Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: 20228

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(CREDIT 26620; 03400)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 16.4 MILLION

TO THE

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

FOR A

LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT AND RANGELANDS MANAGEMENT PROJECT

March 29, 2000

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchaange Rate Effective CFAF 480 (on average))

Currency Unit = CFA Franc (CFAF)Average in CFAF per US dollar

1995 4841996 5131997 6061998 5941999 633

WEIGHTS AND MEASURESMetric System

CFAF I = US$ 0.002US$ 1.00 = CFAF 480 (on average)

FISCAL YEARJanuary I December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IDA International Development AssociationPIU Project Implementation Unit

SOE Statement of ExpendituresMOF Ministry of Finance

ACCB Association Centrafricaine des Commercants en B1etail (CAR Association of LivestockTraders)

ACDA Agence Centrafricaine de Developpement Agricole (CAR Agricultural DevelopmentAgency)

AEA Association d'Eleveurs et d'Agriculteurs (Herders and farmers association)

ANBC Association Nationale des Bouchers Centrafricains (National Association of CAR Butchers)ANDE Agence Nationale pour le Developpement de l'Elevage (National Livestock Development

Agency)CIC Comite Interprofessionnel de Coordination (Interprofessional Coordination Committee)

CICM Centre International de Credit Mutuel (International Mutual Credit Center)DAM Departement d'Animation Mutualiste (FNEC) (Grassroots Capacity Development

Department)DPA Direction de la Production Animale (ANDE) (Animal Production Directorate)DSA Direction Sante Animale (ANDE) (Animal Health Directorate)

FDE Fonds de Developpement de l'Eievage (Livestock Development Fund)

FELGIP Federation Locale de Groupements d'lnteret Pastoraux (GIP) (Local Federation of HerdingInterest Groups)

FIDE Fonds Interprofessionnel de Developpement de I'Elevage (Interprofessional LivestockDevelopment Fund)

Vice President: Jean-Louis SarbibCountry Manager/Director: Serge Michailof

Sector Manager/Director: Joseph Baah-DwomohTask Team Leader/Task Manager: Noel Chabeuf

FOR OFFICLIL USE ONLY

FIDE Fonds Interprofessionnel de Developpement de l'Elevage (Interprofessional LivestockDevelopment Fund)

FNEC Federation Nationale des Eleveurs Centrafricains (National Federation of Central AfricanHerders)

GIAP Groupement d'Interet Agro-pastoral (Mixed Farming Interest Group)GIP Groupement d'Interet Pastoral (Grazing Interest Group)

ICRA Institut Centrafricain de Recherche Agronomique (Central African Agricultural ResearchCenter)

MAE Ministere de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage (Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock)MEF Ministere des Eaux, Forets, Chasse, P8che et Tourisme, Charg6 de l'Environnement

(Ministry of Water, Forestry, Hunting, Fishing, and Tourism, in charge of the Environment)NLP National Livestock Project

PAIA Projet d'Assistance aux Institutions Agricoles (Agricultural Institutions Support Project)PARC Pan African Rinderpest CampaignPARN Projet d'Amenagement des Ressources Naturelles (Natural Resources Management Project)PETF Programme d'Execution Technique et Financiere (Technical and Financial Implementation

Program)PNDE Projet National de Developpement de l'Elevage (National Livestock Development Project)

UCF Unite de Coordination Technique et Financiere (Technical and Financial Coordination Unit)ZAGROP Zone d'Actions Agro-Pastorales (Agro-Pastoral Action Area)

ZIC Zone d'Interet Cynegetique (Wildlife Management Area)

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.

CONTENTS

Page No1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 34. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 65. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 106. Sustainability 117. Bank and Borrower Performance 118. Lessons Learned 149. Partner Comments 1410. Additional Information 16Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 17Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 18Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 20Annex 4. Bank Inputs 21Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 22Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 23Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 24

Project ID: P000474 Project Name: NAT. LIVESTOCK DEV.Team Leader: Noel Rene Chabeuf TL Unit: AFTR2ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: March 27, 2000

1. Project Data

Name: NAT. LIVESTOCK DEV. LIC Number: 26620; 03400Country/Department: CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Region: Africa Regional Office

Sector/subsector. AL - Livestock; TR - Rural Roads

KEY DATESOriginal Revised/Actual

PCD: 01/10/92 Effective: 04/13/95 04/13/95Appraisal: 11/05/93 MTR: 12/31/97 12/31/96Approval: 12/01/94 Closing: 06/30/2000 06/30/99

Borrower/lImplementing Agency: GOVERNMENT/MAEOther Partners: IFAD, EU, France, FNEC

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Jean-Louis Sarbib Edward V.K. JaycoxCountry Manager: Serge Michailof Olivier LafourcadeSector Manager: Joseph Baah-Dwomoh Theodore NkodoTeam Leader at ICR: Noel Chabeuf Noel ChabeufICR Primary Author: Noel Chabeuf

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, U`N=Unlikely, HUN=HighlyUnlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N-Negligible)

Outcome: U

Sustainability: UN

Institutional Development MImpact:

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance: U

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: U

Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes

Executive Summary

Project objectives (Part 3). The objectives of the project were to: (a) improve the productivity of theBorrower's livestock sector and further its integration into the Borrower's economy; (b) improve thestandards of living of the herder population through increased diversification of their sources of income; (c)strengthen the livestock sector's professional organizations through democratization of their operations anddecentralization of the decisionmaking process; and (d) promote adequate and sustainable management ofnatural resources.

Project design resulted from a thorough and systematic preparation based on excellent collaboration amongthe Bank, the Borrower, other Donors and the beneficiaries. It relied on lessons learned from two previouslivestock projects in CAR. However, the project concept, which reflected the broad Government strategy atthe time of identification and preparation (1992), no longer suited the Government that had come to powerjust before negotiations (1994) and remained in place until the closing of the project.

Achievement of objectives and outputs (Part 4). Riots and the looting of Project facilities during the firsttwo years of project implementation resulted in the destruction and loss of technical and financialinformation available at the level of implementing agencies. Insecurity and political instability thereafterprevented continuation of implementation and supervision. Therefore evaluation of the achievement ofobjectives is essentially qualitative.

* There are no data to indicate that livestock productivity was raised by expanding animal health servicesduring this project, and such services were not actually expanded, but rather deteriorated because ofinsecurity and social unrest.

* There are no data to indicate that poverty was alleviated among herders. At best it didn't deterioratefurther, but insecurity probably had an impact on the marketing of livestock and livestock products bymaking it more hazardous and less profitable.

* The most important achievements relate to institutional development with the successful establishmentunder this project of FIDE, the Interprofessional Livestock Development Fund, a private financialinstitution outside Government, managed by a Board where herder representatives have a majorityvote.

3 FNEC, the National Federation of Herders, became more democratic and independent fromGovernment interference, but suffered deeply from the riots and looting, which considerably weakenedit.

* The rangelands component was never implemented on the projected scale because of insecurity, andremained an experimental activity.

Major factors affecting implementation and outcome (Part 5). Although the project had been identified,prepared, and launched under exceptionally favorable circumstances, the socio-political events occurring inthe country after one year of implementation (three mutinies over 18 months, and permanent politicalinstability thereafter), brought an interruption of implementation, and loss of assets and resources.Implementation could never resume despite initiatives by. Donors and Government, such as the anticipatedMid-Term Review meant to re-launch the project after the first mutiny. Civil disobedience and lack oftimely responses by the Government eventually led to closing the Project. The Bank and co-financierswaited for three years after the Mid-Term Review out of concern for the future of the capacity buildingcomponent (students sent abroad for long-term training), and also hoped for a change of attitude by theGovernment that never occurred.

Sustainability (Part 6). Sustainability is rated Uncertain because of the circumstances under which theProject had to be closed and the impact of the general situation in the country (insecurity), on livestockactivities and development.

Bank and Borrower performance (Part 7). Overall Bank performance is rated Satisfactory (marginallyso) because it was HS at identification and appraisal and until the MTR was completed, but deterioratedwhen supervision was no longer possible because of the local situation. The Bank could perhaps havemaintained a more active dialogue with its partners, although high Government turn-over made thatdifficult.

Overall Borrower performance is rated Unsatisfactory, although it was rated HS at preparation. Seriousdeterioration on implementation after the first year caused the rating to change.

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Implementing agencies' performance is rated Satisfactory for FIDE, which did well throughout the projectin spite of minor shortcomings; Unsatisfactory for ANDE which deteriorated very quickly; and FNEC ratedSatisfactory (marginally) because the losses it suffered make it difficult to assess what its real performancecould have been under normal circumstances.

Lessons learned (Part 8). The participatory approach at identification (1992) and appraisal (1994) andduring the MTR was extremely effective in helping achieve a design addressing the real challenges of thesubsector.

FNEC and FIDE, the two institutions outside Government in this project, fared better than ANDE,however, FNEC suffered high losses. Although it afforded FNEC some protection against Governmentattempts at re-establishing control, the Project Agreement between FNEC, IDA, and IFAD didn't providetotal immunity and was of little benefit against the consequences of socio-political unrest.

FIDE stands out as a model for the organization of financial flows to the livestock sector, both from within(user fees) and outside (Credit funds), from the private sector (fees), and from Government, with jointmanagement in which professionals have the opportunity to gain control.

The Bank delayed closing this project in hopes that a political change of attitude would restore the originalopenness and convergence of strategies that had presided over the early stages of project design. Itsresilience was not rewarded except after the Project closed, the Government agreed to finance the finalyears of education for the 12 students sent to Senegal for long-term training under the project, thus savingone of the major achievements of this project.

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:The objectives of the project were to:

- improve the productivity of the Borrower's livestock sector and further its integration into theBorrower's economy;

e improve the standards of living of the herder population through increased diversification of theirsources of income;

* strengthen the livestock sector's professional organizations, through democratization of their operationsand decentralization of the decision making process; and

e promote adequate and sustainable management of natural resources.

3.2 Revised Objective:The original objectives were never modified, and found still valid by the Mid term Review when it wasimplemented in November 1996.

3.3 Original Components:The project was designed with three parts each of whom had several components.

Part A, Strengthening of the institutionalframtework1. (a) Establish and manage FIDE as an interprofessional organization to coordinate financing of sectoralfield activities to be carried out by livestock sector organizations, and (b) formulate and implementprocedures to enable FIDE to mobilize and promptly collect all its revenues and allocate them as requiredto sustain the development of the livestock sector.

2. Improve the operational capacity of ANDE and FIDE through acquisition of equipment, vehicles, andfinancing of operating costs.

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3. Promote AEA in selected localities and provide services necessary to improve the productivity andsustainability of the livestock sector.

4. Establish and manage a mutual savings and loan scheme to provide credit to herders andagro-pastoralists.

5. Design and implement a herd rebuilding scheme, designed to help herders whose herding stock has beendepleted, but are willing to remain herders based on the "passing-on-the-gift" system or any other systemyielding the same results.

6. Conduct (a) a baseline survey of the livestock sector, including a demographic analysis of the herdercommunity, particularly herders experiencing herd attrition; (b) select and monitor a representative sampleof herders and herds; and (c) establish a monitoring and evaluation system for project activities.

7. Conduct (a) a legal and sociological study aimed at streamlining the current procedure for establishingnew ZAGROP and providing land tenure security to herders and farmers established in the said zones; and(b) conduct a study to identify and assess traditional subsistence and commercial hunting patterns with aview to improving the sustainability of traditional hunting, particularly in the wildlife management zone.

8. Strengthen FNEC's grassroots representative character and improve its capacity to efficiently carry outall its operations.

Part B, Improvement productivity of the livestock sector1. Create about 16 additional ZAGROP in the western, central, and eastern regions.

2. Carry out of the following activities in all ZAGROP developed under the Project:* assess water needs and development of water supplies for human and livestock use;* install storage, processing, marketing facilities required for livestock products;* acquire satellite images required for land use mapping; land rights security, and an adequate use of

Savannah lands;* acquire necessary equipments, vehicles, bicycles, motorbikes, materials and supplies;* rehabilitate and maintain about 400 km of new primary tracks to' secure adequate access to all

ZAGROP developed under the Project; and* construct and maintain about 800 km of secondary tracks and construct main firebreak structures.

3. Strengthen animal health and husbandry services inter alia, by: (a) training ANDE's staff to adequatelyimplement all animal health regulations; and (b) equip five border control posts to strengthen screening ofanimal diseases and prevent their spread into the Borrower's territory and increase the mobility of bordercontrol inspectors.

4. By acquiring vehicles and equipment, provide, inter alia, grassroots development services aimedprimarily at men and women members of grassroots and federal organizations to enable them to usefullyparticipate in and manage these organizations.

5. Conduct field experiments focused on themes relating to animal production and animal health.

6. By acquiring vehicles and equipment, provide, inter alia, extension services aimed primarily at women,youth and impoverished herders to familiarize them with appropriate technology for sedentary livestockhusbandry, crop farming, draft cultivation, and processing animal products.

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7. Among the population established within the wildlife management area, promote livestock developmentactivities, including in particular, raising small ruminants, poultry and bee keeping.

Part C, TrainingFormulate and execute: (a) a training program, including in-country seminars, study tours, and long termstudy abroad, as appropriate, to increase the expertise and capacity of the relevant staff of all agenciesinvolved in the execution of the Project; (b) a training program geared at the herder's sons; and (c) afunctional literacy program geared at herder associations members, in particular, women and youth.

The costs of the components were the following:

Component Cost ($) RatingPart AInstitutional support 5,300,000 SFinancial assistance 3,100,000 UTechnical support 2,300,000 SPart BRangeland management 7,700,000 UAnimal Health 3,100,000 UPart C|Grassroots capacity development 3,200,000 S

3.4 Revised Components:The components were reviewed during the Mid Term Review. All were still considered relevant, butseveral new factors modified the original planning of implementation after the MTR, and implementation ofseveral components was deferred:

1. Wildlife, which was under the same Ministry as Agriculture and Livestock when the Project wasappraised, was moved to the Ministry of Forestry, Wildlife and Touring, with which cooperation wastemporarily deferred. Hence the wildlife component, studies of hunting, and activities in the wildlifemanagement area of the far east of the country were shelved.

2. The situation resulting from the riots and the growing insecurity in the hinterland caused the preliminarystudy for implementation of the herd rebuilding scheme to be deferred. It could not be implementedbecause consultants were no longer willing to visit the country. It was also a deterrent for potentialfinancial intermediaries for the credit component, which was initially deferred because a similar componentin another Bank-financed project in the country had procurement problems. Eventually, when the tenderfor the other project was canceled, potential candidates for the Livestock Project could no longer bemobilized.

3. Soon after the first mutiny in 1996, banditry developed in the rural areas where herders had beenestablished longest, particularly in the first three established western ZAGROP. After several families hadbeen victimized and their leaders murdered, most herders fled elsewhere, particularly to the east, wheresecurity was better. The movement of herder populations disturbed all plans and it was decided to waituntil the herders had returned before emphasizing large-scale range management activities. They continued,albeit in only two locations, and on an experimental scale with financial support from the European Union.

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4. Following the mutinies and riots, all foreigners were evacuated for several months. The baseline survevof herders which had just begun was suspended for a long time, but was eventually completed in part in1997. The departure of all technical assistance for several months dealt a severe blow to Projectimplementation, which never recovered from this interruption.

5. Tensions which were not perceptible under the previous projects and during identification, preparation,and appraisal, arose between the rural communities of herders and crop farmers in the most denselypopulated areas of the center-north, causing further movements of herders due to insecurity, and making allfield operations, including vaccination of cattle and quarantine control, problematic.

6. All these factors were initially considered linked to the situation in the capital, but with time it becameclear that the problem were there to stay.

3.5 Quality at Entry:Quality at entry is rated Highly Satisfactory because:

* the capitalization of all the achievements of the two previous successful projects;* the higly participatory manner in which the identification and preparation processes w-ere carried

out; and* the continuous and deep collaboration among Donors.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4. / Ouicomeiachievement of objective:Achievement of objectives is rated Unsatisfactory There are no data available to indicate that livestockproductivity -was raised by expanding animal health services under this project. The nine veterinarystudents being trained in Senegal did not complete their curriculum before the project closed. The looting ofFNEC's warehiouses during the riots seriously disrupted distribution of veterinary pharmaceuticals,resulting in increased mortalities of livestock and alleged emigration of a number of herds to neighboringcountries. Although FNEC has been able to resume drug distribution, albeit at a much reduced level, it islikely that animal health services remain belo%% pre-riot and pre-project performance levels.

There are no data to indicate that poverty was alleviated among herders. The herd rebuilding componentwas never implemented, despite a strong grassroots demand, because the preliminary survey on itsimplementation never took place due to lack of security. Yet a mission by a religious sclholar financed byanother Donor (France) resulted in a public condemnation of the way "Zakat" (the Moslem religious tax)*was collected forcefully by customary chiefs in CAR, and certainly contributed to relieving the customaryfiscal burden on the poorest herders. The Mutual Credit component was never implemented becausepotential candidates to be a financial intermediary did not bid because of the security situation.

FIDE, the Interprofessional Livestock Fund, was successfully established under the project and operatedaccording to expectations to collect users' fees on cattle markets. Collection achieved the targeted figuresfor the first three years of project implementation, providing finances to support vital project operationsduring the suspension of disbursements by Donors (Bank and IFAD). It remains a major source of financeafter the closing of the IDA and IFAD Credits.

Under its new statutes adopted as a condition of Board presentation for this Credit, FNEC, the NationalFederation of Herders, became more democratic with the suppression of any direct involvement ofGovernment in its structures and operations. Two-thirds of its trustees wvere elected by the base. After the

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riots and looting had greatly reduced its economic vitality, FNEC eventually survived and was able torebuild to a limited extent its drug distribution system to a limited extent with support from its foreignsuppliers and Donors (Germany, Japan).

The rangelands management component was never implemented on the projected large scale because ofsecurity problems and has remained an experimental activity' financed by the EU.

4.2 Outputs by components:Part A, Strengthening of the livestock sector institutionalframework

1. a. FIDE wvas established by a decree which became a law on October 28, 1994 as an InterprofessionalDevelopment Fund. Its purpose is to sustainably finance the development of livestock. and rationallymanage natural resources. The Government also agreed through a subsidiary financing agreement tochannel through FIDE the funds from the IDA and IFAD Credits. FIDE would operate tinder theInterprofessional Coordination Committee (CIC), a governing body of seven members, four of whom wereelected from FNEC, two from ANDE and one appointed by a Government representative with no specialright except a veto in cases when CIC's decisions would go against Government policies. CIC would meetat quarterly. and its permanent operational structure would be UCTF, the Financial and TechnicalCoordination Unit. Donors wvere to be invited to CIC's meetings as observers.

1. b. FIDE was allocated the balance of funds remaining oni the former Livestock Development Fund(FDE). It had provided financial support for essential operations of ANDE during the two-year periodbetween the end of the preceding National Livestock Development Project and the beginning of theimplementation of the current one. FIDE was recognized legally as a Public Interest Institution(Etablissement d'lnteret Public). a disposition which allowed it to collect fees and manage public fundsdirectly.

2. The tender for vehicles and equipments had been prepared before the Project, and could thus be launchiedas soon as the Credit became effective. Part of the delivery took place before the 1996 mutiny andequipment was lost to looting, but part of the vehicles! delivered later, were saved.

3. The procedure to establish ZAGROP was modified and simplified through a law dated September 20,1994. The responsibility for the official recognition of ZAGROP Nkas transferred to the Ministry forAgriculture and Livestock (MAE). Practical implementation procedures were to be determined by aconstiltant study (see below).

4. The tender to recruit a financial intermediary to implement the Credit component had been preparedbefore the Credit became effective, but when it was to be implemented, the Bank was in disagreement withthe Government about awarding a contract for a similar operation for another IDA-financed Project.Eventually an agreement for this other operation was reached, but at that time, insecurity in the countrxdeterred potential bidders, and this component was never implemented.

5. It had been agreed that the herd rebuilding scheme would be launched only' after a preliminary consultantmission had determined more precisely in concentration with beneficiaries, how the "passing-on-the-gift"principle could be implemented. At first it vwas difficult to identify a consultant with suitable experience forthis mission, and when one was identified, the local situation, made his mission impractical. Since thisoperation was considered rather risky, it was decided to postpone it until the preliminary mission couldactually be implemented. and this was not possible before the Project closed.

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6. The tender to recruit a consultant to carrv out the baseline survey and establish a Monitoring andEvaluation system for the project had been prepared before the Project became effective and was launchedsoon thereafter. A consultant was recruited. visited the country and launched the survev but * asinterrupted b) the first mutinv. He left the country. The activity resumed later, and eventually the surveywas completed, but by that time, recommendations for strengthening ANDE's Monitoring and E%aluationunit could not be implemented because of difficulties with ANDE's management and the suspensions ofdisbursements.

7. Local consultants wvere recruited through a local competitive bidding process to implement the legal. andsociological study aimed at streamlining the procedures to establish ZAGROP, bit they could not startworking before Project implementation ground to a halt. The study on traditional huntilng patterns waspostponed by the Mid Term Review until an agreement could be reached with the new Ministry in charge ofhunting and wildlife management.

Part B, Improvement of thle productivity of tlte livestock sector1. None of the additional 16 ZAGROP was created. Initial studies could not be completed because of thesecurity situation and subsequent movements of herder populations.

2. Activities in all ZAGROP were not carried out except w'ith financing from the EU on an experimenitalscale.

3. Strengthening animal health and husbandry' services was undertaken, but there was a disagreementbetween ANDE and the Bank about rehabilitation of the Bouar Livestock Training Center, which wouldhave cost more and provided lower quality training than sending trainees to training institutionis in thesub-region. The MTR decided in favor of the second option, but actual implementation wvas not startedbefore the general situation in the country deteriorated. The building of the five new border control postswas not started because there was still some uncertaint) about where to locate them because of changes incommercial cattle routes.

4. Equipments and vehicles *'.ere provided to FNEC's grassroots development division (DAMI), but -werelost during the mutinies. This activity was the only one wvith continued support under direct management byFIDE/UCTF until the Project closed. Funding was from FIDE's own resources when disbursements fromIDA and IFAD Credits were suspended.

5. Field experimentation was funded by the EU component, but was interrupted during the periods of civilunrest. They were focused on long term themes (improving traditional range management techniques), butdidn't yield results during the life of the Project.

6. The MTR found that there was a misunderstanding between ANDE and the Project about the concept ofextension services. The contract that was to be signed between ANDE and ACDA (the agricultural cropextension agency) had been very loosely' drafted and didn't address the real objectives of the Project.Activities wvere focused on providing additional support for settled farmers, but not as planned by theProject, which was support for impoverished herders forced to settle and start subsistence cropping as theirherds dwindled. The MTR decided that this contract had to be redrafted. This could not be completedbefore disbursements were suspended. The extension staff which ANDE had recruited at the start of theProject was put on "Chomage technique" when disbursements were suspended, and theni dismissed wvhen theProject closed.

7. The activities in the wildlife management area were never started for the same reasons as those for which

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the studies were postponed.

Part C, Training

A training program managed by ANDE had been prepared before the Project became effective and wasinitiated immediately thereafter. A first group of six students was selected and sent to the Dakar InterstateVeterinary School in September 1996. A second group of three others to be trained at Thies (Senegal) inanimal husbandry were sent in 1997. This long-tern training program was the greatest concern of Projectmanagement. It appeared at the time of the MTR that ANDE had mismanaged the students scholarshipfunds and put this component in jeopardy. The MTR decided that this program would be directly managedby FIDE/UCTF which contracted it to CIRAD-EMVT, the only organization willing to prefinance andmonitor this program. This agreement went on until the project closed. When this occurred, the first groupof students was still one year away from graduation. The students stayed in Senegal, until eventually theGovernment agreed to finance the resumption and completion of their training using another resource. Twoof the four herder's sons sent to France to be trained in agricultural management failed to quality, butremained in France to continue sudying on their own. The others succeeded and returned home. Thefunctional literacy program w'as implemented successfully by FNEC's grassroots development division(DAM).

4.3 N\et Present IValue. Economic rate of return.In the SAR the economic analysis was dealt with in paragraph 5.06 to 5.09, from which the followingpassage is extracted: "The two main components of the project comprise action to: (a) improve rangelandsmanagement through the development of ZAGROPs, and (b) upgrade animal health. The first componentwould have a measurable impact in helping preserve the country's natural productive capital, while thesecond would greatly improve the herder's financial situation. These two components amount for about 33and 45 percent respectively of total project expenditures. The nature of their benefits makes it impracticalto calculate an internal rate of return. The benefits of the rangelands management component (preservationof natural resources capital) are not recurrent. Those from the animal health component materialize veryrapidly after the pertinent expenditures are made (fruition period under two years), and would produce aninternal rate of return which, while very high, would have no valid significance for decision taking.Economic analysis will therefore be limited to a simple receipts/costs comparison omitting the timeconcept."

For the rangeland management component, the analysis concluded that "Even if the relative preference forlands near the major markets implies only a fraction of the absolute value, the ZAGROP investments,otherwise justified by their numerous social effects, would appear acceptable on economic grounds."

The conclusion for the animal health component was: "Even if the number of animals reached by the healthservices was 25 percent below the initial projections, the capital-output ratio would still be 4, comparableto that for the best rural projects. and the cash flow would still be rapidly positive."

Unfortunately the destruction of data during the riots precludes any ex-post analysis and calculations of anet present value and economic rate of return.

4.4 Financial rate of return.Not available

4.5 Institutional dev,elopment impact:The institutional development impact is rated Modest. As discussed above, FNEC, a national NGO and

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professional institution that had been established under a previous Project and reformed before this projectbecame effective, proved its ability to survive the dramatic material and financial losses suffered during themutinies and riots, and to remain the central herder organization although with a much diminished weight.

FIDE, which was established under this Project to replace the former Livestock Development Fundmanaged within the Government, operated successfully as an independent private financial institution. Itcollected user fees and managed financial flows from and to the livestock subsector, and continues to do soafter the end of the Project.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5. 1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agenc,Y.:The project was designed and prepared under extremely favorable auspices. It was building on theachievements of two successive successful livestock projects, and received continued support from allmajor Donors in CAR--IDA, IFAD, the EU and France. All Donors contributed to the preparation andappraisal of the project, and EU, IDA, and IFAD financing became almost simultaneously. Two years hadelapsed between Project inception and the end of the previous project because of the local political situationand uncertainties. Negotiations and Board presentation were delayed because of local elections. Mutiniesand riots a year after the start of the Project initially disrupted implementation. Further mutinies and riotsresulted in the destruction of project assets, insecurity in the field, and implementation ground to a halt.Othet Bank projects (PAIA, PARDEP), met with the same situation, difficulties, and outcome. TheGovernment didn't have the resources and capacities to concentrate on project implementation difficulties.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:Institutional reforms (establishing FIDE, restructuring ANDE, modi1,'ing the regulations on land tenure toallow for creation of herder-crop farmer associations, the AEAs), were carried out in a timely manner asconditions for the appraisal, negotiations, and presentation of the project to the Board. But Governmentwas ultimately unable to reimburse the funds missing from the Special Account mismanaged by ANDE andF'NEC in time to prevent closing the project afler a warning had been issued and disbursements suspended.There was an excessive turn-over of Government officials, preventing any attempt at a continuousdialogue. Between June 1996 and June 1998, six Ministers were successively appointed for the Agricultureand Livestock portfolio, and between December 1997 and June 1998 there was only an Acting Minister.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:Verv quickly ANDE appeared to be unable to properly manage Credit funds. It could not providejustification for funds spent, and this resulted in project components (training) being %vithdrawn fromANDE to be directly managed at FIDE's level. Ultimatelv disbursements were suspended. The sameapplied to FNEC during the two initial years until it dismissed a Secretary General who was mismanagingits assets.

5.4 Costs andfinancing:The final cost of the project was US$ 4,676,164 for the IDA/IFAD financing (US$ 2,787,246 for the IDACredit and US$ 1,888,918 for the IFAD Credit), and the equivalent of US$1,772,000 for the Beneficiaries'contributions. Financing from the EU and France is not known. Disbursements at project closing (afterfour year's of activity) was 16.38 percent for the IDA Credit and 38.37 percent for the IFAD Credit. Thepercentages are different because disbursements wvere suspended for different periods of time. While thesepercentages are well below appraisal estimates, they must be considered high in view of the frequentperiods (although over 13 months) during wvhich disbursements were suspended, mainly because servicecharges on this and other loans granted by IDA and IFAD were not paid. Expenditures were particularlyhigh in Category I (equipment and vehicles) and Category 4 (operating costs), uith the livestock

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institutions FIDE and ANDE as the main beneficiaries. Comparatively smaller amounts were disbursed foractivities more directly benefiting IFAD's target group (grassroots development, literacy training) and forconsultants' services and overseas training. Costs for the other Donors were not made available.Beneficiaries contributed through FIDE over a four-years period. It is remarkable that in the end,beneficiaries contributed almost one-third of total project cost.

6. Sustainability

6. 1 Rationale for sustainability ratingSustainabilitv is rated Uncertain because since the components most valued by Beneficiaries (herdrebuilding, mutual credit, establishment of herder-farmers associations) will not be implemented, andFNEC has lost much of its economic importance and cohesion of the herder community is likely to weaken.Insecurity is another threat to sustainability since it has already caused the emigration of many herdergroups. Insecurity also hampers the collection of funds by FIDE. Political unrest with the accompanyingcivil disobedience is a further threat to the operations of FIDE.

6 2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:Considering the conditions under which the Project closed, no specific transition arrangements have beenmade. Transition rests essentially on FIDEIUCTF's ability to carry on with its role in controlling financialflows within the livestock sector. Recent information from the Borrower tends to indicate that feecollections become increasingly irregular.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bunk7. I Lending:Bank performance is rated Satisfactory. The appraisal mission in April 1993 included 12 members in orderto cover all components (three Bank staff, two Bank consultants for rangelands and rural roads; two IFADconsultants for rural credit and institutions; two EU representatives one from Nairobi, one from the localEU Office; one representative from the French Ministry of Cooperation, one representative from the localFrench Cooperation mission, and one FAC consultant for xvildlife). It was funded by all Donors, andmanaged to hold 15 meetings in remote villages across the country, thus consulting with an estimated 1,500beneficiaries. Negotiations and Board presentation were delayed because of local elections. As soon as theproject became effective by mid-April 1995, a joint mission with cofinanciers was organized and met in thefield on June 4 for the project launch Seminar. Rather uncommonly all financings was made availablesimultaneously (IDA-IFAD. April 1995, EU-PARC in March 1995, and the continuation of the FrenchFAC which had been the only support to the sector since the end of PNDE).

' ' Slupervision.

The performance of the Bank is rated marginally Satisfactory. The first joint supervision began on June 2,1995 and put the project on track. The second supervision took place six months later in November 1995and was also a joint operation of all Donors (EU-PARC participated through both its regional and localrepresentatives). It reported that the project, despite some concerns about financial management at ANDE,was off to a promising start. The third supervision, originally scheduled for April 1996, had to bepostponed because of mutinies, riots and civil unrest, followed by political instability. The riots resulted inlooting and destruction of Project facilities (FNEC's headquarters, ANDE offices), loss of assets ($1million worth of pharmaceutical supplies at FNEC, $0.5 million worth of lost vehicles and equipmentsaltogether in all components).

The new political situation temporarily reduced Government authority and induced the herders to depose

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the government- supported FNEC Board, elect a new board, and dismiss the governiment-supportedSecretary General who had abused his po%Ners during the past two years. Donors agreed that under thesecircumstances it was necessary to advance the Mid-Term Review and entirely reassess the situation of theproject implementation. The advanced MTR took place between October 8 and 28, 1996, and the teamdrafted and presented a joint MTR report before leaving the country. It found that due to riots andinsecurity, the implementation of certain components (mutual credit, herd rebuilding, and development ofnew pastoral areas) Would have to be postponed until peace returned, and that due to the mismanagement ofCredit funds by ANDE and losses suffered by FNEC, financial management had to be recentralized atFIDE's level, the only location wvith appropriate accounting capabilities and permanent TechnicalAssistance. It also found that 160 million CFAF in advances to ANDE and FNEC wvere unaccounted forand had to be either justified or reimbursed by the Government. Due to the misappropriation of scholarshipfunds by ANDE managers. financial support to the 12 students funded under the project to be trained asveterinarians and animal husbandry specialists *vas contracted to CIRAD b) FIDE for reliability, effectivemonitorinig, and supervision. There was still hope that FNEC w%ould be able to recoup its losses andgradually resume activities with help from some bilateral Donors (Germany, Japan, and France).

Political unrest and civil disorder didn't stop, leading to a prolonged stalemate in Government throLighouit1997, with renewed mutinies and looting. Meanwhile, FIDE went on collecting user fees from the herderson cattle markets, at levels correspondinig to those expected at appraisal, indicating a persistentcommitment of grassroots beneficiaries to the sector organization established under the project. Activitieshesitantly resumed for components supported by EU and France. and on a limited scale -- support toherders associations, and development of crop-farmers/herder associations in two former ZAGROPs. Dueto the existence of the Project Agreements with FNEC and the general orientation of the project outsideGovernment, Donors maintained their support throughout FY 1997 while hoping for an improved generalsituation in the country, but no further supervision was possible. At the beginning of 1998, disbursementswere suspended because the government was late paying arrears to the Bank, during which time activitieswere reduced and ANDE staff put on leave without pay (chomage technique). Following this generalsuspension, the Government was not answering the Bank's requests to justifv or reimburse the missingCredit fuinds, and there was an investigation into FNEC's management before the riots. Disbursementsaffecting ANDE were partially suspended from January 12 to April 12, 1999, followed by a generalsuspension of Credit disbursements with a warning to Government that the project would be closed.Eventually the project was closed on June 30. The Government repaid the missing CFAF 160 million onJulv 19. 1999, but it vas too late.

.3 Overall Bank performance:Overall Bank performance was Satisfactory, with much proactivity at project inception and closecooperation with other Donors for joinlt supervisions and the MTR. But little could be done during longperiods of political unrest in 1997 and 1998, and the fate of the long-term students was a constant concernwhen closing the project became more real in late 1998, explaining delays in making the final decision toclose the project. Every possibilit) has been unsuccessfully explored with cofinanciers. IFAD will close itsCredit for which the Bank is the Cooperating Institution. but the EU and France maintain their support,which focuses on institutional support to FIDE and FNEC, and limited applied research on rangemanagement through the relevant unit of ANDE. Cofinanciers have all been supportive of the project, andparticularly of FNEC.

Borrower'. 4 Preparation:At preparation, Borrowver performance was Very Satisfactory. Although more than tvo years had elapsed

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since the completion of the previous livestock development project in CAR (PNDE, closed in 1992). thecurrent project started under promising auspices. The project had been identified during the last supervisionof PNDE in November 1992. and was prepared almost immediately by a consultant, wvith 20 years ofexperience in the CAR livestock sector who traveled throtughout the country to meet and conisuilt with localcommunities and herders.

.5 Governtnent implementation performance:The performance of the Government for implementation is rated Unsatisfactory. The project was identifiedin 1992 and prepared durinig the followling year under a Government that recognized the economicimportance of the livestock sector and xvas very tolerant of autonomy for FNEC and Donor suppottargeted at this subsector. But the government that came to power when the project was negotiated, signedand during all of its implementation never accepted the emergence of a strong self-reliant organization ofherders and used all available means to try and establish control of both the political and financialleadership. This situation was not alien. FNEC was targeted during the riots, under pressure when a newSecretar- General was to be recruited, and targeted with attempts to manipulate herders general assemblies,government representatives at CIC (the management committee of FIDE), and the FIDE Director.Attempts were also made to impose financial advantages incompatible with FIDE's by-laws.

- 6 Imnplementing 4gencv:FIDE's performance is rated Satisfactory. So far. FIDE remains the only example in Africa of a finanicialmechanism through which beneficiaries from the livestock sector contribute to the financing operations andhave some control over project management as Donors partners. Its establishment w'as made possiblebecause of the relatively successful experience of collecting user fees for FDE under the two previousprojects. These user fees were originally allocated to establishing a veterinary drug distribution systemthrough FNEC. which addressed a priority request from herders. Beneficiaries always undestood how thefees they pay were used. At the time * 'hen international financial institutions and other Donors areencouraging Governmenits to streamlire budgets and suppress all sideline financial processes, aninterprofessional fund like FIDE. with private status and management but an official entitlemenit to collectfees (Reconnu d'utilite publique). appears to be viable to gradually recover costs and ensure thesustainability of activities for beneficiaries. The performance of FIDE has remained Satisfactory to HighlySatisfactory throughout the existence of the project.

FNEC's performance is rated marginally Satisfactory. FNEC. a direct partner of IDA and IFAD throughProject Agreements, has not been inmune to political interference, but thanks to these partnerships hasfound the strength to start defending its indepenidence, a rare case in Africa. FNEC was uliable to control aSecretary General who misused its assets and Project funds and abused his powers for two years beforebeing dismissed by a General Assembly in August 1996. It is remarkable that FNEC achieved enoughrecognition to be granted a grace period from its creditors after the mutinies and even to be partiallyresupplied in order to resume distribution of veterinary drugs. Continuous political unrest, however, putsall achievements in jeopardy, and encotirages divisions within the herder communitv.

The performance of ANDE. whichi was the only structure with some national technical expertise in theimplementationi of previous projects, is rated Highly Unsatisfactory. The Agency has now become toomuch of a parastatal. with permanent government interference for appointments of senior staff. andexcessive top-dov\n management. When young professionals presently undergoing long-term trainingreturn, pressure will increase for a real privatization of veterinary and advisory services. ANDE'stechnical support for range management and animal husbandry advice will have to be transferred to localprivate consultant, the establishment of which will be encouraged. This could not be addressed under the

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current project.

7. 7 Overall Borrower performance:The performance of the Borrower was excellent during preparation and appraisal, but deterioratedthereafter along with the general political situation. Recommendations from the MTR were implementedbelatedly, some to such an extent (reimbursement of SA funds), that they became useless in preventingclosure of the project. The increasing politicization of the Government became a growing handicap. FIDE,as one of the last funds with resources outside Government, attracted increasingly unsolicited interest. Theoverall performance of Borrower is rated Unsatisfactory.

8. Lessons Learned

The Government and stakeholders were closely associated with the process of identification, preparationand appraisal of the project, and consultations with grassroots beneficiaries were held during the appraisalmission in 15 locations for an estimated 1,500 persons. Such wide contact ensured a relevant project designthat addressed concerns of potential beneficiaries, and disseminated information on project objectives andpurpose. This approach explains the continued support of the Project by the herder community and theresilience of project institutions despite a very chaotic political situation. This early participatory approachwas key to the quality of project identification, preparation, and appraisal.

Until FIDE was established, users fees were collected by FNEC and were supposed to be in parttransferred to the former LDF, but this system didn't operate in a satisfactory manner because (a) FNECwas reluctant and always behind schedule in transfering funds, and (b) FDE was an element of the nationalbudget, and mobilization was a cumbersome process, contingent upon the availability of cash in thetreasury, a very rare occurrence. Thus, the successful establishment of FIDE, after some initial difficultieswith FNEC's field representatives, can be considered a success and a Best Practice. The Fund subsequentlyoperated in an autonomous manner and Government attempts at appointing unplanned paid supervisors orrequesting FIDE to finance operations outside its mandate were successfully repelled with intervention fromDonors (who have a status of observers at CIC meetings). FIDE provided the continuous financial supportto essential project activities (support to herders associations, training, audits, maintenance of cattlemarketing facilities), when no other source of funds was available, particularly during suspensions of IDAand IFAD disbursements. Its weakness has been a tendency to overpay its staff, and constant attempts fromCIC members to try and increase their attendance fees. FIDE and FNEC, two institutions ouotsideGovernment, fared better than ANDE, the only parastatal implementing agency.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:Borrower comments (from FIDE's Director) were received belatedly. They can be summarized as follows:

* The initial design of the project was extremely satisfactory and promising, particularly because ofthe consensus among Donors and Government. If Project components had been implemented asdesigned, they would have had a major impact on the livestock sector, but unforeseen eventscompletely jeopardized project implementation -- the three successive mutinies of 1996 and 1997,and the lack of security that coused herders to move from one area to another.

* The end of IDA and IFAD support after 15 years is considered a grave blow to the livestock sectorat a time when it is more in need than ever of external support and guidance.

(b) Cofinanciers:

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1. Objectives. IFAD's main objective in cofinancing the PDEGP was to contribute to povertyalleviation and to the empowerment of grassroots organizations in CAR. The successful collaborationwith IDA and other partners in the past, in particular during the National Livestock Project (IFADLoan 186 CA), provided a good basis for further effort to strengthen the country's livestock sector andits institutions. IFAD put particular emphasis on lifting the constraints faced by small-scale herdersand women and on strengthening herder organizations and their management capacity at local andregional levels.

2. Project Design and Implementation. The project designed and approved by IFAD's EB in 1994included all activities needed to attain the objectives, and provided policy and administrative reformsand development support activities (rangeland management, animal health, grassroots capacitydevelopment, financial assistance including herd reconstitution, technical support, and institutionalsupport). Project implementation, however, was not up to expectations and a number of crucialactivities were realized only in part or not at all (such as the herd reconstitution sub-component). Whilethere has not been an evaluation mission thus far, it has become obvious from supervision visits and theMid-term Review that projects impact on IFAD's target group has been negligible, and moreover, thatpositive results of the earlier livestock projects have not been sustained.

3. IFAD cofinancing through a loan of SDR 3.4 million on highly concessional.terms was provided ona pari passu basis with IDA. Disbursements at project closing, i.e. after four years of activity,amounted to SDR 1,304,544 or 38.4% of the loan amount. While this percentage is well belowappraisal estimates, it must be considered high in view of the frequent periods (altogether over 13months) during which disbursements were suspended, mainly due to non-payment of service charges onthis and other loans granted by IFAD. Expenditures were particularly high on Category I (equipmentand vehicles) and Category 4 (operating costs), with the livestock institutions FIDE and ANDE as themain beneficiaries. Comparatively smaller amounts were disbursed for activities more directlybenefiting IFAD's target group (grassroots development, literacy training) and for consultant servicesand overseas training.

4. Factors affecting project implementation. The main factors in the disappointing implementation were(a) political interference, (b) internal unrest and insecurity in the country, and (c) inadequateperformance by implementing agencies. Among the implementing agencies, only FIDE seems to havecomplied with its terms of reference and executed its part of the project according to rules and agreedupon procedures. Financial and other mismanagement was registered at the level of other agenciesinvolved, worsened by outside interference and the destruction of project property, accounts andrecords due to the general country situation. Insecurity in most parts of the country further impededproject implementation, including the restocking sub-component that could have particularly benefitedIFAD's target group.

5. Performance of the Cooperating Institution (CI). Supervision activities were hampered by thecountry's political and security situation, in particular for field supervision. In view of the basic"institution building" character of the project, technical aspects seem to have been somewhat neglected,both by project implementers and supervisors. While management problems were tackled thoroughlyby the CI at the project staff level, policy issues were not addressed in an adequate manner. More openconsultations between Government and Donors might have yielded better results and led the Borrowerto respond more positively to the recommendations made by the CI.

6. Lessons. The main lesson to be drawn from IFAD's perspective deals with project impact on thetarget group of rural poor/small livestock holders. Project activities will have to be geared more

-15-

directly toward the target group by not channeling assistance through apex or public organizations andby working with the grassroots organizations and their members. A more general lesson is the need forDonors to act quickly, forcefully, and in a concerted manner in cases were political interference andfinancial mismanagement threaten successful project implementation. Immediate and completesuspension by all Donors could have a better impact than pieceiieal action by single agencies. Suchconcerted action could accelerate a positive response from the Borrower and thus minimize the negativeimpact that a suspension can have on the grassroots participants. Moreover, in certain cases it may beadvisable to introduce stricter special account (including a lower authorized amount) and financialreporting rules when the project begins. A third lesson is based on the experience of all three livestockprojects and relates to the sustainability of project investments. It has become obvious that publicmaintenance services cannot be relied upon. It would, therefore, be preferable to entrustproject-financed buildings, equipment etc. to the extent possible to private organizations and agencies,which for this purpose, would have to be involved from the beginning in the financing and O&M ofthese investments.

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):No other comments have been received.

10. Additional Information

It is clear from the record of events that the project has not and will never achieve its objectives. The fouryears of implementation have only led to the establishment of FIDE and its managerial body CIC as afunctional financial system. FIDE has operated albeit with increasing difficulties and under growingpressures, as was expected. Through the collection of users fees it has been able to keep minimal activitiesgoing even during the long suspensions of disbursements. The persistent civil unrest is encouraging fiscaldisobedience and FIDE is. increasingly confronted with misappropriation of the fees it collects, with aresulting reluctance of herders to continue paying those fees. Audits have never found any reportablemismanagement at FIDE's level. The fundamentals of the sub sector's financial organization appear assound as could be expected. Inside CIC, the power struggle between the only government, representativeand members elected from FNEC remains, always renewed by constant turn-over of governmentappointees, and the need to educate the newcomers in their actual duties.

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome I Impact Indicators: .__ _

1. Amount of fees collected by FIDE (SAR target: increase from 240 million/year Actual: 194.439 million CFAF in 1996to 400 in PY 4) 243.697 million CFAF in 1997.

232.963 million CFAF in 1998179.828 million CFAF in 1999

Total: 850.927 million CFAF (1.772 M$)

2. Sales of veterinary pharmaceuticals by SAR target: none since CAR consumption Fell to ca. CFAF 100/head/year in 1997 dueFNEC of 400 CFAFlhead/ year in 1995 was already to shortage of stocks at FNEC following nots

above regional average and looting3. Number of operational herder associations SAR target increase from 238 in 1994 to 358 Reduced to 209 in 1997 due to insecurity

in PY 4 and shortage of pharmaceuticals.

4. Training of Project professionals SAR target: 12 veterinarians, 11 DAM staff, Training of Project professionals. 199727 medium level staff, 10 scholarships for figures: 9 veterinary students and 3 animalherder children production engineers enrolled in Senegal

schools, all other programs on-goingincluding 4 herder children trained in France.

There was no logframe exercise during the preparation, appraisal, or implementation of this project. Theindicators are those identified in the SAR and the actual figures available at the time of this ICRpreparation.

Output Indicators:

End of project

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Cotn onent (in US$ million equivalent)

1. Rangeland management 7.742. Animal health 3.193. Grassroots capacity development 3.224. Financial assistance 3.175. Technical support 2.396. Institutional support 5.33

Total Baseline Cost 25.04 0.00Physical Contingencies 2.99Price Contingencies 4.41 .

Total Project Costs 32.44 0.00Total Financing Required 32.44 0.00

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (APpraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

1. Works 6.60 0.40 7.00()___ __ ___ __ _ _ o(6.60) 0 (0.00) (6.60)

2. Goods 0.50 0.50 4.30 5.30o) (0.30) (0.25) (0.95) (1.50)

3. Services 9.30 3.80 13.10o) 0) (5.10) (0.00) (5.10)

4. Miscellaneous 5.30 1.90 7.20o) () (3.50) (0.00) (3.50)

S. Miscellaneous 0.00()________________________ _ o 0) 0) () (0.00)

6. Miscellaneous 0.00o) 0) .0 () (0.00)

Total 0.00 7.10 15.10 10.40 32.60(0.00) (6.90) (8.85) (0.95) (16.70)

- 18 -

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equival nt)

Procurement MethodExpenditure Category IC Total Cost

1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

o 0 () ()0X () () (0.00)2. Goods 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50

(0.27) 0 0 0 (0.27)3. Services 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15

o) _() 0) (0.09) (0.09)4. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

o) () () 0 () (0.00)

5. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

() 0) 0) 0) (0.00)6. Miscellaneous 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00

()____________________ _ o) ) 0)0 (0.00)Total 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.65

(0.27) (O 0) (0.00) (0.09) (0.36)

" Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies

2 Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contractedstaff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to(i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.

Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

Financing Plan

Million US$ PerentNIDA 16.63 51.2IFAD 4.92 15.2French Aid 3.75 11.6EDF 5.10 15.7Beneficiaries 0.43 1.3

FIDE 1.62 5.0

Total 32.45 100.0

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Annex 3: Economic Costs and Benefits

Due to the losses of data during the mutinies and riots, it is impossible to perform an analysis of economiccosts and benefits for this project.

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) M issions: __._....______________________________.._.__

Stage of Project Cycle - No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating(e.g 2 Economists. I PMS, etc.) Implementation Development:

Month/Year Count 3 Specialty - Progress Objective

Identification/Preparation 4 I LV, I AG, I AREC, I AH S S10/924 IL,A,AE,ASS

Appraisal/Negotiation10/95 11 1 LV, IAREC, I EX, I INF, S S

I NRM, 1 MCR, I AH, IRGM, I FA, I LL, IIM

Supervision6/95 3 I LV, 1 RGM, I AG S S12/95 3 1 LV, 1 RGM, I AG S S11/96 2 1 LV, I PO U U

ICR

AG - agricultural specialistAH - animal health and trainingAREC - administrative reform and economic analysisEX - extensionFA - financial analysisIM - institutional mattersINF - infrastructure specialistLL - land legislationLV - livestock specialistMCR - mutual creditNRM - natural resources managementPO - project officerRGM - rangeland management

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle . Actual/Latest Estimate._______________________ _ :No. Staff weeks - US$ (000)

Identification/Preparation 59 186Appraisal/Negotiation 97.1 284.6Supervision 50.7 142.1ICR 0 0Total 206.8 612.7

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

RatingMacro policies OH OSU*M O N O NASector Policies OH OSU*M ON O NA

Z Physical OH OSUOM * N O NA• Financial O H OSUOM * N O NA• Institutional Development 0 H O SU *M 0 N 0 NA

Environmental O H OSUOM O N * NA

SocialZ Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM * N O NAX Gender O H OSUOM * N O NAi Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N O NA

• Private sector development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA• Public sector management 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA• Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N O NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

Ol Lending * HS O'S O U O HUEl Supervision O HS * S OU OHUO Overall OHS Os * U O HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating

O Preparation * HS OS O U O HUO Government implementation performance O HS OS O U 0 HUEl Implementation agency performance OHS OS * U O HUEl Overall OHS OS * U O HU

-23 -

Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

1. The World Bank: CAR Livestock Development and Rangelands Management Project. Staff AppraisalReport, December 1, 1994, Report No. 13075-CA.

2. Republique Centrafricaine; Projet de Developpement de l'Elevage et de Gestion des parcours - Missiond'Evaluation a Mi-Parcours Rapport de Mission (October 1996).

3. FNEC Secretariat General Rapport d'Activites 1996, 1997.

4. ANDE Rapport Annuel de l'Agence Nationale de Developpement de l'Elevage 1996, 1997.

5. FIDE Rapport d'Activites de l'Ann6e 1996, 1997.

6. FIDE Situation actuelle du PDEGP (August 1998).

-24 -

-25 -

MAP SECTION

NIGER I / 24 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~IBRD 2565~

N I GE R ~' ~CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

CHAD SUDAN ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~NATIONAL LIVESTOCK PROJECT

PROJET NATIONAL D'ELEVAGENIGERIA V~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A ~~~~~~~PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION AREA

N I G E I, I A BIR~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~AO LOCATION OF ZAGROPS &

/ ) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~s ~~~~~~~MNAGEMENT AREA,- 'N ~~~~~~~~- '~~~~~S ES AGRO-PASTORAL DEVELOPMENT AREAS (ZAGROPS)~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3 ARORATOALDEELPMNTARAS(ZGRPS

TRAL 2 VA~S2.ILDURE MAANLAGEM.ENT AREA 1270,000 K.D 'If ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A~~~~~~~~~~~~~(' ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~L ZONE DINTERET CYNErETIQUE ZtC. 270,000kLIE)

)CAMEROGN AFRICAN REP BLIC ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - S~~~~~1 VETTEINARY POSTS~~~~~ETRIAR PST

) 8~~~~~~~~~~~~OE'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-i ' ,%ANJA', \ EXISTIRG INFRASTRUCTURE,

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LTATORIALI ~ UNdR~4, CENTRES VEYVRPAARE CONSTRUES OU REFECTDONNES

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-g...b. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~oCREEELEU DES SECTEUR REGIONPROSINCIAL I PRERECTURE CAPITALSo CREYE DES PROVINCESI /RTRECTORTS

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2CR0 24'10 20 25 0CONGO Th. b .. d-i., d--m.ti- -d -fT.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~AY99