World Bank Document · Bangladesh in November 1995, and revised by staff of the Resident Mission and the Agriculture and ... i Cyclone forecasting and early warning systems, shelters,

Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 15998

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

BANGLADESH

COASTAL EMBANKMENT REHABILITATION & RECONSTRUCTIONPROJECT

PRIORITY WORKS PROGRAMME (PWP)

September 16, 1996

Agriculture and Natural ResourcesOperations DivisionCountry Department ISouth Asia Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY AND EQUIVALENT UNITS

Name of Currency = Taka (Tk)Rate of exchange:

Preparation (May 1992) US$1.00 - Tk. 34.6Interveningyears(1993-1994) US$I.00 = Tk. 39.8

Completion year (1995) US$ 1.00 = Tk. 40.0

BORROWERPeople's Republic of Bangladesh

Fiscal Year

July I -June 30

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 kilometer (kin) = 0.62 mileI acre (ac) = 0.405 hectare (ha)

I metric ton (nit) = 26.8 mound (miid)

ABBBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADP Annual Development ProgramBWDB Bangladesh Water- Developmenit BoardCERP Coastal Embanikmiienit Rehabilitation Project (Credit 2783-BD)EPZ Export Processing ZoneEC European CommunityECU European Currency UnitEU European UnionERR Economic Rate of ReturnICB International Competitive Biddinm-IDA International Developmenit AssociationGOB Governmenililt of BangladeshNCPP National Cyclone Protection Prog,ramO&M Operation and MaintenancePP Project ProformiiaPWP Priority Works Program

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYIMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

BANGLADESH

COASTAL EMBANKMENT REHABILITATION PROJECTPRIORITY WORKS PROGRAM

Table of Contents

Preface ....................................................

Evaluation Sum m ary ......................................................

PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT .................................................... 1

A. STATEMENT/EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES . ................................................... 1Statement of Project Objectives .................................................... 1Evaluation of Project Objectives ................................................... 3

B. ACH[EVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES . ................................................... 3

C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT ................................................... 6Factors Not Generally Subject to Government Control ................................................. ... 6Factors Generally Subject to Government Control .................................................... 6Factors Generally Subject to Implementing Agency Control ....................................................6

D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY. 8

E. BANK PERFORMANCE. 8

F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE. 9

G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME. 9

H. FUTURE OPERATIONS ................................................... 10

I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED ................................................... 10

PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES ................................................... 12Table 1: Summary of Assessments ................................................... 12Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits ................................................... 14Table 3: Project Timetable ................................................... 15Table 4: LoaniCredit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual ........................................... 16Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation .. .................................................. 17Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation ................................................... 17Table 7: Studies Included in Project ................................................... 17

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of theiroffircia] duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed wiLhout World Bank authorization.

Table 8A: Project Costs .......................................... 18Table 8B: Project Financing .......................................... 18Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits ......................................... 19Table I0: Status of Legal Covenants ......................................... 20Table 11: Concurrence with Operational Manual Statements .......................................... 20Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs .......................................... 21Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions .......................................... 21

APPENDICES

1. Aide-Memoire2. Economic Re-Evaluation3. BWDB Evaluation Report

MAP# IBRD 24198R

..


BANGLADESH


Preface

This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Priority Works Program (PWP)of the Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project (CERP) in Bangladesh, for which savings of SDR 21.35million (US$30.50 million equivalent) from four IDA Credits'and Japanese grant funds of Yen 2.7 billion(US$25.2 million equivalent2) were utilized to finance the costs of civil works of five polders3 and thePatenga Polder including the Naval Academy respectively. The amendments to the first three IDA Creditswere signed in April 1992, and to the fourth IDA Credit (Cr. 1870-BD) in August 1994. The agreement onthe provision of Japanese grant funds (PHRD 2127-5BD) was signed on July 23, 1992.

The financing arrangements for PWP were initially scheduled to be closed by December 31,1994, but were extended to the end of December 1995. Due to political disturbances the deadline forsubmitting withdrawal applications for one of the IDA credits for expenditures incurred prior to December31, 1995 was extended to June 30, 1996. SDR 20.8 million (US$29.6 million equivalent) from four IDACredits were disbursed, leaving an undisbursed balance of SDR 0.55 million (US$0.9 million equivalent)which was cancelled as part of the cancellatioin of the undisbursed balance of Cr. 1870-BD, effective July1996. The Closing Date of the Japanese grant was further extended to June 30, 1996 to cover additionalrepairs due to the May 1995 cyclone. The full amount of the Japanese grant funds of Yen 2.70 billion(U$26.6 million equivalent) were disbursed, with the last disbursement on July 29, 1996.

The project was co-financed by European Community (EC) grant funds for the preparation ofdesigns and engineering documentation and for contract supervision. Initially, ECU2.5 rmillion (US$3.1million equivalent) was provided, and this amount was subsequently increased to ECU4.3 million (US$5.4million equivalent) to cover the extended consultant's services.

The ICR was prepared by FAO/World Bank Cooperative Program mnission4 which visitedBangladesh in November 1995, and revised by staff of the Resident Mission and the Agriculture andNatural Resources Operations Division of Country Department 1, South Asia Region. The ICR is basedon a review of relevant project documents, field visits to five out of six polders, and discussions with theBorrower's project staff and associated IDA staff. BWDB prepared its evaluation of the project, which isincluded as Appendix 3. The Borrower also contributed to the preparation of the ICR by commenting onthe mission's Aide-Memoire5 , arranging field visits and discussions with project officers and farmners, andproviding relevant data on project performance.

SDR 9.215 million from Cr. 1467-BD, SDR 4.36 million from Cr. 1784-BD, SDR 3.59 million from Cr. 2048-BD, and SDR4.18 from Cr. 1870-BD.

2 At the exchange rates applied at the time of withdrawals, plus remaining balance at June 96 exchange rates.

Bashkhali, Anowara, Chakoria, Sitakundu and Sandwip Polders.

4Messrs. G. Schokman (Flood Control and Drainage Engineer/Mission Leader) and T. Lohavisavapanich (Economist).

Attached to the ICR as Appendix 1.


BANGLADESH


Evaluation Summary

Introduction

1. Following the May 1985 cyclone, the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) formulated in1986 a National Cyclone Protection Program (NCPP) with the objectives of minimizing disastrouseffects of cyclones and storm surges. NCPP included plans for improving the coastal embankmentsystem and introducing associated preventive measures'. In pursuance of the above program, aconsulting firm financed by the European Community (EC), assisted GOB in the preparation of theCyclone Protection Project (presently called the Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project or CERP--Cr. 2783-BD) which was planned for inclusion in the Bank's FY93 lending program. The preparationwork for CERP was in progress when a devastating cyclone struck Bangladesh in April 1991. As aresult, the entire coastal embankment system in the north-eastem and eastern parts of the Bay ofBengal came under intense surge pressure and suffered heavy damage. At that time the embankmentnetwork was in a poor state of maintenance and embankments were breached in many locations. Thecyclone caused 140,000 deaths and severe property damage. Thus, in addition to the improvements ofthe coastal embankment system originally planned, it became necessary to rehabilitate the damagedembankments as quickly as possible to protect areas against future cyclonic surges. GOB thereforerequested EC assistance for the existing consultant to prepare designs and engineering documents forthe reconstruction of the damaged coastal embankments under a Priority Works Program (PWP).Actual implementation of PWP, which was an emergency operation, was divided into three partsaccording to sources of funds: (i) Part A under GOB's own funds for immediate repairs to preventagricultural losses during the 1991 monsoons; (ii) Part B under the Saudi Government's grant funds forthe reconstruction of four polders; and (iii) Part C under savings from four on-going IDA Credits,2 andJapanese grant funds (PHRD 2127-SBD) for the reconstruction of six polders, viz., Patenga,Bashkhali, Anowara, Sandwip, Sitakundu and Chakoria, with consultants for implementationassistance, financed under an EC grant. This ICR relates to the works under Part C.

i Cyclone forecasting and early warning systems, shelters, protective foreshore afforestation belts, roads andtelecommunications, improved housing and institutional buildings, and education of local officials and the community.

2 Cr. 1467-BD, Cr. 1784-BD, Cr.2048-BD and Cr. 1 870-BD.

Objectives

2. The objectives of PWP were to: (i) protect the agricultural areas within the poldersagainst inundation by saline water; and (ii) provide protection against loss of human lives and damagescaused by cyclonic storm surges. Specifically for the Patenga Polder, an additional objective was toprovide protection to the Export Processing Zone (EPZ), the major industrial areas and the Chittagongairport against storm surges and wave overtopping during severe cyclonic storm conditions. The levelsof protection and the hydraulic design criteria were fixed to meet these objectives.

3. The physical works included: (i) about 79 km of resectioning of existing sea facingembankments; (ii) about 44 km of retirements (new embankments); (iii) 1.4 km of a concrete sea/riverwall to protect the Naval Academy; (iv) 17 new drainage regulators, and repairs to 24 drainageregulators; and (v) about 6.2 km of protection works (revetments).

4. Evaluation of objectives. The objectives of PWP were clearly defined, realistic, andimportant to reduce the risk of loss of lives and restore and safeguard economic activities in agriculture(food crops, livestock, and shrimp farming), salt production, and industry as well as the extensivepublic and private infrastructure within the polders. To ensure that these objectives are achieved, thelevels of protection to be provided were well defined through the selection of sound hydraulic designcriteria, and the embankment design and construction standards were accordingly improved to mitigatethe risks generally faced during cyclonic storms of the intensity of the April 1991 cyclone. In addition,foreshore afforestation included as a protective measure to be undertaken under CERP (Cr. 2783-BD),was to be an added protection reducing future damage.

Implementation Experience and Results

5. The reconstruction works were awarded following International Competitive Bidding(ICB) procedures. Major responsibility for contract management, including supervision and qualitycontrol, was given to the consultant responsible for the preparatory work (pre-construction activities).This proved a success as contracts were awarded to contractors able to construct good qualityembankments, and effective financial and administrative control, supervision and quality control wereprovided by the consultants. However the time allowed for completion of rehabilitation works wasunrealistic. The engineering estimates were prepared under severe time pressure due to the need torestore the damaged embankments as quickly as possible to avoid subsequent risk to lives andproperty. The amount of unstable soil which had to be removed was estimated without soil tests,which was appropriate in the situation provided adequate allowance is provided for contingencies. . Inaddition, emergency dwarf embankments constructed by the Government for immediate protectionagainst tidal inundation in some cases took earth from areas planned to be the base of the widenedembankments to be constructed under PWP. More seriously, the heights of many of the requiredembankments were significantly underestimated, which has a large effect due to their triangular shape.The consultants have stated that they received faulty mean sea level data from the Government, but itwould appear that efforts to check the data were insufficient. The underestimation of earthworksrequirements led to cost overruns of about 50%. These factors, as well as a few land acquisitionproblems encountered during implementation, were responsible for completion delays varying from

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one to two years. In addition, although the major devolution of responsibilities to the consultantproved to be effective, use was not made of the opportunity for the development of capacities of fieldstaff of the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) in contract management and supervision.

6. As of December 31, 1995, the civil works planned under PWP for five polders3 weresubstantially completed with the remaining works (largely additional works arising from damagescaused by the May 1995 minor cyclone) due to be completed within the next 2-3 months. (Due topolitical disruptions, the cyclone damage repairs in the Patenga polder were only completed by June1996.) Thus, PWP's physical objectives have been almost fully achieved in these five polders, albeitwith delays of one to two years. The quality of the civil works is generally good, and significantlybetter than most similar works previously constructed in Bangladesh. The development objectives, viz.protection of agricultural areas and reduction in the risk of loss of life, have also been almost fullyachieved in these polders. For the Sandwip Polder, as originally planned, reconstruction andrehabilitation of only two-thirds of the polder was financed under PWP The civil works for theremainder of the polder, where the need for rehabilitation was less urgent, have been included underCERP (Credit 2783-BD). At Anowara, the sixth polder, progress was delayed due to a dispute on thealignment of the embankment. Physical progress is estimated at about 56%, with the balance 44%expected to be completed by December 1996 through GOB funding. Generally, acquisition of land forconstruction was expeditiously carried out, with a few cases of delays.

7. Environment aspects. There are no adverse environmental effects caused by thephysical works of the program. Problems may arise due to lack of salt and shrimp inlets in the easternpolders. However, funds have been provided under CERP for this purpose, and farmers' requests willbe considered and decisions made without endangering the security of the sea facing embankments4.There are no flood plains in these polders, no major rivers affected, and free movement of fish tospawning grounds would not be impeded. As such flood plain fishermen are not adversely affected.

8. Economic impact. At project preparation, the economic rates of return (ERRs) werecalculated for the individual polders and the whole PWP consisting of ten polders, i.e., inclusive of fourpolders reconstructed with the use of Saudi grant funds (para. 1). The ERRs included quantifiablebenefits only and did not attempt to attribute value to human lives saved. These ERRs were revisedduring project implementation to reflect the increased construction costs and benefits fromafforestation. At that time, an ERR for the combined six polders financed by IDA Credits andJapanese grant funds was also estimated. At project completion, ERRs have been re-estimated for theindividual polders and the combined six polders financed under IDA Credits and the Japanese grantfunds. No attempt was made to re-estimate the ERR for the whole PWP due to non-availability ofcosts and benefits data in respect of four polders financed by the Saudi grant funds and because thisICR relates to that part of PWP which was financed by the IDA Credits and Japanese and EC grantfunds (para. 1). Also for the Anowara Polder, for which a major portion of civil works would becompleted under GOB funding (para. 6), the re-estimated ERR is based on the present cost estimatesto complete the works and the likely benefits that are anticipated to accrue. On this basis, thequantifiable ERRs (excluding the benefits of saving human lives) re-estimated at project completion

3Sitakundu, Patenga, Bashkhali, Chakoria, and Sandwip.

4Such as by providing inlets only in the interior embankments.

v

range from 5.8% for the Anowara to 19% for the Patenga Polder, compared to the revised ERRs of6.4% to 25.3% estimated during PWP implementation. (While economic analysis was not given in thememo to the Board justifying this emergency rehabilitation operation, it was explicitly stated in theBoard documents for the follow-up CERP project that the inclusion of polders with 6% ERRs isconsidered acceptable taking account of the important but not quantifiable additional benefits of savinghuman lives.) The lower ERRs are due mainly to cost overrun, the longer construction period resultingin delayed accrual of benefits and reduced benefited areas. The re-estimated ERR for the combined sixpolders is 13.4% compared to the revised ERR of 15.9% estimated during project implementation.

9. Project sustainability. Provision for the sustainability of PWP to meet its objectives isincluded under the programs for operation and maintenance and afforestation funded under CERP(IDA Cr. 2783-BD and an EC grant). The program envisages the participation of the BWDB, ForestDepartment, the community and the implementation support consultant. Afforestation of embankmentslopes and foreshore will reduce maintenance costs. Maintenance activities under a planned prograrnutilizing the community (landless families, persons displaced due to the project, squatters) are beingpartially funded (at a declining percentage) under CERP. Annual budgetary allocations for each polderhave been estimated for IDA funding and GOB contribution, including GOB funding after completionof CERP, and agreement has been reached during negotiations of CERP on the financingarrangements.

10. Actual cost, financing, and implementation timetable. Initially, it was estimated thatmost construction would be completed by June 1993, but that any work not completed would have towait until the next construction season and would be completed by April 1994. A project closing dateof December 31, 1994 was established for the Japanese grant and the latest closing of the IDA credits.Due to delays and cost overruns additional financing was provided from an ongoing IDA credit with aDecember 31, 1995 Closing Date and the Closing Date of the Japanese grant was initially extended toDecember 31, 1995. With the exception of Anowara (see para 6), most originally planned civil workswere completed by December 31, 1995 excluding some additional repairs of damage from the May1995 cyclone. The Closing Date for the Japanese grant was extended to June 30, 1996 to cover theserepairs for the Patenga Polder. The final costs of the six polders are now estimated at Tk. 2,858million (US$71.7 million), representing a 88% cost overrun over original cost estimates in Taka terms.Expressed in US dollars, cost overrun would be lower at 63% due to the depreciation of the Takaagainst the US dollar. This includes an overrun of about 50% due to the consultants' underestimationof earthworks requirements, $2.8 million equivalent for value added taxes not included in the originalestimates, and about $2.3 million equivalent for repair of works damaged by the 1995 cyclone. TheIDA credits and the Japanese grant funds together were able to finance about 79% of the final projectcosts compared to 89% envisaged at project preparation, increasing the burden on GOB's budgetsfrom 7% to 14%. EC grant funding also increased from 4% to 7% of the final project costs due to theneed for extended consultant services.

11. Key factors relating to achievement of project objectives. The most important causeswhich hampered project implementation were as follows:

Factors not generally subject to Government control. In the first two yearsof the construction season, unusually dry conditions during the first two months

vi

and inclement wet weather during the later part retarded progress. Law andorder problems also forced the consultant and contractors to abandon work forshort spells. The consultants' estimate of earthworks requirements wassubstantially underestimated.

Factors generally subject to Government control. Most of the Government'sresponsibilities were performed in a timely manner. However, serious setbackswere the delay in contract awards, delay in land acquisition and the approval of arevised Project Proforma and the consequent approval of variation orders. Theconsultant claims that some faulty survey data provided by the Governmentcontributed to the underestimate of earthworks requirements.

Factors generally subject to implementing agency control. BWDB hadoverall responsibility for PWP implementation. However, as noted earlier (para.5), the project consultant was given the major responsibility for pre-constructionactivities, and contract management. The causes of the serious underestimationof earthworks quantities are described in para 5. In other respects, both BWIDBand the consultant performed their duties in a generally satisfactory manner, buta few factors under their control hampered implementation. These were:(i) delay in identifying the issue of excess quantities in earthwork, which was themain reason for cost overrun; (ii) some lapses in site supervision; (iii) defectiveconstruction method used in earth filling (at least for the Anowara polder) whichadversely affected the attainment of the required construction quality; and (iv)substandard designs for repairs to existing drainage structures, and the inactionon requests of farmers for provision of inlets to salt and shrimp farms.

12. Performance of the IDA and Borrower. IDA was quick to respond to GOB's requestfor assistance after the April 1991 cyclone. Its assistance was instrumental in the preparation andapproval of funding for Part C of the program (para. 1). IDA's performance continued to besatisfactory during implementation. Staff from the resident mission and headquarters paid regular visitsduring construction and was closely associated in monitoring the progress, advising on contractualmatters, and assisting in expediting payments to contractors. IDA should be particularly complimentedon its role in resolving the issue of the excess of earthwork quantities required and the consequent costoverrun, and increasing the funding to meet the cost overrun. In retrospect, a lapse on the part of IDAwas its acceptance of the unrealistic time schedule allowed for completion of contracts. IDA shouldalso have produced regular supervision reports for the PWP, which practice was not initiated until1994.

13. The Borrower's performance has been generally satisfactory during the constructionphase but a few lapses during the pre-construction phase delayed the award of contracts. A part of theblame for fixing unrealistic completion dates for contracts should be borne by the Borrower. It is alsoevident that the Borrower's supervision of the consultant was less than satisfactory as the cost overruncould then have been identified at an earlier date and defective designs and site supervision lapsesidentified and corrected. Early and positive management decisions on Project Profonna, and variation

vii

orders would have assisted in reducing delays in completion. The Borrower complied with the specialconditions included in the amendments to the Development Credit Agreement of the four Credits.

Summary of Findings, Future Operations, and Key Lessons Learned

14. Project outcome assessment. Despite the above lapses in the performance of the Bankand Borrower, it should be noted that the Bank was prompt in responding to the request foremergency assistance from the Borrower, the quality of the physical works is good and the objectivesof this assistance in terms of protection of human life and property and increased agriculturalproduction are expected to have been substantially achieved. The outcome of the program is,therefore, rated as satisfactory.

15. Plans for future project operations. Future operation would depend on the success ofthe O&M plan, and the implementation of afforestation development to be carried out under CERP, asdescribed in para 9. Its success is dependent in part on the ability of BWDB and the ForestDepartment to work with NGOs and the community in carrying out participatory O&M andcommunity based forestry activities. The arrangements spelled out in the SAR of CERP, followingdiscussions between the Bank, BWDB, the Forest Department, and NGOs, appear to represent anappropriate solution.

16. Lessons for future projects in the sub-sector. The main lessons leamed are:

- Design of engineering works under deadlines appropriate for emergency worksincreases the risk of under/over estimation of quantities and cost overruns.

Public opposition to the alignment of retired embankimnents was a significantfactor in implementation delays. Even for emergency operations, consultationwith land owners and the affected communities at a very early stage of planning,would be useful to help resolve such situations;

Even under emergency procedures, land acquisition bottlenecks can causesignificant implementation delays. Arrangements to ensure land acquisitioncompensation based on prevailing market values and involvement ofcommunities and locally elected officials are essential in expediting theprocessing,

During the planning phase, beneficiaries need to be involved in deciding theprovision of hydraulic structures, particularly inlets to shrimp and salt fields, andflushing sluices for agricultural crops, and their judgments on the requirementsshould be adequately considered;

Designs for improvement and/or repairs to existing structures should be done tominimize maintenance;

viii

Contract management of major civil works by consultants is efficient andimproved quality in civil works construction can be assured. However, to ensureimproved supervision and quality control, and the early identification of contractissues such as cost overruns, BWDB in its role as the "Employer" of thecontract, should effectively supervise the consultant. In addition, where possibleBWDB field staff should be seconded to work with the consultants to gainexperience;

There is a need for GOB to review its procurement procedures to find ways toexpedite decisions, particularly for emergency operations. In planning suchoperations, adequate allowance should be made for the time required forcompletion of both the preconstruction activities leading to the tender awardsand for the actual construction of works; and

The implementation of the foreshore afforestation development under CERP(para. 24) should be given priority. This was evident by the ICR mission's fieldobservations that most of the damages sustained during the May 1995 cycloneand normal monsoon spring tides could have been averted by the foreshoreafforestation.

When financing a project of significant size funded from several credits, an earlydecision should be made to prepare separate supervision reports for suchprojects.


BANGLADESH


PART I: PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT

A. STATEMENT/EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES

Statement of Project Objectives

1. In response to a request from the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) for emergencyassistance to support a priority rehabilitation program for extensive damages caused by the devastatingcyclone of April 1991, IDA agreed to reallocate funds from four ongoing IDA Credits" to finance aPriority Works Program (PWP) which included the reconstruction, repairs and improvements of thecoastal embankment system damaged by the cyclone. Actual implementation of the program wasdivided into three parts according to sources of funding: (i) Part A under GOB's own funds forimmediate repairs to prevent agricultural losses during the 1991 monsoons; (ii) Part B under the SaudiGovernment's grant funds for reconstruction works in four polders; and (iii) Part C under savings fromon-going IDA Credits for the reconstruction of embankments in five polders (Sitakundu-P61/1,Anowara-P63/lA, Bashkhali-P64/lA, Chakoria-P64/2B, and Sandwip-P72), and under the Japanesegrant funds for the Patenga Polder (P62) and the sea wall of the Naval academy, with EuropeanCommunity (EC) grant financing of the cost of consultants services. This ICR covers the worksincluded under Part C.

2. The objectives of the PWP were to: (i) protect the polders against inundation ofagricultural areas by saline water; (ii) provide protection against loss of life and damages caused bycyclonic surges; and (iii) provide protection to the Export Processing Zone (EPZ), the adjoining EPZdevelopment areas, other major industrial areas and the Chittagong airport all located within thePatenga Polder.

3. To ensure that the above objectives are achieved, the levels of protection to be providedwere well defined through the selection of appropriate hydraulic conditions and the embankmentprofile was accordingly designed. The design criteria applied for all the polders, except the PatengaPolder, were: (i) for monsoon conditions, the return period (defined as one event in a number of years)of 5 years and about 13% of waves overtopping2 ; (ii) for cyclonic storm conditions, the return periodof 20 years, where flooding and wave overtopping of sea facing embankments should not result in an

I. Originally BWDB Small Schemes Project (Cr. 1467-BD), Fourth Flood Control and Drainage Project (Cr. 1784-BD) and the Third Flood Rehabilitation Project (Cr.2048-BD). Use of funds from the Second Small Scale FloodControl, Drainage and Irrigation Project (Cr. 1870-BD) was approved in early 1994.

2 Embankment slopes being I on 7 on the sea side and I on 3 on the country side, minimal damage would be

faced if overtopped.

2

average depth in the polder exceeding one meter. For the Patenga Polder, where economic activity hasbeen very high, criteria applied were cyclonic stormns with a return period of 40 years and overtoppingby about 13% of waves could take place.

4. The works under the six po1ders designed for the above hydraulic conditions were dividedinto eight contract packages and included reconstruction of some 79 km of embankments, constructionof about 44 km of new (retired) embankments, 17 new drainage structures, and a new sea wall in theNaval Academy, repairs to 17 drainage structures, and construction of allied protection works(revetments). The works were scheduled for completion at the end of FY93.

5. A consultant engaged with EC grant financing prepared designs and engineeringdocumentation for the reconstruction and improvement works. The same consultant was given majorresponsibility for contract management and supervision of progress and quality control, although theoverall responsibility for program implementation rested with the Bangladesh Water DevelopmentBoard (BWDB). The engineering estimates were prepared under severe time pressure due to the needto restore the damaged embankments as quickly as possible to avoid subsequent risk to lives andproperty. The amount of unstable soil which had to be removed was estimated without soil tests,which was appropriate in the situation provided adequate allowance is provided for contingencies. Inaddition, emergency dwarf embankments constructed by the Government for immediate protectionagainst tidal inundation in some cases took earth from areas planned to be the base of the widenedembankments to be constructed under PWP. More seriously, the heights of many of the requiredembankments were significantly underestimated, which has a large effect due to their triangular shape.The consultants have stated that they received faulty mean sea level data from the Government, but itwould appear that efforts to check the data were insufficient. The underestimation of earthworksrequirements led to cost overruns of about 50%. Initially in April 1992, a total amount of SDR 15.52mnillion (US$19.0 million equivalent) was reallocated from three IDA Credits (Cr. 1467-BD, Cr. 1784-BD and Cr. 2048-BD) to finance the program. In early 1994, this reallocation was increased by SDR1.65 million and an additional reallocation of SDR 4.18 million from a fourth IDA Credit (Cr. 1870-BD) was approved to cover the cost escalation arising from the higher quantities of earthwork requiredthan originally estimated. Thus, the total funds reallocated from the four IDA Credits amounted toSDR 21.35 million (US$30.50 million equivalent). It was originally expected that most constructionwould be completed by June 1993, but that any work not completed would have to wait until the nextconstruction season and would be completed by April 1994 (in time to be financed by Credit 1784 witha December 31, 1994 Closing Date). Additional financing provided from Credit 1870 permittedfinancing of expenditures incurred prior to December 31, 1995. The value of Japanese grant finding(PHRD 2127-SBD) increased from US$20.00 million equivalent to US$26.6 million equivalent due tothe increased value of the Yen, which permitted the original grant amount to finance the increasedcosts of works under the Patenga Polder and the sea wall of the Naval Academy. The originalDecember 31, 1994 Closing Date for the grant was extended initially to December 31, 1995 to coverconstruction delays, and subsequently to June 30, 1996 to cover additional works to repair damagesfrom the May 1995 cyclone. The EC grant funds were increased from ECU2.5 million (US$3.1million equivalent) to ECU4.3 million (US$5.4 million equivalent) to cover the extended consultant'sservices.

3

6. Special conditions or agreements that were expected to promote achievements of theprogram's objectives and included as amendments to the Development Credit Agreements of the fourIDA Credits were: (i) that Part C would be carried by BWDB in accordance with administrativearrangements and procedures satisfactory to the Association; (ii) that the Borrower shall ensure thatworks to be undertaken under Part C shall be selected in accordance with criteria and proceduresagreed between the Borrower and the Association; and (iii) that the Borrower shall, prior to enteringinto any contract for civil works under Part C, cause BWDB to engage consultants to assist BWDB inconstruction, and ensure that its Land Ministry has given its approval for the Deputy Commissioner ofthe District where such civil works are to be carried out to acquire land needed for the purposes of civilworks.

Evaluation of Project Objectives

7. The objectives of PWP were clearly defined, realistic and important to reduce the risk ofloss of lives and restore and safeguard economic activities in agriculture (food crops, livestock, andshrimp farming) salt production, and industrial activities, and the extensive public and privateinfrastructure within the polders. To facilitate the attainment of these objectives, improved designstandards, particularly the hydraulic design criteria, were adopted and provision was made forimproved construction quality in order to lower the risks generally faced during high intensity cyclones.However, the limited preparation time to finalize the engineering documents for award of contracts,and the time allowed for completion of rehabilitation works were unrealistic. These factors, togetherwvith the inability to correctly estimate the quantities of earthwork required which later had to beincreased, as well as a few land acquisition problems (para. 10), were to a great extent responsible forcost overrun and completion delays varying from one to two years.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES

8. Physical objectives. The program's physical objectives have been substantiallycompleted. Over 90% of the civil works planned under PWP in two polders (Sitakundu and Sandwip)were completed by June 1994, i.e., one year behind schedule, and in three other polders (Patenga,Bashkhali and Chakoria) by June 1995, i.e., two years behind schedule. The remaining works in thesefive polders (mainly resulting from damages caused by the May 1995 minor cyclone) were completedby June 30, 1996. The quality of the civil works is generally good, and substantially better than mostsimilar works previously constructed in Bangladesh. At Anowara, the sixth polder, progress wasdelayed by a dispute over the alignment of the embankment. Physical progress at the December 31,1995 Closing Date for Cr. 1870-BD is estimated at about 56%, with the balance to be completed byDecember 1996 through GOB funding. (As of June 30, 1996 the Anowara works were about 80%complete.)

9. Development objectives. The development objectives, viz., protection ofagricultural areas and reduction of loss of life, for the areas of the Sitakundu, Patenga, BashkhaliSandwip and Chakoria polders have been achieved. As regards the Sandwip Polder, as originallyplanned, reconstruction and rehabilitation of only two-thirds of the polder was financed under PWP.

4

The civil works for the remainder of the polder, where the need for rehabilitation was less urgent, havebeen included under CERP. In the case of the Anowara Polder, the development objective would beachieved only after completion of major works to be canried out through GOB funding, scheduled forthe end of 1996.

10. Land acquisition. The processing of land acquisition proposals by BWDB wasexpected to be simplified and expedited under the emergency regulations procedures. Althoughprocessing of most applications was completed in a timely manner, in a few polders, bottleneckscontinued to hold up construction works. In Sandwip, construction of 1.35 km of embankment washeld up due to owners refusing to hand over land. The dispute was settled in late 1995 and workcommenced in December 1995, and was completed by February 1996. In Sitakundu, public oppositionto the proposed retirement alignment held up construction for about two years. Finally, in 1994, workcommenced after agreement was reached to reconstruct the damaged embankment with costlyrevetments (much against the recommendation of the consultant). In Bashkhali, owner's opposition tosale of land for 2 km retirement, delayed the completion by about an year. At Anowara, about 10 kmof embankment works had to be abandoned due to public opposition to the proposed alignment. Inearly 1995, the dispute was settled after agreement was reached on a new alignment. It should benoted that the issues involved in these cases were not primarily the price paid for the limited amount ofland lost. In cases of progressive erosion, consideration of costs requires that the embankments besituated sufficiently set back to have a reasonable life expectancy. However, farmers interests favormaintaining the embankment as far forward as possible, with progressive rebuilding as the embankmentis eroded away. In an emergency operation, there was less time than desirable for consultation andreaching consensus on such issues.

11. Contract management. All contracts were awarded following IntemationalCompetitive Bidding (ICB) procedures of the Bank. Consultant responsible for planning, design, andengineering documentation was designated as the "Engineer's Representative" and made responsiblefor most contract management inclusive of supervision and quality control. These measures were adeviation from GOB's normal practice of contract awards following local competitive biddingprocedures and contract management and supervision by BWDB. The deviation was necessary toensure: (a) that works were carried out by contractors able to construct good quality embankments;(b) effective financial and administrative control in contract management; and (c) better supervision andquality control. The Chief Engineer of BWDB, designated as the "Employer" of the contract, retainedlimited management responsibility particularly on approval of variation orders and managementdecisions on costs. Delays in such decisions adversely affected progress in completion of contracts.The devolution of major responsibility for contract management and supervision to the consultantproved beneficial. However, while BWDB was advised to second some of their staff to work as partof the consultants team, they did not make use of this opportunity to train their field staff and enhancetheir skills in contract management, supervision and quality control.

12. Vital aspects to achieve the objectives of the program were: (i) planning and hydraulicdesign to determine cyclonic surge levels for various return periods, and the levels of protection;(ii) appropriate design of embankments, drainage structures, and provision of protection works(revetments) at those limited locations vulnerable to bank and wave erosion where it is cost-effective todo so; and (iii) contract management to ensure that contract specifications are adhered to and

5

completion to agreed standards met. Planning and hydraulic designs were of a high standard. Designof embankments, new drainage regulators and protection works was highly satisfactory and costeffective. However, a few deficiencies have been identified, based on a desk review of the files andfield visits by the ICR mission. These are: (i) the need for increased earthwork quantities was identifiedlate only during the second year of implementation; (ii) the designs of repairs to existing drainageregulators was substandard with no consideration being given to operation and maintenance aspects;(iii) consultant field supervisory staff were not always present at site when work was in progress toensure proper quality of work; and (iv) in planning, the requirements for shrimp and salt inlets were notadequately addressed, thereby creating a situation of frustration among affected farmers.

13. Institutional development. The opportunities which could have been available underPWP to further the strengthening of BWDB staff in contract management and quality control throughworking in cooperation with an international firm were not made available to the field staff of BWDBbelow the level of the Executive Engineer. Although, major responsibilities for supervision of workswere given to the consultants, greater use could have been made of the field staff to strengthensupervision of construction.

14. Environmental aspects. Studies carried out on environmental aspects during thepreparation phase of CERP, and further work by EC consultants involved during pre-appraisal ofCERP, confirmed earlier information available at the time of this emergency operation that potentialadverse environmental impacts were limited. Being mainly a rehabilitation program the devastatedenvironment was restored to its former condition, and in fact has further improved to minimize oreliminate risks due to possible future devastation. The polder areas are devoid of flood plains and theprotected areas of the polders have no inland lakes (beels) and in addition, as no major or medium sizerivers are affected, the free movement of fish to spawning grounds would not be impeded.Supplementary works for the PWP polders financed under CERP, increasing forested areas andeliminating drainage congestion, would be environmentally beneficial. Shrimp and salt inlets whichmay have inadvertently been omitted in a few PWP polders would be provided for under CERP basedon farmers' specific requests.

15. Economic impact. At project preparation, the economic rates of return (ERRs) werecalculated for the individual polders and the whole PWP consisting of ten polders, i.e., inclusive of fourpolders reconstructed with the use of Saudi grant funds (para. 1). The ERRs included quantifiablebenefits only and did not attempt to attribute value to human lives saved. These ERRs were revisedduring project implementation to reflect the increased construction costs and benefits fromafforestation. At that time, an ERR for the combined six polders financed by IDA Credits andJapanese and EC grant funds was also estimated. At project completion, ERRs have been re-estimatedfor the individual polders and the combined six polders financed under IDA Credits and the Japanesegrant funds (Table 9 of Part II, and Appendix 2). No attempt was made to re-estimate the ERR for thewhole PWP due to non-availability of costs and benefits data in respect of four polders financed by theSaudi grant funds and because this ICR relates to Part C of PWP which was financed by the IDACredits and Japanese and EC grant funds (para. 1). Also for the Anowara Polder, for which a majorportion of civil works would be completed through GOB funding, the re-estimated ERR is based onthe present cost estimates to complete the works and the likely benefits that are anticipated to accrue.On this basis, the quantifiable ERRs (excluding the benefits of saving human lives) re-estimated at

6

project completion range from 5.8% for the Anowara Polder to 190/o for the Patenga Polder, comparedto the revised ERRs of 6.4% to 25.3% estimated during PWP implementation. (While economicanalysis was not given in the memo to the Board justifying this emergency rehabilitation operation, itwas explicitly stated in the Board documents for the follow-up CERP project that inclusion of polderswith 6% ERRs is considered acceptable, taking account of the important but not quantifiable benefit ofsaving human lives.) The lower ERRs are due mainly to cost overrun, the longer construction periodresulting in delayed accrual of benefits and reduced benefited areas. The re-estimated ERR for thecombined six polders is 13.4% compared to the revised ERR of 15.9% estimated during projectimplementation. (The consultants original May 1992 estimates was 14.2%, including the 4 poldersfinanced by Saudi Government grants.)

C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT

Factors Not Generally Subject to Government Control

16. In FY93, inclement wet weather during the months of April to June, and usually dryweather above the normal weather conditions during December and January, retarded progress and tosome extent influenced the deadlines set for completion of the civil works program. Law and orderproblems also forced the consultant and contractors to abandon work for short spells.

17. Engineering documents were based on preliminary surveys carried during the monsoon of1991, and contract awards were made based on these designs. Subsequently towards the end ofFY92, after an year's delay, a cost overrun of 50% due to increase of earthwork quantities wasidentified (para. 5). The relevant estimates needed revision and variation orders had to be issued. Theperformance of some contractors was delayed due to slow mobilization of manpower and constructionequipment.

Factors Generally Subject to Government Control

18. Most of the GOB responsibilities were performed in a timely manner. However, whilethe Project Proforma (PP) was approved in a timely manner, the approval of the revised PPincorporating the excess quantities of works was inordinately delayed, due to prevailing prolongedbureaucratic procedures, thereby delaying approval of variation orders by about two years. Anotherserious setback was the delay in contract awards. ICB tendering was initiated in late 1991/early 1992,about 6 months after the 1991 cyclone, and contract awards made in June/July 1992, six months afterthe call of tenders, with agreements signed on August 1, 1992. As an emergency program, it wasinitially expected that works would commence in January 1992, and completed by June 1993.

Factors Generally Subject to Implementing Agency Control

19. Aside from the underestimation of earthworks quantities (para 5), both BWDB, as theimplementing agency, and the project consultant, who was given full responsibility for planning anddesign and management of all the civil works contracts, performed their duties in a generallysatisfactory manner. Administrative and financial matters were addressed and executed in a timely

7

manner. Technical aspects, particularly the analysis for deciding the levels of protection, andproduction of cost effective embankment designs were of a high standard. Processing of landacquisition proposals by BWDB was carried out expeditiously, and in a few cases in which it took timeto settle disputes, extended litigation was avoided. However, a few deficiencies have been identifiedand these are listed below.

20. BWDB's Chief Engineer, as the "Employer" of the contract, enjoyed wide powers in thetechnical, administrative and financial aspects of contract management, and the supervision of theproject consultant. However, approval of cost overruns and variation orders were not delegated tohim and required prior clearance of BWDB's management (the Chairman and the Board). Thisarrangements proved inefficient and led to disputes with the contractors of works and adverselyaffected the deadlines set for completion.

21. As already noted (para. 12), desk review of project files indicated that there were somelapses in site supervision, the control on pre-work surveys was less than satisfactory, and finalization ofestimates of earthwork quantities were not completed before approval to go ahead with works wasgiven to contractors. As a result the identification of a cost overrun of about 50% was delayed by anyear alter commencement of work. During the field visit to the Anowara polder by the ICR mission, itwas observed that some earthworks were not done to the required specifications, and the constructionmethod used for earth fill was improper. The designs of repairs to some existing drainage structureswere substandard. If not corrected at this stage, major problems would be encountered duringoperational phase. Further, farmers' requests for shrimp and salt inlets were not adequately considered.

As a result, farmers have already started constructing substandard inlets in the sea facingembankments. These are weak spots which could endanger the security of the embankments.Effective supervision of the consultant by BWDB could have eliminated these deficiencies. BWDB hasagreed to address the defective repairs and the provision of inlets and carry out appropriate remedialmeasures.

22. Actual Project Costs. Table 8A of Part II gives a comparative statement of theestimated and final costs. At the time of tender, it was estimated that construction would be completedby June 1993. At the time of IDA approval of the amendments to finance the works (February 1992),it was recognized that some works could extend to April 1994, and the IDA and Japanese financingprovided for a Closing Date of December 31, 1994. The addition of financing from Credit 1870-BDpermitted coverage of expenditures through December 31, 1995. The Closing Date of the JapaneseGrant was extended initially to December 31, 1995 to cover civil works delays, and subsequently toJune 30, 1996 to finance additional works to repair damages due to the May 1995 cyclone. OnDecember 31, 1995, the civil works in five polders (Sandwip, Bashkhali, Chakoria, Sitakundu andPatenga) were substantially completed except for additional works to repair damages form the May1995, but only 56% at the Anowara Polder were completed. (As of June 30, 1996, the Anowaraworks were 80% completed, with completion expected by December 31, 1996.) When allowance ismade for costs to complete the remaining works, the final costs of the six polders are now estimated atTk. 2,858 million (US$71.7 million), representing a 88% cost overrun over original cost estimates inTaka terms. Expressed in US dollars, cost overrun would be lower at 63% due to the depreciation ofthe Taka against the US dollar. In addition to the 50% overrun due to underestimation of earthwork

8

quantities (para 21), this also includes $2.8 million equivalent for value added taxes not included in theoriginal estimates and $2.3 million equivalent for repair of works damaged by the 1995 cyclone.

23. Project Financing. Despite implementation delays, disbursements of the IDA Creditsand the Japanese grant funds have been satisfactory as shown in Table 4 of Part II. The IDA creditsand the Japanese grant funds together were able to finance about 79% of the final project costscompared to 89% envisaged at project preparation, increasing the burden on GOB's budgets from 7%to 14%. EC grant funding also increased from 4% to 7% of the final project costs due to the need forextended consultant services.

D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILI7Y

24. Sustainability of the polders is dependent on: (a) completion of all sea facing and internalembankments, protection works and the drainage regulators, and inlet structures for agriculture, shrimpand salt farms; (b) afforestation of embankment slopes and the foreshore; (c) effective maintenance ofembankments, protection works, and hydraulic structures; and (d) damage repairs that could be causedby cyclonic storms and wave erosion caused by annual monsoon spring tides. With the exception ofAnowara polder (to be completed by December 31, 1996 using GOB financing) remaininguncompleted civil works are being financed under CERP. Embankment and foreshore afforestation arealso to be carried out under CERP. Maintenance activities under a planned program utilizing thecommunity (landless families, persons displaced due to the project, squatters) are being partially funded(at a declining percentage) under CERP. This includes funds required for routine and periodicmaintenance, including damage repairs due to normal monsoon spring tides and due to cyclonic stormswith a return period of 5 years. Damage repairs due to cyclonic storms with a return period of 20years would be expected to require special funding. If such storms occur after full maturity of theafforested area, damage would be drastically reduced and could be expected to be handled withGovernment resources. With these measures, if carried out effectively, sustainability of the programand the continued fulfillment of its objectives should be ensured.

E. BANK PERFORMANCE

25. The Bank was quick to respond to GOB's request for assistance after the devastationcaused by the April 1991 cyclone. Its assistance was instrumental in the preparation and approval ofthe package of funding to meet the cost of repairs for the six polders of the program. Given that it wasan emergency program, much of the usual documentation required for Bank assisted projects wasdone away with. During the pre-construction phase of the program, regular monitoring by Bank staff,particularly during tender award phase minimized the delay in award of contracts.

26. The Bank's performance continued to be satisfactory during implementation. During theinitial years of implementation no formal supervision was carried out. However regular visits by theresident mission staff and visits by headquarters staff and consultants effectively ensured the fulfillmentof the supervisory responsibilities of the Bank. Two formal supervisions were carried out, the first inJune 1994, and the final one in July 1995. Disbursements were closely monitored and, to avoid delaysin payment to contractors, the Bank arranged for direct payments to the contractors on bills certified by

9

the consultant and BWDB. This arrangement was agreed upon as BWDB did not have sufficient fundsto settle claims due to delay in approval of revised PP and insufficient Annual Development Program(ADP) provision.

27. The Bank should be particularly complimented for its role in resolving the issue of theexcess of earthwork quantities required and increasing the funding to meet the resultant cost overrun.In retrospect, a lapse on the part of the Bank was its acceptance of an optimistic time schedule fixed forcompletion of contracts, and not insisting on adjusting the schedule following delays in award ofcontracts.

F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE

28. Generally, the Borrower's performance has been satisfactory. Although it respondedspeedily in formulating the emergency program, its performance during the pre-construction phase wasless than satisfactory. Contract awards which were critical to meet the agreed deadlines for completionof works were made after a delay of about 6 to 8 months. During implementation, approval of therevised PP delayed the settlement of variation claims. The Borrower's performance on acquisition ofland for construction purposes was satisfactory, although in a few cases delays were faced forunavoidable reasons.

29. During the construction phase, the Borrower assisted by the project consultant performedthe day-to-day management of works to a satisfactory standard. However, quicker evaluation ofvariation orders would have been beneficial, and closer supervision of the consultant would haveminimized delays in identifying the excess earthwork quantities and estimate of the cost overrun. Inaddition the defective designs for repairs of existing drainage regulators could have been corrected andadequate provision made for shrimp and salt inlets.

30. The Borrower has complied with conditions included in the amendments to theDevelopment Credit Agreements of the four IDA Credits (see para. 6).

G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME

31. Five of the six polders included under Part C of PWP have achieved both the physical anddevelopment objectives. The quality of physical works is good, and assuming adequate O&M (seepara 33) the anticipated benefits in protection of human life and property and increased agriculturalproduction are expected to be achieved. As originally planned, civil works for Sandwip Polder wereconfined to those portions where rehabilitation was most urgent, with the remainder being financedunder CERP. The dispute over the location of the embankment for the sixth polder (Anowara) hasnow been resolved and the remaining works will be financed through GOB funding. Thus, theachievement of objectives of the program has been substantial and with minimal problems. Further,necessary steps have been taken under CERP to ensure sustainability of the polders and continuedfUlfillment of PWP objectives. The overall assessment of the outcome is, therefore, rated assatisfactory.

10

H. FUTURE OPERATIONS

32. The method of execution of operation and maintenance is described in detail in the SARof CERP. It also includes the activities and responsibilities of BWDB, the Forest Department, thecommunity, non governmental organizations, and the implementation support consultant. Annualbudgetary allocations for each polder have been estimated for IDA funding and GOB contribution, andagreement has been reached during negotiations of CERP on the financing arrangements. The O&Mmanual and the operational plan for the 21 polders, of which ten3 are under PWP, are to be updated toinclude details of community participation in preventive maintenance and the concept of afforestationas a protective measure. BWDB is currently working on the plans for the Part C polders. Theinnovative approach to the maintenance of polders on the scale included in CERP should ensure thesuccessful implementation of an improved O&M program.

1. KEY LESSONS LEARNED

33. The project being confined to civil works, most of the lessons of experience are related todetailed designs, engineering documentation up to award of contracts, and contract management. Themain lessons learned are as follows;

- Design of engineering works under deadlines appropriate for emergency worksincreases the risk of under/over estimation of quantities and cost overruns.

Public opposition to the alignment of retired embankments was a significantfactor in implementation delays. Even for emergency operations, consultationwith land owners and the affected communities at a very early stage of planning,would be useful to help resolve such situations,

Even under emergency procedures, land acquisition bottlenecks can causesignificant implementation delays. Arrangements to ensure land acquisitioncompensation based on prevailing market values and involvement ofcommunities and locally elected officials are essential in expediting theprocessing;

During the planning phase, beneficiaries need to be involved in deciding theprovision of hydraulic structures, particularly inlets to shrimp and salt fields, andflushing sluices for agricultural crops, and their judgments on the requirementsshould be adequately considered;

Designs for improvement and/or repairs to existing structures should be done tominimize maintenance;

3 Six polders of Part C and four poiders under Part B.

11

Contract management of major civil works by consultants is efficient andimproved quality in civil works construction can be assured. However, to ensureimproved supervision and quality control, and the early identification of contractissues such as cost overruns, BWDB in its role as the "Employer" of thecontract, should effectively supervise the consultant. In addition, where possibleBWDB field staff should be seconded to work with the consultants to gainexperience;

There is a need for GOB to review its procurement procedures to find ways toexpedite decisions, particularly for emergency operations. In planning suchoperations, adequate allowance should be made for the time required forcompletion of both the preconstruction activities leading to the tender awardsand for the actual construction of works; and

The implementation of the foreshore afforestation development under CERP(para. 24) should be given priority. This was evident by the ICR mission's fieldobservations that most of the damages sustained during the May 1995 cycloneand nornal monsoon spring tides could have been averted by the foreshoreafforestation.

When financing a project of significant size funded from several credits, an earlydecision should be made to prepare separate supervision reports for suchprojects.

12IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT

BANGLADESH


PART U: STATISTICAL ANNEXES

Table 1: Summary of Assessments

A. Achievement of objectives Substantial Partial Negligible Not Applicable

Macro policies [ LI[ [iL Li

Sector policies ED ED 3Financial objectives [Z Fl Cl [DInstitutional development El Ea FZ [T]Physical objectives [x] El El ED]Poverty reduction El ED al

Gender issues l El E E

Other social objectives El [] El ElaEnvironmental objectives [|] El El ElPublic sector management El El E lPrivate sector development El El E

Other (specify) El El El [K]

B. Project sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain

13

HighlyC. Bank performnance satisfactory Satifaeo Defigient

Identification [ FII rftPreparation assistance ED [ ED

Appraisal' ] ] nSupervision [ C 0

HighlyD. Borrower performance satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient

Preparation II [F 3

Implementation Fi C] F

Covenant compliance' 0] C 0

Operation (if applicable)' [0 [3

Hi&hly HigsyE. Assessment of outcome satisfactoy Satisfactory Unsatisfactory unsatisfactoa

Not applicable.Operations have commenced on a limited scale, and a realistic programme is expected to be implementedshortly under the CERP.

14

Table 2: Related Bank Loans/Credits

Loan/credit title Purpose Year of Statusapproval

Preceding operations

1. Chandpur Irrigation Project (Cr. 340-BD) provision of flood control, drainage 1972 completedand irrigation facilities, includingprimary pumping

2. Drainage & Flood Control Project I (Cr. 864- provision of flood control and 1978 completedBD) drainage (FCD) to 3 mediun size

schemes

3. Drainage & Flood Control Project II (Cr. provision of FCD to 3 medium size 1981 completed1184-BD) schemes

4. Small Scale Drainage & Flood Control Project construction of appurtenant structures 1979 completed(Cr. 955-BD) nationwide

5. BWDB Small Schemes Project (Cr. 1467-BD) provision of FCDI to small schemes 1985 completednationwide

6. Flood Rehabilitation Project I (Cr. 1587-BD) rehabilitation of schemes damaged by 1985 completedthe 1984 floods

7. Third Flood Control, Drainage & Irrigation provision of FCDI to 3 medium size 1985 completed(FCDI) Project (Cr. 159 1-BD) schemes

8. Fourth Flood Control & Drainage Project provision of FCD to one medium size 1987 completed(Cr. 1784-BD) scheme

8. Second Small Scale Flood Control, Drainage construction of SSFCDI works and 1988 completed& Irrigation Project (SSSFCDI) (Cr. 1870-BD) rehabilitation of infrastructure

damaged during the 1987 floods

9. Flood Rehabilitation Project II (Cr. 1876-BD) rehabilitation of schemes damaged by 1988 completedthe 1988 floods

10. Flood Rehabilitation Project III (Cr. 2048- rehabilitation of schemes damnaged by 1989 completedBD) the 1989 floods

Following operations

1. BWDB System Rehabilitation Project (Cr. rehabilitation of BWDB operational 1990 on-going2099-BD) schemes and improved O&M

2. Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project rehabilitation of costal embankment 1995 on-going(Cr. 2783-BD) polders, including afforestation and

improved O&M

3. River Bank Protection Project (Cr. 2791-BD) Prevention of erosion of riparian land 1995 on-goingat two locations and assistingGovernment to improve water sectorplanning.

15

Table 3: Project Timetable

Steps in project cycle Date plannedDaecuU

latest estimate

Identification 5/91 5/91

Preparation 5/91 5/91-12/91

Appraisal NA NA

Negotiations NA NA

Board presentation NA NA

Signing 25/4/92 25/4/92

Effectiveness 25/4/92 25/4/92

Project completion 30/6/93 31/12/95 a!

Credit closing 31/12/93 31/12/95 a!

a/ Completion and closing dates of SSSFCDI (Cr. 1870-BD). Works on one polder to be completed by December 31,1996 using GOB financing.

NA = not applicable

16Table 4: Loan/Credit Disbursements: Cumulative Estimated and Actual

(IJS$ Million)

FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97

IDA Credit:

Estimate d 9.50 19.00

R-evised b/ 12.00 24.00 30.50 30.50

Actual c/:

Cr. 1467 12.19 12.92 12.92 12.92

Cr. 1784 4.72 6.14 6.14

Cr. 2048 3.64 5.20 5.20

Cr. 18704' 0.76 5.38

Total Actual 12.19 21.28 25.02 29.64

Actual as % of revised estimate 102 89 82 97

Date of final disbursement 5/6/96

Japanese PHRD Grant:

Estimatesd 10.00 20.00

Revised 10.00 12.60 26.50 26.6 26.6

Actual 11.55 17.86 24.38 26.4 26.6

Actual as % of revised estimate 116 141 92 99 100

Date of final disbursement 7/29/96

a/ A total of SDR 15.52 million were reallocated from savings from three IDA credits, including SDR 8.155 million from Cr.1467-BD, SDR 4.360 million from Cr. 1784-BD and SDR 3.0 million from Cr. 2048-BD.

b/ Total credit reallocations were increased to SDR 16.58 million (increment of SDR 1.06 million from Cr. 1467-BD), to SDR17.17 million (increment of SDR 0.59 from Cr. 2048-BD), and eventually to SDR 21.35 million (additional reallocation ofSDR 4.18 million from Cr. 1870-BD).

_/ The total disbursements from the four IDA credits were SDR20.8 million (US$29.64 million equivalent), including SDR9.22million (US$12.92 million equivalent) from Cr. 1467-BD, SDR 4.36 million (US$6.14 million equivalent) from Cr. 1784-BD), SDR 3.59 million (US$5.2 million equivalent) from Cr. 2048-BD) and SDR 3.63 million (USS5.38 million equivalent)from Cr. 1870-BD.

d/ Original PHRD grant funds of Japanese Yen 2.7 billion (USS20.0 million equivalent).e/ Revised due to depreciation in US dollar against Japanese Yen.

17Table 5: Key Indicators for Projt Imnplenwntation

Key implementation indicators at preparation Estimated Actual

1. Land Acquisition (ha) 80 317.4

2. Embankments

Retired (km) 44.2 46.7

Re-sectioned (km) 78.9 73.10

Stripping top soil (mi3 ) 435,000 399,810

Removing soft soil (M3

) 13,000 516,374

Existing embankment material (m3

) 357,000 375,707I .~~(M

Core fill class 1 (m3) 4,780,000 7,084,485

Cover layer class 1 (m 3) 3,773,000 4,733,265

3. Revetments (No.)

Under layer Class I stones 42,200 58,600

Armour layer pre-cast concrete blocks 89,000 110,600

4. Total Drainage structures (No.) 17 43

New 18

Repairs 25

5. Naval Academy river/sea wall (m3)

Hard cover layer 6,600 4,756

Compacted filter 815 355

Concrete 15,930 16,803

6. Consultancy services (man-months)

International 74 120

Local 293 714

Table 6: Key Indicators for Project Operation(Not applicable)

Table 7: Studies Included in Project(Not applicable)

18Table 8A: Project Costs

Estimate ! Revised Actual/Final Estimate'

Polder TKi | -US$ Tk | USS Tk J Us$ l(million)

Patenga 610.3 17.6 1,140.0 28.4 1,345.2 33.7

Bhaskhali 266.4 7.7 383.0 9.5 394.2 9.9

Sandwip 262.3 7.6 448.0 11.1 467.6 11.7

Anowara 172.0 5.0 276.0 6.9 327.4 8.2

Chakoria 131.8 3.8 246.0 6.1 201.3 5.1

Sitakunda 75.7 2.2 103.0 2.6 122.9 3.1

TOTAL 1,518.5 43.9 2,596.0 64.6 2,858.6 71.7

a Cyclone Protectioni Project 11, Project Preparation Report, KAMPSAX/BCEOM/DFH Consultants, May 1992.b KAMPSAX/BCEOM/DHI Consultants' Revision of Financial & Economic Analysis Report, June 1994.c Including USS2.8 million for value added taxes not included in the original estimates and about US$2.3 million for repair of

works damaged by the 1995 cyclone. Costs include USS2.5 million required for the remaining works in Polder 63/1A(Anowara) programmed to be completed by December 1996 through GOB financing.

Table 8B: Project Financing(US$ million)

Estimate a Revised b/ Actual/Final Estimate

Source

IDA 19.0 30.5 29.6

Japanese PHRD Grant 20.0 26.5 26.6

EC 1.8 3.1 c/ 5.2d/

GOB's contribution 3.1 4.5 10.3e/

TOTAL 43.9 64.6 71.7

Estimated at preparation of the Cyclone Protection Project 11, May 1992.Revised according to the increased costs of civil works and depreciation of Taka against US dollar vis-a-vis US dollaragainst Japanese Yen.

c/ Equivalent to ECU2.5 million when the agreement was signed in September 1992.d/ Equivalent to ECU4.3 million.Sy GOB's contributions increased from 7% to 14% due to the increased costs of civil works and land acquisition, the costs

required for GOB financing of the remaining works in Anowara Polder and additional costs of about US$2.8 million forvalue added taxes for payment to civil works contractors. (The VAT costs do not affect GOB net contribution to theproject.).

19Table 9: Economic Costs and Benefits(Excluding benefit of saving human lives)

ERR (0/6) Estimate a, Revised 5 d/ ICREstimate d/

Patenga Polder 43 25.3 19.0

Bashkhali Polder 13.6 9.2 8.5

Sandwip Polder 22.2 15.1 13.1

Anowara Polder 4.6 6.4 5.8

Chakoria Polder 12.4 8.3 8.2

Sitakundu Polder 6.0 6.8 6.1

Combined 6 polders e/ - 15.9 13.4

Whole PWP f' 14.2 14.8 -

Assumptions:

Project Life (years) 30 30 30

SCF 0.78 0.87 0.87

CF for Civil Works and O&M 0.75 0.75 0.75

Directed protected area for 6 polders (ha) 31,150 24,770 23,540

Net Cultivable Area for 6 polders (ha) 25,420 20,120 19,195

Afforestation area for 6 polders (ha) - 2,403 2,325

a Cyclone Protection Project II, Preparation Report, KAMPSAX/BCEOM/DHI, May 1992.b/ The analysis excluded benefits from afforestation.

Cyclone Protection Project 11, Revised Economic Analysis, KAMPSAX/BCEOM/DHI, June 1994.d/ The analysis included benefits from afforestation.5' Six polders financed by IDA Credits and Japanese grant funds.

IIncluding 6 polders financed by IDA Credits and Japanese grant funds, and 4 polders financed by the Saudigrant funds.

20

Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants

| ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~Original RevisedCovenant Present fujlfillment fulfillment Description of

Agreement Section type Status date date covenant Conmklents

Amending Section 3. 1 0 5 C- Project to be carried out byAgtreement to (a)* BWDB in accordance withpCA adniinistrative arrangements and

procedures satisfactory to IDA

.01(c) Section 3.10 10 C Selection of works in accord(b)* with agreed criteria and

procedures..01 (b) Section 3. 10 5 C Engage consultants prior to

Schedule 4 (c)(i)* entering civil works contracts

Section 3.10 (c) 10 C Land Ministry approval for land(ii)* acquisition prior to entering civil

works contracts.

* Section references refer to amendment to Credit 1467-BD. Similar provisions were included in amendmentsto Credits 1784-BD and 2048-BD, but locations were different in each agreement.

Covenant type:

8. indigeneous people1. account/audit 9. monitoring review and reporting2. financial performance/generate revenue from beneficiaries 10. project implementation not covered by categories 1-93. flow and utilizatioii of project funds 11. sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or other resource4. counterpart funding allocation5. management aspects of the project or executing agency 12. sectoral or cross-sectoral policy/regulatory institution action6. environmental covenants 13. other7. involuntary resettlement

Status:C = covenant complied with CD = complied with after delayNC = not complied with soon = compliance expected in reasonably short timeCP = complied with partially NYD = not yet due

Table 11: Concurrence with Operational Manual Statements

No lack of compliance with applicable operational manual statements was noted.

21

Table 12: Bank Resources: Staff Inputs(Data not available)

Table 13: Bank Resources: Missions

Perfomiance Rating

Stage of Monthi/ear Number of Days in Field-' Specialised Implementation Development Type ofProject Cycle Persons StaffSkills Status Objectives Problems i'

Representedl'

Through N/Aappraisal

Appraisal N/Athrough Boardapproval

Board N/Aapprovalthrougheffectiveness

Supervision 1992 2 12 1 N!A N/A M1993 4 24 21,D N/A N/A F,M1994 3 30 31,D 2 1 F,M1995 3 15 21 2 2 F,M

ICR 2 22 I.E N/A F,M

- ICR Mission's estimate.bi I Irrigation; E = Economic; D Disbursement.

F = Financial; M = Management.


BANGLADESH

COASTAL EMBANKMENT REHABILITATION PROJECTPRIORITY WORKS PROGRAMME

APPENDIX I

Mission's Aide-Memoire

1. Introduction

1. An FAO/World Bank Co-operative Programme team comprising Messrs.G. Schokman (Flood Control and Drainage Engineer, Mission Leader) and T. Lohavisavapanich(Economist) visited Bangladesh from 19 November to 3 December 1995 for preparation of theImplementation Completion Report (ICR). Initial meetings were held in Dhaka with Messrs.S.A.M. Rafiquzzaman, Task Manager, RMB, Altaf Ali, Member (O&M) of BWDB, Ataul Huq,Chief Engineer, CERP, Azhar Ali, Project Manager of PMU, and Abdul Rahman, Director ofPlanning Schemes I. The mission also met Mr. Abdur Rouf Chowdhury, the Acting Chairman ofBWDB. Subsequently, the mission made field visits to five out of six polders located in Chittagongand Cox's Bazaar Districts, and held discussions with the concemed project staff and farmers aswell as Mr. Z. Davidian, Acting Team Leader. The mission's findings are discussed in a wrap-upmeeting at the Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR) on 29 November 1995, chaired byMr. Muhammad Nazrul Islam, Secretary, MOWR.

2. The mission wishes to thank all concemed staff for the assistance and hospitalityextended to the mission during its stay in Bangladesh.

2. Background

3. In 1986, GOB had fonnulated a National Cyclone Protection Programme with theobjectives of minimizing the disastrous effects of cyclones and storm surges. The Programmeincluded plans for improving the coastal embankment system. In pursuance of the aboveprogramme, a consulting firm, financed by the European Union (EU) under Project No.ALA/91/18), assisted GOB in the preparation of the Cyclone Protection Project, presently calledthe Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project (CERP), for inclusion in the Bank's FY93 lendingprogramme of assistance to Bangladesh.

4. The preparation works were in progress when a devastating cyclone struckBangladesh in April 1991. As a result, the entire coastal embankment system in the north-eastemand eastem part of the Bay of Bengal came under intense surge pressure and suffered heavydamage. Thus, in addition to the improvements of the coastal embankment system originally

BANGLADESH: Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project-Priority Works ProgrammeAppendix I :Mission's Aide-Memoire

planned, it became necessary to rehabilitate the damaged embankments as quickly as possible toprotect areas against future cyclonic surges. GOB therefore requested EU assistance for theexisting consultant to prepare plans, designs and tender documents for the Priority WorksProgramme (PWP) for the reconstruction of the damaged coastal embankments. Theimplementation of PWP was divided into three parts according to sources of fundings: (i) Part Aunder GOB's own funds for repairs of 30 km embankments in Chittagong, Noakhali, Cox's Bazar,Khulna and Satkhira districts; (ii) Part B under the Saudi Government's grant fund forreconstruction of 67 km of embankments in four polders (64/lC, 66/3, 69 and 71); and (iii) Part Cunder IDA Credits for reconstruction of embanktnents and construction of new hydraulic structuresin five polders (61/1, 63/lA, 64/lA, 64/2B, and 72) and under the Japanese grant funding forPolder 62 and the sea wall at the Naval Academy.

3. Project Objectives

5. The objectives of the PWP were to: (i) protect the polders against inundation ofagricultural areas by saline water; (ii) provide protection against loss of life and damages caused bycyclonic surges by minimizing flooding and water flow velocities in the polders; and (iii) protect theExport Processing Zone (EPZ), the adjoining EPZ development areas and other major industrialareas and the airport within Polder 62 in Patenga.

6. The works under six polders were divided into eight contract packages and includedreconstruction of some 79 km embankments, construction of about 44 km of new (retired)embankments, 17 new hydraulic structures, and the sea wall in the Naval Academy, repairs of 21hydraulic structures and construction of allied protective works. The works were to be completedin FY93.

7.The total costs, including land acquisition and the engineering consultants, were estimated atabout Tkl,520 million (US$44.0 million). Initially, a total of SDR15.52 million (US$19.0 millionequivalent) was reallocated from three ongoing IDA Credits' to finance 90% of the total costs ofcivil works of five polders. The amount of IDA credit reallocation was subsequently increased toSDR16.58 million (increment of SDRI.06 million from Cr. 1467-BD), SDR17.17 million(increment of SDR0.59 million from Cr. 2048-BD) and eventually to SDR21.35 million (additionalreallocation of SDR4.18 million from Cr. 1870-BD). Thus, total reallocation from the IDA Creditsamounted to SDR21.35 million (US$30.50 million equivalent). The Japanese Governmentprovided grant finds (PHRD 2127-SBD) of about Yen 2.7 billion (US$20.0 million equivalent) tofinance 95% of the costs of civil works of Polder 62 and the sea wall of the Naval Academy, andthis was subsequently increased to US$26.50 million equivalent due to depreciation of the USdollar against the Japanese Yen. Similarly, EU grant funds were increased from ECU2.5 million toECU4.3 million (US$4.5 million equivalent) to cover the extended consultant's services. Theremaining proportion of the costs, 5%-10% of the costs of civil works and 100% of landacquisition, was to be met by GOB.

SDR 8.155 million (US$10.0 million equivalent) from Cr. 1467-BD, SDR 4.360 million (US$5.4million equivalent) from Cr. 1784-BD and SDR3.0 million (US$3.6 million equivalent) from Cr.2048-BD.

2

BANGLADESH: Coastal En,iba,iknient Rehabilitation Project-Priority Works ProgramileAppendix I Mlissioni's Aide-NMemiioire

4. Evaluation of Project Objectives

8. The project objectives to be achieved under PWP were clear, realistic and importantto protect agricultural areas from saline water intrusion, as well as people and their properties fromcyclonic storms. In addition, the improved design standards lowered the risks generally facedduring cyclonic storms, particularly in the protection of the industrial areas and airport ofChittagong. However, the limited preparation time to finalize the engineering documentation foraward of contracts, and the time allowed for completion of rehabilitation works were unrealistic.These factors were to a great extent responsible for cost overrun and completion delays varyingfrom one to two years. All contracts were awarded following international competitive procedures(ICB). The project consultants responsible for planning and designs were given the addedresponsibilities for contract management (including site supervision, and field tests). Although theExecutive Engineer was nominated the " Engineer" of the contract, the Project Consultant(designated as the "Engineer's Representative") by an agreement between the Chief Engineer (the"Employer") and the Consultant was given full responsibility for all aspects of contractmanagement. BWDB's responsibilities mainly through the Chief Engineer were limited to thesupervision of the consultant. Unfortunately the services of BWDB field staff below the level of theExecutive Engineer were not utilized in assisting the Chief Engineer and the Executive Engineer intheir supervisory role of the Consultant. In addition the project did not provide facilities to theBWDB field staff to improve their standards in construction supervision.

5. Achievements of Project Objectives

9. Physical Objectives. Substantial completion (about 91°%) of civil works in two 2 ofthe six polders was achieved by June 94, one year behind schedule. Three polders3 weresubstantially completed by June 95, two years behind schedule. The remaining works of the fivepolders mainly resulted from the May 1995 minor cyclone and wave erosion during monsoons, andrepair works are programmed for completion by December 3 1, 1995. At Anowara, the sixthpolder, physical progress is estimated at about 30%. The mission's estimates a 85% achievement byDecember 31, 1995.

10. Planning, Design, and Contract Management. Vital aspects to achieve theobjectives of PWP were: (a) planning to determine cyclone surge levels for various return periods,(b) design of embankments and hydraulic structures to minimize damage due to cyclonic storms;and (c) contract managemnent to ensure that contract specifications are adhered to and completionto agreed deadlines. Project consultants were responsible for these activities. Performiance on items(a) was of a high standard, and on item (b), the standard on embankment and protection works, andnew hydraulic structures was to an acceptable standard, whilst the designs for improvements and/orrepairs to existing hydraulic structures were deficient. In addition, no provision was made at theplanning phase to provide for inlets to the salt fields. Regarding the contract management,

2 Sitakundu (polder 61/1) and Sandwip (polder 72).

3 Patenga (polder 62), Bashkhali (polder 64/1 A) and Chakoria (polder 64/2B).

BANGLADESH: Coastal En ililkmcriet Rchabilitation Project-Priorit \Vorks ProgrammnceAppendi\ I: Ni sion's Aide-lemoire

according to project files and the Bank's supervision missions, perfonnance was satisfactory. Themission during field visits observed that with a few exceptions detailed in para 13, management ofcontracts has been satisfactory, and the required quality standards for earthworks, hydraulicstructures and protection works have been attained.

6. Main Factors affecting the Project

11. Factors not generally subject to GOB control. Inclement wet weather during themonths of April to June, and to a lesser extent dry weather above the nonnal weather conditionduring December and January retarded progress and to some extent influenced the deadlines set forcompletion. Construction season of 1993 experienced above average rainfall with precipitation inthe 1994 season reaching the maximum recorded. The 1995 season had minimum precipitation andprovided ideal conditions for construction.

12. Factors generally subject to GOB control. Factors affecting implementationinclude: (a) availability and release of funds, (b) approval of Project Proformia; (c) award of tenders,(d) land acquisition; and (e) approval of variation orders. Items (a). (b). and (d) were treatedexpeditiously. International tendering was initiated in late 1991/early 1992, about 6 months after theApril/May cyclonic storm. However, contract awards were made only in June/July 1992, sixmonths afler the call of tenders, with agreements signed on August 1, 1992. The programme ofconstruction was based on the presumption that work would commence in the dry season of 1992and completed by the end of June 1993. From the outset, the project suffered due to the prolongeddelay in contract awards. In spite of the initial set backs, it is surprising that the completion date ofJune 30, 1993 was maintained. Although the initiation and submission of Variation Orders werecarried out in a timely manner, prolonged delays took place in the processing by BWDB and finalapproval by its management. The Variation Orders were approved by the "Employer" (ChiefEngineer) and issued to the contractors. Most of the works were carried out but only partialpayments were made until fonnal approval was given by BWDB management with a delay of abouttwo years. This is in contravention of the contract agreement which stipulates that the "Employer"who is the Chief Engineer is responisible for the final approval of Variation Orders and payment.

13. Factors generally subject to implementing agency control. BWDB withconsiderable assistance from the project consultants was responsible for implementation. TheExecutive Engineer of the division was the "Engineer" of the contract and the consultant was the"Engineer's Representative". The consultant was mainly responsible for contract management.Generally contract management by the consultant was carried out satisfactorily. Administrative andfinancial aspects were addressed and executed in a timely manner. Desk review of project filesindicated that there were lapses in site supervisioni, pre-work surveys, finalization of plans andestimate of earthwork quantities were not completed before approval to go ahead with work wasgiven to contractors. This resulted in cost overrun being identified about one year aftercommencemnent of construction. Site supervisors were not always present during construction. Thisfactor could have influenced the quality of earthworks. During the field visits to Anowara polder bythe ICR mission, it was observed that earthworks were not done to the required specifications. Asnoted in para 10, the designs of existing hydraulic structures were defective and adequate inletstructures for the salt fields were not provided. BWDB was responsible for the acquisition of landfor construction purposes. The processing was carried out and funds were placed witil the Deputy

4

BANGLADESH: Coastal Embanikmilenit Rehabilitation Projesct-PrionIt Works l'rogramiammAppendix I Nlission's Aide-Memoire

Commissioners in a timely manner. However, at Bashkhali and Sandwip, objections by land ownersinterrupted implementation. At Sitakundu and Anowara, public opposition to the alignment ofretired embankments caused considerable delays. At Sitakundu, designs had to be changed toconform to public demands, and at Sandwip the land dispute affecting a section of embankmentwas resolved a few months back and work is now in progress.

14. A major deficiency in the contractors performance was the slow mobilization ofmanpower and construction equipment. Once mobilization was completed, manpower andconstruction equipment were adequate. Financial resources were generally adequate, howeverduring the closing stages of the project, delays in the settlement of Variation Orders by theimplementing agency affected the progress of the contractor.

15. Project Costs and Financing. Due mainly to substantial increases in earthworks(under-estimation at project preparation) and the increased land prices, the actual total costs ofPWP by December 1995, including the costs of land acquisition and the consultants, are estimatedat about Tk 2,645 million (US$66 million)4 , representing cost overrun of about 50% in nominalterms and 35% in real terms.

16. As of 30 September 1995, total disbursements of IDA Credits amounted toSDR17.97 million (US$25.2 million equivalent), and the undisbursed balance (from Cr. 1870-BD)is SDR3.38 million (US$4.73 million equivalent). Total disbursements under Japanese PH-RD grantamounted to Yen 2.56 billion, and the undisbursed balance is Yen 140 million (US$1.4 millionequivalent). Total undisbursed balance of the IDA Credit and the Japanese grant is US$6.13 millionequivalent.

17. Based on the costs of works completed under the variation orders (US$2.5 million)and the remaining works resulted from the 1995 Cyclone damages and the partial completion ofAnowara polder (US$3.5 million) to be completed by 31 December 1 995, additional disbursementsare estimated at US$5.5 million. The Japanese grant would be fully disbursed, while only US$4.1-million or 87% of the undisbursed balance of IDA Cr. 1870-BD (US$4.73 million) would beutilized, leaving US$0.63 million savings.

7. Project Stistainability

18. Sustainability of the polders is dependent on several factors. These are.(a) completion of all sea facing and internal embankments, protection works and the drainageregulators and in addition inlet structures for agriculture, shrimp and salt farms, (b) afforestation ofembankment slopes and the foreshore; (c) effective preventive and periodic maintenance ofeinbankments, protection works, and hydraulic structures; (d) damage repairs due to cyclonicstorms with a return period of one event in 5 years and one event in 20 years; and (e) damagerepairs due to wave erosion caused by annual monsoon spring tides. Civil works of three(Sitakundu (P 61/1), Patenga (P 62), Bashkhali (P 64/]A) of the six polders have been completedsufficiently to attain project objectives. All civil works under PWP funding for Sandwip would be

IInclulding about US$2.5 miillioii of works unider Variation Orders completed by mid-Novemiber 1995 andUS$3.5 million of the remaining works to be coiiipleted bv December 1995.

5

BANGLADESH: Coastal Embaiikinenit Reliabilitation Project-Priontv Works l'riograiniiticAppendix I:Nlission's Aide-Niernoire

completed by December 31, 1995, and the remaining works limited to complete sections to ensurefill security would be completed under CERP (Cr. 2638-BD). Civil works of Chakoria polder hasbeen substantially completed. Further improvements proposed under PWP are programmed to becarried out under CERP. At Anowara, the sixth polder, about 85% of civil works is expected to becompleted by December 31, 1995, with the balance to be carried out under CERP. Embankmentand foreshore afforestation are to be carried out under CERP, with pilot foreshore afforestationplanned in early 1996 as an emergency operation at vulnerable locations in the six polders.Maintenance activities under a planned programme utilizing the community (landless families,persons displaced due to the project, squatters) are being funded under CERP, commencing June1995. Funds have also been provided under CERP for damage repairs due to nornal monsoonspring tides under the periodic maintenance. Damage repairs due to cyclonic stonns with a returnperiod of 5 years have also been included as a separate item of maintenance. Damage r epairs dueto cyclonic storms with a return period of one event in 20 years have to be carried tlidelspecial funding, and is not incitided tuider CERP. With these measures, if carried outeffectively, sustaiiiability of the project to meet the project objectives is ensurled.

8. Futtire Opeerationial and Action Plans

19. In order to commence an effective operational plan, the incomiiplete works identifiedduring the November ICR mission and in the taking over certificates should be completed. Plans tocomplete the remaining works in four polders and the sea wall by 31 December-, 1995 werecompleted by BWDB and the consultants and works have now started, while the O&M plans in sixpolders are now being prepared and should be completed by December 3 1, 1 995. The subject isdiscussed under three categories incomplete works, afforestation, and operation and inaintenance.

20. Incomplete Works and Action Plan. The works include:

(i) Sitakundti (Polder 61/1). Three existing sluices located at chainages 0,1.0, and 2.05, were repaired under the project. The sea side headwall,and the abutments are not constructed to the design profile of tileembankment. Repairs were done under contract # 7. The plan lin the biddocument indicates that the walls should matchi the designed sea sideslope (I on 7). Thlis defect has induced severe erosioni and Llilessimmediate action is taken to repair the erosion and also raise the walls,erosion will accelerate and the location would be vulnier-able tooutflanking and eventual breaching. The defect should be remediedduring the construction season of 1996, and funds from the SystemRehabilitation Project (SRP) could be utilized; and (ii) blockprotection work at the section damaged by the May 95 cyclone(chainage 2.5) is being carried out under contract # 7 on a variationorder. The work would be completed by December 31, 1995;

(ii) Patenga (Polder 62). Embankimient toe at Patenga North and South andthe backfilling at the sea wall in the Naval Academy were eroded. Repairwork has now commenced at the three sites on variation orders. Work atPatenga North and South would be completed by December 3 1, 1995.

6

BANGLADESH: Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project-Priority Works PrograrmneAppendix 1:Mission's Aide-Memoire

Given the difficulties of mobilization, obtaining specified backfillingspoil, and the added work in placing concrete slabs, in the mission'sview, it would be optimistic to expect completion of the work byDecember 31, 1995. As the backfill is critical to the security of the seawall, it is essential that funds are provided for completion which could beachieved by the end of January 1996;

(iii) Anowara (Polder 63/1A). Work cannot be completed by December 31,1995. The remaining works would be carried out under CERP;

(iv) Bashkhali (Polder 64/lA). Civil works have been completed.Embankment toe has been eroded due to monsoon spring tides. Repairscould be carried out under CERP maintenance funds;

(v) Chakoria (Polder 64/2B). The closure at chainage 107.0 to 107.5 hasnot been completed to design profile. The contractor should completethe defective work by December 31, 1995. Further improvementsproposed for this polder are planned to be carried out under CERP. Theimprovements are needed for protection against damages caused bycyclonic storms; and

(vi) Sandwip (Polder 72). Work on section (chainage 43.15 - 44.50),delayed and eventually omitted due to acquisition of land, has nowcommenced since the disputes had been settled. The works will becompleted by December 31, 1995. The remaining re-section, andretirement works, inclusive of the new retirement at the southern end(needed due to the recent erosion of the sea bank) have been includedunder CERP. The mission did not visit the polder, but it is understoodthat repairs to all the existing sluices carried out under the PWP contractpackage were slmilar to that carried out at Sitakundu (see para 20 (a)above). The improvements could be carried out under the nminor civilworks item of CERP.

21. Afforestation. Foreshore afforestation has a major impact on arresting erosion ofembankments particularly during annual monsoon spring tides, and cyclonic storms with a returnperiod of 5 years. The PWP polders, particularly Sitakundu, Patenga, Anowara, and Sandwip arevulnerable to wave erosion in gaps where no mangrove forests exists. These locations are nowexposed to wave erosion. CERP, besides providing extensive foreshore afforestation, has includedthe implementation of pilot schemes to be carried out in early 1996. The schemes could located atthe vulnerable sections of these polders.

22. Embankment slopes afforestation has been provided under CERP. The work atPatenga, Bashkhali, and Sandwip is scheduled to commence in FY96, at Sitakundu and Chakonra inFY97, and at Anowara in FY98. A major issue, particularly at Sitakundu and to a lesser extent atBashkhali is the cultivation of vegetables on the embankment slopes and crest. This has to be

7

BANGLADESH: Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project-Priority Works ProgranmeAppendix I Mission's Aide-Memoire

addressed immediately as the proposed operational plan for CERP would be jeopardised,and the sustainability of project works would be questionable.

23. Operation and Maintenance (O&M). The method of execution of O&M activitiesis described in detail in the Staff Appraisal Report of CERP. It also includes the activities(preventive and periodic), responsibilities of BWDB, the Forest Department, the Community,Locally Elected Officials, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and the ImplementationSupport Consultant. Repairs to damages caused by cyclonic storms with a return period of 5 yearshave been provided for. Annual budgetary allocations for each polder has been estimated for IDAfunding and GOB contributions, and agreement has been reached during negotiations of CERP onthe financing arrangements. The O&M manual and the operational plan for the 21 polders,including PWP polders, are to be updated to include details of community participation inembankment routine (preventive) maintenance and the concept of afforestation as a protectivemeasure. BWDB needs to complete the operational plan for the six polders under PWP byDecember 31, 1995, and also commence operations with funds allocated for FY96

24. The FY96 budgetary allocations allowed for preventive and periodic maintenance, andcyclone damage repairs could be utilized for repairs of eroded sea side slopes caused by waveaction, runnels caused by rains, and the mninor slips.

9. Lessons Learned

25. As the project being limited to civil works, the lessons learned were mainly related todetailed designs, engineering documentation up to award of contracts, and contract management.These lessons are:

(a) even under emergency procedures for land acquisition, public oppositionparticularly affected land owners, could delay handing over of land. Theinvolvement of communities and locally elected officials is essential inexpediting the processing and taking over of land;

(b) public opposition to the alignment of retired embankments was a main factorin implementation delays. Consultation with land owners and the affectedcommunities at a very early stage of planning, could resolve impasse;

(c) during the planning phase, beneficiaries need to be involved in deciding theprovision of hydraulic structures, particularly inlets to shrimp and salt fields,and flushing sluices for agricultural crops, and their judgements on therequirements should be addressed critically;

(d) designs for improvements and/or repairs to existing structures should bedone to minirmze maintenance"

(e) contract management by consultants of works awarded on tenders following

ICB procedures is efficient and improved quality in civil works constructioncan be assured. However, to ensure improved supervision and quality

BANGLADESH: Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project-Priority Works ProgramnmeAppendix I :.Mission's Aide-Memoire

control, and the early identification of contract issues such as cost overruns,BWDB in its role as the "Employer" of the contract, should effectivelysupervise the Consultant. In addition, it is essential that the role of BWDBfield staff in assisting the "Employer" in future works is clearly specified, andthese staff be provided with facilities to improve their construction standards;

(f) even under an emergency operation, consideration should be given to theconsiderable time required for completion of preconstruction activitiesleading to the tender awards, and the construction period. Under PWP, anunrealistic implementation period of two years was allowed forpreconstruction and construction activities. Pre-construction activitiescontinued for a year and construction for three years, and

(g) the importance of foreshore afforestation was identified at projectpreparation and funds were provided from savings from Cr. 1467-BDHowever, BWDB and its monitoring organization did not give sufficientimportance to the needs for these activities and funds were not utilized. Inaddition, the foreshore afforestation is being carried out by the ForestryDepartment (FD) under the Green Belt Project funded by ADB. It is evidentthat there is no coordination between FD and BWDB and thus criticallocations were not given priority. Most of the damages sustained during theMay 1995 cyclone and the normal monsoon spring tides could have beenaverted if the foreshore of the vulnerable locations of the embankments hadbeen afforested.

10. Follow-up

26. The mission will return to Rome and prepare the ICR for transmittal to the WorldBank by end January 1996. BWDB is requested to prepare its own evaluation as per Bank'sGuidelines and send it to the World Bank Resident Mission in Dhaka by the same date

9

BANGLADESH


APPENDIX 2

ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION

1 . The main benefits as identified at project preparation were: (i) prevention of losses duringcyclonic surges to human lives, agricultural production including crops, livestock, shrimp and salt;(ii) protection of property and infrastructures (houses, roads, culverts, etc.) in the six polders;(iii) protection of property, raw materials and value added of products in the Export Processing Zone(EPZ) and major industrial areas in the Patenga Polder; and (iv) prevention of salinity intrusions andstorm surges during normal monsoons resulting in increased agricultural production. The ERRsdescribed below include quantifiable benefits only, and do not try to attribute value to human livessaved. This operation was presented to the Board as a proposal to amend ongoing projects to dealwith emergency post-cyclone rehabilitation, and reference was not made to economic returns. In thefollow-up CERP project it was specifically stated in the SAR and the MOP that, given the importantbut non-quantifiable value of saving human lives, IDA could accept ERRs for quantifiable benefitsbelow what would be nonnally required. The proposal for Japanese financing of PWP did includeestimated quantifiable economic returns for the project as a whole, and noted that, given the large non-quantifiable benefits, the program was economically viable.

2. The economic rates of return (ERRs), excluding the value of saving human lives, werecalculated at project preparation by the consultants in May 1992' for the individual polders and thewhole Priority Works Programmne (PWP) consisting of 10 polders i.e., inclusive of four poldersreconstructed with the use of Saudi grant funds 2 The estimated ERRs for the six polders funded byIDA and the Japanese grant funds ranged from 4.6% for the Anowara Polder to 43% for the PatengaPolder and 14.2% for the whole PWP as shown below:

I Cyclone Protection Project II, Preparation Report, Kampsax Intemational A/S, BCEOM Danish Hydraulic Institutein associated with Development Design Consultants ltd.(KASAX/BCEOM/D1)II), May 1992.

2 Included 6 polders funded by IDA Credits and Japanese PHRD GTrant funds, and 4 polders (Cox's Bazar, Chanua,Moheskhali and Kutubdia) bv the Saudi grant funds.

BANGLADESH: Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project-Pnority Works ProgrammeAppendix 2: Economic Re-Evaluation

Polder Financial Investment Length of Direct Net Cultivable ERRSCosts (11T M) Embankment Protected Area Area (ha) (%/6)

___________ _ ___________________ (km) (ha)

Patenga 610.3 21.5 1,420 1,020 43.0

Bashkhali 266.4 26.2 4,700 4,300 13.6

Sandwip 262.3 38.5 18,700 15,000 22.2

Anowara 172.0 14.5 1,500 1,250 4.6

Chakoria 131.8 16.4 4,100 3,250 12.4

Sitakunda 75.7 6.1 730 600 6.0

Whole PWP 2,038.4 189.5 43,900 33,320 14.2

3. The main assumptions used in the economic analysis were:

(i) project life of 30 years, including a construction period of one year;

(ii) all costs and benefits were expressed in 1992 constant prices. The economic pricesof traded goods were based on the 1992 world prices forecasted by the WorldBank. For non-traded goods and services, financial prices were adjusted toeconomic prices by a Standard Conversion Factor (SCF) of 0.78;

(iii) the financial investment costs of civil works and structures, and the operation andmaintenance (O&M) costs were adjusted to border prices by a conversion factor(CF) of 0.75. The O&M costs were estimated for protective works, routine andperiodic maintenance;

(iv) the costs of land acquired for construction were valued at the net productionbenefit in without project situation (WOP);

(v) major quantifiable benefits included in the analysis were: (a) protection of losses tocrop, fishery, livestock and salt production; (b) protection of property andinfrastructures; (c) protection of property and raw materials and value added ofproducts in EPZ and major industrial areas in the Patenga Polder; and (d) increasesin agricultural production resulting from protection against intrusion of saline waterand flood caused by cyclonic surges with a return periods of 20 years,

(vi) in the absence of protection from intrusion of saline water, yields of crops wereassumed to decrease from present levels by 2% annually over 5 years in WOP inpolders without irrigation facilities and by 4% annually over 5 years in WOP in

2

BANGLADESH: Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project-Priority Works ProgrmmeAppendix 2: Economic Re-Evaluation

polders with irrigation facilities. In with project situation (WP), yields of cropswere assumed to increase by 5%-10%, while the cropping intensities wereassumed to increase from 134% to 152%;

(vii) benefit from human lives saved was not quantified, though this is a major benefitsof the PWP; and

(viii) benefits from afforestation were quantified but not included in the analysis;

4. ERRs of the individual polders and the whole PWP were re-calculated during projectimplementation in June 1994 by the consultant3 to reflect the increases in the construction costs, andthe afforestation benefits. At that time, ERR for the combined six polders financed under IDA Creditsand Japanese grant funds was also estimated. The revised ERRs for the six polders ranged from 6.4%for the Anowara Polder to 25.3% for the Patenga Polder, 15.9% for the combined six polders and14.8% for the whole PWP as shown below:

Polder Financial Length of Direct Net Cult. Afforestation ERRsInvestment Embankment Protected Area Area (ha) (%)Costs (Tk M) (km) Area (ha) (ha)

Patenga 1,140.0 20.9 1,420 1,020 303.2 25.3

Bashkhali 383.0 25.6 4,700 4,300 612.4 9.2

Sandwip 448.0 38.7 14,660 9,700 715.8 15.4

Anowara 276.0 14.7 1,500 1,250 344.2 6.4

Chakoria 246.0 14.3 4,100 3,250 302.1 8.3

Sitakundu 103.0 6.6 730 600 125.2 6.8

six polders 2,596.0 120.8 24,770 20,120 2,402.9 15.9

Whole 3,319.0 187.1 37,520 28,020 3,487.2 14.8PWP

5. The analysis followed the assumptions used at project preparation in May 1992. The mainrevisions were:

3. Cyclone Protection Project II, Revised Financial and Economic Analysis, KAMPSAX/BCEOM/DHI, June 1994

3

BANGLADESH: Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Projed-Priority Works ProgrammeAppendix 2: Economic Re-Evaluation

(i) all costs and benefits were expressed in 1994 constant prices. The economic pricesof traded goods were based on the 1995 world prices forecasted by the WorldBank. For non-traded goods and services, financial prices were adjusted toeconomic prices by using SCF of 0.87;

(ii) the financial investment costs were adjusted upward by about 70% to reflectchanges in quantity of earthworks which were greatly under-estimated at projectpreparation. The investment costs of afforestation on embankment and theforeshore were included in order to reduce cyclone damage and the maintenancecosts,

(iii) inclusion of benefits from protection of losses to crop, fishery, livestock and saltproduction and property and infrastructures in the six polders, and property andraw materials and value added of products in EPZ and major industrial areas in thePatenga Polder (see Table 2 for the official registered losses caused by the 1991cyclone, and Table 3 for losses avoided in economic terms);and

(iv) inclusion of additional benefits from afforestation.

6. At project completion, ERRs were re-estimated for the individual polders and thecombined six polders financed under IDA Credits and Japanese grant funds. No attempt was made tore-estimate the ERR for the whole PWP due to non-availability of costs and benefits data in respect offour polders financed by the Saudi grant funds and because this ICR relates to that part of PWP whichwas funded by IDA Credits and Japanese and EC grant funds. Also for the Anowara Polder for whicha major portion of civil works would be completed by December 1996 using GOB funding, the re-estimated ERR is based on the present cost estimates to complete the remaining 10.1 km embankmentand the likely benefits that are anticipated to accrue. On this basis, the re-estimated ERRs for theindividual polders range from 6% for the Anowara and Sitakundu Polders to 19.4% for the PatengaPolder (Tables 8-14) compared to the revised ERRs of 6.4% to 25.3% estimated during projectimplementation. The lower ERRs are due mainly to cost overrun, the longer construction periodresulting in delayed accrual of benefits, and the reduced protected areas and agricultural andafforestation areas (Table 7). The re-estimated ERR for the combined six polders is 13.5% (Table 14)compared to the revised ERR of 15.9% estimated during implementation. The results of the re-estimated ERRs are shown below:

4

BANGLADESH: Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project-Priority Works ProgrammeAppendix 2: Economic Re-Evaluation

Polder Financial Length of Direct Net Cult. Afforestation ERRsInvestment Embankment Protected Area (ha) Area (ha) (%)

(Tk (km) Area (ha)

Patenga 1,227.4 21.1 1,420 1,020 303.2 19.0

Bashkhali 379.7 25.6 4,700 4,300 612.4 8.5

Anowara 334.4 a/ 14.7 1,500 1,250 344.2 5.8

Sandwip 460.6 36.5 11,500 9,100 675.0 13.1

Chakoria 194.7 12.5 3,690 2,925 265.0 8.2

Sitakundu 126.7 6.6 730 600 125.2 6.1

six polders 2,689.5 117.0 23,540 19,195 2,325.0 13.4

a! Including additional costs of Tk 20 million for land acquisition and Tk 114 million for constructionto complete the remaining 10.1 km embankment.

7. The economic re-evaluation followed the assumptions used in the consultant's revisedeconomic analysis. The main differences are:

(i) project life of 30 years, including a construction period of 3-4 years;

(ii) the investment costs of the six polders were based on the actual expenditures, plusadditional costs of Tk 90.65 million for repair works damaged by the 1995 minorcyclone at the Patenga and Sitakundu Polders and the sea wall of the NavalAcademy, and additional construction costs of Tk 114 million to complete theremaining 10.1 km embankment at the Anowara Polder (see Tables 4-5), restatedin 1994 constant prices and adjusted to border prices by CF of 0.75; and

(iii) reduced protected areas, agricultural and afforestation areas in the Sandwip andChakoria Polders.

pwpapp2

5

BANGLADESH Table 1Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project (Priority Works Programme)

Implementation Completion ReportBase Data for Polders, Agriculture and Afforestation Areas a/

Name of Polder No. Length of Gross Direct Agric. ..... Cropped Area (ha) .......... Afforestatlion Area.Polder Embnk. Protected Protected Beneflted Present With Total Total

(km) Area (ha) Area (ha) Area (ha) Project Length (km) Area (ha)

Patenga 62 20.9 2550 1420 1020 1846 1926 20.9 303.2Bashkhali 64/1A 25.6 12700 4700 4300 7876 8213 25.6 612.4Sandwip 72 38.7 14660 12320 9700 17460 18430 38.7 715.8Anowara 63/1A 14.7 5450 1500 1250 2288 2388 14.7 344.2Chakoria 64/2B 14.3 7000 4100 3250 5953 6208 14.3 302.1Silakunda 61/1 6.6 730 730 600 1099 1146 6.6 125.2

Sublotal (6 poiders) 120.8 43090 24770 20120 36522 38311 120.8 2402.9

Cox's Bazar 66/3 4.6 3000 3000 900 1648 1719 4.6 108.0Chanua 64/IC 10.0 3000 1500 1200 2198 2292 10.0 138.9Moheskhali 69 12.9 2800 2800 1400 2564 2674 12.9 314.8Kulubdia 71 38.8 5450 5450 4400 8059 8404 38.8 522.7

Total 187.1 57340 37520 28020 50991 53400 187.1 3487.3

a/ Based on estimates given in the Revised Financial and Economic Analysis, Kampsax International A/S. June 1994.

BANGLADESH Table 2Coastal Emnbankment Reliabililation Project

Priority Works ProranimeImplernentation Completion Report

Official Registered Losses from 1991 Cyclone- 1991 Fhiancial Values (Tk Milion) It

Name of Poder No. Gross Direct Agric. .................................................. Lossses......................... . ............................. Total IndusrialPodder Protected Protected Benelited Livestock ..... Shrimp ........ Sall Houses Roads & Losses Losses 2/

Area (ha) Area (ha) Area (ha) Value Area (ha) Value Value Value Culverts DirectValue Protected

AreaMTk MTk MTk MTk MTk MTk MTk MTk

Patenga 62 2550 1420 1020 NA NA NA NA 'NA NA NA 3970Bashkhali 64/lA 12700 4700 4300 15.3 50 2.0 NA 150.0 9.4 176.7Sandwip 72 14660 12320 9700 51.1 218.6 23.0 292.7Anowara 63/1A 5450 1500 1250 5.4 45.0 3.0 . 53.4Chakaria 64/2B 7000 4100 3250 19.2 49.5 8.2 76.9

-i Silakunda 61/1 730 730 600 2.2 50 2.0 71.3 1.5 77.0Cox's BaearG6/3 3000 3000 900 4.3 1500 60.8 32.0 20.3 6.0 123.4Chanua 64/1 C 3000 1500 1200 5.4 21 3 29.4Moheskhali 69 ' 2800 2800 1400 5.9 750 30.4 15.6 52.5 5.6 110.0Kulubdia 71 5450 5450 4400 24.8 90 3.6 2B.1 150.0 10.9 217.4

Total 57340 37520 28020 133.6 2440 98.8 75.7 778.2 70.6 1156.9 3970

1/ Based on oflicial regstered losses for 1 in 40 years.2/ Industrial Losses due to the April 1991 cyclone in tIle Export Processing Zone were estimated at Tk 3,820 million, including damages to industrial buildings, damagesto production equipment, raw material and products, and losses in value added of products due to down-time alter flooding, and Tk 150 million damages to Chittagongairport inlrastructures and equipment.

Source: Cyclone Protection Project II, Revised Financial and Economic Analysis, KAMPSAX?BCEOM/DHI, June 1994.

BANCADESH Table 3Coasail Embarkmerlt Rehabtlzabon Project

Prcxity Waks ProcjamrnmeIiiiplemiientatlon completim Report

Indirect and Agicul.iraf Losses AvoIded- 1094 Ecaiomlc Values (Tk MiltIm) 11

Name of Podder No. Gross Direct .................................................. Lossses Avoided ................................................................... Total CumulatvePodder Protected Protected Livestoc ropiLos .............. Shrimp .......... H.............................. Houses Rcads& Losses Mnualsed

Area (ha) Nrea (ia) Value 2/ Value 3/ Area (ha) Vaiue 4/ Prea p(a) Value 5/ Value 6/ Cuivers Cirect Losses AvdidedValue 7/ Protected Benefits

Area 8/MTk MTk MTk MTk MTk MTk MTk MTk

Paten g9/ 62 2550 1420 2.13 NA NA NA NA NA 2.1 4.2 215.8Bashkhaii 64/iA 12700 4700 15.3 9.11 23.5 15.3 4.7 1.7 112.1 7.0 160.5 4.1Sandwip 72 14660 12320 51.1 17.02 163.4 18.4 249.9 6.4Mno"aa 63/1A 5450 1500 5.4 2.6 15.0 9.8 33.6 2.2 53.6 1.3O<aka ia 64/2B 7000 4100 19.2 6.88 82 29.9 37.0 * 6.1 99.1 2.4Stakunda 61/1 730 730 2.2 1.43 53.3 1A 58.0 1.5Cox'sBazar66f3 3000 3000 4.3 1.9 165.0 107.7 60 21.9 15.1 4.5 155.4 4.0Chanua 64/iC 3000 1500 5.4 2.5 7.5 4.9 45 2.8 15.7 2.2 33.5 0.9Moheskhall 69 2800 2800 5.9 3.0 84 54.8 1120 70.0 39.2 4.2 177.1 4.6Kutunbdia 71 5450 5450 24.8 10.5 327 213.4 327 119.3 112.1 8.1 488.2 12.6

aX Total 57340 37520 133.6 57.1 622 405.9 1638.7 245.6 581.5 55.9 1479.61 253.6

1/ This rhta has been based an dliciai regslered tosses lao 1 In 40 years.2/1991 tinancial value restatedTn 1994 constant pices and adjusted Into economiccalue by using SCF of 0.87.3/ Estmated at 25% of ihe without project net prodciln benefits per year. equIvalent to 50% of gross produiction benefits lost Icr hail year and hag cd the loss aeventade by embarkment.4/ Assuming avera-ge yield per year at 3 ton/ha at ecrnomic farm gate price f Tk 217.5/kg, and propcrtn of the drecUly protected area taken for shlrmp productmn: 05% fla Bankhall and 1% fa Anowara.5/Assumingaverage yield per year of 120 tn/ha ateccnomlc farm gate price of Tk3.040/ton, and propartn the directly protactedarea takenfcr saltprodction:0.1% cr Banskhalland2%acrChkcrila.6/ 1991 value restated In 199.1 constant pIce and adjusted by CF of 0.65, and assumed that embarkment prevents S% d damage7/ 1991 value of roads and riuverts estimated at Tk 2,000 per directly protected ta and 5% and 30% d replacement costs taken as value of cdtma6e restated in 1994 constant price and adjusted by CF of o.658/ Calcubted according to Flood Protection Coordinatlon Organlzalion (FPCO) gildefnes fcr expectaimn and Irecqiency f fnood damage Icr embankment designed for prevention d a 1 In 20 years event.9/ Annualised cumulatve value df losses avticbnce benefits frr Patenga taken drecly ont i dlidal reUsteaed losses.

BANGLADESH Table 4Coastbl Embankment Rehabitblon Project

Pricrity Works Progammelmplemenbttion Completion Report

Project Expenditures (Tk Milon)

Name of Poder No FY92/93 FY93/94 FY94/95 FY95/96 FY96197 TdaiPolacer al a/

1. Patengp 621.1 CMi WoksPatenge North 239.9 134.7 68.6 710 5162Patengs Soudh 165.8 121.6 113.7 69.3 470.2Naval Academy 526 71 1 4.6 It87 147.0SubtbI 456.1 329.4 186.9 159.0 1133.41.2 LandAcquiskWon 435 314 13.0 0.3 60.21.3 Eng AAdmin (ELa b/ 29.9 27.0 325 lao 99.41.4 Taxes 0o 0.0 0.0 0.0 522 522Taal 531.5 359.8 232.4 169.3 522 1345.2

Z Bashkhali 641lA2.1 Cvi Woks 206.9 81.2 310 51 326.2122LandAcquslskon 231 0.0 0.0 11 2522.3 Eng. &Admn (EU) 119 6.6 5.4 0.9 26.82.4 Taxes Q0 0.0 0.0 0.0 110 110Tdal 243.9 87.8 38,4 9.1 110 394.2

D 1 Smndwip 723.1 Chi Works 175.4 179.4 17.5 17.8 390.1a2 LandAcqusiton 19.0 1.0 10 Q0. 21033 Eng. Admn (EU) 11.8 151 39 &2 3a914 TaXIs 0.0 0.0 0.0 Q0 18.0 t5OTotal 206.2 195.5 26.3 21.0 150 467.0

& Alowttra DiA4.1 CMIwolrk 723 25.3 419 24.1 114.0 282.64.2LandAcqustlon 8.6 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.14.3 Eng. &Admh (EU) 50 Z2 7.8 7.7 0.0 2274.4 Taxos 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 110 110Ta'l StL 288 5a7 31.8 127.0 327.4

5 Chkolra 64/2BE1 CtVI works 1172 310 2.6 19 174.712 Land Acquisbon 3.9 0.3 .0 0.0 4.253Eng. &Admhi EU) 7.4 la 36 6 0.6 14.41.4 Taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 to toTotal 128.5 36.1 24.2 4.5 t0 201.3

& Stakunde 61/1tI CdWlworks 36.9 218 9.8 211 916

62LandAcqusition 3.8 0.5 0.0 7.7 1Z063 Eng. &Admh (E) 25 22 1.7 4.5 10.96.4 Taxes 00 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 4.4Toal 412 25.5 11.5 353 4.4 122.9

Grand Tdl 1239.4 736.5 38e1.5 271.0 224.6 2858.0

a/ IncIding cost o repak works damaged by the 1995 cyckne and costs tocompleterematning wcrksat Patengs. Stlkundu and Anoswara Poldes.These figvres elude the budgetary alomatin d US$4.3 milon which BWDB charged to tis proect as7% o cMlI work wet to cots share o BWDB's overheadand engineering office since the enginerIng works were substeniay carred out by EU TechnIcal Team.b/ propcrtxnated tom the tobl enginswing and a iministraton costs

Source: Cycone Protection Proect I. Progess Repot KAMPSAX/BCEO M/DHL October 1995.Land acositeion costs are oroAded bv OWDB. Chitboona Dviskon

MAM-AU Table 5OaCoastal Emtbrkment fttbilration Project

Pricrity Warls ProgrammeImplementalan CampleIn flRpertCvM Waics Expendclres (1k Mllrn)

LIrrEnt Prices)

Name d Pdder No. FY92193 FYS3J94 FY94,g5 FY5/6 8 FY98/97 ToliPdder

1. Pateni 821.1 ChF WcrksPaUnVa Norh 239.9 134.7 68.6 7&0 516.2Pap Scuth 165.6 121.6 113.7 69.3 470.2Nval Acdeny 52.6 7361 4.6 16.7 147.0Subbtioal 458.1 329.4 186.9 159.0 1133.4

12 Eng. & AdrIrn (EL) b/ 29.9 27.0 32.5 10.0 99.413 Taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.2 52.2TaIl 488.0 356.4 219.4 169.0 52.2 1285.0

2. BaslfIll 64/lA2.1 ClWf Wcrs 208.9 81.2 33.0 5.1 326.222 Eng & Adrrnn (ELu 139 6.6 5.4 0.9 26.823 Taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.0 150

- TaMI 22D.8 87.8 38.4 6.0 15.0 368.00

3. Sandlwlo 723.1 CIwWorks 175.4 179.4 17.5 17.8 390.132Eng.&Adn(ELO 11.8 15.1 3.8 3.2 33.933 Taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16O 18.0Tclal 157.2 194.5 21.3 21.0 16O 442.0

4.Anawea 63/1A4.1 CbF waks 72.3 26.3 45.9 24.1 114.0 282.642Eng.&AdnIrn(ELJ) 5.0 2.2 7.8 7.7 0.0 2Z743 Taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1&o iaoTotal 77.3 28.5 53.7 31.8 127.0 318.3

5. Clhkcr 64fRB5.1 CMi woks 117.2 330 20.6 3.9 174.752Eng.&Adrrin(ELB 7.4 2.8 3.6 0.6 14.453 Taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.0 A.0Talai 124.6 35.8 24.2 4.5 8.0 197.1

6.Slakunda 61/16.1 CIw works 36.9 258 9.8 231 95.663Eng &Ad&in(nEL 2.5 2.2 1.7 4.5 10.98A Taxes 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 4.4Tola 39.4 28.0 11.5 27.6 4.4 110.9

Grad Taal 1137.3 731.0 368.5 259.9 224.6 2721.3

a/ lncrdn cogsts fo realr waiks damaged by tie 1995 cydies and costs Iy coxplefiUof d remakg wuoks at Pamnga, Sltunki and Anowe pdcers.b Pr lraaontedkm tie to an ang d acmadnitrsiratitn costs.

SOUCE: Cydcre Protectir Prolect II, Progoess aport KAMBIS(CEOK4D3-, OCtober 195.I and arruim rAts wefi rrnjMtlwW thw RAFM. rNtnmn rIvb-nn

BANGLADESH Table 5(b)Coastal Embankment Ra abilkaton Project

Prioriey Works ProgrammeImplementaton Completon Report

Economic Costs of Ch Works (Tk Milion)(1994 ConstantPrice)

Name of Pdider No. FY92193 FY93/94 FY94/95 FY9S/96 FY98/97 TotalPdder

1. Patenga 62CMv Works a/b/ 380.7 259.4 140.2 115.7 875.9Eng. & Admhi (EU) ald/ 31.4 284 325 9.7 101.9

Total 392.1 287.8 172.7 125.4 977.9

2. Bashkhali 641 ACivi Works 162.9 63.9 24.8 3.7 255.3Eng. & Admin (EU) 14.6 6.9 5.4 0.9 27.8

Total 177.5 70.9 30.2 4.6 283.1

3. San dwip 72Clvi Works 138.1 141.3 13.1 12.9 305.5Eng. & Admin (EU) 12.4 15.9 3.8 3.1 35.1

Totd 150.5 157.1 16.9 16.1 340.6

4. Anowara 6Y1AClvi works 56.9 20.7 34.4 17.5 829 212.5Eng. & Admin (EU) 5.3 2.3 7.8 7.5 0.0 228

Total 622 23.0 422 25.0 829 235.4

5. Chakorla 64/2BCivil works 92.3 26.0 15.5 2.8 138.6Eng. & Admhi (EU) 7.8 2.9 3.6 0.6 14.9

Total 100.1 26.9 19.1 3.4 0.0 151.5

6. Sltekunda 61/1CMlv works 29.1 20.3 7.4 168 73.5Eng. & Admin (EU) 2.6 2.3 1.7 4.4 11.0

Total 31.7 22.6 9.1 21.2 0.0 84.5

Grand Totd 914.1 590.3 290.1 -195.6 829 2073.0

a/ Financial costs were re-stated In 1994 constant prices by wholesale price ndexxbl A4usted Into border prices by CF of 0.75.c/ Adjusted Into border prices by SCF of 0.87.b/ Adjusted Into border prices by CF of 1.0.

BANGLADESH Table 6Coastal Embanikment Rehabilitation Project

Priority Works ProgrammeImplementation Completion Report

Land Acquisition (ha)

Name of Polder No. FY92/93 FY93/94 FY94/95 FY95/96 TotalPolder

Patenga 62 47.5 0 10.8 0 58.3Bashkhali 64/1A 50.5 19.0 0.3 0 69.8Sandwip 72 60.6 27.2 3 0 90.8Anowara 63/1A 21.2 1.6 0 0 22.8Chakoria 64/2B 21.6 1.1 0 0 22.7Sitakunda 61/1 10.1 5.7 0 0 15.8

Total 211.5 54.6 14.1 0 280.2

BANGLADESH Table 7Coastal Embankment Rehablitation Project (Priority Works Programme)

Implementation Completion ReponBase Data for Poiders, Agriculture and Afforestation Areas 1/

Name of Polder No. Length of Gross Direct Agric. .....Cropped Area (ha) .... ..... Afforestation Area.Polder Embnk. Protected Protected Benefited Present With Total Total

(km) Area (ha) Area (ha) Area (ha) Project Length (km) Area (ha)

Patenga 62 21.1 2550 1420 1020 1846 1926 21.1 303.2Bashkhali 64/1A 25.6 12700 4700 4300 7876 8213 25.6 612.4Sandwip 72 36.5 13715 11500 9100 16335 17250 * 36.5 675.0Anowara 21 63/1A 14.5 5450 1500 1250 2288 2388 14.7 344.2Chakoria 64/28 12.5 6300 3690 2925 5360 5590 12.5 265.0Sitakunda 61/1 6.6 730 730 600 1099 1146 6.6 125.2

Subtotal (6 polders) 116.8 41445 23540 19195 34804 36513 117.0 2325.0

1/ ActuaUICR Mission's estimate.2/6.9 km completed as of June 30, 1996, and the remaining 7.6 km to be completed by FY97 under CERP.

BANGLADESH Table 8Coastal Embanklment Rehblitation Project

Priority Works ProgrammeImplementation Completion ReportEconomic Analysis (Tk Million)

Patenga Polder

Investment Land Investment O&M Total Costs Inc. Agric.Afforestatior Indirect & Total BalanceEmbnk/ Acquisition Afforestatlor Costs Net BenefitsNet Benefits Non -Agric. Benefitsstructures Losses Avoid

Yr1 (FY93) 392.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 392.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -392.5Yr2 287.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 288.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -288.2Yr3 172.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 173.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -173.2Yr 4 125.4 0.5 7.8 6.9 140.6 0.6 0.1 215.8 216.5 75.9Yr 5 0.5 4.1 6.9 11.5 1.3 0.2 218.0 219.5 208.0Yr6 0.5 2.8 6.9 10.2 1.9 0.5 220.1 222.5 212.3Yr 7 0.5 1.6 6.8 8.9 2.1 0.3 222.3 224.7 215.8Yr8 0.5 1.4 6.8 8.7 2.3 0.4 224.6 227.3 218.6Yr 9 0.5 6.8 7.3 2.3 13.0 226.8 242.1 234.8Yr 10 0.5 5.9 6.4 2.3 0.3 229.1 231.7 225.3Yr 11 0.5 5.2 5.7 2.3 0.4 231.4 234.1 228.4Yr 12 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 38.3 233.7 274.3 269.2Yr 13 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 0.7 236.0 239.0 233.9Yr 14 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 0.6 238.4 241.3 236.2Yr 15 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 15.2 240.8 258.3 253.2Yr 16 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 0.8 243.2 246.3 241.2Yr 17 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 0.8 245.6 248.7 243.6Yr 18 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 19.5 248.1 269.9 264.8Yr 19 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 1.2 250.5 254.0 248.9Yr2O 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 1.1 253.0 256.4 251.3Yr21 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 157.2 255.6 415.1 410.0Yr 22 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 1.1 258.1 261.5 256.4Yr23 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 1.4 260.7 264.4 259.3Yr 24 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 23.1 263.3 288.7 283.6Yr 25 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 1.5 265.9 269.7 264.6Yr 26 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 1.4 268.6 272.3 267.2Yr 27 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 221.8 271.3 495.4 490.3Yr 28 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 1.4 274.0 277.7 272.6Yr 29 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 1.6 276.8 280.7 275.6Yr3O 0.5 4.6 5.1 2.3 94.9 279.5 376.7 371.6

NPV= 544.2 Tk. Million ERR= 19.0%

al Table 5Source: Revised Financial and Economic Analysis, Kanpsax International A/S, June 1994.

BANGLADESH Table 9Coastal Embankrrmnt Rehabilitaon Project


Bashkhali Polder

Investment Land Investment O&M Total Costs Inc. Agric.Afforestaftor Indrect& Total BalanceEmbnk/ Acquisition Afforestatior Costs Net BenefitsNet Benefits Non -Agric. Benefitsstructures Losses Avoid

Yr (FY93) 177.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 177.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -177.9Yr2 70.9 0.6 0.0 0.0 71.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -71.5Yr 3 30.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 30.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -30.8Yr4 4.6 0.6 15.6 5.9 26.7 2.7 0.2 4.1 7.0 -19.7Yr 5 0.6 8.2 5.9 14.7 5.3 0.3 4.2 9.8 -4.9Yr6 0.6 5.6 5.9 12.1 7.9 0.8 4.2 12.9 0.8Yr7 0.6 3.2 5.9 9.7 8.8 0.4 4.3 13.5 3.8Yr 8 0.6 2.8 5.9 9.3 9.6 0.7 4.3 14.6 5.3Yr9 0.6 5.9 6.5 9.6 29.2 4.4 43.2 36.7

Ui YrlO 0.6 5.2 5.8 9.6 0.3 4.4 14.3 8.5Yr11 0.6 4.5 5.1 9.6 0.4 4.4 14.4 9.3Yr 12 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 86.9 4.5 101.0 96.6Yr 13 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 0.8 4.5 14.9 10.5Yr 14 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 0.7 4.6 14.9 10.5Yr 15 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 33.9 4.6 48.1 43.7Yr 16 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 1.0 4.7 15.3 10.9Yr 17 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 1.1 4.7 15.4 11.0Yr 18 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 43.4 4.8 57.8 53.4Yr 19 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 1.6 4.8 16.0 11.6Yr 20 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 1.5 4.9 16.0 11.6Yr 21 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 347.5 4.9 362.0 357.6Yr 22 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 1.5 5.0 16.1 11.7Yr 23 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 1.9 5.0 16.5 12.1Yr 24 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 51.3 5.1 66.0 61.6Yr 25 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 2.2 5.1 16.9 12.5Yr 26 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 2.0 5.2 16.8 12.4Yr 27 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 488.5 5.2 503.3 498.9Yr 28 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 2.0 5.3 16.9 12.5Yr 29 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 2.3 5.3 17.2 12.8Yr3O 0.6 3.8 4.4 9.6 217.8 5.3 232.7 228.3

W'PV= -107.5 Tk. Million ERR= 8.5%

Source: Revised Financial and Economic Analysis, Kampsax Intemational A/S, June 1994.

BANGLADESH Table 10Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project


Sandwip Pokder

Investment Land Investmernt O&M Total Costs Inc. Agric.Afforestatior Indrect & Total BalanceEmbnk/ Acquisition Afforestatior Costs Net BenefitsNet Benefits Non-Agric. Benefitsstructires Losses Avoid

Yr1 FY93) 150.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 151.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -151.0Yr2 157.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 157.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -157.8Yr3 16.9 0.7 0.0 0.0 17.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -17.6Yr4 16.1 0.7 17.7 8.0 42.5 10.5 0.3 6.0 16.8 -25.6Yr5 0.7 9.2 8.0 17.9 21.1 0.4 6.1 27.5 9.6Yr6 0.7 6.4 8.0 15.1 31.6 1.1 6.2 38.9 23.8Yr7 0.7 3.7 8.0 12.4 40.6 0.6 6.2 47.4 35.0Yr8 0.7 3.2 8.0 11.9 49.7 1.0 6.3 57.1 45.2

H Yr9 0.7 8.0 8.7 49.7 31.8 6.4 87.9 79.2cr YrlO 0.7 7.1 7.8 49.7 0.7 6.4 56.8 49.0

Yrl1 0.7 6.0 6.7 49.7 0.8 6.5 57.1 50.3Yrl 2 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 93.9 6.6 150.2 144.5Yrl 3 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 1.4 6.6 57.7 52.0Yr14 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 1.2 6.7 57.6 51.9Yr1 5 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 37.2 6.8 93.7 88.0Yrl 6 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 1.6 6.9 58.2 52.5Yr17 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 1.8 6.9 58.4 52.7Yrl 8 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 47.7 7.0 104.3 98.7Yr19 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 2.6 7.1 59.4 53.7Yr2O 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 2.4 7.1 59.2 53.5Yr2l 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 383.2 7.1 440.1 434.4Yr22 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 2.4 7.2 59.4 53.7Yr23 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 3.0 7.3 60.1 54.4Yr24 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 56.4 7.4 113.6 107.9Yr25 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 3.4 7.4 60.5 54.9Yr26 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 3.2 7.5 60.4 54.8Yr27 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 540.2 7.6 597.6 591.9Yr28 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 3.1 7.7 60.5 54.9Yr29 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 3.6 7.8 61.1 55.4Yr3O 0.7 5.0 5.7 49.7 233.8 7.8 291.3 285.6

NPV= 41.1 Tk. Million ERR= 13.1%

Source: Revised Financial and Economic Analysis, Kampsax Intemational A/S, June 1994.

BANGLADESH Table 11Coastal Embankment Rehabliltation Project

Priority Works ProgrammeImplementation Completbn ReportEconomic Analysis (Tk Million)

Anowara Polder

Investment Land Investment O&M Total Costs Inc. Agric.Afforestatior Indirect & Total BalanceEmbnk/ Acquisition Afforestatior Costs Net BenefitsNet Benefits Non -Agric. Benefitsstructires al Losses Avoid

Yr 1 (FY93) 62.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 62.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -62.4Yr 2 23.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 23.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -23.2Yr 3 42.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 42.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -42.4Yr4 25.0 0.2 8.8 4.1 38.1 0.8 0.0 1.3 2.1 -36.0Yrs 82.9 0.5 4.7 4.1 92.2 1.6 0.2 1.3 3.1 -89.1Yr6 0.5 3.2 4.1 7.8 2.3 0.4 1.4 4.1 -3.7Yr7 0.5 1.8 4.1 6.4 2.6 0.2 1.4 4.2 -2.2Yr8 0.5 1.6 4.1 6.2 2.8 0.4 1.4 4.6 -1.6

, Yr9 0.5 4.1 4.6 2.8 16.8 1.4 21.0 16.49 YrlO 0.5 3.6 4.1 2.8 0.2 1.4 4.4 0.3

Yrl1 0.5 3.2 3.7 2.8 0.2 1.4 4.4 0.7Yrl 2 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 49.9 1.4 54.1 50.8Yr13 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 0.5 1.4 4.7 1.4Yrl 4 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 0.4 1.5 4.7 1.4Yrl 5 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 19.5 1.5 23.8 20.5Yrl 6 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 0.6 1.5 4.9 1.6Yrl 7 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 0.6 1.5 4.9 1.6Yrl 8 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 24.9 1.5 29.2 25.9Yr19 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 0.9 1.5 5.2 1.9Yr20 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 0.9 1.6 5.3 2.0Yr21 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 199.6 1.6 204.0 200.7Yr22 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 0.9 1.6 5.3 2.0Yr23 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 1.1 1.6 5.5 2.2Yr24 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 29.5 1.6 33.9 30.6Yr25 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 1.3 1.6 5.7 2.4Yr26 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 1.2 1.6 5.6 2.3Yr27 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 280.6 1.7 285.1 281.8Yr28 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 1.2 1.7 5.7 2.4Yr29 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 1.3 1.7 5.8 2.5Yr3O 0.5 2.8 3.3 2.8 125.1 1.7 129.6 126.3

NPV= -114.6 Tk. Million ERR= 5.8%

a/ Including 37.1 ha to be acquired for the remaining 10.1 km embankmentSource: Revised Financial and Economic Analysis, Kampsax Intemational A/S, June 1994.

BANGLADESH Table 12Coastal Embankment Rehabilitlon Project

Prority Works ProgramrmeImplementaton Completion ReportEconomic Analysis (Tk Million)

Chakoria Polder

Investment Land Investment O&M Total Costs Inc. Agric.Afforestatfor Indirect & Total BalanceEmbnk/ Acquisition Afforestatior Costs Net BenefitsNet Benefits Non -Agric. Benefitsstructures Losses Avoid

Yrl FY93) 100.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 100.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.3Yr 2 28.9 0.2 0.0 0.0 29.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -29.1Yr3 19.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 19.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -19.3Yr4 3.4 0.2 6.9 3.0 13.5 1.8 0.1 2.2 4.1 -9.4Yrs 0.2 3.7 3.0 6.9 3.6 0.2 2.2 5.9 -0.9Yr6 0.2 2.5 3.0 5.7 5.4 0.4 2.2 7.9 2.2Yr7 0.2 1.4 3.0 4.6 6.0 0.2 2.2 8.4 3.8YrB 0.2 1.3 3.0 4.4 6.6 0.4 2.3 9.2 4.8

,Yr9 0.2 3.0 3.2 6.6 12.6 2.3 21.4 18.3OXYr10 0.2 2.6 2.8 6.6 0.2 2.3 9.0 6.2

Yrl1 0.2 2.3 2.5 6.6 0.3 2.3 9.1 6.6Yr12 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 37.4 2.3 46.4 44.3Yrl 3 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 0.5 2.3 9.4 7.3Yrl 4 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 0.4 2.3 9.3 7.2Yrl 5 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 14.8 2.3 23.7 21.6Yr1 6 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 0.5 2.4 9.5 7.5Yr1 7 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 0.6 2.4 9.6 7.5Yrl 8 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 18.8 2.4 27.8 25.7Yr1 9 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 0.8 2.5 9.9 7.8Yr2O 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 0.8 2.5 9.9 7.8Yr21 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 151.4 2.5 160.5 158.4Yr22 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 0.8 2.5 9.9 7.8Yr23 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 1.1 2.6 10.3 8.2Yr24 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 22.3 2.6 31.5 29.4Yr25 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 1.2 2.6 10.4 8.3Yr26 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 1.1 2.7 10.4 8.3Yr27 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 213.0 2.7 222.3 220.2Yr28 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 1.1 2.7 10.4 8.3Yr29 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 1.2 2.7 10.4 8.4Yr3O 0.2 1.9 2.1 6.6 93.51 2.7 102.8 100.7

NPV= -58.9 Tk. Million ERR= 8.2%

Source: Revised Financial and Economic Analysis, Kampsax International A/S, June 1994.


Pidority Works ProgrammeImplementation Completbn ReportEconomic Analysis (Tk Milrion)

Sitakunda Polder

Investmernt Land Investment O&M Total Costs Inc. Agrc.Afforestatior Indrect & Total BalanceEmbnk/ Acquisition Afforestatior Costs Net BenefitsNet Benefits Non-Agric. Benefitsstructures Losses Avoid

Yr 1 (FY93) 31.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 31.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -31.8Yr 2 22.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 22.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -22.7Yr 3 9.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 9.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -9.2Yr4 21.2 0.1 3.2 1.5 26.0 0.2 0.1 1.5 1.8 -24.2Yr5 0.1 1.7 1.5 3.3 0.4 0.1 1.5 2.0 -1.3Yr6 0.1 1.2 1.5 2.8 0.6 0.2 1.5 2.3 -0.5Yr7 0.1 0.7 1.5 2.3 0.6 0.1 1.5 2.2 -0.1Yr8 0.1 0.6 1.5 2.2 0.7 0.2 1.6 2.5 0.3Yr9 0.1 1.5 1.6 0.7 5.7 1.6 8.0 6.4Yr1O 0.1 1.3 1.4 0.7 0.1 1.6 2.4 1.0Yr1 1 0.1 1.1 1.2 0.7 0.2 1.6 2.5 1.3Yrl2 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 16.9 1.6 19.2 18.2Yrl3 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.3 1.6 2.6 1.6Yr14 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.2 1.7 2.6 1.6Yrl5 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 6.7 1.7 9.1 8.1Yr16 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.3 1.7 2.7 1.7Yrl7 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.3 1.7 2.7 1.7Yr18 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 8.6 1.7 11.0 10.0Yr19 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.5 1.7 2.9 1.9Yr2O 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.4 1.8 2.9 1.9Yr21 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 69.2 1.8 71.7 70.7Yr22 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.4 1.8 2.9 1.9Yr23 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.8 3.1 2.1Yr24 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 10.2 1.8 12.7 11.7Yr2S 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.8 3.1 2.1Yr26 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.9 32 2.2Yr27 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 97.5 1.9 100.1 99.1Yr28 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.9 3.2 2.2Yr29 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.9 3.2 2.2Yr3O 0.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 43.7 1.9 46.3 45.3

NPV= -42.9 Tk. Millon ERR= 6.1%

Source: Revised Financial and Economic Analysis, Kampsax International A/S, June 1994.


Priofity Works ProgrammeImplementation Completion ReportEconomic Analysis (Tk Million)

Six Polders....................................................... Net Incremental Benefits.

Patenga Bashkhali Sandwip Chakoria Sitakundu Anowara Total

Yr1 (FY93) -392.5 -177.9 -151.0 -100.3 -31.8 -62.4 -915.9Yr2 -288.2 -71.5 -157.8 -29.1 -22.7 -23.2 -592.5Yr3 -173.2 -30.8 -17.6 -19.3 -9.2 -42.4 -292.5Yr4 75.9 -19.7 -25.6 -9.4 -24.2 -36.0 -39.0Yrs 208.0 -4.9 9.6 -0.9 -1.3 -89.1 121.4Yr6 212.3 0.8 23.8 2.2 -0.5 -3.7 235.0Yr7 215.8 3.8 35.0 3.8 -0.1 -2.2 256.1Yr8 218.6 5.3 45.2 4.8 0.3 -1.6 272.5

,>Yr9 234.8 36.7 79.2 18.3 6.4 16.4 391.8°YrlO 225.3 8.5 49.0 6.2 1.0 0.3 290.3

Yrll 228.4 9.3 50.3 6.6 1.3 0.7 296.7Yr12 269.2 96.6 144.5 44.3 18.2 50.8 623.6Yr13 233.9 10.5 52.0 7.3 1.6 1.4 306.7Yr14 236.2 10.5 51.9 7.2 1.6 1.4 308.8Yr15 253.2 43.7 88.0 21.6 8.1 20.5 435.1Yrl6 2412 10.9 52.5 7.5 1.7 1.6 315.4Yr17 243.6 11.0 52.7 7.5 1.7 1.6 318.1Yr18 264.8 53.4 98.7 25.7 10.0 25.9 478.5Yr19 248.9 11.6 53.7 7.8 1.9 1.9 325.8Yr2O 251.3 11.6 53.5 7.8 1.9 2.0 328.1Yr21 410.0 357.6 434.4 158.4 70.7 200.7 1631.8YR22 256.4 11.7 53.7 7.8 1.9 2.0 333.5Yr23 259.3 12.1 54.4 8.2 2.1 2.2 338.3Yr24 283.6 61.6 107.9 29.4 11.7 30.6 524.8Yr2S 264.6 12.5 54.9 8.3 2.1 2.4 344.7Yr26 267.2 12.4 54.8 8.3 2.2 2.3 347.1Yr27 490.3 498.9 591.9 220.2 99.1 281.8 2182.2Yr28 272.6 12.5 54.9 8.3 2.2 2.4 352.8Yr29 275.6 12.8 55A 8.4 2.2 2.5 358.9Yr3O 371.6 228.3 285.6 100.7 45.3 126.3 1157.8

261.4Tk. MiNon ERR= 13.4%

Source: Revised Finaicial and Economic Analysis, Kampsa Intenational A/S, June 1994.

BANGLADESH WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARDMINISTRY OF WATER RESOURCES

GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH

EVALUATION REPORTON

COASTAL EMBANKMENT REHABILITATION &RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

PART-C, (PWP)

PREPARED BY:BANGLADESH WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARD

APRIL, 1996*

* Some subsequent adjustments in actual costs and treatment of ValueAdded Tax occurred after this date and are not reflected in thisreport.

BANGLADESH


APPENDIX 3

BWDB EVALUATION REPORT ON CERP-PWP

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 This is the pre-final evaluation report on the Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation &Reconstruction Project, Part-C (Priority Works Programme). For the implementation of thisproject, IDA made available SDR 21.35 Million (US$30.50 Million) from 4 IDA Credits and aJapanese Grant Fund of 2.7 Billion Japanese Yen. An EC Grant of about 4.3 Million ECUcovered the cost of the supervision consultant of the project. These funds were utilized forrehabilitation & reconstruction of the infrastructures of the CERP on priority basis damagedduring 1991 cyclone with the following objectives:

(a) to protect the agriculture areas within the polders against inundation by salinewater;

(b) to provide protection against loss of human lives & damages caused by cyclonicstorm surges;

(c) to introduce improved technology in the design and construction of protectionworks and improved method of construction of Coastal infrastructure; and

(d) to protect the Export Processing Zone (EPZ), the adjoin EPZ development areaand other major industrial area in polder 62, Patenga against inundation by salinewater due to storm surge and wave overtopping during saver cyclonic condition.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 The Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project (FAP-7) is a part of the comprehensiveFlood Action Plan 1990-95 prepared by the World Bank in close cooperation of Government ofBangladesh.

2.2 In 1986 GOB formulated a national cyclone protection programme including the proposedprogramme for improving the existing coastal embankment and protecting newly accredit land asa part of mid-term programme. The Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation project was conceivedto strengthen, extend and improve the existing coastal embankment and allied structures. The

BANGLADESH: Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project-Priority Works ProgrammeAppendix 3: BWDB Evaluation Report on CERP-PWP

project comprises of more that 400 Km. of embankment in 21 polders and was to be constructedstarting from 1992-93.

2.3 A severe cyclonic storm struck Bangladesh during the night of April 29-30, 1991 whichleft a trail of destruction in the coastal region of Cox's Bazar and Chittagong. As a result, itbecame necessary to rehabilitate the damaged embankment systems on priority basis. Accordingly,the PWP was identified and sub-divided in 3 parts as shown below according to the source offinancing available at that time:

(e) Part-A : To be financed from GOB own resources for immediaterepair to prevent agricultural losses during 1991monsoon.

(f) Part-B : To be financed out of the grant from Saudi Govt. forrehabilitation & reconstruction of 4 polders.

(g) Part-C To be financed out of surplus IDA Credits (Cr. 1467-BD, 2048-BD, 1784-BD, & 1870-BD) and JapaneseGrant supported by EC Grant ALA 91/18. So Part-C(PWP) is a part and parcel of the mid-term programmefor the Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project.

3. SCOPE OF WORK:

3.1 The works of Part-C all together covers polder 72 (Sandwip), polder 61/1 (Sitakunda),polder 62 (Patenga), polder 63/1A (Anowara), polder 64/lA (Banskhali) and polder 64/lB(Chokoria). The works comprises 73 Km. resectioning of embankments and construction ofabout 47 Km, new retired embankments; construction of 1.4 Km. reinforced concrete sea/riverwall, 18 new hydraulic structures, repair of 25 hydraulic structures and construction of about 6.3Km. allied protective works (Please see Table 1).

3.2 GOB financed the works of all the contracts of which the contracts 1, 4, 5, 6 & 7 wasunder the credit provided by the International Development Association (IDA) and the contracts2, 3 and 8 under the grants provided by the Government of Japan.

2


Table-1: Key Indicators for Project Implementation

SI. No. Key implementation indicators at preparation Estimated Actual1. Land Acquisition (ha.) 80 317.42. Embankments

Retired (Km.) 44.2 46.7Resectioned (Km.) 78.9 73.10Stripping top soil (cu.m) 435,000 399,8100Removing soft soil (cu.m) 13,000 516,374Existing embankment material (cu.m) 357,000 375,707Core fill class (cu.m) 4,780,000 7,084,485Cover layer class I (cu.m) 3,773,000 4,733,265

3. Revetments (Nos)Under layer class 1 stones 42,200 58,600Armour layer pre-cast concrete blocks 89,000 110,600

4. Total drainage structures (Nos) 17 43New 18Repair 25_

5. Naval Academy river/sea wall (cu.m)Hard cover layer 6,600 4,756compacted filter 815 355Concrete 15,930 16,803

6. Consultancy services (man-month)International 74 120Local 293 714

4. IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS:

4.1 BWDB with considerable assistance from the project consultant is responsible forimplementation. The Executive Engineer of the Division is the "Engineer" of the contract andthe consultant is the "Engineers Representative". The consultant is mainly responsible forcontract management.

4.2 The "Engineers Representative", the consultant is the Joint Venture consisting ofKampsax International A/S, BECOM & Danish Hydraulic Institute in Association with

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BANGLADESH: Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project-Pnority Works ProgranuneAppendix 3: BWDB Evaluation Report on CERP-PWP

Development Design Consultant Ltd. of Bangladesh. The consultancy services is finance by theEuropeam Commission.

4.3 The Employer is the Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) acting through theChief Engineer, South Eastern Zone, Chittagong.

5. OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE:

5.1 During tender stage it was assumed that the works could commence during the dry seasonbefore May, 1992. But in fact due to prolonged tendering procedure and specially the delayedawards of contracts, the work could not commence before October, 1992. On the other hand thevolume of work subsequently increased to almost 40% to that of the work conceived based onpre-construction surveys. Inspite of this set back the original completion date of June 30, 1993was still maintained. Therefore, the time allowed for completion of rehabilitation works wasunrealistic. The overall progress achieved during the period was only 44%.

5.2 In general, it was observed that all the contractors were too slow in mobilizing labourforce and construction equipment. This coupled with the inclement weather and lack ofpossession of land caused considerable delay in all work sectors. Based on causes for delaysoutside their control, as well as the increased quantities of work, the contractors forwardedapplication for time extension. The consultant assessed the eligible time extension and submittedit to BWDB for perusal. This was discussed in a meeting in the Chief Engineer's office on 14June, 1993. The meeting concluded that recommendation for time extensions would be presentedto the Board of BWDB with revised contractual dates. Accordingly completion dates wereapproved by the Board and communicated to World Bank. Based on actual progress of work andsituation obtainable in the field further extensions were agreed. The approved programme aimedat completion of all work under the contracts as per dated indicated in the following table:

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BANGLADESH: Coastal Enmbankment Rehabilitation Project-Priority Works ProgrammeAppendix 3: BWDB Evaluation Report on CERP-PWP

Table 2: Interim Completion Dates, Actual Completion Dates andAnticipated Completion Dates

Contract Interim Completion Date Actual Completion Dates as Anticipated CompletionNo. Given by the Beginner per Taking Over Certificates Dates1. 31 May, 1994 31 May, 1994 *) 31 December, 19952. 31 May, 1994 30 June, 1995 **)31 March, 19963. 31 May, 1994 30 June, 1995 **) 15 April, 19964. 31 May, 1994 * *) 30 June, 19965. 31 May, 1994 13 October, 1994 *

6. 31 May, 1994 09 July, 1994 *

7. 31 May, 1994 17 August, 1994 **) 31 December, 19958. 30 April, 1994 31 May, 1994 **) 30 June, 1996

*) Anticipated date for completion of reactivated works.**) Anticipated date for completion of May 95 Cyclone Damage repair works.

5.3 The project overall progress by March 31, 1996 is about 96.5% which is satisfactory. Theworks of seven out of eight contracts have been substantially completed and taken over byBWDB. Contracts 1, 2, 5, 6 & 7 have been completed in all respects including the variationorders within the stipulated time period. Contracts 3 & 8 are likely to be completed by April, 96& June, 96 respectively. At Banskhali & Sandwip objections by land owners interruptedimplementation. At Sitakunda & Anowara public opposition to the alignment of retiredembankments caused considerable delays including stoppage of works in Anowara for almost ayear. In Anowara though land possession along the sea facing alignment has been attained inJanuary 1996, the contractors could not yet start work from Ch. 35.30 Km. to 36.80 Km as thereis still disputes with the land, homesteads & other infrastructures. The land along the Sungu riveris yet to be acquisitioned. The progress of this contract at the end of March, 96 is 75%. As thepeak time for construction is almost over, even employment of huge man-power by the contractorat this stage would not be helpfil to achieve anything worth of specification overnight. It is likelythat the project may be carried over to the next year programme.

5.4 Generally the contract management by the consultant was carried out satisfactorily.Administrative and financial aspects were addressed and executed in a timely manner. Thoughinitially there was little slack in the supervision, it improved to a great extent at the later stage. Itis understood that these contracts being a new type of work in the country, the contractor andeven the consultants were to some extent inexperienced. Financial resources were generallyadequate, abnormal delay in land acquisition and during the closing stages of the project, delay in

5


the settlement of variation orders affected the progress of the contractor. It is observed thatmainly due to substantial increase in the earthworks (under estimation at project preparation) andthe increased land prices, the actual total costs of PWP by December 1995, including the costs ofland acquisition and the consultants, are estimated at about Tk. 2,645 million (US$ 66 million),representing cost overrun of about 50% in nominal terms and 35% in real terms.

5.5 The reconstruction works were awarded following International Competitive Bidding(ICB) procedures and full responsibility for contract management including supervision & qualitycontrol was entrusted to the consultant who were also responsible for the preparatory works.This proved a success as contracts were awarded to contractors specialized in works similar tothose included in the programme, and effective financial & administrative control, supervision &quality were ensured. The full devolution of responsibility to the consultants through provedbeneficial, the development of capacities of field staffs of BWDB in contract management &supervision for this reason has been drastically reduced. The field staffs below the level ofExecutive Engineer were not being utilized and BWDB eventually has been deprived of groomingits young technical staffs especially the SDE's and S.O's to improve their standards inconstruction supervision.

6. EVALUATION OF BANK PERFORMANCE:

6. 1 APPRAISAL

6 1 1 Government of Bangladesh (GOB) formulated in 1986, a National Cyclone ProtectionProgramme (NCPP) with the objectives of minimizing disastrous effects of cyclones and stormsurges. NCPP included plans for improving the Coastal Embankment System and introducingassociated preventive measures. In pursuance of the above programme, a consulting firmfinanced by the European Union (EU), assisted GOB in the preparation of the cyclone protectionproject (presently called the Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project (CERP). Thepreparation work for CERP was in progress when a devastating cyclone struck Bangladesh inApril 1991. As a result, the entire coastal embankment system in the north eastern parts of theBay of Bengal came under intense surge pressure and suffered heavy damage. Thus, in addition tothe improvements of the coastal embankment system originally planned, it became necessary torehabilitate the damaged embankments as quickly as possible to protect areas against furthercyclonic surges. GOB therefore, requested assistance from its development partners. IDA andEU responded quickly, appraised the project and arranged the necessary funds for carrying outthe intended works.

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BA,NGLADESH: Coastal Embankimienit Rehabilitation Project-Priority Works ProgramieAppendix 3: BWDB Evaluation Report on CERP-PWP

6.2 FUND RELEASE

6.2.1 The Bank was quick to respond to GOB's request for assistance after the devastationcaused by the April 1991 cyclone. Its assistance was instrumental in the preparation and approvalof the package of funding to meet the cost of repairs for the six polders of the programme. TheBanks performance continued to be satisfactory during implementation. Disbursement wereclosely monitored and to avoid delays in payment to contractors the Bank arranged for directpayment to the contractors on bills certified by the consultant & BWDB.

6.2.2 EC response was also instantaneous. A Financing Memorandum as signed in July 1991for 2.5 million ECU. Subsequently this was raised by another 1.00 million ECU to cover theextended services of the consultant. EC also arranged the bridge financing amounting to ECU 1.5million for the period February 1995 to date.

6u3 SUPERVISION MISSION

6.3. 1 During the pre-construction phase of the programme regular monitoring by Bank staff,particularly during tender award phase minimized the delay in award of contracts. During theinitial years of implementation no formal supervision was carried out. However, regular visit bythe resident mission staff and visit by headquarters staff and consultants effectively ensured thefulfillment of the supervisory responsibilities of the Bank. Two formal supervision were carriedout, the first in June 1994 and the final one in July 1995 regarding contract managementaccording to project profiles the Bank supervision missions performance was satisfactory.

7. EVALUATION OF THE GOB PERFORMANCE

7.1 TECHNICAL/FINANCIAL MATTERS

7. 1.1 Generally the Borrower's performance has been satisfactory. Although it respondedspeedily in formulating the emergency programme, its performance during the preconstructionphase was less than satisfactory. Contract awards which were critical to meet the agreeddeadlines for completion of works were made after a delay of about 6 to 8 months. Duringimplementation, claims. The GOB's performance on acquisition of land for construction purposewas highly satisfactory, although in a few cases delays were faced for unavoidable reasons.

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BANGLADESH: Coastal Embankment Rehabilitation Project-Prionty Works ProgrammeAppendix 3: BWDB Evaluation Report on CERP-PWP

7.2 GOB FUND ALLOCATION/RELEASE

7.2.1 GOB Fund allocation was adequate and fund release was made in timely manner.

7.3 VARIATION IN ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED PROJECT COST

7.4.1 Initially it was estimated that construction would be completed by June 1993. Currentestimate indicate that final construction is not likely to be completed until June 1996. This wouldincrease burden on the GOB's budgets from 7% to 11%. The variation in actual & estimated finalcost of the packages works is shown in Table -2. Accordingly, the final cost of the total projectas Tk. 3096.4 million from the original 1743.30 million.

7.4 BIDDING PROCEDURE & CONTRACT APPROVAL

7.4.1 All contracts were awarded following ICB procedure of the Bank. The "Employer" isthe Bangladesh Water Development Board acting through the Chief Engineer, South EasternZone, BWDB Chittagong. The acting Chief Engineer, South Eastern Zone had to operate withinthe limit of the delegation of power by the Bangladesh Water Development Board.

Contract Polder No/Name Original Contract Final Contract Increase in Increase inNo. Price Price Tk. %

1 72, Sandwip 264,352 391.837 127.485 48.232 62, PatengaNorth 308.262 521.540 213.278 69.193 62, Patenga South 335.354 474.286 138.932 41.434 63/lA, Anowara 230.161 282.567 52.406 22.775 64/lA, Banshkhali 281.804 333.277 51.473 18.276 64/2B, Chokoria 144.649 176.549 31.900 22.057 61/1, Sitakunda 77.036 96.900 19.864 25.798 62, Naval Academy 120.515 146.993 26.478 21.97

Total 1,762.133 2,423.949 661.816 37.56

8. COMMENTS ON LESSON LEARNT FROM IMPLEMENTATION

8.1 The main lessons learned from implementation are as follows:

(a) The existing system of land acquisition causes significant delays. In case ofpriority projects, in particular, for the CERP there must have a special landacquisition system to quicken the processes;

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BANGLADESH: Coastal Embankment Rehabilitatioii Project-Priority Works ProgrammeAppendix 3: BWDB Evaluation Report on CERP-PWP

(b) Public opposition to the alignment of retired embankments was a main factor inimplementation delays. Involvement of affected communities, consultation withland owners and elected representatives at a very early stage of planning couldresolve the impasses;

(c) During the planning phase, beneficiaries need to be involved in the deciding theprovision of Hydraulic structures, particularly inlets to shrimp and salt fields, andflushing sluices for agricultural crops, and their judgments on the requirementsshould be addressed critically;

(d) Designs for improvement and/or repairs to existing structures should be done tominimize maintenance;

(e) Contract management of major civil works by consultants is efficient and improvedquality in civil works construction can be assured. However, to ensure improvedsupervision and quality control, and the earlier identification of contract issuessuch as cost overruns, BWDB in its role as the "Employer" of the contract,should effectively supervise the consultant. In addition, it is essential that the roleof BWDB field staff in assisting the "Employer" in further works is clearlyspecified, and these staff be provided with facilities to improve their constructionsupervision standards.

(f) In planning an emergency operation such as the PWP which mainly involves civilworks construction particular consideration should be given to the considerabletime required for completion of both the preconstruction activities leading to thetender awards and the actual construction of works.

(g) The implementation of the foreshore afforestation development under CERPshould be given priority. This was evident by the ICR mission's field observationsthat most of the damages sustained during May 1995 cyclone and normal monsoonspring tides could have been averted by the foreshore afforestation.

M:CERPPWP/PWPAPP3

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Documents

World Bank Document · Bangladesh in November 1995, and revised by staff of the Resident Mission and the Agriculture and ... i Cyclone forecasting and early warning systems, shelters,