Document of

The World Bank

FOR OMCAuL USE ONLY

Report No. 5331

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

LIBERIA

BONG COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(Credit 700-LBR)

October 30, 1984

Western Africa Projects DepartmentAariculture Division B

This docunent is a resrided distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfonmace oftheir offcial dutes Its cntents may not oderwise be disclsed wthout World Bank mghorivMon.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

Currency Unit = Uzited States DollarsCurrency Exchange Rate = US $1.00- Appraisal Year Average = US $1.00- Intervening Year Average = US $1.00- Completion Year Average = us $1.00

WEIGHTS AND MEASURES

1 Metric ton = 0.98 long ton1 long ton = 2,240 lb = 1.016 metric ton1 hectare (ha) = 2.47 acres1 acre = 0.405 hectare1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 mile1 mile = 1.609 kilnmeter

ABBREVIATIONS

ACDB = Agricultural and Cooperative Development BankADPs = Agricultural Development ProjectsBCADP = Bong County Agricultural Development ProjectCAO = County Agricultural OfficerCARI = Central Agricultural Research InstituteCDA = Cooperative Development AgencyCME5U = Central Monitoring and Evaluation UnitCS = Cooperative SocietyGOL = Government of Libera.LBDI = Liberian Bank for Development and InvestmentLCADP = Lofa County Agricultural Development ProjectLPMC = Liberia Produce Marketing CorporationM&E - Monitoring and EvaluationMOA = Ministry of AgriculturexMW = M'inistry of WorksPMU = Project Management UnitPSC = Project Steering CommitteeTCU = Town Cooperative UnitUSAID = United States Agency for International Development

FISCAL YEAR

July I - June 30

FOR OFMCIL USE ONLY

LIBERIA

BONG COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(Cr. 700-LBR)

COMPLETION REPORT

Table of Contents

Page to.

PREFACE ................................... i

BASIC DATA SHEET . ................ * , i4

HIGHLIGHTS . ... ............ . iv

BANK OVERVIEW OF THE COMPLETION REPORT ....................** 1

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT PREPARED BY THE PROJECTMONITORING AND EVALUATION UNIT . ........... 9

I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 9

II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION AlD APPRAISAL 10

III. THE PROJECT ............. * ......... o.**e* 11

IV. PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION . .............................. 14

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS ................................... . 23

VI. PROJECT IMPACT ....................................... 25

VII. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION . . . 29

VIII. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORIMNCE AND DEVELOPMENT ............ 31

IX. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK . . . 35

I. CONCLUSIONS .............. ... 35

ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 KEY INDICATORSANNEX 2 INCREMENTAL COSTS AND BENEFITS

APPENDIX I: Comments from the Borrower.

MAP: IBRD Map No. 12366 Liberia Bong County AgriculturalDevelopment Project.

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its oontents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

LIBERIA

BONG COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPKENT PROJECT(Cr. 700-LBR)

CONPLETION REPORT

PREFACE

1. This is a completion report (PCR) on the Bong County AgriculturalDevelopment Project (BCADP). The Credit for the project was approved by theBoard of Directors in April 1977, in an amount of US $7.0 million, and wasclosed in December 1983, in accordance with the original closing date.

2. The report consists of a Project Completion Report prepared byBCADP (BCADP/PCR), and a Bank Overview of the BCADP/PCR prepared by theWestern Africa Region Projects Department. This project has not been thesubject of an audit by the Operations Evaluation Department (OEXD). However,OED expects that it will undertake an audit of Bong County AgriculturalDevelopment Project Phase II, when it is completed, and, at the same timecarry out an impact evaluation of Bong County Agricultural Development ProjectPhase I and Lofa County Agricultural Development Project, which iws thesubject of a PCR prepared in 1983 (Report No. 4517 dated 27 May, 1983).

3. Western Africa Region finds the BCADP/PCR to be a satisfactoryreview of the project and, generally, is in accord with its major findings andconclusions. Any significant differences of opinion between the Bank andBCADP, and any relevant additional information on Bank files which may nothave been available to BCADP are reflected in the Bank Overview.

4. The draft PCR was sent to the Borrower for comments in July 1984.Comments received from the project are attached as Appendix I.

5. The Western Africa Regional Office gratefully acknowledges thevaluable assistance provided by Government officials involved in the projectand project staff. Their assistance contributed greatly to this report.

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m1m oaT AGam DLmI O!iT E!EI (Cr.7a0-im)

PJE9 CO lETI RK! BASC DATA MMI

Key Pmject DIta

Actualcr Actal as %Appraisl Current of ARaisal

Item E;timte EmtiMte Efaite

Project Costs (US$ rllion) 2D)3 21.9 1 1CBCredit Amaunt (US$ imllic) 7.0 7.0 100Disbused to Narch 31, 19B4 7.0 6.9 99Institbtiamal Perfarumce Good SabisfactoryAgramic Perfonmice-affee (k1Aa) 1,000 561 56Agrnaomic Perfaluce-Ooa (kgJha) 1,000 392 3Agrinadc Perfa rSce-OW IRce (kgAa) 3,000 2,5W 83Agrmxic Pe1rfa Ulmd Rice (kg/ha) 1,300 2 1,500 115

^B=Mec Rate of etu (%) 21 4 19Ihinber of eeffciarnes 9,000 8,200 91

Project Dates

Date Board Approval April 1977 April 1977Effectiveness Date March 1978 March 1978Completion Date June 1983 June 1983Closing Date December 1983 December 1983-

Project Disburseents Schedule (munlat-ive)

M7t7/ FTM879 F 9/80 FN03/1 F1/82 FE2.83 PY/84

SAR Ebtimte 0.4 1.9 3.4 4.7 6.2 7.0 7.0Attul/Cinent Ebtimte - 1.3 2.4 3.8 5.2 6.1 7.0% A/E - 68 71 81 84 87 100

Date of Nnml Disbuzsemnt: There is s7tll a sue.) aiott of US $3,874 stiU to disbZse.

1 This is the latest estimate as at February 1984 and, therefore, it differsfrom the actuals shown in Tables 7 & 8, which were as at 30 September &31 December 1982, respectively.

2 Without fertilizer. The SAR estimated that with fertilizer the yield ofupland rice would reach 1,800 kg/ha, in which case actual would be about83% of appraisal estimates. It turned out that very few farmers usedrecommended amounts of fertilizer on upland rice.

Spea- - / 2/ 4

DIte of Db. of No. of izatim Perfomon eSPN. No. Rsp* PeNrss Ueeis atg Tred Probam

Identificationby GOL 6/74

Preparation 5/75Appraisal 5/76 10

1 4t18 1 1/2 c 1 1 I2 1t19 2 2 a,c 1 1 -

3 8t79 2 2 a,c 2 1 1,04 1/80 3 4 a,a,c 2 1 F5 7/80 2 2 b,c, 2 1 1,76 12/80 1 1 b 2 1 X,F7 6/81 5 5 b,d,c,a,c 2 1 1,F.08 9/82 2 2 a,c, 2 1 F,T9 1/83 1 1 a 2 1 F,T

10 5/84 2 2 a,f 2 1 F,TTotal: 21.T 2

Other Project Data

Borrower - Government of LiberiaExecuting Agency - Ministry of AgricultureFiscal Year - July 1 - June 30Lame of Currency - United States DollarFollow-on Project - Bong County Agricultural Development Project

Phase II (Credit 1447 LBR - Approved by the Board13 March 1984)

y~a = agriculturist; b = agricultural economist; c = financial analyst;d = operations assistant; f = credit specialist.

g/ 1 = problem-free or minor problems; 2 = moderate problems./ 1 = improving; 2 = stationary.

4/ F = financial; M = managerial; T = technical; and 0 = other.

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LIBERIABONG COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(Cr 700-LBR)

COMPLETION REPORT

HIGHLIGHTS

1. The Bong County Agricultural Development Project was the Baik Group'ssecond major integrated agricultural development project in Liberia. It wasmodelled, basically, on the earlier Lofa County Agricultural DevelopmentProject (Cr 577-LBR). The project, which was identified by GOL/IDA, wasprepared by consultants as part of the Liberian Agricultural Development andTechnical Assistance Project (306-LBR) financed by IDA, USAID and theGovernment of LIberia. The primary objective of the project was to increaseproduction of smallholder rice, coffee, and cocoa, in three districts(Gbarnga, Kokoya, and Sanoyie) of Bong County by means of an extension systemwith supporting services such as credit, input supply, marketing andcooperative development. In addition, the project included the constructionof new feeder roads, feeder road rehabilitation, well construction, and theprovision of buildings including the expansion of a training center.

2.. The agricultural targets attained by the project compared to those atappraisal, in terms of hectarages developed, were about 24% for swamp rice,114% for upland rice, 92% for coffee new plantings, and 113% for cocoa newplantings.

3. Incremental yields are difficult to assess because of the longgestation periods for coffee and cocoa. Best estimates as a percentage ofappraisal targets are 83% for swamp rice, 115% for upland rice, 56% for coffeenew plantings, and 39% for cocoa new plantings. About 7,500 farm families, orabout 83% of the appraisal target of 9,000 farm families, participateddirectly in the project. Through its unit designed to carry out small roadmaintenance and the construction of access tracks, the project completed asubstantial program of construction and reconditioning of about 650 km offeeder roads, 383 culverts, 44 bri'dges, 91 village wells, and 26 latrines.Although there were four changes of project manager, overall management of theproject was satisfactory witb local staff taking over complete responsibilityfrom expatriates by project year 5.

4. Revised estimated total project cost is US$21.9 mllion, about 108%of appraisal estimates. Expenditures up to the end of September, 1982 (PY5)for IDA-financed components totalled US$6.5 million, USAID components US$3.6million and Government of Liberia contribution US$7.8 million. The actualcosts exceeded appraisal estimates in building and construction, vehicles andvehicle operating costs, furniture and equipment, salaries and generaladministration, and village wells, but were less for farm inputs, feeder road

construction, research and feasibility studies.

5. The revised economic rate of return is estimated at 4%, much lowerthan the appraisal estimate of 21%, due mainly to the late start up of cropactivities, lower than estimated crop yields, benefits from tree cropsaccruing much later than expected, and large areas planted with cocoa onunsuitable soil. In line with observed yield performance, future expectedyields have been adjusted downwards. New cocoa planting has also beenexcluded from the follow-on Bong ADP Phase II.

6. As the designs of the Lofa ADP and Bong ADP were basically the sameand the timing of the two projects overlapped considerably, the conclusions ofthe two Project Completion Reports, not surprisingly, are very similar. Theproject had only limited success. It has been reasonably successful overallin effecting improvements in the agriculture of Bong County. Althoughproblems were encountered in farmer adoption of improved swamp ricetechniques, cocoa planting on unsuitable soils was close to disastrous. Thephysical achievement, mobilization of farmers, institutional performance anddevelopment of a trained and motivated management and extension staff havebeen satisfactory. In addition, the feeder road network has been extendedenabling goods and services to reach villages not previously served by roadtransport, and the foundation for good input supply, credit and marketingsystems have been established.

7. The main lessons which emerge from the project's implementationexperience, and which have been taken into consideration for the Bong ADPPhase II, include:

- technological packages in projects should be kept under constantreview (BCADP/PCR para 4.06);

- care needs to be taken in project design to take into considerationindigenous farming systems (BCADP/PCR para 4.07);

- appropriate assessment of soils is a key factor prior to recommendingtree crop development (BCADP/PCR para 4.08);

- monitoring and evaluation units have an important role to play inproject implementation and policy changes (BCADP/PCR para 4.21);

- monitoring of staffing, organization and management is essential toavoid over-staffing and to improve cost effectiveness of projects(BCADP/PCR para 8.05); and

- adaptive research closely associated with the farming communityis important (BCADP/PCR para 10.03).

LIBERIA

BONG COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(CR 700 - LBR)

COMPLETION REPORT

Bank Overview of the Bong County Agricultural Development ProjectCompletion Report Prepared by the Project Monitoring and Zvaluation Unit 1/

A. Background

1.01 The Project Completion Report was prepared by the Project Monitoringand Evaluation Unit, assisted by the Ministry of Agriculture's CentralMonitoring and Evaluation Unit. The report is thorough and appropriatelycritical. Except for some information in Bank files, which was not availableto the Liberians, the report covers all relevant information concerning theproject. Gaps in the report have been filled by reference to the files andare covered in this Overview, as are instances where the judgment of the Bankdiffers from that in the report.

1.02. The project, which was modelled, basically, on the earlier LofaCounty Agricultural Development Project (CR. 577-LBR), was identified by theGovernment of Liberia in 1975, prepared by consultants in 1975, and appraisedin 1976. Board approval was in April 1977 and the Credit became effective inMarch 1978. The Credit closed in June 1984 in accordance with the originalclosing date.

1.03. The project was designed to increase farm incomes and agriculturalproduction, particularly that of smallholders, in three districts (Gbarnga,Kokoya and Sanoyie) of Bong County, which has a total area of 650,000 ha and apopulation of about 140,000 of which about 100,000 (19,000 farm families) areengaged in farming. In order to achieve that objective, the project providedfor:

- development and seasonal loans to increase production of about6,000 ha of upland rice, 2,000 ha of swamp rice, 3,000 ha of cocoa,and 1,500 ha of coffee;

- construction of about 65 km of new feeder roads andreconditioning/upgrading about 210 km of feeder roads;

- construction of project offices and accommodation for senior staff;

1/ Minor editorial changes have been made to the BCADP/PCR.

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- recruitment of qualified Liberian and expatriate technical andadministrative persounel, and training of Liberian seniorcounterpart staff to take over the executive and technicalfunctions from the expatriates;

- establishment of farmer cooperatives to facilitate farm input,credit supply and marketing; sad

- construction of schistosomiasis and crop research laboratories,and about 300 village wells for improved water supply.

1.04. Total project costs were estimated at US$20.3 million; IDA wouldprovide US$7.0 million, USAID US$6.6 million, and the Government of LiberiaUS06.7 million. The economic rate of return was estimated at 21%.

B. Implementation

Staffing and Organization

1.05. Staffing, particularly senior staff, has been a major problemthroughout the project period. Credit effectiveness was delayed for someconsiderable period due mainly to the time taken to appoint a project managerand a manager for the Finance Division. The project manager, an expatriate,resigned after a year in office; he was replaced by another expatriate whostayed with the project for only eighteen months. The third project manager,this time a Liberian, remained with the project for only eight months when hevas then promoted and transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture. Threeproject managers within such a short period, each with his own style ofmanagement and ideas on priority components, clearly had an impact on projectprogress and on staff morale generally. The other major senior staff changesthat took place were the expatriate manager of the Commercial ServicesDivision who served for about one year, and the expatriate swamp developmentofficer who stayed with the project for only three months. It was not untilthe fourth, and current, project manager, a Liberian, took office that theproject really began to settle down. The prcject has now taken shape; severalpast mistakes, particularly the planting of cocoa on unsuitable soil, havebeen corrected, and staff morale is good. Under local management, the projectcontinues to operate satisfactorily, therefore, the organizational andstaffing aspects of the project were implemented successfully.

Crop Development

1.06. Overall, about 95% of the planned hectarage benefitted under variouscrop development programs. Coffee and cocoa new planting of about 1,380 haand 3,380 ha respectively, were about 92% and 113% of appraisal estimates.Upland rice with about 6,540 ha was 114% of appraisal estimates; but swamprice, about 420 ha was only 24%.

1.07. All the cocoa farms were newly established and during PY1-PY4

farmers increasingly showed interest in cocoa development. However, by theend of PY4, the position had changed dramatically; it was discovered thatcocoa seedlings were being planted in areas where the soil was unsuitable andalso that the low tolerance of cocoa to the heat of the sun was causingconsiderable losses on those farms with insufficient shade. About 50% of thearea planted to cocoa is estimated to have suffered from those causes. In aneffort to help those farmers who, an the advice of the project, plaLted cocoawhich later proved to be in unsuitable areas, the project is helping byreplacing the cocoa seedlings with free coffee seedlings. Soil is being morethoroughly tested and new cocoa planting has been excluded from Bong ADP PhaseII.

1.08. New coffee planting was about 92% of target; the main constraint wasthe shortage of seedlings. The Liberia Produce Marketing Corporation (LPKC)was unable to maintain the supply to both the Bong and Lofa projects as LPNCencountered difficulties in obtaining coffee seed on time and in adequatequantities. Tn the end, both projects were forced to set up their ownnurseries.

1.09. The original upland rice package of improved seed and fertilizerevoked little response prom farmers. They felt that fertilizer was too costlyand that the technical package of effective application had not been proven.If the bush fallow is more than eight years, good yields could be obtainedwithout fertilizer. The more popular package was improved seeds alone whichwas generally provided through seed exchange. By the end of the project,about 114% of appraisal target had been achieved.

1.10. Swamp rice achievement was only about 24% of target and, to a certainextent, that reflects the policies on swamp development which varied from oneproject manager to another. In the earlier years the project was notsuccessful in encouraging farmers to work in swamps because of the danger ofschistosomiasis and other diseases associated with them. Some farmers who diddevelop their swamps, achieved greater production and higher yields; themajority, however, could not cope with the demand for greater care andmaintenance in view of major labor constraints, with the result that swampfarms were either reduced in size or the swamps were allowed to revert totheir underdeveloped state.

1.11 The quantities of inputs actually distributed to farmers over theproject period are shovn below:

Appraisal Actual as %Input Estimate Actual Appraisal Estimate

Rice Seeds (mt) 1/ 390.0 379.3 97Coffee Seedlings ('000) 1,889.7 1,889.7 100Cocoa Seedlings ('000) 3,790.0 3,840.3 101Fertilizer (mt) 3,732.1 212.8 6

1/ Both swamp and upland of which 94% was upland.

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Cooperatives and Credit

1.12. The project attempted to build up a viable cooperative system tohandle credit, input supply and marketing. At the end of PY5, the cooperativestructure consisted of 230 Cooperative Service Units affiliated to sixDistrict Cooperative Societies; total membership was about 7,500 (81% ofappraisal targets). By the end of PY6, membership had grown to about 8,300(92% of appraisal targets). The six District Cooperative Societies formed afederation licensed by LPMC to buy directly from farmers. The project playeda prominent role in the development of the cooperative structure; however,mainly because of management and staffing constraints, the cooperatives werenot able to discharge their input supply and credit functionssatisfactorily. Although some success was achieved in marketing, andstrengthening of the cooperatives is an on-going process, the Bank does notagree with the statement in the PCR prepared by the project that thecooperatives were strengthened in the area of input supply and credit.Throughout the project period both input supply and credit were handled by theproject Commercial Services Division. At the end of the project it was agreedthat cooperative. should have responsibility, supported by the projectCommercial Services Division, for input supply and marketing, but that creditshould be taken over by the Agricultural Cooperative and Development Bank(ACDB). In preparation for Bong ADP Phase II, ACDB has already taken over,successfully, all the Bong ADP farmer loan accounts numbering about 8,000.Seasonal loan recoveries by the project were satisfactory (90%); developmentloans are only just starting to fall due for repayment and data are not yetavailable on recoveries; they are, however, expected to be low because of theloans granted for cocoa in unsuitable areas. Those loans are not necessarilybad debts as coffee seedlings are being offered free by the project to replacethe cocoa plantings.

Civil Works

1.13. Generally, this component was implemented successfully, but notwithout considerable difficulties. The political upheaval in 1980 and theresulting uncertainties were the major factors which disrupted, among otherproject activities, the construction of the administration building. Civilworks undertaken by the project included, in addition to the administrationbuilding, an annex to the training centre, four houses, a workshop, aschistosomiasis laboratory, three cooperative input sales centers, about 90village wells and 26 latrines. A substantial program of construction andreconditioning of about 650 km of feeder roads, 380 culverts and 45 bridgeswas also carried out successfully.

1.14. There was considerable community self-help assistance in theconstruction of feeder roads, wells and latrines. Latrines were included inthe project at the request of the Head of State during a visit to the projectarea. However, unlike the village wells program where utilization wassatisfactory, the latrine program was slow in gaining acceptance at thevillage level.

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Disease Control

1.15 The Schistosomiasis Surveillance Unit was established to determineand monitor any presence of a prevalence of schistosomiases in swamps to bedeveloped for rice production in the project area. About 170 swamps and 50contact sites were surveyed, and 2,700 farmers tested for S. Reamatobrium andS. iansoni. Children and villages were also tested. In the beginning, theanalysis of specimens showed a wide range of infections. Drugs were givenfor treatment and by PY 5, the range of infection among swamp farmers wasdown to about 9% with S. Heamatobrium to about 14Z with S. Mansoni. Thiscomponent was successfully implemented and contributed greatly to theimplementation of the swamp rice program.

Monitoring and Evaluation

1.16. The Monitoring and Evaluation Unit was set up late 1979. The Unitcarried out farm business surveys similar to those carried out in LOYA ADP,and also produced a number of reports. The subjects covered: crop yields,feasibility of farm models, benefits from roads, labour supply and demamnd,food consumption, e-'c. The Unit has been a valuable source of information forproject management and has been able to influence several policy changes madeIn the project. The Unit, with the assistance of the K.nistry of Agriculture,Central Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, also prepared the BCADP/PCR.

Financial Aspects

1.17. Estimated total project cost is US$21.9 million as compared toUS$20.3 million estimated at appraisal. The cost of buildings, vehicles andvehicle operating costs, general administrative services, furniture andequipment, and village wells, exceeded appraisal estimates; whereas farminputs, roads, counstruction and research costs were much lower. Farm inputswere only about 74% of appraisal estimates since fertilizer was almostexcluded from the rice package, and swamp rice development was well belowappraisal targets. USAID, as a cofinanc-ier, financed the cost of farm inputs,road construction, some local staff salaries, and general services.

Procurement

1.18. No major procurement problems arose during project implementation.

Extension and Training

1.19. The project recruited its own extension staff and exercised a highstandard of selection. A modified version of the Training and Visit systemhas been introduced and so far both project staff and farmers appear to beenthusiastic in its use. Further refinement of the system Will, however, beundertaken under the second phase project.

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Crop Yields

1.20. A Liberian National Agricultural Producticn Surrvy carried out In1978 indicates that rice yield in Bong County was about 1,235 kg/ha. Nofurther survey data are available. BCADP Nonitoring and Ivaluation Unitstarted collecting its own data in PY2. The appraisal estimated that yieldsof upland rice would increase from about 1,000 kg/ha- ithout develouent toabout 1,800 kg/ha with the adoption of a package copprising improved need andfertilizers or about 1,300 kg/ha without fertilizers. Seed exchang praved tobe more popular than the seed fertilizer package and, in addition, projectstaff concluded that in the shifting cultivation system of agriculture whereplanting takes place after a normal fallow period of between 10-15 years,there is little advantage gained in applying fertilizer. Upland rice yieldsare about 1,500 kg/ha (about 115% of appraisal estimate). If the NationalAgricultural Production Survey estimate of 1,235 kg/ha is taken as the baseyield instead of the 1,000 kg/ha estimated at appraisal, the incrementalbenefits to the project may well have been lower than estimated.

1.21. With regard to swamp rice, the appraisal estimated an increase inyields from 1,750 kg/ha to 3,000 kg/ha using a package of proper watermanagement, timely planting and fertilization and use of seed varietiesresistant to iron toxicity. Actual yields are estimated at about 2.500 kg/ha(83% of appraisal estimate). Farmers tended to reduce the quantitieo offertilizer applied and paid little attention to proper maintenance. Projectextension staff supervised closely the development efforts in the beginningbut in the succeeding years, as farmers generally became less interested inproper care and maintenance, or in following recommended practices, the levelof supervision diminished.

1.22. It was estimated at appraisal that new coffee plantations would startbearing fruit in the fourth year after planting, yielding a harvest of 300kg/ha rising to 1,000 kg/ha in PY6. During project impementation thesefi-gures were revised downward, and recent project surveys show en averageyield of 108 kg/ha for PY4 rising to 163 for PY5. Estimated yield for P16 isabout 560 kg/ha (56% of appraisal estimates), rising to about 600 kg/ha inpeak year PY7.

1.23. Appraisal estimated that new cocoa plantings would start bearingfruit in PY5 with a harvest of 200 kgha rising steadily to the peak year P110when yields were expected to reach 1,000 kg/ha. In PY3 some cocoa plantationshad already begun to bear frui-t and the average was 56 kg/ha; this rose to 224kg/ha in PY5. However, the present method of yield data collection (which isbeing improved) is still very crude and is too small a sample to bereliable. A mid-term project review reduced estimated yield to a peak in P17of about 450 kg/ha (45% of appraisal estimates). - -

1.24. It is clear that crop yield estimates for both coffee and cocoa werevery much overestimated at appraisal.

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Economic Re-evaluation (ERR)

1.25. The economic rate of return is estimated at a little over 4% ascompared to 21% at appraisal. The main reasons for the shortfall are : (i)late start-up of crop production activities; (4i) a large area of cocoa (andto a lesser extent coffee) was planted on unsuitable soils; and (iii) cropyields were much lower than estimated at appraisal. In line with observedyield performance, future expected yields have been adjusted downwards and newcocoa planting has been excluded from Bong ADP Phase II. The ERR could beimproved considerably if all recomended technieal practices for tree crops andswamp rice are followed, thus increasing production.

Bank Performance

1.26. In view of the general lack of experience and knowledge of thesector at the time of appraisal (the first project - Lofa ADP - wasdeclared effective at the time of Bong ADP appraisal) Bank performance wasreasonably satisfactory, particularly in designing a package which integratedfeeder roads, inputs, extension and training, and schistosomiasis monitoring.Adequate resources were provided to help the project meet its objectives andtargets. The major flaw in project design was related to the lack ofexperience with the understanding of Liberian conditions. Principally, theproject was least successful in the development of swamp rice and cocoa, andin the development of cooperatives to take over responsibility for credit andinput supply by the end of the project period. Although Bank supervisionswere adequate in number (10) and frequency (two per year), it would have beenadvisable to have included a cooperative credit specialist during the earlysupervisions. Bank supervision missions should also have focused more seriously,at an earlier stage, on problems of cocoa development especially soil testingrequirements. The missions were, however, instrumental in guiding project staffin areas of procurement, project planning and implementation, accounting pro-cedures and, eventually in the transfer of farmer loan accounts from the projectto the Agricultural Cooperative and Development Bank.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

1.27. While major problems were encountered due to inadequate knowledge atappraisal. a political upheaval during 1980, and irregular funding byGovernment, the project was reasonably successful in effecting improvements inthe agriculture of Bong County. Institutionally, the project has establisheda sound base with experienced and dedicated management and staff, that willprovide a good start-up for Bong ADP Phase II.

1.28. The main lessons learned from project implementation and which havebeen taken into consideration in the design of the follow-up project include:

- technological packages in projects should be kept under constantreview (BCADP/PCR para 4.06);

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- care needs to be taken in project design to take into considerationindigenous farming systems (BCADP/PCR para 4.07);

- appropriate assessment of soils is a key factor prior torecommending tree crop development (BCADP/PCR para 4.08);

- monitoring and evaluation units have an important role to play inproject implementation and policy changes (BCADP/PCR para 4.21);

- monitoring of staffing, organization and management is essentialto avoid over-staffing and to improve cost effectiveness ofprojects (BCADP/PCR para 8.05); and

- adaptive research closely associated with the farming communityis important (BCADP/PCR para 10.03).

-9-

LIBERIA

BONG COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT(Cr. 700-LBR)

Project Completion Report 1/

I. INTRODUCTION

Sector Background

1.01 Liberia has two major sub-sectors in the agricultural economy,namely: (i) the more modern export; and (ii) the subsistencetraditional sector. Agriculture as a whole contributes about 32% to theGDP (14% from monetary and 18% from the traditional sector). During theperiod 1974-79, the agricultural sector maintained an average growthrate of about 4Z but fell to almost zero growth in 1981-82 due possiblyto depressed prices of the export commodities, including, rubber, cocoaand coffee. The yields of farm crops in the traditional sector (whichis still a larger portion of the total) are held at significantly lowerlevel than those of the Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs) becauseof the lack of capital, technical know-how and the inability to getincentives vis a vis prices at farmgate. Even project farmerscooperating with the ADPs are sometimes held back from producing more bythe inability of the Liberia Produce Marketing Corporation (LPMC, theonly marketing agency in Liberia) to buy on time and at pricesacceptable to farmers in general. The military coup in 1980 alsoaffected slightly the performance of agriculture more specially in theADP areas.

1.02 During the project years (1977-78, a pre-operation, and then1978-1983) the Government's sector objectives were mainly to increaseproductivity, employment and income in the rural areas, most especiallyof the small farmers. The Government also aimed at establishing largeplantations of coffee, cocoa, oil palm, coconut, sugarcane and even riceby public corporations. To be able to achieve the planned objectives,the Government increased the agricultural budgetary allotment from 4% in1970 to 21% in 1980. The appropriation of the Ministry of Agriculture(MOA) was in the vicinity of about $20.5 million in 1982-83. This isabout 6.0% of the Fiscal Year Budget. The Government has pursued the

1/ Prepared by the project's Monitoring and Evaluation Unitassisted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Central Monitoringand Evaluation Unit. Minor editorial changes have been made.

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policy of decentralization, hence, created three regions in order toimprove the administration of agricultural programs including research,extension and training. In the case of the strategy for the smallholderfarms, extension services were categorically implemented by two majorgroups: (i) Ministry of Agriculture's extension service which hasalways been hampered by the lack of funds and logistic support-makingits effectiveness questionable in spite of the "free" material; and (ii)the ADP extension which proved to be more effective because of theavailability of inputs and farm tools at reasonable prices, i.e.,fertilizers at subsidized price and on credit.

II. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION, PREPARATION, AND APPRAISAL

Preparation and Appraisal of the Project

2.01 The initial preparation for the Bong Project was carried outin 1971 as reported in the Upper Bong Rural Development ProjectFeasibility Study (1975). Hence, the project was identified by GOL andfeasibility report prepared by consultants with funds from the LiberiaAgricultural Development and Technical Assistance Project, Credit306-LBR. The Appraisal Report No. 130a-LBR (1977) was finally producedbased on the findings of a joint IBRD-USAID appraisal mission thatvisited Liberia in May-June, 1976.

2.02 The original proposal (feasibility study) included theimprovement of extension services, setting up of cooperative societies,revolving credit funds, strengthening of Central Agricultural ResearchInstitute (CARI) operation, provision of infrastructures particularlyroads and setting up of a health unit to monitor the incidence ofdiseases. Generally, all these were approved and considered by theappraisal mission. Hence, the appraisal mission considered further theextent of 9,000 farm families to be assisted and provided farm supportservices such as extension advice, input supply, credit arrangements,land development and soil selection. To be able to implement all these,as in the Lofa Project. a special administrative entity, the BongProject Management Un- (BPMU) was created and headquartered in Suakoko.A Project Steering Co- ittee (PSC) was created to determine projectpolicy, exercise budgetary control, financial control, approveappointment of professional staff, determine conditions of service andensure inter-agency cooperation and coordination. To be meaningful tothe local people and community, a Project Consulative Committee (PCC)was organized; it would facilitate communications between project andfarmers and would also assist in loan recovery. Other support servicesincluded the Agricultural Cooperative Development Bank (ACDB) providingbanking facilities and the Rural Development Unit of the Ministry ofPublic Works to help in well construction and farm to market roadconstruction.

2.03 The Development Credit Agreement No. 700-LBR between theGovernment of Liberia and the International Development Association(IDA) of the World Bank was signed on December 29, 1977 and the Credit

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was made effective on March 15, 1978. The USAID Loan No. 669-T-035,which also supported the project, was signed on January 16, 1978 but wasmade effective after two conditions were met: (i) appointment of anevaluation officer; and (ii) registration of small farms aligned withthe national laws of Liberia.

2.04 Total project costs were estimated at US$20.3 million of whichabout 48Z was expected to be foreign exchange component. The totalfinancing was split into three sources IDA (US$7.0 million), USAID(US$6.0 million) and GOL (US$7.3 million).

III. THE PROJECT

3.01 Project Area. The project area is located in Upper BongCounty, north of Monrovia. It is lying between Montserrado, Nimba,Bassa and Lofa Counties. The project area covers 650,000 hectares and apopulation of about 140,000 of which about 100,000 (19,000 farmfamilies) were farming. The project area has averaged rainfall rangingfrom 1,650 mm in 1979-80 to 3,768 mm in 1982-83. The land is generallyrolling with some isolated hills and mountains but about 12X is inpoorly drained swamps. The upland is characterized by low fertilitywhereas the lowland, while fertile, has some problems of iron-toxicityand sandy contents.

3.02 Of the total land in the project area a very small percentagewas considered under cultivation. There were many large-scale farmsdevoted to the production of rubber (almost 2/3) and the remaining 1/3occupied by peasant farmers with diversified croppings. The latter werenormally used for shifting cultivation with fallow periods ranging froman average of 6 to 30 years. Most, however, were observed to be in therange of 7-15 years for upland rice farming. About 90 percent of thefarmers in the area cultivate upland rice as the primary source oflivelihood because it allows for intercropping of other minor crops forfamily consumption. Cassava and such vegetables as pepper, corn andeddoes constitute these minor crops. Before the project, the Governmenthad already put emphasis to coffee and cocoa as part of thediversification program among small farmers. However, the project camein to introduce better seeds and seedlings (technological packagecomponent) and new methods of husbandry and culture.

3.03 The project was mainly conceived and implemented on the basisof increasing farm income and welfare of the farmers and to strengthenand develop the support services. Thus, the project comprised of farmand crop development, development of infrastructure, institutionalsupport and other assistance. There were two major types of loansgranted to tree crop farmers, development loans and, afterestablishment, maintenance loans (mainly for labor payments). Seasonalcredit included fertilizers and farm chemicals in swamp, and seeds forboth upland and/or swamp.

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3.04 Farm and Crop Development. The project intended to providecredit for farm inputs. During the first year, development would beconfined to upland and swamp rice and, thereafter, the tree crops. Inthe upland, 5,750 hectares would be primarily planted to LAC-23 andreplaced with new seed everv 5th year; fertilizer (22-40-d) and bettermanagement practices would be applied. The project would also develop3,000 hectares of cocoa and 1,500 hectares of coffee and developmentwould consist of new plantings of high yielding materials; fertilizers,pesticides and fungicides would be used and better husbandry practicesintroduced. Better ways of processing/fermenting cocoa would be taughtto maintain high quality. In the swamp 1,650 hectares of inland swampwould be redrained and 400 hectares of existing swamps improved. Of thetotal swamps targetted only 300 hectares would be double cropped.

3.05 Supply of Inputs. About 500 tons of rice seeds would beissued to farmers, 7.0 million cocoa and coffee seedlings distributed,5,000 tons of fertilizers, insecticides, chemicals, shade crops, powertillers, sprayers,-hand winders, chain saws, fermentation boxes, etc.provided. All inputs and farm equipment would be rented/sold at fullcommercial cost with provision for credit.

3.06 Staffing. A smallholder development project requires staffwith high levels of managerial efficiency, technical competence andinnovation. Where possible the BPMU positions would be filled byLiberians. The project would also provide funds for six recruits fromother countries. About 359 personnel and staff were expected in thelast year (PY-5) of the project financial period.

3.07 Training. Manpower at all levels was a problem. No oneeducational institution in Liberia seemed to produce the immediate needsof the project. Hence, the Lofa Project would provie facilities forall extension, cooperative and credit field staff training. Some staffwere to be trained abroad specially in tree crops proCnction andmanagement. Others would be trained in project managemenIt and ruraldevelopment administration. The project would prepare its own trainingprogram which would consist of short courses plus practicum. Technicaltraining for field staff would be at CARI (funding of center under306-LBR) and close cooperation with WARDA would be sought. Shortrefresher courses would follow. Farmer training would also be aimed atand audio-visual aids provided.

3.08 Farm Inputs - Procurement ard Distribution. The input supplyand marketing section of the cooperative and credit services divisionwould organize the farm input delivery system. Village levelcooperatives would estimate the requirements of farmers (members) thenthe chiefdom cooperatives would collect the bigger cooperatixrerequirements for delivery by LPMC; and latter would provide space forstorage before actual distribution. All importations and warehousing atthe port would bo either rented out or held at full cost. Basic inputslike seeds, seedlings and fertilizers and chemicals would be under theBPMUs development section. CARI would supplv breeder rice seeds to bemultiplied by selected farmers and on project seeds farms. Hybrid cocoa

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and coffee seeds would be raised in project nurseries and some farmers'nurseries would be supervised by the project.

3.09 Village Wells and Latrines. The original project appraisaldid not specify latrines as components of the project. However, theneed was felt during project year two (PY-2) for the inclusion of thisprogram as a source of incentives to the farmers.

3.10 Schistosomiasis Surveillance. Monitoring if project farmerswas deemed important and the project would strengthen theSchistosomiasis Surveillance Unit (SSU) established under Credit577-LBR. It would also undertake limited testing of vector controltechniques. Additional staff, vehicles and laboratory facilities wouldbe provided for the unit. However, administratively, the unit would beunder the Liberian Institute for Biomedical Research.

3.11 Roads. The project would construct 170 km of newfarm-to-market roads, upgrade 130 km of existing roads and maintain 540km (including new ones) within the project area. The Ministry of PublicWorks-(MPW) would work closely with BPMU, since MPW has the primaryresponsibility of building roads.

3.12 Monitoring and Evaluation. The Lofa MEU would be strengthenedwith additional staff and equipment in order to cover Bong Project.

3.13 Project Benefits. Based on the World Bank Appraisal theincremental benefits would be from the following:

TABLE 1

Anticipated Crop Yields(kg/ha)

Crop Without Project With Project

Upland Rice 1,000 1,500 2/Swamp:Improved 1,400 3,000 (at PY-3)Advanced 3/ 1,400 5,250 (at PY-4)

Coffee (new) 200 1,000 (at PY-6)Cocoa (new) 250 400 (at PY-6)

The project benefits include the provision of basic farm inputs and tools oncredit to make farming more wholesome and enjoyable. The secondary benefitswere expected from the infrastructure, mainly roads and health facilities.

2/ Based on average of semi-improved and improved scheme.

3/ Pilot

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IV. IMPLEMENTATION

4.01 Effectiveness. The credit was expected to take effect on March 15,1978.

4.02 Organization. A Project Steering Committee (PSC) was appointed by theGovernment of Liberia in 1978. The committee was chaired by the Minister ofAgriculture and the members comprised of representative from the Ministries ofFinance, Planning and Economic Affairs, Internal Affairs (Local Government), andthe Project Manager as secretary. This committee had the responsibility ofoverseeing the project and its operations. An advisory committee on the locallevel was also organized to coordinate community leaders and project at countylevel. The PCC, headed by the Superintendent, provided all the local supportservices needed to facilitate the effective implementation of the projectactivities. Members of the PCC included the Paramount Chiefs, CooperativesPresidents, Clan Chiefs and other local leaders. The BPMU was headed by theProject Manager who in turn was responsible to the Minister of Agriculture.Nine divisions were established: Administration, Agricultural Services,Commercial Services, Finance, Land Use Planning, Roads and Workshops, Training,Schistosomiasis Surveillance Unit and Monitoring and Evaluation. Historically.the project had undergone some organizational changes. During the initialstage, in the absence of the appropriate person to man the new Land Use PlanningDivision (LUP), the head of the Agricultural Services had the addedresponsibility of running the Division. LUP became autonomous only in projectyear three (PY-3). Similarly, Workshop which is now headed by a Liberian, wasunder the Administration Division until PY-3 when an expatriate (British) wasrecruited to head it. Similarly, the activities of the Roads and Wells Divisionwere administered by LUP until project year three (PY-3) when it was separated.With regard to the suitability of the project staff, recruitment of Liberians toreplace expatriates has been on a purely competitive basis. Thus, the projecthad been fortunate to attract and maintain some of the good talents inspecialized areas, even though there were a few who needed to be upgraded.Liberian counterparts started taking over most of the various sections in 1979(PY-2) and 1980 (PY-3). Prior to this time most of the Divisions, including theposition of the Project Manager were occupied by expatriates. The Monitoringand Evaluation Unit was organized only in the latter part of 1979 although theunit manager was in Lofa.

4.03 Staffing. The trend in staffing the project was increasingparticipation of Liberians. From PY-1 to PY-5 there has been an increase 'from54% to 88%. By PY-5, only 12% (2 expatriates) were left in the project(Table 2). Staffing in 1981-82 shows that out of 21 local staff, 6 includingthe Project Manager were newly recruited and the balance (15) had been with theproject for 1-3 years. With the coming of a new Project Manager in PY-4, somekey senior positions were created andfor filled up. For example, the PlantMultiplication Section was created only on February 8, 1972. The otherpositions were the Sr. AEO, Sr. Soils Surveyor, Deputy Manager for M&EU and Sr.Marketing Officer. Liberians started taking over senior staff positions in thebeginning of PY-4.

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Senior Staff

The turn-over of expatriates was noticeably fast in the early years of theproject. In January 1978, an expatriate assumed the PK position. After a yearhe resigned and was replaced by another expatriate on November 24, 1979 whoserved the project for about 18 months. He resigned on April 4. 1981, almostone year after the coup. A Liberian then took over for 8 months and by December4, 1981, he was promoted and transferred to MOA. Then, the fourth handover wasmade to another Liberian. These turn-overs, which were due to various reasons,affected the operations and resulted in different reactions from within andoutside. In addition to the turn-over in major positions, the manager forCommercial Services Division (an expatriate), served only for about a year (May1978 - May 1979) and resigned. The Swamp Development Officer, also anexpatriate, served only for three months (November 1978 - February 1979).

Table 2

Senior Staff *

Category PY-1 PY-2 PY-3 PY-4 PY-51978 1979 1980 1981 1982

(number)

Local 6 9 16 23 21Expatriate 5 5 8 7 2Total 11 14 24 30 23

(percent)

Local 54 64 67 77 88Expatriate 46 36 33 23 12Total 100 100 100 100 100

* As of September ending each year.

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4.04 Physical Iuplementation. The project achieved physically someof the targets, see below:

Table 3

Physical Achievements

Component Appraisal Estimates Actual

Crop Development (ha) 12,300 11,723 4/

Civil Works

Village Wells (No.) 300 91 5/Latrines (No.) Not specified 26Feeder Roads 275 (65 new,210 upgrade) 287Culverts (No.) Not quantified 383Bridges Not quantified 44Cooperative & Credit (US$) 2.8 million 1.4 million

Note that the actual operations of the Project did not take place untilafter nine months because of the difficulty of recruiting an expatriateproject manager.

4.05 Crop Development and Improvement. Overall achievement wasabout 95% of plan 12,300 hectares. The actual below is based on thetotal area at PY6, the completion date and/or interim period inpreparation for Phase II, if any. If we compute the achievement on thebasis of PY5 actual, the rate would be 85X only or 10,462 hectares.Details are found in Annex 1, Key Indicators. Note that in upland rice,the scheme without fertilizers finally succeeded from PY4 although theproject was flexible enough to issue fertilizers if farmers asked forit. From PY1 to PY4, cocoa should have showed an increasing trend(area) but soon after discovering that many farms were not planted inthe right soils and crops were not vigorously growing, the project tooksteps to minimize its disastrous effects, physically andpsychologically.

4/ At PY6.

9/ At PY5.

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Table 4

Crop Development Program

Appraisal ActualProgram Estimate at Completion Percent(ha) (at PY5) (M)

Upland Rice 5,750 6,541 114

Swamp Rice:Improved 1,750 417 24Advanced (Plot) 300 Nil Nil

Coffee (new) 1,500 1,382 92

Cocoa (new) 3,000 3,383 113Total 12,300 11,723 95

Although the figures on cocoa area planted were high, indications ofdeterioration due to unsuitable soils condition were observed in certaindistricts and to a small extent, the poor performance of the cocoa wasattributed to farmers' failure to conform with recommended maintenancepractices. Similarly, coffee actuals were generally not far fromtargets specially in PY4 and PY5 and in fact, cocoa farmers withunsuitable soils for cocoa were encouraged to replace cocoa with coffee.In the case of swamp rice, there was extreme difficulty of convincingthe farmers that it is a possible source of greater benefits than uplandrice. However, the trend in area cultivated had been increasing inspite of the obstacles farmers had to surmount, i.e. specially in theinitial development stage (see Annex 1, Key Indicator). The projecttried to rationalize the strategy by allowing more farmers to get intoswamp no matter how small the area was, say two plots 0.08 hectare only.In this way, the project could show the farmers the actual benefit fromthe use of the package. For this reason, the appraisal credit packagefor swamp was revised into even smaller ones. But, as the farmers getthe experience they could expand to as big as 0.40 hectare.

4.06 Upland Rice. The original schemes conceived by the projectincluded: (i) semi-improved (with LAC 23 seeds but withoutfertilizers); and (ii) improved (with both HYV and fertilizers). Duringthe first two years (FY1 and PY2), 40 out of 360 hectares and 45 out of860 hectares respectively, were planted using "improved package" withfertilizers. Based on the studies of the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit(MEU), farmers showed little interest in using fertilizers partiallybecause it was too costly, and they had not acquired the requisitetechnical know-how for effective application. They could get goodyields even without fertilizers if the bush fallow is above 8 years.Crop-cutting surveys conducted by MEU show that the difference in yieldbetween "with fertilizers" and "without fertilizers" was about 38percent. However, many of the farmers who adopted HYV and fertilizers

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had only a small cropped area. On the other hand, the "without"fertilizer scheme became more successful when farmers would justexchange their local rice seeds for project LAC-23. They felt that theyhad no burden on repayment of loan. Some farmers complained that afterthree years the yield of the seeds tend to decrease. Many farmers couldnot offer rice seeds for direct exchange, hence, repayment in kind wasusually deferred to the end of the crop year with five additional lbs.per every 100 lbs. of LAC-23 being returned to the project.

4.07 Swamp Rice. There was no swamp controlled irrigation. Hence,the concept of advance was a misnomer. Swamp rice farms could beconsidered improved even though the land use intensity reached only 1.2or 1.3 that is 20 to 30 percent of area double cropped. Consideringthat many swamps are characterized by high iron-toxity, IR-5 and S-8varieties were recommended and distributed. They mature in five months.Earlier, the project was not very successful in encouraging farmers togo into swamps because of the many arguments of schistosomiasis andother diseases associated with swamps. But the few old farmers who hadsustained efforts and had bigger farms were happily reaping the benefitsfrom greater production and relatively higher yields. However, a goodnumber of swamp farmers could not cope up with the demand for greatercare and maintenance, hence, the following consequences: (i) either theyfall back temporarily to traditional culture; (ii) stop permanently andlet the developed swamp revert to its former state of undevelopment;and/or (iii) reduce the size being cultivated. Policies on swamp ricevaried from one Project Manager to another. In 1980, the policy tode-emphasize nurseries and transplanting was apparent. The reason wasmainly due to labor constraints. However, experience showed thatyields/production were not encouraging with direct seeding orbroadcasting in the swamps. MEU observed that transplanted swampsyielded significantly higher if properly maintained, i.e. fertilized andweeded according to recommendations. AlBo, the proportion of farmerswho double-cropped was only about 40 percent in 1980 and may be less inlater years because of the lack of water in the swamps and in somecases, laziness on the part of some farmers.

4.08 Cocoa. All cocoa farms were newly established. Many farmersgot so interest.u in cocoa as is shown by the increasing trend inparticipation and area planted over the first four years. But thistrend stopped and the enthusiasm damped by the late discovery of the lowpotential in Bong County because of poor soils. Some areas moresuitable for coffee were also planted to cocoa. Coupled with the bigdecrease in price of cocoa, the project had to divert its tree cropproduction away from cocoa. The low tolerance of cocoa to heat (sun)caused many farms without sufficient shading a great disaster. Damageto the extent of more than 50% of the trees was observed specially wheremaintenance was not followed.

4.09 Coffee. The actual area achieved in coffee (new) was 92percent by the end of PY-5. The constraint in the effectiveimplementation of the coffee program was partly due to the inability ofLPMC to deliver the seedlings ordered by the project. Hence, until

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later on, the project had to put up its own nurseries for both coffeeand cocoa. The demand, nevertheless, increased over time. Earlier theproject made it a policy to set a minimum area for tree crops at 1.5acres (0.61 hectares) for a development loan but later this wasdecreased to only 1.0 acre (0.4 hectares) so that more farmers could beserved. The quantity of seedlings available became a constraint.

4.10 Input Distribution. The project distributed to farmers duringthe project years the following:

Table 5

Input Distribution

Input Appraisal Actual(5 years) (5 years)

Rice Seeds (m.t.) 6/ 390.0 379.3Coffee Seedlings ('000) 7/ 1,889.7 1,889.7Cocoa Seedlings ('000) 3,790.0 3,840.3Fertilizers (m.t) 3,732.1 212.8

4.11 Cooperatives and Credit. The growth of cooperatives in thearea was apparent with the implementation of BCADP. However, threeplaces were cited as the forerunner of cooperative movement in Bong: (i)Kpartwee; (ii) Kilebei, and (iii) Zota. Unlike in Lofa, the movement inBong was clearly strengthened bv the project in the area of inputsupplies and credit and marketing of farm produce. The effectiveutilization of the cooperative as a tool for agricultural developmentwas indicated strongly in the produce buying made by Tungban Federationof Cooperatives in BCADP area. The buying of farmer's produce startedonly in PY-4 when six district cooperatives formed a federation and werelicensed by LPMC to buy directly from farmers. The federation wasregistered and officially designated as agent of LPMC. By the end ofPY-5, the membership of the cooperatives rose to 7,489 (or 81% ofappraisal target) in 230 CSU (Cooperative Service Units) in villages.By PY-6 the total membership had grown to 8,321. It is still 8% belowthe total projected cooperative members.

4.12 The cooperatives experienced great difficulties due to thelack of competent leaders and officers to implement the operations ofthe organizations. The project took on the responsibility to help theTungban Cooperative Union (Federation) in its function as buying agentbecause of the problems inherent in a new venture. However, there weremany limitations, e.g., from finance to personnel.

6/ Both swamps and upland of which 94% was upland.

7/ All new plantings.

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4.13 By the end of PY-5 the total loans actually disbursed by theproject had reached $1.3795 million of which 87 percent was given asdevelopment loa-n to farmers, and the balance of 13 percent as seasonalcredit. Repayments of seasonal loans fluctuated over the projectperiod. The tremendous effort in 1980-81, offset the previous years'collection. Overall, the recovery of seasonal loans from PY-1 to PY-5was 90 percent (seasonal loan disbursed was $178,000 against $160,400recovered), (see Annex 1 Key Indicators). Below shows the trend.

Table 6

Seasonal Loans Disbursed)

and Recovered

SeasonalYear Loan Extended Amount Repaid Balance Z Recovery

(1,000 dollars)

1978 11.2 9.0 2.2 801979 24.8 12.5 12.3 501980 44.9 27.5 17.4 611981 50.2 77.4* (12.2) 961982 46.9 34.0 12.9 73Sub-total *178.0 160.4 17.6 901983 22.8 n.a -

*Includes repayment for old loans and not necessarily for 1981 loansalone. Hence the Z recovery was computed on the basis of total loansextended from 1978 to 1981 against recovery for the same period.- Thecoup in 1980 affected psychologically the mental attitude of the farmersfor repayments. Collection, therefore, was adversely affected andrecovery was relatively low. Immediately after the coup while thesituation was tense, the Tungban Cooperative Federation was conceivedand registered. About $100,000 was borrowed from ACDB for the producebuying. Hence, in the 1981-82 produce buying season, the Union made aprofit of about $6,846 after paying ACDB on its principal and interestplus other expenses. Such profit was divided and 45% went to theTungban Union and the 55Z balance distributed among the six cooperativesaccording to their ccutributed sales value.

4.14 Revolving Credit Funds. The amoun, of money paid back byfarmers (principal plus interest) is put back into a Revolving CreditFund (RCF) in ACDB. Of the 10% interest paid on the farmer's loan, halfof it should go to this fund. By the end of PY-5. the total cash in theRCF was $108,554 or 32% of the cumulative "surplus" targetted in PY-4.

4.15 Civil Works. The project experienced a long "pre-operation"period, hence,land development and building of residential staff houseswere started on the site of the Headquarters in Suakoko. Of those staffhouses, three were built in PY2. The other buildings constructed

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included one store house and training building in 1979; the workshop,three sub-centers, one SSU Laborator;7, one shed, and one recreation butin 1980, one administration building, one 3 room guest house in 198.,two toilets (serarate), one pump, two sub-center sheds, and one gasstation house in 1982. Delays were generally experienced specially inthe construction of the administration building because of the coup in1980. Financial constraints were also experienced. As in Lofa ADP, theMPW7 was supposed to complete and rehabilitate roads. A lump sum wasfunded by USAID to MPW to buy and maintain heavy road buildingequipment. However, the agreement between BCADP, USAID and MNW was notsuccessfully adhered to. In the end BCADP had to take fullresponsibility for constructing these roads.- With the assistance ofUSAID, BCADP got all the equipment from MPW in 1982 but much repairswere needed on some, while others required complete overhaul and/or newreplacements. The details of accomplishments are shown in Annex 1. KeyIndicators.

4.16 Wells and Latrines. Originally, latrines were not in theproject proposal. However, in 1979 the Liberian President visited theADPs and saw the need and consequently suggested that latrines beincluded as part of an integrated approach to rural development. Thewells were solely handled by the project but latrine was asemi-self-help with some assistance from the project. The wells werereceived with interest but not latrines. People were re]uctant to helpdig pits and produce mud blocks. Over a period of five vears(1978-1982) about 100 wells were installed. Of these wells about 40%were inoperational after two or three years. No problems were observedin the proper maintenance and in some cases a big drawdown on watertable caused breakdowns for overstressing the pumps. Latrines, on theother hand could have been more successful if the felt need was welldefined in the community. Onlv 26 units of latrine were built bututilization did not seem to be at maximum.

4.17 Schistosomiasis. The SSU became fully organized with theappointment of the supervisor. By 1982 (PY5) about 174 swamps and 49contact sites were surveyed. About 2,696 farmers were tested for S.Heamatobium and 2,612 tested for S. Mansoni. Children and other villagepeople were also tested. In some places, the children were the commoncarrier and victim specially of S. Heamatobium (urinary form). Lateron, the SSU started engaging in treating victims specially swamp farmfamilies. Monitoring of old and new swamps and new contact sites wereconducted also. On the last year, a health officer was hired to treatpeople not only of schistosomiasis but also other kinds of infection.It was becoming a financial burden to give drugs to treat patients. Inthe beginning, the analysis of stool and urine specimens showed a widerrange of infections but by the end of the project period the range ofinfection among swamp farmers reduced to about 9% with S. Heamatobiumand to about 14% with S. Mansoni.

4.18 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). The M&E was not organizeduntil the latter part of 1979 when a Deputy Manager was recruited onAugust 15, 1979. The Unit was functioning under the direction of the

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Lofa Project M&E Manager who finally moved into BCADP in February 1980.The very first s-irvey conducted was a Farm Business Survey (PBS) similarto the one in Lofa. Crop--cutting of rice for yield estimation was alsostarted and conducted yearly, thereafter for upland and swamp rice forboth project and traditional farms. The weekly interviews were startedonly after the preliminary analysis of the FES data to know the criticalareas for observation.

4.19 Many ad hoc activities were also undertaken including theassessment of the seedlings production and distribution (tree crops),updated economic and financial returns studies for both Lofa and BongProjects, feasibility of loan repayments and benefits from projectroads. The joint WB/IDAIIFAD evaluation team that visited the projectin 1981 considered the works being done by the MEU were the appropriatetypes of activities and the only limitation (for which suggestions forimprovement were advanced) was the selection of samples. However, thisproblem was brought about more by the limited number of staff to performindependent studies.

4.20 Among the documents produced by the Unit were discussionpapers for the Project Managers and other division managers whichprovided data on rice yields and input analysis, labor supply and demandfor labor at critical periods, farm enterprise costs and returns, casestudy of seed rice production, maintenance of cocoa/coffee on BongProject farms, food consumption and expenditures of farmers, food cashexpenditures for Kuu labor, cash flows and budget of a swamp rice farm(case), and marketing of produce.

4.21 Some major policy decisions were influenced by the M&E resultsand recommendations including the emphasis on the use of transplantingof rice in swamps in favor of broadcasting, and restruction of loanrepayments to postpone the first amortization of loans on tree crops andto prolong the grace periods.

4.22 Consultant Services. Except for the expatriates who wererecruited to manage the various divisions including the position of theProject Manager, no specification was made at appraisal with respect tothe quantity of technical man-months that would be recruited to up-gradeor oversee any specific component of the project. During projectimplementation, local consultant services have been employed to assistthe Schistosomiasis Surveillance Unit. A management accountant (Indian)was also recruited to review, reorganize where necessary and set up anappropriate farm record keeping system and related services tofacilitate easy monitoring of the general accounts of the project.Lessons from implementation tend to suggest that project benefits wouldhave been significantly improved if consultant services were utilized inboth the swamp development and the tree crops programs (cocoa/coffeespecialist).

4.23 ACDB Services. The bank in Gbarnga City operated not only forgeneral banking services, and extension of credit but also providedservices to the project. The RCF was kept by ACDB. As in Lofa, ACDB

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experienced cash shortages and this affected the timely delivery ofwages and salaries for project employees. In fact, even the RCF wasbadly affected as a result of the 1980 coup.

V. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

5.01 Costs. The project costs reached $16.9 million by the end of1981 crop year September 30, 1982 against the appraisal estimate of$20.3 million. Breakdown of the project costs up to September 30, 1982are as follows:

TABLE 7

Project Costs(S '000)

Appraisal* Actual** Z of Appraisal

Buildings 542.0 1,223.2 225Vehicles 488.1 1,025.4 210Furniture & Equipment 371.0 683.9 184Salaries & Wages 5,424.0 5,621.0 104vehicle Oper. Costs 676.9 1,972.9 291General Services 561.0 1,735.7 309Farm Inputs 2,775.7 2,060.7 74Hired Labor 660.1 249.4 38Road Construction 2,312.5 1,881.5 81Research 650.0 259.2 40Consultant 150.0 - 0Feasibility Study 200.0 90.5 43Village Wells 100.0 168.1 168Dev. of Banking Inst. 150.0 - 0Contingencies 5,194.5 8.2 0

TOTAL 20,255.8 16,979.7 84

* Over 5-years ending June 30, 1982 (FY)** Up to September 30, 1982

5.02 Without contingencies the actual costs exceeded theappraisal's costs of about $15,06 million ($20.25 less $5.19 millioncontingencies). Hence, the figures under actuals have built-incontingencies. The actual costs incurred for buildings, vehicles,furnitures and equipment, vehicle operating, general services andvillage wells were significantly higher than what the appraisalestimated. Hired labor and farm inputs fell below those of theappraisal. The cost overrun in the vehicle operating and generalservices were partly due to the unrelated use during the 1980 upheaval,and in buildings the overrun was due mainly to the unusual increase inprice of construction materials not expected by the appraisal. Theproblem was also exaggerated by the delays in the construction of

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buildings specially the Administration which was completed in PY-4(1981). The contractors failed to fulfill their obligations as percontract. On vehicles the over-expenditure was mainly due to theunexpected useful life, that is, shorter than the assumed 4-5 years;costs of maintenance was also higher than expected. The budget forconsultants should have been used in areas where the operations wereweak specially in the area of land use planning and comercial/credit.The cost of farm inputs was only 74 percent of the appraisal. Theinability of the project to receive the bulk of fertilizers from abroadthrough LPMC in 1980-81 set back the proper maintenance specially oftree crops. Hence, while the physical area targets for tree crops weremet, the quality of the plants was affected. Even the area in swamprice never increased even to 50 percent of the target. MEU studiesshowed that farmers in general were using less fertilizers thanrecommended particularly in swamp rice. What quantity the farmersreceived from the project was used for two or more seasons to allaytheir fear of high-cost production.

5.03 Financing. Funding for the first phase of the project wasjointly done by IDA, USAID and the Government of Liberia in the tune ofUS$7.0, US$6 and US$6.7 million respectively. While IDA participated infinancing all components except farm inputs, hired labor and thefeasibility study, USAID's participation was limited to only threeactivities: PMU salaries, farm inputs and road construction. This planexperienced some modification during implementation. Table 9 below hasthe breakdown of the project funding.

Table 8

Project Financing

From April 1, 1977 to December 31, 1982

Co-financier Appraisal Actual %(US$ million)

IDA 7.0 6.5 93USAID 6.6 3.6 55GOL 6.7 7.8 116ALL 20.3 17.9 8/ 88

5.04 Procurement. The project, during its first Phaseimplementation, adhered to the procurement guidelines agreed upon withthe co-financiers at project appraisal. All of its procurement (bothlocal and foreign) have been done on a competitive basis. The project's

8/ Note: This figure is at 31st December, 1982; therefore, itdiffers from the figure shown in Table 7 which is at the cropyear ended 30th September, 1982.

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experience with foreign procurement has been mixed; going fromoccasional shortage on the International Markets to delivery ofinconsistant materials - (spare parts) and to escalating Internationalprices, thus making it difficult to adhere to budgetary appropriations.For local procurement, the project closely followed the competitive bidsystem. Except for a few internal structural changes, there was nosignificant deviation from plan.

5.05 Disbursement. Disbursement for Phase I implementationcommenced nine months earlier (pre-operational period) than the date foractual productive activity. The recruitment of expatriate personnel toman the project and the erection of office and residential quarters werecarried out during this period. Throughout the life of project,disbursement has most often lagged b-dgetary timetable.

5.06 The financial crisis that has plagued the National Economy hashad some adverse spillover effects on the project. The inability of theGovernment to disburse, on time, its allotment seriously hamperedproject activities during the latter years of implementation. It ismanagement's fervent hope that the creation by Government of a specialbudget for development projects along with the participation of theAfrican Development Bank will improve the situation for the future.

VI. PROJECT IMPACT

6.01 The main program of crop and farm development was to develop12,300 hectares of upland rice, swamp rice, cocoa and coffee. All theseareas were new and no rehabilitation was implemented even in swamps. Inspite of the difficulty of compiling data over time, specially onproduction and area, it was made possible at least with rice in the last4-5 years. Therefore, it is quite possible to measure roughly theimpact of the project. But in the case of tree crops, the gestationperiod is longer because fruiting and income generation come much laterthan with rice, it is not possible to view its impact in a short run.Given the revised yield projection specially for tree crops; there isgood reason to be hopeful for increased production.

6.02 Crop Yields. The National Agricultural Production surveycarried out in 1978 shows that the yield of rice was about 1,235 kg/ha.On the other hand, the MEU in BCADP started crop-cutting surveys in 1979(PY2) and conducted surveys every year to find out any trend in yieldand area cultivated specially in swamp rice. In order to assess for anypossible increase, traditional farms were also surveyed for yields andinputs-basically seeds and labor. In PY5 and 6, attempts were made toestimate yields on project tree crop farms. However, the data obtainedduring these two periods were too small to make any meaningfulstatistical inference.

6.03 Upland Rice. The appraisal estimated that the yield of uplandrice would improve from about 1,000 kg/ha without much development to1,800 kg/ha with development. This means that the project package of

26 -

inputs LAC-23 (RYV) and fertilizers (minimum package), the benefit dueto these would be about 800 kg/ha. In the first two year. this packagecalled "Improved" scheme (without fertilizer.) was introduced.Comparatively, the yields of the "Improved" farms were higher, on theaverage, than "Semi-Improved" but not appreciably, about 300 kg/ha andnot 500 kg/ha as estimated in appraisal. Hence, for most farmers, itwas better for them to do without fertilizers because with LAC-23 (iYV)rice seeds and cultivating old bushed land, (10-15 years) could give asmuch as 1,560 kg/ha, on the average, or an incremental yield of 560kg/ha. For this reason, the project promoted the EYV withoutfertilizers and to stop it all, the Seed Exchange Program was launchedwith ease in 1980. Farmers were allowed flexibility to decide whetherto take HYV seeds plus fertilizers or not. The farmers felt freer tojust get the project rice seed with no financial obligations. In thelast two years (1981 and 1982) almost 95Z of the cropped area was onSeed Exchange Scheme and 5Z on credit (seed only).

Table 9

Yields of Upland Rice

Project W/Out Project WithYear Traditional Fertilizers Fertilizers

1978 1,000 N.A N.A1979 1,038 1,100 (39) 1,421 (11)1980 1,206 (121) 1,558 (63) N.A1981 1,200 (74) 1,417 (80) N.A.1982 1,234 (40) 1,540 (41) N.A.WeightedAverage* 1,171 (300) 1,424 (223) Xmx

* From 1979 to 1982 based on crop-cutting surveys conducted by MEU; allnumbers in parentheses are size of samples in-farm.

The incremental yields show difference of about 21 percent betweentraditional and project (without fertilizer) which was not any differentwith fertilizer. The age of bush must have contributed significantly tothe good yields of project rice seeds. With proper timing in brushing,broadcasting and harvesting, performance of project farms could be asgood as with fertilizers in older bush.

6.04 Swamp Rice. In the appraisal, there were two schemes, namely(i) Improved with Minimum Package (HYV Seed and Fertilizers) andCropping Intensity of 1.0/Year; and (ii) Minimum Package (HYV Seeds andFertilizer) and cropping intensity of 1.75/year at full developmesit. Iuthe latter case, it is considered advanced and by PY-3 the croppingintensity would be 1.2 and by PY-4 onward it would be 1.75/year; thus,expecting yield of 5,250/kg for two seasons. In the actual experienceof the project, however, farms could hardly with doluble crops reach anaverage of 1.75 cropping intensity because of the inadequacy ofirrigation water. In 1981, MEU reported 1.3 cropping intensity

- 27 -

(average) and in 1982 the special survey reported 1.2 croppingintensity. Less than half of the swamp farmers were able to double cropand only to a very limited area. With the project the package alsoincluded labor payments chemicals and tools. Sprayer, power tiller andthresher were optional and in most cases only served as demonstration.With the package plus the extension advice, production in the swamp wasobserved to be higher than the traditional where cultural practices werethat of the upland. Land development in project farms included adefinite sequence of work such as: (i) cutting the main canal from thebottom of the swamp to the top, thrawing the earth between the linesmarking the floodway bunds; (ii) from the top work down the swampconstructing the floodway bunds, sloping the sides of the bunds; (iii)construct the head dykes to the correct dimensions, ensuring it is wellconstructed over old stream channels; (iv) construct the tail dyke thesame way but last; (v) construct the peripheral canal from the top tothe bottom, ensuring that water came in one way; (vi) construct thereturn canal from main drain to peripherals; and (vii) level paddies.In addition, bunds must be built slightly highly than recommended toallow for settlement; clay must be used, bamboo cane used in bunds forcutting holes.

b.05 In the beginning, the project extension staff were able toclosely supervise the development efforts in the farms but in thesucceeding years the level of supervision was diminished. In the latteryears, the swamps further away from the road were not given adequatesupervision. The works in the first year are usually not done withfiness and development works tend to continue, when necessary, in thesecond year. The engineering works are never perfect and, therefore,supervision is still needed. But since project did not have provisionfor further development loans to farmers, everything was left to thefarmers and more often they lost the drive and incentive to work hard.

6.06 Input and labor utilization in swamp rice farms were observedto be below optimum. Surveys conducted by MEU for four years showedvery small difference between farms with fertilizers versus farmswithout fertilizers. In fact, with an average rate of 43 kilo/ha ofurea, the average yield was only 2.42 tons/ha against 2.47 withoutfertilizers. However, the experience in 1980 and 1981 shows adifference in yield of 319 kg and 286 kg per hectare, respectively, overthose without fertilizers. Over the four years 1979-1982 the overallaverage rate of fertilizer use was only 144 kg/ha against therecommended 247 kg/ha beginning 1980. The appraisal estimated 300 kg/haas the requirement (200 kg of urea and 100 kg of TSP). In welldeveloped farms where farmers gave full attention and higher level ofcare and maintenance, the yield could easily go as high as 3.5 tons perhectare. In general, the average yields were lower than expectedbecause weeding was done only once and partially by most farmers. Onlyabout 6 to 8 percent of the farmers did weeding twice. Also, theassumption in the appraisal is that the yield in the first year would belower than the succeeding years and continue to increase as years go by.This was observed to be untrue and not realistic in the case of Bong andLofa. In the first year, the yield was high and then decreased in the

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following years because of the inability of the farms to replenish thenutrients taken up by the rice plants in the initial year. The surveyby MEU in 1982 shows that there vas a decreasing trend among farmers inthe use of fertilizers. Nore new farmers also tended to use urea thanTSP. Perhaps the bias for urea was its immediate good effect on thephysical look of the plant.

6.07 There was suspicion, in fact, apprehension that many farmerswere dropping out from the swamps. However, the survey of the CMEU(1983) and the Special Survey in 1982 suggest that many farmers wereonly temporarily absent and had no intention to abandon their swampfarms. The only problem that could be brought about by temporaryabsence is that the growth of weeds and regrowth of some tree stumpscould bring back the "developed swamps" back to underdevelopment. This,in effect may need fresh development capital. There were also problemsof tenure where the previous farmer stopped cultivating and a new farmeris registered as new in the project but correspondent to the same oldproject swamp farms (previously registered in the project, hence beingcounted twice).

6.08 Cocoa. The appraisal assumed that cocoa (new) could startbearing fruits in the 5th year after planting with 200 kg/ha yield.However, PMEU observed sixteen farms that produced an average of 56kg/ha in the third year (as observed also in Lofa). The yield in the4th year of six 1978 farms surveyed by MEU was estimated at 224 kg/ha.In 1981 when the preparation team for Borng II came from Abidjan, theyields of cocoa was revised and brought to a much lower level than theappraisal estimate because of the alleged poor soil conditions on theproject farms. The peak yield was expected in year 7 with about 450kg/ha only and then decrease to 392 kg/ha in year eight onward. Presentmethod of yield data collection is still very crude but it is expectedto improve as time goes by.

6.09 Coffee. In the appraisal report, coffee (new) would startgenerating income four years after planting. PMEU to date has notproduced reliable estimates of yield. Very few were observed in year 4to merit the validity of the results. The maximum estimated appraisalyield occured in year 6. The optimism shown in the appraisal washampered by the 1981 expected, year 3 yield at 56 kg/ha, 280 kg/ha inyear 4 and a peak of 674 kg/ha in year 6 and then decrease to only 561kg/ha for year 7 onward. In recent years coffee has proven to be moreresistant to drought conditions than cocoa. However, the yield capacityis also affected badly, it seems. Recent (1983 cropcut) survey of PMEUshows an average yield of 163 kg/ha for year 5 farms and 108 kg/ha foryear 4 farms.

6.10 Prices. In the appraisal the Bank forecast prices were usedin the economic and financial analysis. In constant 1982 terms theprices were:

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Table 10

Economic and Financial Prices

Economic Financial1980 1985 1980 1985

(US $M.T)

Rice (paddy) 237 239 248 253Cocoa 991 814 744 613Coffee 1,548 1,260 1,179 956

6.11 The LPMC purchase price of rice (paddy) at 14% moisture was 12cents per lb ($264 per M.T) from 1978 to 1981 and 18 cents per lb ($396per M.T from 1982 to date). With the institutionalized increase in theprice of paddy rice from 12 cents in 1978 to 18 cents in 1982, farmerswere expected to immediately take advantage of the substantial pricedifferential through increased production. Analysis of the Phase I cropdevelopment shows that total paddy production started 87% below thetarget (63 M.T against target of 370 M.T). This trend increasederatically from one year to another, except between PY4 and PY5. Thehighest production was achieved in PY5 1,490 M.T, a little over 8%increase above the previous year (1,374 M.T). The increase in pricereally did not stimulate any substantial increase in production.

VII. ECONOMIC RE-EVALUATION

7.01 The annual incremental costs and benefits data used incomputing the economic rate of return to the project are presented inAnnex 2. The data on crop year yields, areas and costs of productioncame from the Bong Monitoring and Evaluation Unit. The followingassumptions and methods were used in calculating the benefits and coststream:

(a) Project Life: The life of the project is assumed to be30 years from Project Year 1.

(b) Project Cost:

(i) The opportunity cost of family labor was valuedat $1.00 per manday at 1982 constant prices.Hired labor was valued at $2.00 per manday.Family labor have been costed at 50% of themarket wage to reflect the average opportunitycost and productivity in the area. Experienceshows that the opportunity cost of family laborin the project ranges from as low as $0.75 permanday around the Guinea-Liberia border to$1.50 in the Central and Southern Regions. Atappraisal all hired labor was priced at full

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market wage rate and family labor at 502 of themarket rate. Family labor participation is 382in the first year development in the swamp andfrom PY2 onward, family labor participation Is85Z. In the case of upland rice, family laborparticipation is 94% and the remaining 6% ishired labor.

(ii) All actual project costs were considered fromJanuary 1978 through January 1983 and convertedinto constant terms. Project costs were notseparated into foreign and local.

(iii) All material farm inputs (seeds, seedlings,fertilizers, chemicals, tools and equipment)were costed at full landed price in the projectarea.

(iV) 60% of the feeder roads investment costs wasincluded in the economic costs since theimproved road network will also be used fornon-project activities, and benefits derivedfrom such uses will be sufficient to offset 40Zof the costs that have been omitted.

(v) All of the village wells and latrine costs andrelated infrastructural, research, consultancy,studies and banking investment costs wereexcluded in computing the economic cost. Atappraisal, similar deductions were also made.

(vi) Only 85Z of the training cost was considered.At appraisal, an amount of US $0.60 million outof the investment and staff training wasexcluded from the economic costs as theyrepresented investments and technicalassistance for development of socio-economicinfrastructure.

(vii) Unrelated Costs:

(i) 10% and 3% of the Vehicle Operating Costsfor 1979/80 and 1980/81 respectively, werededucted. Similarly 30% and 212 of theGeneral Services Cost for the same periodsabove were also deducted. Thejustification being they were associatedwith the coup and have no bearing toproduction. Military Personnel seized andused project vehicles for activities notrelated to project. This situation

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persisted until project year 4 and finallysubsided by end of the year.

(C) Benefits:(i) Swamp - the area for the main crop was reduced

by 5% in the second and third years afterdevelopment and then increased by 5% in fourthyear. The assumption is that about 5% of theswamp farmers only abandon the swampstemporarily (about two years) and returnthereafter. The 5% abandonment is notpermanent so the idle area is brought underproduction in about the third year afterabandonment.

(ii) Double crop - area double cropped is 25% of themain crop area. This represents a land useintensity of about 1.25. At appraisal,cropping intensities of 1.0 for PY1, 1.0 forPY2, 1.2 for PY3, 1.75 for PY4 and onvard wereassumed. The current computation of theproject benefits assumes that double croppingstarted from project Year 1 instead of in Year3 as proposed in the appraisal.

(iii) Tree Crop - the area of the tree crops wereadjusted (reduced) to account for mortality.The four years mortality rate average is 19%for cocoa and about 7% for coffee. These areall first year mortality figures.

7.02 Using these assumptions, the economic rate of return (ERR) isestimated at a little over 4% compared to 21.35% at appraisal. Thepoor performance is attributed to the wide spread distribution ofunsuitable cocoa/and coffee soils in project area. The yield figuresused in the economic benefit estimation were based on recommendationsmade during a World Bank supervision mission in May, 1982. These yieldswhich were based on good farms are 50% lower than the appraisal figures.Benefits from tree crops are shifted much later than the timetableproposed in the appraisal and the expected yields have correspondentlybeen adjusted downward. Additionally, only 20% of the swamp target wasachieved, and yield levels were not as high as anticipated at appraisal.The creation of an Infrastructural Division separate from Workshop andthe creation of the Plant Multiplication Division are contributingfactors for the increase in costs. It is necessary to point out thatthe ERR could be improved if all recommended cultural practices for treecrop are closely followed thus increasing the per unit area production.

VIII. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

8.01 Project Management/Staffing. Given the broad spectrum ofresponsibilities and functions with which the Ministry of Agriculturewas charged and the serious resource constraints that prevailed at

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appraisal, the proposal for a semi-automous body (Project ManagementUnit, PMU) to handle the implmentation of the project met no oppositionfrom the Government. This proposal has the dual advantage of relievingthe Ministry of Agriculture from worrying about the day-to-dayimplementation of the project and secondly minimizes the risk of havingspecial project funds diverted to other activities. It was also agreedat Appraisal that staffing of some of the various components includingthe position of the Project Manager be done through internationalrecruitment, since the availability of local personnal with therequisite training and experience was limited. The following nationalsconstituted the composition of the initial management staff: British,Pbillipino, Indian, Sierra Leonean, Sri Lankan, Australian andNorwegian. For the most part, it was envisized at appraisal that themanagement staff (foreign) would remain through the life of the project,after which the project's extension staff - better trained, equipped andmore experienced would be turned over to MOA for continuation.

8.C2 The day-to-day running of the project was the soleresponsibility of the Project Management Unit with little or noconnection with any Government Agencies except NPW and MRD regarding thefeeder road aud well construction respectively. At the local level, theproject affiliates with the Project Consultative Committee (PSC), a bodychaired by the Superintendent of the County and is composed of Paramountand Clan Chiefs. The primary function of this committee has been tofacilitate the promotion of the project's concept and assist in therecovery of the loans from farmers. The Management Unit approach torunning the project received little objections from Government and theidea was generally welcome by most agencies. The misconception on thepart of some Government Administrators wherein they held such views thatthe special nature of the project would leave littei or no room forGovernment's input, was corrected through the periodic invitation ofGovernment officials and the public to expose and acquaint themselveswith project activities. These efforts have proven very helpful inbridging the apparent gap between the public and the project. It hasalso helped in winning and returning the confidence; of the poor peasantfarmers.

8.03 MPW's affiliation with the project was brief because of thebad experience the project had with the Ministry in relation to thefeeder road program. The Ministry crew just could not achieve theproject feeder road targets which made it extremely difficult (if notimpossible) for the distribution of farm inputs and effective fieldsupervision. In three years, MPW had completed only a little over 25 kmof roads. At this junction, the project saw fit (after recruiting theappropriately trained personnel) to take over construction of the feederroad program. This move enjoyed the support of USAID (primary funder ofthe road program) and the Government. The project association with MRDwas contractual (specifically to construct village wells). The actionof PM in the implementation of the project is accountable to a bodycalled the Project Steering Committee (PSC), which represents theGovernment. All policies affecting the project must meet the approvalof this body which is chaired by the Minister of Agriculture.

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8.04 The inherent complexities in these smallholder developmentprojects requires staff of high level anagerial efficiency, technicalcompetence and innovation. In view of this, it was agreed at the startof the project that all technical divisions (Finance, AgriculturalServices, Training Cooperative/Credit Services and Land Use Planning andSwamp Development) including the position of the Project Manager, beoccupied with international recruits working along side their Liberiancounterparts. It was only by the end of project year four, that most ofthe managerial positions were taken over by Liberians. NationalPolitical developments in project years two and three, coupled withinadequate field supervision and escalating indiscipline, orchestratedby a few difficult field staff, almost resulted into a stagnation ofproject activities. However, the Government, realising the graveconsequencies that such deteriorating situation could bear cn theproject and ultimately the agricultural sector- immediately arrested andcorrected the situation by instituting some strict structuraltransformation. The elevation of the first Liberian Project Manager tothe position of Deputy Minister and his subsequent transfer to MOAcoupled with the weeding out of some difficult employees were among therescue measures taken by Government to save the project. Since hetook-over, the current (fourth Project Manager) Project Managerdemonstrated tremendous managerial capabilities in improving the moraleof the field staff and cementing the working relationship of the officeand senior staff. In 1980-81 the Project Management experienced greatdifficulties with USAID. The refusal of USAID to grant a waiver for thepurchase of tools, farm supplies including fertilizers, seriouslyhampered project operation. In May of 1982, a six-man World Bank-Teamvisited the project and conducted an indepth evaluation oS the tree cropyield assumptions. The reporting system for the project is based on twoperiods separated by three months, there is the fiscal period which runsfrom July 1 to June 30 and the crop year which goes from October. 1 toSeptember 30 (used by the Monitoring and Evaluation Unit).

8.05 Staff;yg in the project by and large exceeded appraisalestimates, 471 - compared to 255 in the appraisal. At appraisal,Agricultural Services Division and Land Use Planning were placed underone manager. It was decided during implementation (1979), to separatethe two to facilitate effective supervision and easy monitoring.Similarly, Workshop which was initially a part of Administration, wasseparated and decentralized into two components in 1979: (1) a heavyduty unit; and (2) a light duty unit both headed by a Deputy Manager.By 1982, the heavy duty unit had been elevated to a fr.ll di-& ion statuswith the requisite increase in staff and logistics to handle all civiland infrastructural activities of the project. By the same year, 1982,it was deemed necessary to separate the nursery program fromAgricultural Services Division and elevate same to full livision status(Plant Mlultiplication and Research Division) with the requisite increase

9/ As at December 1982.

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in staff logistics to run the program. The World Bank hass in the lastyear of the project life, recommended an adjustment (downward) of thepersonnel of Administration and other divisions and the need tostrengthen Training, and Agricultural Internal Audit Divisions.

8.06 Extension Training. Because Liberia did not have a pool ofmanpower, especially at the intermediate lower technical levels, norcould it turn out trained personnel for immediate project use,substantial staff training funds were provided under the Lofa ADP to beused by Bong ADP. It was also envisaged at appraisal that in view ofthe shortage of cocoa/coffee specialists in the Liberian job market,provisions would be made for additional senior Liberian technical andmanagerial staff to be trained in project management and ruraladministration. A technical training center financed under Credit306-LBR was constructed at project headquarters. This facility has beenextensively used in training junior project staff, personnel fromseveral agro-organizations, and participating farmers, through farmvisits - Training and Visit (T&V.), discussions and audio-visual aids.Short refresher training sessions are periodically held for field staffand farmers at this center. The newly introduced concept of trainingand visit (herein referred to as Training and Kuu) has substantiallyfacilitated and aided the extension st=ff in reaching farmers.

8.07 Cooperative Credit and Marketing. Unlike Lofa, Bong Countydid not have a local credit institution. The BPMU Commercial ServicesDivision was given the exclusive responsibility for the credit program:estimation of farmer or village group credit needs, distribution ofinputs, repayment of loans, and documentation. To date, the projectstill handles the extension of credit to farmers and the recovery ofloans. The responsibility of keeping the accounts of the farmers hasbeen transferred to ACDB. The marketing of produce has also been takenover by Tungban Union of Cooperatives for the county. There existscurrently six district level cooperatives each being composed of manysmall village level cooperative society units (CSU).

8.08 Accounting and Reporting. All efforts were made to adhere tothe requirements of the Credit Agreements, with regard to the size ofthe credit packages and record keeping of farmers' accounts. Allrecords of farmers' accounts are kept by the Commercial ServicesDivision except for the recent move to transfer them to ACDB. TheDivision, which is responsible for designing and releasing credits (farmtools, fertilizers, farm chemicals, seedlings and cash for laborpayment) to farmers, organizing cooperatives and marketing of produce,was headed by an expatriate up until 1981, when a Liberian took over.Given the paperwork involved with keeping small farmers records, theCommercial Services has done a good job. Nevertheless, the need toimprove the sy tem of record keeping in the Division still exists. Todate, it is still difficult to easily extract such information as thenumber of farmers and a breakdown of number of farmers who paid theirdevelopment loans by year of establishment. With the improvementsintroduced, the unit will be a bank of valuable information for futureplanning. The Division reports periodically on debts and repayment

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status. Financial statements and budgetary matters are handled by theFinance Division. Monitoring and Evaluation Division has beenr-esponsible (in addition to other information gathering activities) forcompiling periodic reports on project activities.

IX. PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK

9.01 Project Design. With all due respect, the Bank must becommended for piecing together an integrated rural development projectcapable of providing such valuable services and inputs as extension,cooperative training, feeder roads and the monitoring of the incidenceof schistosomiasis. The design included provision for adequateresources to facilitate the achievement of project design. Sufficientflexibility was built in the design to allow for unforeseeable events.

9.02 The primary shortcoming of the design came as result ofinadequate knowledge about the expected response of the intendedbeneficiaries and the prevailing soil condition in the proposed projectarea. This lack of knowledge was manifested in the unrealistically hightargets (yield) set for tree crops and swamps programs. Only about 20%of the swamp target (area) was achieved. The yield assumptions atappraisal were discounted by over 50% for the unsuitable environmentaland soil conditions. The expected response to the swamp program washighly inconsistent with reality. Traditionally, the small ruralfarmers are not swamp farmers, rather upland farmers. Encouraging themto move into the low land meant breaking a long standing tradition.Such change is viewed as being risky. Hence the program was receivedwith caution and skepticism.

9.03 Supervision. Generally, the Bank's supervision teamsperformed satisfactorily. These teams were very instrumental incritically assessing the performances of most of the technical arms ofthe project and in recommending possible means for improvement. Theirexperience was very useful in either improving already existing systemsor designing new ones. The flaw in the maimer in which the farmersaccounts were being kept was unearthed during one of the team's visits.Areas which enjoyed much benefits from the supervision missions arecooperative and marketing, procurement procedures, monitoring andevaluation and finance. The critical manner in which issues werehandled often resulted in improvements in the system.

X. CONCLUSION

10.01 From appraisal through completion, the project enjoyed arelatively smooth journey. By and large the farmers in Bong are not asdifficult to work with as it may have seemed during implementation.They were generally receptive to extension advices and supervision ofthe project.

10.02 During implementation, the difficulties associated withchanging the lifestyle (from traditional to improved) was appreciatedalthough grossly underestimated at appraisal. Traditionally, farmers

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produce rice for family consumption as a primary objective, andmarketing has a socia significance which bears little relationship tosocio-economic improvement. Farmers view rice and cocoa,'coffeedifferent as far as marketing is concerned. Rice is traditionally notviewed as a cash crop. So price and other marketing facilities mustprovide some incentive for farmers to accept the concept. The overalleducation process is much longer than what was envisaged at appraisal.especially in the case of the swamp rice program. It was observed thatfarmers who followed the swamp program and remained in it, realized muchhigher yields than their traditional and upland counterparts.

10.03 Although not envisaged at appraisal a well staffed and alogistically supported adaptive research unit is necessary to thesuccess of the crop development program. It is important that the unitbe closely associated with the farming pattern, only introducing changeswhere absolutely necessary. Much on-farm trials should be emphasized.

10.04 The training facilities at the project site have and continueto provide much needed services to both farmers and the public. Seniorstaff have visited other projects and agricultural institutionsoverseas. The need for more management and tecbnical training stillexists.

10.05 The feeder roads and wells programs enjoyed the mostenthusiastical reception from the villagers. The roads were veryinstrumental in making many productive areas accessible and stimulatedmarketing activities. The program was key in the distribution of farminputs and supplies. Community participation was very encouraging.

10.06 Although set as a condition for USAID's participation,importance of the M&E Unit in the project design was not appreciateduntil the later years of the project. The human tendency of resentingperiodic check on one's activities has been the attitude of some projectpersonnel when dealing with the uuit. In spite of these problems, theunit continues to be the fulcrum for coordinating project activities.

10.07 With the strengthening of cooperatives and the possiblehanding over of inputs supply and credit functions to the cooperatives,the total project cost should be reduced substantially. The matter ofstrengthening MOA and related institutions should be considered whendesigning future agricultural development projects. Much localparticipation should be encouraged at appraisal so as to safeguideagainst repeating the errors of the past.

10.08 In summary, while inadequate knowledge at appraisal gave riseto much problems for implementation, and given the complexities ofchanging a large subsistence agriculture and the weakness of nationalinstitutions, the project, as a case study, for integrated agriculturaldevelopment, was successful. The lessons learnt during the first phaseimplementation will certainly provide much guidance for future planners.With the improvement of encouraging the block farming system in tree

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crops, much supervision cost can be saved and greater benefits accruebecause of the inherent competition in the approach.

KEY INDICATORS

PHASE I and Interim Poriod

PY-1 PY-2 PY-3 PY_ 4 P__ -5 pv-e

ITEI, tlNIT App-lA Re/ Act App Rev Act App Rev Act App Rev Act App Rev Act Apa_ .s wa._ _ . _ _. _ _. __ _ _

Farmers Participation No. 500 500 34.0 14.00 1400 1233 2300 2180 2316 2600 3200 2301 1000 800 1299 ,

Cropped Area Ha. 500 300 320 750 940 815 1000 1540 1620 1000 1400 1598 1000 1619 1253 756 809

lUpland Rice-TSmIrtSE _ 100 50 40 200 250 45 300 260 20 400 219 500 11 AL _

Subtotal 600 350 360 950 1190 860 1300 1800 1640 1400 1619 1598 1500 1619 1253 756 756 eogSwamp - Advanced Ir 5 - 10 r

Swamp - Improved _ 6 250 250 10 500 100 82 500 364 144 500 142 93 23 100 80Sub-total " 100 50 6 350 350 10 600 100 82 500 364 144 500 142 93 5 -

*:ocoa (New) Ha - 20 30 300 300 181 700 1000 750 1000 1220 1074 1000 1215 978 = 370

Coffee (New) - 20 3 150 s 350 350 33 50 b 3*5u * 6 0 7

Subtotal - 40 35 450 300 2 4 5 1050 1350 10S3 1500 1820 i620 1500 1822 1442 .... ._70

. Cxop.i Total 700 440 401 1750 12l 5 i 2950 3250 2'7 3400 ia *336 500 358 1270 8 ,79 45 t 1261

Yl.?ld % - Aieraxe MT/HA. I __

Upland Pice-SI/S_ " 1.3 - 1.02 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.3 | 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.5

Upland Rice I.MP *1.6 - 1.44 1.8 1.7 1.8 1. 7 NA NA NA NA

Swamp Rice ..ADV 1.6 - - - |Swamp/Rice -IMP 7 * 1.6 - T 2. - - 2.9 - 3.2 2.1 2 -23 3.9

(Seml-IPsoved done only for the first 2 years) without fertilizer. SE-started in PY-3 onward (W/0 fert.) only seeds.

1/ As of PY-4 the *improves package upland discontinued. I -

2/ Appraisal estimates.3/ Revised estimates.

KEY INDICATORS

PY-1 PY-2 PY-3 P-4 P5 p.-6

T'EI UNIT App_. Rev.. Act App Rev Act App Rev Act Apj Rev at App RaV Act App Rev Act

Cocoa (New) KT/HA - - _ _ _ _ _ag .054 0.2 0.175 M.A | .35 *

Coffee (New) _ -_ _ _ _ _ .06 0.3 0.28 A O.X 0.45.. NA _Inputat MT _

Fertilizers: Urea ' 74.1 15.0 5.0 222.4 112.0 14.2 .0.0 236.0 42.0 100.0 271.0 48.8 250.0 92.5 _T S P n 37.0 7.5 3.7 111.2 59.0 2.3 15.0 236.0 46.0 50.0 275.0 6.7 25.01242.5 5 *- 508

Compound 4.0 - - 6.0 5.1 - 33.0 17.0 _ _ | 11.17 ; . - 68.6Rockphose U - - 3.6 - 145,0 106.0 405.5 - - 579.0 I eg 670. _1

NPK - - - - _ 299,0 - - 360.0 282.0 46.3 95.0 75.2 _

All 111.1 26.5 1 23 333.6 322,0 127.6 49.5 505.: iii.o 1089.l *32- o 1.18 t 2 a 346.7 Zi2.8 1S0.0

;Se.ds

IH-5/s-a/BG-90 K,T. 5.0 - 0.2 17.5 - 0.1 30.0 6.0 5.0 25.0 14.0 9.1 25. 7.3 6.4 3.1 W

LAC - 23 * 30.0 - 21.0 47.5 - 51.0 65.0 90. 92.0 70.0 91.0 120.0 7S.C 83.6 .14.5. 47.1

Total ,_ _ 35.0 21.2 65.o - 51.1 9500 96. 97.0 95.0 105.0 129.1 100. 90.9 00.9 - 50.2Seedlings 1000 it

Cocoa _ 50.0 35.0 370.5 232.0 84-5.0 1235. 1016 1235. 1312,5 1306, 1320 1500.; 1248.4 437.1CcSXee loom -_3- 5 ; 7; 10"7 - a - -; -- G. -- M 7

TOTAL a _ 100 41. I 4 5 310,341 1853 9.1947 1980 2250.1 -39.8

* Survey going-on at present

Appraisal estimates. N I

Revised estimates.

KEY INDICATORS

_ . -PY-1 - - _PY-2 PY-3 -,-4 Py.-5 Py-6ITEM UNIT AP Rev 2 Act App Rev Act App Rev Act App Rev Act App Rev Act App Rgv ,Act

Knife 900 - 2100 = Ooo _000Cutlas 500 96 2650 _ _ 14 5100 - 3271 5500 - 61 s soo I 1687 -

Ax 200 71 700 562 1¶200 .2545 1000 1576 1000 292 527

807Pirgalin/Spide I - 90 900 77iO 2100 - s -o 67 3000 - -bhovrl _o1000_ 26 5500

-7 -SO00 -69Digger 200 _ 29 700 46 1200. &2 lowo .x17 looo . s* .- 60Roe * 500 1221 750 x x1000 2sno ei 2 500.Sickle - _ I _ _ _ aSpriyers 1 411 -- -346 - - 75075Bird N1ot

1 _ _ - _ 15 - 140 _3 -

Rice Thresher * * -_ _ - _ _ 2 _ _ .

TOTAL - 2400 547 11100 2705 20700 11030 21000 - 1301 21000 7 _ 5J65

1/ Appraisal estimates2/ Revised estimates

w

IKEY INDIICATOR

t-i Py_-2 IP3-3 Pr-4 PT-S W-6IT E w UNI KiCT APP REV ACT' REV ACT APP REV ACT APP REV ACT

5. Credit 1000 ------------

Loun zo farniers … … … … … ……- -. .-IDevelopment 47.8 11.4 236.0 11.9 518.7 314.6 822.9 280.3 876.9 86.5 288.- ~~~~T- -----------

Seasonal 26.5 11.2 69.5 24.8 81.5 44.9 61.3 50.2 34.0 46.9 22.1Tt'al 74.3 22.6 305.5 136.6 600.2 _ 59.5 884.2 - 327.4 910.9 533.4 311.

Recovery aDevelopment _ _ . . _ _ _ 6.70 _A

Seasonal * 0.1 _. 23._ 12;5 14.4 _ 27.5 22.81 - 7734. - -

Total u 0.1 9.0 23.2 1251.A7 22.8 77.4 N1.51 INA

1/ Appraisal estimates2/ Revised estimates 'I'

-- >V~C~A f _i-3 Pr .Y-4 . PY-5 PY-6

ITEM UNtT A_ Re_ v AAc tRev Act AD Rev Act Ap_D Rev Act6. Project StaffinA - 1

Administratlon * No 28 _1 .JL. 33 2 3 - .34 -3 59 3 _ 46Pinance 13 6 16 _ 11 18 1 5 J18 17 18 16 18 __ 16Training 20 _ _[ 21 16 22 1 22 16 2223 22 _ 216

L;nd Planning 51 11 51 22 Si __. 24 .L - 22 51 26 Si - _Z§

Ag. Servlices 9S - J_117 71_ - 147 1.9_ 13 159 . 1 148 127 146 152Roads & Workshop** a_ 49 53 _5S6 _6

Commnercial 24 41 33 45 I' _ - ll79 9 - _i .O -3 . 9 2

S S U e 12- _ 14 11 14 13 14 13 14 13_ 14 11 1

M E U , 9 _= 9 13 11 1j3 14 13 14 13 |_ 14TOTAL 2 ;t5 130 29R7 221 331 .35 _ 78 _V2 L24 332 | '468

!. Training - _ _ _ - - - _ - -…

(a) StaffPre-service No. 48 . 63 . _ 65 . 20 2_5 _

i In - Service .05. _17 25_ _ - - 21 291 1

(b) Farmer - - - - _ - . - - - - - I -

ResLdential _ 2g 2 27In - Fleld , . - - - 1127 -518 7511 *l1 45- - -

* Includes PHU Note: In PY-1 the field staff were trained in Lofa.*O Previously under Administration

1/ Appraisal estimates tn -.2/ Revised estimates

P_-1 P _-2 P-3 | PY-4 PY-5 PY-6

I t e m Unit APP Re Act App Rev kct App Rev Act APp Rev Act ApP ReV Act IR ACtInfrastructure - - 1- - 11 ------------- - --------- -1-

Residentia; No 8 a

Storehcuse I = - 1 = - - - -* -I -

Workshop 1 -

TrA in ing 2 - - - _ - - -

Admini3tration _ - 1 __ - -. -

Sub Center 2

SSUJ Lab1 - - - - - - - -

Guest House 1 b

Shed___- - - - - - -

Palava Hut - 1 - - - - -_ - - -Toilet (Headqtr) 2 =

Pump Attendatice 1of

Sub gas station _ -_ - - - -r - - - - -

,,n -ath house _ _ ,................ T _ ....ahou _________.=_ i I

1/ Appraisal estimates, 2 2/ Revised estimates.

0_ w

KEY INDI'CATORS

Pv-l 19' B_ PY-2 1979 .pY- 1980 PY-4 19lll PY-5 82 IPY-6 198

., :UNIT A tEA7 AR I - Ac Hav Act Rev Act App I Rev Act Ap RV Act

Vel l s No _ | _ __ _ _ 5 _ 30 20 _ 40 16 -5 5* 0 i s

Latrines 75 | -*

Rnad - - - - Ž1 ~~~~~~~~~~40 6 - 10 9 71.

Access 4 _ , _.8 =48 68.8 40 83.2 26 104 96.5 J1.41

Recond/Maint 130n7 8_ _ 2 _ .• 1'225 143.4 137 22 5 6 137. -

0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

That is the appraisal target for teconditioning. The rest of the appraisal targets in this row are exclusively

for maintenance.

Includes 44.8 km constructed by BCADP and 25.6 km constructed by MPW.

1/ Appraisal estimates.

2/ Revised estimates.

XI

KEY IHDICATORS

..- I __ PY2 - P-3PY-4 . - PY-5 -Py.6

_E M . UNIT ARRv.v lAct Ap RevI Act Act Rv Act IRvAct~~~~~~~~Rv.' Act |App |Rv |Act |ADP Rev

19 Cooperat.;--es _ _>. . _ -Clnm Memnbership No 520 1967 1999 2786 4426 4216 7169 650o 6190 9300 7409 _ .970'

0. s s u No~I t

SWAMP (knew) _ ___ _ _|30 24 7 = = 53 - - 60 -

| Contact Sites - -_ .60 14 16 1 2 -(New) _ l - - - - 6

Farmers 2ested: -L

- - - - - -

S. Heema-:bitnu No _ _ _ | 935 422 2 _ 270 - - 1069 794

S. Mansor N__' -~~~ I - -: - t :- l0 t t I tI

1/ Appraisal estimates.

2/ Revised estimates.

(A)

BONG COUNTY AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT PHASE IINCREMENTAL ECONOMIC COST AND BENEFITS

A. Incremental Costs PY-1 PY-2 PY-3 PY-4 PY-5 PY-6 py-7 PY-8 PY-9 PY-IO PY-I1 PY-12-301977-78 78 -79 79-80 80-81 81-82 82-83 83-84 84-85 85-86 86-87 87-88 88-89

Building 265.5 354.9 178.3 190.4 179.9 10.8 - - - - - -

Vihicle 70.7 305.8 109.5 328.1 211.5 25.5 - 69.4 164.2 44.0 55.8 148.8

Furniture 6 Equipment 119.5 152.8 105.9 115.2 156.0 14.5 - 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0

Salaries & Wages:

PMU 99.3 465.3 842.1 1173.9 1513.6 1541.6 427 427.4 427.0 427.0 427.0 427.0

IDA 31.5 166.0 230.1 438.6 223.0 68.0 - - - - - -

VOC 19.9 110.1 240.0 415.3 480.3 312.2 82 81.9 81.9 81.9 81.9 81.9

GSC 62.4 131.0 198.6 364.8 574.3 410.0 131 131.0 131.0 131 131 131 .

Farm Inputs 5.7 149.9 447.0 968.5 735.6 706.2 439.31 381.3 346.0 346.0 335.0 340.3

Hired Labor - 2.2 25.1 84.0 100.1 150 150.0 150 150.0 150 150.0 150.0

Road Wurks - 690.0 182.5 70.9 204.3 230.3 108.5 36.0 36 36.0 36.0 36.0

Family Labor Q $1.00/MD 73.9 191.6 435.5 519.0 465.4 314.8 333.31 333.4 333.4 333.4 333.4 333.4

Faniily Labor @ $1.50/MP 110.7 287.3 778.5 697.8 416.4 491.0 .491.0 491.0 491.0 491.0 491.0 491.0

Less: Tnvestment onTraining 200 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Present Ext. Services ____ 4_2 46 51 56 61 68 74 82 90 99 108 120

Total (Undeflated) 506.4 2618.6 2843.6 4512.7 4683.0 3615.8 1497 1514.0 1610.8 1511.3 1511.3 143E

Deflated Costs: at 1.n/MD 639.1 3046.4 2985.7 4352.3 4809.9 361i.8 1497 1514.0 1610.8 1511.3 1520.3 i436

at 1.50/MD 675.9 3142.1 3203.5 4611.8 5042.3 3717.4 1654.6 1654.6 1768.4 1668.9 1677.9 1593.6._ , .~~~~~~~'

(B)

B. PHASE I BENEFITS:

Rice (Padi) 21 42 301 528 356 297 462 499 552 580 b14 688

Cocoa 9 66 225 502 860 1072 1091.0 983

Coffee - - - Neg. 8 46 217 503 856 1165.0 1165.0 1155

Total Benefit 21 42 301 528 373 409 904 1504 2268 2717 2870 2786

C. NET INCREMENT VALUE AT:Sl.00/MD. (618) (3004) (2684) (3824) (4437) (3207) (593) (10) 657 1206 1350 1350

At $1.50/HD F. Lobor (655) (3100) (2903) (4084) 4669) 3308) (751) (168) 500 1048 1192 1192

1/ PY6 cost is 6% of building, 12Z of vehicle; 91 of furniture & Equipment; 1022 of PHU S6W 30X of IDH 652 of VPC 712 of CSC, 963

farm inputs, 152 hired labor, 13X of, is considered. Farmers will be expected to purchase farm inputs three of the cropn on their

own. So Ex-poste Project involvement was cut back.

2/ In PY-7, the second year after the end of Phase I, only about 1/3 of PMU will be around and hence only 252 of VOC and about 322

CSC.

From PY-7 onward, the value of the family labor is the average of the previous six (6) years.

(C)

680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680

939 986 1034 1081 1129 1176 1176 1176

1156 1201 1246 1291 1336 1383 1383 1386

2775 2867 2960 3052 3145 3239 3239 3239

1339 1431 1524 1616 1709 1803 1803 1803

1181 1273 1366 1458 1551 1645 1645 1645

(A) At $1.00/MD - Family Labor (B) At $1.50/MD - Family Labor

BCR 4% = PWB 35644228 26 1.02 BCR 41 36,442.88 - 0.95PWC 35,622.26 38,440.34

BCR 5% = 31,246.10 - o.9 BCR 5% 31,246.1 . 0.8932,643.43 35,167.8

BCR 6% m 26,943.15 = 0.88 BCR 6% 26,943.15 . 0.8330,699.94 32,376.78

BCR8% = 20,362.15 0.78 BCR 8% 20,362.15 = 0.7326,015.91 27,903.33

(A) IRR at $1.00/MD . 4.34% (B) IRR at 1.50/MD - 3.16%

- 49 -

APPENDIX I

COMMENTS FROM THE BORROWER

INTBAFRADWASHINGTON DCTELEX NO. 440098

PROJECT's CONMENTS ON THE PCR

PARA 1.15 THE SECOND SENTENCE IN THIS SECTION SHOULDREAD: ABOUT 170 SWAMPS AND 50 WATER CONTACT SITES WERESURVEYED, 2,700 FARMERS TESTED FOR S. HAEMATOBRIUM ANDS. MANSONI STOP COPIES OF TYPICAL FARM BUDGETS FOR COCOA,COFFEE AND SWAMP RICE ARE BEING MAILED TO YOU UNDERSEPARATE COVER STOP THEY WERE OMMITTED FROM THE ORIGINALDRAFT SENT YOU STOP BESIDES THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS,THE PROJECT IS SATISFIED WITH THE PCR STOP

REGARDS

DANIEL GOE