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Workers’ EU Political Alignments during the
Great RecessionAndré FreireLuís Cabrita
Mariana Carmo DuarteHugo Ferrinho Lopes
ETUI EDU DAYS 2015 Conference, European Trade Union Institute, 19-20 November 2015 Berlin
Table of Contents
Introduction
Hypotheses Social cleavages and mass political attitudes and behaviour Attitudes towards the EU and the Great Recession
Data and Methods
The impact of socioeconomic factors upon support for the EU Project
Behaviour Attitudes
Conclusions and policy recommendations for Unions’ strategies
Introduction
Research Question: Does the Great Recession (the 2008 international crisis
and its aftermath, namely the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the austerity policies that followed) changed the patterns found previously in the literature concerning workers’ EU political alignments (i.e. mainly Eurosceptic)?
(or, to put it another way, is the Great Recession linked with further workers’ support for the EU, or not?)
Objectives To study the impact of socioeconomic factors upon
support for the EU Project, after the Great Recession; behaviour (party vote in the 2014 EP elections). attitudes (diffuse EU support, also in mid 2014);
Literature review & Hypotheses (I): social cleavages and mass political attitudes and behaviour
H1: Hypothesis 1) - We expect to find a significant fragmentation in the political choices of the social classes;
H2: Hypothesis 2) - This fragmentation should be stronger in countries where new value divides are present and, above all, have a clear translation at the party system level.
Literature review & Hypotheses (II): Attitudes towards the EU and the Great Recession
H3 (Hypothesis 3) – According to the main findings in the previous literature, we expect that the less privileged social strata to be less supportive of the European Project, as compared with more well-off social groups;
H4 (Hypothesis 4) - According to the main findings in the previous literature, we expect that the less privileged social strata also tend to vote more in parties less supportive of the EU Project/ Eurosceptic parties (both from the radical left and the nationalist or radical right), as compared with the more well-off social groups, which tend to vote more on pro-European parties (social democratic parties and liberal conservative parties).
Data and Methods
European Election Studies of 2014 - micro level data to measure citizens’ attitudes regarding the EU and their electoral behaviour in EP elections
Case Selection – 8 Countries – Portugal, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Germany, France, Finland, Sweden.
1. High vs. Low Crisis Severity: Portugal, Spain, Greece, Hungary – vs. Germany, France, Finland, Sweden
2. Strong vs. Weak Nationalist/ Far Right Parties: Greece, Hungary,
France, Finland – vs. Portugal, Spain, Germany, Sweden
Sample Size – representative samples of adult populations in each country (N = 9290):
Portugal – 1033 Spain – 1106 Greece – 1085 Hungary – 1104 Germany – 1648 France – 1074 Finland – 1096 Sweden – 1144
Data and Methods
Dependent Variables:
Party family vote in EU 2014 elections;
Attitudes towards the EU.
• Independent Variables (special ocus on Socioeconomic Characteristics):
a) Occupation;
b) Trade union membership;
Cross validating indicators:
c) Education;
d) Goods ownership (Index);
e) Self-positioning social staircase.
Data and Methods
o Methods:
o 1st) present paper:
o Cross tabultations (bivariate analysis) & statistical tests & measures of association
o 2nd) follow-up to the present paper (revised version to send later, after meeting discussions):
o Multivariate analysis with binary and multinomial logistic regressions.
The impact of socioeconomic factors upon support for the EU Project (I): Behaviour
Table 1.1 Party Family Vote EU Elections 2014 by social class
Radical Left/ Greens
Social DemocracyLiberal/
ConservativesNationalist
ConservativesFar Right
Row N % Row N % Row N % Row N % Row N %
Greece
Occupation
Self-employed 40,6% 13,3% 25,9% 8,4% 11,9%
Managers 45,7% 8,6% 40,0% 2,9% 2,9%
Other white collars 49,5% 16,1% 17,2% 7,5% 9,7%
Manual workers 58,0% 12,0% 16,0% 4,0% 10,0%
Cramer's V 0.126
Pearson’s Chi-Square 15,372
Spain
Occupation
Self-employed 10,5% 26,3% 63,2% 0,0% 0,0%
Managers 38,9% 27,8% 33,3% 0,0% 0,0%
Other white collars 59,1% 27,3% 13,6% 0,0% 0,0%
Manual workers 38,0% 23,9% 38,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Cramer's V 0.227*
Pearson’s Chi-Square 13,397*
Finland
Occupation
Self-employed 20,8% 6,3% 64,6% 8,3% 0,0%
Managers 26,1% 6,0% 63,4% 4,5% 0,0%
Other white collars 24,3% 21,6% 40,5% 13,5% 0,0%
Manual workers 11,5% 29,5% 34,4% 24,6% 0,0%
Cramer's V 0.246**
Pearson’s Chi-Square 50,653**
France
Occupation
Self-employed 21,7% 8,7% 52,2% 0,0% 17,4%
Managers 26,8% 33,9% 28,6% 1,8% 8,9%
Other white collars 28,6% 28,6% 23,8% 0,0% 19,0%
Manual workers 22,4% 22,4% 16,3% 4,1% 34,7%
Cramer's V 0.226**
Pearson’s Chi-Square 22,898*
Source: data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study 2014;Notes: *p<0,05; **p<0,01.Legends: 1) Green (1st Choice in %); 2) Blue (2nd Choice in %); Red (3rd Choice in %); 4) Purple: Left-left majority (only the second element on the possible coalition is marked rose).
The impact of socioeconomic factors upon support for the EU Project (I): Behaviour
Table 1.2 Party Family Vote EU Elections 2014 by social class
Radical Left/ Greens
Social DemocracyLiberal/
ConservativesNationalist
ConservativesFar Right
Row N % Row N % Row N % Row N % Row N %
Portugal
Occupation
Self-employed 18,5% 51,9% 29,6% 0,0% 0,0%
Managers 29,6% 25,9% 44,4% 0,0% 0,0%
Other white collars
28,6% 28,6% 42,9% 0,0% 0,0%
Manual workers 30,5% 42,4% 27,1% 0,0% 0,0%
Cramer's V 0.155
Pearson’s Chi-Square 6,480
Sweden
Occupation
Self-employed 42,9% 10,2% 42,9% 4,1% 0,0%
Managers 44,5% 18,8% 33,5% 3,1% 0,0%
Other white collars
36,4% 23,3% 31,0% 9,3% 0,0%
Manual workers 48,7% 24,0% 23,3% 4,0% 0,0%
Cramer's V 0.109*
Pearson’s Chi-Square 18,527*
Germany
Occupation
Self-employed 37,5% 17,9% 42,9% 1,8% 0,0%
Managers 27,2% 28,1% 36,0% 8,8% 0,0%
Other white collars
20,0% 24,3% 47,1% 8,6% 0,0%
Manual workers 25,0% 40,0% 28,0% 7,0% 0,0%
Cramer's V 0.134*
Pearson’s Chi-Square 18,430*
Hungary
Occupation
Self-employed 0,0% 26,9% 0,0% 61,5% 11,5%
Managers 0,0% 40,0% 0,0% 56,7% 3,3%
Other white collars
0,0% 21,7% 0,0% 69,6% 8,7%
Manual workers 0,0% 20,0% 0,0% 57,6% 22,4%
Cramer's V 0.180
Pearson’s Chi-Square 12,090
Source: data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study 2014;Nots: *p<0,05; **p<0,01.Legends: 1) Green (1st Choice in %); 2) Blue (2nd Choice in %); Red (3rd Choice in %); 4) Purple: Left-left majority (only the second element on the possible coalition is marked rose).
The impact of socioeconomic factors upon support for the EU Project (I): Behaviour
First, there is considerable political fragmentation among the social classes, a clear indication that the decline of cleavage politics remained in spite of the great recession: confirming H1.
Second, the erosion of the political cohesion of social classes is particularly evident where the party system shows the presence of a strong libertarian-authoritarian value divide, namely indicated by the strong presence of «nationalist conservatives» and /or the «far right», confirming H2.
Moreover, among the lowest social class strata (manual workers) support for Eurosceptic parties («radical left/greens», «nationalist conservative», and «far right») is usually more widespread than among higher class strata (white collar workers, managers and self-employed), confirming H4 and H3.
Additionally, except for Finland, France and Hungary, there are always left-left majorities among workers.
The impact of socioeconomic factors upon support for the EU Project (I): Behaviour
Table 2 Party Family Vote EU Elections 2014 by Union membership
Radical Left/ Greens Social Democracy Liberal/ ConservativesNationalist
ConservativesFar Right
Row N % Row N % Row N % Row N % Row N %
Greece
Trade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 44,8% 13,3% 26,5% 6,3% 9,1%
Unionized 54,2% 16,7% 16,7% 4,2% 8,3%
Cramer's V 0.051Pearson’s Chi-Squared 1,690
Spain
Trade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 28,2% 29,5% 42,3% 0,0% 0,0%
Unionized 51,4% 25,7% 22,9% 0,0% 0,0%
Cramer's V 0.161*Pearson’s Chi-Squared 8,617*
Finland
Trade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 19,1% 8,5% 62,6% 9,8% 0,0%
Unionized 20,4% 20,1% 49,1% 10,4% 0,0%
Cramer's V 0.176**Pearson’s Chi-Squared 16,491**
France
Trade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 22,4% 27,4% 33,3% 1,2% 15,6%
Unionized 29,5% 31,8% 18,2% 2,3% 18,2%
Cramer's V 0.110Pearson’s Chi-Squared 4,392
Portugal
Trade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 23,6% 44,7% 31,6% 0,0% 0,0%
Unionized 41,7% 20,8% 37,5% 0,0% 0,0%
Cramer's V 0.135*Pearson’s Chi-Squared 6,103*
Sweden
Trade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 26,4% 18,1% 46,3% 9,3% 0,0%
Unionized 44,5% 23,5% 28,6% 3,3% 0,0%
Cramer's V 0.248**Pearson’s Chi-Squared 54,980**
Germany
Trade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 20,9% 31,9% 41,3% 5,9% 0,0%
Unionized 22,7% 45,5% 21,8% 10,0% 0,0%
Cramer's V 0.143**Pearson’s Chi-Squared 17,285**
Hungary
Trade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 0,0% 26,6% 0,0% 61,4% 12,0%
Unionized 0,0% 25,0% 0,0% 56,3% 18,8%
Cramer's V 0.039Pearson’s Chi-Squared 0,657
Source: data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study 2014;Notes: *p<0,05; **p<0,01.Legends: 1) Green (1st Choice in %); 2) Blue (2nd Choice in %); Red (3rd Choice in %); 4) Purple: Left-left majority (only the second element on the possible coalition is marked rose).
The impact of socioeconomic factors upon support for the EU Project (I): Behaviour
Considering now the political cohesion of union members (either the respondents themselves and/or someone in their household) as compared to non-union members (see Table 2), we can say that for all the countries expect Finland and Hungary (where the «liberal conservative» and the «nationalist conservative» or the «nationalist conservative» and the «far right», respectively receive an absolute majority of the union members’ vote) the political cohesion of union members is much higher than for social classes.
This is so because in each and every of the remaining countries there is always a left-left absolute majority («radical left/greens» and «social democracy»).
However, only in Spain, Finland, Portugal, Germany and Sweden are these relationships statistically significant.
Thus, political fragmentation is much lower in this case, not confirming H1, except for countries where there is a significant authoritarian-libertarian divide at the party level, confirming H2.
The left-left majorities among union members in all countries except Finland and Hungary means also that support for the EU project is mixed, not confirming at least completely H3.
The impact of socioeconomic factors upon support for the EU Project (II): attitudes
QP7 Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the EU is...?
A bad thingNeither a good nor a bad
thingA good thing
Row N % Row N % Row N %
Greece
Occupation
Self-employed 24,0% 33,7% 42,3%
Managers 14,3% 19,6% 66,1%
Other white collars 23,4% 31,0% 45,5%
Manual workers 26,4% 40,0%33,6%
Cramer's V 0.126*
Pearson’s Chi-Squared 16,439*
Spain
Occupation
Self-employed 11,0% 27,4% 61,6%
Managers 1,8% 29,8% 68,4%
Other white collars 7,7% 24,6% 67,7%
Manual workers 14,6% 23,7% 61,6%
Cramer's V 0.104
Pearson’s Chi-Squared 8,955
Finland
Occupation
Self-employed 5,3% 26,3% 68,4%
Managers 7,3% 16,8% 75,9%
Other white collars 8,5% 39,0% 52,4%
Manual workers 17,2% 33,3% 49,4%
Cramer's V 0.191**
Pearson’s Chi-Squared 38,002*
France
Occupation
Self-employed 15,6% 22,2% 62,2%
Managers 5,7% 19,3% 75,0%
Other white collars 16,1% 35,6% 48,3%
Manual workers 20,4% 37,2% 42,3%
Cramer's V 0.206**
Pearson’s Chi-Squared 39,689**
Source: data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study 2014; otes: *p<0,05; **p<0,01.Legends: 1) Green (1st Choice in %); 2) Blue (2nd Choice in %); Red (3rd Choice in %); (Now considering only «A good thing» option»: EU Support)
The impact of socioeconomic factors upon support for the EU Project (II): attitudes
QP7 Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the EU is...?
A bad thingNeither a good nor a
bad thingA good thing
Row N % Row N % Row N %
PortugalOccupation
Self-employed 28,0% 25,3% 46,7%
Managers 9,6% 24,7% 65,8%
Other white collars 14,3% 21,4% 64,3%
Manual workers 22,9% 37,3% 39,8%
Cramer's V 0.172**Pearson’s Chi-Squared 26,863**
SwedenOccupation
Self-employed 11,5% 19,7% 68,9%
Managers 12,3% 22,4% 65,4%
Other white collars 13,0% 18,8% 68,2%
Manual workers 23,4% 28,6% 47,9%
Cramer's V 0.133**Pearson’s Chi-Squared 22,526**
GermanyOccupation
Self-employed 13,8% 12,8% 73,4%
Managers 6,8% 10,9% 82,3%
Other white collars 5,9% 25,2% 68,9%
Manual workers 11,7% 34,0% 54,3%
Cramer's V 0.193**Pearson’s Chi-Squared 50,276**
HungaryOccupation
Self-employed 17,3% 25,0% 57,7%
Managers 9,9% 39,4% 50,7%
Other white collars 8,4% 39,3% 52,3%
Manual workers 11,0% 49,5% 39,5%
Cramer's V 0.122*Pearson’s Chi-Squared 15,169*
Source: data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study 2014; otes: *p<0,05; **p<0,01.Legends: 1) Green (1st Choice in %); 2) Blue (2nd Choice in %); Red (3rd Choice in %); (Now considering only «A good thing» option»: EU Support)
The impact of socioeconomic factors upon support for the EU Project (II): attitudes
Even in the cases where there is an absolute majority of supporters of the EU project («country’s EU membership is a good thing») within each and every social class (Spain and Germany), the workers (white-collar and manual, but especially the latter) are the least supportive or are among the least supportive occupational groups.
In the case of the other countries, white-collar workers and, above all, manual workers are the occupational groups which are the least supportive of the EU Project and that usually means only minority support (except white-collars in Finland, Portugal, Sweden, and Hungary).
Thus, the least privileged strata of the population, i.e. the manual workers are indeed the occupational group that is least supportive of the EU Project (sometimes, in some countries, they are also joined by the white-collar workers: Finland, France, and Germany). These relationships are always statistically significant, except in Spain.
The impact of socioeconomic factors upon support for the EU Project (II): attitudes
QP7 Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the EU is...?
A bad thingNeither a good nor a bad
thingA good thing
Row N % Row N % Row N %
GreeceTrade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 25,8% 30,3% 43,9%
Unionized 39,3% 17,9% 42,9%Cramer's V 0.055
Pearson’s Chi-Squared 3,308
SpainTrade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 14,8% 26,1% 59,1%
Unionized 9,5% 17,6% 73,0%Cramer's V 0.072
Pearson’s Chi-Squared 5,566
FinlandTrade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 13,3% 29,4% 57,3%
Unionized 14,1% 31,6% 54,2%Cramer's V 0.030
Pearson’s Chi-Squared 0,993
FranceTrade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 14,7% 28,7% 56,6%
Unionized 16,2% 34,3% 49,5%Cramer's V 0.043
Pearson’s Chi-Squared 1,907
PortugalTrade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 25,5% 32,9% 41,6%
Unionized 27,8% 27,8% 44,4%Cramer's V 0.025
Pearson’s Chi-Squared 0,623
SwedenTrade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 15,7% 21,4% 62,9%
Unionized 15,7% 23,6% 60,7%Cramer's V 0.026
Pearson’s Chi-Squared 0,772
GermanyTrade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 7,8% 24,6% 67,6%
Unionized 7,3% 16,3% 76,4%Cramer's V 0.063*
Pearson’s Chi-Squared 6,423*
HungaryTrade Union Mebership
Non Unionized 10,7% 43,2% 46,1%
Unionized 15,2% 24,2% 60,6%Cramer's V 0.067
Pearson’s Chi-Squared 4,738
Source: data elaborated by the authors from the European Election Study 2014; otes: *p<0,05; **p<0,01.Legends: 1) Green (1st Choice in %); 2) Blue (2nd Choice in %); (Now considering only «A good thing» option»: EU Support)
The impact of socioeconomic factors upon support for the EU Project (II): attitudes
Looking at Table 3 we can conclude that, on the one hand, union members are the least supportive of the EU Project in Greece, Finland, France and Sweden, as compared with non-union members.
However, even in Finland and Sweden a majority of union members is nevertheless in favour of the EU Project, it is only a matter of relative support.
On the other hand, in all the other countries the union members are more supportive of the EU Project when compared with non-union members (but in Portugal this means, nevertheless, only minority support).
In any case, the differences between union members and non-union members are usually rather small, and that is why only in Germany are the differences statistically relevant.
Conclusions
Our paper basically confirmed our hypotheses (H1-H4) and provided a negative answer to our major research question. As for the latter, there are no signs that since the great recession (i.e. the 2008 international crisis and its aftermath, namely the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the austerity policies that followed, especially in bailed out countries: see Blyth, 2013; Freire et al, 2016; Moury and Freire, 2013; European Commission, 2011; Monastiriotis et al, 2013) the workers (manual and white-collar, but especially the former) are now more in tune with the EU Project, quite the contrary.
First of all, the lower strata of the population (the manual workers, the less educated, with less material well-being, the ones self-reported as underprivileged) are still more distant from the EU Project than the better well-off groups.
Conclusions
Second, in line with the thesis about the decline of cleavage politics, there is a large fragmentation of workers’ voting choices which go from the radical left to the radical right, although with strong variations across countries.
Third, that fragmentation is even larger, as expected, in countries (like France, Finland and Hungary) where the party system reveals multiple dimensions of competition, namely the presence of an authoritarian-libertarian divide, cross cutting the classical left-right divide, evidenced by the presence of a strong far right or, at least, a strong nationalist conservative party.
Fourth, the detachment of workers vis-à-vis the European project is also evidenced by the workers’ significant support for Eurosceptic parties (on the left and on the right).
Conclusions
Fifth, on the positive side there is the indication of stronger political cohesion of union members (both more pro-European and more pro left-left coalitions) vis-à-vis non-union members.
Sixth, also on the positive side: in most of the countries (except Finland and Hungary) workers given majority support for left-left coalitions (i.e. social democracy and radical left/greens taken together), although in France this is true only for non-manual workers and in Germany it is the other way around.
Policy recommendations for Unions’ strategies
Our policy recommendations are the following:
First, unions should invest in new political alliances (namely in left-left coalitions, which usually gather a majority of support from workers in the countries under study) to fight for a Social Europe, a more democratic Europe and an Europe that gives more institutional representation to workers’ representatives vis-à-vis the status quo that clearly favors corporations (all problems identified in the literature and that can be said to be, at least in part, behind the divorce between workers and the EU Project: see Schmitter, 2000 and 2011; Crouch, 2004; Mair, 2013; Merkel, 2015; Streeck, 2015; Freire, 2015).
Policy recommendations for Unions’ strategies
Our policy recommendations are the following:
Second, the above mentioned new left-left political alliances are fundamental because otherwise you can end up with the nationalist conservatives and the far right/the radical right monopolizing the fight against euro liberalism (like in Hungary, Finland or France).
Finally, union membership still proves to be a strong element of political cohesion for the working class (manual and non-manual), thus investment in unionization is still worth to be pursued, namely to back more social and democratic versions of the EU Project supported by new left-left coalitions at the party level.