance of promoting a diversified local economy aimed at improving social welfare, and (iii) the strengthening the capacity of local governments to provide quality services to the poorest households. 64 Due to these complex post-conflict circumstances, no meaningful baseline indicators, control, or counterfactual data were available and could, thus, not be included in the Project’s results framework in the PAD. [0]

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Achievement of Project Development Objectives

Rating: Satisfactory

53. The Project was successful in meeting the overarching PDO of “achieving improved, expanded, and sustainable utilization of basic social and economic services and to support a governance system where local government and communities can gradually become mutually accountable.” With respect to the second component, the Project’s outcomes went well beyond the PDO, given its significant overarching institutional impact as discussed in paragraph 67.

54. FAS III’s achievements are substantial, especially in light of the difficult circumstances under which the Project was implemented: (i) physical infrastructures were in shambles, and human and social capital eroded; and (ii) the country was run by a public administration that was more geared toward war efforts than toward providing public services. Service delivery in general was poor and inefficient, given the very limited institutional capacity, especially at the local government level, and the lack of skilled staff, procedures, and systems. The Project’s main accomplishments are demonstrated by the following outcomes.

Component I: Community Development Component (CDC)

55. Component I (a): Subprojects. According to 2008 beneficiary survey, 84 percent of the respondents expressed a positive perception about the quality, access, and sustainability of services supported by the Project.65 The CDC thus achieved its intended objectives of “improved, expanded, and sustainable utilization of basic social and economic services” to the poor as demonstrated by the following outcomes.

56. Improved and expanded basic service provision in underserved and war-affected areas.FAS III financed 1,575 basic social and economic infrastructures in 65 municipalities in all of Angola’s 18 provinces (see Table 1 below).66

Table 1 - Number of subprojects completed by sector Sector Number of

completed subprojects

Share of number of subprojects

(% of all subprojects)

Share of subproject cost (% of total subproject cost)

Education 445 28.3 29.9 Water & Sanitation 380 24.1 25.5 Economic and Productive

201 12.8 13.5

Health 188 11.9 12.6 Other (bridges, tertiary roads, etc.)

361 22.9 24.5

TOTAL 1.57567 100 100

57. Beneficiary assessments conducted in the provinces of Benguela and Cunene, with a sample size of 1,181 respondents, concluded that the main benefits gained by the communities with FAS III investments in order of priority were: (i) greater access to education (91.9 percent),

65 The EoP target value of 100 percent was determined prior to the Project’s expansion into the ‘new’ provinces. 66 SIFAS, 2009. See also Annex 2. 67 Of these 1,575 subprojects, 727 or 46 percent were funded by the EC Trust Fund. For a more detailed description of EC-funded activities and achievements, see Annex 2, part II.

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(ii) greater access to health services (57 percent), (iii) greater access to water and sanitation (30 percent), and (iv) improved economic conditions (15 percent). Other noted benefits included: the reduced distance to health services (43.9 percent) and the reduced distance to education infrastructures (40.6 percent). While it is undoubtedly an accomplishment that the number of completed subprojects more than fully achieved the End of Project (EoP) target values recommended during the Mid-Term Review, these numeric indicators do not capture the full extent of the CDC’s accomplishments. FAS III’s expansion from nine provinces to national coverage was particularly significant at a time when the country’s institutions and logistics were in disarray. The formidable implementation challenges were met with flexibility and creativity on the part of FAS management.

58. Sustainable Utilization. While the Project enabled about 2.3 million Angolans to gain access to basic economic and social services, one of the best proxy outcome indicators for improved utilization of the Project’s subproject investments are health outcomes. The impact evaluation survey conducted in 2007 with a sample size of 1,156 households from 156 communities in six provinces suggested that living in a FAS-supported community reduced the number of days lost to illness by up to 40.9 percent.68 The survey also suggested that FAS III investments were associated with the “elimination of more than 80 percent of the gap separating the average child from adequate nutritional health.”69 These are commendable accomplishments in light of widespread food insecurity, malnutrition-induced stunting among children, and other human development indicators (see paragraph 1). The probability of sustained utilization of Project investments appears to be high, given that about 98 percent of the respondents rated the quality of the infrastructures as good or very good, and an “overwhelming proportion” of the respondents considered FAS-financed infrastructure either well or very well managed.”70

68 The survey results also suggested that FAS III investments reduced the probability of being afflicted by malaria by 16.3 percent, and of not having experienced any health problems during the past six months by 13.8 percent. See 2008 FAS III Baseline Survey, p. 26. 69 See 2008 FAS III Baseline Survey, p. 26. 70 See 2008 FAS III Baseline Survey, p. 9.

Box 2: Municipal development planning in the municipality of Amboin, Kwanza Sul province

The municipality of Amboin in Kwanza Sul Province is part of the second group of municipalities that benefited from technical assistance and resources provided under FAS III’s Municipal Development Component (MDC). With an estimated population of 210,000 inhabitants, the municipality is mainly rural and depends on subsistence agriculture and trading activities in the informal sector. The MDC support was instrumental in facilitating the establishment of the Municipal Forum,which comprised 113 representatives of civil society at-large. The involvement and dynamism of its leaders (Executive Secretariat) led to the strengthening of a culture of participation and accountability. Internal evaluations showed that the Forum members interacted for the first time without fear with the municipal administrationofficials. In the process of data collection for the development of the municipal profile, the Executive Secretariat raised funds among Forum members to pay for the transport of the working groups to the more remote communes. As a result, the nearby municipality of Cela requested the support of FAS after seeing the Municipal Plan of Amboin and described the planning methodologiestested under FAS III as essential to all municipalities in Angola.

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59. Component I (b): Vulnerability and Conflict Impact Assessment (CIVA). The CIVA has satisfactorily provided operationally relevant information on the nature, scope, and the impact of vulnerability at the community level. It also outlined concrete recommendations for addressing the key challenges in tackling poverty and vulnerability in post-conflict Angola. Through the publication of a first of its kind report and guidelines,71 FAS facilitated a national dialogue on vulnerability in the context of service provision and local development. This represents a relevant achievement particularly considering the limited understanding of the concept. This represents a key achievement in an environment where understanding of the concepts of vulnerability and collaborative efforts around it have been very limited.72

Component II: Municipal Development Component (MDC)

60. The impact of the Project’s “support of a governance system where local government and communities can gradually become mutually accountable” was significant. At a time when human capital and institutional capacity were at its low point, FAS III had a profound and lasting influence on GoA’s decentralization agenda as evidenced by the mainstreaming of FAS’ participatory development planning approach and practices.

61. Improved sub-national public expenditure coordination and accountability. In an environment marked by fragmented, poorly coordinated, and low functioning institutions, FAS III emerged as one of the main agencies capable of convening and engaging local and provincial governments, communities, civil society organizations, and development partners in a participatory investment planning process. In an institutional environment characterized by a top-down governance style and no prior history of consultations with communities about their priorities, FAS III managed to legitimize the role of participation and community empowerment, which was a significant milestone in the local governance reform process.73 For the first time, municipal authorities were able to articulate and then incorporate their investment priorities (as presented in the Municipal Development Plans) into Provincial Investment Plans.74

62. Enhanced strategic development planning capacities of local administrations. The Project strengthened the capacity of 12 municipal administrations in essential areas, including investment planning and expenditure management, surpassing the end of Project target value of nine municipalities as recommended at Mid-Term Review.75 The methodology employed paved the way for GoA’s76 requirement for every municipality to prepare and submit its respective municipal plan as a prerequisite to receiving intergovernmental transfers. On several occasions, FAS was invited by the Local Administration’s Training Institute (IFAL) to deliver training in municipal planning to municipal administrators. An agreement between FAS and MAT/IFAL,

71 Particularly noteworthy are the Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Exclusion in Post-Conflict report produced in cooperation with DfID and the Social Vulnerability Guide. 72 See ISR, May 2006. 73 Interview with former ICR team member, November 17, 2009. 74 FAS III demonstrated that it is possible to put in place participatory investment planning processes without undermining the hierarchical relationship between provincial and municipal tiers of governments. 75 Due to its pilot nature as well as the real time it took for FAS to introduce its participatory local governance mechanisms, the Municipal Development Component’s targets were also revised from the original 18 municipalities to 9 at MTR. 76 This Law states that the “State’s local administration is responsible for representing the Central Government at the local level and for leading and coordinating all the services that comprise the local administrations” (Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 128, p. 5).

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which will formally incorporate FAS’ capacity development model into the IFAL curriculum on local participatory development planning, is expected to be signed under the follow-on operation.

63. Increased civil society voice in decision making. According to the impact evaluation, the end of Project target was achieved with about 60 percent of the respondents expressing satisfaction with the participatory process promoted by FAS.77 Beneficiary assessments indicated that the participatory methods employed, such as the municipal forums, allowed community members to interact with local government officials and voice their priorities in a structured manner. The Forums established under FAS III have been institutionalized by the Local Administration Law 02/07, which is a considerable achievement.

B. Efficiency 64. FAS’ Management Information System (SIFAS) indicates that FAS has been a least-cost vehicle for delivering basic infrastructure in Angola due to its clear and transparent fiduciary procedures.78 The average unit construction costs of FAS-financed infrastructures were significantly lower compared to those of similar programs executed by the Ministry of Public Works. For instance, the unit construction cost for schools is nearly 50 percent lower and in the case of health facilities, 65 percent lower than similar structures built by the respective line ministries.79 FAS III’s average infrastructure construction cost amounted to about one-third of comparable cost of the provincial government of Luanda, for example, at US$67,356 compared to US$190,600 (see Annex 3). In addition, the operating and maintenance cost of FAS III-financed infrastructures tend to be below the equivalent cost of infrastructures managed by most ministries and provincial governments.

C. Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Satisfactory

65. This rating is based on the consideration that the Project: (i) outcomes were achieved, and outputs were highly relevant to the reality on the ground and were largely achieved (see section 3.2); (ii) pioneered a local participatory service delivery approach in Angola and provided GoA with seasoned advisory and technical expertise; (iii) maintained a Satisfactory technical and fiduciary performance throughout its execution; (iv) enjoyed continued high GoA support, with its activities fully integrated into the agendas of the Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Territorial Administration, and other key public entities; (v) demonstrated its potential to be replicated; and (vi) provided important lessons learned for similar future operations.

77 Source: SIFAS 2008. 78 About 78 percent of FAS III resources were spent in infrastructure investments (US$102.9 million), about 5 percent in municipal development (US$6.1 million), and about 12 percent in operational costs (see Annex 1). 79 The unit costs for providing potable water varied significantly given the different technologies and types of water sources across the country. On average, water points financed under FAS III are within the cost range of similar facilities built by non-governmental organizations.

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Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes, and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development


66. FAS is considered by GoA as its main vehicle for rebuilding small-scale infrastructure, creating employment, and improving local governance.80 The Project assisted the GoA in addressing poverty reduction and social development issues in Angola by investing in: (i) improving poor households’ access to basic public services, including those living in more remote provinces; (ii) strengthening sub-national institutional capacities for public services delivery; (iii) increasing the peoples’ voice in decision making; and (iv) generating employment opportunities for the population in the Project areas.

67. In regards to employment opportunities, according to SIFAS, a total of 19,375 jobs, both permanent (11,215) and temporary (8,160) were created by FAS III.81 The communities that benefited from the services provided have also benefited from both temporary and long-term employment.82 This is particularly relevant given that Angola’s oil-based economy did not benefit the poor in the form of trickle-down effects and employment generation.

68. While gender equity continues to be a challenge in Angola, FAS III proactively engaged women in decision making through measures, such as by establishing quotas - two out of five members of the community subproject committees had to be women (see Annex 2).

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

69. Strengthening institutional capacity was a key strategy for ensuring sustainability of the activities and investments financed under the Project. To this end: (i) all civil works financed were complemented by specific technical assistance; (ii) a distinct array of capacity development activities was provided to strengthen human, organizational, and institutional capacities in local development planning and expenditure management among public, private, and civil society organizations at both the national and local levels; and (iii) it emphasized knowledge sharing and access to information as critical elements for meaningful participation.83 Overall, FAS organized 251 trainings and workshops on a range of themes related to local development planning and expenditure management.84

70. The following long-term institutional impacts have been noted:

80 PAD, pp. 5-9. 81 These figures only include people that became employed as a result of FAS activities; they do not include FAS staff. 82 While temporary jobs are mostly related to the construction/rehabilitation of infrastructure, most permanent jobs are in the public sector linked to the staffing of new or expanded service facilities. Most of the permanent jobs created under FAS are found in the following areas: (i) education: school directors, administrative staff, teachers, janitors, and guards; (ii) health: doctors, nurses, administrators, janitors, and guards; and (iii) other services: lawyers, administrative staff, librarians, and guards. 83 In addition to workshops and inter-institutional meetings, FAS communicated its implementation progress, lessons learned, and other relevant information with its beneficiaries and partners through its bi-monthly newsletters, publications, municipal portals, and website. 84 A total of 7,200 individuals participated in workshops and trainings, about 40 percent of whom were subproject beneficiaries, 30 percent were civil society representatives, 25 percent were public sector officials; FAS staff accounted for about 5 percent of the participants (see Annex 2).

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71. At the Local Level, municipalities receiving support from FAS are better prepared to fulfill their newly assigned roles in planning, budgeting, and procurement as well as in monitoring of service provision.85 The Project assisted the participating municipalities in mobilizing communities and establishing the municipal forums,86 which provided direct channels for citizen participation in public management and facilitated empowerment.87 FAS also assisted in the participatory preparation of Municipal Development Plans and the coordination of activities with key provincial and municipal entities to ensure coherence, relevance, and sustainability of the activities financed under FAS III.88 According to the findings of supervision missions, the results of these FAS III-supported activities have been duly recognized and endorsed by the participating municipal authorities, key stakeholders, and beneficiary population. Throughout Project implementation, FAS developed ways to transfer and disseminate its knowledge through manuals and to deepen capacity among municipal authorities and officials.89 Furthermore, greater transparency in civil service employment policies was evidenced in those municipalities where FAS piloted the Municipal Development Component.90

72. At the National Level, FAS III provided advisory support to key central government agencies for the review of the country’s legal framework for decentralization (Law 02/07) and for human resources enhancement (IFAL curriculum). Furthermore, the Conflict Impact and Vulnerability Assessment (CIVA), the Index for Social Services Access (IASS), and the Municipal Development Plans have provided national government agencies with effective tools for participatory local development planning and management. The Project also brought together national institutions, provincial and local governments, and civil society organizations—which often did not collaborate—and forged a positive dialogue among them on local development planning and management. This was one of the key factors that contributed to the satisfactory outcome of Project implementation. The attained inter-institutional technical coordination was also essential for the sustainability of the Project’s results and for future similar initiatives in Angola.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative, if any)

73. One positive yet unexpected outcome of the Project was the institutionalization of its municipal development approaches and methods in the country’s new legal framework for decentralization. Another unintended positive outcome was the impact of its participatory planning and decentralized resource management on the strategies of partnering agencies. For example, USAID/Chevron funded municipal development programs that were modeled after FAS III’s Municipal Development Component. Lastly, IFAL’s adoption of the MDC methodology was another positive outcome.

85 Angola Local Governance Assessment Draft (2008). 86 The forums created opportunities for dialogue, civic education, practicing democracy, and representation of those who were usually excluded from decision-making processes, and served as a demonstration effect of how accountability mechanisms work in practice (Angola Local Governance Assessment Draft (2008). 87 FAS III PAD. 88 Civil society representatives participated actively in the design and implementation of all activities, including in the preparation of the municipal profiles and plans. 89 In addition, with FAS’ support, members of the municipal administration in Benguela benefited from training that enabled them to manage a municipal web portal that gathers socio-economic information about the municipality. Other municipalities have since requested its replication, which is expected to be addressed under the follow-on operation. 90 Angola Local Governance Assessment Draft (2008).

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74. Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

75. Two beneficiary surveys were conducted during Project implementation. A 2007 survey conducted with a sample size of 1,156 households from 156 communities in six provinces focused on two aspects: (i) community perception of and participation in FAS activities; and (ii) differences between FAS-supported communities in regard to child anthropometrics, education, and health.91 A second survey was conducted in 2006 with a sample of 1,181 beneficiaries in two provinces. The areas of inquiry included: (i) respondent perceptions on the impact of FAS investments on their quality of life; (ii) general awareness of FAS and its approaches; and (iii) general knowledge of decentralization and participatory planning.92

Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Moderate

76. Sustainability: A sustainability analysis conducted at the completion of FAS II concluded that 91 percent of the Project’s investment was “fully operating with adequate, staffing, material, and provision of recurrent cost.”93 The probability of FAS III investments being sustained is therefore rather high. From the outset, the Project’s main sustainability strategy had been to ensure that its activities and investments were embraced by key national and local agents and institutions involved, and that its approaches, procedures, and activities were institutionalized. Creating a sense of ownership through the participatory processes, for instance, by engaging local populations in the preparation of the municipal profiles and development plans, was another important strategy adopted to promote sustainability—particularly of the pilot activities financed by the Project.

77. Using ‘matching’ funds for the provincial governments’ co-financing of the MDPs was a third important element adopted to ensure the relevance of the investments made by the Project and future handover of their operation and maintenance to local institutions. The sustainability of the Project investments and activities was further enhanced through the formation of strategic partnerships with key government agencies, such as the Ministry for Territorial Administration (MAT) and the Institute for Local Administration Training (IFAL), as well as partner development agencies which had indicated continued interest in co-financing future FAS-supported activities. Despite the positive Project outcomes, the long-term sustained decentralization in Angola hinges upon factors, particularly political stability and the will of future administrations that are beyond the scope of this operation.

78. Human, Organizational, and Institutional Development: Strong evidence from the beneficiary assessments, impact evaluation as well as supervision and ICR missions demonstrate the extent to which the Project contributed to enhancing human, organizational, and institutional capacities at the national and local levels through a robust program of capacity development. For instance, the MAT/IFAL staff is applying their newly acquired knowledge in developing a new curriculum and course for local officials. Civil society has been organized in structured decision-making forums in the pilot municipalities. The Project-financed training in strategic planning and financial management increased the capacity of local officials to effectively manage GoA’s inter-governmental transfers. It is worth mentioning that one of the most experienced FAS provincial

91 See paragraph 56 for more details on the FAS III Baseline Survey. 92 See Annex 6 for more details. 93 Angola Local Governance Assessment Draft (2008).

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directors was nominated Deputy Governor, to a large extent due to his skills acquired during the implementation of the current Project and in its previous phases.

IV. ASSESSMENT OF BANK AND BORROWER PERFORMANCE

A. Bank Performance Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry


79. FAS III’s design was fully aligned with GoA long-term development objectives and built on the lessons learned from the previous two operations assisted by the Bank in Angola. The Project pioneered the concept of a participatory local development and provided Angolan officials, experts, and civil society representatives with new methods and tools for the implementation of GoA’s post-conflict/development initiatives. Furthermore, the Project design addressed the existing institutional fragility through a carefully designed ‘graduation’ approach. In retrospective, the Project’s expansion strategy would have benefited from a survey providing more detailed information on the logistical and institutional conditions found in the new participating provinces.

Quality of Supervision

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

80. Supervision missions were conducted, for the most part, twice a year during Project implementation in close collaboration with FAS staff and partners. The missions included field visits and engaged specialized technical experts, partnering institutions, public officials, community members, and civil society representatives. Fiduciary reviews were carried out at least twice a year, and ‘no objections’ were provided in a timely manner. Despite the continued high-level technical and fiduciary implementation support provided by the Bank, the overall quality of Bank supervision was considered Moderately Unsatisfactory, for the following reasons.

81. Due to an oversight on the Bank’s part and subsequent lack of timely action, the EC Trust Fund was partially cancelled and Euro 15.86 million of the original Grant of Euro 44.55 million remained undisbursed (Project files).94 The oversight occurred because the closing dates of the Financing Agreement signed between the GoA and the Bank (June 30, 2008) differed from those of the Administrative Agreement (AA) signed between the EC and the Bank (January 31, 2007). Recognizing this dilemma, the EC granted an extension of the closing date until December 31, 2007. While the Bank’s request for a second extension in January 2008 was not granted, the EC allowed the Bank to honor all contracts signed before December 31, 2007.95 As a consequence, 185 subprojects had to be temporarily suspended. In addition, FAS offices in five ‘new’ provinces were not staffed,96 and FAS staff salaries were cut by 60 percent for the remainder of

94 In order to accommodate the retroactive extension of the EC TF’s closing date and allow the necessary time for the EC to authorize withdrawal applications of earlier expenditures, the IDA Credit’s closing date was extended twice, i.e., to June 30, 2009. 95 Payments for these expenditures were allowed after that date considering that all subprojects were concluded by December 31, 2009. This allowed the Bank to reimburse FAS III eligible expenditures. For a description of EC-funded activities and results achieved see Annex 2, part II. 96 Lunda Sul, Lunda Norte, Kuando Kubango, Uige and Moxico.

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the Project’s life.97 This financing shortfall was promptly addressed by the GoA through increased counterpart funding. In addition, FAS promptly devised an emergency strategy to save costs by establishing ‘satellite offices’ in support to the five ‘new’ but unstaffed provincial offices and putting in place a ‘mentoring’ program in which the most experienced provincial teams assisted the recently established teams.98

82. In addition, the sudden death of the TTL in March 2008, three months before the original Project closing date (and when nearly 97 percent of the credit proceeds had already been disbursed), adversely affected the Bank’s quality of supervision during its final implementation and closing stage.

83. While regular supervision and implementation support was provided until the end of 2007, and the continuity of the core Project team members resulted in the Satisfactory ratings of the Project’s fiduciary and the technical performance, the issues relating to the extension of the EC Trust Fund, data collection for the impact evaluation, and not formally amending the legal documents after the MTR were problematic.99

Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

84. While the Bank’s technical and fiduciary team members provided high quality support throughout Project design and implementation, the rating for overall Bank performance is Moderately Satisfactory given the above mentioned shortcomings in Bank management and supervision.

B. Borrower Performance Government Performance

Rating: Highly Satisfactory

85. The Project’s design was fully aligned with GoA’s development priorities, and FAS III enjoyed strong GoA commitment, ownership, and active interest from its design and throughout its execution stages, as reflected in the US$33.7 million in total counterpart contribution, four times the US$8.25 million agreed at the time of appraisal. Furthermore, GoA institutionalized civic participation as part of its Local Administration Law 02.07, through the creation of councils for civic engagement modeled after the municipal forums introduced by FAS. In addition to seeking FAS’ advisory support in reviewing and shaping the country’s legal framework for decentralization, GoA also considers FAS an important partner in developing the capacity of municipal administrations in participatory planning nationwide.

Implementing Agency Performance


97 AM November 8-28, 2008 ISM, p. 6. 98 The decision to establish ‘satellite offices’ was further motivated by the recognition at Mid-Term Review that there was not sufficient time left to recruit and train new teams in the remaining ‘new’ provinces. This in addition to the fact that construction cost in these provinces were higher than expected. 99 Although the rating of the Bank’s supervision performance generated discussion among the participants of the ICR review meetings, the ICR rates the quality of supervision as Moderately Unsatisfactory.

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86. Project management was carried out by an experienced team at FAS, which processed more than 8,000 contracts for works, goods, and services in an effective manner. The employment of a decentralized implementation structure as well as of effective and transparent administrative and fiduciary methods, the active involvement of local entities and partners, the gradual transfer of its expertise and functions to local agencies, and the timely assessment, dissemination, and incorporation of lessons learned throughout Project implementation are all in line with good practices for Project management. In addition, FAS provided valuable advisory support to GoA to advance its legal decentralization framework and institutionalize participatory municipal planning.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance


87. The Project has been rated one of the best performing operations of the Bank’s portfolio in Angola with a Satisfactory technical and fiduciary performance rating throughout its implementation. The Project consistently enjoyed strong GoA support, and its approaches and methods have been fully integrated into the agenda of key national government agencies as well and in the strategies of partner development agencies.

V. Lessons Learned

The main lessons learned from FAS III include (see LDP PAD):

88. Use of Pilot Activities – The iterative approach of the Municipal Development Component’s pilot activities was critical as it allowed sufficient time and resource inputs to develop the capacity of local partners, while fine tuning the methodologies applied to the diverse and rapidly changing local conditions. It also helped to build trust among stakeholders and keep expectations realistic. The guidance provided by a highly qualified local development expert to FAS management was critical to the successful design, implementation, and monitoring of the Project’s Municipal Development Component pilots.

89. Commitment by Local Leaders to Civic Engagement – Building working relations of trust and confidence in public officials at the provincial and municipal levels was essential to FAS efforts in promoting effective civic participation in local development. Clear communication of the distinct roles and functions of government and civil society and the way in which they are brought together in a participatory process is essential to bring about recognition and legitimacy of the adopted bottom-up approach of development process.

90. Investment Sustainability – Community participation through FAS-supported Nucleus Groups were necessary but not sufficient to ensure sustainability of improved infrastructure. FAS III emphasized the importance of operation and maintenance and of linking it with investments by coordinating planning with provincial and municipal authorities as well as to harmonize these with municipal maintenance programs and budgets.

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Annex 1. Project Costs and FinancingTable 1: Project Cost and Financing by ComponentSource: SIFAS2009

PAD ActualComponent Indicative

cost (US$)% ofTotal

Bankfinancing

(US$)

Actual cost(US$)

% ofTotal

Bankfinancing

(US$)

GoA EC UNDP Chevron UNICEF Total

CommunityDevelopment

87,500,000 72.9 38,500,000 102,967,398 78.9 51,238,557 21,004,280 31,829,360 566,094 260,672 81,364 102,967,395

MunicipalDevelopment

10,000,000 8.3 4,400,000 6,183,661 4.7 677,812 2,766,856 2,738,992 0 0 0 6,183,660

InstitutionalStrengthening

8,000,000 6.7 5,500,000 5,702,475 4.3 1,075,455 2,650,330 1,976,689 0 0 0 5,702,474

OperationalCost

14,500,000 12.1 6,600,000 15,649,504 11.9 7,218,154 7,314,948 1,116,401 0 0 0 15,649,503

Total 120,000,000 100 55,000,000 130,503,038 100 60,209,978 33,736,414 37,720,442 566,094 260,672 81,364 132,515,964

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

I. Outputs of FAS III Activities

According to the Results Framework in the PAD, the outputs of each component were as follows:

Component I: Community Development Component (CDC):

• (Component Ia) Quality community-prioritized basic infrastructure services provided, in use and maintained, in collaboration with MAs;

• (Component Ib) Vulnerable groups, conflict impact and community demand for supportive interventions identified; and

Component II: Municipal Development Component (MDC):

• Municipal administrations delivering accountable and sustainable quality services to communities along the CDD principles and in accordance with municipal development plans (PAD, p. 35).

FAS III’s two components were, in general, satisfactorily implemented. The following section summarizes the results by component and subcomponents.

A. Component 1 - Community Development (CDC) (estimated US$87.5 million; actual US$104.98 million). The CDC comprised two subcomponents: (a) Subprojects and (b) Conflict Impact and Vulnerability Assessment (CIVA).

CDC Overview

Sub-component I (a) Subprojects. This subcomponent aimed to “expand and improve access, management and sustainable use of basic social and economic infrastructure, improve governance, and build social capital.”100 In accordance with a Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach, this subcomponent intended to finance small-scale community infrastructures to be identified, prioritized, co-implemented, and co-maintained by the beneficiary communities.

Subproject investments included: (i) construction and/or rehabilitation of 1,575 basic infrastructures for health, education, and water and sanitation; (ii) small-scale community and municipal infrastructure, such as, public markets, public parks and sports facilities, and (iii) environmental upgrading, for example, solid waste management, reforestation, etc. 101

In order to foster a meaningful dialogue between communities and local governments, and to enable community members to make more informed choices on their investment priorities, this subcomponent also provided communities, service providers, and partner agencies with a capacity development program, which included training, workshops, and activities alike focusing on themes such as social promotion, community mobilization, operation, and maintenance of basic services and participatory local development planning.

The subcomponent also expanded FAS coverage from the nine initial provinces (i.e., “old provinces”), where FAS has invested in the provision of basic infrastructures since its inception in 1994, including Cabinda, Luanda, Bengo, Huambo, Cunene, Huila, Kuanza Sul, Benguela, and Namibe, to all of Angola’s 18 provinces.

100 PAD, p. 10. 101 DCA, p. 17.

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FAS’ expansion strategy followed a two-pronged approach:

• Expansion into ‘new’ FAS provinces. The Project’s expansion was gradual, starting in 2004 with the establishment of provincial offices in four provinces (Bie, Malanje, Kwanza Norte, and Zaire), with a portfolio of about 15 subprojects per province. In 2006, FAS expanded into the remaining five provinces (Uige, Lunda Sul, Lunda Norte, Kuando Kubango, and Moxico), with a portfolio of about five subprojects per province. However, due to the lack of resources at the time they were established, these provincial offices were not staffed and ‘satellite offices’ were established in support to them. Those offices provided financial support and capacity strengthening only to community-based type of investments.

• Expansion within existing ‘old’ provinces. Based on considerable demand from the population and municipal administrations in the provinces where FAS have had a presence since 1994, FAS prioritized additional municipalities and communities within these so-called ‘old’ provinces.

The CDC also started to emphasize the importance of investing in ‘integrated investment packages” which consisted of a combination of primary social infrastructures (e.g., school buildings, health posts, and water points) and facilities (e.g., teachers housing, water, and energy supply–solar panels) to ensure a sustainable operational unit and its optimal access and utilization within the community. These integrated packages were provided mostly in the nine ‘old’ provinces.

Sub-component I (b) Conflict Impact and Vulnerability Assessment (CIVA). The CIVA aimed to assess, on an experimental pilot basis, in a total of 10 communities “how the particularity of the post-conflict context constrains or fosters social capital building.”102 In order to carry out the CIVA, the subcomponent financed a mapping exercise and a capacity development plan on vulnerability as well as the preparation of social and economic vulnerability indicators. Proposed training materials and a toolkit as well as training of trainers tailored to the identified needs of municipal administrations were envisaged but not completed due to the lack of funding in light of the cancelation of the third tranche of the EC Trust Fund.

The CIVA participatory assessment provided FAS and partner organizations with critical information on: (i) the nature and scope of vulnerability at the community level, means for assisting vulnerable community members, and the extent to which vulnerable population groups have been able to benefit from infrastructures and services provided by FAS; (ii) the impact of conflict at the community level and war-affected communities’ commitment and capacity to negotiate different viewpoints and engage in collective action around a common goal; and (iii) the nature and scope of community demand for targeted support to vulnerable groups and peace-building efforts.

CDC Achievements

The CDC’s overall implementation performance was rated Satisfactory by the Project task team and the ICR team given its positive impact on households’ improved access to basic social and economic services in 65 municipalities located in all of Angola’s 18 provinces through the construction and rehabilitation of 1,575 infrastructures. Table 1 below shows the breakdown of

102 PAD, p. 11.

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FAS III-financed subprojects by province.

Table 1 – Number of FAS III subprojects and cost by province

Province Actual number of completed subprojects (as of August 2009)

Actual cost of completed subprojects (in US$)

1 Benguela 139 10,380,751.98 2 Bengo 132 7,724,927.97 3 Bie 43 3,678,170.10 4 Cabinda 140 7,193,053.12 5 Huambo 141 8,144,199.65 6 Huila 129 8,306,765.46 7 K. Kubango 10 1,624,091.17 8 Kwanza Norte 25 2,525,949.37 9 Kwanza Sul 242 13,884,993.49 10 Kunene 134 8,786,772.17 11 Luanda 126 7,616,505.00 12 Lunda Norte 3 1,217,276.60 13 Lunda Sul 6 1,616,751.74 14 Malanje 33 5,528,383.70 15 Moxico 4 495,047.19 16 Namibe 148 11,418,422.86 17 Uige 6 937,432.02 18 Zaire 114 6,373,435.92

Total 1,575 107,452,929.51 Source: SIFAS, August 2009.

In quantitative terms, as indicated in Table 2 below, the CDC surpassed the target recommended at Mid-Term Review (1,565 subprojects) by 10 subprojects. According to SIFAS, as of August 2009, the total number of subprojects by sector are: (i) education 445 (28.3 percent); (ii) 380 in water and sanitation (24.1 percent); (iii) 201 in economic and productive activities (12.8 percent); (iv) 188 in health (11.9 percent); and (v) 361 (22.9 percent) in ‘other’ works, such as bridges, tertiary roads, etc. (22.9 percent).

Table 2: Number of FAS III subprojects by sector Sector Completed

subprojects (Number)

Share of subprojects (%

of all subprojects)

Total cost by sector as of July

2009 (in US$)

Average cost per investments

(in US$)

Share of subproject cost

(% of total subproject cost)

Education 445 28.3 50,778,556.95 114,109.12 29.9 Water & Sanitation

380 24.1

6,260,812.97 16,475.82 25.5

Economic and Productive

201 12.8

8,881,687.90 44,187.50 13.5

Health 188 11.9 18,415,705.07 97,955.88 12.6 Other 361 22.9 21,952,166.46 60,308.15 24.5 TOTAL 1.575 100 106,288,929.35 66,607.29 100 Source: SIFAS, July 2009.

In qualitative terms, the CDC enabled about 2.3 million Angolans to gain access to basic social

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and economic services. According to the 2007 impact evaluation conducted with a sample of 1,156 households from 156 communities in six provinces:103

• 13.8 percent of interviewed individuals perceived a reduction of health problems; • 16.3 percent perceived a reduction of the malaria prevalence; • 40.9 percent perceived a reduction of number of days lost to illness; and • 18.2 percent stated satisfaction with the school facilities.104

About 98 percent of the respondents also rated the quality of the infrastructures as good or very good, and an overwhelming proportion of the respondents considered FAS-financed infrastructure either well or very well managed.105

Beneficiary assessments conducted in 2005 in the provinces of Benguela and Cunene in a sample of 1,181 households, concluded that the main benefits gained by the communities with FAS III investments were, in order of priority: (i) greater access to education (91.9 percent), (ii) greater access to health services (57 percent), (iii) greater access to water and sanitation services (30 percent), and (iv) improved economic conditions (15 percent). Additionally, other noted benefits were the decreased distance to health services (43.9 percent), and the reduced distance to reach education facilities (40.6 percent).

Measures to ensure sustainable utilization were an integral part of Project implementation. Prior to financing any new subproject, each FAS provincial team collected written commitments as to staff needs and recurrent budget allocation from deconcentrated sector ministries and provincial authorities to ensure that the infrastructures and/or service financed under FAS would be adequately operated and maintained over time. FAS provincial teams also agreed up-front on operation and maintenance responsibilities for FAS-financed infrastructures after their handover to communities, with representatives from beneficiary communities through the nucleos comunitarios.

In addition to the provision of service delivery infrastructure, the CDC created a total of 19,375 jobs of which 11,215 were permanent and 8,160 temporary (Table 3).

103 FAS III Baseline Survey, p. 5. 104 FAS III Baseline Survey, p. 26. 105 FAS III Baseline Survey, p. 8.

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Table 3 – Number of jobs created by FAS III by province and type of employment

Province Permanent jobs Temporary jobs Total Benguela 1,616 2,604 4,220 Bengo 1,246 637 1,883 Bie 364 0 364 Cabinda 325 1,408 1,733 Huambo 690 504 1,194 Huila 1,382 525 1,907 K. Kubango 17 84 101 Kwanza Norte 169 22 191 Kwanza Sul 1,691 523 2,214 Kunene 984 132 1,116 Luanda 872 728 1,600 Lunda Norte 9 43 52 Lunda Sul 12 79 91 Malanje 192 81 273 Moxico 12 54 66 Namibe 1,584 357 1,941

Uige 12 54 66 Zaire 38 325 363 Total 11,215 8,160 19,375

Source: SIFAS, July 2009.

B. Component II – Municipal Development Component (MDC) (estimated US$10 million, actual US$6.2 million) aimed to strengthen the capacity of local governments (including municipal administrations and municipal forums) to become gradually proficient in the provision of social and economic services to communities in an accountable manner.

MDC Overview

Municipal administrations, jointly with respective municipal forums, were the loci for identifying and planning the MDC activities. Twelve pilot municipalities were competitively selected by FAS to participate in the MDC: one municipality in each of the nine ‘old’ provinces and one in each of the three best performing provinces.

As one of the requirements, municipal forums were established, comprising representatives from civil society at large. The forums played a critical role in ensuring that FAS III resources and activities responded to the demands articulated by the communities in the pilot municipalities. They were responsible for the joint preparation of the respective municipal profiles, Municipal Development Plans, and annual budgets as well as for monitoring their implementation by the municipal administrations.

Through the MDC, a strategic local development planning methodology (aka macro plan or strategic participatory planning cycle) was developed and tested as an alternative to the subproject cycle methodology previously adopted by FAS. Strategic planning was carried out as a deliberative instrument, through which citizens engaged with local authorities in envisioning their future and in promoting more transparent procedures for the provision of public goods and services.

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The methodology used a graduation scheme, which was based on a needs assessment conducted in each pilot municipality, thus providing on-the-job capacity strengthening and resources for participating municipal administrations to gradually build-up the expert skills and experience needed to effectively provide and manage public services and goods.

At the core of this graduation scheme was a “learning by doing” process through which FAS transferred its array of technical and management methods, public service functions and skills to the municipal administrations.

The strategic planning cycle comprised five stages, namely: (i) Process Structuring; (ii) Municipal Profiles; (iii) Envisioning and Local Development Plan; (iv) Municipal Investment Program Execution; and (v) M&E and start of new cycle. The five stages were characterized as follows:

• Stage 1 – Process Structure. FAS provincial teams provided facilitation to municipal authorities and Forum members in the identification and preparation of Municipal Development Plans. As part of the process, FAS teams provided technical assistance (TA) and financed selected consultancy services to support municipal authorities and Forum members in the preparation of a communication strategy and a TA package tailored to the specific needs of the individual pilot municipalities and Forums.

• Stage 2 – A Municipal Profile was prepared by the municipal authorities and Forum members with assistance from FAS provincial teams, to map the geographical and socioeconomic aspects as well as service coverage information in the participating municipalities. The profiles contained representation of socio-geographic stratification, indicating relatively poorer and/or underserved areas that were used as the basis for poverty-targeting MDC investments in the pilot municipalities.

• Stage 3 – Envisioning. Based on the municipal profiles, the municipal authorities and Forums jointly prepared, with assistance from FAS provincial teams, their respective two year Municipal Development Plans with an agreed-upon medium-term development vision, along with strategic measures and targets, and public investments necessary to achieve their vision. Each municipal administration, with approval from their respective Forum jointly developed its annual investment plan for FAS co-financing.

• Stage 4 – Municipal Investment Execution. After screening the municipal development plans, each FAS provincial team, municipal officials, and Forum members recommended municipal investments to the respective provincial government for review and approval. As part of the provincial government deliberations, FAS sought the assurance from sector staff and municipal authorities that they would assume operation and maintenance costs of the prioritized investments. Only then were civil works and goods financed by FAS.

• Stage 5 – Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning was integrated throughout the planning cycle. Information gathered through monitoring and evaluation was disseminated to the public as a means of learning and improving accountability downward to communities.

Guided and supported by a Strategic Planning Coordinator in FAS Executive Management office, FAS provincial teams thus assisted municipal authorities and Forums in: (i) the preparation of profiles, development and annual investment plans in a participatory manner; (ii) the integration of municipal budgets into provincial investment plans; and (iii) the coordination with decentralized sector authorities at the provincial government level to ensure sufficient

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budget allocation for operation and maintenance of the infrastructures financed under FAS III.

As expected, the pilot municipalities completed the planning cycle within a range of different timeframes due to their varying levels of experience and capacity for local development planning and management. The three provinces with a higher level of capacity (Benguela, Kuanza Sul, and Namibe) a second municipality was selected; four other provinces had municipalities with some capacity (Cabinda, Huambo, Huila, and Cunene) and two with lesser capacity (Luanda and Bengo), respectively. Throughout the MDC implementation, FAS role was tailored to the capacity of each of the participating municipalities and Forums, ranging from an intensive hands-on learning-by-doing process to a more advisory support to key functions, such as procurement of required contractors, disbursement of payments, and monitoring of progress.

Capacity development – in essential aspects of participatory development planning, public expenditure management, and citizens’ oversight of investments – was at the core of the MDC process. FAS provincial teams provided hands-on support to municipal administrations and Forums to enable them to jointly prepare, manage, and monitor Municipal Development Plans and investment plans.

MDC Achievements

The MDC’s overall implementation performance was rated Satisfactory in all ISRs and by the ICR team as it has effectively established the mechanisms and practices for a participatory governance system in which local governments are increasingly more accountable to their constituencies. The MCD target, as recommended at Mid-Term Review, was to institute a participatory governance system in nine municipalities. By Project closing, 12 competitively selected pilot municipalities had improved their capacity to plan, manage, provide goods, and monitor budget execution in an accountable and efficient manner as a result of technical assistance and financing provided by the Project.

All pilot municipalities attained satisfactory levels of performance, completed the five stages of the Participatory Investment Cycle, and finalized their respective municipal profiles as well as municipal development plans (MDP). In addition, all pilot municipalities have improved their local development planning competencies.

The Project developed an innovative capacity development framework which focused on simultaneously enhancing individual skills, and organizational as well as institutional competences. The capacity development efforts within the scope of the MDC focused on the following four areas:

• Articulate demands at the community level to facilitate participatory processes for communities and their associated organizations to clarify and properly articulate their needs, and the means for translating those needs into effective demand and actions. According to the 2006 beneficiary assessment, ICR interviews and assessments by local development advisors, this process was instrumental in enhancing the ability of communities to negotiate – for the first time – their priorities with government interlocutors at public agencies.

• Enhance service providers’ accountability in relation to articulated local priorities by strengthening the capacity of service providers, NGOs, municipal administrations, local partners, and line ministries to respond more adequately to their constituencies and to ensure that these responses meet the demand articulated by communities and the requirements for subproject sustainability.

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• Establish strategic partnerships to integrate and manage dispersed efforts, thus aligning collective actions and coordinating practices among community-based, non-governmental, and governmental organizations working directly and indirectly on service delivery in the pilot municipalities.

• Establish dynamic knowledge management mechanisms and platforms to exchange information and lessons learned between policy makers and their constituencies by documenting and disseminating acquired operational knowledge, experiences, and impacts as well as establishing thematic debates on key conceptual and operational issues at community, municipal, provincial, and central levels (i.e., the Portal of the Municipality of Benguela, and radio programs in the Municipality of Vianna).

The MDC attained far reaching results in terms of enhanced local governance and improved accountability in the pilot municipalities, especially considering the challenges it faced. These included initial delays given that it took more time than expected to introduce a new working methodology and ensure political commitment and adherence by provincial and sometimes changing municipal administrations to the MDC approach.

The main achievements of this pilot experience can be categorized into four major areas: (i) strengthened local administrations’ strategic development planning capacities, (ii) strengthened sub-national public expenditure coordination and accountability, (iii) stronger civil society voice in decision-making processes, and (iv) enhanced local development policy making.

Strategic Local Development Planning – The MDC methodology has been considered instrumental in enabling municipalities and representatives of civil society, for the first time, to jointly engage in the decision-making process. In addition, it promoted a long-term and geographic approach of development as reflected in the Municipal Development Plans. Moreover, it allowed for improved coordination of provincial and municipal investment plans and use of resources. As a result, several provincial governments, namely, Huambo, Kuanza Sul, Cabinda, Namibe, and municipalities have requested that FAS expand this investment planning approach to neighboring municipalities.

Local Public Expenditure Management and Accountability – The July 2008 Local Governance Assessment report suggests that FAS III pilot municipalities are better prepared to absorb other investment programs, such as the GoA’s intergovernmental transfers (FUGEM), given that Municipal Development Plans already reflect local priorities and articulated preferences. These municipalities also seem to be better prepared to manage the process of basic service provision, and to undertake competitive procurement and accountable contracting for local works and services as well as monitoring of services provided. Nine pilot municipalities aligned their planning cycles with the respective provincial governments’ annual budgets, which permitted timely integration of new service delivery units into investment planning, staffing, and recurrent budgeting.

Strengthening of Civil Society and Public Accountability – The July 2008 Local Governance Assessment report revealed that the municipal forum mechanism promoted by FAS was effective in strengthening the municipal governance capacity in preparation for decentralization. In practical terms, it confirmed the positive synergy gained by engaging public sector, civil society, and private sector representatives jointly in budget formulation and public expenditure oversight. Most municipal administrators perceived the municipal forum as value added to their administrations by enriching the deliberations and decisions on local development priorities.

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All Forums are still functioning and some meet regularly, as in the case of the Municipal Forum of Porto Amboin in Kwanza Sul, which has been able to raise additional funds from the private sector to cover its administrative and community articulated demands, such as a bus service for students. The Forum has also been active in ensuring employment opportunities for the youth through a partnership with the Centro de Formação which provides information on existing job vacancies for youth.

Local Development Policy Making – The results of the MDC pilots exceeded initial expectations and informed the revision of the 1999 Local Administration Decree and, as a consequence, promoted the inclusion of civil society in decision making in the new Local Administration Law 02/07 approved in 2007. Based on the results of the MDC pilots’ experience, FAS assisted the Parliamentary Commission for Local Development in assessing the progress made toward participatory municipal planning and GoA’s legal decentralization framework.106 Strong working relations have also been established with the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MAT), which is responsible for decentralization policy in Angola, and its Institute for Local Administration Training (IFAL). In 2006, MAT inducted FAS to become a formal member of its decentralization working committee and participate in the preparation of a curriculum and a syllabus to be delivered by IFAL to all municipal administrators in accordance with the MDC implementation manuals. Furthermore, acknowledging FAS participatory development planning and service delivery mechanisms, the provincial governments of Cabinda and Huambo adopted FAS III’s approach and methods to provide services to remote areas of difficult access and previously not covered by FAS III.107

C. Capacity Development Framework (actual US $ 5.1 million).

CDF Overview

Previously, FAS’ capacity enhancement efforts focused primarily on individual-level training activities. As part of the design of FAS III, however, a Capacity Development Framework (CDF) was devised that embodied a new concept and a cross-cutting tool to address capacity development challenges and needs at three levels: individual, organizational, and institutional. The Bank’s Operations Policy and Country Services (OPCS) office considered the CDF of FAS III an innovative concept and commended the Project task team on its development and application, given that there had not been any similar approaches recorded in Bank operations.

The CDF expanded FAS scope and range of activities to include a combination of capacity needs assessments, training of trainers, peer-to-peer workshops, on-the-job training, field study visits, networking, database development and data analysis, and the provision of equipment. Capacity development also entailed technical assistance to and learning-by-doing training of municipal staff and citizens involved in the Forums in participatory expenditure management. Capacity development themes included: strategic planning, municipal profile and budget formulation, investment programming and financial management, procurement of goods, works and services, social mobilization, monitoring and evaluation, negotiation, environmental assessment, and resettlement, among others.

Specifically, it entailed a learning process which focused on four inter-related aspects: (i) enhancing technical skills and individual competences for managing assets and resources; (ii) fostering organizational capabilities for collective action and civic engagement in local development apart from infrastructure construction or rehabilitation; (iii) establishing information sharing networks and knowledge platforms among key decision making and

106 Interview with FAS management on November 4, 2009. 107 Impact evaluation (part 1) and interview with FAS management on November 4, 2009.

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implementing organizations; and (iv) strengthening institutional competences for establishing collaborative partnerships and relations among municipal administrations, Forums, and other government levels and sectors.

CDF Achievements

In quantitative terms, FAS carried out 258 capacity development activities of which 123 were completed under the CDC and 128 under the MDC. During Project implementation, about 7,200 individuals benefited from FAS III capacity development activities, half of whom (3,108) received formal training. The latter comprised members (1,196), civil society members (865), public sector officials (836) and FAS staff (211). Table 4 shows the composition of training beneficiaries, and Table 5 provides information on the capacity development activities by component.

Table 4: Type of beneficiaries of training activities

Type of Beneficiaries Number of beneficiaries Beneficiaries by sector (%) Public Sector 836 27 Civil Society 865 28 Community Members 1,196 38 FAS Staff 211 7 Total 3,108 100

Source: SIFAS. Table 5: Capacity Development activities by component

Component Number of activities

Topics Individuals (male)

Individuals (female)

Total

FAS procedures Community mobilization and diagnostic techniques Participatory M&E

Community Development Component

123

Safeguards

1,665 869 2,534

Strategic planning FM and procurement Environmental management Moderation for stage 3 Participatory M&E

Municipal Development Component

128

Municipal portal

3,160 1,506 4,666

Vulnerability assessmentMIS management Administrative support Impact Evaluation HR management

Institutional Strengthening

7

Angola’s fiscal system

N/A N/A N/A

Total 258 N/A N/A N/A Source: SIFAS.

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FAS also produced a series of detailed user-friendly manuals on social promotion, participatory local development planning, financial management, and environmental management related to service delivery at the local level. These manuals have recently been adopted by the Minister of Territorial Administration, and they will be incorporated into the main curricula of the Institute for Local Administration Training (IFAL).

During the ICR field visits and beneficiary interviews community members mentioned that the municipal forums had enabled them to participate in local development and interact with local government officials. Evidence shows that this type of learning fostered and broadened collective engagement in participatory action and strengthened the link between communities and their municipal governments.

II. Outputs of FAS III Activities Funded by the EC Trust Fund (No. 053490)

Per the 2004 Administration Agreement signed between the Commission of the European Communities (EC) and the International Development Association (IDA), it was agreed that IDA would administer a grant made available by the EC to co-finance the implementation of FAS III. The total grant amount was EURO 45.0 million, to be paid in three tranches of EURO 22.5 million, EURO 13.5 million, and EURO 9 million (see Administration Agreement, p. 1).

As described in more detail in Section 5 of this ICR, due to an oversight on the Bank’s part, the closing date of the Administration Agreement lapsed on December 31, 2007 while the closing date of the Bank’s Financing Agreement and Project Agreements was July 31, 2008. As a result, Euro 15.86 million of the total original Grant amount of Euro 44.55 million remained undisbursed (Project files). As Table 6 below shows, US$37.72 million were disbursed out of the EC Trust Fund, which amounted to about 28.5 percent of the total disbursements under FAS III.

Table 6 - FAS III disbursements by source of funding

Source Total (US$) % funding of total actual Project cost IDA 60,209,979.07 45.42 GoA 33,736,417.18 25.45 EC Trust Fund 37,720,643.71 28.45 Chevron/Texaco 261,464.00 0.20 UNDP 566,094.91 0.43 UNICEF 81,364.24 0.06 TOTAL 132,575,963.11 100.00

Source: SIFAS 2009.

The objective of the EC Trust Fund was the same as FAS III’s overall Project Development Objective, that is, “to achieve improved, expanded, sustainable utilization of basic social and economic services and to support a governance system where local government and communities can gradually become mutually accountable” (Administration Agreement, p. 5 and Project Appraisal Document (PAD), p. 2).

The Trust Fund was expected to support the implementation of the two main project components, the Community Development Component (CDC) and the Municipal Development Component (MDC), as well as institutional development. However, two-thirds of the EC TF proceeds were to be used to support high priority social and economic infrastructure subprojects in poor communities, within the framework of FAS III. In order to strengthen the poor’s abilities

37

to better plan, budget, and manage their own development processes, the Trust Fund intended to finance demand-driven community-based investments in education and health infrastructure, water and sanitation facilities, markets and transport facilities, and construction or rehabilitation of other social and economic infrastructure (Administration Agreement, p. 5).

In regards to FAS III’s Municipal Development Component, the Trust Fund intended to support the national decentralization process by financing technical assistance to strengthen municipal administrations as well as by helping to enhance the capacity of FAS and its partners in M&E, financial management, procurement, and operational capacities.

The Project’s outcome/impact indicators were nearly the same108 as the ones contained in the FAS III PAD, as they included: (i) primary school enrollment increased; (ii) access to and usage of health services increased; (iii) access to and usage of water and sanitation facilities increased; (iv) number of Consultative Forums (CF) created and functioning; (v) 80 percent of participating municipal administrations achieving highest level (8) of performance by the End of Project, 40 percent by Mid-Term Review; (vi) number of municipal staff skills, competencies, and practices improved; (vii) number of communities making use of FAS-supported mechanisms to hold municipalities accountable; and (viii) beneficiaries satisfied with services provided by the Project.

The expected outputs were as follows: (i) subprojects completed; (ii) report and agreed action plan identifying demand for support to vulnerable groups in 10 communities; (iii) improved CDD capacity in communities among partners; (iv) municipal administrations graduating through capacity scheme; and (v) M&E system operational, timely disbursements.

In light of the fact that the EC Trust Fund co-financed activities within the overall FAS III results framework, the outcome/impact and output indicators are essentially the same as the ones contained in the FAS III PAD, which are described in great detail in Section 3, Assessment of Outcomes, in the main text of the ICR as well as in this Annex 2. In addition, in line with the synergistic co-financing nature of this Trust Fund, it is difficult to attribute the achievements of activities FAS III (e.g., capacity development for community-driven development or support to the national decentralization process) to individual funding sources (i.e., GoA counterpart, IDA credit or EC TF proceeds).

However, given that the EC Trust Fund’s main focus was to support community-driven subprojects, Table 6 below depicts key information related to the use of funds and outputs that are attributable to the Trust Fund. As Table 7 shows, the EC TF financed a total of 727 subprojects, which is nearly half (46 percent) of all subprojects completed under the Project. Of these 727, 36 percent were in education, 14 percent in health, 12 percent in water and sanitation, 7 percent in productive/economic opportunities, and 31 percent in the ‘other’ category.

The total EC TF disbursements on the rehabilitation or construction of community-based, small-scale, and demand-driven service delivery infrastructure amounted to about US$32.9 million, of which disbursements for education subprojects accounted for 47 percent, health subprojects for 13 percent, water and sanitation subprojects for about 4 percent, productive/economic subprojects for about 6 percent, and ‘other’ subprojects for about 29 percent (see Table 8 below).

108 With the exception of the following indicator contained in the PAD: “number of vehicles on repaired roads increased by x% and travel time reduced by x%.”

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Table 7 – Number of subprojects financed by the EC Trust Fund by province and type

Province Education Health Water/ Sanitation

Productive/Economic

Other Totals

1XPEHU�RI�VXESURMHFWV�






CABINDA 18 3 1 0 17 ��K. SUL 49 11 22 11 20 ��BENGUELA 33 16 1 1 36 ��NAMIBE 9 5 4 7 21 ��HUILA 16 6 7 4 11 ��KUNENE 3 4 1 3 33 ��LUANDA 28 8 5 0 9 ��BENGO 17 4 4 3 16 ��HUAMBO 13 6 2 7 11 ��ZAIRE 24 11 30 3 30 ��BIÉ 14 7 4 6 2 ��K. NORTE 6 6 6 2 0 ��MALANGE 18 6 1 3 7 ��UIGE 6 1 0 0 0 ��LUNDA SUL 3 2 1 0 2 ��LUNDA NORTE 3 2 0 0 2 ��K.KUBANGO 4 2 0 0 3 ��MOXICO 1 1 0 0 2 ��7RWDO� ��

39

Table 8 - EC Trust Fund disbursements on subprojects by province and type

3URYLQFH� (GXFDWLRQ� +HDOWK�:DWHU��

6DQLWDWLRQ�3URGXFWLYH��(FRQRPLF� 2WKHU� 7RWDOV�

�LQ�86�� LQ�86�� LQ�86�� LQ�86�� LQ�86�� LQ�86��

CABINDA 469,055.22 50,571.00 23,940.00 0.00 293,242.05 836,808.27 K. SUL 2,189,351.00 554,293.00 231,315.97 595,995.00 866,583.53 4,437,538.50 BENGUELA 1,267,792.40 436,303.25 22,302.40 19,728.96 1,190,114.13 2,936,241.14 NAMIBE 650,962.00 120,126.60 81,976.40 340,171.40 1,764,863.03 2,958,099.43 HUILA 1,274,012.60 346,965.00 62,335.00 99,920.00 783,321.30 2,566,553.90 KUNENE 29,696.00 143,097.52 234,355.00 40,349.00 1,165,316.00 1,612,813.52 LUANDA 1,002,052.65 263,238.04 92,694.90 0.00 213,499.90 1,571,485.49 BENGO 1,178,938.80 169,290.86 13,719.92 135,272.65 418,015.03 1,915,237.26 HUAMBO 793,259.00 221,180.00 95,858.00 374,815.00 710,589.00 2,195,701.00 ZAIRE 1,935,363.13 562,351.82 231,776.00 95,918.00 1,170,782.46 3,996,191.41 BIÉ 514,165.60 252,018.86 197,869.34 44,673.00 286,928.92 1,295,655.72 K. NORTE 385,974.83 280,636.00 0.00 83,570.00 256,740.00 1,006,920.83 MALANGE 1,905,833.29 281,170.67 20,450.92 169,857.90 276,426.96 2,653,739.74 UIGE 260,050.50 149,692.60 0.00 0.00 5,336.00 415,079.10 LUNDA SUL 612,393.60 222,343.96 0.00 0.00 91,426.40 926,163.96 LUNDA NORTE 493,215.10 99,040.00 0.00 81,143.97 12,000.00 685,399.07 K.KUBANGO 320,421.94 171,832.36 100,654.00 0.00 113,552.55 706,460.85 MOXICO 36,100.00 16,200.00 0.00 0.00 28,400.00 80,700.00 7RWDO� ��

The breakdown of the disbursements of EC TF proceeds by disbursement category is as follows:

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Table 9 – Disbursements of EC Trust Fund proceeds by disbursement category

Disbursement category/purpose Total disbursed (US$)

(1) Subprojects

Education 14.811.305,95

Health 4.291.607,81

Water & Sanitation 1.742.187,96

Productive/Economic 2.254.552,53

Other 9.697.134,62

Subtotal 32.796.788,87

(2) Other disbursement categories

Works 0,00

Goods, Services, Equipment 788.623,88

Training/Consultancies 3.018.828,94

Operational Cost 1.116.402,00

Subtotal (2) 4.923.854,82

Total ( 1) + (2) 37.720.643,69 Source: SIFAS.

In terms of the EC TF contribution to the Municipal Development Component, the expenditures cannot be broken down by province, given that they entailed overarching expenditures, such as capacity development for strategic municipal development planning. Examples of expenditures include vehicles and IT equipment (goods, services, and equipment), consultancies (development of training materials, training of trainers, consultancy services for the implementation of Municipal Forums and study visits).

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Annex 3: Economic and Financial Analysis A. Financial Analysis of Community Development Investments

The financial analysis of the Project was carried out at the appraisal, following the standard procedures applicable to investments made in public goods and services. However, an economic analysis for the Project as whole was not carried out. As in the case of most demand-driven programs, there are constraints to determining an economic rate of return (ERR) because the portfolio mix and allocation outcomes are not known ex-ante. Moreover, calculating ERR for social funds tends to pose problems given the diversity with which communities tend to choose Projects. Although a minimum social rate of return could in principle be established, a cost-benefit analysis at the subproject level is generally not calculated for social fund and other similar CDD programs since these benefits are difficult to qualify or estimate at the micro-level. Thus, as with the cases for subprojects in FAS I and II, due to difficulties in obtaining meaningful data especially for estimating accrued benefits ERRs. At the program level, this annex describes the experience with FAS III as a delivery mechanism, which is based on information retrieved from SIFAS. At the investment level, the annex describes the economic and technical analysis of investments carried out by FAS III. The annex also discusses the economic and financial rationale associated with planned pilot activities in improving basic services through strengthened accountability and promoting local economic development.

B. Economic Analysis of Infrastructure Investments

In accordance with its Operational Manual, and subject to minimum requirements agreed with relevant sector agencies, FAS experts applied technical criteria, standard designs, and simple economic criteria to determine subproject economic viability. This included application of a comprehensive list of unit costs by type of investment. Ex-ante economic analysis also takes into consideration recurrent costs and the financial sustainability of investments. For schools and health posts, attention is paid to facilities having the appropriate staffing and materials prior to FAS approval; provincial and municipal authorities are required to assume staffing and recurrent cost commitments in writing. For water and sanitation and roads Projects, operations and maintenance costs are estimated and willingness by communities to contribute through user fees or direct participation is assessed. These sustainability measures were checked by desk and field appraisals carried out by FAS technical staff as part of analyzing proposed investments.

FAS’ design also fostered greater allocation efficiency in public expenditure compared to the sector constrained and hierarchically organized public investment planning processes otherwise employed in the Angolan and budgeting process. Through the promotion of participatory decision making at the local level, FAS has empowered communities to allocate scarce resources across sectors, thereby contributing to ensure that such resources are applied in response to articulated local priorities. As such, FAS financed investments tend to fill gaps in service coverage which would otherwise be difficult for the Public Investment Plans (PIP) to address due to information asymmetries between communities and officials and provincial and central-level planners.

Based on ex-post evaluations, 70.85 percent of the social and economic infrastructure investment built from the beginning of FAS I in 1994 was found to be functioning well. During the FAS III Project, according to the FAS III Baseline Survey (2008) results, over 98 percent of the beneficiaries perceive that FAS built infrastructure to be good or very good. Over 93 percent believe the infrastructure is well managed meaning that there is almost no perception of lack of

42

transparency in management. 45.2 percent of beneficiaries have at least one family member who participated in FAS meetings and 41.8 percent had at least one family member who participated in some form or another in the construction of a FAS-financed infrastructure.

With the introduction of multi-year and multi-sectoral spatial development plans at the municipal level, which begun during FAS III, further improvements were made in allocative efficiency and the marginal return on local investments. This was attained by linking individual investment decisions to a comprehensive territorial assessment of service access gaps and differentials among community-clusters within municipal boundaries. Experience indicates that broad-based participation foster local ownership, which, combined with other complementary activities that FAS provided (such as institutional strengthening), enhanced sustainability of investments and extended the life of the investment’s benefits.

C. Economic Analysis of FAS as a Service Delivery Mechanism

Basic Infrastructure Provision

SIFAS indicated that by taking into account all construction and administrative costs and the quality of the end-products, FAS executed infrastructures are in average lower than similar ones provided by other government agencies and other organizations. Unit cost for school construction is as low as 46 percent compared to Ministry of Public Works similar construction. Unit costs for providing potable water vary significantly given the different technologies and types of water points. FAS unit costs for health facilities are in average 20 percent lower than those by the Ministry of Public Works. The following table provides a comparison of average cost of infrastructure subprojects by sector implemented under FAS III with similar works commissioned by the GoA/sector ministries. The average cost of similar facilities built with donor funding in Angola was not available at the time of this assessment.

Table 1 – Comparative average cost of subproject investments

Subproject sector Average cost of FAS III investments (in $US)

Average cost of similar facilities built by GoA/sector ministries (in US$)

Education 114,109.12 328,430.00 Water & Sanitation 16,475.82 28,375.00 Economic and Productive

44,187.50 N/A

Health 97,955.88 238,350.00 Other 60,308.15 135,428.00 TOTAL overall average

66,607.29 Overall average

182,645.75

In addition, SIFAS review of FAS investment programs indicated that:

• FAS generally makes use of higher quality building materials and better construction methods, covers a range of geographic areas, and contracts out all of its construction work.

• In all sectors, community contributions to FAS III investments are lower than the counterpart funding for infrastructures carried out by other agencies.

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• In comparison to other agencies, FAS has a more positive impact on the private and public sector, by setting point of reference, such as prices and transparency in the adopted procedures.

The data indicate that FAS has led the least cost approach for delivering basic infrastructure and social equipment in Angola during period where conflict, poor logistics and high input costs have been formidable hurdle to an efficient delivery in most of the countryside localities. Average construction unit costs of FAS financed infrastructures are significantly lower compared to similar programs executed by the Ministry of Public Works. For instance, school construction unit cost is 46 percent lower than similar constructions by the Ministry. Unit costs for providing potable water vary significantly given the different technologies and types of water sources at the sites. On average, however, FAS provision falls within the cost range of non-governmental organizations. Health facilities are also in a similar situation where FAS unit costs tends to be about 20 percent lower compared to similar facilities executed by the Ministry of Public Works.

As to operating costs, during the course of FAS I, II, and III implementation, administrative, and overhead costs have substantially decreased as a result of economies of scale and improved management and planning. In 1998, operating costs were 25.7 percent of the overall budget, and reduced to 8.3 percent in December 2008.

Table 2 – FAS III Operating Costs as Percentage of Total Project Costs

Category IDA financing (US$) Operational cost (%) Public works 277,596.58 0.48

Goods, vehicles, equipment 210,970.50 0.44

Subprojects (infrastructures) 51,610,898.55 86.00

Consultants, auditors, training 691,822.42 1.05

Operational Costs 7,198,430.01 11.00

Bank transactions/expenses 10,993.73 0.03

Total 60,000,711.79 100 Source: SIFAS, December 2008.

The analysis indicate that the Project has made a significant contribution in improving Angola’s poor households access to basic public goods and services, generated significant employment opportunities—both permanent and temporary jobs—and assisted the GoA in collaborating with civil society, NGOs, and the private sector in the delivery of a range of public infrastructures and services. Given a favorable period of growth of the national economy, GoA was able to increase its counterpart contribution to Project and, thus, overcome significant funding difficulties arising from the suspension of the EC TF. The methodology and models of community participation developed under the Project provide significant tools for the future expansion of basic service provision to poor households in Angola. Management of FAS III has also adopted a set of measures to ensure that public goods and services, including the new infrastructures, are sustainable over time. This was attained by empowering local administrations working closely with provincial authorities and the selected Project communities.

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Annex 4: Bank Lending and Implementation Support Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members at Lending and Supervision Names Title Unit Responsibility

TTL Wim H. Alberts Sr. Social Protection Specialist AFTH1 TTL at Appraisal and MTR Inguna Dobraja Sr. Social Protection Specialist AFTHE TTL in 2008 Laura Rose Sr. Health Specialist TTL at closing Appraisal and Supervision Mirey Ovadiya Sr. Operations Officer AFTSP Operational Stefania Abakerli Local Development Specialist LCSSO Municipal Development /

Capacity Development Framework

Daniel P. Owen Sr. Social Development Specialist

SDV CDD

Jonathan Nyamukapa Sr. Financial Management Specialist

AFTFM Financial Management

Soukeyna Kane Sr. Financial Management Specialist

AFTFM Financial Management

Jose Janeiro Senior Finance Officer LOAG2 Financial Management Slaheddine Ben-Halima Consultant AFTED Procurement Francesco Sarno Consultant AFTQK Procurement Teresa McCue Finance Analyst LOADM Disbursement Isabella Micali Drossos Senior Counsel LEGLA Legal (Appraisal) Eduardo Brito Senior Counsel LEGAF Legal (Supervision) Clara Brillembourg JPA AFTHD Cary Anne Cadman Forestry Specialist AFTEN Safeguards (at Closing) Arvil Van Adams Lead Social Protection Specialist AFTHD Advisor Mei Wang Senior Economist OPCPD Advisor Domingas Pegado Team Assistant AFMAO Team Assistant Geraldine Geraldo Team Assistant AFMAO Team Assistant ICR Elisabeth Maier Consultant AFTSP Ana Maria Carvalho Communications Associate AFMAO Communications Associate Adriana Cunha Costa Language Program Assistant AFTED Program Assistant Consolacao Claudia Dias

Team Assistant AFMAO Team Assistant

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(b) Staff Time and Cost

Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle

No. of staff weeks US$ Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Lending FY03 47 296.04 FY04 1 14.93 FY05 0.00 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00 FY08 0.00

Total: 48 310.97 Supervision/ICR FY03 0.00 FY04 23 102.87 FY05 37 160.26 FY06 43 189.03 FY07 28 149.53 FY08 25 106.65 FY09 21 0.00

Total: 177 708.34

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Annex 5: Quality Enhancement Review Angola Third Social Action Fund

Quality Enhancement Review Panel Report

Introduction

At the request of the Angola Third Social Action Fund (FASIII) project team, the Social Funds/Quality group at the anchor organized a Quality Enhancement Review (QER) on January 24, 2006 to facilitate collegial brainstorming on strategic and technical elements of design and implementation aimed at strengthening the quality of supervision. In particular this review will feed into the forthcoming Mid-Term Review.

The QER panel consisted of Maryam Salim (Chair, Sr. Human Development Specialist, EASHD); Sandor Sipos, (Sector Manager, HDNSP), Jacomina De Regt (Lead Specialist, AFTSD); Yasser El-Gammel (Sr. Operations Officer, MNSHD); Julie Van Domelen (SF consultant, via audio connection in Colorado) and Andre Herzog (consultant, SDV). Non-panel members included Samantha De Silva (Sr. Social Protection Specialist, HDNSP); Rodrigo Serrano (Local Development Specialist, HDNSP); and Randa El-Rashidi (Operations Officer, HDNSP).

The Panel met with Wim Alberts (Task Team Leader/Sr. Social Protection Specialist, AFTH1); Mirey Ovadiya (Sr. Operations Officer, AFC03); Stefania Abakerli (Social Development Specialist, LCSEO); Daniel Owen (Coordinator, CDD Development, SDV) from the task team, as well as Victor Hugo (Executive Director); Henda Ducados (Deputy Director); Manuel Esteves (Provincial Director) and Augosto Neto Sakongo (Provincial Director) from the FASIII government team.

The issue paper prepared by the task team requested the QER Panel address the following issues:

Design Aspects

• Appropriateness of design with respect to: (i) Program management; (ii) Implementation arrangements; (iii) Linkages and coordination with sector ministries and donors; (iv) Community mobilization/sensitization; (v) IEC; (vi) O&M mechanisms and sustainability; (vi) M&E; (vii) interface/division of labor between the social fund and the local administrations; and (viii) Knowledge Management in order to achieve the stated development objectives.

Community Development

• Given the poverty/vulnerability profile of Angola and low administrative capacity in both public sector and civil society, should FAS expand its menu, which is now primarily oriented toward building social and economic infrastructure, and include other targeted interventions? If yes, what kind of programs and institutional arrangements would be relevant and suitable?

• What can be learned from other social funds in terms of poverty targeting and inclusion of the vulnerable groups? What types of examples are available on supports for OVCs, youth at risk and female headed households?

• Should the project move toward community direct financing? If yes, what should be the institutional arrangement? Should the institutional arrangements involve local government

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and use the institutional arrangements established by the Community Development Component (CDC)?

• What are the elements of success for doing direct financing? Given the specific circumstances of Angola, should there be certain criteria applied in the selection of communities eligible for direct financing?

Municipal Development

• What should be the FAS strategy to address MAT (Ministry of Territorial Administration) willingness to expand the FAS local development planning model to other municipalities? How can FAS learn from experiences of other SFs in scaling up their pilot municipal development activities?

• How can FAS learn from successful experiences of SFs which have facilitated grant transfers to local administrations in an incipient decentralization process?

• How can FAS learn from SF experiences that have proven to catalyze and improve social accountability in a highly centralized political environment?

• What are some good practices/suggested mechanisms to improve participation/civic engagement in an incipient decentralization process? How can a SF better engage civil society to advocate for their preferences and hold the government accountable?

During the meeting, the task team and government team asked the Panel to focus on the following in particular: (i) CDD vs. municipal planning – how to balance between the two; (ii) geographical expansion – how to move forward given existing constraints; (iii) expansion of menu; and (iv) addressing implementation constraints.

General Program Implementation

The FAS staff and Bank team should be congratulated on the high quality of documentation, clear and focused nature of the operation, and the technical depth of the QER discussion (a member of the Panel would have appreciated receiving some of the Portuguese documents as well, but understand that they could not count on panel members speaking Portuguese). Clearly the FAS has seized opportunities in Angola to deepen and expand its impact, not only in terms of direct benefits to poor communities, but also to the institutional fabric of the country. Many of the areas they are entering into, bringing local governments closer to the people and strengthening communities’ abilities to engage in improving governance, no doubt will have an institutional effect beyond the immediate subproject cycle activities. FAS should declare victory and seek to document as much as possible this best practice experience.

Decentralization and Municipal Development Component

The panel discussed with the FAS team the challenge of municipal strengthening given the timid decentralization progress in Angola, as well as the need to make coherent CDD planning versus municipal planning. The panel acknowledged that the constraints that FAS faced in getting the pilot municipalities to the final stage really represent not an inability to meet project goals but perhaps overly ambitious goals. Furthermore the Panel noted that municipal development is a longer term process that involves building institutions, systems and getting local players (including government, civil society organizations, and communities) to fully understand these

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systems. Planning and expectations of this component need to be consistent with the nature of this process.

The international experience with similar processes in social funds is that municipal performance is uneven and progress depends greatly on the level of initial understanding of participatory processes and the pace of the decentralization processes (political, fiscal and technical). As we have learned, social funds are not well placed to ’drive’ decentralization in a country. At best, they can be a complimentary instrument once a sound decentralization framework has been put in place and where there is strong government ownership of reforms.

The panel warned FAS that they would have to negotiate between trying to push decentralization beyond where the national framework is, or get sidelined as decentralization takes hold and be seen as in competition with municipal governments.

The panel congratulates FAS on successfully managing this process thus far. It is important for the FAS to document the process as the implementation progresses since a methodology is being developed during this process. The establishments of the forums, the way different players are reacting and forming their expectation are all lessons that need to be documented. If some standardization can be introduced to some stages/parts of the municipal strengthening process, this should be focused on to facilitate replication in the future. The FAS also needs to develop assessment tools to be able to realize the level of achievement of goals of this component. There are other experiences in this area in the World Bank that the FAS can learn from.

FAS has become a key stakeholder in designing the decentralization process in Angola and needs to retain this engagement. Specifically, the municipal planning process being piloted in 41 municipalities should be made compatible with the FAS experience and procedures. In looking ten years down the road, if the experience in Angola is similar to other countries, pressure will come from municipalities. This does not mean that FAS will phase out, however. Even in the most highly decentralized and high income countries, like the US, there are a plethora of national programs that transfer funds through local governments or directly to community groups/NGOs for a host of social and economic objectives.

Community Direct Financing

The FAS should consider deepening the responsibility of communities within the subproject cycle. Lessons of experience from around the world show that there could be significant benefits to this, including (a) a savings of 25-40 percent on average subproject costs; (b) a stronger impact on local social capital formation, which is all the more important in a post-conflict setting like Angola; (c) creation of local economic multipliers in poor communities, including a greater propensity to use local contractors and hire local labor; (d) better chance of meeting FAS’s objective of strengthening communities from the bottom up and enabling citizens to better interface with local government and to hold public officials accountable; and (e) increases technical and administrative skills in poor communities, including the confidence to approach banks, bureaucrats, elected officials, etc.

The FAS team expressed some questions on what conditions or settings work better for putting in place direct community financing for instance. Experience shows it has worked well in every setting where it has been tried, from middle income countries (like Argentina and Brazil) to the poorest countries (like Lao PDR, Malawi), including post-conflict settings (e.g., Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, East Timor). The most difficult obstacles are the administrative and organizational

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challenges to a social fund to change the way it operates. FAS may want to experiment on a pilot basis, for example in certain rural areas.

Some key elements for successful implementation of direct financing:

1. Extensive training of communities;

2. Putting social accountability mechanisms, such as community score cards, into the normal subproject cycle;

3. Working closely with procurement advisors to ensure they do not hinder the community procurement process (for example, if they insist on three quotes for every purchase, in every instance, you will face major difficulties in moving forward in the more remote areas. Insist on direct purchase possibility below a certain amount to get around this obstacle and make sure that the communities have access to reasonable unit costs so they can control/bargain greed/corruption by monopoly suppliers);

4. Be sure to check what is needed for communities to open up a bank account. In Mozambique they needed three signatures and a deposit but at same time were told they needed a bank account to make the first disbursement for the subproject (chicken and egg problem). By contrast, in the DRC where there are no local banks for bank accounts they were able to get agreement in the CDD project (MAP) to use the coffres of the local diocese and the money was transported to the diocese (check with John Elder to see how this is operating). There are precedents to get around the bank account problem; examples exist in other regions as well.

5. You may want to gradually move to community direct management as bank account problems are solved and training has been completed. You could also tell the community they are invited to submit one proposal which FAS would manage and a much smaller one which they would manage. If they did well, their next project they would be allowed to manage, so you have incentives to do well and to learn by doing.

Poverty Targeting

Time did not permit a detailed discussion about poverty targeting, but since the FAS team had flagged that as an issues in the MTR issues paper, the panel wanted to provide a few suggestions. The overall targeting strategy of FAS is not clear. On the one hand, the evolving post-conflict means that there will be more and more opportunities for FAS to reach national coverage as areas become more accessible. These areas are also the poorest and most remote, so expanding geographically will likely improve FAS’s ability to reach poor communities. On the other hand, the municipal development component appears to focus on developing some best practice examples of municipalities that are able to take on more and more of the project cycle responsibilities. This puts the emphasis on the better off municipalities. These conflicting geographical targeting goals will need to be reconciled. This depends on the importance FAS puts on orienting resources to poor communities. The PAD for FAS III does not make much reference to targeting, though it does mention an objective of reaching poor communities. The aide memoires state that FAS is in the process of developing a map of social service coverage of social services (IASS) as well as a map of vulnerability. It is not clear to what extent these maps will be used to orient resources.

A reasonable targeting strategy for the FAS team to consider might include:

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a) Setting a clear objective of developing operations in all of the poorest provinces, as a priority for future expansion. Since it is in the poorest provinces and municipalities where FAS will remain most relevant in the longer term, this would help solidify FAS’s niche in terms of helping reach national objectives to increase access to services and meet MDGs (and not just strengthen municipalities to transfer responsibilities to them).

b) To provide predicable resource flows, FAS should, if it does not do this already, set a notional annual target for financing per province that participates in its program. This should be progressively tilted on a per capita basis toward the poorest provinces so that FAS can stake a claim to being a pro-poor program.

c) In terms of making sure that FAS investments tend to benefit poor households within communities, the menu of eligible investments should be reviewed. International evidence strongly suggests that some types of investments, like sewerage, tend to be enjoyed primarily by better-off households, and some, like latrines, tend to be used mainly by the poor.

d) Build a focus on participation of the poor into the subproject cycle. The CIVA points out that the poorest and most vulnerable households tend to participate less in community development activities. Moreover, some recent research based on data in Ecuador show that in settings of higher income inequality (relevant to the Angola context), subprojects that overwhelmingly benefit the poor tend not to be chosen in the identification of community priorities. There are many ways that social funds have attempted to create more inclusive processes. In the community needs assessment/participatory planning process, issues of vulnerability and needs of vulnerable groups can be made specific topics of community discussions. Several social funds require a minimum percentage of the community be present when subproject ideas are generated and discussed. Many social funds require that a certain number or percentage of women. In Senegal, the planning process identifies vulnerable groups (elderly, female-headed households etc.) in the village are requires that there be representation of these groups in the community committees. Other social funds provide bonuses to communities that present projects benefiting vulnerable or poorest groups. The beneficiary assessments are an excellent tool to get feedback on the extent to which the poorest households participate in the processes and enjoy the benefits of social fund investments.

Vulnerability and Vulnerable Groups

On related topic, the team asked the panel if FAS should expand its menu to better include vulnerable groups. Per the CIVA, one the biggest vulnerable groups in Angola are internally displaced persons and the unemployed ex-combatants, not only because of the potential to spark future conflicts, but also – per the CIVA – due to the social isolation of internally displaced who have often lost their links to family and social networks to help with their survival.

In terms of addressing vulnerable groups there are several options:

a) The FAS could open a separate vulnerability window. Social funds like the Honduras FHIS have set up such special programs to help fund efforts mainly of established NGOs and that assist youth, street children etc. The Thailand Social Investment Fund supported CBOs in providing grants to the elderly, AIDS orphans, etc. Given the current mission of FAS, this may overcomplicate the project design. In terms of social services – like

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addressing street children or orphans, needs of these groups rarely come up in community needs discussions; and, they often require the intervention of skilled intermediary organizations, most often NGOs.

b) The FAS could open up the menu – basically operating with just a negative list – and see what happens. This will require expanding FAS technical capacity to appraise a more diverse set of subproject proposals. Experience from other countries suggests that there will be some diversification, with certain communities identifying interesting interventions (community radio in rural areas, training of community health workers to improve services, etc.) that extend beyond the typical infrastructure. But in all cases, basic infrastructure continues to be the core demand from communities.

c) FAS could establish an incentive framework to encourage communities to include vulnerable groups in their investment priorities (Samantha’s examples from Afghanistan and Sri Lanka).

d) or build it as an issue in community planning and project cycles (see discussion under poverty targeting section).

e) partner with organizations such as the Ministry of Social Affairs or the demobilization and reintegration project to identify joint-ventures like FAS building infrastructure (shelters for instance) administered by Social Affairs or identifying unemployed ex-combatants as workers for FAS infrastructure projects.

In any case, given Angola’s need for basic infrastructure (i.e., safe water access to only 38 percent of the population, degraded urban infrastructure, post-conflict zones that require massive reconstruction efforts), the FAS should anticipate that basic infrastructure (education, water health etc.) will continue to represent community priorities for the foreseeable future. In this situation, the best path may be to open up to a negative menu (i.e., do not exclude non-infrastructure investments), mainstream the issue into the community planning process and look for some strategic partnerships with the Ministry of Social Affairs or key NGOs, rather than creating a separate window at this stage.

Issue of FAS expansion – go deep or wide?

The FAS needs to move as quickly as possible to full national coverage. The FAS team explained the current uneven coverage where some communities/provinces have not had any experience in CDD-type approaches. In terms of expanding to new provinces, even if for remoteness or other factors certain regions are only accessible six months a year, those regions are going to be the poorer areas and so should have FAS priority. FAS may need to look at varying the institutional model for expansion, since it may be that not all provinces can have a separate office.

At the same time FAS III pilots municipal planning experience where municipalities are more capable, cohesive and more receptive. In deciding on expansion paths (deep versus wide), in fact FAS will be obliged to progress in both directions. FAS will need to use the next two to three years (to project closing) to do two things (a) consolidate issues of municipal capacity building and be present in evolving national discussion and mechanisms, and (b) set the intention to have national scope in FAS IV, first at community level. On the municipal front, FAS should be less concerned with the number of municipalities that get to the final stage given timid and evolving decentralization process. It is more important that FAS engage in the design of the

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decentralization process in order (a) to bringing the lessons of experience so that it is not just a theoretical discussion, (b) to ensure participatory mechanisms are mainstreamed – so that there is not a FAS planning process that is different from a national planning process, and (c) to avoid being ‘sidelined’ and thus viewed as irrelevant to the decentralization process or antithetical to it. That being said, the panel was of the opinion that the FAS should not add new municipalities to its MD component but rather focus on building on the nine provinces experience and documenting the process and outcomes.

On the expansion of the current "menu options" the panel had the following comments:

• As already noted above, the current portfolio is consistent with the situation in Angola and is similar to other Social Funds operating in similar environments.

• The portfolio also reflects the demand coming from the field which is an important feature of SFs operations.

• It is important that the FAS standardize its process as much as possible in sectors which receive a large percentage of the funding (i.e., education and water).

• Given the experience so far, the development stage in which Angola is in, and the competing demands on the FAS capacity the panel is of the opinion that a large increase in the "menu options" is not advisable. The FAS should continue to focus on its core areas and the basic needs of the poor population.

• That does not, however, prevent the FAS from piloting activities in new sectors. These pilots however need to be on a limited scale, in a relatively favorable environment, and most importantly, need to have a clear objective.

Monitoring and Evaluation

At the MTR, it will be important to confirm that all monitoring and evaluation of FAS is functioning and able to provide adequate project reporting, furnish required indicators of project output and outcome and develop insights into the design of a FAS IV. From the team, it appears that monitoring is on track and that FAS has a best practice MIS system. Specific evaluations are carried out periodically – Beneficiary assessments, review of the municipal program, etc. FAS appears to have done well in integrating GIS information as well. One panel member suggested that GIS has the potential to really assist all of us working in Social Fund/CDD type operations to move decentralized decision making forward and that we have not yet realized the full potential of this tool. FAS has all its project data geo-referenced, and hopefully there are geo-reference data on the stock-taking of service availability, the mines and de-mining, the poverty data. FAS seems to have geo-referenced all information in the nine pilot municipalities. This is the opportunity to build a full pilot to showcase the power of this technical tool. In Mozambique for example, all the staff in the secretariat of the National AIDS Council have GIS software on their desktops; the information of the next census will also be geo-referenced in down-loadable form, and they already have the capacity to do quite a bit of analysis on the epidemic and their local response mechanisms with the information they have. Building a platform inside the country for coordination of geo-referencing all data is something FAS should not have to champion alone. Colleagues from PREM as well as sectoral colleagues should all be interested in this. It could potentially be built into the next emergency credit phase.

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While the monitoring system may be best practice, it was less clear what the analytical basis for impact evaluation and the measurement of key project outcomes, particularly in the area of expanded access to and utilization of services and changes in household welfare (health and education status, income etc.) and to measure the relative poverty level of beneficiary households. From other documents (e.g., TSS) it appears that there is limited national statistics/surveys, for example the TSS states that the latest household survey was published in 2001. If this is still the case, it will limit the ability to do a full impact evaluation since you will not have the national dataset to create counterfactuals. To do a proper impact evaluation, you need a with and without, and a before and after. It is not necessary to do the full ‘Cadillac’ of impact evaluations – a randomized experimental design. Sufficient rigor can be introduced using quasi-experimental designs. However, the experience is that this takes a great deal of time and technical expertise to set up. If FAS wants to have data that can feed into the preparation of the next operation, they need to start already in defining terms of reference, identifying survey possibilities and consultants with the technical capacity to carry out the econometric analysis.

Since it is not clear where the FAS stands in terms of putting in place the means to measure impacts, the Panel recommends that:

a) FAS should consult HDNSP’s Impact Evaluation Toolkit for Social Funds and set up a video conference with the impact evaluation specialists within the Bank to discuss options and approaches;

b) Per the last aide memoire, the existence of baseline indicators of the communities in which FAS operates should be confirmed in terms of the robustness in how they are calculated;

c) Ideally, the community and household surveys are integrated both into a national household survey (hence critical to identify when and if a national survey is planned) and to any qualitative Beneficiary Assessments planned;

d) Before project end, another sustainability survey (2002 is too old) should be carried out, which could be done as part of the impact evaluation;

e) Given the importance of social capital in a post-conflict setting, this should be a separate theme of the impact evaluation; and

f) The Bank team should staff next mission with impact evaluation specialist.

Some General Comments

Mid-Term Review. The focus of the MTR is not so much reviewing progress and adjusting the objectives and outcomes and modalities to ensure a better implementation for the rest of the project implementation period, but more an opportunity for thinking about the future of FAS – specifically FASIV. This MTR is about political positioning, as much within the country program inside the World Bank, as within the government for the future of the CDD approach in decentralization and future of FAS as an agency within such a devolving and evolving scene (see developments of the Senegal and Madagascar Social Funds; both countries are moving toward having a Local Development fund in their normal budget make-up kind of integration of community plans into a local development plan at the LG level). FAS is uniquely placed to influence whether or not this integration of the CDD approach into the normal business of government will take place.

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So, this MTR should be planned with two stages: first, with the appropriate technical people, where all the technical implementation issues are discussed (e.g., menu expansion; geographical expansion; role of facilitators in subproject choice, etc.) but above all a second stage should be planned as a political/policy influencing event, where you declare huge victory (loads of positive achievements) and project the future.

Name change. FAS is a brand name known throughout most parts of Angola and identified with excellence. It would be a shame to change the name to anything else and lose name recognition!

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Annex 6. Beneficiary Survey Results Abstract from:

The FAS III Baseline Survey by Jean-Louis Arcand, Eric Dkimeu, Marie-Charlotte Buisson, Aude-Sophie Rodella

February 14, 2008

“This report, based on the 2007 FAS III baseline surveys, highlights a number of findings concerning: (i) beneficiary assessment of and participation in FAS activities and infrastructure and (ii) the impact on child anthropometrics, health and education associated with treatment by the FAS. The following results stand out: first, knowledge concerning the FAS is widespread among respondents in areas in which the program intervenes, and poor in areas in which it does not; in the latter areas, households that can be characterized as being poor appear to be those most aware of the program’s existence.

Second, the assessment by beneficiaries of the quality of FAS funded infrastructure per se, and its management, displays great heterogeneity among different classes of households, as well as between communities with different characteristics. In general, households that are poor in monetary terms appear to be very satisfied with FAS infrastructure, larger households less so, while educational attainment appears to have almost no incidence on perceptions. One’s area of economic activity is a key factor, with households benefitting directly from FAS projects, such as those operating in the health sector being relatively favorable, whereas those perhaps perceiving a crowding out effect (such as those in the NGO sector) being relatively more critical. Peer effects, in terms of the impact of membership in various groups and associations, appear to be an important determinant of perceptions, while households that include a soba are overwhelmingly negative in their assessment.

Third, participation in FAS meetings is strongly associated with households that are used to engaging in community activities, as shown by their participation in groups that display these qualities. Moreover, as with participation in FAS meetings, being part of the núcleo comunitário is associated with membership in groups that are engaged in social (as opposed to purely economic or rent-seeking) activities, with elite capture concerns appearing not to be an issue. Participation in the construction of FAS projects is the purview of relatively younger households, with little education and who are relatively poor in monetary terms. Social exclusion, meaning here not being solicited by one’s own community to participate in the construction of FAS infrastructure projects, is the lot of households that are relatively large, that are headed by a widow or a widower, that are in the lower monetary income bracket, that are involved in petty commerce, that have a member who belongs to a funeral insurance or religious group and not to a political group, and who do not count a soba among their members.1

Fourth, treatment by the FAS appears to be associated with a strong positive effect on MUAC height z�scores, effectively compensating for almost all of the shortfall in nutritional status encountered in the sample.

Fifth, treatment by the FAS appears to be associated with a reduction in malaria prevalence of 16.3 percent, and with an increase of 13.8 percent in the likelihood of a respondent encountering no health problems.

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Sixth, treatment by the FAS appears to be associated with an extremely large 40.9 reduction in the number of days lost to illness.

Seventh, while treatment by the FAS is not associated with any statistically significant impact on the ability to keep schoolchildren in school, on literacy rates, or on educational attainment, it is associated with a small fall in the number of school days lost, and with a reduction of 18.2 percent in the likelihood of respondents identifying poor school buildings as constituting a problem.

Executive Summary of 2006 Participatory Beneficiary Assessment

(Excerpt from the 2006 Participatory Beneficiary Assessment – Translated from Portuguese)

The Social Action Fund (FAS) is a government agency established in October 1994, with legal personality and administrative and financial autonomy, aimed at combating poverty through financing basic social infrastructures.109 Since its inception, FAS has financed the construction and/or renovation of 2.300 social infrastructures in the fields of education, health, water and sanitation, economic and production support infrastructures. Currently, FAS is implementing its third phase, with the financial support of the Government of Angola, the World Bank (loan), besides grants from the EU, other bilateral agencies and the private sector. Thus, in order to guide its future community development line of action, it ordered a mid-term beneficiary participatory assessment of phase three, FAS III. The sample of this assessment was undertaken in Benguela and Cunene Provinces, covering a total of 38 Projects.

This report outlines the outcomes of the said assessment, the objectives of which were: i) collect perceptions and opinions on the outcomes of the third FAS loan, and ii) monitor information directly related to the new objectives and components of FAS III.

The perceptions and opinions of the Project beneficiaries were collected using a combination of quantitative (survey administration) and qualitative (focal group discussions and individual interviews of key interviewees) methods. A total of 1181 beneficiaries were interviewed of the 1251 planned; and 43 individual interviews and 19 group discussions were conducted.

An analysis of this data reveals that:

FAS is widely known and the perceptions of the beneficiaries on the agency converge in the recognition of its positive impact on the enhancement of the conditions of life through the improvement of access to education, health, water and sanitation services and improvement of economic conditions.

In spite of the widespread knowledge of FAS, few beneficiaries are aware of the procedures used to identify Projects, although they are considered as easy, accessible and transparent by beneficiaries that know them.

There is a lot of active participation in Projects financed by FAS, but community members generally feel less involved than members of the community nuclei, municipal fora and partners, who have low participation in decision-making processes in some municipalities.

109 Africa Legal clarified in their written comments of December 2, 2009 that: “The Social Action Fund (FAS) is a government agency that enjoys legal personality, and is under the control and jurisdiction of the Angolan Ministry of Planning. It was created through the approval of Angolan Decree Number 44/94, on October 28, 2004.”

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FAS totally or partially meets the expectations of the community, translating to a high level of satisfaction with the Projects financed. However, the beneficiaries are more satisfied with the quality and access to infrastructures than with management, maintenance and participation of the municipal administrations.

There is basic knowledge on decentralization, good governance, and strategic planning, but this knowledge is not yet widespread.

Members of municipal fora believe in the success of the Municipal Development Component, but do not yet understand their role in the forum.

Participation and acquaintanceship between the civil society and municipal administrations are good and have contributed to improving relations between them.

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Executive Summary of 2003 Participatory Beneficiary Assessment

(this survey was conducted during the preparation of FAS III)

This report outlines the outcomes of the Participatory Beneficiary Assessment (PBA) of 68 subprojects implemented during the second phase of the Social Action Fund (FAS), designated FAS II, undertaken by a team of ADRA consultants and FAS assistants, in August 2003. The subprojects assessed are located in different places in Benguela (22), Cabinda (24) and Huíla (22) Provinces, corresponding to 25.9 percent of projects considered as assessable, as their impact could be analyzed. During FAS Phase II 344 subprojects were assessed in the three provinces, of a total of 886 by mid-2003.

The assessment was undertaken in three different stages:

I. Consultation of documents and preparation of field work;

II. Training of the FAS team on Qualitative and Quantitative Research techniques;

III. Data collection; and

IV. Data processing and analysis and writing of final report.

The data collection was based on quantitative and qualitative research techniques used among the beneficiaries, Mainstreaming Agencies, Administrations, and line supervisory bodies. The quantitative data were processed using specific computer software, while the quantitative data were processed using speech analysis and information density techniques.

The perception of the communities, Mainstreaming Agencies, Administrations, and other stakeholders on FAS mechanisms and procedures was assessed. It was possible to perceive that FAS is an institution that is fundamentally known for the quality and usefulness of the infrastructures that it finances, and this understanding is greater and more expressive among men and the leadership in general. FAS is assessed positively by the different stakeholders, with which it has good levels of relations and an image of reference, opening for new prospects and citizenship, substantially different from that of other government institutions. The FAS procedures are accepted by partners, though not necessarily understood; as a result, the Mainstreaming Agencies question the procedures, in part. This aspect raises the need to review the Operations Manual and other FAS normative documents in order to make them simpler and more understandable. The beneficiaries agree with the contributions required of them for the

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implementation of the subprojects, but the manner in which they are accounted for is not sufficiently clear. Men and leaders contribute more with organizational aspects, ideas and decisions, while the physical work is left for the women and the poor and the less powerful. Furthermore, the role of FAS after the “handover” of the subprojects is not well defined. There is need to ascertain whether it is truly possible to “handover” something that the communities already consider as their own, according to some, or something that does not belong to them, as others think. Although some decisions have already been made in this respect, it is suggested that infrastructure that are easier to manage, such as water and sanitation, should be effectively handed over to the communities, who should be made responsible for their management, as well as to the line supervisory bodies. Thus, during Phase III, FAS should assume a role of facilitating and promoting organizational strengthening actions targeted at Community Nuclei and Administrations, as well as evaluation and monitoring of the implemented subprojects.

Notwithstanding the shortfalls come across, FAS intervention led to the increase of the social capital in the communities understudied. Participation of beneficiaries in decision making is still limited to a small group of people in the communities, namely the leaders and members of Community Nuclei. To a certain extent, this explains why the FAS teams continue to be the major actors at all phases of intervention, from promotion of the subprojects up to the “hand over” of the infrastructure. However, this can also be explained by the weaknesses of the teams and references from the past, which made the communities not to be accountable and to resign to fatalism and to conform. The intensity and the level of participation of the communities and other stakeholders reduces at the “post-handover” stage, when the entities responsible, depending on the type of subproject, have difficulties to manage and maintain the infrastructure, due to their poor organizational capacity and lack of financial resources. The best managed subprojects are those that are taken on by the Mainstreaming Agencies linked to religious bodies. In other situations, the communities participate in the management in partnership with line supervisory bodies, but always in a subordinate position, save in one school or market or the other, which have attained near co-management. In the water subprojects there is self-management being undertaken by the communities, although rudimentary.

The current FAS monitoring and evaluation system neither allows for an effective follow up of the work done nor does it meet the concerns of FAS II, in spite of the capacity building effort undertaken. The non-existence of an organic relationship with provincial governments gives a certain level of autonomy to the FAS teams, but also creates some sort of lack of coordination in the implementation of actions and lack of harnessing of synergies that bring about more adequate local development strategies. Learning from other international experiences and periodic exchange visits with institutions that are carrying out the same type of work would help to create conditions for the appropriation of the Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach, as provided for in phase III.

Of the 1172 subprojects envisaged in FAS II, 886 (76 percent) were implemented, of which 86 percent were social infrastructure. The type of subproject depended on the established plan and continues, sometimes, to be subject to the interests of the line supervisory body. But this is understandable, given their need to be integrated into the network of services to the population. The level of satisfaction with the results is high, both of the beneficiaries and other partners. The projects bring relevant benefits to the population through the establishment of services in the communities – in spite of their poor quality – at short distances from the residences. The increased number of health posts has had the impact of a reduction in the occurrence of diseases;

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increased school levels contributes to the reduction of number of children outside the school system and to the enhancement of the quality of education; water and sanitation infrastructure have considerable impact on women and the enhancement of conditions of hygiene. However, the choice of technology used is questionable, as it is expensive and difficult to maintain and reproduce, and its appearance is a shocking contrast with the poor environment of the communities. FAS actions also have impact on the dynamics of the communities, especially due to the establishment of Community Nuclei, which represent the communities before FAS and the Administrations and serve as a communication channel. Some of them are able to manage some facilities, mainly where the line supervisory bodies do not take over, such as in the subprojects of water and sanitation and the economic and productive ones, and when they gain more experience with the implementation of new subprojects. However, their operations are poorly run, due to insufficient community involvement work, lack of systematic follow up by FAS after the “handover” and due to the short duration of the subprojects. Only 13 Mainstreaming Agencies related with thee subprojects during phase II in the provinces understudied. The greatest impact of FAS on them, as well as on the Administrations and supervisory bodies is the penchant for the adoption of participatory approaches and practices of dialogue and conciliation with the communities.

The impact of FAS on gender relations is not yet significant, although its concern is recognized with the selection of water and sanitation subprojects (45 percent) that have to do with the conditions of life of women. The environmental impact is non-existence, as there is no significant change to the natural state of the areas, either positively or negatively.

Of the 68 subprojects assessed, only seven were either not functional or functioning irregularly, usually due to lack of fulfillment of government institutions with the established agreements (lack of staff and medicines, problems with water supply). The state of most infrastructures ranges from “good” to “satisfactory”. When the communities take over ownership of the infrastructures, they accept their responsibility to maintain and manage them, although in practice this only happens with the water and sanitation and economic and productive ones. In the others, the supervisory bodies and Administrations have the responsibility, all with a lot of human and financial resources difficulties. Only the Mainstreaming Agencies affiliated to religious bodies are able to ensure an acceptable management level. The payment for services or voluntary contribution for the raising of funds could bring about some level of financial stability. However, it is questionable whether people that are so poor should pay, while others do not, given the interest of the State to facilitate access of the population to services.

Notwithstanding the above, FAS intervention should be governed by procedures, norms, and general rules. The work practices and characteristics of provincial teams have produced results according to the local specificities. Thus, the results achieved in each of the provinces assessed have specific characteristics and profiles that should be taken into account for redesigning the work, should the same probably occur in other provinces where FAS is operating. Thus, it is of prime importance to put in place measures and strategies that help to guide and resolve these types of shortcomings.

The main conclusion of this assessment, in general terms, is that from the point of view and opinion of the beneficiaries and other stakeholders, FAS is or continues to be a relevant and innovative Project under the current context of Angola and is contributing to the idea that it is possible for the government to combat poverty and help the population to resolve their problems. Despite the challenges, the impact on the life of the communities and institutions is notable.

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Furthermore, FAS gathered valuable experience from phase I, which should be considered as a process and which translates to the competence and dynamism of its teams. Apart from physical capital, FAS is gradually contributing to the consolidation of social capital, which could be important for collective action, taking into account the establishment of local authority in Angola and the process of citizenship building and autonomy at the levels of the communities. FAS has attached important relevance to the path of “modernization” (expressed by access to services) and participation (in spite of the shortcomings and difficulties). However, for a more balanced intervention, there is need to face other challenges such as that of identity (which leads to greater cultural entrenchment) and social change (stakeholders assuming new roles, especially women).

The BPA led to the learning of lessons and identification of weak points based on which the following summarized recommendations are made:

1. Improve the internal technical capacities of FAS to improve on its field work;

2. Implement actions aimed at strengthening the organizational and institutional capacities of partners;

3. Carry out actions that could contribute to the sustainability of the subprojects;

4. Change some FAS mechanisms and procedures.

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Annex 7: Social Vulnerability Guide Angola (Introduction) (Excerpt from the Social Vulnerability Guide Angola – Translated from Portuguese)

The Social Action Fund (FAS) is an autonomous institution, under the supervision of the Ministry of Planning, established by the Government of Angola in October 1994 through Council of Ministers decree 44/94110. Since then it has performed the role of acting as one of the major instruments in the fight against poverty and support to social inclusion.

The third phase of FAS commenced in March 2003 with operations cutting across most provinces of the Republic of Angola. The main objective of this phase is to contribute to the alleviation of poverty levels through the combination and promotion of two important development components:

• Community development as a tool for social emancipation and participation, including specific action targeted at the most vulnerable groups;

• Municipal development, a tool targeted at challenges involving the strengthening of a decentralized policy action.

The idea of combining these two components aims at benefiting and strengthening the communities, integrating them into administrative municipal nuclei; linking them with public institutions operating at different territorial levels. These links are of utmost importance, especially against the background of the end of the war phase in Angola, in 2002, not only because they strengthen the political and social structure of territorial micro-relations and their horizontal relations, but also because they have become important locus for the consolidation of actions taken at the national level. It is understood that these will be the challenges of this new phase of institutional relations strengthening that is being established in Angola.

During the preparation of FAS III, the subcomponent of “vulnerable social groups” was appropriately identified as an object of special interest. Understanding the aspects of social vulnerability of Angola became a priority for investigation at this stage, for the promotion of FAS actions in the present and in the future.

Initially, in March 2005, FAS, together with DfID (British Department for International Development) conducted an initial vulnerability assessment focused on the impact of war conflicts.

This effort produced, apart from a concise document (CIVA – Conflict Impact and Vulnerability Assessment), a final report with the methodology and outcomes of the sampling survey conducted and a document of recommendations to FAS. The main recommendations of this report pointed to the need to: i) engage vulnerable social groups in decision-making processes, aimed at facilitating access to the supply of services; ii) contextualize and define social vulnerability by poverty situations apart from the measurement adopted with the establishment of arbitrary poverty lines57; and iii) include aspects that capture the poor social cohesion with a focus on: a) inequalities; b) social exclusion; c) conflicts and violence – these latter were identified in the reintegration, rehabilitation and peace building programs.

110 Africa Legal clarified in their written comments of December 2, 2009 that: “The Social Action Fund (FAS) is a government agency that enjoys legal personality, and is under the control and jurisdiction of the Angolan Ministry of Planning. It was created through the approval of Angolan Decree Number 44/94, on October 28, 2004.”

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Thus, within the context of the challenge posed and presented in the Angola Social Vulnerability Guide – GVS, the issue is not only limited to capturing aspects on the vulnerability of social groups by factors related to political conflicts. It is also not the objective of this work to measure vulnerability through information capturing insufficient income, but rather to understand and map factors affecting and perpetuating the vulnerability of individuals and social groups, which condemn them to poverty and exclusion. The knowledge of these factors will provide a series of information that will lead to the establishment of the GVS as a tool for the identification and fight against social vulnerability in Angola.

It is noteworthy that the contextualization of the analysis and mapping of the causes of vulnerability in Angola raised in this document does not only take into account the previous recommendations, but also makes some others. Thus, it is able to expand, group and combine factors for mainstreaming in a series of situations of identified adversities.

This document is a conclusive object of a phase of works and was systematized as a result of the various stages: field research, empirical research, contextualization according to the most current trends of thought on the topic of vulnerability and methodologies that are proposed for the systematization of actions that combat vulnerability. It was thus drafted to cover the following stages:

• Understanding of a series of diverse qualitative and quantitative information produced on Angolan reality by the government and promotion agencies;

• Contact, in loco, with vulnerable population groups through interviews, workshops and guided tours;

• Mapping of interventions target at vulnerability through the observation of the action of different institutions working in Angola;

• Critical reading and methodological understanding of the different mainstreaming proposals.

This effort was guided by methodological rigor and sticking to the bases of available information during the entire period of 2006, aimed at delineating the social vulnerability matrix of Angola. The current idea, during the entire period of the works, was to research and collect the scare though valuable, existing information and produce a proposed work.

The profiles of the 18 provinces are presented in the first part of the work, reproducing movements and demographic portraits of life cycles, socio-economic differences and inequalities in institutional structure. Such information was extracted from the MICS II 2001 (UNICEF/INE) sample research of the National Institute of Statistics of Angola – INE/DPA, and from reports and consultation of MINFIN information databases, the latter of which are based on the series of questions contained in the Instrument I questionnaire, specifically drafted for this work. Also during the first stage, different documents were consulted, including: the report on the Program for the Improvement and Increase of Basic Social Services to the Population for the two-year period of 2005-2006 and the Poverty Strategy Paper of 2005, both of MINPLAN; as well as information databases of the Public Investment Program, of MINPLAN as well.

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In the second part of the GVS, the social vulnerability combat instrument is presented with special focus on the determining factors that make this process an action that requires partnership between sectors and programs, as already made evident by the multidimensional aspects of vulnerability presented in the previous chapters. It is noteworthy that this part of the GVS is reflected in the proposal adopted by FAS, when it made choices that strengthen and streamline the micro and macro territorial relations, without which mainstreaming actions in Angola cannot be planned. The role given to local institutions and social participation is highlighted through an action design process. This culminates in a methodological vulnerability combat proposal that results from the partnership between various institutions, but which should be especially understood and coordinated at the action level.

It would be a mistake not to note that this document should be taken as an initial effort, without forgetting that a social vulnerability matrix is subject to the temporal plasticity of the social and political dynamics of any country and requires constant observation of the reality. With great satisfaction and the certainty of constituting another step in the development process of Angola, this GVS is presented in the hope that this instrument will contribute to guiding, like a compass, the path of public policies and the challenges involved in the reduction of social risks.

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Annex 8: Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Stakeholders were interviewed as part of the February 2008 FAS III Baseline Survey (based on a survey conducted in 2007, which was essentially part one of the FAS III impact evaluation) and a 2006 beneficiary assessment (based on a survey conducted in 2005). No stakeholder workshop was conducted.

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Annex 9: Borrower’s Implementation Completion Report Implementation Memorandum Report Prepared by FAS III Project Team

1) Background

The Social Action Fund emerged within the framework of the Government of Angola Economic and Social Program 1994 (PES/94), under its chapter on “Other Global Policies” aimed at long term structural poverty eradication.

On 28 August 1994, under the Council of Ministers Decree 44/99, the Social Action Fund (FAS) was established as an autonomous government agency, a legal entity with financial and administrative autonomy, with its own assets and procedures, enabling it to act speedily, efficiently and effectively.

FAS is provided with the means for simple and transparent control for the utilization of resources placed under its management in order to promote social alleviation and fight against poverty, fostering the involvement of the population in the reconstruction and economic and social development process of the country, through the financing of small projects.

2) Objectives of FAS III

FAS executed the first two phases, from 1994 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2003, respectively. The third phase of the project entered into force in March 2004, aimed to achieve improved and expanded use of basic social and economic services as well as to support a system of governance where the local government and community are jointly accountable.

Specific Objectives

(i) Foster the utilization of basic social and economic services in a more sustainable, broader and enhanced manner;

(ii) Increase human and social capital at the community and municipal levels, developing the capacity of local agents to promote development; and

(iii) Support the establishment of a system of governance where municipal council authorities and communities gradually become mutually and reciprocally accountable.

The Impact Indicators include:

• Increased primary school enrollment, number of families with access to and utilizing health services, water points, and adequate sanitation systems;

• Increased number of vehicles plying repaired roads and reduction of travel time; amount of tax and fees collected from market traders;

• Number of municipal administrations and respective fora that reach the final graduation stage of Component 2;

• Number of communities that make recourse to the mechanisms instituted by FAS III to represent their interests before the municipal administrations and hold it accountable for its activities; and

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• Number of beneficiary communities that are satisfied with established services and infrastructure, the municipal management process and with their representativeness at the municipal forum.

The target of FAS III was composed of a collective group of beneficiaries, service providers, and partners, namely: communities and their organizations (community nucleus); municipal administrations; appointed officials and their teams; network of intermediary organizations: local NGOs, training institutes, private sector, churches, individual trainers and consultants, central and provincial governments, and the public sector in general.

3) FAS as an instrument for strengthening local governance

The government design framework for local development in Angola has improved in recent years, representing a change of context that is favorable to FAS in terms of support to the implementation of its agenda of strengthening local governance.

Specifically, the government, through the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MAT), identified the need to strengthen the capacities of municipal administrations, with special focus on administrative deconcentration and decentralization aimed at increasing levels of civil society and citizen participation in governance.

FAS III, in addition to service provision, organizational and participation issues, sought to develop strategies within the scope of strengthening local governance, thus making partnership with MAT a priority, supporting it in the provision of training on municipal management, through the Local Administration Training Institute (IFAL), based on its municipal development experience through its component.

Like other partners, FAS fostered the creation of local participation structures. The municipal fora, as microcosm of what the Municipal Auscultation and Conciliation Council, instituted by the government under Decree No. 02/07.

4) FAS Approach and Characteristics

FAS is responsible for managing the funds made available to it from World Bank loans, the National Budget, and various multilateral, bilateral, and private sector donors. Thirteen provincial offices111 are responsible for the contracting and implementation of subproject activities, while the FAS Coordination Unit in Luanda coordinates and supervises program liaising with international partners and donor agencies.

Through its Community-Driven Development Component, FAS focuses its action on community-driven demand, targeting its activities at social investment. Explicitly, FAS activities follow the stages spelt out in the project cycle, for which the major aim is to follow up with community members in the process of identifying, programming, executing and monitoring of the subprojects.

111 In Zaire, Cabinda, Bengo, Luanda, Kwanza Sul, Kwanza-Norte, Malange, Bié, Huambo, Benguela, Huíla,

Namibe, and Cunene Provinces.

The Forum is a non-formal organ that comprises public and private institutions, citizens individually or organized, who with their ideas seek for solutions with a view to improving the conditions of life of the municipality and to guaranteeing the well-being of its inhabitants.

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The Municipal Development Component emerged at the beginning of FAS III with the general objective of strengthening the capacity of municipal administrations selected using previously established criteria to improve performance of legally assigned duties related to the local development process.112

In order to achieve the stipulated provisions and acquire the necessary capacity to implement the activities of the Component, a Municipal Development Strategic Planning tool was used in five stages. This tool aims to promote collective and consensual decision making, prioritize initiatives, implement, monitor, and assess actions based on the analysis of internal and external factors capable of facilitating or hindering the development of an organization or territory.

5) Outcomes (projects and disbursements)

During its implementation period, the program financed 1,578 subprojects, of the 1,568 subprojects envisaged, 29.9 percent (445) in the educational sector, 12.6 percent (188) in health, 25.5 percent (380) in water and sanitation, and 13.5 percent (201) economic, productive, and environmental.

The financing of the subprojects led to the creation of 19,375 jobs, 57.8 percent (11,215) of which are permanent and 42.1 percent (8,160) temporary, attaining a total of 6.625.742 beneficiaries.

The capacity development strategy provided training to a total of 3,108 people, among which 26.8 percent (836) in the public sector, 27.8 percent (865) the civil society, 38.4 percent (1,196) community partners, 6.7 percent (211) from FAS teams, of which 10 percent were women.

The disbursement level attained the amount of USD122,996.55, of which USD60,141,419.62 from the IDA loan and USD33,648,512 from the EU grant. The contribution of the Government of Angola was USD26,297,882.37. Notable among the financial contribution of other donors is that of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) with USD566,094.91, UNICEF with USD81,364.24, and the oil company, Chevron, with USD261,464.00.

5.2 Coverage, target and equity

The Project expansion activity was done according to the availability of funds as stipulated in the Project Assessment Document (PAD) that spells out all the targets by available finance portfolio. It was possible to achieve the targets set in the PAD, as the benefit of a higher financial portfolio made it possible to work in seven provinces, namely Malange, Kwanza-Norte, Uíge, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Moxico, and Kwando Kubango. This is considered national coverage. The involvement of the provincial governments from the outset was an element of success for the quick integration of the Project as well as the proper implementation of the Project.

The lessons learned from FAS I and II led the Project management team to introduce a new methodological instrument, the Social Services Access Indicators (IASS), during the priority identification and definition phases. It aimed at improving equity in terms of the choice of area and the sector of intervention.

The introduction of the IASS enabled, on the one hand, support to the identification of critical areas and sectors in terms of access to basic social services and, on the other hand, qualitative improvement of the information needed for taking decisions on investments to be made. It is

112 Cacongo, Viana, Dande, Benguela, Porto-Amboim, Caála, Chibia, Bibala, and Ombadja.

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noteworthy that the use of the IASS, as a diagnostic tool, shed more light on the mapping of poverty among the communities.

5.3 Capacity Development

While FAS gained experience in the previous phases in capacity consolidation at the different phases of the project cycles and on the promotion of organization of community members through the establishment of accountability mechanisms and delivery structures for the poor, it was discovered that there was still room to fine-tune and implement a skills development and local development framework under FAS initiatives. The lessons showed the importance of the creation of a “suitable environment” as an essential element for ensuring efficient participation and sustainability of subprojects beyond the subproject cycle.

Within the context of FAS III, skills development feature as a cross-cutting framework, as it builds blocks for local participation and development. To this effect, the strategy of FAS III is to improve and institutionalize the individual, organizational skills, competences, and abilities at the community and government levels, establishing evidence to support the ongoing decentralization process.

Table 01: Origin of participants in training sessions

N/O Origin of participants Quantity % 1 Public Sector 836 26.8 2 Civil Society 865 27.8 3 Community members 1.196 38.4 4 FAS (Staff) 211 6.7

TOTAL 3.108 100 Source: SIFAS/FASIII. Table 02: Number of training sessions per component

NUMERO DE FORMAÇÕES POR COMPONENTE Components Nº Training sessions Capacity building impact

123 Diagnosis techniques and FAS procedures; Monitoring and Evaluation. National Workshop on Impact Assessment.

Municipal Development

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Environmental management; Strategic Planning (stages I, II and II in the 3 municipalities) and 5 stages in the current 9 municipalities); Moderation for stage III; Monitoring and Evaluation for FAS and partners; inter-municipal exchange visits; Training on management and maintenance of Intranet.

Institutional Strengthening

7

Participatory Monitoring & Evaluation; Vulnerability; SQL Database management Networks and Systems; Secretariat Techniques; Human Resources Management and Angolan tax system. Participatory management.

Source: SIFAS/FASIII.

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Other outcomes achieved:

Besides this, FAS maintained a strategy of constant interaction with the community nuclei and their leaderships, from the perspective of on-the-job training. However, it is important to underscore that gender equality in the participation of both sexes in the training sessions continues to be a great challenge, as female participation represented only 10 percent of the total number of participants. This implies that future mobilization work should be focused on the increased participation of women.

The component produced various interesting outcomes, as well as impacts at the level of social and political capital:

�� 3,108 people trained on 20 topics;

��Three study visits embarked on to Brazil and three to Portugal, with 30 percent participation comprising people from public institutions and municipal participation structures;

��Three exchange visits embarked on in Benguela, Porto Amboim, and Bibala Municipalities;

��Eleven editions, 7,500 copies each, of Jornal Amigo produced; 5 issues of Caderno Amigo, 1,000 copies each;

��Six training manuals produced on the Municipal Development Component; one on Community Development Component and two on Vulnerability subcomponent.

��Constructed the intranet structure of the selected municipalities (Kilambi Kiaxi and Benguela), as well as a FAS institutional intranet.

Finally, it was concluded that the actions carried out under the capacity development strategy led to obtaining the results (albeit interim), creating bases and sustained capacities (especially the training of local partners, which enabled the conduct of research for data collection), and drafting of job profiles and municipal development plans (which became important points of reference for decision making at the level of the municipality).

5.4 Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) emerged during FAS II and was improved on in FAS III to respond to the increasing challenges of the current phase and to overcome the limitations encountered during the implementation of activities.

In FAS III, the component continued with its objectives of storing and systematically evaluating data on the impact of the activities on projects, as well as creating capacities in the teams to analyze and collect quantitative data.

It could be said that the M&E process was marked by the implementation of the following key activities:

��Dissemination of the outcomes of the 4th Beneficiary Participatory Evaluation at the provincial and national levels through reflection workshops, 2005;

��Conduct of a consultancy to enhance the indicators to be used for monitoring and evaluation as well as for the Information System (SIFAS), 2005;

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��Conduct of a reflection meeting with some teams on monitoring and evaluation concepts and indicators (PMA – Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation, 2006);

��Implementation of Information Sites;

��Beneficiary Participatory Evaluation, 2006;

��Conduct of the first phase of the Beneficiary Impact Assessment, 2007;

��Conduct of the second phase of the Beneficiary Impact Assessment, 2007;

��Conduct of evaluations at the end of each Municipal Development Component in the 12 municipalities.

5.4.1 Outcomes achieved in the M&E component

During the implementation of the activities, the following outcomes were achieved:

��Greater follow up and monitoring of projects during implementation of the activities and after their delivery, with more involvement of the communities and partners.

��Better structuring of the project portfolio and greater involvement of partners in the project cycle.

��At the level of the provinces, the teams have a better understanding of the use of indicators.

In spite of the efforts made, there are many challenges by FAS teams:

• Prompt a posteriori conduct of evaluations after projects are delivered with greater community involvement; and

• Systematization of the experience of implementing the M&E process in the different components.

5.4.2 Social Services Access Indicators (IASS)

The lessons learned with the implementation of FAS I and II led the Project management team to introduce a new methodological instrument, the Social Services Access Indicators (IASS) during the phases of priority identification and definition. The use of IASS, as a diagnosis tool, provides better understanding on the mapping of the poverty of communities based on the values calculated and their index, thus allowing for better balance in terms of choice of area and sector of intervention.

6) Factors of success and failure

Considering that the objective of this document is to report on the activities carried out and to serve as an instrument for reflection, the major aspects that had positive or negative impact on the success and sustainability of the project are listed as follows:

The introduction of the IASS enabled: The provision of support to the identification of critical areas and sectors in terms of access to basic social services; Improvement of the quality of information needed for decision making on investments to be made.

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6.1.1. Factors of success

a) Under the Community Development Component

• The credibility of the project, as well as its 14 years of experience, facilitated its penetration into the remote areas of the country and expansion of its activities into new provinces;

• The training actions offered to partners during the program consolidated the human capital among the communities as well as facilitated increased credibility of FAS among them;

• The transfer of tools to partners through training sessions facilitated the strengthening of the social capital of the communities, which could be observed through their engagement in the project cycle; and

• The expansion of the activity to other more remote provinces (Uige, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Moxico, and Kwando Kubango) enabled greater access to target grassroots community social infrastructure, as well as the broadening of the basic services.

b) Under the Municipal Development Component

• The favorable situation of decentralization enabled FAS to contribute to the agenda of development and strengthening of local governance in the country;

• The work strategy adopted facilitated the dissemination of the Planning Strategy as a methodological tool in various municipalities, as training content and practice of participatory municipal management;

• The municipal development profiles and plans drafted with the methodological support of FAS served as the basis for the implementation of projects with government resources;

• The speedy use of procedures fostered their correct usage by the partners; and

• The publication of a series of methodological guidance manuals on “Municipal Development Strategic Planning,” from the FAS experience.

6.1.2. Factors of failure

a) Under the Community Development Component

• The subproject targets as stipulated in the Project Assessment Document (PAD) were not achieved due to the lack of funding from EU grants;

• The poor engagement of municipal administrations of the new provinces ((Uige, Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Moxico, and Kwando Kubango) is due to lack of FAS teams on the ground;

• The maintenance of the subprojects could have been strengthened through greater sharing of an accountability framework by the municipal administrations and other partners; and

• The gender imbalance at the level of the project cycle was mainly due to cultural issues as well as the need for FAS to invest in a gender strategy.

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b) Under the Municipal Development Component

• Low involvement by some local leadership, especially at the provincial level;

• The inability of provincial teams and partners to systematize and disseminate implementation experiences;

• Inability to consolidate the introduction of data collection and analysis into the daily activity of the municipal administrations; and

• Capacity strengthening was more based on the local civil society sector, as it was more receptive and aware of the benefits of its participation in this type of capacity strengthening programs.

7) Lessons Learned

As a result of the experience acquired during the implementation of FAS III, lessons were learned, which, if taken into consideration in the design of the future FAS IV could be useful for the enhancement of approaches of similar projects.

a) Engagement and strengthening of local governance

The engagement of the local government at various levels, from the beginning of the process, is fundamental for its consolidation and success. Investment in training actions should focus on staff of municipal administrations in general and not only on the leadership, thus avoiding hindrances in the transfer of skills due to change of leadership.

b) Expansion of the project to new provinces

The success of the expansion of the project activities to new provinces largely depends on the receptiveness and involvement of provincial governments and the existence of a local team capable of carrying out the planned objective.

c) Change in community demand

Adaptation demand response to the local peculiarities and diversity is the best solution to enable us to move closer toward the solution to the real problems of the communities,

d) Limited response capacity of domestic market

The project should be adapted to the imperfections of the local market with a view to better directing its response capacity.

e) Interaction of the three capitals

The Project strategy of focusing on the development of the four capitals (physical, human, social, and political) is one of the key elements of its success.

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Annex 10. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Comments were solicited from the Delegation of the European Commission in Luanda as well as Chevron; however, no comments were received.

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Annex 11. List of Supporting Documents 1. World Bank Supervision mission reports (Aide Memoire), Angola, 2003-2009. 2. World Bank Implementation Status Reports, 2006. 3. Project Appraisal Document (PAD), World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2003. 4. Development Credit Agreement 3816 ANG, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2003. 5. Grant Agreement Document TF 053490 ANG, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2003. 6. Project Credit Agreement Document 3816 ANG IDA, World Bank, Washington, D.C.,

September 15, 2003. 7. Mid-Term Review Report, World Bank, Angola and Washington, D.C., 2006. 8. Quality Enhancement Review report, World Bank, 2006. 9. J.L Arcand, E. Djimeu, M.C. Buisson, A.S. Rodella; “The FAS III Baseline Survey” report,

World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2008. 10. ICR Guidelines, World Bank, 2009. 11. FAS “Guia de Vulnerabilidade Social, Angola. Acção de Combate à Pobreza e Exclusão

Social”, Angola, 2007. 12. Yngstrom, H. Ducados; “Poverty, Vulnerability and Social Exclusion in Post-conflict

Angola” report, Angola, 2007. 13. FAS “Série de Manuais sobre Planeamento Estratégico para o Desenvolvimento Municipal.

Estruturação do Processo”, Angola, 2007. 14. FAS “Série de Manuais sobre Planeamento Estratégico para o Desenvolvimento Municipal.

Análise da Situação” Angola, 2007. 15. FAS “Série de Manuais sobre Planeamento Estratégico para o Desenvolvimento Municipal.

Formulação da Visão e das Opções Estratégicas”, Angola. 2007. 16. FAS “SÉrie de Manuais sobre Planeamento Estratégico para o Desenvolvimento Municipal.

Implementação do Plano de Desenvolvimento Municipal”, Angola, 2007. 17. FAS “Série de Manuais sobre Planeamento Estratégico para o Desenvolvimento Municipal.

Revisão e Seguimento”, Angola. 2007. 18. FAS “Série de Manuais sobre Planeamento Estratégico para o Desenvolvimento Municipal.

Recolha e Análise de Dados”. Angola, 2007. 19. World Bank - Development Credit Agreement. Third Social Action Fund (FAS III) between

Republic of Angola and the International Development Association, Washington, D.C., September 2003.

20. Grant Agreement document “Third Social Action Fund Project negotiated by the Republic of Angola and Fundo de Apoio Social and International Development Association-- acting as administrator of the European Community Trust Fund for Angola Third Social Action Fund. Washington, D.C., May 2005.

21. FAS Avaliação Participativa de Beneficiário, Angola, 2004. 22. FAS Avaliação Participativa de Beneficiários (revised document), Angola, 2006. 23. World Bank: Implementation Completion Report (ICR), Second Angola Social Action Fund,

Washington, D.C. and Angola, August 2004. 24. World Bank Project Appraisal Document (PAD)—“Angola Local Development Program”,

Washington, D.C. November, 2009. 25. Felicio, M. and Yilmaz, S. “Local Government Discrection and Accountability in Angola”.

Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 128, World Bank, October 2009.

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Annex 12. Persons Consulted During ICR Preparation

FAS Project Management Unit, Luanda

Victor Hugo Guilherme, Director

Henda Ducados, Deputy Director

Carlos Barbosa, M&E Officer

Simao Miguel, FM Officer

Helena Farinha, Local Development Advisor

Benguela

FAS team

Carlos Guardado, Director

Artur Mapuna, Director Adjunto

Baltazar Roque, Procurement and Infrastructure Assistant

Victor Moita, M&E Assistant

Adao Faustino, Social Promoter

Maria de Jesus da Silva, Financial Assistant

Carolina, Secretary

Forum members and trainers

Carlos Amandio, Forum member

Jose Pedro Lopes, Forum member

Aspirante Jose Prate, Forum member

Ilda Valerio, Executive Secretary

Geraldo Sanjinji, Forum President

Eduardo Eugeniu, Social Promoter

Prezeres Angeline Saldanha, Forum member

Zeferino Sandjila, Forum member

Manuel Kafranda da Silva, Forum member

Kuanza Sul

FAS team

Santinho Figueira, Director

Alexandre Luis Domingos, Procurement and Infrastructure Assistant

Carolina Maricel Cardoso Aguiar, Secretary

Zeca Ngulo, M&E Assistant

Malanje

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Joaquim Fernandes, Director

Maria Ginga da Silva de Sousa, Social Promotor Assistant

Kuanza Norte

Jacinto, Director

Ludi Vasco Antonio, Social Promotor Assisant

15 Forum members

Partners and development partners

Mamadou Beye, Chevron

Luis Padrelhas, EC

Alfredo Texeira, UNDP

World Bank Staff and Consultants

Laura Rose, Task Team Leader FAS III, Sr. Economist (Health)

Stefania Abakerli, Local Development Specialist

Mirey Ovidaya, Sr. Operations Officer

Kjetil Hansen, Sr. Public Sector Management Specialist

Ricardo Gazel, Sr. Economist

Ana Maria Carvalho, Communications Associate

Domingas Pegado, Team Assistant

Jenni Pajunen, Jr. Professional Officer

Jonathan Nyamakupa, FM Specialist

Joao Tinga, FM Specialist

Cary Anne Cadman, Sr. Forestry Specialist

Mariana Felicio, Consultant

Louis Helling, Consultant

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Annex 13. Map of Angola

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