Women's Policy Agencies and Institutional Architecture in ...FILE/dis4238.pdf · Women’s Policy Agencies and Institutional Architecture in Comparison: Building Blocks for Equal

Women’s Policy Agencies and Institutional Architecture in Comparison:

Building Blocks for Equal Gender Relations

DISSERTATIONof the University of St. Gallen,

School of Management,

Economics, Law, Social Sciences

and International Affairs

to obtain the title of

Doctor of Philosophy in International

Affairs and Political Economy

submitted by

Christine Scheidegger

from

Huttwil (Bern)

Approved on the application of

Prof. Daniele Caramani, PhD

and

Prof. Dr. Birgit Sauer

Dissertation no. 4238

Difo-Druck GmbH, Bamberg 2014

Women’s Policy Agencies and Institutional Architecture in Comparison:

Building Blocks for Equal Gender Relations

DISSERTATIONof the University of St. Gallen,

School of Management,

Economics, Law, Social Sciences

and International Affairs

to obtain the title of

Doctor of Philosophy in International

Affairs and Political Economy

submitted by

Christine Scheidegger

from

Huttwil (Bern)

Approved on the application of

Prof. Daniele Caramani, PhD

and

Prof. Dr. Birgit Sauer

Dissertation no. 4238

Difo-Druck GmbH, Bamberg 2014

The University of St. Gallen, School of Management, Economics, Law, Social

Sciences and International Affairs hereby consent to the printing of the present

dissertation, without hereby expressing any opinion on the views herein

expressed.

St. Gallen, October 29, 2013

The President:

Prof. Dr. Thomas Bieger

Dedicated to all fighting for justice in societal relations. In this each has an own

way to walk. Nonetheless, representative for many: Ursula Lipecki, Katharina

von Salis, Nina Fargahi, Dora Scheidegger, Frank Luck, Brigitte Schnegg, Nicole

Gysin, Patrizia Mordini, and Louise Schneider.

Executive Summary

This dissertation analyses women’s policy agencies (WPAs) and their institutional

architecture within different states. In other research often referred to as women’s

policy machineries, the institutional architecture encompasses the combination of

all WPAs per state designated to promote women’s empowerment and gender

equality. They are the building blocks for equal gender relations. These new insti-

tutions and state infrastructures are of interest for comparative research, diffusion

literature and state feminism. My research questions focus on the peculiarities of

WPAs and institutional architecture and the explanation of the later. The global

comparison covers the current situation (2007–2010) in 151 states worldwide. I

tested the characterisation of WPAs developed by Berkovitch as standard features

of modern statehood.

The dissertation employed an integrated mixed-methods approach. An induc-

tive, secondary analysis of cross-sectional text data supplied a new definition of

WPAs, a new classification system and two typologies. States perceptions of WPAs

were derived from UN DAW survey data. Information on existing entities was pro-

cessed qualitatively by iterating through coding entities, conceptualizing relevant

dimensions and entities, and developing graphical representations in a non-linear

way of theorizing. Hypotheses testing using aggregated data explained variations

of institutional architecture. One hypothesis was tested visually on a world map.

The newly developed classification of WPA forms distinguishes WPAs by set-

ting and scope of action (Chapter 1–2, and 5). States currently employ a wide

range of WPAs forms (Chapter 7) and have created varying institutional archi-

tecture worldwide (Chapter 6 and 8). However, specific state capability remains

limited presently. My tested hypotheses explain the variety of institutional archi-

tecture found in part (Chapter 3 and 9). The recurrent attribute of present-day

specific state capability is heterogeneity, which is found in WPA forms, types of

institutional architecture, and countries involved. The depiction of all 151 states

is made tangible using a 3D-model visualising institutional complexity.

i

Zusammenfassung

Diese Dissertation untersucht Gleichstellungsstellen und Gleichstellungsarchitek-

turen als besondere Strukturen innerhalb des Staates und der staatlichen Verwal-

tung. Alle Gleichstellungsstellen eines Staates bilden zusammen dessen Gleich-

stellungsarchitektur. Diese ist auf die Forderung von Frauenermachtigung und

Gleichstellung ausgerichtet. Von anderen auch Frauenpolitikmachinerie genannt.

Diese staatlichen Strukturen sind Bausteine fur gleichberechtigte Geschlechter-

beziehungen, so meine These. Diese neuen Institutionen sind bedeutsam fur Ver-

gleichende Politikwissenschaften, Diffusions- und Staatsfeminismusforschung. Die

Forschungsfragen beziehen sich auf die Variation von Gleichstellungsstellen und

-architekturen und die Erklarung der Letzteren. Der globale Vergleich umfasst

die gegenwartige Situation (2007–2010) fur 151 Staaten. Die Dissertation ver-

folgt einen integrierten mixed-methods Ansatz. Die induktive Sekundaranalyse

von Querschnittsdaten in Textform liefert eine neue Definition von Gleichstel-

lungsstelle, eine Klassifikation und zwei Typologien. Die Umfragedaten von der

UN Division for the Advancement of Women geben die staatliche Wahrnehmung

von Gleichstellungsstellen wider. Informationen zu existierenden Einheiten wur-

den in einem nicht-linearen Theoretisierungsprozess qualitativ verarbeitet. Dazu

wurde zwischen dem Kodieren von Einheiten, der Konzeptualisierung von rele-

vanten Dimensionen und Einheiten und der Entwicklung von graphischen Darstel-

lungsformen iteriert. Das Testen von Hypothesen mit aggregierten Daten diente

der Erklarung der Variation. Eine Hypothese wurde auf einer Weltkarte visuell

getestet. Die weiterentwickelte Klassifikation von Arten von Gleichstellungsstellen

unterscheidet diese nach Ansiedlung und Einsatzbereich innerhalb des Staates oder

der staatlichen Verwaltung (Kapitel 1–2, und 5). Gegenwartig setzen Staaten

weltweit eine breite Palette an Formen von Gleichstellungsstellen (Kapitel 7) und

Typen von Gleichstellungsarchitekturen (Kapitel 8) ein. Die Analyse zeigt die

Beschrankung der spezifischen Handlungspotentiale einzelner Lander. Die Va-

ri-anz von Gleichstellungsarchitekturen ist durch die getesteten Hypothesen teil-

weise erklarbar (Kapitel 3 und 9). Die spezifischen Handlungspotentiale einzelner

Staaten sind in Bezug auf Arten, Typen, Niveaus und Lander gepragt von Hetero-

genitat. Diese Heterogenitat wird in einem dreidimensionalen Korper dargestellt.

ii

Resume analytique

La these analyse les agences d’egalite des sexes et les machineries d’egalite en tant

que structures particulieres dans l’etat et l’administration publique. L’ensemble

des agences d’egalite des sexes constitue la machinerie d’egalite visant l’autonomisa-

tion des femmes et la promotion de l’egalite des sexes. Je l’appelle l’architecture in-

stitutionelle. Je pretends que ces instances d’une capacite specifique de l’etat sont

les elements cles dans le developpement de l’egalite des sexes. Ces nouvelles institu-

tions sont interessantes pour la recherche sur la diffusion des innovations politiques

et le feminisme etatique et la recherche comparative. La recherche porte sur les

variations des agences d’egalite des sexes et l’architecture institutionelles d’egalite

et l’explication de la deuxieme. La comparaison globale couvre la situation actuelle

(2007–2010) dans 151 pays. J’ai eu recours a l’observation de Berkovitch en ce qui

concerne les agences d’egalite des sexes comme caracteristiques standards de l’Etat

moderne.

La these emploie une approche de methodes mixtes integrees. L’analyse in-

ductive secondaire des donnees textuelles transversales fournissait une nouvelle

definition et classification de l’agence d’egalite des sexes et deux typologies des ar-

chitecture institutionelles. Les perceptions etatiques des agences d’egalite des sexes

proviennent d’une enquete de l’ONU – Division de la promotion de la femme. Les

informations sur les entites existantes ont ete traitees qualitativement en iterant

entre le codage d’entites, la conceptualisation des dimensions et entites importantes

et le developpement de presentations graphiques dans une approche non-lineaire.

Le test des hypotheses avec des donnees agregees expliquait la variation des ar-

chitecture institutionelles. Une hypothese a ete testee visuellement sur une carte

du monde. La nouvelle classification des formes des agences d’egalite des sexes

les groupe par lieu et champ d’action (chapitres 1–2 et 5). A present, les etats

emploient un grand eventail d’agences d’egalite des sexes (chapitre 7) et types des

architecture institutionelles (chapitres 6 et 8) a l’echelon mondial. La capacite

etatique actuelle est limitee. La variete des architecture institutionelles etait en

partie expliquee par les hypotheses testees (chapitres 3 et 9). L’heterogeneite

concernant les formes, types, niveaux et pays representes dans un corps solide

constitue la caracteristique recurrente de la capacite etatique actuelle.

iii

iv

Acknowledgment

I thank Prof. Dr. Daniele Caramani and Prof. Dr. Birgit Sauer for their support

from the early beginning of this dissertation. Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Prugl agreed

to serve as a second external expert after the presentation of the results at the

European Conference of Politics and Gender in Barcelona (March 2013). I feel

honoured by her participation in the dissertation committee. In particular I like

to thank Prof. Dr. Daniele Caramani for providing me with an interesting em-

ployment at the University of St. Gallen and his support for the topic. I like to

thank Prof. Dr. Birgit Sauer for her friendly support during the various stages of

the dissertation process. In particular, the many great comments on the draft and

the intense discussion in Vienna in February 2013.

This dissertation is inspired by a myriad of mothers and fathers. I am in big

debts to generations of feminist researchers and political activists. The possibility

to pursue my path of education has many societal reasons and a few individual

ones. I benefit from education expansion which enabled economic emancipation

of women, changes in divorce law, and a slow change in academic men enabling

more women and feminist researchers to pursue their work and support female and

even feminist researchers doing a PhD. I am part of the first generation to have a

profound education in gender and feminist studies within an official curriculum in

Switzerland. I am grateful to the inspiring work of Brigitte Schnegg, Andrea Mai-

hofer, Heinzpeter Znoj, Ulle Jager, Christa Binswanger, Gesine Fuchs, Stephan

Meyer, Tomke Konig, Anelis Kaiser, Cornelia Hannah Bruellmann, Emanuel von

Erlach, Friedrich Engels, Tove Soiland, Michel Foucault, Luce Irigaray, Robert and

Raewyn Connell, Eva Kreisky, Birgit Sauer, Frank Luck, Judith Butler, Catherine

MacKinnon, Hannah Arendt, Michael Meuser, Amy Mazur, Myra Marx Ferree,

Erving Goffmann, Sabine Hark, Nancy Fraser, Virginia Woolf, Iris von Roten,

v

Judith Lorber, Simone de Beauvoir, Daniele Caramani, Doris Wastle-Walter, An-

gelika Wetterer, Lea Sgier, Hanspeter Kriesi, Anne Phillips, Petra Meier, Fritz

Sager, Barbara Holland-Cunz, Judith Squires, Candace West, Don H. Zimmer-

man, Julia Nentwich, Giuliano Bonoli, Carole Pateman, Martin Senti, Klaus von

Beyme and Elinor Ostrom.

A long list of persons supported me on my way which led to this dissertation.

First of all my parents, Dora Scheidegger and Fredy Scheidegger, and my relatives,

they laid the foundation for this dream and nourished my curiosity in the world.

I thank all my colleges and friends for their support, especially Ursula Lipecki,

Matthias Muller and Ina Dohnke. Most I am in debt to David Buchmann. Thank

you for all the seconds, hours, nights, days, weeks, months, and years. As long as

I see the glitter in your eyes I hope I will be there for you.

Thanks go to various (doctoral) fellows at Bodanstrasse 8 and Rosenbergstrasse

51 (2nd, 4th and 5th floor). It will miss the intellectual pleasure of coffee breaks

with Sharlene Ramlall, Andrew Walton and Beatrice Eugster. In particular I like

to thank in general the administrative staff of the University of St. Gallen for their

service orientation and their efficiency, and in particular Edith Hollenstein und

Nicole Sturm-Schmid for their constructive support in matters of administrative

procurements and in the daily life of the institute. I am happy that the members

of the Graduiertenkolleg Bern Fribourg: Gender Prescripts and Transcripts and its

organizing institution (University of Fribourg and Bern) accompanied part of the

way of this dissertation. I learned a lot in this environment. I am especially grateful

for the ultimatum from its coordinator Dr. Andrea Kofler at the right time. I

thank Prof. Dr. Sabine Maasen who constructively took apart an earlier version

of the introduction in the framework of the writing clinic of the Graduiertenkolleg.

It was a pleasure to rewrite it. The person who has deep insights into the text

is the wise and careful reader Ursula Lipecki. Thank you for your invaluable and

constructive advice. In regard to English academic writing I profited of feedback

of Giulia Mennillo and Valeria Camia on earlier sections. The dissertation profited

from English editing by Dr. Virginia Penrose in the parts Introduction, Chapter

nine and the Conclusions. Nonetheless, all mistakes and omissions remain my

responsibility. Thank you!

Christine Scheidegger Bern, Switzerland 2013 (July)

vi

Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

Zusammenfassung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

Resume analytique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Acknowledgment v

Structures of Women’s Policy Agencies in Comparison 1

Historical Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

State of the Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Contributions to State Feminism Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Methods and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Scope of the Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Structure of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Part I: Description of WPAs and WPMs 14

1 Terminology 14

1.1 Specific State Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

1.2 Women’s Empowerment and Promotion of Gender Equality . . . . 18

1.3 Women’s Policy Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

1.4 Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

2 Literature and Questions 27

2.1 Gender, State and Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

2.2 Understanding of (Gendered) States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

vii

2.2.1 From Complete Exclusion to Partial Inclusion . . . . . . . . 33

2.3 Feminist Institutionalism, Gender and

Inequality Globally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

2.4 Purposes of Women’s Policy Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

2.4.1 State Capabilities as Potentially Powerful Vessels . . . . . . 36

2.5 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

3 Explaining Variation in Institutional Architecture 39

3.1 Dependent Variable:

Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

3.2 Possible Explanations from Five Arrays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3.3 Testing of Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

3.4 Possible Explanations and Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

3.4.1 TIME: Gender Equality History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

3.4.2 EMERGING CONTEXT: Bloc Participation . . . . . . . . . 46

3.4.3 POLITY: Governmental System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

3.4.4 POLICY DIFFUSION: Organizational Neighbours . . . . . 48

3.4.5 GEOGRAPHY: Geographical Diffusion . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

3.4.6 CULTURE as an Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

3.5 Alternative Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

3.5.1 Economic Wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

3.5.2 Population Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

3.6 Operationalization and Sources of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

3.6.1 Coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

4 Methods and Data 62

4.1 Mixed-Methods for Different Parts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

4.1.1 Three Major Parts in the Research Process . . . . . . . . . . 64

4.1.2 Various Data Sets for the Different Parts . . . . . . . . . . . 64

4.2 Construction of Original Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

4.2.1 Survey Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

4.2.2 Survey Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

4.2.3 Processing of Survey Data by UN and States . . . . . . . . . 68

viii

4.3 Selection and Processing of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

4.3.1 Transfer and Merging Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

4.3.2 Cleaning Data and Adding Further Details . . . . . . . . . . 71

4.3.3 Coding Entities and Controlling Activities . . . . . . . . . . 72

4.3.4 Clustering and Failed Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

4.3.5 Exclusion of almost all African States . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

4.4 Quality of States Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

4.4.1 Non-Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

4.4.2 Over Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Part II: Conceptual Adaptation for a Global ComparativeFramework 82

5 Identify Women’s Policy Agencies 82

5.1 Distinguishing Women’s Policy Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

5.1.1 Different Ways of Distinguishing Forms of Women’s Policy

Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

5.1.2 Critique of Existing Lists of Forms

of Women’s Policy Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

5.2 The Classification of Different Forms of

Women’s Policy Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

5.2.1 The New Classification in Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

5.2.2 Different Forms of Women’s Policy Agencies . . . . . . . . . 99

5.3 Definition of Sample Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

5.3.1 Not Included Women’s Policy Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

5.3.2 Not Women’s Policy Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

5.3.3 Entities Outside of Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

5.4 Visualization of Women’s Policy Agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

5.4.1 Building Blocks for Another World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

5.4.2 Mapping State Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

6 Identifying Types of Institutional Architecture 126

ix

6.1 Developing Typology of Institutional

Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

6.1.1 Inexistence of Typologies and New Purpose . . . . . . . . . 126

6.1.2 Rationale for Inductively Generated Typology . . . . . . . . 129

6.2 A New Way of Identifying Types of Institutional Architecture . . . 131

6.2.1 Construction of Typology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

6.2.2 Chain of Capital Letters Indicating the Type . . . . . . . . . 131

6.2.3 Other Groupings of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . 137

6.2.4 Labelling of Types of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . 141

6.3 Visualization of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Part III: Comparative Empirical Analysis 145

7 Mapping Women’s Policy Agencies Worldwide 145

7.1 Women’s Policy Agencies on a Global Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145


7.1.2 Varying Empirical and Conceptual Relevance of Forms . . . 147

7.1.3 Occurrence of Sectors of Governmental Action . . . . . . . . 152

7.2 Women’s Policy Agencies per State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

7.2.1 Number of Women’s Policy Agencies per State . . . . . . . . 155

7.2.2 Different Forms of Women’s Policy Agencies per State . . . 158

7.2.3 No Global Form of Women’s Policy Agency . . . . . . . . . 158

7.2.4 Uneven Distribution of Forms among States . . . . . . . . . 160

7.2.5 Occurrence of Different Sectors per State . . . . . . . . . . . 162

7.2.6 Discussion of Thesis Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

7.3 Women’s Policy Agencies in Regional

Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167


7.3.2 Forms of Women’s Policy Agencies per Region . . . . . . . . 172

7.3.3 Occurring Sectors per State in the Regions . . . . . . . . . . 174

7.3.4 Discussion of Thesis Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

7.4 “Women’s Policy Agency” – an Adequate Term? . . . . . . . . . . . 177

x

8 A Comparison of Specific State Capability Worldwide 181

8.1 Cross-national Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

8.1.1 Occurring and Missing Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

8.1.2 Empirically Relevant, Less Relevant and Rare Types . . . . 185

8.1.3 Absent Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

8.1.4 Comprehensiveness of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . 187

8.1.5 Patterns over Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

8.1.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

8.2 13 Types of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

8.2.1 The State Administrative-Legislator-Judiciary-

Advocacy Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

8.2.2 The State Administrative-Legislator-Judiciary Type . . . . . 199

8.2.3 The State Administrative-Legislator-Advocacy Type . . . . 201

8.2.4 The State Administrative-Judiciary-Advocacy Type . . . . . 203

8.2.5 The Legislator-Judiciary-Advocacy Type . . . . . . . . . . . 205

8.2.6 The SWO-governed Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

8.2.7 The State Administrative-Legislator Type . . . . . . . . . . 207

8.2.8 The State Administrative-Judiciary Type . . . . . . . . . . . 208

8.2.9 The State Administrative-Advocacy Type . . . . . . . . . . 210

8.2.10 The Legislator-Judiciary Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

8.2.11 The Legislator-Advocacy Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

8.2.12 The Judiciary-Advocacy Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

8.2.13 The Exclusively State Administrative Type . . . . . . . . . 212

8.2.14 The Exclusively Legislator Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

8.2.15 The Exclusively Judiciary Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

8.2.16 The Exclusively Advocacy Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

8.2.17 The Type Zero . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

8.2.18 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

8.3 Heterogeneity of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

8.3.1 Heterogeneity of Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

8.3.2 Heterogeneity Among Neighbours of Switzerland . . . . . . . 218

8.3.3 Identical and Unique Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . 219

8.4 Global Blueprints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

xi

8.4.1 Global Blueprints of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . 226

8.4.2 Global Blueprints of Specific State Capability . . . . . . . . 227

9 Explaining Variation in Institutional Architecture 228

9.0.3 Testing Hypotheses by Reading Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

9.1 Gender Equality History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

9.1.1 Relations: Women’s Suffrage and Right to Stand for Elections234

9.1.2 Weak Relations: First Females on Top of Parliament and

First Female Member of Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

9.1.3 No Influence: First Female Prime Minister,

President or Ratification of CEDAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

9.2 Bloc Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

9.3 Governmental System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

9.4 Policy Diffusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

9.4.1 Influence of Commonwealth of Nations:

Type EO and E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

9.4.2 AOSIS, CARICOM, and PIF favour Type E and EO . . . . 246

9.4.3 Arab League, Council of Arab Economic Unity,

Organization of the Islamic Conference, and OPEC . . . . . 246

9.4.4 Nordic Council: Type ELJO Missing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248

9.4.5 Relations: Spanish and Portuguese Organizations . . . . . . 249

9.4.6 International Human Rights Treaties:

ACHR, ICCPR and ICCPR1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

9.4.7 Variety among Former Warsaw Pact, COMECON, CIS and

CENTO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

9.4.8 Minimal Relations: EU, NATO, OECD, Council of Europe,

WTO, ICJ, and ASEAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254

9.4.9 No Relations: OSCE, NATO PfP, FRANC and APEC . . . 256

9.5 Geographical Diffusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

9.6 Alternative Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

9.7 Similarities and Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

9.7.1 Spectra of Divergence: Type ELJO, Type Zero and Type O2 264

9.7.2 Paired in Similarities: Type E and Type EO . . . . . . . . . 267

xii

9.7.3 Triade in Similarities: Type EJO, Type EJ and

Type ELJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

9.7.4 Paired in Divergence: Type ELO and Type EL . . . . . . . 271

9.7.5 The Rare Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

9.8 Dominance of Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

9.9 Nominal and Ordinal Types of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . 276

9.9.1 Four Ordinal Types of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . 277

Discussion and Conclusions 282

Main Findings and Major Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282

New Definition of Women’s Policy Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282

Hidden Assumptions in Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

Classification of Forms of Women’s Policy Agencies . . . . . . . . . 283

Typology of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

Heterogeneity of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

Specific State Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

Some Explainable Types, but no Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

Relevance and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286

Broadening the Phenomena Under Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . 286

Recognising Institutional Heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288

Future Development and Application of Classification . . . . . . . . 288

Future Development and Application of Typology . . . . . . . . . . 289

Moving from State Capability to State Capacity? . . . . . . . . . . 290

History of Current Situation of State Capability . . . . . . . . . . . 290

Travelling and Arrived Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

How to Improve Gender Equality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291

Appendices I

Appendix A: Further Details about Coding of Data . . . . . . . . . . . . I

Additional Information to Ignored Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV

Coding Rigidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI

Procedure of Coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI

xiii

Appendix B: States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VII

Attribution of States and Territories to Regions . . . . . . . . . . . VIII

Appendix C: Data Behind Typology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIV

Appendix D: Data Behind Testing of Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . XX

Appendix E: Testing of Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXV

Appendix F: Ordinal Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXVIII

References LXII

CV LXIII

Selbststandigkeitserklarung LXV

xiv

Abbreviations

CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against

Women

CSW UN Commission on the Status of Women

ECA UN Economic Commission for Africa

ECE UN Economic Commission for Europe

ECLAC UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

ESCAP UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

ESCWA UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

ICPSR Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research

ILO International Labour Organization

NCHR Nominal Commitment to Human Rights

RNGS Research Network on Gender Politics and the State

SWO State-run Women’s Organization

Type ELJO state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type

Type ELJ state administrative-legislator-judiciary type

Type ELO state administrative-legislator-advocacy type

Type EJO state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type

Type LJO legislator-judiciary-advocacy type

Type O2 SWO-governed type

Type EL state administrative-legislator type

Type EJ state administrative-judiciary type

xv

Type EO state administrative-advocacy type

Type LJ legislator-judiciary type

Type LO legislator-advocacy type

Type JO judiciary-advocacy type

Type E exclusively state administrative type

Type L exclusively legislator type

Type J exclusively judiciary type

Type O exclusively advocacy type

Type Zero type zero

UN United Nations

UN DAW UN Division for the Advancement of Women

WEGE women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality

WPA women’s policy agency

WPAs women’s policy agencies

xvi

Indicator Longer Form

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic CooperationACHR American Convention on Human RightsAOSIS Alliance of Small Island StatesAPEC Asia-Pacific Economic CooperationARABCOUN Council of Arab Economic UnityARABLEAGUE Arab LeagueASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsBLOC Bloc participationCARICOM Caribbean CommunityCEDAW Ratification of CEDAWCENTO Central Eastern Treaty OrganizationCENTRAMER Organization of Central American StatesCIS Commonwealth of Independent StatesCOE Council of EuropeCOMECON Council of Mutual Economic AssistanceCOMW Commonwealth of NationsEU European UnionFRANC International Organization of the French-Speaking WorldFRSTMP First female Member of ParliamentFRSTPM First female prime ministerFRSTPRES First female presidentFRSTPRLMT First female head of parliamentGEOGRAPHY Geographical neighboursICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political RightsICCPR1 First optional protocol to the ICCPRICJ International Court of JusticeMERCOSUR Southern Common MarketNATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNATO PfP NATO Partnership for PeaceNORDIC Nordic CouncilOAS Organization of American StatesOECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOIC Organization of the Islamic ConferenceOPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting CountriesOSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in EuropePIF Pacific Islands ForumPOPULATION Population sizeREGIME Governmental systemUNIVSFFRG Introduction of women’s suffrage for all womenUNIVSTAND Right for all women to stand for electionsWARSAW Warsaw PactWEALTH Economic wealthWTO World Trade Organization

List of Figures

3.1 Embedding of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3.2 Directions of Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

3.3 Time Lags in Women’s Enfranchisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

5.1 Visualization of Location of Women’s Policy Agencies . . . . . . . . 125

7.1 Bar Chart about Different Forms of WPAs Globally . . . . . . . . . 149

7.2 Pie Chart of Sectors Globally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

7.3 Bar Chart about Number of Women’s Policy Agencies per State . . 156

7.4 Bar Chart about Different Women’s Policy Agencies per State . . . 156

7.5 Word Cloud With Frequencies of Occurring Sectors . . . . . . . . . 164

7.6 Intersecting Types with Percentage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

8.1 Word Cloud With Frequencies of Existing Types . . . . . . . . . . . 185

8.2 Word Cloud With Frequencies of Identical Combinations . . . . . . 223

9.1 Intersecting Memberships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

9.2 Types on World Map . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

9.3 All Cases on One Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

9.4 Four Ordinal Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280

xviii

List of Tables

1.1 Focus of Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

3.1 Explanations and Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

3.2 Operationalization of Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

3.3 Indicators for Hypothesis H1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

3.4 Coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

4.1 Reporting Behaviour of States and Territories . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

4.2 Non-Reporting States in Original Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

4.3 Over Reporting States Without Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

5.1 Different Classifications in Comparison Part I . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

5.2 Different Classifications in Comparison Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

5.3 13 Different Forms of WPAs in Government Sectors . . . . . . . . . 94

5.4 Classification of Women’s Policy Agencies by Jahan (2008, 2010) . . 97

5.5 WPAs and Ignored Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

5.6 Categories of Ignored Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

5.7 Numbers of Included and Ignored Entries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

5.8 Building Blocks for WEGE Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

6.1 Possible Types of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

6.2 Other Groupings of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

6.3 Levels of Comprehensiveness of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . 140

6.4 Labels for Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

7.1 Global Frequencies Various WPAs Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

7.2 Sectors Globally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

xix

7.3 Nominal Size of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

7.4 Conceptual Size of Institutional Architecture per State . . . . . . . 159

7.5 Different Forms of Women’s Policy Agencies per State . . . . . . . . 159

7.6 Many Times Existence of WPAs per State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

7.7 Sectors per State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

7.8 Number of Sectors per State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

7.9 Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

7.10 Regional Size of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

7.11 Key Figures about WPAs per State on Regional Level . . . . . . . . 169

7.12 Regional Conceptual Size per State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

7.13 Key Figures Different WPAs per State on Regional Level . . . . . . 171

7.14 Regional Existence of Different Forms per State . . . . . . . . . . . 173

7.15 Sectors per State per Region Globally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

7.16 Regional Number of Sectors per State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

8.1 Occurring Types 2007–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

8.2 Number of Cases per Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

8.3 Comprehensiveness of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . 187

8.4 Attribution of States to Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

8.5 European Types of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

8.6 OECD Types of Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218

8.7 Types of Institutional Architecture of Neighbours of Switzerland . . 219

8.8 Identical Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

8.9 States with Identical Combinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222

8.10 Unique and Identical Institutional Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . 224

9.1 UNIVSFFRG → Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230

9.2 Types → UNIVSFFRG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

9.3 Results of Testing of Hypothesis H1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

9.4 BLOC → Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

9.5 Types → BLOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240

9.6 REGIME → Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

9.7 Types → REGIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

9.8 General Results of Testing Hypothesis H4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

xx

9.9 Results Testing Hypothesis H4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250

9.10 WEALTH → Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

9.11 Types → WEALTH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

9.12 POPULATION → Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

9.13 Types → POPULATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263

9.14 Ordinal Types Conceptually . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

9.15 Coding of Coverage of Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

Appendices I

1 Territorial Entities in States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII

2 Attribution of States and Territories to Regions . . . . . . . . . . . XIII

3 States Alphabetically Attributed to Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIX

4 Limitation of Data Chapter 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXV

5 UNIVSTAND → Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXVI

6 Types → UNIVSTAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXVII

7 FRSTMP → Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXVIII

8 Types → FRSTMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXIX

9 FRSTPM → Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXX

10 Types → FRSTPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXI

11 FRSTPRES → Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXII

12 Types → FRSTPRES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXIII

13 FRSTHDPRRLMT → Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXIV

14 Types → FRSTHDPRRLMT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXV

15 CEDAW → Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXVI

16 Types → CEDAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXVII

17 Ordinal Types Empirically I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXXIX

18 Ordinal Types Empirically II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XL

19 Ordinal Types Empirically III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XLI

20 Ordinal Types Empirically IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XLII

Structures of Women’s Policy

Agencies in Comparison

This analysis studies certain structures inside the state and public administration;

more specifically, those state structures which have been explicitly designated to

develop policies to counter women’s discrimination and promote equal gender re-

lations. The smallest structural unit in any particular country has been labelled

women’s policy agency (WPA) by prior research. In the course of my research,

I have defined the institutional architecture as the entirety of all women’s policy

agencies occurring in one state. Another term also used in this context is the

women’s policy machinery (WPM) of a state. As a whole, these structures repre-

sent the permanent and specific capability of a state to deliver policies for women’s

empowerment and promotion of gender equality. Foci of this dissertation are the

various forms of these three entities: the women’s policy agencies, the institutional

architecture in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality and the

permanent and specific state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion

of gender equality.

In 2009, United Nations requested that all 192 member states fill out a ques-

tionnaire regarding their women’s policy agencies and women’s policy machineries

and their working. In many ways, the thus compounded survey data denotes

the starting point of this dissertation. The survey’s first question asked United

Nations member states to list all their women’s policy agencies.1 The responses

revealed the existence of varying numbers and forms of women’s policy agencies

1The question read: “Please list all bodies that are national mechanisms for gender equality,within the legislative, executive and judicial branches, as well as independent/advisory bodies”(UN DAW 2009, 2).

1

with diverse priorities. For example, at one end of this spectrum, Tuvalu reported

a Department of Women (SDD 2010, 85, 111) and Myanmar a National Commit-

tee for Women’s Affairs and a Myanmar Women’s Affairs Federation (SDD 2010,

81, 100). States such as Tajikistan and the Netherlands represent the other end of

the spectrum: Tajikistan listed gender focal points, a parliamentary committee on

Family, Health, Social Protection and Environment Affairs, a coordination council

of the government and a Committee on Women and the Family (Abdurazakova

2010, 68-69). The Netherlands reported having a Minister of Emancipation, an

Equal Treatment Commission and the existence of some other entities (Tavares da

Silva 2010, 76). Comparing these diverse forms and numbers is the puzzle analysed

in this dissertation.

Why, however, is permanent and specific state capability in women’s empow-

erment and promotion of gender equality relevant today? More precisely, why

should the structures of women’s policy agencies, their forms and numbers, be of

interest to us? Dependent on the addressee, there are three reasons: First of all,

these structures represent an important component of gender quality governance

of states. Hence, they are of interest for specialists in gender equality, women’s

movements and policy advisors. Secondly, these structures are very much a part of

states’ empirical reality of today, which implies not only that they may be encoun-

tered in the course of daily political reality, but they can also play a major role in

shaping political opportunity structures for different actors. Thus, women’s policy

agencies are also relevant for politicians and other political stakeholders. Finally,

for historical and categorical reasons, these structures depict an interesting case

study for comparative research and diffusion literature.

Historical Development

Researchers usually note the first women’s policy agency was established in 1920

in the United States: the Women’s Bureau in the Department of Labour (Stetson

1995, 256; Mazur and Stetson 1995a, 314; McBride and Mazur 2010, 268). The

woman director is always appointed by the President of the United States and then

confirmed by the U.S. Senate (Stetson and Mazur 1995, 2; Stetson 1995, 257). This

first generation women’s policy agency was located in the department of labour

2

and commissioned to protect working women and children (Berkovitch 1999, 163).

This initial form of women’s policy agencies could be found in the 1940s and 1950s

mainly dispersed throughout Latin American and in the European socialist states

(Berkovitch 1999, 163-164).

The second generation of women’s policy agencies emerged in the 1960s and

became the main form to be found around the world. These agencies place their

focus on policy advice (Berkovitch 1999, 164). This is where the agency in women’s

policy agency actually comes from. Current examples of this generation are the

gender focal points in Tajikistan and the Department of Women in Tuvalu men-

tioned earlier.

Most states established their first women’s policy agency in the 1970s and 1980s

(Mazur and Stetson 1995a, 311-314). Further forms of organizational structures

emerged and states established more women’s policy agencies. Ministers and even

whole ministries were created and the spectrum of issues covered expanded. As

it will be shown in the course of this analysis, institutional development is still in

progress.

How did those new structures become part of current statehood? Historically,

women’s policy agencies and institutional architecture are an international co-

construction by states and international organizations (Berkovitch 1999, 163-165;

Stetson and Mazur 1995, 3). Since the 1960s, states have been under pressure to

establish women’s policy agencies to help remedy women’s oppression and gender

inequality (Berkovitch 1999, 162). These demands emanate from domestic as well

as transnational women’s movements. International pressure has been coming

from specialist organizations within the larger international organizations, such as

the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) and the Committee of the

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in

the United Nations. States have since committed themselves morally and legally

to create and strengthen their women’s policy agencies. Moral obligation has been

renewed time and again at the four Women’s World Conferences held in 1975,

1980, 1985 and 1995 through the signing of the conferences’ concluding agreements.

States have also accepted certain legal obligations through their ratification of the

International Human Rights Treaty, the Convention on the Elimination of All

Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

3

Almost all states ratified this convention, however many have entered strong

reservations against particular articles, whole sections or even the spirit of the

convention, but not against the institutional means to implement it. The mem-

ber states that have ratified the CEDAW are obligated to take immediate [sic!]

appropriate measures against all forms of women’s discrimination. Women’s pol-

icy agencies are one possible measure. States have to report their progress to

the CEDAW Committee regularly. Its rulings are legally binding. Beside other

points, those rulings request from ever and anon that states should strengthen

their women’s policy agencies and place them at the highest possible level in gov-

ernment.

In brief, in the last five decades the world has seen the creation of a com-

pletely new category of state structures serving new state responsibilities: putting

an end to women’s discrimination and fighting gender inequality (Squires 2007,

133). An enormous societal transformation unfolds by conceptualizing women as

human beings2 and equal members of society. It encompasses all areas of life as

well as a wide range of issues such as education, politics, economy, and legislation,

sexual and reproductive rights. The state assumes many roles in this grand trans-

formation: as legislator, as implementer of laws, as employer, and not least, as a

representative of the collective will of (a major part of) citizens.

Neither women’s empowerment and gender equality, nor women’s policy agen-

cies are straight forward concepts. They are as such – constitutively – politically

contested. They question the past, criticise the present and demand other fu-

tures for a single issue, for a group and sometimes from a whole society. Content,

causes, solutions, devices and time schedules are all controversial. A wide range

of stakeholders – citizens, social movements and political parties, but also whole

states and international organizations such as United Nations – negotiate such is-

sues continuously to find various (temporary) solutions. Women’s policy agencies

can be regarded as the visible evidence of the on-going conflicts pertaining to gen-

der inequality. They can be employed as one of the possible instruments towards

solving those conflicts (Squires 2007, 1-2).

2Recognition of women’s rights as human rights by the United Nations was an achievementof the Human Rights Conference in Copenhagen 1993.

4

State of the Art

Based on prior research, I have formulated three guiding thesis statements, chal-

lenging limitations of prior research. Women’s policy agencies are quite popular

topics of research (Goertz and Mazur 2008) in the last decade. With ‘state fem-

inism’ a research field (Mazur 1999) has developed, which also deals marginally

with structures of women’s policy agencies. Past research has mainly focused on

women’s policy agencies’ contribution to “improve the status of women”, on the

“formation of feminist policy” and on the increase of “access of women’s movement

activists to the political process” (Mazur and Stetson 1995b, 272). The influence

of women’s policy agencies on state policy and their ability to open access for

women’s movement activists have been of particular interest to researchers (Mazur

and Stetson 1995b, 274). Finally, particular attention has been concentrated on

policies dealing with issues such as abortion, violence against women, prostitution,

women’s political representation, paid labour, major political debates in one coun-

try (so-called hot issues), as well as on the state as such (Stetson 2001; Weldon

2002b; Joyce 2004; Lovenduski 2005; Mazur 2001; Haussman and Sauer 2007a).

Review of the research landscape reveals that there are few international compar-

ative studies (cf. Squires 2007, 60). Most studies on women’s policy agencies have

been included in publications brought out by the Research Network on Gender

Politics and the State (RNGS) (McBride Stetson and Mazur 1995; Outshoorn and

Kantola 2007; Haussman and Sauer 2007a).

In comparison, institutional architecture and structures of women’s policy

agencies have been given much less attention over the years. Usually, one or

two single women’s policy agencies are at the focus, due to certain methodological

reasons3 (McBride and Mazur 2010; Stetson and Mazur 1995, 13; Borchorst 1995,

66; Mazur and Stetson 1995b, 275; Squires 2007, 60; Haussman and Sauer 2007a).

Many conceptualizations that have thus been proposed are designed for a women’s

policy agency and do not encompass neither the spectrum of all agencies in one

state, nor the entirety of all agencies in one state.

3E.g. qualitative similar system design, conceptual stretching and research economics.

5

Initial Thesis Statement

My initial assumption for this research was that women’s policy agencies are

a global phenomenon. This thesis statement was inspired by Berkovitch, who

characterises women’s policy agencies as a standard feature of modern statehood

(Berkovitch 1999, 163-164). However, hers is not the general view. For the most

part, women’s policy agencies are seen as a domestic phenomenon which by chance

occurs internationally in many post-industrial states. While global implies that

the phenomenon can be studied worldwide, domestic indicates by contrast that

the phenomenon encompasses a limited number of cases and can only be analysed

in small n comparisons. Global also implies that (almost) all states will contain

this phenomenon, whereas international is understood as a significantly smaller

number of states display the phenomenon.4

Although Berkovitch’s observation is older than a decade, I am not aware of

any other study as of yet that has taken its methodological implications seriously

and tested the concept using a large sample. In fact, prior research has focused

mainly on case studies limited to OECD-states5. The following studies presented

here covers 151 states worldwide.

Second Thesis Statement

Due to the lack of research done on a worldwide scale, there is little literature to

be found on the structural variations of women’s policy agencies and institutional

architecture. Still, based on the previously mentioned sample of OECD-states,

scholars have established that women’s policy agencies structures are very hetero-

geneous and divulge no visible patterns (Mazur 2002, 175-176). Particularly inter-

esting was the fact that even in the small-scale case studies, “no single blueprints”

were uncovered (McBride and Mazur 2010, 48). Could these findings also hold true

on a global scale? Could there be a European model, for instance? Or could there

be a specific Asian blueprint of women’s policy agencies structures? Or, quite the

opposite, have all states actually developed idiosyncratic structures, even though

4E.g. a fifth up to a third of all states worldwide.5Around half of the post-industrial democracies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-

mark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,Poland, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States (McBride and Mazur 2010, 46).

6

they all began more or less at the same time to create their first women’s pol-

icy agency? In the course of my research, I looked for models and blueprints

of women’s policy agencies. This study tested to what extent the heterogeneity

found by small-scale studies, also applies on a global scale. Consequently, my

second thesis statement was: Patterns in institutional architecture can be found.

Third Thesis Statement

If the single political entities – the women’s policy agencies – exist globally, then the


of gender equality may occur worldwide as well. If structures for gender equality

are part of current state structures, that would signify that gender equality, as a

concept, has a real global significance; that is, in practice, as an integral part of

state structures, and not simply in theory with only a vague, disputable value in

real life. It would also be a proof that feminists made further inroads into state

institutions. By shaping political structures, another level of shaping priorities is

achieved. Accordingly, my third thesis statement is: Permanent and specific state

capability in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality is a global

phenomenon.

Research Questions

In order to analyse these thesis statements in more detail, I developed two re-

search questions. The first research question was: How varies current permanent

and specific state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender

equality internationally? The focus of the analysis was placed on the description

of variations. Permanent and specific state capability in women’s empowerment

and promotion of gender equality covers both women’s policy agencies and institu-

tional architecture. Current refers to their situation between 2007 and 2010. The

151 states covered in this analysis are indeed a large share of current6 states; three

quarter. Nevertheless, the sample used here cannot make conclusive statements

about the variations of state capability globally. To emphasise this, I chose alter-

6The split of the Republic of South Sudan from the Republic of Sudan took place after theperiod covered in this research.

7

natively the term international. The second research question was: How explain

variations in institutional architecture in women’s empowerment and promotion of

gender equality?

Contributions to State Feminism Research

This study contributes to research in state feminism in four major spheres: defi-

nition, classification, typology and explanations. The first major contribution ad-

dresses the reconceptualization of what is considered as a women’s policy agency

(Chapter 1 & 5). To be able to compare structures of women’s policy agencies in

a large number of states, it is necessary to have a precise operational definition of

a women’s policy agency. My criteria for an entity to be categorised as a women’s

policy agency are: part of the state or public administration, core administration,

external orientation, national level, permanency, specificity and women’s empow-

erment and promotion of gender equality as designated duty. Those criteria were

rigorously applied to data. Entities not fulfilling all set criteria were excluded from

further analysis.

The second major contribution encompasses the development of a classification

of different forms of women’s policy agencies (Chapter 5) and its application to

data (Chapter 7). This new classification was developed with the aim to have

a framework to identify and compare women’s policy agencies on a global scale.

Furthermore, it was built as a sociological classification. The classification intro-

duced in this study expands upon an existing categorisation of women’s policy

agencies by Jahan (2008, 18), which was applied in the aforementioned United

Nations survey. The new classification defines a possible women’s policy agency

by its location within the state and public administration and the scope of action

of the entity. This framework is applicable to identify and compare different forms

of women’s policy agency for a sample of any size.

The third major contribution of my research deals with the development of a

typology of institutional architecture in women’s empowerment and promotion of

gender equality (Chapter 6). This typology was built from scratch as a device

to reduce empirical complexity of current permanent and specific state capabil-

ity. The institutional architecture is defined in this study as the entirety of all

8

women’s policy agencies per state. The typology is based on the occurrence of

different forms of women’s policy agencies in sectors of governmental action. The

typology enables the identification of idiosyncratic as well as identical institutional

architecture. Its application to empirical data (Chapter 8) reveals strengths and

weaknesses in current specific state capabilities in women’s empowerment and pro-

motion of gender equality.

Classification of varying forms of women’s policy agencies and typology of

institutional architecture were constructed in such a fashion that they can be re-

adapted to additional institutional developments such as new forms of women’s

policy agencies or additional dimensions. The subtitle of this dissertation refers to

women’s policy agencies as ‘building blocks’ for gender equality. Possible locations

for further institutional development of a state appear in the graphical depictions

of forms of women’s policy agencies as ‘building blocks’ for gender equality.

The fourth and final research contribution to state feminism entails the testing

of a broad set of possible explanations for the variations of institutional archi-

tecture (Chapter 9). Testing revealed that states employing the same or similar

institutional architecture can vary on many dimensions. The inordinate character

of the heterogeneity of state groupings is a challenge for future research.

Methods and Data

The two research questions discussed above were answered in two separate phases

of the analysis. Several methods and various sources for data were used in both

phases. In the first phase, the reconceptualization of women’s policy agencies, the

classification and the typology were generated through an inductive approach on

the basis of a secondary analysis of nominal cross-sectional empirical data. The

data originated from the above mentioned United Nations survey. In my view,

this data manifests individual states’ perception of their women’s policy agencies.

Information on existing entities derived from this data was processed qualita-

tively by using a non-linear approach to theorizing (cf. Ackerly and True 2010, 80).

This entailed recurrent iterations between coding entities in SPSS, making sense of

data by conceptualizing relevant theoretical dimensions and entities and developing

graphical representations. In accordance with the non-linear approach, the pro-

9

cess of analysis included recurring phases of reflection on conceptual development

(cf. Ackerly and True 2010; Goertz and Mazur 2008) as well as counter-factual

thought experimenting (Ragin and Sonnett 2005) to comprehend what states re-

gard as their women’s policy agencies. These continuous critical reflections lead

to a deeper conceptual understanding.

In the process of constructing the typology, the initially planned usage of the

SPSS algorithms for clustering (CLUST) and classification (CHAID and QUEST)

of women’s policy agencies provided neither meaningful dimensions, nor stable

results. Therefore, the most dominant conceptual dimensions in the data – lo-

cation and scope of women’s policy agencies – were used qualitatively to further

structure dimensions in the typology. Jahan (2008) had already used location as

a structuring part of her classification. Her classification was easily accessible to

the reporting states.

Most data needed to answer my first research question came from an on-going

research project being conducted by two United Nations organizations; the United

Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (UN DAW) and the United

Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DAW 2010a;b; Jahan

2010). The UN research project endeavours to strengthen existing women’s policy

agencies. Their data, assembled in six regional reports by consultants employed by

the regional organizations of the United Nations, came from the above mentioned

United Nations survey sent out to all UN member states (Tavares da Silva 2010;

Abdurazakova 2010; Fernos 2010b;a; SDD 2010; Jad 2010).

The spacious tables in the appendices of the regional reports entail information

on the existing women’s policy agencies in individual states (Tavares da Silva 2010,

68-80; Abdurazakova 2010, 58-74; Fernos 2010a, 3-31; SDD 2010, 77-112; Jad 2010,

63-67). I transferred the information in these tables into SPSS. Thus, I was able

to identify 1,200 entities, of which 776 could be categorised as women’s policy

agencies according to my own definition. Using this empirical basis, I developed

the classification system and the typology.

The second research question discussed above was answered using aggregated

data. Five main hypotheses and two alternative hypotheses were developed from

the literature. The hypotheses testing had two functions. First, it was needed

to rule out possible explanations which have little empirical support. Second, the

10

hypotheses were used as a guideline to improve the understanding of the variations

beyond the specified hypotheses.

The various explanations were tested on scientific data sets (Paxton et al.

2008b; Marshall et al. 2012; Ulfelder 2011b; Wejnert 2007b; Cali 2009), on data

of the World Bank (2013b) as well as on my own collections of data regarding

memberships in international organizations. Finally, one hypothesis was tested

visually on a world map without taking any further data into account.

Scope of the Research

This research analysed variations of women’s policy agencies, institutional archi-

tecture and permanent and specific state capability in women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality in 151 states and territories. The main explanatory

power of this analysis lies on its inclusion of states on the five continents Australia

and Oceania, Asia, Europe, North America, and South America and six states –

Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia – on the African continent.

In principle, the scope of this research is global, even without current data about

most African states.

The data for states on the African continent were collected by the UN Division

for the Advancement of Women; however the regional report of Africa (Tsikata

2010) had yet to be published during my analysis (UN DAW 2011a). If and

when this data becomes available for all African states, future research may reveal

that the new operational definition of women’s policy agency, the classification

and the typology are applicable and appropriate to map permanent and specific

state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality on an

entirely global scale.

To what extent the analysed structures are able to actually impart women’s

empowerment and gender equality is beyond the scope of this study. Evaluation of

the effectiveness of individual women’s policy agencies, institutional architecture

as a whole and gender equality governance of entire states must be left to future

research.

11

Structure of the Study

This dissertation has been divided into three main parts and ten chapters. The first

part focuses on the theoretical framework for comparing specific state capability

in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality and encompasses four

chapters. Chapter 1 introduces important terms. The second chapter embeds the

two research questions in a wider theoretical framework. Chapter 3 specifies how

variations in specific state capability can be explained. And finally, the fourth

chapter gives an overview about applied methods and data of my research.

The second part explains the conceptual adaptations necessary for global com-

parative research. For this purpose, Chapter 5 covers the smallest unit of analysis;

the single women’s policy agency and Chapter 6, the entirety of all women’s policy

agencies per state – the institutional architecture in women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality.

The third part contains the empirical results in three chapters. Chapter 7 maps

the current situation of women’s policy agencies worldwide and Chapter 8 does the

same for types of institutional architecture. Chapter 9 then appraises theoretical

explanations for the variety of institutional architecture found. The last chapter

discusses major findings, shows their relevance in a wider context and identifies

areas for future research.

12

Part I: Theoretical Framework for

Comparing Specific State

Capability

13

Chapter 1

Terminology

This chapter explains important terms such as specific state capability, the area

of women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality (WEGE), women’s

policy agency (WPA) and institutional architecture.

1.1 Specific State Capability

This analysis studies ‘specific state capability’. That is the short form of the

term ‘permanent and specific capability of a state in women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality’.1

‘Capability of state’ denotes the ability of a state to act – or as (Cheung

2008, 122) put it, the “ability of the state to get things done in pursuance of

state-defined objectives and goals”. Ability would be a synonym. Hence, state

capability encompasses the structural potential of a state to take action in a certain

area. The area is women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality as it

is circumscribed in the next subsection. To refer to the phenomenon under study

specific state capability is my larger theoretical concept. To get things done states

need an organizational entity such as a program or an administrative body. Line of

demarcation to state capacity is discussed on page 18. The focus of this analysis is

on administrative bodies. Hence, the formal structures of the structural potential

of a state.

1The qualifiers permanent and specific are explained below as well.

14

States as Territorial Entities

State in the term state capability encompasses a collective entity, an organisation,

linked to a geographical circumscribed area – a certain territory on earth. States

exist through their mutual recognition. For the end of the first decade of the

21st century there are 192 states recognising each other (more or less) as states.

In order to compare specific state capability the underlying assumption is that

those states are comparable as far as they entail bureaucratic structures. Further

delimitations to non-state are given in subsequent sections.2

Distinction Between Specific and Unspecific Entities

Specific entities can be distinguished from unspecific entities. A particular state

entity can be described as specific if it is explicitly designated to develop and im-

plement policies for women’s empowerment and the promotion of gender equality.

Unspecific entities in the state and public administration are, for instance, the

ministry of finance and a chamber in the parliamentary assembly. Unspecific does

not imply that such entities do nothing or little for equal gender relations. They

can even have a duty to do gender mainstreaming. However, such a duty exists

beside a wide range of other duties. Such as collecting taxes and administration

of financial flows by the ministry of finance or legislation by a chamber of the par-

liamentary assembly. Women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality

is the main duty of a specific entity. It may even be the case that this particular

entity did not exist before the assignation of this duty. The decisive criteria are

the range of duties and their orientation. In this sense, specific state capability is

not the whole state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender

equality. There are unspecific measures as well.

Distinction Between Permanent and Temporary

There is a further distinction. ‘Permanent’ stands for bureaucratic entity on a

lasting legal basis. The contrasting entities are temporary entities such as a round

table or a working group. Permanent neither indicates that the entity has a legal

2Relevance of states and their embedding in a bigger environment is explained in the literaturereview in Chapter 2. Boundaries to non-state are drawn in Chapter 5.2.

15

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16

basis on its own, nor does it not prescribe how long a certain entity is lasting. The

endurance of an entity is positioned between an institution and seasonal entities

which will vanish or become abandoned after public attention changes to other

issues.

Even though the entity has a permanent lasting presence (McBride and Mazur

2010, 67), it is not conceptualized as an institution, due to its lack of the features

of an institution: the institutional stability. Internationally there are differences

how often such entities are restructured and even abandoned (Mazur and Stetson

1995a, 311-314; Borchorst 1999, 174-176). Changes in political party compositions

of government are one of the factors for such instability (Stetson 1995, 267; Mazur

and Stetson 1995b, 291). This is in sharp contrast to the enduring quality of

gender inequality. In my view, the feature of persistence of gender inequality

would require that the specific state capability becomes an institution.

Figure 1.1 separates the four possible fields of state action in women’s em-

powerment and promotion of gender equality. The dissertation concentrates the

attention on one particular field, the permanent structures, which are specifically

designated to contribute to women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equal-

ity (grey-shaded area). Both qualifiers, permanent and specific, have to be present

in a particular entity to identify it as the state capability of interest in this analysis.

Interrelations of Concepts

Specific state capability is the theoretical concept. Women’s policy agencies and

the institutional architecture defined below are the observable manifestations of

specific state capability.

States may employ other strategies to further women’s empowerment and pro-

mote gender equality, such as gender mainstreaming, gender controlling, gender

budgeting, and gender quotas (see e.g. Squires 2007). Primarily, they are proce-

dural instruments which do not necessarily have a structural deposit in the state

structure like a women’s policy agency. Their implementation by a state is possi-

ble with and without existence of women’s policy agencies. In other words, specific

state capability does not include them, but they may be part of the overall state

capability in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality

17

Delimit State Capability from State Capacity

The four fields of state capability give the potential of a state to take action in

women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality. However, that is not

the actual ability of a state to take action, the state capacity. If state capability is

the mere possibility, then state capacity is the realizable potential. State capacity

includes the resource endowment, such as political commitment, finance, staff,

training for staff, instruments, space, working environment, access to media and

public attention. Furthermore, it encompasses the legal framework of competences

and duties to intervene. State capacity is not surveyed by the dissertation.

1.2 Women’s Empowerment and Promotion of

Gender Equality

The discussed permanent and specific state capability is target to a particular

area: the women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality (WEGE). The

term is not so far away from wordings by other authors like “state-based agency

[...] charged with promoting the advancement of women and/or gender equality”

(McBride and Mazur 2010, 29). Historically, the phenomenon received differ-

ent names. For instance the United Nations used in the 1970s “advancement of

women” (Jahan 2010, 1) and the “promotion of the status of women” (Jahan 2008,

3). Newer is the wording of “national mechanisms for gender equality” (UN DAW

2009, 2) or “promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment” (Jahan 2010,

1). Other names are emancipation, liberation of women, women’s right, gender

justice, equal rights, anti-discrimination, or diversity. In reference to the intersec-

tionality debate there is even the possibility to name an entity equality body, to

embrace various forms of societal inequalities such as class, race, sexuality, disabil-

ity or age. They vary in their historical context and the conceptualizations of the

problem, its causes and the possible solutions (cf. (Becker-Schmidt and Knapp

2003[2000], 39)). I use ‘women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality’

as a generic term to encompass them all. However, the different terms refer to

different theoretical premises.

My term names two distinct targets: empowerment of women and gender equal-

18

ity. They do not accord necessarily in regard to possible solutions and employed

means and time schedules. Nor is one of the targets privileged over the other.

Specific state capability may have both or one of both as designated duty.

I apply this long and rather old fashioned terminology to stress two points.

Firstly, the fundamental problem, the societal inequality of gender relations, is

an ancient history as well as the long history of resistance and struggle for equal

gender relations (de Beauvoir 1949; von Roten 1958[1996]; Dohm 2003, 1; Holland-

Cunz 2003). This legacy is for instance visible in the term women. Secondly, in

a worldwide context those inequalities vary to a large extent. To represent the

contingency of various historical positions terminology was not unified on one term.

That was done to avoid reduction of the basic problem by a alleged unambiguous

term. For the fluency of the continuous text ‘women’s empowerment’ and ‘gender

equality’ are used as synonyms.

1.3 Women’s Policy Agency

I define a women’s policy agency as a state entity designated to deliver policies to

the area of women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality. Other au-

thors used similar terms (McBride and Mazur 2010, 29; Jahan 2010, 1; UN DAW

2009, 2; Jahan 2008, 3). In the past, a wide range of state entities and admin-

istrative functions have been subsumed under the term women’s policy agencies

(Borchorst 1999, 168; Testolin 2001; Goetz 2004, 2-3; Outshoorn and Kantola

2007, 3). Furthermore, previous studies have used a variety of labels to charac-

terize those entities, such as “women’s policy machineries, gender equality offices,

and women’s rights agencies” (McBride and Mazur 2010, 4). Although there are

differences in their mandate, function, size and activities (Squires 2007, 34; True

and Mintrom 2001, 31; Stetson and Mazur 1995, 4), I use ‘women’s policy agency’

as a generic term to encompass them all.

Women’s Policy Agency as a Vessel

I conceptualize women’s policy agencies (WPAs) as vessels for programmatic con-

tent. That is to say that mandate, function, size and activities represent dimen-

19

sions of programmatic content. The questions of democratic control and emergence

of programmatic content of those vessels are beyond this study, as well as the big

question of performance of women’s policy agencies.

In a worldwide perspective, women’s policy agencies neither operate in the

same way, nor do they affect state policy to the same extent (Berkovitch 1999,

164). Internal processes and specific conditions in the individual countries account

for the variation in content and actual action taken by such state bureaucracies

(Berkovitch 1999, 164).

Given the variety of possible locations within the state, the formal

role of these agencies can vary a great deal, from studying problems

related to their remits and making recommendations, to proposing and

adopting policy, to enforcing and implementing laws, and to adminis-

trative oversight (McBride and Mazur 2010, 29).

The size of women’s policy agencies varies as well. My minimal threshold for

a women’s policy agency is: A women’s policy agency consists of at least of one

person working full time or part time (e.g. appointee/representative). Empirically,

the maximal sizes of women’s policy agencies seem to be open. They may have

up to several hundreds of employees (e.g. in a ministry) (McBride and Mazur

2010; Testolin 2001; Outshoorn and Kantola 2007, 106, 108). It will be shown

in Sections 5.2 and Chapter 7 that their place in state and public administration

varies considerably.

State and Public Administration

In my view, women’s policy agencies can exist in all sectors of governmental action;

state and public administration. Some are linked to public administration, such

as ministries, focal points in a department or coordinating networks of representa-

tives of different ministerial entities. Nevertheless, not all forms of women’s policy

agencies are incorporated into the public administration. They can also consti-

tute a parliament committee, a working group in the judiciary, or a commission

consisting of representatives of non-governmental organizations. In my opinion,

the latter entities are also a part of the ‘state’ in the sense that they belong to

20

the institutional arena of the three different branches of government (legislative,

executive and judiciary). In doing so, a broader picture of state action regarding

women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality policies can be encom-

passed. Until now, research in this area has rarely encompassed all three branches

of the government, as will be discussed below.

The focus is on women’s policy agencies located in state and public administra-

tions. In other words, women’s policy agencies associated with private enterprises,

welfare organizations, universities, trade unions, churches, international organiza-

tions, clubs or other associations have not been included in this research.

Existence and absence of women’s policy agencies may matter for the configu-

ration of policies states provide regarding women’s empowerment and promotion

of gender equality. Where they exist, they may have an impact on their environ-

ment. In countries, where they are missing, this absence may make a difference

in the sense that states provide little or nothing in regard to women’s empower-

ment and promotion of gender equality. Absence of any women’s policy agencies

in a particular state means that there is no specific state capability in women’s

empowerment and promotion of gender equality.

Intersectionality-plus Approach

Specific entities have usually no or only a few additional duties. However, following

the intersectionality debate (Crenshaw 1991; McCall 2005; Phoenix and Pattynama

2006), having several duties is for me not a criterion excluding an entity from be-

coming identified as a women’s policy agency. By using an intersectionality-plus

approach as defined by Weldon (2006, 244) a women’s policy agency, may be in

addition to women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality designated

with duties to work with other societal inequalities such as class, race, sexual-

ity, age, language and / or disability. It can also have other unrelated duties to

perform.3 Still, women’s empowerment and gender equality are central tasks of

women’s policy agencies. Often such agencies have been created solely to perform

this duty.

3Real world examples are: administrating projects for general secretariat of ministry, mar-keting of the ministry, harmony of social relations, social assistance or family affairs.

21

1.4 Institutional Architecture

Women’s policy agency is an important operational concept in this study. The sec-

ond important operational concept is the institutional architecture in women’s em-

powerment and promotion of gender equality. I define the entirety of all women’s

policy agencies per state as the institutional architecture of this state to deliver

specific policies against women’s oppression and gender inequality. I prefer the

self-created term ‘institutional architecture’4 over other terms such women’s pol-

icy machinery, mechanisms and state apparatus. I encountered again and again

that people exposed to my research believe that I would study the performance of

women’s policy agencies or the status of gender equality lived by a large part of the

population. Those are important questions. However, this analysis is about the

institutional performance of whole states. The long-term commitment of states,

measured about the formal structures they established and maintain.

The strength of the term ‘institutional architecture’ is its potential to become

explained, because it is unknown what it contains. Furthermore, it communicates

a static character of a phenomenon with a lasting presence, though, without pre-

scribing it for a long term. Institutional architecture is human made. They are

constructed in political processes. Hence, they be subject to re-constructions. In

contrast to institutional design, institutional architecture is more than an idea on

paper. It has practical effects. Its organizational character shapes for instance

the opportunity structure of political actors. The weakness is its implicit claim

about size. The term gives the impression that a lot of energy is built into the

phenomenon. In view of that, institutional design would be smaller.

With ‘architecture’ the structural component are implied. ‘Institutional’ char-

acterises the formal structure of those components. The single components of an

institutional architecture are the women’s policy agencies. Prior research made

implicit and explicit statements about the organizational setup of institutional ar-

chitecture and relations from its different parts. For instance: the national lead

mechanism is prescribes as the hub whereas the other women’s policy agencies are

the spokes (Teghtsoonian and Chappell 2008, 32) or the women’s policy agencies

constitute a network. It is not expedient to assume that all institutional architec-

4Tip came from Daniele Caramani.

22

ture have the same set of role division inside. It is more accurate to treat the role

distribution as an open empirical question. Similar is the case with the network

conceptualization. Networks can work highly selective, there are power differen-

tials and conflicts between state agencies and women’s policy agencies and among

women’s policy agencies.

Therefore organizational relations between different women’s policy agencies

are not part of my definition of institutional architecture. It is open to further

research to reveal which sorts of institutional relations are suitable in order to reach

certain goals. At the current exploratory stage of research for a global sample, I

consider it as necessary to conceptualize institutional architecture as a heap, a

conglomerate or a set of women’s policy agencies. Further research may show if

the combination of women’s policy agencies form a configuration imposing certain

effects on the interaction among the women’s policy agencies and beyond.

Measurement of Institutional Architecture

I measure institutional architecture about the combination of existing different

forms of women’s policy agencies per state. For instance Tajikistan let the United

Nations know that it employs gender focal points, a parliamentary committee on

Family, Health, Social Protection and Environment Affairs, a coordination council

of the government and a Committee on Women and the Family (Abdurazakova

2010, 68-69). That indicates that the institutional architecture of Tajikistan con-

sists of the forms of women’s policy agencies: focal points, coordinating council,

parliamentary committee, and a committee. With this small amount of informa-

tion the exact number of women’s policy agencies is not known. However, there

are at least five women’s policy agencies and four forms. Those four form build

together the institutional architecture. In the case of Tuvalu the women’s policy

agency falls together with the institutional architecture. Tuvalu reported a De-

partment of Women (SDD 2010, 85, 111). There is one women’s policy agency

and accordingly one form of women’s policy agencies.

Why are different forms of women’s policy agencies at the centre of the mea-

surement? Prior research established that the basic institutional form is “the

central distinguishing feature of a women’s policy agency” (McBride and Mazur

23

2010, 52). It makes a difference “whether agencies are ministries, administrative

offices, executive commissions, advisory councils” (McBride and Mazur 2010, 52).

The combination of different forms of women’s policy agencies is the possibility

of a country to have a fine-grained, interlocked appliance in the state and public

administration to deliver women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equal-

ity. With different forms of women’s policy agencies a variety of locations and

solutions are covered to make a remedy to women’s oppression. Gender inequality

appears in interdependent subsystems of society (Ballmer-Cao 2000, 60-67). To

work in direction of equal gender relations changes have to occur at the same time

at various issues. Therefore, I assume that a state employing a broader approach

might be more successful than a state with a more focused approach.

At the conceptual core of the institutional architecture lies the formal compo-

sition with different forms of women’s policy agencies. With a focus on the formal

combination the structure moves into the centre of analysis as an indicator for


of gender equality. Whereas in a conceptualization of specific state capacity the

resource endowment (means, staff, political commitment, budget) would be more

in the foreground besides to their formal structures.

Why not Women’s Policy Machinery?

Another possible term for the phenomenon under study would have been women’s

policy machinery. Two reasons spoke against its usage. First, the term women’s

policy machinery has an inconsistent usage in the field. Some scholars use it

as a synonym for women’s policy agencies. Others employ it as a term for a

particular women’s policy agency, usually one which has a lot of competences and

is enabled to pursue a wide range of activities, the national leading mechanism.

The descriptive conceptualization, that all women’s policy agencies in one state

form the women’s policy machinery, is not common.

Second, women’s policy machinery is not applied as a main term because it

could cause misunderstandings outside of feminist scholarship. The term women,

as its circumscription of the conceptual core, entails the risk of neglecting older

and newer theoretical developments in the field such as gender equality, anti-

24

discrimination, or intersectionality. In contrast, the cryptic character of the term

‘institutional architecture’ enables confusion and discloses clarifications. Yet, open-

ness to future development is an important feature of the term institutional archi-

tecture.

Other Dismissed Terms

There are other terms which are not used in this study: national machinery, leading

mechanism, and national mechanisms for gender equality.

In the terminology of United Nations a “national machinery for the advance-

ment of women is the central policy-coordinating unit inside government. Its main

task is to support government-wide mainstreaming of a gender-equality perspec-

tive in all policy areas” (BDPA 1995, 84). In other words, this national machinery

is one entity in state and public administration. It is the leading state unit on

national level. This leading mechanism is a particular women’s policy agency ex-

isting beside other mechanisms such as for instance inter-ministerial bodies, gender

equality ombud, or parliamentary committee. The leading mechanism is usually

the contact point between the United Nations and the national state. The na-

tional entity designed to enter contact with United Nations bodies may draw some

internal privileges from this duty.5 This particular entity might be relevant in

the national micro structure. However, for the purpose of this dissertation – the

comparison of the women’s policy agencies employed by states – the entity with

the connection to the United Nations is just one body beside others.

Another term is the ‘national mechanisms for gender equality’ (Jahan 2008, 2)

which is formed by the different women’s policy agencies of a state. On the one

hand with mechanism this term is rather vague. On the other hand is national

not the same in all states and the target area of gender equality does not cover

the broadness of the programmatic discussion.

During my thesis I worked over a longer time with specific state apparatus

in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality as the main term

instead of institutional architecture. I dismissed the term because it is more static

and prescribes a bigger size, than institutional architecture. Strengths of the

5The literature is assuming those forms of power. However it does rarely spells out what theyentail.

25

term specific state apparatus in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender

equality are that is has similar figuratively allusions as machine to machinery: the

possibility to have a fine-grained, interlocked working environment in the state

and public administration to deliver women’s empowerment and promotion of

gender equality. Such a well-constructed machine, would bring about equal gender

relations in two particular ways. Firstly, with less effort by feminist, because state

employees have to do it as part of their normal duties (Wordsworth 1995, 1329).

Secondly, a public administration as an effective organization would constantly

progress in the matter (Merriam Webster 2012). Its frictionless functioning would

achieve more than a small number of feminists levigate in daily live.

26

Chapter 2

Literature and Questions

This chapter embeds the two research questions within the literature.

2.1 Gender, State and Institution

Women’s policy agencies are popular in research (Goertz and Mazur 2008). With

‘state feminism’ there is even an own research field analysing women’s policy agen-

cies. It is one of the four main research clusters1 of feminist comparative policy.2

“State Feminism examines whether state structures and actors can promote femi-

nist notions through focusing on women’s role in the state as policy makers, the

gendered nature of state agencies that influence women’s [and men’s] roles and the

activities of women’s policy machineries in a wide variety of government agencies

and branches” (Mazur 1999, 487) a large part of the research is done by the Re-

search Network on Gender Politics and the State (RNGS). Accordingly, women’s

policy agencies perform all three roles; they are policy makers, part of the gendered

nature of states, and deliver state action.

State feminism studies the connection between women’s movements, women’s

policy agencies and the state with a particular conceptual relation: “The con-

cept of state feminism is about the relationships between women’s movements and

women’s policy agencies. State feminism exists when these two factors work to-

1The four clusters are: Feminist Policy Formation, Feminist Movement and Policy, statefeminism, and feminist welfare state research (Mazur 1999, 487).

2With which I share most of the common methodological approach (Mazur 1999, 484-492).

27

gether to produce policy change” (Goertz and Mazur 2008, 21), i.e. state feminism

has broad understanding of states as arena. Instead, my analysis focuses on the

description and explanation of women’s policy agencies as dependent variables.

While women’s policy agencies are one of the two necessary explaining conditions

for the emergence of state feminism.

My holistic approach to structures is institutionalist. It enables a governance

perspective on the actions of states in the area of women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality. The description of the structures of women’s policy

agencies is a prerequisite to further description and analysis of the causal interplay

of women’s policy agencies, states and women’s movements. In this sense, I regard

my analysis as a contribution to the field of state feminism.

Most research focus on qualitative case studies of individual women’s policy

agencies, and their utility in a particular period of time and issue area, or as part

of a changing state (Mazur 2001; Stetson 2001; Weldon 2002b; Joyce 2004; Loven-

duski 2005; Haussman and Sauer 2007a; McBride and Mazur 2010; Outshoorn

and Kantola 2007; McBride Stetson and Mazur 1995). The largest sample com-

prises a selection of OECD-states.3 Missing is a global perspective; a large scale

comparison of women’s policy agencies.

Focus on One or Two Women’s Policy Agencies per State

In addition, there have been often two restricted ways of describing women’s policy

agencies. Neither way is adequate to describes them all in any one country.

United Nations sources usually focus their interest on the leading national

agency that maintains contact with the United Nations (Haussman and Sauer

2007b, 10-11). This type of concentration of attention does not give us an overall

picture of the women’s policy agencies in a country. The instrumental rationality

of United Nations towards the nation states is understandable from an organiza-

tional point of view, but not against the background of scientific evaluations of

performance of all women’s policy agencies per state.

The second restricted way has been used in RNGS case studies which usu-

3Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, UnitedStates of America (McBride Stetson and Mazur 1995; Haussman and Sauer 2007a).

28

ally describe one women’s policy agency per state instead of the whole network

of women’s policy agencies to be found in a state. The data then actually used

in those analyses were restricted per state to the most relevant women’s policy

agency within a given time period. Hence, usually only those women’s policy

agencies which had played a major role regarding a particular issue in each cov-

ered state were actually analysed. As a result, the research findings only offer a

snapshot of the structures and activities of additional women’s policy agencies in

the states studied (McBride and Mazur 2010, 66). This particular approach has

been justified as a pragmatic decision due to the economics of research (Haussman

and Sauer 2007a, 10) and some other sound methodological reasons, such as qual-

itative similar system design, avoidance of conceptual stretching (Giovanni 1970),

and lack of gender trained researchers in the mid 1990s (McBride and Mazur 2010,

269).

International and Global Conceptualization

Most of these studies regard women’s policy agencies as an international and not as

a global phenomenon; one exception is, however, a study done by Nitza Berkovitch

(1999). In contrast to case studies, Berkovitch uses a much larger sample. On the

basis of a discourse analysis and in view of the distribution of three particular sorts

of women’s policy agencies: agency, ministry and commission, she even points out

that, women’s policy agencies became a standard feature of modern statehood in

the course of the 20th century (Berkovitch 1999, 163-164). This dissertation is an

empirical and conceptual test of Berkovitch’s characterisation.

Forms of Women’s Policy Agencies

Different forms of women’s policy agencies are rarely distinguished. Squires ar-

gues even that the state of the art is not to distinguish between them (Squires

2007, 66-67), even though, there are different ways to separate forms of women’s

policy agencies (Mazur and Stetson 1995a, 311; McBride and Mazur 2010, 48,

52-57; Berkovitch 1999, 163-164; Testolin 2001, 9-25; Goetz 2004, 2-3; Sawer 2004,

2-7; Squires 2007, 34; Jahan 2008; 2010). A framework to identify and compare

different forms of women’s policy agencies is lacking. Furthermore, prior research

29

does not study different forms of women’s policy agencies competitively. As for

instance, how effective is a ministry in comparison to a commission or a gender

focal point in a ministry? The global spectrum of different sorts of women’s policy

agencies is not known yet. A global comparison gives the opportunity to observe

this range. This range is delivered in Section 6.2 and Chapter 8. In addition, a

common standard of identifying the entire network of women’s policy agencies in

a country does not exist to this day despite interest in evaluating states (Jahan

2008, 28). To know the global range might provide new insights about the rele-

vance of certain aspects. For instance Berkovitch ascertains that only nine of the

thirty-six ministries established until 1993 were created by “old, established, and

developed countries” (Berkovitch 1999, 165). A majority of ministries for women’s

empowerment and promotion of gender equality were established in states getting

their independence in the 1960s. Many of them are small island states (Berkovitch

1999, 164-165).4

Paradoxical Status of Women’s Policy Agency in Current Research

on State Feminism

I conclude that women’s policy agencies are in a paradoxical situation in research

on state feminism. On the one hand, a women’s policy agency is the exemplary

case of state feminism in the sense of institutionalizing women’s or feminist notions

in the state. On the other hand, their structural composition is rarely part of the

analysis. Paradoxically, women’s policy agencies are at the core of attention and

at the margin of analysis at the same time.

This study applies another perspective on women’s policy agencies and insti-

tutional architecture. The specific state capability in women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality, the composition of institutional architecture with

different forms of women’s policy agencies, is at the core of attention. So this study

moves the formal structure of women’s policy agency and institutional architec-

ture from the margin to the centre of attention. The focus changes from evaluating

utility of women’s policy agencies to the responsibility of states to provide citizens

with state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality.

4Furthermore, states have regarded the establishment of women’s policy agencies as a sign ofmodernity (Berkovitch 1999).

30

This does not imply that in the future all researchers should focus on the for-

mal structures of women’s policy agencies and institutional architecture. Though,

structures should become part of the picture, in addition to better researched

factors in the field like policy environment or commitment of left parties. Such

a basic research about the institutional architecture provides the foundation for

future research about performance of states and their specific state capability.

Substantial Findings about Structures of Women’s Policy Agencies and

Institutional Architecture

Structures of women’s policy agencies are rarely studied from a global perspective.

Research on the variety of all women’s policy agencies per state from a worldwide

perspective is absent. Hence, it is not surprising that prior research offers little

substantial information about current variation of structures. Still, a small number

of statements concern structures.

Women’s policy agencies are very heterogeneous (Mazur 2002, 175-176). Re-

garding structures, the selective sample of OECD-states shows no clear cut pat-

terns. There are neither organizational blueprints, nor national styles of women’s

policy agencies (McBride and Mazur 2010, 48, 64). The absence of obvious pat-

terns and the confusing heterogeneity is the starting point of my analysis.

The global comparison will enable to answer to what extent RNGS-results –

such as the structural heterogeneity of women’s policy agencies and no visible

blueprints – are generalizable for institutional architecture as well.

At the current exploratory stage of research on structures of women’s policy

agencies and institutional architecture worldwide, case selection for any sample is

difficult, as there is no grid to judge differences and similarities in women’s policy

agencies and institutional architecture.

2.2 Understanding of (Gendered) States

The unit of analysis is the specific state capability in women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality. It takes place in a certain state. The state is the

31

level of analysis.5 There are different conceptualizations of states (Loffler 2011).

The majority of scholars of the Research Network on Gender Politics and the

State follow a neo-institutional understanding. The state is conceptualized as a

“complex set of institutions and arenas” (McBride and Mazur 2010, 7-8, citing

Pringle and Watson 1992), while earlier notions conceptualized the state as a

unified political actor. Further, the newly conceptualized state is dynamic and

heterogeneous, in the sense that it is “a site of structures and processes that are

internally differentiated” (McBride and Mazur 2010, 8, citing Franzway, Court

and Connell 1989). Understood in this way, a state consists of incoherent and

contradictory sites to carry out and negotiate political conflicts about limited sets

of issues. Such a view is nearer to US scholars, who conceptualize the state often

as policy and policy process. In contrast, European scholars regard the state more

often as a “thing” (McBride and Mazur 2010, 7). I am more familiar with the

European vision. Scholars of RNGS do not favour one vision over another. They

emphasize the relativity of states to their contexts: “whatever the state means is

relative; conceptions vary from culture to culture and may affect the way state

agencies intervene in women’s lives” (McBride and Mazur 2010, 8). This involves

that states may vary to a large extents on certain aspects.

Despite this complex heterogeneity of states, all units in this study are states

in the sense of the declarative theory of recognition of sovereign states (Schneck-

ener 2005, 22; Schultze 1998, 606). “To be a state, a political entity has to have

a permanent population, well-defined boarders, a government, and a capacity to

honour international obligations. This was called the declarative theory of state-

hood, whereby an effective government was a prerequisite for international status

and recognition” (Osterud 2011, 2511). Accordingly, states, which are members

of United Nations are widely recognised. I consider states as comparable, if they

fulfil those criteria.

5For 2010 there are 192 states, the Vatican and 10 territories disputed by states. I count 202states and territories as the basic population. In my sample are 151 states and territories; 146states and 6 territories. The six territories included in this way are: American Samoa, CookIslands, Hong Kong, Macao, Palestine, and Puerto Rico. They are marked with an asterisk (*).State is used as a generic term to refer to states and territories.

32

2.2.1 From Complete Exclusion to Partial Inclusion

Historically, exclusion of women as women – qua sex – from modern politics and

state positions has been fundamental for the construction of modern European

statehood in political theory (e.g. contract theory Pateman (1988), for the un-

derstanding of equality (Maihofer 2001)) and in political practise (Wecker 1983;

Wecker et al. 2001; Majer 2008). Historically, the gender project of modern state-

hood is patriarchic (Loffler 2011, 237).

Even though there were major achievements in the inclusion of women in the

last centuries, the process of full inclusion on equal terms is on-going yet. For

instance, in 2012 the United States of America had 16.9 per cent and Switzerland

28.5 per cent female members in parliament. While the world average was with 20

per cent far from equal. The highest percentage of female members in parliament

had Rwanda: 56.3 per cent (IPU 2012a;b).

As gender is part of almost all societal fabrics, it is part of the state as well.

States could be regarded as gendered organizations (Connell 2012[2009], 72). Such

a gendered organization is multidimensional and dynamic. Combined with Wet-

terer’s notion of the ubiquitousness of persistence of gender inequalities and gender

equalities (Wetterer 2005) states are a multi-faced actor with contradictory labile

balances of power. For the particular structures under study, states are the com-

plex context for making a remedy to women’s discrimination and for the promotion

of gender equality.

2.3 Feminist Institutionalism, Gender and

Inequality Globally

Feminist institutionalism deals with the relevance of institutions like other insti-

tutionalisms (Mackay et al. 2010, 576, 580-582). The added value of feminist

institutionalism is its explicit interest in change and persistence of institution in

relation to gender and gender inequality (Mackay et al. 2010). Its focus on formal

and informal rules of the game is a helpful analytical tool to distinguish between

institutional design (rules-in-form) and rule-in-use (Mackay et al. 2010, 576). Fem-

inist institutionalism gives a frame for analysis of gendered working of institution.

33

I understand gender as a historically constructed, performative societal phe-

nomenon working as a primary signifier of power (Scott 1986, 1067). Gender is

working at the various levels of individuals, groups, national states and interna-

tionally at the same time (Scott 1986; West and Zimmerman 1987; Butler 1990).

Therefore, gender inequality is shaped by the local gender system and its pervasion

by imperial gender systems (Connell 2011).

Taken together, this means for a global comparison that states differ largely,

next to other characteristics, in their gender and gender inequality systems, and

their possible reaction to the emergence of women’s policy agencies at the inter-

national agenda in the 1960s. Therefore, it is important to use a framing able to

cope with such heterogeneities.

Gender inequality is a persisting societal problem recurrent in all aspects of

life. More specifically, women’s oppression and gender inequality are present in a

multitude of settings and come in different forms. Women’s policy agencies are one

possible answer of states to gender inequality (Squires 2007, 1-2). States started

in the 1960s to establish women’s policy agencies as one possible answer to the

problem (Robinson 1995, 205; Rai 2003; Berkovitch 1999; Squires 2007, 2, 10).

To bring overall structural change in interdependent subsystems of modern

society, women’s policy agencies have to work at the same time in different sub-

systems into a similar direction (Ballmer-Cao 2000, 63-65). This justification for a

detailed multi-faced approach has an instrumental quality. Women’s policy agen-

cies can be considered as the dream of gender equality specialist and apparatchiks.

With all expert driven instruments there is the problem of democratic, majoritar-

ian control over the selection of the experts, their control, the control of priorities

of such entities and the emergence of the programmatic content and its tension

with minoritarian views. Feminist institutionalism helps to identify where states

concede power and resources to women’s actors or feminists in the state appara-

tus. The multitudes of settings and forms of gender inequalities within the state

stimulated in the last 50 years the development of a wide range of sorts of women’s

policy agencies.

34

2.4 Purposes of Women’s Policy Agencies

The added value of an ideal women’s policy agency are presence, process and

voice (Squires 2007, 15). ‘Presence’ indicates that the women’s policy agency

should bring visibility within the state to the issues of women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality. ‘Process’ stands for giving women’s advocates and

otherwise unheard gender equality actors access to state processes to influence state

behaviour from within the state. The process dimension covers the whole policy

cycle from the genesis of policies, over the decision and the implementation phase.

‘Voice’ is relevant by giving women and gender equality advocates a legitimated

and powerful position to speak within and outside the state.

The idea of a women’s policy agency is to work as structure within the po-

litical processes and the administrative structure of the state bringing women’s

and feminist demands into the process and is able to speak directly with execu-

tive government (McBride and Mazur 2010, 48). There, “women’s policy agencies

and their agents are antidotes to the resistance of established institutions accus-

tomed to reproducing dominant patterns of gender roles and patriarchy” (McBride

and Mazur 2010, 29) in their “gendered ‘logic of appropriateness” (Weldon 2002a;

Eisenstein 1996; Louise 2006)’(McBride and Mazur 2010, 29, 269). They are in-

tended to work against serious gender-specific capacity failure (Squires 2007, 5,

citing Goetz 2004: 15).

There are various reasons why states established women’s policy agencies such

as pressure from women’s movements, ideological reasons, obligations by interna-

tional law, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-

tion against Women (CEDAW) or international donors (Rai 2003).

In regard to the purposes of women’s policy agencies, there are three hot is-

sues among feminists. First, there is considerable disagreement among feminists

whether and how women’s policy agencies promote the cause of women or even

feminists interests.6 One of the reasons for completely distinct diagnoses are dif-

ferent views about the possible role of the state as reliable ally for women. Due

to painful experiences in history of women and feminist for instance in the legis-

lation and implementation of abortion legislation and other issues of reproductive

6Whatever they are in a particular time and context (Squires 2007).

35

rights.7 Second, it is contested how those structures are accountable to women,

women’s movements and feminist demands. Thirdly, it is open how (and if) men

are relevant positive actors in gender equality politics. Not all would agree that

men (and women) are aware of the fact that “men and boys often do have substan-

tial reasons to support change” (Connell 2011, 17-19) of existing unequal gender

relations.

The institutional set-up of women’s policy agencies has a bearing on all those

questions; single women’s policy agencies as well as institutional architecture.

Then, such structures shape behaviour of actors by restricting some and enabling

others. Similar sets of different forms of women’s policy agencies per state may

face similar institutional advantages and disadvantages not visible in other sets.

Furthermore, it is likely that a state with a women’s policy agency in the judiciary

sees other activities from women’s organizations than a state without a women’s

policy agency in the judiciary.

2.4.1 State Capabilities as Potentially Powerful Vessels

Specific state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equal-

ity is a potentially powerful tool in the hand of the ones who decide about its

activities. The compelling idea behind single women’s policy agencies and institu-

tional architecture is that there is in all sorts of governmental action a permanent

entity dealing with issues of women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equal-

ity. Those entities intervene into daily state practice, coordinate their activities

and may even share parts of a similar understanding of the problem, priorities,

means, and time schedules.

I conceptualize a women’s policy agency as a vessel for various programmatic

content to account for the differences in mandate, function, size, location, circum-

stances and activities. Yet, in substantial terms women’s policy agencies and insti-

tutional architecture can be used for very different purposes, beside women’s em-

7E.g. development of feminist state scepticism (Sauer 2001). In contrast to andro-centricconstituted state (Kreisky 1995; Blattmann and Meier 1998), Connell dismiss the homogeneityof men and states “given the spectrum of masculinity politics, we cannot expect consensus ongender equality. What is possible is that support for gender equality might become hegemonicamong men” (Connell 2011, 22).

36

powerment and promotion of gender equality. For instance, France used women’s

policy agencies as spies to detect parts of public administration and bureaucrats

not in line with the governing political party (Mazur 2007). Women’s policy agen-

cies can be used as tool to carry out authoritarian control and be subject to serve

the interest of an undemocratic regime (Mazur and Stetson 1995b, 191; Robinson

1995, 205). They can serve goals of party politics; such as establishing women’s pol-

icy agencies to maximizing electoral success of political parties, especially among

female voters (Squires 2007, 10). Or, when women’s policy agencies are institu-

tionally upgrade or downgraded before elections. That they are used as a symbol

(Berkovitch 1999) to communicate particular ideas, is not restricted to interna-

tional politics. The literature names such other uses of women’s policy agencies.

The difference is, that those instances are not considered as accidental in my con-

ceptualization. They are a constitutive possibility of the women’s policy agency,

as a vessel for many sorts of programmatic content.

2.5 Research Questions

The first research question is: How does current permanent and specific state ca-

pability in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality vary interna-

tionally? This research question is descriptive. With ‘current’ the focus is on the

present: the used data give the situation for the time 2007–2010. With ‘interna-

tional’ the research is cross-sectional and aims at a comparative research design.

As a theoretical concept, specific state capability is not directly measurable.

It is operationalized with two measurements of women’s policy agencies and in-

stitutional architecture or with two perspectives on the phenomenon. In the first

perspective, women’s policy agencies are measured over the forms of women’s pol-

icy agencies. In the second perspective, institutional architecture is measured

over the combination of different forms of women’s policy agencies. The first per-

spective is able to give evidence about the range of different forms of women’s

policy agencies (conceptually in Chapter 5.2 and empirically in Chapter 7). The

second perspective delivers the conceptually possible spectrum of institutional ar-

chitecture (Section 6.2) and the empirically used spectrum (Chapter 8). Both

operationalizations concentrate on formal structures. By comparing 151 states

37

the focus lies less in depth than in amplitude. The focus lies in the appraisal what

are global, common, restricted and idiosyncratic patterns. Beyond this analysis,

the expectation is that those structures may make a difference for gender equality.

The second research questions builds on the answers to the first research ques-

tion, the variation of current specific state capability. However, the second research

question is explanatory: How explain variations in institutional architecture in

women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality? The second research

question concentrates on institutional architecture as the operational concept for

specific state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equal-

ity. It does not intend to explain the variation of women’s policy agencies.

States reconcile relative strengths of actors and institutions differently (Jessop

2001). States structure their institutions by their decision-making. States give

institutions different attribution of power (Hall and Taylor 1996, 941). It matters

what states decide on their institutional architecture. States with similar formal

structures may show similar strengths and face similar problems. With this, states

do not determine action. However, they make particular scopes of action possible

and foreclose others. Those scopes of action condition social practice (Loffler 2011,

152).

Explanations are researched for the groups of states employing a similar insti-

tutional architecture. Similar states may employ similar institutional architecture.

Too, there might be different states employing similar institutional architecture.

As such equifinality (Ragin 2000) could play a role, differences among states with

similar institutional architecture are analysed as well.

38

Chapter 3

Explaining Variation in


This chapter identifies the possible theories for explaining the variation of the

dependent variable institutional architecture. Furthermore, it specifies hypotheses

and operationalization to answer the second research question.

3.1 Dependent Variable:


Variety of institutional architecture was used as dependent variable to capture


of gender equality.

Variety of institutional architecture was measured in general and in detail. The

general way was to measure the comprehensiveness of institutional architecture.

Comprehensiveness was measured over the number of occurring sectors of govern-

mental action in which there are women’s policy agencies in this country.1 The

comprehensiveness of an institutional architecture measures the broadness of the

approach of states to women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality.

The detailed way to measure institutional architecture is to compare the differ-

ent types of institutional architecture. The different types of institutional architec-

1See discussion of comprehensiveness in Chapter 6.2.3.

39

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONSEconomic Wealth

Population Size

Variation of Current Permanent and

Specific State Capability in WEGE

PO

LIC

Y D

IFFU

SIO

N

PO

LITY

Organizational Neighbours Governmental System

GEOGRAPHY

Geographical DiffusionH

ISTO

RY

CO

NTE

XT

Gender Equality History Bloc Participation

Figure 3.1: Embedding of institutional architecture.

ture are introduced in extenso in Chapter 6.2. They are ordered according to their

size. Both measurements cover the full structural complexity of current specific

state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality.

3.2 Possible Explanations from Five Arrays

The situation of a state is covered with a set of five arrays of possible explanations.

They are: history, context, polity, geography and policy diffusion (see Figure 3.1).

Those five embrace the state situation for specific state capability in women’s


History encompasses on the one hand the situation prior to the creation of

the institutional architecture. On the other hand, the history of a state accompa-

nies the enfolding of the institutional architecture. Context refers to the general

40

cultural environment towards gender equality when the institutional architecture

emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. Polity takes the structure of the state into

account, whereas Geography analyses its location. Policy Diffusion incorporates

different behaviours of states. Each of those arrays entails one hypothesis. In addi-

tion, there is a controlling array with two alternative hypotheses taking structural

factors into account.

Each hypothesis stipulates a relation between a possible explanation (inde-

pendent variable) and the dependent variable institutional architecture. In this

way, there are seven hypotheses. They are listed in Table 3.1 on page 49. The

first column gives the number of the hypothesis. The second column entails the

explanation and the corresponding hypothesis.

3.3 Testing of Hypotheses

Each hypothesis was tested in three ways: general, in direction a) and in direction

b). The general test of hypothesis encompasses the question if the data meet

the expectation for the hypothesis (hypothesis confirmed or refuted) and to which

degree (partly refuted?). Independent from the general analysis, I tested two

directions. For each hypothesis there is a presumption for direction a) and a

presumption for direction b). Direction a) stands for the possible explanation

as the cause and variation of institutional architecture as the effect. Direction

b) analyses if certain types of institutional architecture show a preference for a

particular characteristic value of the explanation. Note, direction b) does not

postulate that a particular type of institutional architecture causes a particular

characteristic value of an explanation.

Direction a) was tested for all presumptions of the seven hypotheses. Then, the

presumption of direction b) was tested for all hypotheses. Afterwards, followed

the test of the hypotheses in general. With this split into three separate tests per

hypotheses I tried to avoid interference from the result of one test to another.

41

Five Arrays of Explanationssimilar institutional architecture H1

a) similar states

different institutional architecture H0

H1 similar states

b) similar institutional architecture

H0 different states

Controlling Arraydifferent institutional architecture H1

c) similar states

similar institutional architecture H0

H1 different states

d) similar institutional architecture

H0 similar states

?

?

?

?

Figure 3.2: Two directions of testing.

Direction of Testing and Explanandum

In an abstract way, Figure 3.2 gives the two possible directions (a and b) for each

relation of variables in the five arrays and in the controlling array (c and d). The

question mark symbolises the open question, respectively the decision about the

connection.

In direction a): Are there similar states and similar institutional architecture,

or are there similar states and different institutional architecture? In direction

b): Are there similar institutional architecture and different states or are there

similar institutional architecture and similar states? In the five arrays, similarities

in both directions were the explanandum. That is marked in the Figure 3.2 by the

grey-shading of boxes.

The alternative hypotheses had to pass another criterion. To exclude the pos-

42

sibility that structural variables explain the variety of institutional architecture,

the alternative presumption had to refute that there is no connection. While the

other presumptions had to refute that there is a connection. Consequently, the

presumptions of the controlling array have differences as the explanandum: In

direction a) Are there similar states with different institutional architecture? In

direction b) Are there similar institutional architecture with different states?

3.4 Possible Explanations and Hypotheses

3.4.1 TIME: Gender Equality History

The first possible relation comes from the array of time. It is the historical legacies

in gender equality history of a particular state, more specifically, the legacy of

women’s enfranchisement. Women’s enfranchisement, the becoming eligible of

women to political participation as full citizen on all levels, is a major project in

the gender equality history of states. Other substantive steps are equality before

the law, equality in marriage, liberty from gendered violence and equal wage for

comparable labour. Historically, women’s enfranchisement is in many states before

the other mentioned achievements. However, the full participation of women and

men on equal terms is ongoing.

Women’s inclusion as complete citizen consists of several steps. I considered

the following six steps: right to vote is granted to all women, right to stand for

election for all women, first women elected to legislative assembly, first woman

elected as president of country, first woman elected as prime minister, first women

elected as head of parliamentary body.

In all those steps, the process of enfranchisement is not finished with the pio-

neering women. Rather, each of those steps is a point in time where perceptions

change in a further area. It is still a long and on-going process until women and

men are treated alike in all areas.

There can be quite extensive and notable time lags between the different steps.

As Paxton et al. (2006, 909-911) show, there is a remarkable number of states

in which the election of the first women to legislative assembly is still pending:

Since the middle of the 20th century, women’s right to vote is legally approved in

43

© Paxton, Green and Hughes 2006: 910.

Figure 3.3: Global development of women’s enfranchisement.

more than 90 per cent of the states. Still, twenty per cent of states have not seen

the first elected female member of legislative assembly. In 2003, women’s share

in legislative assemblies is in 90 per cent of states below thirty per cent. Those

variations in the historical development of women’s enfranchisement may explain

current institutional architecture.

Therefore, Hypothesis H1 is: States moving towards gender equality at an ear-

lier point in time have similar types of institutional architecture. For the relation

in the direction a), the refutable presumption is that there seem to be an influence

between legacy of gender equality history and variation of institutional architec-

ture. For the other direction, b), the refutable presumption is that for particular

types there seem to be an influence by the legacy of gender equality history of

states. Note, direction b) does not stipulate that the institutional architecture

influence the gender equality history of a particular state. That would violate the

requirement that the independent variable has to be present before the dependent

variable in order to influence it. Instead, the direction b) analyses if a particular

44

type of institutional architecture occurs more often among states with a particular

gender equality history.

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against

Women (CEDAW) is one of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties.2 CEDAW

is explicitly and solely target on women. Its ratification is part of the second half

of the 20st century and the beginning 21st century. I consider the legacy of this

legal framework as a seventh step in gender equality history of a state.

CEDAW codifies the basics and establishes various obligations of states to take

action to end all discrimination of women. It covers a wide range of issues, “in

particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields” (CEDAW 1979, Art.

3) and is explicit about the aims: “all appropriate measures, including legislation,

to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the purpose of

guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental

freedoms on a basis of equality with men” (CEDAW 1979, Art. 3). Provisions

against violence against women become more explicit in the 1990s. CEDAW does

not only bend states. It also has third-party effects (horizontal effect). In this

sense, it is applicable as well for discrimination inside partnerships and families

and between employers and employees. CEDAW contains particular obligations for

states to establish and run institutional means to counter women’s discrimination

(CEDAW Art. 2d, f). It does not stipulate what forms of institutional measures,

but it entails the obligation for immediate implementation of performing measures.

The studied institutional architecture is one possibility to fulfil such obligations.

There is a second reason why its ratification may play a role for the varia-

tion of institutional architecture. The drafting process of CEDAW needed a lot

of time and international negotiation; the precursor document, the Declaration on

the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women passed the General Assembly

1969. CEDAW’s final passage in the General Assembly of the United Nations

took place 1979. It entered into force 1981. CEDAW and its ratification are

2The other ones are: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICE-SCR), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Convention on the Elim-ination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), Convention against Torture and OtherCruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), Convention on the Rights of theChild (CRC), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workersand Members of Their Families (ICPRMW), and International Convention for the Protection ofAll Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPED) (Hausammann 2002).

45

regarded as possible explanatory variable due to its global reach. 2013 (as at Jan-

uary), 187 states have ratified the convention (UN Treaty Collection). Therefore

CEDAW has a similar emerging context than the institutional architecture, which

also started in the 1960s and gained momentum in the 1970s and 1980s. Diffusion

process came along with the conference’s platforms for action3 from the series of

Women’s World Conferences (Mexico-City 1975, Copenhagen 1980, Nairobi 1985,

and Beijing 1995).

For the relation in the direction a), the refutable presumption is that there

seems to be an influence between ratification of CEDAW and variation of institu-

tional architecture. For the other direction, b), the refutable presumption is that

there seem to be no influence between particular type of institutional architecture

and time of ratification of CEDAW.

Alternative Measurements of Gender Equality History

Alternative measurements which were considered, but refuted are: state partici-

pation in world women’s conferences, electoral quotas, measures against violence

against women, and age of women’s policy agencies. Attendance of states to those

conferences is not a suitable indicator, because almost all participated in some way

or another. Introduction of strong electoral quotas or changes in law in order to

fight against violence against women are topics which gained momentum in the

1990s and 2000s, but not in the formative phase of women’s policy agencies in the

1970s and 1980s.

The age of the first women’s policy agency created by a particular state may

contribute to explain current variation in institutional architecture. Currently

there are two problems. Firstly, data about the creation of women’s policy agencies

in various sources are not reliable. Secondly, the various sources do not encompass

all states.

3.4.2 EMERGING CONTEXT: Bloc Participation

The second possible explanation comes from the array of the emerging context of

institutional architecture. The initial phase of establishing a new sort of structure

3For instance section H in the Beijing Platform for Action (BDPA 1995, 84-89).

46

is crucial for its further institutional development. As there are path dependencies

which are difficult to change later on (Pierson 2000). Most states started in the

1970s and 1980s to establish their first women’s policy agency and began to build

their institutional architecture in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender

equality. In those formative years, the ideological bloc confrontation was a major

issue on a worldwide scale. There were three different groups of states: First,

second and third world. Each bloc perceives the world from its own ideological

paradigm. The differences in institutional architecture may be a legacy of the

competition of different systems in the 1980s. A particular type may not occur

in different ideological worlds. There are two further reasons why institutional

architecture as part of the area of gender equality might be influenced by this

ideological competition. All three worlds had their own vision on gender relations

and the position of women in various spaces. In the ILO an alliance of states of

the second and third world regularly pressed for further progress in legislation on

gender relations.

The three groups are understood in the sense of the ethnologists George Ba-

landier and Alfred Sauvy of 1952: First world as capitalist bloc, second world

as socialist bloc and third world as a third group in the Cold War. Third world

referencing to the third booth of France in the ancient regime (Le Monde diplo-

matique 2011[2010], 44).4 With the end of the Berlin Wall the idea of the three

worlds is definitively outdated historically as an idea to describe current systems.

However, applied to the 1980s and in the sense used here as the conglomerate of

states non-aligned to one of the two super powers during the Cold War, it may

explain some differences and similarities due to the historical coexistence of the

Cold War frame and the emergence of the global idea of women’s policy agencies.

Therefore, Hypothesis H2 is: Former members of different geopolitical blocs

have dissimilar types of institutional architecture. For the relation in the direction

a), the refutable presumption is that there seem to be an influence between bloc

participation and variation of institutional architecture. For the other direction,

b), the refutable presumption is that for none of the particular types of institutional

4This reading differs from the three world theory of Mao Tse-tung. There, the United Statesand the Soviet Union as superpowers are the first world. The underdeveloped world is the thirdworld. The second world consists of powers in between such as European states. China is partof the third world (Le Monde diplomatique 2011[2010], 45).

47

architecture there seem to be a connection with the membership of states in one

of the ideological blocs.

3.4.3 POLITY: Governmental System

The third possible explanation for the variation of institutional architecture anal-

yses the array of state polity. The polity, more precisely the governmental system

of a state, may influence its institutional architecture in women’s empowerment

and promotion of gender equality. Governmental systems may work just like a

paradigm, which delimits relevant issues and non-issues (Kuhn 1996[1962]).

Hypothesis H3 is: Different governmental systems have different types of insti-

tutional architecture. For the relation in the direction a), the refutable presumption

is that there seem to be an influence between governmental system and variation of

institutional architecture. For the other direction, b), the refutable presumption

is that there seem to be no connection between particular type of institutional

architecture and the different governmental systems, in other words; authoritarian

systems do not employ different types of institutional architecture than democratic

or aurocratic governmental systems.5

3.4.4 POLICY DIFFUSION: Organizational Neighbours

The fourth possible explanation for the variation of institutional architecture comes

from policy diffusion literature. “Policy diffusion is the process by which ‘policy

choices in one country affect the policy choices in other countries’ (Meseguer and

Gilardi 2009, 528)” (Obinger et al. 2013, 729-730).6 The content of the diffusion

process varies in size. It reaches from the spread “of broad ideas like liberalism

(Simmons and Elkins 2004) [...] to very concrete measures such as sustainable

energy portfolio standards (Chandler 2009)” (Strebel 2011, 469). Both, women’s

policy agencies and institutional architecture, are ideas. However, for the second

research question I focus on institutional architecture as states practices. Scholars

distinguish different forms of diffusion, such as inspiration, emulation, copying,

5For operationalisation and coding see subsequent sections.6Similar (Dobbin et al. 2007, 450).

48

Num

ber

Expla

nat

ions

and

Hyp

othes

es

H1

Gender

Equality

His

tory

Sta

tes

mov

ing

tow

ards

gender

equal

ity

atan

earl

ier

poi

nt

inti

me

hav

esi

milar

typ

esof

inst

ituti

onal

arch

itec

ture

.

H2

Em

erg

ing

conte

xt

of

inst

ituti

onal

arc

hit

ect

ure

For

mer

mem

ber

sof

diff

eren

tge

opol

itic

alblo

cshav

edis

sim

ilar

typ

esof

inst

ituti

onal

arch

itec

ture

.

H3

Govern

menta

lSyst

em

Diff

eren

tgo

vern

men

tal

syst

ems

hav

ediff

eren

tty

pes

ofin

stit

uti

onal

arch

itec

ture

.

H4

Policy

Diff

usi

on

Sta

tes

wit

hth

esa

me

inte

rnat

ional

orga

niz

atio

nm

emb

ersh

ipar

em

ore

like

lyto

exhib

itsi

milar

typ

esof

inst

ituti

onal

arch

itec

ture

inco

mpar

ison

wit

hnon

-mem

ber

s.

H5

Geogra

phic

al

Diff

usi

on

Nei

ghb

our

stat

eshav

eth

esa

me

typ

eof

inst

ituti

onal

arch

itec

ture

.

Alt

ernat

ive

Expla

nat

ions

C1

Eco

nom

icW

ealt

hSta

tes

wit

hco

mpar

able

econ

omic

wea

lth

hav

em

ore

sim

ilar

typ

esof

inst

ituti

onal

arch

itec

ture

.

C2

Popula

tion

Siz

eSta

tes

wit

hco

mpar

able

size

ofp

opula

tion

hav

em

ore

sim

ilar

typ

esof

inst

ituti

onal

arch

itec

ture

.

Tab

le3.

1:E

xpla

nat

ions

and

hyp

othes

es.

49

learning, acculturation, socialization, hybridization, synthesis, competition, per-

suasion and last, but not least, coercion (Shipan 2008, 840; Dobbin et al. 2007,

450; Goodman and Jinks 2004, 630; Finnemore 1993, 566; Rose 1991, 22). Due

to the absence of reliable longitudinal data on the emergence of women’s pol-

icy agencies in the covered states it is not possible (yet) to identify the forms

of diffusion. However, instances of inspiration, emulation, learning, socialization,

persuasion and even coercion are possible mechanisms for single women’s policy

agencies as well as for whole institutional architecture. The role of membership

in international organizations is crucial for a state to be exposed to such diffusion

mechanisms. Women’s policy agencies are an idea which was developed in a co-

construction from domestic and international pressure on states. States which are

members of the same international organizations may share their experiences and

influence each other in the selection and maintenance of different forms of women’s

policy agencies.

There is another reason why international organizations may play a prominent

role in the diffusion of similar institutional architecture. The empirical relevance

of the executive sector of governmental action7 makes it likely that international

learning process may play a role; as there is more international cooperation between

executive sectors than between the other sectors of state action.

The explanation explores if there are models restricted to particular interna-

tional organizations. Is there an OECD-, NATO-, or EU-model of current insti-

tutional architecture? Or, are they bound to regional organizations working for

instance in the Caribbean or in Asia? Have members of the Commonwealth of

Independent States an institutional architecture distinct from non-members? Is

there a model among former Eastern Europe states?

Hypothesis H4 is: States with the same international organization membership

are more likely to exhibit similar types of institutional architecture in comparison

with non-members. For the relation in the direction a), the refutable presumption

is that there seem to be no influence between organizational neighbourhood and

variation of institutional architecture. Hence, there are no models. For the other

direction, b), the refutable presumption is that there seem to be a certain con-

nection between particular types of institutional architecture and organizational

7Observed and discussed in the Chapters 7 and 8.

50

neighbours of states. Thus, some types are prominent by members of certain

international organizations.

3.4.5 GEOGRAPHY: Geographical Diffusion

The fifth possible explanation comes from the array of geography. The geograph-

ical location of a state may matter as “regional diffusion may play an important

independent role in state compliance with international norms” (Pegram 2010,

741). “Exchange of information, as well as competition, should be more frequent

between neighbours than between distant countries” (Obinger et al. 2013, 115).

Furthermore, “geographic proximity might matter because of greater economic

contact, cultural similarity rooted in a common history, more frequent person-to-

person contact between individuals living relatively close to one another, common

exposure to exogenous influences of various kinds, or some combination of these

and other considerations” (Fordham and Asal 2007, 36). “A common language

or a common cultural background should also positively influence transnational

communication” (Obinger et al. 2013, 115). For that it make sense to study neigh-

bouring and remote countries (Obinger et al. 2013, 117). Therefore I analyse the

geographical closeness of states. It is more likely that states which are immediate

neighbours may learn from each other due to similar structural preconditions. If

states are nearer to each other they may have the same or similar types.

Hypothesis H5 is: Neighbour states have the same type of institutional archi-

tecture. For the relation in the direction a), the refutable presumption is that

there seem to be no influence between geographical closeness and variation of in-

stitutional architecture. For the other direction, b), the refutable presumption

is that there seem to be no connection between particular types of institutional

architecture and geographical closeness of states.

3.4.6 CULTURE as an Explanation

Culture on a micro-, meso- and macro-level of a particular country could be another

area of explanations for the variation of institutional architecture. Due to several

reasons those possible explanations were not considered in the hypotheses testing,

but discussed in the following.

51

On the micro-level, culture is about bureaucratic culture and gender culture of

the bureaucracy. An institutional architecture is operating in a particular bureau-

cratic culture. There are different bureaucratic cultures or legacies of bureaucratic

cultures (Egeberg 2003; Ziller 2003; Muller 2011). A bureaucracy influenced by

for instance the legal culture of France or the United Kingdom may employ other

institutional architecture.8 In analogy to the diffusion of human rights institution

from the United Kingdom to its former colonies (Pegram 2010, 745), there might

be similar effects for institutional architecture. This explanation was not further

developed as it intersects with policy diffusion mechanisms over memberships in

international organizations like the British Commonwealth or the International

Organization of the French-Speaking World (OIF) of hypotheses H4.

The gendered character of the bureaucracy is on the micro-level as well. In

the gender regime approach of Connell the proportion of women and men in a

workplace is one variable among many. Data from the International Labour Or-

ganization (ILO) on the numbers of women and men as state employees shows

big differences worldwide. Women’s share varies between 20 and 70 per cent of

all state employees (ILO 2013). The annual data generated mainly by the labour

force survey covers only a third of my sample of states (53 states).

On the meso-level, two other possible explanations are the impact of the welfare

state environment on the institutional architecture and the influence of feminist

families of nations (Mazur 2002). With approximately 110 states the sample cov-

erage in the welfare state literature is better than for the gendered characteristics

of state administration. The feminist families of nations is available for 13 OECD-

states. The factors analysed in the RNGS-framework, such as social movements

and women’s mobilisation, were not considered for testing as my work is comple-

mentary to the RNGS-framework. Politics of social movements and their power

in a domestic political setting are relevant factors for institutional architecture.9

On the macro-level, I omit two possible explanations in the hypotheses testing;

religion and post-materialism. Both explanations are about dominant value pat-

terns of societies at large. Religion is a politicised fuzzy concept. Secularisation

as long term societal force of modernity intersects with the struggles for re- or

8C.f. family of nations (Castles 1993).9Similar (Fordham and Asal 2007, 36).

52

neo-traditionalisation by conservative and populist parties and social movements.

How does religion influence institutional architecture? What is counted as reli-

gion? Modernity clashes with religion about what? Is modernity the new religion

of the elites in politics and science and is this religion believed worldwide as Meyer

et al. (1997, 174) postulates? If women’s policy agencies are a sign of modernity

(Berkovitch 1999), how can religion, modernity and women’s policy agencies be-

come entangled for analysis? Without a clear picture of the causal mechanism,

appropriate indicators and the perspective of reliability and validity of an indicator

on a worldwide scale, I refrain from formulating a hypothesis.

The post-materialism thesis of Inglehart and Norris (2003) is the other possible

explanation on the macro-level of a whole society. Value-change is an impressive

force. Imagine under which conditions your great-grandparents, grand-parents,

and parents lived. How their relationships worked, how they prepared meals and

what was necessary to have meals differ between the generations, genders and

classes. The World Value Survey (Medrano 2010; World Value Survey 2010) entails

various questions concerning the post-materialist attitudes of individuals in a wide

range of states. The longitudinal data covers only a third of my sample of states

(55 states).

Unfortunately, the existing data do no permit the testing of all explanations

intended in the research design. I had to decide between the coverage of a sample

of around 40 well documented states and the initial sample of 151 states with a

reduced set of possible explanations due to lack of reliable data. I decided to stay

with the worldwide approach continuing the descriptive analysis of the worldwide

situation of women’s policy agencies and institutional architecture. The reduction

of the number of possible explanations tested is a reduction of the theoretical com-

pleteness. The decision for the smaller sample would have had the disadvantage

of a sample selection on the basis of available data and a higher risk of overstating

certain factors which are not significant in global comparison (acceptance error).

Nonetheless, the decision for the worldwide coverage with a reduced number of

possible explanations does not block the possibility to carry out an analysis on a

smaller sample with a broader set of explanations later on.

53

3.5 Alternative Explanations

There is a controlling array of possible explanations. Variation of institutional ar-

chitecture might be influenced by structural variables beyond the discussed above.

Two are taken into account as alternative explanations to control for sample ef-

fects: economic wealth and population size.

3.5.1 Economic Wealth

In a global comparison states have different levels of economic wealth. The com-

parative economic wealth may matter for the extent to which states deliver in-

stitutional architecture. Comparable richer states may have more institutional

architecture than states with less economic resources. Economic wealth is used as

an indicator for estimation of the principal potential of a state to have resources

for creating an institutional architecture.

Alternative Hypothesis C1 is: States with comparable economic wealth have

more similar types of institutional architecture. For the relation in the direction a),

the refutable presumption is that there seem to be no influence between economic

wealth in comparison to other nations and variation of institutional architecture.

For the other direction, b), the refutable presumption is that there seem to be no

influence of states with different economic wealth.

3.5.2 Population Size

Another structural variable which is stable over a long time is the size of the

population of a state. As well as in the case of economic wealth in a global

comparison size of the population matters for the state. If there is only several

hundreds or thousands of people in a state this state have other possibilities and

weaknesses than big states with several millions or even over one billion of people.

Alternative Hypothesis C2 is: States with comparable size of population have

more similar types of institutional architecture. For the relation in the direction a),

the refutable presumption is that there seem to be no influence between population

size and variation of institutional architecture. For the other direction, b), the

refutable presumption is that there seem to be no influence between particular

54

types of institutional architecture and various size of population.

3.6 Operationalization and Sources of Data

Selection of indicators for the five arrays covering the situation in the 151 states

and territories in the sample was not easy. Many scientific data sets do not cover

states with a population of less than 500,000 persons (e.g. (Paxton et al. 2008a;

Ulfelder 2011a; Singer and Small 2006[1994])). Those are 18 per cent of all states

and territories worldwide. I refused to exclude states with a population of less than

500,000. For a global perspective they should be part of the picture. Other inter-

esting indicators, such as gender regime or welfare state system, are not available

for such a large sample of states.

Operationalization and sources of data for testing hypotheses are given in Table

3.2. In this table the number of the hypothesis and the explanation are given in

the first and second column. The third column entails in capital letters the name

of the used indicator. The fourth column gives the original source of the used data.

For Gender Equality History (H1) a set of different indicators were used to

capture the various time lags in a worldwide comparison. The focus was on in-

dicators of political participation. As those have a more direct relation to the

establishment and maintenance of women’s policy agencies than indicators con-

cerning for instance changes in marriage legislation, citizenship status or measures

against violence against women. The ratification of CEDAW was taken as a fur-

ther indicator because there it entails an obligation for states to take action such

as the maintenance of women’s policy agencies.

55

Initially, I intended to operationalize Bloc participation (H2) on my own over

indicators such as participation in the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in the

1980s (NAM 1983, 172-177). However, the measurement validity of this indicator

(Adcock and Collier 2001) was critical. Furthermore some states were multiple

defined (e.g. Cuba in second and third world) and for many cases there were

no data (incomplete coverage). Therefore, I coded every state from a coloured

map of Kaspar et al. (2009, 277). The four colours for the third world (newly

industrialised countries, oil-exporting countries, medium developed countries and

least developed countries) were summarised to third world. For Governmental

System (H3) data from Polity IV Project were used (Marshall et al. 2012). Of the

used sample they do not cover in particular territories and not all states.

For the Policy Diffusion (H4) a wide range of memberships in international

organizations and Human Rights Treaties were employed. An initial set of indica-

tors gave the situation for 2010 (Ulfelder 2011b) and for 1990 (Wejnert 2007b) for

organizations abandoned after the end of Berlin Wall. I lost trust into the accuracy

of those merged data in the working process.10 Consequentially, I decided to enter

membership for all international organizations and Human Rights Treaties anew

and on my own, according to information about memberships on the websites of

the organizations in question. Beside the reestablishment of trust there were two

additional advantages of the new data. First, all states of the analysis were now

covered with this data. Second, I could be sure that the data are accurate because

I coded all states and territories not indicated as members as not members. In the

original data it was possible that a particular state is member of an international

organisation, but as this state is not covered by the sample the information that

this state is a member was not available in the data set.

Geography (H5) was tested visually on a world map of political entities (MSF

2010) depicting also small states. The map is organised in the dominant way of

Europe and Africa in the central perspective. Search for a less Europa-centric

world map with for instance Latin America or Asia at the central perspective was

unfruitful. Visualisation on the used map was carried out by hand with different

10I recognised a serious corruption of the data; it was no longer clear if a particular value iscorrectly attributed to a particular state. Going back to the original data did not restore thetrust. On account of this I lost trust into the accuracy of the original data.

56

No.

Hyp

othes

esIn

dic

ator

Sou

rces

(Op

erat

ional

izat

ion)

DE

PE

ND

EN

TV

AR

IAB

LE

ST

yp

esof

inst

ituti

onal

arch

itec

ture

TY

PE

SU

ND

AW

dat

a(2

011)

,or

igin

ally

IND

EP

EN

DE

NT

VA

RIA

BL

ES

H1

Gen

der

Equal

ity

His

tory

HIS

TO

RY

ICP

SR

2434

0(2

003)

,N

CH

R(2

009)

H2

Blo

cP

arti

cipat

ion

BL

OC

Kas

par

etal

.(2

009,

277)

H3

Gov

ernm

enta

lSyst

emR

EG

IME

Pol

ity

IVd

(201

1)H

4P

olic

yD

iffusi

onM

EM

BE

RS

ICP

SR

3054

1(2

010)

;IC

PSR

2044

0(1

990)

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57

highlighters. The map tool of SPSS is not equipped with a mapping showing all

island states of my sample. Furthermore, its colouring is not visible enough to

transport the spatial information, as the entities are too small.

There are various indicators to measure economic wealth of a nation in com-

parison to other nations. There is a scientific debate around better measurements

than the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Due to the need of coverage

of most of the 151 states and territories I selected the gross national income (GNI)

per capita. In comparison to GDP, it has the advantage that it also includes re-

mittances11, which can account for a large part of circulating money in developing

states. GNI was used in the version of purchasing power parity (PPP), instead of

just in US Dollars.12 To account for volatility and measurements mistakes in the

data I took the ten years mean for the latest available time period (1999–2008).

Population size was treated in the same way, by taking the ten years mean for

1999–2008.

3.6.1 Coding

The Tables 3.3 and 3.4 indicate the coding of the various indicators. The second

column gives the threshold values for the different coding. The dependent vari-

able institutional architecture is coded along the comprehensiveness of the types,

which will be explained in detail in the Section 6.2. The state administrative-

legislator-judiciary-advocacy type is the most comprehensive type. Type Zero is a

type of institutional architecture with the smallest possible number of sectors of

governmental action.

H1, H3, and H4 were answered with recoded data from existing scientific data

sets (Paxton et al. 2008b; Marshall et al. 2012; Ulfelder 2011b; Wejnert 2007b; Cali

2009). H2 was tested with data from Kaspar et al. (2009, 277), which I processed.

H5 was tested visually on a world map, without taking further data into account.

The alternative hypotheses C1 and C2 were tested with recoded World Bank data

11“Net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) fromabroad” (World Bank 2013a).

12“(GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An interna-tional dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States”(World Bank 2013a).

58

Categorised UNIVSFFRGStates granting suffrage rights to all women at same time period1 = early movers (until 1940) 2 = mass (1941–1981)3 = late (1982–2010)4 = until now (1995), no women’s suffrage

Categorised UNIVSTANDStates granting all women right to stand for elections at same time period1 = early movers (< 1941) 2 = mass (1941–1981)3 = late movers (> 1981)4 = until now (1995), women are not allowed to stand for election

Categorised FRSTMPStates having first female elected to parliament at same time period1 = early movers (1900–1939) 3 = historical (1990–1999)2 = mass (1940–1989) 4 = late mover (2000–2009)5 = until now (2004), no woman became Member of Parliament

Categorised FRSTPRESStates having first female elected president at same time period1 = early (before 1990) 2 = later (from 1990 on)3 = until now (2000), no female president

Categorised FRSTPMStates having first female elected prime minister at same time period1 = early (before 1990) 2 = later (from 1990 on)3 = until now (1998), no woman became prime minister

Categorised FRSTPRLMTStates having first female elected head of parliamentary body at same time period1 = early (before 1990) 2 = later (in 1990s)3 = until now (2000), no woman became president of parliamentary body

Categorised CEDAWStates ratified CEDAW at same time period1 = Ratification between 1980 & 1988 2 = Ratification between 1989 & 20003 = Ratification between 2001 & 20104 = signature, no ratification (not yet member of CEDAW)5 = until now (2013), no signature, no ratification (not member of CEDAW)

Table 3.3: Coding of various indicators of Gender Equality History (H1).

59

(World Bank 2013b).

Recoding of data signify that the original data were grouped into two to five

categories. The grouping into categories was already a feature of the original data

for H2 (first, second and third world) and H4 (member and not member). The

Polity IV data for H3 were recoded into governmental regime along a suggestion of

one of its authors (Marshall and Cole 2011, 11). Instead of their five categories13

only three (democracy, anocracy, and autocracy) were employed. The seven in-

dicators for H1 were recoded into pioneers, mass, late comers and if necessary

not comers. The threshold values for the grouping were set on the basis of the

distribution over time (end 19th century to end of 20th century). Note the var-

ious indicators for gender equality history end in the 1990s and 2000s. They do

not cover the latest developments until 2012. The indicators for C1 and C2 were

grouped into three groups: small, medium and large. The threshold values were

set on the basis of the distributions. The List on page xvii at the beginning of this

thesis specifies the names of all tested indicators sorted alphabetically.

131 = Full Democracy (Polity = 10); 2 = Democracy (Polity = 6 to 9); 3 = Open Anocracy(Polity = 1 to 5); 4 = Closed Anocracy (Polity = -5 to 0); 5 = Autocracy (Polity = -10 to -6).

60

Indicator Values of Variable (threshold value)

DEPENDENT VARIABLEInstitutional ArchitectureTYPE

1 = state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type (Type ELJO),2 = state administrative-legislator-judiciary type (Type ELJ),3 = state administrative-legislator-advocacy type (Type ELO),4 = state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type (Type EJO),5 = SWO-governed type (Type O2),6 = state administrative-legislator type (Type EL),7 = state administrative-judiciary type (Type EJ),8 = state administrative-advocacy type (Type EO),9 = legislator-advocacy type (Type LO),

10 = exclusively state administrative type (Type E),11 = exclusively legislator type (Type L),12 = exclusively advocacy type (Type O),13 = type zero (Type Zero)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLESBloc Participation

BLOC1 = first world,2 = second world,3 = third world

Governmental System

REGIME1 = democracy (polity: between 10 and 6),2 = anocracy (polity between 5 and -5),3 = autocracy (polity between -10 and -6)

Policy Diffusion

MEMBERS1 = member in particular int. organization,0 = not member (30 international organizations)

ALTERNATIVE VARIABLESEconomic Wealth

WEALTH

1 = small (<2,000),2 = medium (2,000 ≤ x < 10,000),3 = large economic wealth (≥ 10,000)(10 years mean GNI p.c., PPP, current international Dollar)

Population Size

POPULATION1 = small (<1 million),2 = medium (1 ≤ x < 60 million),3 = large population (≥ 60 million)(10 years mean Population, total)

Table 3.4: Coding of dependent and independent variables.

Chapter 4

Methods and Data

This chapter has four sections. The first section gives an overview over the used

methods and the research process. The second section describes the construction

of the initial data. Section three discusses the selection of the data and how they

were processed in order to have a precise data set for analyses. Section four gives

an overview about the reporting behaviour of states.

4.1 Mixed-Methods for Different Parts

This study used an integrated mixed-methods approach to reach a more complete

understanding (McBride and Mazur 2010, 43) of specific state capability. The

long-term goal beyond this study is to develop an empirically based theory of the

structural abilities of states to provide state feminism. The methods vary for the

two research questions. The first question was mainly answered inductively and

the second more deductively.

The first research question – the variation of specific state capability – was

answered with the development of a classification of different forms of women’s

policy agencies, a new definition of women’s policy agency, two typologies of insti-

tutional architecture and the description of the empirical distribution of women’s

policy agencies and institutional architecture in a worldwide perspective. The sec-

ond research question was answered by testing various possible explanations in the

form of hypotheses.

62

Classification of women’s policy agencies has been generated through an in-

ductive approach on the basis of a secondary analysis of nominal cross-sectional

empirical data. The situation of women’s policy agencies between 2007 and 2010

in the member states of the United Nations was analysed in an extensive research

design. The classification is based on the various states’ current understanding of

their women’s policy agencies from interpreting their synthesised answers to a sur-

vey sent out 2009 by the UN Division for the Advancement of Women (UN DAW)

(Jahan 2010, 2-3; UN DAW 2009). Information about existing entities were pro-

cessed qualitatively in a non-linear way of theorizing (Ackerly and True 2010, 80),

consisting of iterations between coding entities in SPSS, making sense of data by

conceptualizing relevant theoretical dimensions and entities and developing graph-

ical representations.

In accordance with the non-linear approach, the process included recurring

phases of reflection on conceptual development (Ackerly and True 2010; Goertz

and Mazur 2008, 14-43) as well as counter-factual thought experimenting (Ragin

and Sonnett 2005) to make sense of what states regard as their women’s policy

agencies. The recurrent questions were: What are the guiding visions of the terms?

How should data look like if the guiding visions of the terms hold? What visions

of the world do the data give? Do those visions differ and how? These contin-

uous critical reflections lead to a deeper conceptual understanding. The earlier

discussed definition of a women’s policy agency was developed during this process.

Empirically, a typology of current state capability in women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality was built over the formal combination of different

forms of women’s policy agencies in a particular state.

The second research question was answered by testing hypotheses of five arrays

and a controlling array. By applying the perspective of complex causality seven

relations were tested. The answers of the first research question were used to

construct the dependent variables. Its specification is given in the Chapter 3.

Hypotheses testing served two purposes. Firstly, it was applied to separate

between possible explanations explaining part of the variation and possible expla-

nations which do not. Secondly, hypotheses testing was applied as a guide for

better understanding of data. When the data revealed patterns other than the

one suggested in the hypotheses, those other connections were discussed to obtain

63

a more complete understanding. The hypotheses were tested with various sources

of aggregated data.

4.1.1 Three Major Parts in the Research Process

The research process consisted of three major parts: the development of the new

classification of women’s policy agencies on the basis of empirical data and the

original classification by Jahan (2008; 2010), the building of the new typology

of institutional architecture on the basis of the formal combination of different

forms of women’s policy agencies, and the testing of hypotheses about the possible

explanation of the patterns of variation of specific state capability. The first and

the second part were overlapping. The third part followed after the completion of

the other two.

Classification of women’s policy agencies and typology of institutional archi-

tecture were built on the current understanding of states of their capacity in the

women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality by synthesising from

their answers (Tavares da Silva 2010; Abdurazakova 2010; Fernos 2010b;a; SDD

2010; Jad 2010). There were already theoretical dimensions in those data. States

reported to UN Division for the Advancement of Women along a particular clas-

sification, the one of Jahan (2008). As will be shown in Chapter 5 earlier classifi-

cation schemes have some strengths and weaknesses (assumptions and conceptu-

alizations). By criticising existing classification schemes and by carving out their

existing theoretical dimensions it became more visible what scholars and states

consider as state capability in the area of women’s empowerment and promotion

of gender equality policies.

4.1.2 Various Data Sets for the Different Parts

Four data sets were created in the research process. Data set zero contains the

merged data taken together from the tables of the five published regional reports

(Tavares da Silva 2010; Abdurazakova 2010; Fernos 2010b;a; SDD 2010; Jad 2010).

Those cleaned data were transferred to data set one. Reported entities were coded

(labelled) in data set one. In general no further data were considered for the

coding. The exceptions are states which may have employed a particular form of

64

women’s policy agency; a State-run Women’s Organization (SWO).1 To identify

those states data from the Freedom House Index were applied. Data set one entails

for each entity detailed information about location, mandate, name, activities and

other dimensions. The classification (Section 5.2) and the analysis of the empirical

existence of different forms of women’s policy agencies (Chapter 7) are based on

data set one.

For data set two the data of data set one were aggregated on state level. Data

set two encompasses for each state the number and forms of women’s policy agen-

cies in the four sectors of governmental action. Data set two was used to build

the typology of institutional architecture. Chapter 8 entails the analysis of the

empirical relevance of the various types of institutional architecture. Data set two

delivered the dependent variables for testing the hypotheses of the explanatory

part of the dissertation.

Data set three contains the data for the hypotheses testing in addition to the

information of data set two. Sources of the aggregated data are given in Chapter

3. Testing of hypotheses took place in data set three. The results are given in

Chapter 9.

4.2 Construction of Original Data

Data for assessing current state capability in women’s empowerment and pro-

motion of gender equality come from the UN Division for the Advancement of

Women (UN DAW).2 Beside a lot of other topics UN Division for the Advance-

ment of Women published several studies about women’s policy agencies (UN

DAW 1998a;b; Jahan 2005; UN DAW 2005). Those publications were escorted

by meetings of experts for discussions of further perspectives. The latest source

of data come from five reports published 2010 and 2011 (Tavares da Silva 2010;

Abdurazakova 2010; Fernos 2010b;a; SDD 2010; Jad 2010; Jahan 2010).

Those regional reports entail detailed tables on the situation in the states cov-

1For further details see Section 5.2.2.2United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (UN DAW) was an organization

inside the United Nations. In 2010 UN Division for the Advancement of Women became part ofUN WOMEN.

65

ered. The 2010 data of UN Division for the Advancement of Women are the most

comprehensive in respect to coverage of states and up to date for the purpose at

hand. It is the first time that such extensive data has been made available; older

reports (2004, 1998) did not provide similar data (UN DAW 2005; 1998a). UN

Division for the Advancement of Women reports that comprehensive data inde-

pendent from national governments are not available yet (Jahan 2008, 28; Jahan

2010, 4).

4.2.1 Survey Data

My data come out of an research project of UN Division for the Advancement of

Women and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN

DESA) taking place from 2009 to 2012 (UN DAW 2010b). The focus of the United

Nations research project is on strengthening existing women’s policy agencies (UN

DAW 2010a; Jahan 2010). At the beginning of their project stood a survey sent

2009 to all member states of the United Nations. The answers of the states to

the survey were conditioned into six regional reports and one synthesising global

report (May 2009–March 2010). That implies that my analysis took place parallel

to the United Nations research.

Those reports became realised by UN Division for the Advancement of Women

(today UN Women) in cooperation with the five regional commissions of the

United Nations (UN); the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), UN Eco-

nomic Commission for Europe (ECE), UN Economic Commission for Latin Amer-

ica and the Caribbean (ECLAC), UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia

and the Pacific (ESCAP) and UN Economic and Social Commission for Western

Asia (ESCWA), and with financial support of Italy.

66

4.2.2 Survey Question

The questionnaire consists of eight questions.3 The relevant question for the

typology is question one4:

“Question 1:

Please list all bodies that are national mechanisms for gender equal-

ity, within the legislative, executive and judicial branches, as well as

independent/advisory bodies. Please provide information about the

mandate, roles/functions, structure, location and resources of each of

the bodies listed. [Note: Information already provided in the response

to the Beijing + 15-questionnaire does not need to be repeated.]” (UN

DAW 2009, 2)

In addition, the questionnaire entails further explanations for all questions (UN

DAW 2009). The information for question one is: “Question 1 seeks basic

information about all bodies that are recognized as national mechanisms

for gender equality” (UN DAW 2009, 2).5

The interesting entity is the women’s policy agency, or in the words of the

United Nations, the ‘national mechanisms for gender equality’. A particular struc-

ture is defined as women’s policy agency if it is recognised as such by state actors.

This definition was formulated in a similar way in earlier studies (Jahan 2005, 3).

Criteria are substantiated by the proliferation of a working definition of ‘national

mechanisms for gender equality’:

“For purposes of this study, the term ‘national mechanisms for gen-

der equality’ is understood to include those bodies and institutions

3Question two to eight are about the interaction of institutional architecture with other stake-holders, possibility of institutional architecture to influence national goals and how do politicalwill, obstacles, opportunities, effectiveness of institutional architecture look like in view of gendermainstreaming (UN DAW 2009, 2-4). Answers to the seven other questions are not relevant forthe dissertation project. It has to be noted that the willingness of states to deliver informationto the question two to seven declines after the first question (Jahan 2010, 4, 22, 68). Dissertationis not affected by this data gathering problem.

4Emphasis and brackets in the original.5Emphasis in original.

67

within different branches of the State (legislative, executive and ju-

dicial branches) as well as independent, accountability and advisory

bodies that, together, are recognized as ‘national mechanisms for gen-

der equality’ by all stakeholders. They may include, but not be limited

to:

• the national machinery for the advancement of women within Govern-

ment (e.g. a Ministry, Department, or Office. See paragraph 201 of

the Beijing Platform for Action)

• inter-ministerial bodies (e.g. task forces/working groups/commissions

or similar arrangements)

• advisory/consultative bodies, with multi-stakeholder participation

• gender equality ombud

• gender equality observatory

• parliamentary committee” (UN DAW 2009, 2).

The working definition has two parts. On the one hand, it specifies what

structures are covered by the survey. On the other hand, it includes an explicitly

open list of different sorts and locations of women’s policy agencies.

4.2.3 Processing of Survey Data by UN and States

The original data were created in the interaction of states and the United Nations.

The UN Division for the Advancement of Women questionnaire was sent to the

national lead agencies in June 2009 (UN DAW 2009). Within two months states

should report all their current women’s policy agencies (UN DAW 2009, 2). States

have been served with a list of possible forms of women’s policy agencies (Jahan

2008, 18). The member states of the United Nations had to provide their answers

to their regional economic commission by August 2009 (UN DAW 2009, 2). The

regional economic commission summarized the answers of the states into six re-

gional reports (Tsikata 2010; Tavares da Silva 2010; Abdurazakova 2010; Fernos

2010b;a; SDD 2010; Jad 2010). Each of the five regional economic commissions of

the United Nations; UN Economic Commission for Africa, UN Economic Commis-

68

sion for Europe,6 UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean,

UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, and UN Economic

and Social Commission for Western Asia) employed a local consultant to prepare

one of those synthesizing regional reports.

Next to the state answers to the questionnaire the consultants used desk infor-

mation like previous studies, and other United Nations sources (Jahan 2010, 4).

All consultants of the regional studies indicate that they used additional sources,

such as other questionnaires, analysis and for specific information contacts with

experts in the field (Jad 2010, 7; SDD 2010, 5; Fernos 2010b, 7; Abdurazakova

2010, 6; Tavares da Silva 2010, 6).7 Mentioned sources are answers to a ques-

tionnaire which was sent out around at the same time to report progress in the

framework of Beijing +15 (Jahan 2010, 4, 68).8 There was a close interlinking

between this study and the time schedule of Beijing+15 and the establishment of

UN Women out of the previous United Nations structures specializing in women’s


Member states were invited to comment on the findings of the regional reports

(Jahan 2010, 3-4; UN DAW 2009; UN DAW 2011a). With this consultation phase

states could intervene if they did not agree with their representation in the reports.

An executive summary of the global synthesis report was discussed by the UN

Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) on 11 March 2010 in commemoration

of the 15th anniversary of the adoption of the Platform for Action of the Forth

World Women’s Conference hold in Beijing (UN DAW 2011a). Since January 2011

also five of six regional reports are available for a wider public (Tavares da Silva

2010; Abdurazakova 2010; Fernos 2010b;a; SDD 2010; Jad 2010).

What do those data tell? States reported what they regard as their women’s

policy agencies. The data are self-declarations of the states. States were even

consulted if they agree with their representation in the regional reports. Out

of this particular step I conclude that those data indicate the perception of the

6The UN Economic Commission for Europe delivered two regional reports. One about Eu-ropean states (Tavares da Silva 2010) and one about states in South-East and Eastern Europe,Caucasus and Central Asia (Abdurazakova 2010).

7Speculatively, possible reasons might be: lack of answers, lack of information and translationproblems.

8States do not have to report the same information twice. The Beijing +15-questionnaire isalso mentioned in question one, under note (UN DAW 2009, 2).

69

states of their women’s policy agencies at their disposition. It is not possible to

know from those data, if those structures exist only on paper. Nonetheless, taken

together for every state those women’s policy agencies are the current institutional

architecture.

4.3 Selection and Processing of Data

The next section describes my selection and processing of data and gives reasons

for the exclusion of 46 of 52 African states from further analysis.

Usually the continuous text of the regional reports contains basically vague

statements about the situation in single states. Due to avoidance of shaming this

imprecise form is common for United Nations reports dealing with judgments over

the efforts of states. In addition to the continuous text of the regional reports there

are large table sections providing information about women’s policy agencies in

single states. Those tables (Tavares da Silva 2010, 68-80; Abdurazakova 2010, 58-

74; Fernos 2010a, 3-31; SDD 2010, 77-112; Jad 2010, 63-67) were employed as the

main source of data for this dissertation. It is assumed that the data in the tables

of the regional reports are more reliable because of the higher precision than the

continuous text.

4.3.1 Transfer and Merging Data

The processing of data entailed four stages. First of all, the whole content of

the tables was transferred into SPSS. That was stage one. For this the 95 pdf

pages with tables were transferred into Excel with the program pdf2excel. From

Excel the single pages were transferred into SPSS by copy paste. The content of

data was not altered in this transfer stage. However, orthographical issues were

harmonised, such as whitespace, upper and lower case and exclusion of unnecessary

signs. Smallest entity in data set zero is a single women’s policy agency per row.

Women’s policy agencies of one state are grouped together along their mentioning

in the sources.

In the same stage the transferred content of the different regional reports were

merged into one data set. The quality of reports varies. Especially, the UN Eco-

70

nomic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) and the UN Economic

Commission for Europe (ECE) provided imprecise information in tables. The Eu-

ropean states provide mainly the names of their women’s policy agencies. Columns

and rows as an ordering principle of tables vary. Regional reports used different

dimensions to represent their data, which hampers the comparability of the data

beyond regions. This caused difficulties in the process of merging the data into

one data set (incongruent data).

The transfer and merging stage took place between January and April 2011.

In the end, data set zero contains 900 rows for 202 states and territories. Those

data were copied to data set one.

4.3.2 Cleaning Data and Adding Further Details

The second stage consisted of cleaning of data (expansion, reduction and checking)

in data set one. If states reported more entities than the initial rows indicated,

then further rows were included (expansion).9 Reduction involved the elimination

of duplicates. Checking encompasses the consultation of secondary source of in-

formation to cure lack of information or add further details on affiliation, location,

mandate, activities or name. For all states it was checked if their named entities

exist in the current directories (UN DAW 2010c;d; 2011b; 2006).

Those directories are mainly a list of address of the main national bodies in

gender equality and women’s policy. They include between one and six entries

per state. The main source was the directory of March 2010 (UN DAW 2010c).

The directory of May 1996 (UN DAW 2006) was usually outdated in view of the

ones of 2010 (UN DAW 2010c;d). The directory of February 2011 (UN DAW

2011b) was consulted. To represent the situation before the Arab spring of March

2011 information from the directory of February 2011 UN DAW (2011b) were

not included if there were changes in comparison to the directories of 2010 (UN

DAW 2010c;d). The used data give an impression of the situation of permanent


equality at the end of the first decade of the 21st century (2007–2010). With the

use of the directories a considerable number of entities became added to the data

9This happened when an entry (row) entails details about more than one entity.

71

set one. In a small amount of ambiguous cases the named entities were searched

on websites of the particular state. In this step of cleaning and adding further

details the number of rows amounted to over 1,000 for 202 states.

4.3.3 Coding Entities and Controlling Activities

The third stage was the coding phase. Smallest entity in data set one is a single

women’s policy agency per row. The new coding scheme – the new classification

of different forms of women’s policy agencies – was developed in data set one.

Every entity received a label. Those labels were attributed detached from the

classification of Jahan (2008: 8; 2010: ii, 22, 24) and other classifications discussed

in Chapter 5. After several rounds of labelling there were more than 200 different

labels. This step was necessary to familiarise myself with the data and to explore

possibilities to name structures.

In several rounds of coding those labels where reduced to twenty, eighteen and

in the end thirteen labels. The new classification of women’s policy agencies was

developed in the intense interaction between data, labelling, theoretical reflection

on the dimensions of the coding scheme, the single categories and the graphical

representation of those data. Developing and application of the coding scheme on

data set one took place between April and July 2011.

There were several controlling activities to make the data more reliable. After

coding all entities, I tested this coding scheme with an interdisciplinary group

of gender researchers (literature, geography, history, and sociology). They were

provided with a randomised sample of 35 entities and the classification system.

Their feedbacks went into further development of the coding scheme.

For a considerable number of states there is no information available in the

tables of the reports. Therefore, I decided to consider the information about single

states from the continuous text provided by a simple word search. This was a time

consuming activity. For all states the corresponding regional report was searched

if the continuous text names women’s policy agencies in connection with the name

of the state. For instance with the search word ‘Monaco’: ctrl + F, Monaco. If

there are entities in the environment of the word ‘Monaco’ they were included in

the data set one.

72

By considering the entities in the continuous text the number of states having

reported to the United Nations could be enhanced and the number of found entities

increased to 1,200. Data quality improved especially in the case of the states of

the region of UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean

(ECLAC) and UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA).

The last controlling activity was a complete intra-coder reliability check. A

year after completed initial coding, I recoded the entire data set once again using

the new classification. By this third step inconsistency over the whole set of 1,200

entities were reduced.

At the end of this cleaning and controlling data stage followed the exclusion of

entities which are not regarded as permanent and specific structures of the state

designated to women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality along the

definitions specified in Chapter 1. 776 rows were remained and went into data

set two. Entities which were left out in this process (around 35 per cent of data

set one) were analysed in the Section 5.3 from page 111 on. Additional details to

coding procedure and categorisation of different entities are given in Appendix A

in Section 9.9.1.

4.3.4 Clustering and Failed Methods

The last stage in the construction of data was the aggregation of the data of data

set one to data set two. All women’s policy agencies of one state in data set one

were summarised in data set two into one row containing the information about

all women’s policy agencies of this state. The smallest entity (row) in data set two

is a single institutional architecture of one state. Data set two has been created

by the automatic procedure CASESTOVARS in SPSS. This algorithm enables to

restructure information in data set one from cases to variables. Data set two is

the essential set for building the typology of institutional architecture on the basis

of their composition of women’s policy agencies.

It was planned to cluster the nominal cross-sectional data of data set two with

the aid of clustering algorithms (CLUST) of SPSS into types. In this fourth stage

classification software would have had the function of an auxiliary mean. It would

not deliver the finished answer. It would have to be interpreted along theoretically

73

meaningful dimensions. It was planned that the number of types is not a priori

determined by theoretical considerations (Sodeur 1974). The number of types

should come from the empirical data. Same or similar formal compositions of

women’s policy agencies were meant to cluster together into the same type.

However, the clustering by SPSS did not deliver meaningful results. The de-

veloped classification with eighteen different forms of women’s policy agencies was

too detailed. Clusters were unstable.10 An alternative procedure by classification

algorithms (CHAID and QUEST) was even less convincing. Those algorithms

allow building trees of similar and more distant entities.11

In the end, the conceptual importance of the four sectors of governmental action

has been taken serious.12 Those dimensions were already built in the classification

of women’s policy agencies of Jahan (2008, 18): executive, legislative, judiciary

branch of governments and entities outside public administration. The used data

were already marked by the separation of powers (see question one page 4.2.2). The

number of different forms of women’s policy agencies was reduced to 13 different

forms. Then, typology was built over the occurrence of different forms of women’s

policy agencies in the four sectors of governmental action. With this conceptual

approach a conceptually meaningful typology appeared.

Notwithstanding, the recognition of the dominant dimension in the data altered

the character of the empirically generated typology to an empirically-conceptually

generated typology. The number of types was assigned with the selection of the

four sectors of governmental action as privileged dimension of the typology.

4.3.5 Exclusion of almost all African States

The regional reports give information on overlapping sets of states. Therefore, it

was not visible from the beginning that there was not enough information about

African states. Furthermore, in principle the regional study on Africa states is

10E.g. the alphabetical sorting of cases from A to Z and from Z to A delivered completelydifferent typologies.

11Their focus on the most frequent forms of women’s policy agencies was not able to provideconceptually meaningful results. Focus on degree of empirical relevance makes little statementsabout conceptual importance. Especially, in the case of a large number of small frequencies.

12I thank Dr. Klaus Edel of the research helpdesk of the University of St. Gallen for thisadvice.

74

promised to become published later on (UN DAW 2011a). During coding it became

clear that I cannot wait until the African report is published, nor that there is

enough reliable information about African states over the other regional reports.

There are other sources on Africa: two directories (UN DAW 2010d;c) and an

address list (NGM-net Africa 2008). These first two were tested for usage in the

data set. Usually, they entail only information about one or two entities per state

in Africa. The purpose of the directory is to name the main contact point for the

United Nations. Therefore, the directories provide in most cases one, rarely two

and very seldom more entities per state. As a consequence, the data set entails

for African states usually only one or two women’s policy agencies per state. It is

unlikely that this data represents the whole institutional architecture in Africa.13

The use of older data for African states (NGM-net Africa 2008) was another re-

jected option, as this source entails even less information than the directories. Per

state it entails mainly the national leading mechanism.

This poor and unreliable quality of those data lead to the complete exclusion

of all African states which are not covered in the five published regional reports.

For 46 of 52 states, there are no reliable published data available comparable to

the other regions.

As a further consequence of this exclusion the global claim of the dissertation

to compare current state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion of

gender equality on a global level has to be narrowed down to a comparison of

all states on five continents and the limited number of six cases (Algeria, Egypt,

Libya, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia) on the African continent.

This set-back in the access to data does not signify that African states have

no specific state capability. Not at all, it only indicates that the collected data

about current women’s policy agencies and institutional architecture on the African

continent (Tsikata 2010) are not accessible until now (July 2013). Further research

may have the chance to give a detailed account on the situation of African states

in comparison to other states and regions.

The reported numbers of women’s policy agencies in cases beyond the African

13For instance: A case study about Uganda exhibits (situation 2000) at least five differentspecific structures: a ministry, two commissions, a directorate and a department (Kwesiga 2003,207). Whereas data set one knows only from two entities; a ministry and a minister.

75

continent have a certain tendency to gravitate to one, two or three as well. My data

may underestimate the effective number of women’s policy agencies a state has at

its disposal (cf. Subsection 4.4.1). Out of caution towards the completeness of the

data I declare that the size of the phenomenon might be bigger than estimated

in this work. The picture outlined in this work can be considered as the minimal

base what states employ.

4.4 Quality of States Reporting

The reports of the United Nations do not actively name which states reported to

the United Nations survey and which ones did not. One can speculate why such

information are lacking. For example: the information seems to have political

repercussions (shaming).

Various Reporting Number Percentage

Not reporting states 13 9Over reporting states 84 56Total 151 100

Table 4.1: Reporting behaviour of states.

However, it was possible to identify the quality of the state’s reporting in

comparison with another source of information. The next section discusses varying

relevance of non-reporting and over reporting. As can be seen in Table 4.1 the

numbers of cases varies between these two categories.

4.4.1 Non-Reporting

From my sample of 151 states nine per cent of states did not report to the United

Nations survey. Not reporting entails that their names do not occur in any of

the tables or in the continuous text in connection with a women’s policy agency.

On the one hand, this amount seems to be rather small. On the other hand,

every tenth case is a substantial share. The 46 states on the African continent

excluded from analysis due to lack of published data could be added to those 13

76

non-reporting states. Then, it would be a share of almost 30 per cent of states14

about which there is no information in the United Nations survey. That is a

significant reduction of the population of cases. Unfortunately, this reduction is

inevitable due to circumstances beyond the control of the author.

Table 4.2 gives the states which did not report. Especially one name is note-

worthy: the United States of America did not report to the UN Division for the

Advancement of Women survey. The other non-reporting states are mainly small

(island) states from Central America and Europe.15

Region State Number of States

Asia 1Palau

Africa 46Europe 4

Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San MarinoCaribbean 6

Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Grenada, SaintKitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent andthe Grenadines

South America 1Guyana

North America 1United States

Total 59Without Africa 13

Table 4.2: Non-Reporting states in original data.

Due to the prominent role of the United States of America in world politics and

in gender equality on the international level its lack of reporting was corrected by

considering another source of information. For the US, the most topical published

case study (Outshoorn and Kantola 2007, 246-265) was considered. This supple-

ment by older data changed the picture from three entities to eighteen entities (12

1413 + 46 = 59. 59/202 = 29.2%.15It is a serious understatement when UN Division for the Advancement of Women wrote:

“Information generated by the regional studies, again, underscores the limitations of empiricaldata and lack of independent evaluation of the functioning of national mechanisms. Not allcountries responded to the Beijing + 15 and the supplementary questionnaires” (Jahan 2010, 4).

77

considered women’s policy agencies, 6 excluded women’s policy agencies (mainly

subnational ones) and 3 dismantled women’s policy agencies). This was the only

full exception of the rule to use basically UN Division for the Advancement of

Women data.

For the 12 other non-reporting states the directories (UN DAW 2010c;d; 2011b;

2006) delivered information about women’s policy agencies. For those states fur-

ther analysis is based on the information provided by the directories. Note, those

data may underestimate the specific state capability in those states.

Furthermore, this analysis of non-reporting states shows that published case

studies may deliver more women’s policy agencies, than the directories and the

regional reports. However, it is unclear to what extent the women’s policy agencies

delivered by case studies are still operational at the time of the publication of the

research. As a conclusion for all cases, the reported entities have to be regarded as a

bottom line estimation of the number of women’s policy agencies and institutional

architecture instead of what states have actually at their disposition.

4.4.2 Over Reporting

The picture is quite different in the case of over reporting. Over reporting is when a

state reports entities which are not regarded as women’s policy agencies according

to the used definition. For instance unspecific entities like the Ministry of Finance

or the office for family affairs.16

It is widespread to report unspecific or non-permanent entities. 84 states or 56

per cent of all cases in the sample reported at least on entity which does not fall

under the definition of a women’s policy agency as a permanent and specific state

structure designated to women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality.

A reason for this pattern could be that states try to appear in a better light

by having more entities than there are really in the area of women’s empowerment

and promotion of gender equality. To ensure proper data, the coding scheme was

applied rigorously.

Table 4.3 gives the names of the over reporting states. In comparison to the

number of states in the various regions there is an even share of over reporting

16The full list of excluded forms are discussed in Section 5.3.

78

Reg

ion

and

Cas

esN

o.P

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egio

n

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a37

74%

Afg

han

ista

n,

Aust

ralia,

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amb

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ook

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nds,

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rgia

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aysi

a,M

aldiv

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rones

ia,

Mar

shal

lIs

lands,

Mon

golia,

Nep

al,

New

Zea

land,

Pak

ista

n,

Pal

au,

Pap

ua

New

Guin

ea,

Philip

pin

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Russ

ia,

Sam

oa,

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gap

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omon

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nds,

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orea

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aji

kis

tan,

Thai

land,

Ton

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lu,

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and

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Eu

rope

2862

%A

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ra,

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ria,

Bel

arus,

Bel

gium

,C

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zech

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mar

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onia

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atvia

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ithuan

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ta,

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ania

,Slo

vakia

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and

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mer

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417

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Iran

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esan

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es(w

ithou

tA

fric

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dth

eir

shar

ep

erre

gion

.

79

in all regions. Asia and Europe have the largest shares of over reporting states,

while Central and South American states have a much smaller share. There are

two possible interpretations for this difference. Higher numbers of over reporting

might be an effect of higher numbers of reported entities. Or it is an effect of the

implementation of the concept of gender mainstreaming and a certain benchmark

pressure to report more entities.

80

Part II: Conceptual Adaptation

for a Global Comparative

Framework

81

Chapter 5

Identify Women’s Policy Agencies

This chapter suggests a new way to identify women’s policy agencies on a global

level. The first section reviews existing ways of distinguishing different forms of

women’s policy agencies. The second section gives a detailed account of every form

of women’s policy agency in the new classification. The third section shows the

boundaries of the used sample and explains why 35 per cent of all entities were

excluded from further analysis. The last section introduces visualizations of the

new classification and discusses further institutional development.

5.1 Distinguishing Women’s Policy Agencies

In any case, it is not so easy to categories women’s policy agencies (McBride Stet-

son and Mazur 1995, 4). Sometimes there is no need to distinguish different forms

of women’s policy agencies, because for the particular research purpose there is no

added theoretical gain by going more into detail and separate different forms of

women’s policy agencies. In those cases, the literature makes references to diversity

of women’s policy agencies only for illustrative purposes. In contrast, in research

practice there are mainly two forms of women’s policy agencies under study: the

entity in a ministry and the ministry designated to women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality. Squires goes even as far as to argue that it is the

state of the art of research not to distinguish between different forms of women’s

policy agencies (Squires 2007, 66-67). However, even when both forms of women’s

82

policy agencies are studied, they are usually analysed without discussing their dif-

ferent abilities and weaknesses coming from the form. In contrast, this dissertation

studies the combination of different forms of women’s policy agencies to capture

specific state capability. Hence, the separation of different forms of women’s policy

agencies as the smallest possible entities of institutional architecture is crucial.

There exist different ways to distinguish forms of women’s policy agencies.

The following subsection reviews eight classification systems (McBride Stetson

and Mazur 1995, 311; McBride and Mazur 2010, 48, 52-57; Berkovitch 1999, 163-

164; Testolin 2001, 9-25; Goetz 2004, 2-3; Sawer 2004, 2-7; Squires 2007, 34; Jahan

2008; 2010). The forms of women’s policy agencies vary on all those lists (Squires

2007, 34; McBride Stetson and Mazur 1995, 4). Purposes and addressees of those

lists vary as well. There is a variety of potential addressees of those lists: member

states of international organizations such as the United Nations or the Council of

Europe, and scientific research communities in world sociology, gender studies, and

political science. That signifies that those classifications are applicable in various

contexts and for different research questions.

5.1.1 Different Ways of Distinguishing Forms of Women’s

Policy Agencies

Those lists are reviewed along their historical emergence from the mid 1990s to

2008. Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 display the different categories of the reviewed classi-

fications. The different sectors are marked by grey-, respectively white-shadowing.

Entities on the same line are comparable over the different classifications. Enti-

ties on rows between black lines are of similar form. The last column gives the

respective entity in the new classification. Those tables are applicable to identify

comparable entities in different classifications.

RNGS’s First Categorisation: The Applicable Work-in-Progress List

The earliest reviewed list of different forms of women’s policy agencies is from the

initial book of the Research Network on Gender Politics and the State (RNGS)

(McBride Stetson and Mazur 1995) setting the further research framework for the

decade to come. Addressees are scientists in social sciences and practitioners. It

83

is a work-in-progress list of different forms of women’s policy agencies. The list is

conceptualized and applied in this initial book.

McBride Stetson and Mazur (1995, 311) distinguish five forms of women’s pol-

icy agencies. There are no women’s policy agencies in the legislative assembly

and in the judiciary. Instead, there is a clear focus on different forms of agencies.

There are three sorts of women’s policy agencies with agency in the name; Inde-

pendent Agency, Agency Within a Department, and Equal Employment Agency.

Those three are separated from each other by their ascribed area, their degree of

autonomy of the executive and their location within public administration.

From the reviewed classifications this is the most detailed list on agencies in

particular. It is less detailed on other forms. There are gaps between the distin-

guished women’s policy agencies. For instance is there no women’s policy agency

with a coordinating function between different entities of the state. This is a side

effect of the methodological decision of researchers in the Research Network on

Gender Politics and the State to focus their analysis on one, or in rare cases, two

women’s policy agencies per state. In this framework, a coordinating entity is less

likely to count as the most relevant women’s policy agency per state in a particular

policy debate in comparison to an independent agency or a ministry.

RNGS’s Second List: The Conceptually Enlarged List and its Restricted

Application

One and a half decade later, in the capstone book of the Research Network on

Gender Politics and the State, there are eight forms of women’s policy agencies

(McBride and Mazur 2010, 48). Now, judiciary and legislative branches of govern-

ment are locations for women’s policy agencies as well. Addressees are scientists

in social sciences and practitioners. With Sections in Political Parties there is

an entity beyond the border of the state counted as women’s policy agency. It

is named quasi-WPA (McBride and Mazur 2010, 54-57). Comparison with the

initial list of women’s policy agencies at the beginning of the Research Network

on Gender Politics and the State decade shows that there is even a residual cate-

gory in the capstone book. In conclusion, there is a conceptual enlargement in the

understanding what sorts of entities are women’s policy agencies.

84

Are

aM

cBri

de

Ste

tson

an

dM

cBri

de

an

dM

azu

rB

erkovit

chT

esto

lin

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Mazu

r1995:

311

2010:

48

1999:

163–164

2001:

9–25

2014

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85

However, in the further discussion of the book only five categories are con-

sidered: Ministry, Administrative Office, Commission in the Political Executive,

Advisory Council, and Section of Political Party (McBride and Mazur 2010, 52-57).

The two entities in the legislative (Legislative Council) and judiciary (Judiciary

Body) branches of government receive little empirical attention. In brief, the en-

largement did take place only on the conceptual level.

In contrast, the inclusion of all sectors of governmental action as possible lo-

cation of women’s policy agencies is an important feature of my newly developed

classification of women’s policy agencies.

Berkovitch’s List: Less Focus on Forms than on Phenomenon as Such

The list of Berkovitch (1999, 163-164) entails even less forms of women’s policy

agencies than the lists reviewed above. Distinguishing different forms of women’s

policy agencies is less the focus of Berkovitch, than establishing the phenomenon

of women’s policy agencies as a relevant issue on a global scale. Addressees are

scientists in world sociology and practitioners. In this list, women’s policy agencies

occur only in the executive sector of governmental action. This was already com-

mon in the lists of the Research Network on Gender Politics and the State. The

wording of the forms of women’s policy agencies is consistent and parsimonious.

The newly developed classification was inspired by this wording.

Testolin’s List: Wide Range of Heterogeneous Forms

Completely on the other end of the spectrum is the list of different forms of Testolin

(2001, 9-25). She names thirteen forms of women’s policy agencies in three sectors

of governmental action (executive, legislative and judiciary). The goal here is to

show members of the Council of Europe that women’s policy agencies can occur

in all sectors of governmental action and that there is a wide variety of different

forms. Furthermore, this list is for practitioners and policy activists. In addition,

this list is the only list including minister as a separate category. This classification

system entails two non-permanent women’s policy agencies: Working Group /

Special Committee and Working Group in Parliament. It is not visible if the list

of Testolin is complete in the sense that it entails all existing WPA forms.

86

Are

aG

oet

zS

aw

erS

qu

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Jah

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2008:

18;

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2004:

2–3

2004:

2–7

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34

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87

My newly developed classification separates on a detailed level between Minis-

ter and Ministry. As it was specified in Subsection 1.1 the dissertation will focus

mainly on permanent women’s policy agencies.1

Goetz’s List: Small List with Perspective from Within

A more compact list is given by Goetz (2004, 2-3) in the frame of an expert meet-

ing of the United Nations. Addressees are practitioners within the United Nations

cosmos and policy specialists. She distinguishes four forms based on their function:

Advocacy or Advisory Unit, Policy Monitoring Unit, Unit with Implementation Re-

sponsibilities and Commission with “Oversight” and Investigation Powers. There

is little prescription of the location of the first entity, the Advisory and Consulta-

tive Bodies. The strength of this list, beside its parsimony, lies on its focus on the

power dimension of such entities. The perspective is from a position within the

public administration specifying the abilities of those women’s policy agencies.

Sawer’s List: Small List with Perspective from Outside

At the same United Nations expert meeting another list (Sawer 2004, 2-7) was pre-

sented taking the whole system into account. Addressees are practitioners within

the United Nations cosmos and policy specialists. The list does not separate dif-

ferent forms of women’s policy agencies in the executive sector of governmental

action. Instead, they are subsumed under the fuzzy heading Mechanism within

Government. Under the lists with few entries Sawer’s list is the one which takes

entities in the legislative branch of government and in the judiciary into account.

Furthermore, the list entails an entity outside the state: non-governmental organ-

isations.

As it was specified in Subsection 1.1 the newly developed classification focus

on the state structures. Non-governmental organisations are by definition not part

of the state.

1It is an effect of the mode of creation of the newly developed classification of women’s policyagencies that it encompasses all forms, which states regard as women’s policy agencies.

88

Squires’ List: The Most Parsimonious List

The most parsimonious list is the one of Squires (2007, 34). She distinguishes three

forms of women’s policy agencies. However, the categories are rather broad: Unit

within Governments with Advisory, Monitoring, or Implementation Responsibili-

ties ; Statuary Commission; and Advisory and Consultative Body (Squires 2007,

34, citing Goetz 2004: 2-3 and Sawer 2004: 2-7). Addressees are scientists in

gender studies and social science. Formal structures are less the focus of this list.

More at the centre are the possible abilities of women’s policy agencies. In this

respect, the list goes more into detail than the one of Sawer (2004).

Jahan’s List: The Most Extensive List

The most extensive list of women’s policy agencies is the one of Jahan (2008;

2010). She distinguishes 16 different forms of women’s policy agencies (also visible

in Table 5.4 at page 97). She even has two categories for women’s policy agencies

beyond the national level: Regional Equality / Gender Structures and Municipal-

ity / Local Equality Structures. The list entails innovative distinctions such as the

separate category of a Unit in the Office of the Head of Government or the Insti-

tute (mainly available in Latin American states). In the judiciary there are four

different categories. There is even a separation between Complains Committee

and Equality Authorities / Tribunal. This is the most detailed list in the judiciary.

Addressees are practitioners within the United Nations cosmos, policy specialists

and social scientists.

On this list there are inconsistencies in the wording of different forms of women’s

policy agencies. Most labels contain no information on the programmatic target

of the entity, such as ‘gender’ or ‘equality’. However, some have. Furthermore, it

is unclear why sometimes a form has only gender and in another case only equality

or equal opportunity as prescription.

The newly developed classification applies a wording without prescribing the

programmatic content. The area of action is circumscribed with the broad term

‘women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality’.

89

5.1.2 Critique of Existing Lists of Forms

of Women’s Policy Agencies

All eight ways of categorisation used in prior research encompass open lists of

different forms of women’s policy agencies. In contrast to complete, open encom-

passes that they are flexible for changes; new forms of women’s policy agency may

be added and those women’s policy agency sorts who have ceased to exist can be

eliminated from those lists without major changes.

The comparison of the eight prior categorisations reveals a disparity between

the forms included as well as concerning their names. Only two sorts of women’s

policy agencies can be found in all categorisation: some form of ministry and

the commission. Differing number of women’s policy agencies sorts can be de-

tected within the three sectors of governmental action: While the various forms of

women’s policy agencies located in the executive branch and public administration

are described in great detail, there are smaller numbers of women’s policy agency

sorts in the legislative and judiciary branches of government and their descrip-

tions are vaguer. With vaguer naming is implied for instance: parliamentary body

versus equality ministry.

Finally, these categorisations reveal discrepancies when dealing with temporary

organizations such as working groups and special committees, with subnational

organizations such as regional and municipal agencies, as well as non-governmental

organizations or groups such as sections in political parties, trade unions and non-

governmental organisations.

However, over the last decade categorisations have become more detailed. In

particular, the legislative and judiciary branches of government became settings

for women’s policy agencies. Still, there remains variation of density over the four

sectors.

Hidden Assumptions in Prior Classifications, Research and

in State Reporting

The comparative analysis of the eight categorisation schemes exposes various hid-

den assumptions between the researchers and the states reporting their women’s

90

policy agencies. The four hidden assumptions are: core administration, outside

orientation, specificity and permanency. All four hidden assumptions influence

what is considered as a women’s policy agency.

First of all, all forms of categorisation are based on the assumption that

women’s policy agencies are linked to the core administration of a state. Agen-

cies with policy implementation functions have been ignored. Such as: women’s

shelter providing space for victims of gendered violence or information centres for

women’s rights. Why it is assumed that there are no organizations designated with

these tasks? That has not been discussed or justified by the eight categorisations.

Such organizations have just not been taken into account.2 This hidden consensus

is deep-seated. It is so resilient that even the development of a new system of cat-

egorisation has not lead to a change of the dominance of the core administration

assumption.

The second hidden assumption is manifest through the absence of forms of

entities working for the state as an employer in the area of women’s empowerment

and promotion of gender equality. Examples of such entities would be, employees’

commissions dealing with wage discrimination and other gender equality relevant

issues, ombud persons dealing with cases of sexual harassment, or gender equality

controllers verifying compliance with gender equality policy. On the one hand, one

may argue that such duties are mainstreamed into unspecific permanent structures.

On the other hand, the complete absence of such employers’ entities in all states

is as unlikely as that all are mainstreamed. Another possible explanation could

be the tendency in the scientific community to separate discussions dealing with

policy procedures that occur within and those outside of public administration.

Such a conceptualization would generate two arenas and accordingly two sorts of

gender equality specialists, both employed by the state. The ‘insides’ work as

an organization for the state as an employer, which has to fulfil aims of gender

equal treatment of the employees and citizens. The ‘outsides’ work for the general

public, meaning a state wants to achieve policy goals for society and citizens.

However, are the ‘inside’ agencies only of interest for organizational literature and

2Existence of some field offices are mentioned by McBride and Mazur (2010, 53-54, 57) as partof ministries, administrative office and women’s policy agencies at subnational level. Howevernot as entities in their own right.

91

business studies, while ‘external’ agencies are the concern of political and social

scientists? In the empirical data of the UN Division for the Advancement of

Women none of the states involved reported a single instance of an ‘inside’ entity.

Thus, this division of perspectives is to be found both at the conceptual level of

classifications developed by researchers and gender equality experts alike as well

as in the discourse of the reporting states. This conceptual separation intensifies

the influence of the first assumption. Its bias on the data was not bridgeable. The

new categorisation system had to follow this second assumption, because there is

in the used data no information about internal agencies.

The third assumption is the distinction between unspecific and specific struc-

tures designated to deliver women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equal-

ity policies. Regarding the conceptual level, all the named sorts of women’s policy

agencies are specific entities. Nevertheless, in the UN Division for the Advance-

ment of Women data, states also reported a large number of unspecific entities,

such as for instance: Ministry for Social Affairs or Minister of Finance. The implicit

consensus among reporting states seem to include unspecific entities as women’s

policy agencies. This inconsistency in categorisation systems provided by scholars

and the less than uniform framework of reporting states has been solved in the new

classification system offered here by justifying the distinction between unspecific

and specific and clarifying the criteria for entity attribution. Only specific entities

are counted as women’s policy agencies (see Section 1.3).

The last hidden assumption is the distinction between temporary and perma-

nent structures. In this case the older categorisation systems are less stringent.

Some also include temporary entities (Testolin 2001; Jahan 2008; 2010). The new

classification system is supposed to provide a framework to identify long-term

structures; the overall picture could be obscured by temporary entities. Therefore,

temporary entities have been excluded explicitly from the definition of women’s

policy agencies. My categorisation system is the first attempt to define perma-

nency and specificity as implicit assumption and justifying such an approach.

92

5.2 The Classification of Different Forms of

Women’s Policy Agencies

This section describes the new way of identifying different forms of women’s policy

agencies by the new classification. The section has two subsections. The first

subsection compares the new classification with previous ones, while the second

defines for each category which sort of entities where classified in this category.

5.2.1 The New Classification in Comparison

In this subsection the classification as a whole is discussed. It is visible in Table

5.3. The introduced classification system entails 13 different forms of women’s

policy agencies. The thirteen different forms of women’s policy agencies are not

substitutable by another one. In other words, states employ currently a range of

13 different forms of women’s policy agencies.

Both new and particularly significant for this new categorisation, is the sep-

aration of women’s policy agency sorts along the four branches of government:

executive (E), legislative (L), judiciary (J), and outside (O). The sector ‘outside’

(O) stands beside the three primary branches of government and covers entities

which are not attributable to one of the three primary branches of government.

The short name of each form of women’s policy agency consists of the capital letter

of the sector and a number.

As can be seen in Table 5.3, the thirteen different forms of women’s policy agen-

cies are evenly distributed across those four sectors of governmental action. In the

executive sector of governmental action (E), there are four and in the other three

sectors (L, J, and O), three different forms of women’s policy agencies. In com-

parison to the other categorisations, the system discussed here demonstrates also

a more consistent depth of conceptualization given that each sector encompasses

between three and four forms of women’s policy agencies.

The sectors are of equal importance. Each sector is a relevant dimension of

state action which cannot be substituted by another sector. The executive sector

is listed as the first sector because it includes one form of women’s policy agencies

93

Sector

Short

Form

Form

ofW

omen

’sP

olicyA

gencies

Short

Descrip

tion(fu

nction

alpurp

ose)(E

,L

,an

dJ

hierarch

icallyord

ered)

Execu

tive

Bra

nc h

E

E1

Unit

inT

opL

evelG

overnm

ent

Entity

part

oftop

levelof

governm

ent

E2

Min

istryor

Min

isterM

inistry

orhigh

levelresp

onsib

leE

3U

nit

ina

Min

istryE

ntity

inM

inistry

E4

Coord

inatin

gB

ody

Work

sw

ithin

and

beyon

dad

min

istrationL

egisla

tive

Bra

nc h

LL

1C

omp

etence

Cen

treL

eg.A

ssembly

Exp

ertisefor

Legislative

Assem

blies

L2

Legislative

Com

mittee

Focu

ssedsp

ecialisationL

3L

egislativeC

aucu

sN

etwork

forw

omen

(’sissu

es)Judicia

lB

ranch

JJ1

Hum

anR

ights

Body

Profession

al,gen

eralfo

cus

judiciary

J2

Equality

Auth

orityP

rofessional

orlay

person

sju

diciary

J3

Work

ing

Grou

pin

Judiciary

Exch

ange

and

structu

ralch

ange

Outsid

eof

Prim

ary

Bra

nch

es

OO

1C

omm

issionA

dvisory

and

/or

advo

cacyO

2State-ru

nW

omen

’sO

rganization

State

controlled

wom

en’s

organization

O3

Mon

itoring

Body

Know

ledge

generation

Tab

le5.3:

Thirteen

diff

erent

forms

ofw

omen

’sp

olicyagen

ciesin

four

sectorsof

governm

ental

action.

94

more than the other three sectors and due to its empirical significance in the data.3

However, even though the executive sector is listed first in Table 5.3, conceptually

it is not more important than the other sectors.

Contrary to the non-hierarchical relations perceived between the sectors, the

categories of within each of the three primary branches of government (E, L and J)

are ordered hierarchically along the location of the entity in the state apparatus.

This hierarchy within a particular sector is also an implicit feature of Jahan’s

classification system (Jahan 2008). In the tables of the five reports (Tavares da

Silva 2010; Abdurazakova 2010; Fernos 2010b;a; SDD 2010; Jad 2010), the most

powerful or hierarchically highest form of women’s policy agency is listed first

and the less important entities afterwards. In the course of developing a new

classification system, the attempt was to order the different forms of women’s

policy agency explicitly according to their hierarchical location.

Innovations of the New Classification System

This new method of classification differs from other existing categorisations in

several respects, especially, in comparison to the one of Jahan (2010; 2008) (see

Table 5.4). The several modifications concern the sectors as well as the categories

within the sectors.

Regarding the sectors of governmental action, I have 1) renamed one of the

sectors, and 2) eliminated the subnational level. Firstly, the Outside sector (O) is

comparable to the dimension ‘Autonomous Bodies’ used by Jahan. It was devel-

oped to take into account that the degree of independence from governing executive

may vary to a large extent in a worldwide perspective. However, the dimension is

renamed to be less determinate concerning the entity’s independence from the top

level of power.4 Second, the new classification of women’s policy agencies analyses

3Further details are given in Chapter 7. Other categorisations give even more weight to theexecutive sector (Jahan 2010; McBride and Mazur 2010; Jahan 2008; Squires 2007; Goetz 2004;Sawer 2004; Testolin 2001; Berkovitch 1999; McBride Stetson and Mazur 1995). The greatersignificance of the executive sector found in the data may be influenced by the UN Division forthe Advancement of Women data gathering process; the survey addressees encompasses peoplemainly employed in the executive branch of government, which are the customary first pointof contact used by the UN Division for the Advancement of Women when dealing with nationstates.

4There are no information in the data about the extent of each entity’s independence.

95

only entities at national level. The subnational dimension occurring in the classi-

fication of Jahan was preliminary eliminated in the new classification for reasons

of data reliability in relation to reporting subnational entities.5

There are significant changes on the level of individual categories. Several new

categories have been introduced, while others have been combined. There are four

new categories, one additional category for each of the four sectors of governmental

action: Minister (E2), Competence Centre in Legislative Assembly (L1), Human

Rights Body (J1), and State-run Women’s Organization (O2). Only one of these

categories is genuinely new in the sense that it reflects a new trend that has evolved

in many states over the last decade: the Human Rights Body (J1). The other three

categories have been discussed elsewhere in the literature, although they were not

included in Jahan’s classification. They were added to my classification because

they surfaced from the data as a result of my different method of analysis. Hence,

they represent a conceptual gain of the inductive approach.

Three categories of Jahan’s classification (Ombudspersons Offices, Equality

Authority/ Equality Tribunal/ Equality Boards and Gender Equality Complaints

Committee/ Advocacy or Equal Opportunities) were combined into a single cate-

gory of women’s policy agencies, the Equality Authority (J2). The reason for this

was that I had found little theoretical difference between the three in the general

perspective of the new classification and in the course of the analysis it became

increasingly difficult to make a clear-cut assignment of the entities to one of the

three categories.

Finally, entities which do not fulfil the requirement of permanent and specific

state structures in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality have

been excluded from further analysis (see Section 5.3).

Strength and Limits of the New Classification

This new classification of women’s policy agencies has several strengths: It is more

accurate for the purpose at hand, the global comparison of the entirety of women’s

policy agencies at the end of the first decade of the 21st century. Conceptually, it

5Systematic coverage of subnational level is needed to analyse the highly complex and diver-sified subnational level (McBride and Mazur 2010, 57). Illustrative: McBride and Mazur (2010,58-60).

96

I.N

ati

onal

Level

Sta

nd

alon

em

i nis

try

Unit

inth

eoffi

ceof

the

hea

dof

gove

rnm

ent

Execu

tive

Bra

nc h

Div

isio

n/d

epar

tmen

tin

am

inis

try

Inte

rmin

iste

rial

/inte

rdep

artm

enta

lst

ruct

ure

sF

oca

lp

oints

/wor

kin

ggr

oups

inline

min

istr

ies

Legis

lati

ve

Bra

nc h

Com

mit

tees

/com

mis

sion

sC

aucu

ses/

net

wor

ks

Hori

zonta

lO

mbudsp

erso

ns

office

sA

ccounta

bilit

yE

qual

ity

Auth

orit

y/

Equal

ity

Tri

bunal

/E

qual

ity

Boa

rds

Inst

ituti

ons

Gen

der

Equal

ity

Com

pla

ints

Com

mit

tee/

Advo

cacy

orE

qual

Opp

ortu

nit

ies

Com

mit

tees

/W

orkin

gG

roups

wit

hin

the

Judic

iary

Inst

itute

sA

uto

nom

ous

Bodie

sE

xec

uti

veco

unci

ls/c

omm

issi

ons

Obse

rvat

orie

s/m

onit

orin

gce

ntr

es

II.

Dece

ntr

alize

dL

evels

Reg

ional

equal

ity/g

ender

stru

cture

sM

unic

ipal

ity/l

oca

leq

ual

ity

stru

cture

s

Tab

le5.

4:C

lass

ifica

tion

ofw

omen

’sp

olic

yag

enci

esby

Jah

an(2

008:

18,

2010

:ii,

22,

24).

97

is more explicit regarding the borders of specific state capability; more specifically,

the borders between unspecific and specific state structures, between temporary

and permanent as well as between the categories themselves.

The definition of women’s policy agency was rigorously applied; 35 per cent of

reported entities were excluded from analysis. 776 entities were coded as women’s

policy agencies; only five entities did not fit into my classification of different forms

of women’s policy agencies (0.6%).6 All other entities were attributed to one of

the listed 13 different forms.

Nevertheless, this new classification has at least three weaknesses, which ul-

timately stem from the used database. Although subnational entities became

popular in state practice and feminist research in the last decade (Tavares da Silva

2010, 11-13; Vickers et al. 2013) they had to be excluded from analysis due to un-

systematic states’ reporting. Subnational women’s policy agencies can be added

to the framework if reliable data are delivered in future research. The same applies

to the many excluded African states (46 cases). As long as there remains poor

data quality or no access to data the analysis does not cover the overall situation

on the African continent.

Another weakness is the lack of data about resources states attribute to their

institutional architecture as a whole or to individual women’s policy agencies. The

United Nations survey explicitly asked for such information in question one (UN

DAW 2009, 2). Nonetheless, there is almost no information about the financial

resources in the regional reports.7 Some reported number of staff (persons) others

reported the financial expenditure for a women’s policy agency or for the sector as a

whole.8 Such information is indispensable for global comparisons. However, there

seems to be a consensus among states not to deliver such information which goes

beyond rhetorical support of women’s empowerment and gender equality. Lack

of accountability to resource endowment mirrors an almost global brotherhood of

little willingness of states to make a real effort. Remaining silence over resource

6Those conceptually interesting entities are discussed in more detail at page 118.7Only a small number of states (27 of 151 = 18%) delivered analysable information about

resources either in general or for particular women’s policy agencies.8In my view, good data would entail: number of employees (persons), number of full time

equivalent (effective positions), financial means for projects, financial means for each women’spolicy agency, state spending to the whole sector, state expenditures in general (all financialindicators in US-Dollar adjusted for purchasing power).

98

endowment is part of a global blueprint of current state capability in women’s


5.2.2 Different Forms of Women’s Policy Agencies

This section describes the different forms of women’s policy agencies as a grid of

categories to classify empirical entities. Women’s policy agencies are part of a

new gender project of the state, mainly inspired by liberal and reform feminism

(Lorber 1997). Each of those forms of women’s policy agencies is one form of

answer to particular problems within a gendered state. The classification was

developed inductively from existing data (see Section 4.2). The data mirrors the

view of states.

Previous to the circumscription of each category is a short introduction why

a particular sector of governmental action is relevant for women’s empowerment

and promotion of gender equality policies.

Executive Branch of Government (E)

The executive branch of government is busy with daily decisions; it is implement-

ing political decisions into real life of people. Details are filled in where top level

of executive branch and the legislative branch of government have decided the

big guidelines. Why is the executive branch of government relevant for the ad-

vancement of women and promotion of gender equality? In all those decisions over

details and implementation works there are spaces of discretion in line with gender

equality or against.

E1 Unit in Top Level Government The category Unit in Top Level Gov-

ernment contains women’s policy agencies which are an integral part of the “core

executive, which comprises ‘all those organizations and procedures which coordi-

nate central governmental policies, and act as the final arbiters of conflict between

different parts of the government machine’.” (Muller 2011, 142, citing Rhodes

1995: 12). In my view, the core executive includes the head of state, president,

cabinet or government, and head of government. For instance: the women’s policy

agency could be a division of the office of the president. Such an entity is needed

99

to provide the highest level of government with expertise. It may intervene in

situations where issues embrace gendered dimensions or particular decisions could

deteriorate gender relations. If such an entity is at a strong or weak place in the

governmental system as a whole has to be determined in the individual case.9 The

framework provides only the category for further analyses.

E2 Ministry or Minister The category Ministry or Minister entails two dis-

tinct entities. Since they virtually occupy the same hierarchical level in the exec-

utive branch of government, they have been combined to one category. An entity

is classified as Ministry or Minister if it has the features of one of both. The head

of a ministry is the minister. The category includes (deputy) ministry, (deputy)

general secretariat, (under) state secretariat, (deputy) minister, (under) state sec-

retary, and (deputy) secretary general. This category does not make a distinction

between standing alone ministry (e.g. Women’s Ministry), mixed ministry (e.g.

Women’s Affairs and Social Affairs) and buried ministry (e.g. Finance, Church

and Gender Equality). Furthermore, it does not distinguish by name between

priority of women and / or gender equality issues and other issues.

A ministry is the largest possible entity in women’s empowerment and pro-

motion of gender equality in the state administration pertaining to the numbers

of employees and scope of influence. The number of employees can range from

several dozen up to several hundreds. Other classification systems, with the ex-

ception of Testolin (2001), do not include the minister as a category; however, the

states themselves mentioned ministers, sometimes in conjunction with the min-

istry, sometimes alone. From the perspective of the output of such structures,

there is a hierarchy. One or several ministers working on women’s empowerment

and promotion of gender equality policies are the minimum. More output can be

expected from a whole ministry than from a single person. Most can be expected

from both working together.

9An entity in the office of the head of state may have less influence in a parliamentary systemthan in a presidential system. While a similar entity in the office of the prime minister may havemore impact in a parliamentary system than in a semi-presidential system.

100

E3 Unit in a Ministry An entity within a ministry consists of at least one

person. A wide range of entities are combined under the category Unit in a Min-

istry : department, directorate, agency, centre, office, secretariat, division, section,

sector, institute, machinery, ministerial unit, focal point10, representative, or am-

bassador. Unit in a Ministry is the smaller entity than the Ministry or Minister.

The Unit in a Ministry is often incorporated into the formal chain of command

operating remote from the top level of the ministry. However, it can be a staff

section (Stabsstelle) as well.

It may provide and distribute knowledge (advice and advocacy), intervene in

the framework of the ministry in its area of expertise, and – if it has been given

that particular authority – it may transgress the organizational boundaries of

the ministry and intervene in the decision-making processes of other ministries or

interact with the general public. The category Unit in a Ministry is ultimately the

residual category for an entity which does not fit anywhere else in the executive

branch of government.

E4 Coordinating Body A Coordinating Body is an entity coordinating women’s

empowerment and promotion of gender equality policies between representatives

of similar or various organizational entities. An entity is categorised as Coordinat-

ing Body if two or many more representatives come together to work continuously

on issues of women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality. Confer-

ences which meet only once or twice a year and do not maintain an administrative

office at all times are excluded from this category because they do not fulfil the

permanency requirement. Entities of the category Coordinating Body can assume

different roles11 and be thematically focused12. The extent to which the state

actually controls these agencies has to be determined in the individual case.

A Coordinating Body can include representatives from other women’s policy

10Gender mainstreaming focal points are included alongside focal points with other targetswithin the area of women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality

11Public role (watch dog), professional role (defence of decent working conditions for femocratsand gender equality representatives), facilitating knowledge transfer (e.g. sharing informationabout experiences in working with a specific tool or a certain environment), tactical role (coor-dination, cooperation, division of labour, avoidance of multi-lane activities) or strategically role(pushing into same direction in a coordinated manner).

12E.g. violence against women or trafficking in women and girls.

101

agencies of the same form as well as from other forms of women’s policy agency

or unspecified entities. Furthermore, it can consist of a small number of represen-

tatives beyond the mentioned entities.13 However, if the entity members mainly

originate from interest groups and civil society organizations and only a few rep-

resentatives from other agencies or governmental organizations, then the entity

is categorised as a Commission. Coordinating Body is the second choice of cate-

gory if an entity does not fulfils the requirement for Commission (O1) and can be

assigned neither to E1 through E3, nor does it belong to the entities excluded.

Empirically, the category Coordinating Body challenges two aspects of per-

manent and specific state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion of

gender equality: state and permanent. If a state reports the existence of a Co-

ordinating Body this was considered as proof for its state quality. If there is no

compelling information indicating that the entity is temporary, it is considered as

permanent.

Legislative Branch of Government (L)

The legislative branch of government decides over long lasting issues for the po-

litical community as a whole. It regulates living together by reaching binding

decisions about laws and political actions in a certain state and beyond. Why is

the legislative branch of government relevant for the advancement of women and

promotion of gender equality? The legislative branch decides about the form of

laws, about financial flows of states (revenues and expenditures) and special pro-

grams. It can bring new forms of discrimination into being and it can eliminate

or sanction existing discriminations in law and state practices.

L1 Competence Centre in Legislative Assembly A Competence Centre

(CC) in Legislative Assembly is an entity working for members of parliamentary

assembly or for the parliamentary process as a whole. It can document a wide

range of legislative assembly members with relevant material on women’s empow-

erment and promotion of gender equality, such as members of the parliamentary

13From academia, civil society organizations, members of parliamentary assemblies, interestgroups as well as representatives from subnational entities, focal points from (private) enterprisesand persons nominated and delegated by the state to this structure.

102

assembly, committees, or speakers. Furthermore it can make contact with experts.

It can monitor aspects of the parliamentary process (e.g. speaking patterns of

members of parliamentary assembly, or financial flows) and provide advice to var-

ious groups. It can also work as a controlling or monitoring instance designated

to block discriminating laws and programs or delivering the key documents in the

area of women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality such as gender

inequality audits and gender budgets.

The category Competence Centre in Legislative Assembly is a completely new

category of women’s policy agencies added by empirics in the development of the

new classification. There is no similar category in Jahan’s classification (2008,

18); nor is it mentioned in any of the other categorisations systems (Jahan 2010;

McBride and Mazur 2010; Jahan 2008; Squires 2007; Goetz 2004; Sawer 2004;

Testolin 2001; Berkovitch 1999; McBride Stetson and Mazur 1995).

Hence, the emergence of the empirical taxonomy produced unanticipated re-

sults. Using any other classification system, this form of women’s policy agency

would most likely be overlooked because of its small number.

L2 Legislative Committee A Legislative Committee is an entity in a parlia-

mentary assembly. It may have the responsibility to initiate, draft, discuss, and or

recommend issues of women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality in

the parliamentary process. This may be done in the framework of a general com-

mission14, as a specialist committee15 or as a specialist body reviewing work of the

parliamentary assembly on its impact on gender inequality. Committee is used as

the generic term for committee, commission, council and board. No distinctions

are made between “committees” and subunits of committees (e.g. sub-committees)

in the parliamentary assembly.16

The specificity criterion is applied with less rigour to this category than in

the executive branch. Even the Commission for Social Policy and Family would

qualify as specific, since ‘family’ is exceptionally among the terms that fall under

14Such as foreign affairs, social policy or taxation system.15E.g. violence against women, women and politics, gender equality in social politics.16The Sub-committee on the Comprehensive Act on Gender Violence, which represents a

specialist sub-committee is categorised under Legislative Committee; another example is theConsultative Commission for Social Emancipation in Chamber of Representatives.

103

key words associated with the women’s empowerment and promotion of gender

equality focus. The denominators human right, minorities and citizen qualify as

well. Nevertheless, exclusively social affairs as well as social policy are both not

specific enough as common denominators to qualify an entity as a women’s policy

agency.

L3 Legislative Caucus A Legislative Caucus is a network of female members

of parliamentary assembly or a network of parliamentary assembly members inter-

ested in or assigned to women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality

policies, or a combination of these options. Such a network can exist officially or

informally. Both varieties are taken into account as long as other criteria also hold

true. A network restricted to one fraction of the parliamentary assembly or to one

party would not be included in this category because they lack state quality.17

A Legislative Caucus differs from a Legislative Committee with regards to mem-

bers, function and institutional integration. A Legislative Caucus can be comprised

of members of cabinet and administration, researchers, civil society representatives,

and even members from other parliamentary assemblies. Usually, only few of the

members are not in the parliamentary assembly. This form of women’s policy

agency may take an active role in public affairs.18

A Legislative Caucus could be a small, but irreducible vessel within the parlia-

mentary assembly if there are no other structures for women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality. It may provide moral as well as real support (tacit

knowledge). It may be a network working against or alongside the traditional old

boys’ network in the state and public administration.

Judiciary Branch of Government (J)

Judiciary is the sector of governmental action which deals with legal conflicts

between different interests. It is a mean for conflict resolution, adjusting and

updating inequalities, enacting and implementing laws. It may do justice. It

may remedy violations of rights and it may take authoritative decisions. Why

is the judiciary relevant for the advancement of women and promotion of gender

17States did not report such networks in the analysed data.18For instance, recommending candidates for government or evaluating drafts.

104

equality? Historically, the judiciary proofed to be a relevant area for fights for the

advancement of women and the promotion of gender equality. It also proved to be

a setting of considerable resistance against more equal relations between sexes and

genders, i.e. non-introduction of women’s right to vote by new interpretation of

the constitution in Switzerland (cf. Bigler-Eggenberger (2003); Bigler-Eggenberger

and Kaufmann (1997)).

J1 Human Rights Body A Human Rights Body (HRB) is an entity for juridical

treatment of violations of human rights. Its members are highly specialised profes-

sionals and internationally well-connected to global discourses of human rights. It

decides lawsuit related to human rights. As women’s rights become human rights

in the last decades they can be enforced by legal action. The universal character

of a Human Rights Body enables a wide range of people – at least in principle –

to plead.

A Human Rights Body may work against conservative bias of jurisprudence

as a political practice in the state and as a discipline. It might act as a signifi-

cant player in the process of gendering human rights. Human Rights Body is a

newer form of women’s policy agency. It is neither mentioned in Jahan (2008),

nor in the questionnaire (UN DAW 2009). This form of women’s policy agency

seems to be too new to be acknowledged and reported as a women’s actor by the

states. Therefore, it is more likely that the number of Human Rights Bodies is

underestimated by the used data.

Human Rights Body exists at the shifting borders between unspecific and spe-

cific structures. This enables it to challenge the standing demarcations between

the two. Some states documented specialised entity for women’s issues within a

Human Rights Body. Others have attributed the responsibility for gender equality

to the Human Rights Body as whole. Both cases have been categorised in my

classification system as Human Rights Bodies. Even though, the requirement of

specificity is challenged in the second case.19

19In principle, if the whole structure is responsible for women’s empowerment and promotionof gender equality and has the expertise to act, then it belongs to the gender mainstreamedstructures. As such, it is per definition no longer a specific state structure. However, in thecategory of Human Rights Body, I refrained from distinguishing between gender mainstreamedand specific entities due to the exploratory stage of research and the strong suspicion of the

105

This is the second instance, in which it was discernible that the coding pro-

cedure with the labelling phase had presented unexpected results. As in the case

of Competence Centre in Legislative Assembly (L1), it is most likely that Hu-

man Rights Bodies would be overlooked by using other classification systems due

to their low number. It can therefore be concluded that the applied method of

classification reveals the conceptual borders between unspecific and specific state

structures.

J2 Equality Authority An Equality Authority is a juridical body commissioned

to deal with conflicts of interest and law enforcement. Arbitral verdicts are legally

binding or recommendatory. Such legal mechanisms can be accessed individually

or as a group. In contrast to the broad focus of the Human Rights Body dis-

cussed above, an Equality Authority is target to a particular area. Possible areas

of conflict are among others: discrimination in paid labour (equal wage, sexual ha-

rassment), violation of personal integrity (violence), and divorce, sexism, or hate

crimes. States give those juridical bodies different names such as equality author-

ity, board, commission, ombud, prosecutor, tribunal, and complains mechanism.

They are all categorised as Equality Authority.

Persons working in such an entity are professional lawyers, judges and attor-

neys or laypersons. Authority, tribunal, commission, and board consist usually

of several persons. Whereas prosecutor and ombud encompasses individuals or a

small number of person, which may have some staff at their disposal. A complaint

mechanism can consist of one or several persons working on a voluntary basis.

Such an entity has less sanctioning power than the entities named above and it is

often low-threshold for claimants and defendants.

J3 Working Group in Judiciary A Working Group in Judiciary is an en-

tity in which members of the juridical profession discuss concrete procedural or

substantial issues in relation to gender inequality and the access of women to the

judiciary in the group as well as together with external technical experts. Women’s

judiciary access includes women as claimants, as defendants, and as professionals

(lawyers, specialists, judges, and clerks). The objectives of the Working Group

states underreporting.

106

in Judiciary may be to reassess common practices, behavioural change, (further)

education, development of new common understandings and applicable standards,

consistency checks, discovering and reassessing discriminatory practices, and /or

problem solving on a structural level. In some cases, such processes need legal

change to become permanent.

The temporary quality of a working group contradicts the permanence require-

ment of permanent and specific state capability in women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality. The permanence requirement has been eased con-

cerning this point for the judiciary as just the existence of a working group in

the judiciary is a noteworthy manifestation in itself. The further development of

women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality policies in the legal prac-

tice needs persons and structures engaged in this process. Jahan’s classification

contains a similar category: Committees / Working Groups within the Judiciary

(Jahan 2008, 18; Jahan 2010, ii, 22, 24).

Entities Outside State Administration (O)

The three primary branches of government discussed above do not cover all areas of

statehood. By different means states exercise influence on civil society and society

as a whole and vice versa. Degree of entities independence from the executive or

other authorities varies over time and between states. Why are entities outside

the state administration relevant for the advancement of women and promotion

of gender equality? Further transfer of decision-making power into this sector of

governmental action in the last decades makes gender equality governance in this

sector even more relevant.

O1 Commission A Commission is an entity in which different forms of people

discuss women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality issues. Its mem-

bers can be from outside the administration such as delegates or representatives

from women’s organizations, trade unions, employer’s organizations, economic in-

terest groups, women’s and feminist movements, gender research community, as

well as respected personalities. In addition, it can include members of parlia-

mentary assemblies, representatives of the state administration and members of

107

government. The classification introduced here does not distinguish between com-

mission, committee, council and boards. They are all included under the term

Commission.

Commissions differ in their functions. he category entails advisory councils

and commissions in the political executive because it is not possible with the used

data to separate the two. Both types are necessary. In both cases the location and

its attribution is key for substantial input of the structure (McBride and Mazur

2010, 56-57). The new category has a bottom line orientation. The category

Commission is the main residual category for indistinct entities of women’s policy

agencies.

O2 State-run Women’s Organization (SWO) A State-run Women’s Or-

ganization (SWO) is a women’s organization or several women’s organizations

established by the state.20 Most of these organizations were founded in the middle

of the 20st century21 and controlled by the party in governing power.

There are two main instances of SWOs. In former state socialist systems, SWOs

are controlled by the ruling party. Usually, these SWOs are mass organizations

and reach into all areas of life that are considered relevant to the gender ideology

of the governing party. They can be quite large and some have divisions on all

state levels down to the level of town districts. The second instance is to be found

in authoritarian regimes, dictatorships, or monarchies where ruling powers estab-

lished women’s organizations to give international communities an impression of

an existing civil society. In both cases, SWOs are created by the governing system

to produce an entity which can communicate with international communities. Ex-

istence of pro forma entities is possible as well. A State-run Women’s Organization

may function as a state actor with a wide range of (intervening) competences.

In past research this organizational entity has not been acknowledged as a form

of women’s policy agency; State-run Women’s Organization does not appear on

existing categorisations of different forms of women’s policy agencies (Jahan 2010;

20As a reminder, states report what forms of women’s policy agency they have at their disposi-tion. States were allowed to comment what was summarised about them in the regional reports(see page 65f.).

21Myanmar 2003 (SDD 2010, 100). Cambodia converted its SWO in two steps (1993 and 1996)into a ministry (SDD 2010, 78-79).

108

McBride and Mazur 2010; Jahan 2008; Squires 2007; Goetz 2004; Sawer 2004;

Testolin 2001; Berkovitch 1999; McBride Stetson and Mazur 1995). Nonetheless,

State-run Women’s Organizations are described in the literature concerning former

state socialist systems (Goetz 2003, 73; Jezerska 2003, 171; McBride and Mazur

2010, 204). Former state socialist systems, authoritarian regimes, dictatorships, or

monarchies make a conscious decision to create a SWO. As long as a substantial

number of states maintain such regimes, it is necessary to reflect also on their

possibilities regarding women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality as

well as their real world behaviour. In my opinion, a SWO can be considered as a

form of women’s policy agency limited to political systems with restricted civil or

political liberties.

This category is the only category for which additional data were taken into

account to classify the entities in the data. The Freedom House Index (Freedom-

house 2010a;b) was used as a simple and uniform standard to judge as to whether

a state may employ this form of a women’s organization. If a state has been given

a ranking between five and seven in Political Rights and Civil Liberties, which

measures the degree of political rights and civil liberties in a state, then this state

was included in the sample of states which may administers a SWO.22 Values

between five and seven indicate that this state allows little or no political rights

and civil liberties (Freedomhouse 2011). In the 2010 edition of the Freedom House

Index, this included all states categorised as not free and the lower 20 per cent

of the states categorised as partly free. Those are 43 states of the used sample.

In all those cases the United Nations data were carefully analysed to find enough

evidence if there might be one or several women’s organizations controlled by the

state. A remarkable number of these regimes do not make use of SWOs: 70 per

cent of limited Free states do not employ or not report a SWO. It is possible that

the empirical relevance of SWOs is underestimated by the data as the classification

of Jahan did not ask for them.

Some women’s advocates and feminists may regard the inclusion of this cate-

gory into the new framework as a betrayal of the women’s cause in general and

degrading for the work of women’s policy agencies. Reasons for such an evaluation

may further contribute to the understanding of women’s policy agencies as a soci-

22Seven stands for: not free. One stands for: free.

109

ological phenomenon. However, if women’s policy agencies are conceptualized as

vessels for programmatic content, then this conceptualization does not prescribe

the programmatic content – and the content varies greatly. I emphasis explicitly

that it is relevant to analyse the programmatic content and the governing of the

structure. Furthermore, who is using the women’s policy agencies and for what

purposes are equally relevant issues over and above SWOs. They are relevant for

all women’s policy agencies.23 The issue of democratic control of the content of

state entities (Squires 2007, 177-178) is a general problem that needs to be ad-

dressed; this problem is not linked to a particular form of women’s policy agency.

It touches a sore spot of democratic politics and as such a key issue of Political

Science.

O3 Monitoring Body Entities with a knowledge generating role such as re-

search centres, research institutes, observatories as well as monitoring bodies them-

selves are categorised together in Monitoring Body. Location of a Monitoring Body

within the state and public administration vary (inter alia not national level). De-

gree of independence from the state, international donors or civil society has to be

determined in the individual case. Furthermore, a Monitoring Body may have in-

tervening and sanctioning powers. To account for these wide ranges of institutional

variations, the entity is labelled with the indefinite word ‘body’.

Specific entities in statistical services generate knowledge as well. However,

they do not fall under the category Monitoring Body because they are more ac-

countable to their principal than to a policy goal. For this, as well as another prac-

tical reason24, entities in statistical services have not been classified as women’s

policy agencies.25

23E.g. France used women’s policy agencies as spies to detect parts of public administrationand bureaucrats not in line with the governing political party (Mazur 2007). Such a usagehas little to do with women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality, but the vesselcontains this possibility. In my view it is necessary to recognise the conceptual possibilities andthe empirical usages.

24Collected data appears to be distorted due to serious underreporting by the states.25They are classified in the category Sectorial (see Subsection 5.3.1).

110

5.3 Definition of Sample Boundaries

The third subsection reviews three types of ignored categories of entries. The

new classification of women’s policy agencies covers only women’s policy agencies

fulfilling the criteria of the new definition of a women’s policy agency. They are:

permanency, specificity, designation to women’s empowerment and promotion of

gender equality focus, part of state or public administration, core administration,

and external orientation. A considerable share of reported entities was excluded

from analysis because they do not fulfil all those criteria.

There are three groups of ignored entries: Entities not regarded as women’s

policy agencies, women’s policy agencies, which were not included for analysis,

and the ones outside of classification. Table 5.5 gives an overview.

WPAs Not WPAs

Included WPAs Not included WPAs Excluded entities

ELJO

*Subnational *Not Permanent*Residual *Not Specific- Sectorial - Unspecific- Profession - Not Specific Enough- International *Not State

*WPA Component*Service Delivery

Outside of Classification

Table 5.5: Women’s policy agencies, not included women’s policy agencies andexcluded entities.

The list of ignored categories has been developed in the same way as the cat-

egories included for further analysis; by conceptual developing on the basis of

data reflecting the views of states about their women’s policy agencies. The three

111

groups vary in size (see Table 5.7).26

5.3.1 Not Included Women’s Policy Agencies

The first group consists of women’s policy agencies, which are not taken to further

analysis. In principle, they have the features of women’s policy agencies. However,

there are reasons why they are not used for further analysis: A large number of

such women’s policy agencies are not included because they are on subnational

level (category: Subnational). The other entities are in the category Residual.

In both cases the problem is mainly one of poor reporting systematics of states.

States did not report such entities in a systematic manner. The unsystematic

reporting of the states reduced the reliability of the data. Therefore subnational

and residual entities were excluded from further analysis.

Subnational In the case of the subnational entities there is an additional prob-

lem: structural heterogeneity of states. In general, existence and relevance of fed-

eralism and subnational governmental entities varies between states under study.

That implies states have different structural preconditions for women’s policy agen-

cies. For federal states it is much more likely that they have subnational entities

in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality than for Unitarian

or centrally governed states. Subnational entities in women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality are excluded from analysis in order to make data

more comparable on a national level. Loss of coverage through the exclusion of

subnational entities creates a desideratum for further research, especially against

the background of the growing popularity of subnational women’s policy agencies

in state practice and in research on state feminism (Tavares da Silva 2010, 11-13;

Vickers et al. 2013). When states report such entities in a more systematic and

consistent manner, then they might become included in the framework.

Residual: Sectorial, Professional, or International The category of the

Residual consists of thee sub-categories. The three sub-categories are: Sectorial,

Professional and International. Each entails a small number of entities.

26For some of the discussed ignored entries there are further details in appendix A (see Section9.9.1).

112

Sectorial entities are women’s policy agencies which are restricted to a particu-

lar area. Empirical examples are entities for instance in the police against violence

against women, or women’s or gender equality entities in universities and specialist

entities in statistical services.

The category Professional entails entities which work on a professional basis

on research about women or gender. This includes entities of women’s and gender

studies at universities, network for women’s or gender studies or academics and

researchers working in gender or women’s studies.

An entity is classified as International if it is part of an international organi-

zation and is not part of a specific state. It is not part of a particular state in

the sense that this state controls its activities. Examples are the UNESCO Chaire

“Eau, Femmes et Pouvoir de Decisions” (Ivory Coast) and the United Nations

Gender Mainstreaming Committee (Philippines).

Entities in the category Residual are rarely reported. That implies analysis

would underestimate their real amount of existence if they had been considered

for analysis. The small number of entities in the category Residual indicates that

states in the big majority of cases do not count them as women’s policy agencies.

They were excluded from analysis for the sake of consistency, clarity and reliability

of data. In a later version of the data such entities may become included, when

states report them in a more consistent and reliable manner.

113

5.3.2 Not Women’s Policy Agencies

The second group consists of entities which are not regarded as women’s policy

agencies, because they do not fulfil the definitions of women’s policy agencies.

There are different categories depending on the criteria they do not fulfil.

Not Specific The biggest category entails the entities which are not specific.

There are two sub-categories: Unspecific entities and entities not specific enough

to be counted as women’s policy agencies. Unspecific entities are for instance a

ministry for finance, a ministry for social affairs or the state secretary of health

in the ministry of health, wellbeing and labour. Those entities are excluded to

get a concise account of women’s policy agencies.27 Due to the prestige function

of women’s policy agencies it is necessary to distinguish rigorously between real

women’s policy agencies and entities which are reported, but have nothing to do

with specific women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality. That is a

delimitation to entities having a mandate for gender mainstreaming.

In contrast, a ministry for family for instance is not specific enough to count

as women’s policy agency. Yet, a ministry for women’s empowerment and elderly

policies would count as specific enough, due to women’s empowerment as one of

the key duties. Following from that, multi-sectorial entities may count as specific

if women, empowerment, gender, equality, or discrimination is part of the name.

Not Permanent Temporary entities are not regarded as women’s policy agen-

cies due to their preliminary time horizon. Examples are working group, round

table, task force, steering committee, project, program, and conference. They may

play important roles for a limited period of time. Still, the temporary feature is

a weakness and an obstacle for sustainable long term structural change. Gender

equality is a true long-term project which needs a long-lasting commitment, also

on a structural basis. Entities in the category Not Permanent are beyond the

border of permanent and specific state capability in women’s empowerment and

27If there is an entity within which fullfils the criteria of the definition for a women’s policyagency then this entity is counted as women’s policy agency.

114

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115

promotion of gender equality.28

Not State Entities which are not part of the state are categorised in the cate-

gory Not State. Examples are non-governmental organisations or alliance of non-

governmental organisations. A non-governmental organisation is per definition

independent of a state. That concerns for instance resources, agenda-setting, and

choice of means. In reality, there are a lot of shades of grey when it comes to

influence society or states.29

Non-governmental organisations in women’s empowerment and promotion of

gender equality are usually women’s organizations. Often there is a national co-

ordination of women’s organizations: an alliance of women’s organizations. Some

alliances are thematic, such as alliance against violence against women or against

trafficking in human beings. Other alliances are one of several national alliances30

or the national organization vis-a-vis the national government.

WPA Component An entity is classified as WPA Component if it is part of

another organizational entity and is not a self-contained entity. For instance in the

case of France: There is a High Authority for Combating Discrimination and for

Equality. There are also an executive bureau and an advisory committee in this

authority. Each, the executive bureau and the advisory committee are counted as

a WPA Component. The High Authority for Combating Discrimination and for

Equality is classified as Equality Authority.

At times the distinction between a women’s policy agency and a women’s policy

agency component is not straight forward. A working group within for instance a

High Authority for Combating Discrimination and for Equality would be classified

as Not Permanent and not as a WPA Component.

28Exceptional among those entities is the entity Men Against Violence Advocacy Group ofSamoa. It is one of the very few entities focusing explicitly on men as an issue in women’sempowerment and promotion of gender equality policies. In this case, men are even named asactor around a group is organised.

29How much non-governmental organisations are independent of a particular state has to beevaluated in the individual case and for a particular period of time. Such an evaluation hasto consider other contextual factors, such as the distinction between corporatist and unitarianstates.

30E.g. Switzerland has seen alternating one or two national alliances of women’s movementsduring the last century (EKF 2001).

116

Group and CategoryWith African States Used SampleNumber Percentage Number Percentage

Women’s Policy AgenciesIncluded Women’s Policy Agencies 860 72 776 70.9

Not included Women’s Policy Agencies 137 11.5 135 14.7Subnational 116 9.7 115 10.5Sectorial 9 0.8 9 0.8Professional 8 0.7 8 0.7International 4 0.3 3 0.3

Not Women’s Policy Agencies 192 16.1 135 12.3Not Specific 70 5.9 56 6.1Not Permanent 50 4.2 50 4.6Not State 41 3.4 41 3.7WPA Component 15 1.3 15 1.4Service Delivery 16 1.3 16 1.5

Outside of Classification 5 0.4 5 0.5Women’s Parliament 1 0.08 1 0.1Entity in Economic Council 3 0.3 3 0.3Target Fund 1 0.08 1 0.1

Total 1194 100 916 100

Table 5.7: Numbers of included and ignored entries.

Service Delivery Entities dealing primary with the provision of services to

affected groups are classified in the category Service Delivery. There are two

different forms: knowledge providers and physical aid in the topic of violence.

The biggest number of entities classified as Service Delivery is busy with violence

against women (and children). Some of those entities are integrated into the

work of the police. At the fore are issues of consulting and providing shelter or

protection.

The second group consists of various consulting and educational entities. Their

purpose is to distribute knowledge. Women’s centres have often a thematically

broad approach. In contrast, entities with the purpose of educating women in

117

politics or providing advice to women in their professional careers have a target

focus. Empirical examples are a provider of legal aid (Indonesia) and a provider

of funds for women (India: Rashtriya Mahila Kosh).

5.3.3 Entities Outside of Classification

In the group of the entities outside of classifications are all those entities which are

not able to fit into the classification. This third group is quantitatively marginal,

but conceptual relevant.

There are five entities which can be separated in three groups. They are:

• Reserved seats for women in urban local self-government institutions (India)

• Commission for equal opportunities and treatment in the Social and Economic

Council (Romania)

• Delegation on women’s rights and equal opportunities in the Economic and Social

Council (France)

• Women’s committee in the chamber of commerce (Syria)

• National Fund for Social Solidarity (Tunisia)

The first entity challenges to some extent the framework of the new classifi-

cation. Does the character of a council or a legislative assembly change if there

are reserved seats for women (or particular minorities)? The entity in India are

local self-government institution (Panchayati Raj system) with reserved seats of

a third.31. It is the only such entity named in the data. In the data it is one-of-

a-kind-agency. It is thinkable that the used data underestimate the existence of

this form of structures. Other structures with reserved seats or gender quotas are

absent.

Contra-factual thinking provides an even more challenging entity for the frame-

work; all-women’s parliaments. Such an entity consists explicitly and exclusively

of women. There is no such entity named in the list of Jahan, nor do one occur

in other reviewed classifications. However, such an entity does not violate the

31Introduced by national level 1993, consists of three tiers (Kudva 2003, 446-447)

118

premise that structures should consist of state employees working on a daily basis

in the name of the state. In this respect, members of the women’s parliamentary

assembly could be regarded as similar to the members of a Legislative Committee

which receive attendance money. The difference of a women’s parliament to a na-

tional legislative assembly lies in the exclusionary access to women’s parliament:

women’s only. It remains for further research if and how entities with exclusionary

access can be integrated into the suggested framework. It is possible that there

are more entities with this particular feature.

The next three entities are part of a political high level entity in the area of

economic and social politics. The degree of independence of those entities from the

state is not visible in the data. Are they part of private sector organizations? On

the one side, the boundaries of the state are unclear in those cases. On the other

side, they may be part of the top level of decision making in cooperation between

state, employers and trade unions. Such entities are not mentioned by the list of

Jahan. It is thinkable that the data underestimate the existence of such a form

of women’s policy agency. The reason is that states do not regard this structure

as a women’s policy agency. Further conceptual development of the classification

may for instance integrate such entities as a fifth column in the building blocks

depiction (see below).

The fifth entity, the National Fund for Social Solidarity, is unspecific on the

first sight. On second sight, it is an entity which highlights the importance of who

is deciding over state money and the possibility of access to state money. In the

framework such an entity may form a fourth category in the sector outside of the

three primary branches of government. As there was no reference in the list of

Jahan and in the survey question states did not report such entities, the data may

underestimate the existence of this form of entity.

The small number of entities outside of the classification (0.6%) indicates that

there is little conceptual space outside the classification. As a result, the classi-

fication is comprehensive. Furthermore, together with the blind spots in current

institutional architecture, such entities may show where further institutional de-

velopment in specific state capability is possible (see below).

119

5.4 Visualization of Women’s Policy Agencies

The non-linear approach to theorising did not end after developing the suggested

classification of women’s policy agencies on the basis of empirical data and the

exclusion of ignored entities. There was a recurrent reflection including contra

factual experimenting (Ragin and Sonnett 2005) and conceptual thinking (Goertz

and Mazur 2008, 14-43) to make sense of what states regard as their women’s policy

agencies. This constant reflection brought a conceptual deepening. Developing

suitable graphical representations of the phenomena was used as a heuristic device.

This creative process forces to simplify the argument to the essence of the topic

at hand. Two graphical depictions of women’s policy agencies were developed:

an abstract and an optical one. The aim was to increase understanding of the

phenomenon. Since the purpose of the depictions is to represent specific state

capability, the ignored categories are not represented in the depictions.

5.4.1 Building Blocks for Another World

What is missing in Jahan’s classification as well as in the other categorisation

systems reviewed here is a graphical representation of the entire system of entities

which are run by a specific state (Jahan 2008; 2010; McBride and Mazur 2010;

Jahan 2008; Squires 2007; Goetz 2004; Sawer 2004; Testolin 2001; Berkovitch 1999;

McBride Stetson and Mazur 1995). Conventional organograms are inadequate if

one attempts to portray more dimensions than just the public administration. In

addition, it is difficult to compare dimensions because organograms simply need

a lot of space. For these reasons, I developed a graphical representation of the

currently existing forms of women’s policy agencies. The graphical depiction of

Table 5.8 is another way to represent the content of Table 5.3. The four sectors

of governmental action are the most distinctive aspects of the empirical data used

here; so much so that it induces to be used in structuring a graphical depiction of

the women’s policy agency categories. This dimension is so strong in the empirical

data that it was used later on for the typology of different institutional architecture.

The second dimension is the scope of entities. The scope of an entity refers to its

principal ability to influence its environment. This scope conveys the possibility

120

of change.

Each square of Table 5.8 entails one form of a women’s policy agency. I call

a square a building block. I have denominated these squares ‘building block’ or

‘building brick’ as they represent to me the components needed to ‘form’ gender

equality. Amongst other things, a building block/brick embraces two meanings

metaphorically relevant for the topic at hand. Both underline the earlier mentioned

conceptualization of women’s policy agencies as vessels for programmatic content:

a) A building block/brick depicts a component necessary to build walls in the

construction of houses. b) Brick is also the name for a particular dough or pastry

widespread in the Maghreb. It comes in thin pastry sheets, which are filled with

various ingredients for example such as vegetables, meat, egg, fish, or fruits. This

second meaning, emphases the role of political instances to fill the mystery bag

women’s policy agency with political objectives, duties and resources.

The building blocks are arranged in rows (sectors of governance) and columns

(scope of entity). I have designated four scopes for various forms of women’s pol-

icy agencies: Trans-sectorial (T), Sectorial (S), Particular (P), and Network (N).

Different women’s policy agencies in the same row share the same sector of gov-

ernmental action. Different women’s policy agencies in the same column have a

similar scope of action. Sectorial encompasses women’s policy agencies that have

a broad focus and a wide range of activities on a high hierarchical level within

the state or public administration. Their influence is sector-wide. Particular em-

braces women’s policy agencies that have a less wide range of activities. They are

located lower in the hierarchy and their interactions with others are hampered by

institutional boundaries. Their influence is limited to a particular area. Network

constitutes women’s policy agencies that are cross-cutting organizational bound-

aries and linking different actors and structures. Within this network they are

distributors of information and coordinate activities. The final scope of action

I have labelled Trans-sectorial. Women’s policy agencies in the column Trans-

sectorial are situated at the highest level in the power hierarchy in the respective

sectors of governmental action. They have overall influence in the sense of trans-

sectorial influence. Currently, there is only one women’s policy agency in this

column, the entity in Top Level Government. Pendants in the three other sectors

of governmental action are missing in the data of UN Division for the Advancement

121

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122

of Women.

The three empty building blocks in the column Trans-sectorial indicate that

the used date contains no entity with this particular feature at the power hub.

Similarly placed women’s policy agencies in those sectors are conceivable. Further

institutional developments regarding women’s policy agencies may, for instance,

fill these empty building blocks. In view of that, the graphical depiction made the

areas visible where there is little state activity or even blind spots. The frame-

work developed in the course of my research is expandable to encompass further

institutional development in the area of women’s empowerment and promotion of

gender equality policies; new possibilities are already be perceived on the concep-

tual horizon.

Overall, those 13 different forms of women’s policy agency yield an impressive

list of the span of agencies with which states deal with women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality issues. Women’s and feminist ideas have truly made

an inroad into state structures. Various states have adopted from the conceptual

inventiveness originating from feminist scholars to combat women’s oppression and

gender inequality. Certainly, there are empty building blocks and more instruments

will be developed to counteract the damaging effects from women’s discrimination

and gender inequality. For the moment, states have a wide range of different forms

of women’s policy agencies at their disposal in the field of women’s empowerment

and promotion of gender equality.

The newly developed system of classification introduced here enables the cate-

gorisation of real world entities making them comparable with entities to be found

in states. The size of the sample in such research endeavours is of little importance

as this framework is applicable similarly in single case studies, small n studies alike

large n comparisons.

For single case studies and small n comparison it is even conceivable to combine

this framework for formal structures with other frameworks, for instance the grid

developed for qualitative research by RNGS-project, which is able to study the

structural capacity of single women’s policy agencies and a couple of women’s pol-

icy agencies in comparison (McBride and Mazur 2010, 48, 51-52). Its dimensions:

type of agency, appointment of agency head, policy orientation, and proximity

to decision-making power, policy making power, leadership, and administrative

123

resources are able to cover the strength and weaknesses of a small number of

structures.

5.4.2 Mapping State Action

Women’s rights activist, feminists, and others have identified different locations

within the state and public administration where women’s policy agencies should

work. In contrast, Figure 5.1 shows where current states employ women’s policy

agencies at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, i.e. it optically visualizes

women’s policy agencies. The four sectors of governmental action are arranged in

four separate squares.

In each square respectively in each sector of governmental action, unspecific

and specific state structures in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender

equality exist next to each other. Note, each sector structures differently.

This optical depiction is mapping the range of possibilities for a single state.

There are 13 different forms of women’s policy agencies within the state and public

administration. Possible locations of women’s policy agencies are indicated by red

circles. The size of the red circle has no meaning. Hence, it does not indicate

the empirical weight or the size of the women’s policy agency. The blue writing

indicates the form of women’s policy agency.

Inside each sector of governmental action the reading logic of an organogram is

applied. The outside sector is not hierarchical. All other sectors are hierarchically

structured. Entities on top of the square are hierarchically on top. Entities at the

bottom of each square are at the bottom line of the hierarchy inside a particular

sector of governmental action. Hierarchical structure within a sector differs from

other sectors. As it was mentioned before, the sectors among themselves are not

hierarchically arranged. The fact that executive and the outside sector are depicted

nearer to the bottom line of the page does not signify that they have conceptually

a lower weight than the legislative and the judiciary branch of government.

124

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125

Chapter 6

Identifying Types of Institutional

Architecture

This chapter suggests a new ways to identify and compare institutional architec-

ture on a global level. The first section reviews the absence of typologies of specific

state capability. The second section explains the new nominal typology of insti-

tutional architecture. The third section introduces the visualizations of types of

institutional architecture as a solid figure.

6.1 Developing Typology of Institutional

Architecture

This section develops the new typology of institutional architecture in two sub-

sections. The first subsection reviews the missing literature about typologies of

specific state capability and specifies the purpose of the new typology. The sec-

ond subsection gives the rationale for building an inductively generated typology

instead of deductively developing a classification or ideal types.

6.1.1 Inexistence of Typologies and New Purpose

Until now research classified parts of institutional architecture, mainly single women’s

policy agencies. The idea seems to be new to build a typology of the institutional

126

architecture as a whole over the composition of the formal structures of different

forms of women’s policy agencies (e.g. Borchorst 1999, 169; Testolin 2001; Goetz

2004, 2-3; Outshoorn and Kantola 2007, 3).

Whereas earlier research sees no patterns of structures of women’s policy agen-

cies (Mazur 2002, 175-76) this dissertation substantiates the claim that there are

patterns in compositions of institutional architecture. Hence, these patterns or

types do not follow the usual clusters. Until now, these patterns have been over-

looked because no one tried to compare all states.

A broader picture becomes possible with the description of the global situation.

The broadening takes place on the level of sectors of governmental action in which

women’s policy agencies may exist and by considering all women’s policy agencies

per state. Furthermore, a broadening is achieved by a wider coverage of states.1

The aim is a closer representation of what states have at their disposition as specific

state capability designated to deliver women’s empowerment and promotion of

gender equality policies. Mapping of institutional architecture on the basis of the

composition of their formal structures is a way to deal with empirical complexity

of the potential state capability.

Beyond this dissertation the typology may hold the possibility to enable the-

ory development for entities which were not comparable before on such a wide

scale. For building a typology of institutional architecture with the intention to

compare whole institutional architecture from different states the focus lies on

the similarities and differences of the combinations of different forms of women’s

policy agencies. For this, there is a need for a common terminology for women’s

policy agencies and institutional architecture. A purpose behind the typology of

institutional architecture is to identify identical and unique cases of institutional

architecture.

For comparative purposes it is necessary to compare similar entities. By having

a comparable set of different forms of women’s policy agencies existing institutional

architecture can be compared. By comparing institutional architecture over their

formal structures a mosaic part of the whole interacting process is taken under a

magnifying lens.

1The intention was to go beyond limitation of existing samples of cases. Due to the accessi-bility of data this intension was realised.

127

The aim of this research is to develop a new framework for understanding insti-

tutional differences and similarities of states worldwide. It should be a conceptual

framework to understand institutional variation across nations, a framework con-

tributing to future research questions like: Is there institutional conversion? Are

there common deficiencies of particular types of institutional architecture? Are

some types of institutional architecture more effective than others? Does the in-

stitutional development go towards more comprehensive institutional architecture?

Or on the contrary, do states retreat from their political responsibility to act on

women’s empowerment and gender equality? Institutional composition of institu-

tional architecture does not explain every failure of states to act on gender equality.

Permanent and specific state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion

of gender equality is just a part of the picture. They may play an important role.

However, they can be designed in a way to become marginal or irrelevant. Societies

face societal change with and without such structures.

Women’s policy agencies form opportunity structures for states, civil societies

and for people working in such agencies. Political opportunity structure is concep-

tualized as a background assumption which is not empirically challenged in this

study.

It is not only the quantity of women’s policy agencies which matters. Even

more, the different quality of women’s policy agencies matters for the ability of

a state to remedy women’s discrimination and gender inequalities. Each form

of women’s policy agency has its strengths and weaknesses. By privileging the

coexistence of different forms of women’s policy agencies it becomes analysable

that the working together may balance the weaknesses of the employed women’s

policy agencies (Squires 2007, 66-67). Different women’s policy agencies form a

complex set of political opportunity structures.

With this approach the number of types of institutional architecture was not

predefined theoretically (Sodeur 1974). The number of types should come from

the empirical data.

128

6.1.2 Rationale for Inductively Generated Typology

Building typologies is one of the important non quantitative means of knowledge

generation of Social Science (Wienold 2007, 679; Recker 2000, 683). Building a

typology is used as a specific “method of investigation” (Marshall 1998, 292). It

is applied as a heuristic device to sort peculiarities of real world phenomena into

a simplified representation (Marshall 1998, 292). A typology is sorting an area of

items along specific criteria into groups, the types (Recker 2000, 683). Types are

a means to give a gross orientation about a complex phenomenon. They should

simplify the access to a certain topic by giving an overview.

One type is viewed as a basic form (Hillmann 2000, 910). Types do not dispense

detailed description of cases. Types are only a possible starting point for more

detailed description of cases in a more ordered universe of known comparative

cases. At the moment the whole universe or range of the phenomenon institutional

architecture is not known.

There are alternative methods of investigation to sort patterns of current in-

stitutional architecture: classification and ideal types. Building a classification

of institutional architecture would be another and more rigid form of a sorting

undertaking (Wienold 2007, 679). Building a classification is more demanding

on the quality standards of uniqueness, totality and exclusiveness (Lamnek 2000,

333-334). Due to the exploratory state of research about institutional architecture

as the entirety of all women’s policy agencies in one state and the claim to com-

pare most states of the world, a classification is too demanding. Furthermore, the

quality of the available data would make such an undertaking risky.

Building ideal types would be another mean to sort the phenomenon. Ideal

types are more distant to empirical phenomenon because they have a more theo-

retical and explanatory character (Marshall 1998, 292). Ideal typology would be

built on theoretically deduced and therefore predefined dimensions (Sodeur 1974).

Ideal types are less likely to achieve a theoretically meaningful character due to

the exploratory stage of the field in the area of worldwide coverage of states. On

the one hand, with its theoretically predefined dimensions it is likely that there

would be dimensions without empirical cases. On the other hand, there might be

crowded dimensions with little directions for detailing efforts.

129

Therefore, an inductively generated empirical typology is more suitable. Real

types or empirical types as schemes for sorting observable properties of objects

(Hillmann 2000, 910) are more appropriate for the exploratory stage of research

on a global scale. It provides details about distribution of cases, special cases,

surprising patterns, and what there is more. Such a research is open to surprises

on different areas. With the enlarged sample and the transgressing of prior research

barriers new patterns may become visible. It becomes possible to answer questions

like: Is there a European model? Or is a particular type common to all OECD-

states? Or even, are there any commonalities for all member states of the United

Nations?

With an inductively generated typology it has been more likely to spot unan-

ticipated patterns. Still, there are no theory-less empirical data. Just, in my

approach the theoretical dimensions within the data were carved out in the pro-

cess of analysis. Instead of that the data have to become consistent with predefined

theoretical dimensions in the first place as it is the case in a deductive approach.

Such a proceeding – building a typology by developing in advance an applicable

coding scheme for women’s policy agencies, the new classification of different forms

of women’s policy agencies, and then a typology of institutional architecture on

the basis of their combinations of different forms of women’s policy agencies –

does not foreclose the possibility to develop an analytical typology of institutional

architecture later on. An inductively won typology of institutional architecture

over their composition with different forms of women’s policy agencies has limits.

Major points are the quality of the used data, their stability and the access to

data. If there are a lot of missing data then the found picture is not accurate.

Furthermore, comparability is not given in the future if the reporting of states

differs much from the ones used here.

Another point is the applicability of such a synchronical typology to earlier

and later points in time in the historical process. With the synchronical design

a maximum of cases is taken into account. To what extent will it be possible to

apply the typology to older data? In principle, the typology is able to become

dynamic by applying more data for other points in time. If such data would

become available this would be a good starting point to apply the argument on a

wider time horizon.

130

6.2 A New Way of Identifying Types of Institu-

tional Architecture

This section explains the developed typology of specific state capability in women’s

empowerment and promotion of gender equality, the institutional architecture, on

a conceptual level. The subsections introduce purpose, building principles, possi-

bility space, conceptual size, and comprehensiveness of institutional architecture.

Furthermore, labelling of types of institutional architecture and their visualization

are discussed.

6.2.1 Construction of Typology

This subsection explains the usage of capital letters, the four building principles,

and reasons for them and the possibility space of the new typology of institutional

architecture.

Typology of institutional architecture is built over the four sectors of govern-

mental action grouping 13 different forms of women’s policy agencies. Table 5.3

shows for each form of women’s policy agency where it is located in the four sectors

of governmental action. The four sectors executive (E), legislative (L), judiciary

(J), and outside (O) structure the typology of institutional architecture. Each

form of women’s policy agency exists only in one sector.

The classification of different forms of women’s policy agencies fulfils the three

criteria of a sociological classification (Lamnek 2000, 333-334): completeness, un-

ambiguousness and exclusiveness. That implies the classification is complete since

it entails all currently existing forms of women’s policy agencies. It is unambiguous

and exclusive. This encompasses, that an entity is attributed without doubt to

only one category.

6.2.2 Chain of Capital Letters Indicating the Type

Furthermore, the typology fulfils the same criteria. As institutional architecture of

a particular state can only be attributed to one type of institutional architecture.

The attribution is unambiguous and all institutional architecture is attributable.

131

Occurring Sectors Type LabelE L J O Type ELJOE L J Type ELJE L O Type ELOE J O Type EJO

L J O Type LJO. . . O2 Type O2E L Type ELE J Type EJE O Type EO

L J Type LJL O Type LO

J O Type JOE Type E

L Type LJ Type J

O Type OType Zero

Table 6.1: Possible types of institutional architecture (possibility space).

One sector consists of three to four different forms of women’s policy agencies.

The typology is built on the occurrences of different forms of women’s policy

agencies in each sector. The chain of capital letters indicates the occurring sectors

of governmental action. If there is at least one form of a women’s policy agency in a

particular sector, then this sector occurs. Not occurring sectors are not mentioned.

The chain of capital letters indicates the name of the type (see Table 6.1).

For instance, the Type EO embraces cases which have their women’s policy

agencies in the executive (E) and the outside (O) sectors. The capital letter and a

particular number identify a particular form of women’s policy agencies. There are

four different forms of women’s policy agencies in the executive sector (E); the Unit

in Top Level Government (E1), Ministry or Minister (E2), the Unit in a Ministry

(E3), and the Coordinating Body (E4) and three different forms of women’s policy

agencies in sector O; the Commission (O1), the State-run Women’s Organization

(O2), and the Monitoring Body (O3). An institutional architecture of the Type

EO has any of those forms of women’s policy agencies. The numbers are not used

for the typology. For an institutional architecture of the Type EO there have to

132

be at a minimum two women’s policy agencies; one in the executive sector (E) and

one in the outside sector (O).

Table 6.1 shows all 17 types and gives the occurrence of the sectors. Type O2

is special in several ways. It is explained further below. The typology rests on

four building principles.

Occurrence of Different Forms in a Particular Sector

The first building principle is: Typology is fundamentally built on occurrence

of different forms of women’s policy agencies in a particular sector. This building

principle is illustrated by the institutional architecture of Iceland. The institutional

architecture of Iceland has a Unit in a Ministry (E3), an Equality Authority (J2)

in the judiciary, and a Commission (O1). The Unit in a Ministry (E3) is part of

the sector executive (E), the Equality Authority (J2) is part of the sector judiciary

(J) and the Commission (O1) is part of the outside sector (O). Taken together in a

chain of capital letters, Iceland’s institutional architecture has the sector pattern

EJO. In other words, the institutional architecture of Iceland is of the Type EJO.

I call the rudimentary form of the sector pattern the basic type. Rudimentary

means that each capital letter occurs only once. For instance, the institutional

architecture of Iceland has the pattern of the basic type EJO. All the absent forms

of women’s policy agencies are not relevant for the attribution to the type.

A Sector Occurs if there is at Least One Women’s Policy Agency in a

Particular Sector

The second building principle is: Occurrence of a sector is given, if there is at

least one women’s policy agency in a particular sector. All further women’s policy

agencies in this sector do not add information for the attribution to types. For the

attribution to a type it does not matter if there are one or several women’s policy

agencies in a particular sector. The decisive information is if there is at least one

women’s policy agency in a particular sector. The underlying assumption is that

it is easier to have a second women’s policy agency in a sector than to establish

the first women’s policy agency in a sector.

For example the institutional architecture of Sri Lanka has two different forms

133

of women’s policy agencies in the executive sector (E): a Ministry or Minister

(E2) and a Unit in a Ministry (E3), beside an Equality Authority (J2) and a

Commission (O1) in judiciary and the outside sectors. The possibility of different

forms of women’s policy agencies in a particular sector is represented by the chain

of capital letter of these sectors: EEJO in the case of Sri Lanka.2 The institutional

architecture of Iceland and Sri Lanka exhibits both the characteristics of the Type

EJO. Both states have the same basic type; they have the same type of institutional

architecture. Hence, those two states have a similar institutional architecture.3

That the institutional architecture of Sri Lanka has more than one form of women’s

policy agency in a sector (E2 and E3) is not relevant for the attribution to the

type.

Privileging Quality of Women’s Policy Agencies before Quantity

The third building principle is about the counting of women’s policy agencies:

Different forms of women’s policy agencies are counted. The quantity of the same

form of a specific women’s policy agency is not counted. Occurrence of several

entities of the same form of a women’s policy agency is not used for attributing

cases to types. If a state has several entities of the same form of women’s policy

agency, then this particular form of women’s policy agency is still counted as

one. The idea is similar to the one with the counting of different sectors. It is

assumed that it is easier to establish a second or a third entity of a particular

form of women’s policy agency, than another form of a women’s policy agency in

the same sector.4 In brief, the main achievement is to establish the first entity

of a particular form of a women’s policy agency in a sector. The typology of

institutional architecture measures the heterogeneity of women’s policy agencies

and not the nominal number of the same form of women’s policy agencies.

2Theoretical and practical implications of several agencies in one sector and the linkagesbetween sectors go beyond this work.

3If they would even have the same forms of women’s policy agencies. In addition to the sametype of institutional architecture, then they would have an identical institutional architecturemeasured over the composition with different forms of women’s policy agencies. More detailsabout identical institutional architecture are given conceptually in Section 6.2.3, and empiricallyin Section 8.3.3.

4For the effectiveness of an institutional architecture the establishment of several women’spolicy agencies of the same form may matter. However, this is beyond this work.

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Occurrence of Dimension Plus Area Does Not Count

The last building principle is: The occurrence of a sector is privileged before the

occurrence of different forms of women’s policy agencies in a sector. One can illus-

trate this on the case of Peru. Peru’s institutional architecture has eight different

forms of women’s policy agencies: Ministry or Minister (E2), Unit in a Ministry

(E3), Coordinating Body (E4), Competence Centre in the Legislature (L1), Leg-

islative Committee (L2), Equality Authority (J2), Commission (O1), and Moni-

toring Body (O3).5 This gives the pattern of sectors EEELLJOO. Basically, the

institutional architecture has the four sectors ELJO. Therefore, Peru is attributed

to the Type ELJO. The dimension plus area, the occurrence of several forms of

women’s policy agencies in the same sector, is neglected for the attribution to

types.

The second, third and the fourth building principle simplify institutional com-

plexity of institutional architecture to make them comparable.

Rationale For Building Principles

Why is the typology built on the occurrence of various sectors and forms of women’s

policy agencies within sectors? In this conceptualization, states have a range of

four sectors to act on behalf of women’s empowerment and promotion of gender

equality. The idea behind privileging sectors is to weight the range of areas states

are able to act. In view of that, the typology measures the degree of structural

impact of the idea of promotion of women and gender equality. Such an approach

takes the omnipresence of gender inequality in all areas of governmental action into

account. With a detailed multi-faced approach a state is more likely to bring overall

structural change in interdependent subsystems of modern society by working at

the same time in different subsystems into a similar direction (Ballmer-Cao 2000,

63-65). By weighting the occurrence of two sectors higher than the occurrence of

two different forms of women’s policy agencies in one sector, it is assumed that

state action in all four sectors represents a more comprehensive approach to fight

women’s oppression than state action in fewer sectors.

5Full name of different forms of women’s policy agencies is given in Table 5.3. Section 5.2.2describes each form in detail.

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By mapping the occurrence of different sectors a maximal selectivity is achieved

to distinguish between different sorts of institutional architecture. Similar institu-

tional architecture using the same composition of sectors may have more similar

interaction problems than institutional architecture with other compositions of

sectors. To have the composition of sectors at the centre of the typology makes

it conceptually easier to conduct research on the real world functioning of institu-

tional architecture as a whole. Typology delivers a starting point for research on

the interplay of their parts – one of the lacunas of prior research (Jahan 2010, 4).

Possibility Space

Following from the building principles of the typology there is a particular possi-

bility space. There are 16 (= 24) possibilities that a specific sector occurs once or

not. Those are the 16 types. Due to conceptual considerations there is one en-

largement of this 16 folded typology. A State-run Women’s Organization (O2) is a

particular form of women’s policy agencies (see Section 5.2.2). The occurrence of

a State-run Women’s Organization may have a larger impact on the institutional

architecture as a whole than other forms of women’s policy agencies. Therefore,

all institutional architecture with occurrence of a State-run Women’s Organiza-

tion are taken together in a separate type, the Type O2. It is the only type where

the capital letters do not specify the occurring sectors, but a particular form of

women’s policy agency. In this type the number of sectors is not predefined by

the type. It is open to the individual case of institutional architecture how many

sectors there are present next to the outside sector (O) given by the State-run

Women’s Organization (O2). Therefore, Table 6.1 exhibits in the case of Type O2

only dots in the executive and the legislative sector, and in the judiciary, whereas

other types indicate the occurrence or absence of a particular sector. Hence, for

the typology as a whole, there is a possibility space of 17 types (= 24+1).

Basic Types and Dimension Plus Area

In the discussion of the types the redundant sectors are named. They are referred

to as the dimension plus area. They vary in numbers. In particular types they are

widespread. Cases with a dimension plus area are sub-summed under the basic

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type. The reduction of the sector pattern by subsuming them under the basic

types is a reduction of complexity, especially in the case of occurrence of executive

sector where there are four possible forms of women’s policy agencies.

When is There No Specific State Capability?

If a state has no women’s policy agencies at all, then this institutional architecture

is not comprehensive. One may wonder why no women’s policy agencies should

count as an institutional architecture. One may even wonder where the minimal

limit is for single machinery in the terminology of the field of women’s policy ma-

chinery. There is no clear cut answer to this important question. Provisionally,

this dissertation regards an institutional architecture without any form of women’s

policy agency as a particular form of institutional architecture (Type Zero). Hav-

ing no women’s policy agencies at all is part of the possibility space. States are

responsible and accountable for their actions and inactions. It is again and again a

decision of a state not to have any form of women’s policy agency. It is a possible

reality of current statehood to work without any form of women’s policy agency.

However, I distinguish between institutional architecture and specific state capa-

bility. By my definition a state with an institutional architecture without any form

of women’s policy agency (Type Zero) has no specific state capability. Or in other

words, there is no women’s machinery in this state.

6.2.3 Other Groupings of Institutional Architecture

Typology of institutional architecture gives with 17 types a lot of details. There

are various ways to utilize the typology of institutional architecture in a more

aggregated form: groups, comprehensiveness and sizes of institutional architecture.

Groups of Institutional Architecture

The first other way to group various institutional architecture is the one of merging

types into groups. The 17 possible types are taken together into six groups along

the number of occurring sectors. In group one all four sectors (E, L, J, and O)

occur. In group two three sectors out of four occur. Group three is a special case.

137

It assembles all the institutional architecture with a State-run Women’s Organi-

zation. It is open to the individual case if a particular institutional architecture in

this group has one, two, three or four sectors.

Type Group ComprehensivenessType ELJO group 1 Most comprehensiveType ELJ group 2 More comprehensiveType ELO group 2 More comprehensiveType EJO group 2 More comprehensiveType LJO group 2 More comprehensiveType O2 group 3 openType EL group 4 Less comprehensiveType EJ group 4 Less comprehensiveType EO group 4 Less comprehensiveType LJ group 4 Less comprehensiveType LO group 4 Less comprehensiveType JO group 4 Less comprehensiveType E group 5 Less comprehensiveType L group 5 Less comprehensiveType J group 5 Less comprehensiveType O group 5 Less comprehensiveType Zero group 6 Not comprehensive

Table 6.2: Other groupings of different institutional architecture.

Table 6.1 on page 132 indicates this openness of the number of occurring sectors

by three dots (...). Group four entails two of possible four sectors. Group five has

one sector and group six has zero sectors. In group six there are the states without

any women’s policy agencies after the used definition.

Comprehensiveness of Institutional Architecture

The second way to aggregate the typology is to merge types along the breadth of

their approach to gender inequality. Building on the idea that gender inequality

is a societal phenomenon built into most societal fabrics it is one perspective to

mend gender inequality in many settings at the same time to improve women’s

empowerment and bring the possibility of more gender equality in the daily life of

citizens. Such a broad approach is reflected in state action by taking all sectors of

138

governmental action into account to contribute to gender equality. States taking

action in several or all sectors may achieve better results than states focused on

one or two sectors. Further research may show if this conceptual assumption holds.

Therefore, the types of institutional architecture are aggregated to three levels of

comprehensiveness. States without any forms of women’s policy agencies in any

sector have no comprehensive institutional architecture. States with a less com-

prehensive institutional architecture operate in one or two sector of governmental

action. That encompasses the Types E, L, J, O, EL, EJ, EO, LJ, LO, and JO.

States with a more comprehensive institutional architecture have three or four sec-

tors of governmental action; the types ELJ, ELO, EJO, LJO and ELJO. The most

comprehensive institutional architecture is Type ELJO. States with an institu-

tional architecture of the Type O2 are attributed on an individual basis according

to their number of occurring sectors to the different levels of comprehensiveness.

Sizes of Institutional Architecture

There are two other measurements to represent the size of institutional architec-

ture: nominal and conceptual size.

There is a difference between the conceptual size and the nominal size of an

institutional architecture. The nominal number of different forms of women’s

policy agencies in a state is the conceptual size of an institutional architecture.

This number may differ from the nominal number of women’s policy agencies

in a particular state, the size of an institutional architecture. Nominal number

of women’s policy agencies (nominal size of institutional architecture) ≥ 13 ≥Nominal number of different forms of women’s policy agencies, the conceptual

size.6

For instance: Sudan reports a Minister, a Ministry of Social Care, Women and

Child Affairs, gender units in some ministries and a Division of Woman and Family

in a ministry. The nominal size is at least four: Minister, Ministry, and (at least)7

two Units in a Ministry. The conceptual size is two; Ministry or Minister and Unit

in a Ministry.

6Table 9.9.1 in Appendix C gives the attribution of institutional architecture of states sortedalphabetically.

7As there seem to be gender units in more than one ministry.

139

Levels of Institutional Architecture

The conceptual size is used for another grouping of institutional architecture: the

levels. Depending on the conceptual size of an institutional architecture different

levels of institutional architecture are defined. There are six levels of institutional

architecture (see Table 6.3). Note this measurement is not based on the types, the

sectors of governmental action. It counts the number of different forms of women’s

policy agencies (conceptual size).

The conceptual size is an indicator for the sophistication of the problem analysis

of the state and its willingness to make a remedy to gender inequality in all places

where it appears. The distinctive qualities of the various forms of women’s policy

agencies means that a larger number of different forms might be better suited to

adapt to different challenges in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender

equality policies.

This measurement is suitable if conceptual size is too detailed, or when concep-

tual size, group and attribution to types differ widely. For instance the institutional

architecture of Italy has a conceptual size of six different forms of women’s policy

agencies. Due to the concentration of them in the executive sector (all four forms

available) and the outside sector the institutional architecture is of the less com-

prehensive Type EO. A minimal version of the Type EO has one women’s policy

agency in the executive and one in the outside sector. Hence, it has in minimum a

conceptual size of two. With the levels such a state has a bottom level institutional

architecture, while Italy has a rudimentary level of institutional architecture.

Range Levels of Institutional Architecture

0 No

level of institutional architecture

1–3 Bottom4–6 various forms Rudimentary7–9 of WPAs Noticeable

10–12 Big13 Encompassing

Table 6.3: Levels of comprehensiveness of institutional architecture.

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6.2.4 Labelling of Types of Institutional Architecture

There are two names for each of the 17 types of institutional architecture. The

short names introduced above are for tables and depictions with little space for

the long labels. The long name spells out the different sectors of governmental

action in which there are women’s policy agencies.

Short Label Long Label

Type ELJO state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy typeType ELJ state administrative-legislator-judiciary typeType ELO state administrative-legislator-advocacy typeType EJO state administrative-judiciary-advocacy typeType LJO legislator-judiciary-advocacy typeType O2 SWO-governed typeType EL state administrative-legislator typeType EJ state administrative-judiciary typeType EO state administrative-advocacy typeType LJ legislator-judiciary- typeType LO legislator-advocacy typeType JO judiciary-advocacy typeType E exclusively state administrative typeType L exclusively legislator typeType J exclusively judiciary typeType O exclusively advocacy typeType Zero type zero

Table 6.4: Attribution of long labels to types of institutional architecture.

Table 6.4 identifies the attribution of the short and the long label. The long

labels are built by a name for each sector of governmental action indicating the

function of this sector. State administrative stands for the executive and legislator

for the legislative branch of government, judiciary for the judiciary and advocacy

for the outside sector of governmental action.

6.3 Visualization of Institutional Architecture

As described in the method section, visualization of institutional architecture was

used as a heuristic device to make sense of the data. During this process several

141

prototypes of visualization were created. The final one consists of a solid with

17 faces. One face stands for one of the 17 types of institutional architecture.

The solid resembles slightly on a globe. However, the solid does not represent

geographical location of oceans, mountains, rivers, and states. The solid visualizes

the universe of current institutional architecture and depicts the cluster of states

which have the same type of institutional architecture. It depicts the whole world

of institutional architecture in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender

equality. Pictures are available on www.christine-scheidegger.ch.

The seventeen faces consist of eleven pentagon and five squares. The solid is

built from a regular dodecahedron8 and another solid which emerges from one of

the pentagons of the dodecahedron. This second solid consists of a pentagon as

basal face and opposite another pentagon. The two pentagons are connected with

five squares using each one edge of the two pentagons.

The pentagon is taken as a basal form to depict the four sectors of governmental

action and the states with this type of institutional architecture. Occurring sectors

are grey-marked. The five squares are for the four types with one sector (Type E,

L, J and O) and Type O2 (special type). On the solid Type Zero and Type ELJO

are arranged opposite to each other. All other types are in between those two.

Types with the same number of occurring sectors have the same background

colour. They are part of the same group (see Table 6.2). The colours are selected

from the spectral colours. They are attributed to groups along their occurrence in

the visible spectrum. White for nothing, yellow for one sector, red for the SWO-

governed type (Type O2), green for two sectors, blue for three sectors and violet

for all four sectors of governmental action.

It is up to the beholder if the solid should stand on the type zero (Type Zero)

and enfold the bigger types as a tree top (historical perspective) or have the state

administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type (Type ELJO) as the underlying

goal and exposing the smaller types. A third group of beholders lays the solid on

its side.

After its creation this solid functions mainly as a communicative device. It

allows to present results of the dissertation in a few minutes. Persons exposed to

the solid and the introduction by the author take the solid often in their hands. In

8That is a solid with 16 faces, consisting of pentagons.

142

many cases follows a discussion with surprising and inspiring questions. The solid

causes this effect for various sorts of persons.9 It seems to make science tangible.

The solid has some advantages over the rather technical descriptions in Chap-

ter eight or the Table 9.9.1 in the Appendix listing all states alphabetically. It

contains all information at once, without reducing the institutional complexity of

the typology of institutional architecture. For layperson and scholars it is a device

to get in touch with the question of gender equality architecture worldwide. The

large number of states makes it appealing to look for the own country, compare

it with countries in the same type or with other countries one is interested in. In

such a situation it is a communication tool to transport basic information.

However, it is more. The possibility to rotate the solid and take a close look

on the sample of states in the types near the country or type of interests generates

questions why those states are together or apart. Some of those questions might

become research questions for a broader ambit. The assembling of states with

the same type of institutional architecture often reveals ethnocentric assumptions,

touristic glimpses and religious or racialist prejudices about various states in gen-

eral and in particular regarding gender equality. Beyond its question generating

ability, it might be used as a stimulus in stereotype research.

9Artisans; cultural, information, natural, and social scientists, stewards, people in the train,practitioners; feminists and not feminists.

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Part III: Comparative Empirical

Analysis

144

Chapter 7

Mapping Women’s Policy

Agencies Worldwide

This chapter holds a detailed description of the worldwide appearance of different

forms of women’s policy agencies at the end of the first decade of the 21st century

on a global, a state and a regional level. Each level is discussed in a section. The

fourth section reflects the appropriateness of the term women’s policy agency in

the light of the global empirical distribution of the phenomenon.

7.1 Women’s Policy Agencies on a Global Level

This section analyses women’s policy agency as a phenomenon on a global level.

Overall, there are 776 entries in the data set classified as women’s policy agen-

cies. Those entries are the basis of analysis in the next three chapters. 776 women’s

policy agencies are a rather small number distributed on 151 states. There are on

average five women’s policy agencies per state. Women’s policy agencies are not

a major quantitative phenomenon with several thousand or hundred thousands of

entities. However, there are several hundred women’s policy agencies in 151 states.

It is quite likely that the used data underestimate the real number of women’s pol-

icy agencies on a global level. Still, even if there are ten women’s policy agencies

in every state more there are less than four thousands women’s policy agencies in

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all states.1 Estimated cautiously for all 202 states, women’s policy agencies are a

phenomena in the low thousands.

The number of different forms of women’s policy agencies per state is smaller.

Per state there are on average 3.6 different forms of women’s policy agencies.2


There are currently thirteen different forms of women’s policy agencies employed

globally. Thirteen different forms are an impressive span of institutional options

states have at their disposal in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender

equality. Those different forms are the range employed by current states.

As Table 7.1 shows the different forms of women’s policy agencies vary in their

empirical frequency. The variation ranges from 0.8 to almost 30 per cent. Con-

sequently, next to the heterogeneity of different forms of women’s policy agencies

there is heterogeneity of employment of such structures.

Unit in a Ministry, Commission and Ministry or Minister are empirically the

most widespread forms of women’s policy agencies. A majority of 60 per cent of

current women’s policy agencies are one of those three forms. The most widely used

form of women’s policy agency is the Unit in a Ministry (E3). Three out of ten

women’s policy agencies are Units in a Ministry. The next frequently used forms of

women’s policy agencies have only half of the share of Units in a Ministry. However,

the categories Commission (O1) and Ministry or Minister (E2) are widespread.

Every sixth entity is a Commission and every seventh entity is a Ministry or

Minister. 75 per cent of all current women’s policy agencies in 151 states are of

one of the five forms: the Unit in a Ministry, the Commission, the Ministry or

Minister, the Coordinating Body (E4), and Legislative Committee (L2). In the top

five there is a strong representation of women’s policy agencies of the executive

sector.

After the top five, there is a group of four forms of women’s policy agencies;

Equality Authority, Monitoring Body, Human Rights Body, and Unit in Top Level

Government, which are by far less frequent. However, all four are potentially

1The phenomenon would then be five times bigger than the data exhibit.2In contrast, the proportion of ignored entries is high. On average there are 2.7 entities per

state which were reported, but were not counted as specific state capability.

146

ShortForm of

Frequency PercentageCumulative

Women’s Policy Agency Percentage

E3 Unit in a Ministry 228 29.4 29.4O1 Commission 130 16.8 46.1E2 Ministry or Minister 107 13.8 59.9E4 Coordination Body 70 9.0 68.9L2 Legislative Committee 59 7.6 76.5J2 Equality Authority 49 6.3 82.9O3 Monitoring Body 33 4.3 87.1J1 Human Rights Body 30 3.9 91.0E1 Unit in Top Level Government 27 3.5 94.5L3 Legislative Caucus 14 1.8 96.3O2 State-run Women’s Organization 13 1.7 97.9J3 Working Group in Judiciary 10 1.3 99.2L1 CC in Legislative Assembly 6 0.8 100.0

1–13 Total 776 100.0

Table 7.1: Global frequencies of various forms of women’s policyagencies (WPAs).

strong forms of women’s policy agencies which are able to reach binding decisions

and to influence political agenda setting. Still, as the middle group they have

certain empirical relevance. Quantitatively of marginal importance (less than 3%

of all entities) are the Legislative Caucus (1.8%), State-run Women’s Organiza-

tion (1.7%), Working Group in the Judiciary (1.3%), and Competence Centre in

Legislative Assembly (0.8%).

In summary, states employ currently a wide range of forms of women’s policy

agencies. Furthermore, they apply those forms to various degrees and with a

preference for forms in the executive sector. Many of the potentially strong forms

are of medium empirical relevance.

7.1.2 Varying Empirical and Conceptual Relevance of Forms

In the following the frequency of each form of women’s policy agencies from Unit

in Top Level Government (E1) to Monitoring Body (O3) is discussed on a global

level.

147

On the one hand, category Unit in Top Level Government (E1) is rarely de-

scribed in the literature. In this light, it is currently broadly employed empiri-

cally. On the other hand, the international community emphasizes on and on that

women’s policy agencies should be at the highest possible location in the govern-

ment (BDPA 1995). The Unit in Top Level Government is, beside the Ministry

or Minister, the possible highest entity. In the worldwide comparison Unit in Top

Level Government are of marginal empirically importance (3.5%).

Berkovitch reports 36 ministries worldwide for the beginning of the 1990s

(Berkovitch 1999, 166). This is a significant lower number than the 61 ministries

and the 46 ministers in the broader category Ministry or Minister (E2). Hence,

this category became a relevant part of current specific state capability. However,

the category Ministry or Minister is not the major backbone on a global level.

They are with 107 entities (14%) empirically the number three behind Unit in a

Ministry (30%) and Commission (17%).3 Still, Ministry or Minister is a globally

relevant category.

The Unit in a Ministry (E3) is by far the most frequently employed form

of women’s policy agency. Almost 30 per cent of all women’s policy agencies

globally have this form. Clearly, the main backbone of global state capability in

women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality is Unit in a Ministry. Its

empirical weight on a global level makes it understandable why it is prototypical in

prior research. Its empirical weight gives the phenomenon under study the name

women’s policy agency. Measured over the global occurrence of different forms of

women’s policy agencies the name is an appropriate denomination.

3The smaller empirical weight of Ministry or Minister on a global level in comparison toUnit in a Ministry and Commission stands in contrast to the restricted view which is possibleon African states with the available, limited data. They consist mainly of the entries of thedirectories and give not the whole picture about the institutional architecture of African states.It is noteworthy, that more than 70 per cent of the zero to four entities that are available in thedata from African states are of the category Ministry or Minister. The share of Unit in TopLevel Government is similar to the one on a global level. Number three are with 13 per cent theUnit in a Ministry. In view of that, African states may have a much stronger focus on formsof women’s policy agencies in upper levels of hierarchy, a situation which would be more in linewith demands of international community than the observed distribution on a global level. Theempirical weight of the Ministry or Minister within the executive branch and over all four sectorsis in strong contrast to the distribution of entities in other part of the worlds. This glimpse onthe current empirical situation of African states shows the conceptual and empirical relevance ofresearch on Africa states. Future research should research the situations in Africa more in depth.

148

4.3

1.7

16.8

1.3

6.3

3.9

1.8

7.6

0.8

9.0

29.4

13.8

3.5

0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0

Monitoring Body

State-run Women's Organization

Commission

Working Group in Judiciary

Equality Authority

Human Rights Body

Legislative Caucus

Legislative Committee

CC in Legislative Assembly

Coordination Body

Unit in a Ministry

Ministry or Minister

Unit in Top Level Government

Percentage of all Women's Policy Agencies

Form

s of

Wom

en's

Polic

y A

genc

ies

Different Forms of Women's Policy Agencies Globally

Figure 7.1: Empirical weight of forms of women’s policy agencies globally.

One reason for the larger number of Unit in a Ministry is that there is more than

one instance where they may be employed. As there are a number of ministries

per state and there can be more than one Unit in Ministry in any ministry.

As global number four, Coordinating Body (E4), has with 70 entries (9%) an

empirical relevance. Every tenth women’s policy agency globally is a Coordinating

Body. This form of women’s policy agency can be quite weak. With this empirical

weight it is astonishing that they are rarely under research.

There are with six entries (0.8%) only a very small number of entities in cat-

egory Competence Centre in Legislative Assembly (L1). Their low number is sur-

prising. One reason could be that UN Division for the Advancement of Women

did not ask for it in the survey (Jahan 2008; UN DAW 2009). Still, is this form of

women’s policy agency currently empirically so rare because it might be effective?

149

Research beyond this study may deliver an answer.

An entity with a clear empirical relevance is the Legislative Committee. An

existence of 59 entries (7.6%) is globally prominent. As in the instance of the Unit

in a Ministry the higher number of Legislative Committee can be expected because

there are usually a number of legislative committees in the parliamentary assembly.

Therefore, there can be more than one in the realm of women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality per state. In regard of that, the worldwide number

is rather small.

The last form of women’s policy agency in the legislative branch of government

is the Legislative Caucus (L3). On a global level they are with 14 entries (1.8%)

rare. The questionnaire of UN Division for the Advancement of Women did not

explicitly asked for this form of women’s policy agencies (UN DAW 2009). How-

ever, they are named several times in the supplementary document (Jahan 2008,

3, 8, 18, 25).

In contrast, the number of entities in category Human Rights Body (J1) is

astonishing high, given, that UN Division for the Advancement of Women did not

ask for this sort of entity (Jahan 2008; UN DAW 2009). However, it is disputable

if they are a specific enough to be part of specific state capability. With 30 entries

(3.9%) they exist on a global scale.

More widespread, with 6.3 per cent of all reported women’s policy agencies on

a global scale (49 instances), is the form Equality Authority (J2). In principle, this

form of women’s policy agency may contribute substantially to gender equality by

deciding over law suits in questions of gender discrimination. Measured on the in-

ternational rhetoric about the role of law for gender equality the number of equality

authorities is rather small. Those figures may be underestimates as states do not

regard the equality authorities as part of the women’s policy agency framework.

Nonetheless, in the international framework of juridification of gender equality and

human rights the numbers of existing Equality Authority is surprisingly small. As

well as in comparison to the Legislative Caucus. The number appears even lower

against the background that there might be several Equality Authorities per state

for different issues (e.g. paid labour, family law or sexual harassment).

UN Division for the Advancement of Women explicitly asked for information

about working groups, but not on working groups in the judiciary (Jahan 2008,

150

2; UN DAW 2009, 6, 8, 18). There are a small number of ten entries (1.3%)

in category Working Group in Judiciary (J3). It is possible that the reporting

persons were not aware of such entities or did not consider them as women’s

policy agencies.

Commissions (O1) are quantitatively an important category: 130 entries (16.8%).

It is number two among the women’s policy agencies worldwide. Given the possi-

bility that there might be several commissions in the same state for various issues

it is not surprising that they are empirically relevant. Furthermore, it is the resid-

ual category. However, in general, a Commission is a rather weak form of women’s

policy agency.

The category State-run Women’s Organization (SWO, O2), is the only category

to which a reduced number of states have access. The partly free and not free states

hold a share of 28 per cent4 on the 151 states. Thirteen of them (1.7%) report

the existence of a State-run Women’s Organization.5 Thus, almost 70 per cent

of states with limited political freedom have no State-run Women’s Organization

or did not report one.6 Or in other words, State-run Women’s Organization as a

strategy is employed by less than a third of limited Free states. Overall, State-run

Women’s Organizations are not an empirically dominant strategy. However, they

have a considerable share in a particular part of states. Empirically, they are more

widespread than the Competence Centre in the Legislative Assembly.

In the category Monitoring Body (O3) are with 30 entries (3.9%) only a few

entities. The low number is noteworthy given the omnipresence of neoliberal dis-

courses in many states on the necessity to evaluate public administration. Fur-

thermore, Monitoring Body is one of those forms of women’s policy agencies from

which a state can employ more than one to account for various topics.

This detailed discussion of different forms of women’s policy agencies shows

that there is an uneven distribution of different forms of women’s policy agencies

on a global level. Several forms can occur more than once per state (E1 to E3,

442 of 151 states. The share of the sample of limited free states is slightly smaller than theshare for the whole world, which is 33 per cent (67 of 202 states and territories).

513 of 42 limited free states = 31 per cent.6The Arab spring of 2011 does not affect those numbers. Yemen is the only state with a high

ranking in the freedom house index and a change of the situation in the spring 2011 until now(September 2011).

151

L2, J2, O1 and O3)7. Forms with possible strong influence (Unit in Top Level

Government, Competence Centre in Legislative Assembly, Human Rights Body,

Equality Authority and Monitoring Body) are rare.8 The empirical distribution

per sector is carrot shaped: Few at the summit, more in between and few at the

bottom line.

7.1.3 Occurrence of Sectors of Governmental Action

This subsection analyses the global distribution of women’s policy agencies into

sectors. On a global level state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion

of gender equality is not evenly spread between the four sectors of governmental

action (see Table 7.2).

Sectors Frequency PercentageCumulativePercentage

Executive 432 56.6 56.6Outside 176 22.7 79.3Legislative 89 11.1 90.3Judiciary 79 9.7 100.0Total 776 100.0

Table 7.2: Sectors globally.

The main sector is clearly the executive sector. 493 entities or nearly 57 per

cent of all entities are part of this sector. The other three sectors have a share

between ten and twenty per cent. The sector outside the three primary branches

of government is number two in respect to quantities of entities. 22.7 per cent of

all included entities are in this sector. The legislative and the juridical sectors are

quantitatively much less prominent. With a bit more than ten per cent their size

is almost identical. The executive sector has one form of women’s policy agency

more than the other three sectors (four instead of three) and more forms which

can be employed several times. Even against this background, the executive sector

7Unit in Top Level Government, Ministry or Minister, Unit in a Ministry, Coordinating Body,Legislative Committee, Equality Authority, Commission and Monitoring Body.

8Their source of strengths are intervention or regulatory competencies or their nexus to thecentre of political state power.

152

56%

11%

10%

23%

Sectors Globally

Executive

Legislative

Judiciary

Outside

Figure 7.2: Empirical weight of sectors of governmental action globally.

is quantitatively strong. Still, the empirical weight of the executive sector is not

as strong as it would be appropriate to focus research only on women’s policy

agencies in the executive sector.

While, the coding scheme is conceptually balanced in its number of possible

forms of women’s policy agencies, the empirical employment of sectors of govern-

mental action is not. The executive sector is quantitatively dominant. The outside

sector is dominated by the Commission. Women’s policy agencies in the legisla-

tive and judiciary sector are not inexistent, yet with ten per cent each they are

rare. Both sectors are relevant for the long term changes of society as a whole.

Are states doing enough to guarantee the human right of gender equality in those

sectors of governmental action?

More than half of all women’s policy agencies globally are in the executive

153

sector. As a result, the empirical data support the conceptual and empirical focus

of the literature9 on entities in the executive sector, especially women’s offices

and gender equality ministries. Considering the different empirical weights of the

sectors and the women’s policy agencies within, it is no accident that prior research

centred its attention on Unit in a Ministry, Commission and Ministry or Minister.

That mirrors their empirical weight on a global level.

9E.g. see lists of forms of women’s policy agencies in Section 5.1.

154

7.2 Women’s Policy Agencies per State

This section analyses women’s policy agency (WPA) as a phenomenon at the level

of states. Hence, all women’s policy agencies per state are at the focus of attention.

7.2.1 Number of Women’s Policy Agencies per State

States vary in their numbers of employed women’s policy agencies. The following

numbers give the nominal size of an institutional architecture. There is a big

range of numbers of women’s policy agencies per state (see Table 7.3 and Figure

7.3). States employ between zero and twenty-five women’s policy agencies. On a

global level the size of institutional architecture varies widely. It is not possible to

delimit three or four clusters. An overwhelming majority (87.4%) of states have an

institutional architecture of a size between one and eight women’s policy agencies.

The median is five and the mean 5.14 entities per state. The mean is slightly

biased due to the outliers of 15 respectively 25 entities per state by the Phillipines

and Spain. The distribution of numbers of women’s policy agencies per state is

right skewed. There are several modi: 3, 6, 10, 12, 15 and 25. That implies that

there is neither a continuous distribution, nor a cluster of states with a particular

number women’s policy agencies.

Thirty per cent of states have an institutional architecture with a size above

five women’s policy agencies. In other words, most institutional architecture of

states are small. Ten per cent of states globally have more than nine women’s

policy agencies in their institutional architecture. A quarter of all women’s policy

agencies globally are concentrated in 12 per cent of the states, the top 18 states.

There is a lonely top rank with one state having 25 entities of women’s policy

agencies. At the other end of the spectrum, there is one state without any form

of women’s policy agency (Monaco).

On the level of states, women’s policy agencies are a global phenomenon. Under

the 151 states there is one state without any women’s policy agency. On the other

side, 99.3 per cent of the states in the sample have at least one women’s policy

agency.10 Concluding, women’s policy agencies are a phenomenon available in

10Many people are surprised about this almost global spread of women’s policy agencies.

155

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

Num

ber o

f Sta

tes

Number of Women's Policy Agencies per State

Nominal Size of Institutional Architecture per State

Figure 7.3: Nominal size of institutional architecture per state.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Num

ber o

f Sta

tes

Number of Different Forms of Women's Policy Agencies per State

Conceptual Size of Institutional Architecture per State

Figure 7.4: Conceptual size of institutional architecture per state.

156

Number SizePercentage

Cumulativeof States of IA Percentage

1 0 0.7 0.716 1 10.6 11.316 2 10.6 21.925 3 16.6 38.415 4 9.9 48.313 5 8.6 57.019 6 12.6 69.515 7 9.9 79.513 8 8.6 88.15 9 3.3 91.46 10 4.0 95.41 11 0.7 96.03 12 2.0 98.01 13 0.7 98.71 15 0.7 99.31 25 0.7 100.0

151 100.0

Mode 3; 6; 10; 12; 15 and 25Median 5Mean 5.1Std. Deviation 3.38Skewness 1.72

Table 7.3: Nominal size of institutional architecture and descriptives.

almost all states. Given the heterogeneity of gender systems and of various sets of

gender inequalities, it is truly noteworthy that almost all states have at least one

women’s policy agency. Women’s policy agencies seem to be regarded as a viable

solution on a global scale. This can be considered as institutional isomorphism.

The size of institutional architecture in single states varies mainly between one and

ten women’s policy agencies. There is an outlier with 25 women’s policy agencies.

Measured over the nominal size, institutional architecture is a global phenomenon

as well. However, the single institutional architecture is usually rather small.

157

7.2.2 Different Forms of Women’s Policy Agencies per State

The distribution of different forms of women’s policy agency per state is less right

skewed than the distribution of all women’s policy agencies (see Table 7.4 and

Figure 7.4). The range is with zero to nine much smaller than for all women’s

policy agencies per state. Under the different forms of women’s policy agencies

there is no outlier. More than 50 per cent of states have less than four different

forms of women’s policy agencies. In other words, there are many states with

a small institutional architecture. The largest twenty per cent of institutional

architecture has more than five different forms of women’s policy agencies. Clearly,

states employ currently a bottom line orientation in respect to conceptual size of

institutional architecture.

The distribution shows a continuous lump ranging from one to six different

forms of women’s policy agencies. A clearly detectable top group is not visible.

There is neither a top flight nor a bottom line group. The distribution is even

more accentuated than in the case of the number of women’s policy agencies. In

short, there is a continuous lump from one to six forms of women’s policy agencies.

Women’s policy agencies are unevenly distributed to states. Six per cent of

states have a share of 12.5 per cent on all different forms of women’s policy agen-

cies.11 In this top flight are Spain, Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Costa Rica, El

Salvador, Greece, the Philippines, and Poland. On average those nine states have

7.6 different forms of women’s policy agencies. A broad range of different forms of

women’s policy agencies exists mainly in those states. Other states select from a

wide range of forms of women’s policy agencies, but analysis of a particular state

shows that the single state does not employ a wide range of forms of women’s

policy agencies.

7.2.3 No Global Form of Women’s Policy Agency

There is no form of women’s policy agency which exists in all states. On a global

level Table 7.5 shows that there are 228 Units in a Ministry. However, not each

of the 151 states in the analysed sample has a Unit in a Ministry. There are a

couple of states having several ones and a couple of states having none. There are

1168/545 = 12.5%.

158

Number Different Forms ofPercentage

Cumulativeof States WPAs per State Percentage

1 0 0.7 0.718 1 11.9 12.631 2 20.5 33.131 3 20.5 53.622 4 14.6 68.220 5 13.2 81.519 6 12.6 94.05 7 3.3 97.43 8 2.0 99.31 9 0.7 100.0

151 100.0

Mode 2 and 3Median 3.0Mean 3.6Std. Deviation 1.87Skewness 0.46

Table 7.4: Conceptual size of institutional architecture and descriptives.

Different Forms of WPAs ShortGlobal No. of Percentage

Existence States of States

Unit in a Ministry E3 228 126 83Commission O1 130 89 59Ministry or Minister E2 107 67 44Coordination Body E4 70 52 34Legislative Committee L2 59 47 31Equality Authority J2 49 43 29Monitoring Body O3 33 27 18Human Rights Body J1 28 28 19Unit in Top Level Government E1 27 22 15Legislative Caucus L3 14 13 9State-run Women’s Organization O2 13 13 9Working Group in Judiciary J3 10 10 7CC in Legislative Assembly L1 6 6 4Total 776 151

Table 7.5: Number of different forms of women’s policy agencies per state.

159

126 states with at least one Unit in a Ministry. Those are 83 per cent of all states.

That signifies, not even the most widely spread form of women’s policy agency

exists in all states. Hence, no form of women’s policy agencies is globally spread

in the sense that it exists in every state. The second most widely spread form

of women’s policy agency, the Commission, is employed in almost 60 per cent of

states. However, a large number of states (40%) do not have a Commission at

their disposition. All the other forms of women’s policy agencies are much rarer.

Half of the forms have a share of less than 20 per cent of states.

In summary, states employ the idea that women’s policy agencies are part of

statehood. However, there is not one form of women’s policy agency which is

employed by all states. A wide range of thirteen different forms of women’s policy

agencies is in use. Even the most widespread forms of women’s policy agencies

are not employed by all states. There is not a global idea which form of women’s

policy agency is the manifestation of the idea women’s policy agency.

7.2.4 Uneven Distribution of Forms among States

Some states run several entities of the same form of women’s policy agencies. The

columns ‘Once’ up to ‘More’ of Table 7.6 indicate their frequency. The last column

indicates a strong uneven employment of forms of women’s policy agencies between

states. 71 per cent of all Units in a Ministry exist in states which employ more than

one entity in a ministry. The share is more equal in the case of Commission. The

states which have several commissions account for 50 per cent of this women’s

policy agency. The second strongly unevenly employed form of women’s policy

agency is a Ministry or Minister. 70 per cent of the category Ministry or Minister

is employed by states which have several of this form of women’s policy agency.

The other forms are more evenly distributed between the states having one or

several of a particular form of women’s policy agency. The rarest forms of women’s

policy agencies are used only once per state.

One or Several Per State

The women’s policy agencies are unevenly distributed between states with one

and several of the same form. In the case of Unit in a Ministry five per cent

160

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161

of all states (5 cases) in the sample have a share of 16 per cent (36 entities) of

all existing Units in a Ministry. 35 per cent of all states globally (53 cases with

two or three Units in a Ministry) have 55 per cent (126 entities) of all reported

Units in a Ministry. In the case of Ministry or Minister there are 35 states which

have more than one of this forms of women’s policy agency.12 They are half of the

states having a Ministry or Minister. However, they have 70 per cent of all reported

Ministry or Minister. In other words, the different forms of women’s policy agencies

are unevenly distributed among the states. The uneven distribution is especially

prominent in the top five of different forms of women’s policy agencies.

From the 42 states reporting Legislative Committees 30 states have one Leg-

islative Committee, 10 states have two, Spain has three and Romania reports four

entities. The weight of states with two and more entities means that only 30 per

cent of states have Legislative Committee(s). There are nine states with two or

three legislative committees. In five states there is one committee in the chamber

of representatives and one in the senate. In three cases there are two committees

with a different focus in the same chamber.

If there is any, there is usually one Legislative Caucus per state. The exception

is France, which has two; one in the Senate and one in the National Assembly.

Of the 71 states with Commissions 68 per cent (48 states) have one commission.

The next 24 per cent (17 states) have two commissions. Four states have three

commissions. Bulgaria has four commissions and Israel five. Still, not every state

has one. With 103 for 141 states its number is definite below the total number of

analysed states. The number of states without any commission is even lower as

there are several states with several commissions. In the end, 70 states or 50 per

cent of states are without any commission.

7.2.5 Occurrence of Different Sectors per State

This subsection analyses a global level the distribution of women’s policy agencies

to sectors per state.

States have a clear preference for women’s policy agencies in two particular

12E.g. Afghanistan, Cambodia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nepal, Peru, Spain, Tunisia, andUnited Kingdom.

162

sectors (see Table 7.7). 94 per cent of states have at least one women’s policy

agency in the executive sector. In other words, on the state level the executive

sector is even more dominant than on a global level. Almost 70 per cent of states

have at least one women’s policy agency in the outside sector. A large majority of

states has women’s policy agencies in the executive and the outside sector.

SectorsFrequency Per PercentageGlobally State of States

Executive 432 142 94.0Outside 176 103 68.2Judiciary 79 61 40.4Legislative 89 59 39.1Total 776 151

Table 7.7: Sectors per state.

In comparison to all women’s policy agencies on a global level per state, there

is a slight change of the order of sectors between the legislative and the judiciary.

Judiciary are empirically a bit more prominent than the legislative sector of gov-

ernmental action. On the level of states those two sectors are only for a minority

of 40 per cent of states an area for specific state action in women’s empowerment

and promotion of gender equality.

States differ in the number of employed sectors in their institutional architec-

ture (see Table 7.8). 30 per cent of states have three sectors, a good quarter has two

sectors and almost twenty per cent have one sector. The most comprehensive insti-

tutional architecture, the one with four sectors, is present in 16 per cent of states

on a global level. Almost nine per cent of states have a State-run Women’s Orga-

nization (O2) in their institutional architecture and one state (0.7%) has no sector

at all. To sum up, measured in number of sectors there is a wide range of sizes of

institutional architecture. Figure 7.5 illustrates the empirical relevance of different

numbers of governmental sectors by font sizes.13 The type zero (Type Zero) which

has no sector at all is with one case almost invisible. In a global perspective four

sectors, the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type (Type ELJO)

is far from dominant.

13Word clouds were generated by http://www.wordle.net/advanced.

163

Group Frequency PercentageCumulativePercentage

Three Sectors 45 29.8 29.8Two Sectors 40 26.5 56.3One Sector 28 18.5 74.8Four Sectors 24 15.9 90.7O2 13 8.6 99.3No Sector 1 0.7 100.0Total 151 100.0

Table 7.8: Occurrence of number of sectors per state.

Figure 7.5: Word cloud visualising number of occurring sectors.

164

75 per cent of all states have an institutional architecture with three, two or

one sector. Almost half of all states in the sample have an institutional archi-

tecture with one or two sectors. That indicates half of the states have a little

comprehensive institutional architecture.

Empirically, states with more sectors have a higher number of women’s policy

agencies and a higher number of different forms of women’s policy agencies than

states with fewer sectors. This is probable; however, it does not have to be like

this. It would also be possible that states with two sectors may have more different

forms of women’s policy agencies and even more forms of women’s policy agen-

cies than states with three or more occurring sectors. The reason would be that

there are states with only two sectors, but with many women’s policy agencies.

Empirically this is not the case. There seem to be no states with two sectors in

a ‘waiting position’ to have more women’s policy agencies than an average three

sector institutional architecture.

7.2.6 Discussion of Thesis Statements

This subsection discusses the consequences of the empirical distribution of women’s

policy agencies per state on the thesis statements of this dissertation, that women’s

policy agencies and institutional architecture are global phenomena at the end of

the first decade of the 21st century.

On a state level, women’s policy agencies are a global phenomenon in the sense

that they exist worldwide (99.3%). The most widespread form of women’s policy

agency (Unit in a Ministry) exists in 83 per cent of all states. However, there is no

global form of women’s policy agency. Meaning, a form of women’s policy agency

occurring in all states with women’s policy agencies. This absence of a standard

form of women’s policy agency over all states emphasis the strong heterogeneity

of forms of women’s policy agencies. There is not a global idea which form of

women’s policy agency is the manifestation of the idea women’s policy agency.

The different forms of women’s policy agencies are to various degrees unevenly

distributed to the states. Especially, two of the most widespread forms, the Unit

in a Ministry and the Ministry or Minister are concentrated (70%) in states which

have several of these forms of women’s policy agencies.

165

Different forms of women’s policy agencies are unevenly distributed to states.

For instance, the top nine states hold a share of 6 per cent of all states and

12 per cent of all different forms of women’s policy agencies. 35 per cent of all

states globally have 55 per cent of all reported Units in a Ministry. Specific state

capability is in most cases quite small, regarding the nominal and conceptual size

of institutional architecture. There is a limited number of states with institutional

architecture with three or four sectors (45.7%). On a state level, all four sectors

occur on a global scale in 16 per cent of states.

With its occurrence in 94 per cent of states, the executive sector is clearly

empirically dominant. In view of those patterns, it becomes clear why women’s

policy agencies there are usually the focus in the literature. There is a small em-

pirical difference of the size of a single women’s policy agency, a couple of women’s

policy agencies and an entity called institutional architecture. Even though the

size of institutional architecture varies, they are in general so small that they are

almost not distinguishable from one or several forms of women’s policy agencies

per state in contrast to all women’s policy agencies per state. Hence, empirical

distribution supports prior research in its view to privilege one women’s policy

agency or a small number of women’s policy agencies per state. Empirically, there

is not much more to research per state. In other words, states employ such a small

number of women’s policy agencies that there is almost no distinction between

a single women’s policy agency, a couple of women’s policy agencies and institu-

tional architecture. Exception is a group of eighteen states (12%) with more than

eight women’s policy agencies. They hold a share of 26 per cent (205/776) on all

women’s policy agencies globally.

Therefore, the first and second thesis statements are confirmed. Women’s pol-

icy agencies are a global phenomenon available in various forms and frequencies in

almost all states. The patterns are that the executive and the outside sector are

dominant and that the overall size of institutional architecture is small, while the

different forms are unevenly distributed between states and among states with a

particular form of women’s policy agencies.

166

7.3 Women’s Policy Agencies in Regional

Perspective

This section analyses women’s policy agencies as a phenomenon on a regional

level. There are five world regions mirroring membership of states in the regional

organizations of the United Nations; the UN Economic Commission for Africa, UN

Economic Commission for Europe, UN Economic Commission for Latin America

and the Caribbean, UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific,

and UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia).14 There is no regional

organization of the United Nations covering South-East, Eastern Europe, Caucasus

and Central Asia. Those states are taken together to ECE plus, similar to as it

was done in the regional report of Abdurazakova (2010).

Table 7.9 shows the numbers of states, the cases, in the five covered regions.

There are three bigger and two smaller regions. The bigger regions have between

33 and 43 states. They are: Asia (ESCAP), Europe (ECE) and South America

(ECLAC). The smaller regions have a bit less than 20 states. They are: Western

Asia (ESCWA) and the region covering South-East, Eastern Europe, Caucasus

and Central Asia (ECE plus).

RegionNo. of

PercentageStates

ESCAP 43 28.5ECE 39 25.8ECLAC 34 22.5ESCWA 18 11.9ECE+ 17 11.3Total 151 100.0

Table 7.9: Key figures about regions.

14There are a few states which are member in several of those regional organizations. Attri-bution to regions is made over the regional reports about the situation of the women’s policyagencies, see Tavares da Silva 2010; Fernos 2010b; SDD 2010; Abdurazakova 2010; Jad 2010. Theattribution of states to regions can be seen in Appendix B in Table 9.9.1. Note, United Statesof America and Canada are part of UN Economic Commission for Europe as well as Turkey andIsrael. States of Maghreb are taken together under Western Asia as it is the case in the regionalreports.

167

No. of WPAsESCAP ECE ECLAC ESCWA ECE+ Global

per State

0 0 1 0 0 0 11 6 3 3 2 2 162 4 1 5 5 1 163 8 3 6 4 4 254 5 3 2 3 2 155 3 4 1 2 3 136 5 5 5 1 3 197 4 5 4 0 2 158 4 6 2 1 0 139 3 2 0 0 0 5

10 0 2 4 0 0 611 0 0 1 0 0 112 0 2 1 0 0 313 0 1 0 0 0 114 0 0 0 0 0 015 1 0 0 0 0 116 0 0 0 0 0 017 0 0 0 0 0 018 0 0 0 0 0 019 0 0 0 0 0 020 0 0 0 0 0 021 0 0 0 0 0 022 0 0 0 0 0 023 0 0 0 0 0 024 0 0 0 0 0 025 0 1 0 0 0 1

Total 43 39 34 18 17 151

Table 7.10: Number of women’s policy agencies per state (size of institutionalarchitecture), distinguished by regions.

168

ESCAP ECE ECLAC ESCWA ECE+ Global

Minimum 1 0 1 1 1 0Maximum 15 25 12 8 7 25Mode 1; 3; 6; 15 1; 8; 12; 25 3; 6; 10 2; 8 1, 3; 5 3; 6; 10;

12; 15; 25First Quartile 3 4 2.75 2 3 3Median 4 6 6 3 4 5Third Quartile 7 8 7.25 4.25 6 7Mean 4.8 6.6 5.3 3.3 4.2 5.1Std. Deviation 2.98 4.34 3.21 1.82 1.91 3.38Skewness 0.98 1.94 0.43 1.03 -0.16 1.72N 43 39 34 18 17 151

Table 7.11: Descriptive statistics about women’s policy agencies per stateon regional level.

As it is visible in Table 7.10 there exists no top group in the different regions.

The states are continuously and broadly distributed over the whole range of num-

ber of women’s policy agencies per state. There are two regions having each a

single outlier: UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and

UN Economic Commission for Europe (Philippines and Spain). Furthermore, UN

Economic Commission for Europe is the only region with a state without any form

of women’s policy agency. All other regions range from one up to fifteen women’s

policy agencies per state. The distributions are bi- up to quadri-modal. Medians

are between three and six women’s policy agencies per state and means between

3.3 and 6.6 women’s policy agencies per state. Means differ significantly. However,

only 9.9 per cent (Eta squared) are explained by the attribution to regions. In

general, the distributions are right skewed. The exception is the one of ECE plus

which is slightly left skewed.

The values of the first and third quartiles in Table 7.11 show that the quartiles

are broader in the case of UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the

Pacific, UN Economic Commission for Europe, and UN Economic Commission for

Latin America and the Caribbean and less dispersed in the case of the smaller re-

gions; UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and ECE plus. The

global aggregation of the numbers of the women’s policy agencies per state shows

169

a broader distribution than the single distribution in the different regions. There

is a large variation of values outside the quartiles; especially, in the region UN Eco-

nomic Commission for Europe and UN Economic Commission for Latin America

and the Caribbean. The UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

has the smallest nominal size of institutional architecture, whereas UN Economic

Commission for Europe and UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the

Caribbean have the biggest sizes.


Those patterns are accentuated if one examines the number of different forms of

women’s policy agencies per state along regions. Still, there is a wide range. The

range is smaller than in the case of the number of women’s policy agencies per

state discussed above. As it is visible in Table 7.12 the states are continuously

distributed over the whole range of number of women’s policy agencies per state.

There is no top group in any region. There is one region with a single outlier:

Europe.

Different WPAsESCAP ECE ECLAC ESCWA ECE+ Global

per State

0 0 1 0 0 0 11 6 3 4 3 2 182 9 3 10 6 3 313 10 7 2 6 6 314 5 8 3 1 5 225 6 7 6 1 0 206 6 7 4 1 1 197 1 2 2 0 0 58 0 0 3 0 0 39 0 1 0 0 0 1

Total 43 39 34 18 17 151

Table 7.12: Conceptual size of institutional architecture per state by regions.

The three biggest regions have the broadest distribution of numbers of different

forms of women’s policy agencies. The smaller regions have smaller institutional

170

architecture measured over the conceptual size. The region UN Economic Com-

mission for Europe has the broadest range as it starts with a state without any

women’s policy agency and reaches up to nine different forms of women’s policy

agencies per state. It is the most heterogeneous region. Those numbers confirm

Europe-centred research, which observed a confusing heterogeneity of women’s pol-

icy agencies and women’s policy machineries (Mazur 2002, 175-176). The smaller

regions (UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and ECE+) have

the smallest range of different forms of women’s policy agencies per state. The

distribution of number of different forms of women’s policy agencies is less right

skewed than the one of all forms of women’s policy agencies per region. Analysis

of variance of means of the number of different forms of women’s policy agencies

per regions is significant15. However, only very little of variance is explained by

the attribution to different regions (Eta squared = 0.073).

ESCAP ECE ECLAC ESCWA ECE+ Global

Minimum 1 0 1 1 1 0Maximum 7 9 8 6 6 9Mode 3; 5 4; 9 2; 5; 8 2 3; 6 2First Quartile 2 3 2 2 2 2Median 3 4 4 2.5 3 3Third Quartile 5 6 6 3 4 5Mean 3.4 4.2 3.9 2.7 3.1 3.36Std. Deviation 1.72 1.91 2.24 1.33 1.25 1.87Skewness 0.31 0.01 0.35 1.04 0.31 0.46N 43 39 34 18 17 151

Table 7.13: Descriptive statistics of different forms of women’s policy agenciesper state on regional level.

Table 7.13 shows the narrowing of the quartiles of the conceptual size in com-

parison to the nominal size of the institutional architecture per region. There is a

wide range of variation of cases outside of the quartiles. Medians and means of the

number of different forms of women’s policy agencies per state (conceptual size)

differ less across regions than for the number of women’s policy agencies per state

and regions (nominal size). Medians are three or four different forms of women’s

15On a level of significance of 5 per cent.

171

policy agency per state in the different regions. Consequently, the different regions

are much nearer together than in the previous section.

7.3.2 Forms of Women’s Policy Agencies per Region

Table 7.14 shows the empirical weight of different forms of women’s policy agencies

in different regions. A Unit in a Ministry is in all regions the most widely dis-

tributed form of women’s policy agency. Between 67 and 95 per cent of states per

region have this form of women’s policy agency. Almost every state in UN Eco-

nomic Commission for Europe and UN Economic Commission for Latin America

and the Caribbean has it, while two thirds of states in UN Economic and Social

Commission for Western Asia have one. In other words, regions differ in their

employment of this form of women’s policy agencies.

After the most widespread form of women’s policy agency the patterns began

to differ between regions. UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and

the Pacific, UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and

UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia have Commission as the

second most widely used form of women’s policy agency, with between 39 and 72

per cent. UN Economic Commission for Europe has the Equality Authority (J2)

as the second widely used form: 69 per cent. ECE plus employs in 59 per cent of

its states the Legislative Committee (L2). The third, fourth and fifth most widely

used forms of women’s policy agencies are Ministry or Minister (E2), Coordinating

Body (E4), Human Rights Body (J1), Unit in Top Level Government (E1), and

Commission (O1) in different orders in different regions. The top four, first, clearly

Unit in a Ministry (E3), and in various rankings Commission (O1), Ministry or

Minister (E2), Coordinating Body (E4), and Legislative Committee (L2). The fifth

is Human Rights Body (J1) in the regions ESCAP and UN Economic Commission

for Latin America and the Caribbean, Unit in Top Level Government (E1) in

region UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and Ministry or

Minister (E2) in ECE plus. UN Economic Commission for Europe is the exception

with Equality Authority (J2) already as the second most widely distributed form

(69%).

Hence, the global aggregation does not mirror the regional variation in the rank-

172

ings of different forms of women’s policy agencies. However, the most widespread

forms of women’s policy agencies exist in all five regions. The rare forms of women’s

policy agencies exist in most cases, but at least once in each region. There are four

forms of women’s policy agencies which are not available in all regions; Compe-

tence Centre in Legislative Assembly, Legislative Caucus, Working Group in the

Judiciary, and State-run Women’s Organization.

Form ESCAP ECE ECLAC ESCWA ECE+ Global

No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %E3 34 79 37 95 30 88 12 67 13 76 126 83O1 31 72 22 56 20 59 7 39 9 53 89 59E2 21 48 21 54 15 44 5 28 5 29 67 44E4 15 35 12 31 15 45 6 33 4 24 52 34L2 8 19 17 44 9 27 3 17 10 59 47 31J2 4 9 27 69 8 24 1 6 3 18 43 28J1 9 21 5 13 11 32 1 6 2 12 28 19O3 7 16 8 21 8 24 3 17 1 6 27 18E1 4 9 7 18 4 12 5 28 2 12 22 15L3 4 9 4 10 5 15 0 0 0 0 13 9O2 6 14 0 00 1 3 4 22 2 12 13 9J3 1 2 2 05 7 21 0 0 0 0 10 7L1 3 7 0 00 1 03 1 6 1 6 6 4Total 43 39 34 18 17 151

Table 7.14: Number of states with particular form of women’s policy agencyby regions.

The four exceptions of this general observation are the absence of Legislative

Caucus and Working Group in the Judiciary in the two smaller regions of UN

Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and ECE plus. The other

two exceptions are the inexistence of State-run Women’s Organization and more

surprisingly the lack of Competence Centre in Legislative Assembly (L1) in UN

Economic Commission for Europe.

Some regions show a clustering of rare forms of women’s policy agencies. The

bigger regions have all a small number of Legislative Caucus (L3). The UN Eco-

nomic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean has 70 per cent of all

Working Group in the Judiciary (J3) and UN Economic and Social Commission

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for Asia and the Pacific has 50 per cent of all CC in Legislative Assembly (L1).

In summary, most forms of women’s policy agencies exist in all regions. In small

numbers the different forms of women’s policy agencies exist in almost all regions.

The exceptions are the lack of Competence Centre in Legislative Assembly and

State-run Women’s Organization in UN Economic Commission for Europe and

Legislative Caucus and Working Group in the Judiciary in the smaller regions of

UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and ECE plus. Europe

differs from the other regions in the priority and empirical relevance of the Equality

Authority before the Commission, while ECE plus states prioritise Legislative

Committee instead of the usual Commission.

7.3.3 Occurring Sectors per State in the Regions

This subsection discusses empirical occurrence of single sectors and of numbers of

sectors per state on a regional level.

Sector occur ESCAP ECE ECLAC ESCWA ECE+ Global

No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %Executive 41 95 37 95 33 97 16 89 15 88 142 94Legislative 13 30 20 51 13 39 3 17 10 59 59 39Judiciary 11 26 27 69 16 47 2 11 5 29 61 40Outside 32 74 24 62 23 68 12 67 12 71 103 68Total 43 39 34 18 17 151

Table 7.15: Sectors per state per region worldwide.

Table 7.15 indicates the empirical relevance of the four sectors in the five regions

and on a global level. It entails the number of states indication of the occurrence

of a particular sector. The executive sector is empirically very widespread in

institutional architecture. Women’s policy agencies in this sector are employed

in 88 to 97 per cent of states per region. On a global level the outside sector is

the second most occurring sector with between 62 and 74 per cent of states. This

is the case for all regions, with the exception of UN Economic Commission for

Europe. In the region of UN Economic Commission for Europe sector number two

is the judiciary which is occurring in almost 70 per cent of states. The third sector

174

in UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, UN Economic

and Social Commission for Western Asia and ECE plus is the legislative. In UN

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean it is the judiciary and

in UN Economic Commission for Europe the outside sector.

Table 7.15 shows further that the employment of particular sectors varies be-

tween the regions. Priorities of the second to the fourth sector differ from region

to regions. The global figures would suggest that the second sector (outside sec-

tor) occurs in two thirds of states and the third (judiciary) and fourth (legislative)

sector in approximately 40 per cent of states. However, the regions are more

heterogeneous. In UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia sector

three and four (judiciary and legislative) are employed by ten to twenty per cent of

states. In UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific the same

sectors are at disposition of around 30 per cent of states, and in UN Economic

Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean by approximately 40 per cent.

In ECE plus 60 per cent of states have the third and 30 per cent the fourth sector.

In UN Economic Commission for Europe all four sectors occur in more than 50

per cent of states.

In conclusion, all four sectors occur in all four regions. They differ in the

extent of dispersal under the states within a region. All regions have in common

that the institutional architecture in women’s empowerment and promotion of

gender equality have in around 90 per cent of cases women’s policy agencies in the

executive sector. The ranking of the other three sectors differ among regions. The

UN Economic Commission for Europe is the only region where more than 50 per

cent of states show each sector.

The following discusses the number of occurring sectors per state in the five

regions (see Table 7.16). There are five possibilities of numbers of occurring sectors:

0, 1, 2, 3, and 4. Almost all possibilities occur empirically in all five regions. The

bottom group, no sectors, occurs only in UN Economic Commission for Europe.

Four sectors is mainly a phenomenon in UN Economic Commission for Europe and

UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. In the region UN

Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia neither occur the top group,

the four sectors, nor are three sectors very common. The globally most widely

used number of sectors is three sectors. There are more cases with an institutional

175

architecture with one sector than with four sectors.

No. of Sectors ESCAP ECE ECLAC ESCWA ECE+ Global

Four Sectors 3 10 9 0 2 24Three Sectors 14 16 8 2 7 47Two Sectors 17 8 8 11 5 49One Sector 9 4 9 5 3 30No Sector 0 1 0 0 0 1Total 43 39 34 18 17 151

Table 7.16: Occurrence of number of sectors per state by region.

In brief, in most cases institutional architecture have two or three sectors. In

other words measured in number of sectors institutional architecture of states are

intermediary. Share of states per regions having a particular number of sectors

varies (between 60 and 70%). The regions vary in the preferences of many states

to a particular number of sectors.

7.3.4 Discussion of Thesis Statements

This subsection discusses to what extent women’s policy agencies and institutional

architecture are available in all regions.

Women’s policy agencies as structures exist in all regions. Different forms of

women’s policy agencies exist to various extents in all regions as well. There are

some forms which are not available in all regions; State-run Women’s Organization

and Competence Centre in the Legislative Assembly in UN Economic Commission

for Europe and Legislative Caucus and Working Group in the Judiciary in UN

Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia and ECE plus. Given the

small numbers of some forms of women’s policy agencies it is surprising how wide

they spread over the regions. Some rare forms of women’s policy agencies are

concentrated in some regions: Working Group in the Judiciary in UN Economic

Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean and Competence Centre in the

Legislative Assembly in UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the

Pacific. All four sectors are available in all regions. The extent varies across

regions. However, the most widespread sectors, the executive (E) and the outside

176

(O) sectors, occur in 62 up to 97 per cent of the states per region. The other

sectors have less empirical relevance. The region UN Economic Commission for

Europe is the only region where all four sectors occur each in more than half of

the states. The priorities of number of sectors vary between the regions. The

possibility to have no sector at all is realised only in Europe.

In the light of this, women’s policy agencies are a global phenomenon and most

forms of women’s policy agencies are globally available in all regions. States do

not employ the full range of possible size of institutional architecture measured in

numbers of sectors. There are pattern in institutional architecture. Concluding,

the three thesis statements about the global existence of women’s policy agencies

and institutional architecture and their patterns are confirmed in subtle nuanced

forms.

The test of the observation of Berkovitch that women’s policy agencies are a

global phenomenon was successful. Women’s policy agencies and institutional ar-

chitecture are globally available. It is correct to describe them as standard feature

of modern statehood. However, they are limited measured in nominal and concep-

tual size or in forms of potentially strong women’s policy agencies.16 Institutional

architecture with four sectors is even less widespread than institutional architec-

ture with one sector. States have a sophisticated range of forms of women’s policy

agencies at their disposition. However, states pick some forms of women’s policy

agencies more often than others.

7.4 “Women’s Policy Agency” – an Adequate

Term?

This section reflects on the appropriateness of the term women’s policy agency in

the light of their global distribution pictured in the last three sections.

Four points can be synthesised from the description above. First, women’s

policy agencies are a very heterogeneous phenomenon in view of forms and num-

bers of entities. Second, there is no global form of women’s policy agency. None

16Many people were shocked about their small size. Many people believe – I am included –that states take care of women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality, despite thebasic facts that there is little progress in daily live.

177

of those thirteen possible forms exists in all analysed states. Third, states em-

ploy different forms of women’s policy agencies to various extents. There is no

clear dominance of one single form of women’s policy agency. However, the top

three groups consist of Unit in a Ministry, Commission and Ministry or Minister.

Fourth, some of the empirically most widespread employed forms of women’s pol-

icy agencies are potentially rather weak forms of women’s policy agencies. Of the

five forms in the leading group (Unit in a Ministry, Commission, Ministry or Min-

ister, Legislative Committee, and Coordinating Body) the majority is if anything

weak in their range and capacity to reach considerable change. It is telling that

the two most widespread forms (Unit in a Ministry and Commission) are located

somewhere in the line of command of executive branch of government or between

state and outside of public administration. Potentially effective structures such

as the Competence Centre in the Legislative Assembly, the Human Rights Body,

or the Monitoring Body, which would monitor in general or in a particular area

are almost completely inexistent globally. In brief, empirical weight of different

forms of women’s policy agencies shows willingness of states to run potentially

weak structures.

With this distribution in mind is it correct to call the phenomenon women’s

policy agency? Is it reasonable to name a phenomenon agency, assuming a couple

of employees working professionally on a daily basis if the women’s policy agency

number two is a commission with representatives working on a voluntary basis?

Contra-factual thinking may help to judge this empirical distribution. On the one

hand, empirically number two (Commission) and four (Coordinating Body) are

rather weak forms of women’s policy agencies. On the other hand, number three

(Ministry or Minister) and five (Legislative Committee) are entities which may

have a strong influence on their environment. If the ranking would be Ministry

or Minister, Legislative Committee, Equality Authority, Unit in a Ministry and

the Monitoring Body (E2, L2, J2, O3 and E3), then women’s policy agencies

would have developed over the last five decades from rather marginal entities

(Commission) to potentially influential entities.17 This is not the case, empirical

reality is more mixed. At the end of the first decade of the 21st century there is

17In such a scenario, the Commission would be an also-run under all forms of women’s policyagencies or under the top ranks.

178

a mixture of marginal and potentially stronger forms of women’s policy agencies

widespread on a global level.

However, women’s policy agency is currently still the correct name. Whether

the term has to be changed in the future has to be studied. In particular if there

is a further strengthening of women’s policy agencies. For instance if a majority

of states employ Unit in Top Level Government (E1), Ministry or Minister (E2),

Human Rights Body (J1), Competence Centre in the Legislative Assembly (L1)

and Monitoring Body (O3) or if those forms of women’s policy agencies become

more widespread than the todays prototype, the Unit in a Ministry (E3).

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ELJOELO

ELJ

EJO

LJO

EL

EJ

EO

LJLO

JO

E

L J

O

E

L J

OSWO

Type Zero16%

0%

13%

16%

4%

2%15%

1%13%

0%

7%0%3%

0%

1%

1%9%

Figure 7.6: Intersecting types with percentage of empirical relevance.

180

Chapter 8

A Comparison of Specific State

Capability Worldwide

This chapter maps current specific state capability on a worldwide scale. The

first section reviews cross-national evidence of the occurrence of different types

of institutional architecture. The second section discusses the thirteen different

types in detail. The third section highlights the institutional heterogeneity of

institutional architecture in Europe and on the level of the single state. The

fourth section summarises the global blueprints of institutional architecture and


8.1 Cross-national Evidence

This section gives the cross-national evidence of currently occurring and non-

occurring types of institutional architecture. It discusses the absence of particular

cases and the level of comprehensiveness of institutional architecture. As last, it

reviews the common threads running through the different types.

8.1.1 Occurring and Missing Types

Table 8.1 shows the possibility space of the typology of current institutional archi-

tecture and the occurring and non-occurring types. There are 17 types possible.

Those 17 possible types are the basic types. Basic type stands for all cases with

181

the same pattern of sectors. States do not utilize the whole possibility space.

There are 13 types of institutional architecture employed by the 151 states. Four

types have no empirical cases between 2007 and 2010. Consequently my findings

show that there is no state with this particular pattern of sectors. The four types

without empirical cases are: the legislator-judiciary-advocacy type (Type LJO),

the legislator-judiciary type (Type LJ), the legislator-advocacy type (Type LO),

and the exclusively judiciary type (Type J).

The possibility space of the 16 types1 with zero to four occurring sectors (E,

L, J, or O) implies that each sector may occur eight times. All eight possible

types with an executive sector (E) have empirical cases. All missing types have

in common that they have no executive sector. Of the eight possibilities for the

legislative and the judiciary sectors there are only five with empirical cases. The

outside sector has six types with empirical cases.

Types with a legislative, judiciary or outside sector are less in use than types

with an executive sector. The observed empirical dominance of forms of women’s

policy agencies in the executive sector is perceivable on the level of types of insti-

tutional architecture as well. Empirical absence of those types supports appraisals

of the strong dominance of the executive sector (Jahan 2010).

The executive branch of government seems to be central for specific state ca-

pability. Some may argue that it is speculative to think about types without

empirical cases. Whereas others may argue that counter-factual thought experi-

ments and some considerations about non-occurring cases (limited diversity) may

add substantially to the general picture (Ragin 2000). Among others, feminist

scholar see themselves often in the position to point out, that in a particular place

and time women are missing or rare or that men are absent. Therefore, the absent

types are in the next paragraph.

Forms of women’s policy agencies in the legislative and the judiciary sectors are

more seldom than the ones in the other two sectors. Hence, it is statistically more

likely that there are fewer cases in types with a legislative or judiciary sector. Any-

how, in dealing with women’s empowerment and gender equality states select some

forms of women’s policy agencies more often than others. It seems to be illogical for

1For this particular discussion, the 17th type, the SWO-governed type (Type O2), is nottaken into account as it has another construction logic than the other types.

182

No. Occurring Sectors Type Label Group 20101 E L J O Type ELJO group 12 E L J Type ELJ group 23 E L O Type ELO group 24 E J O Type EJO group 25 L J O Type LJO group 2 missing6 . . . O2 Type O2 group 37 E L Type EL group 48 E J Type EJ group 49 E O Type EO group 4

10 L J Type LJ group 4 missing11 L O Type LO group 4 missing12 J O Type JO group 413 E Type E group 514 L Type L group 515 J Type J group 5 missing16 O Type O group 517 Type Zero group 6

Table 8.1: Possible sectors combinations and 2007–2010 occurring types.

states to have an institutional architecture with two or three forms of women’s pol-

icy agencies in the legislative and the judiciary and nothing in the executive branch

of government, such as the legislator-judiciary-advocacy type (Type LJO), the

legislator-judiciary type (Type LJ), and the legislator-advocacy type (Type LO).

In addition, the absence of the exclusively judiciary type (Type J) may suggest

that a solitary form of women’s policy agency in this sector is not an entry point

for an institutional architecture.

Table 8.2 shows the frequencies of the various types of institutional architecture.

Each type is discussed in detail in the Section 8.2. The number of cases in the oc-

curring basic types varies between one and twenty-four cases. An even distribution

of cases to types would signify that there are on average 8.8 cases per type. There

is no even distribution to types. The distribution is quinto-modal. The mean is 12

and the median 20 cases per type. The state administrative-legislator-judiciary-

advocacy, the exclusively state administrative, the state administrative-advocacy,

the state administrative-legislator-judiciary and the state administrative-legislator-

advocacy types (ELJO, E, EO, ELJ and ELO) are widespread (13 to 16% of

183

cases). Six types have between one and six cases (0.7 to 4%). In between are

the two types SWO-governed type (Type O2) and state administrative-judiciary

type (Type EJ). The more widespread types are all with executive sector. In other

words, the executive sector is not only more widely used, it is also more often in

use. Succinctly, states are unevenly distributed into types and between types of


Frequency PercentageCumulativePercentage

Type ELJO 24 15.9 100.0Type ELJ 5 3.3 84.1Type ELO 20 13.2 80.8Type EJO 20 13.2 67.5Type O2 13 8.6 54.3Type EL 6 4.0 45.6Type EJ 11 7.3 41.7Type EO 22 14.6 34.4Type JO 1 0.7 19.9Type E 24 15.9 19.2Type L 1 0.7 3.3Type O 3 2.0 2.6Type Zero 1 0.7 0.7Total 151 100.0

Table 8.2: Distribution of cases into types.

States utilize the full range of possible small and bigger types of institutional

architecture. Quinto-modality shows that there is a cluster for each group with the

same number of sectors. The preferred types are the exclusively state administra-

tive type (Type E), the state administrative-advocacy type (Type EO), the state

administrative-legislator-advocacy type (Type ELO), the state administrative-judi-

ciary-advocacy type (Type EJO) and the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-

advocacy type (Type ELJO). Empirical weight of the exclusively state adminis-

trative type is striking. There is not a larger number of states in the larger types

than in the smaller ones. Half of states have between zero and two sectors and the

other half has three or four sectors.

The word cloud of Figure 8.1 shows the empirical weight of different types.

184

Figure 8.1: Word cloud visualising different frequencies of existingtypes of institutional architecture.

Types in bigger fonts occur more often than types in smaller fonts. The rare

types are almost invisible in comparison to the size of the frequent types, such as

the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy, the exclusively state admin-

istrative, the state administrative-advocacy, the state administrative-legislator-

advocacy and the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy types (ELJO, E, EO,

ELO and EJO).

In summary, states employ a wide range of types of institutional architecture.

They utilize those types to varying degrees. The wide range of types is employed

continuously from the smallest to the largest types. There is no preference for the

largest type. The absent types of institutional architecture have the absence of

the executive sector in common.

8.1.2 Empirically Relevant, Less Relevant and Rare Types

The types differ in their empirical relevance (see Table 8.2). Some types are

widespread, meaning they occur in many states, others are less widespread or

even rare. In this analysis, a type is defined as empirically relevant if it has more

than ten per cent of all cases. Accordingly, the state administrative-legislator-

judiciary-advocacy (Type ELJO, 24 cases), the exclusively state administrative

(Type E, 24 cases), state administrative-advocacy (Type EO, 22 cases), the state

administrative-legislator-advocacy (Type ELO, 20 cases) and the state administra-

tive-judiciary-advocacy (Type EJO, 20 cases) are empirically relevant types. The

185

empirically less relevant types have between 3 and 9.9 per cent of all cases. This

applies to the SWO-governed type (Type O2) (13 cases), the state administrative-

judiciary type (Type EJ) (11 cases), the state administrative-legislator type (Type

EL) (6 cases) and the state administrative-legislator-judiciary type (Type ELJ) (5

cases). The empirically rare types have less than three per cent of all cases, or less

than five cases. The rare types are: the exclusively advocacy type (Type O) (3

cases), the judiciary-advocacy type (Type JO) (1 case), the exclusively legislator

type (Type L) (1 case), and the type zero (Type Zero) (1 case). In short, states

employ a wide variety of types of institutional architecture to different extent.

8.1.3 Absent Cases

There are a couple of cases which are absent. They are possible conceptually, but

there are no empirical cases with this combination of different forms of women’s

policy agencies. There are no cases having the full range of all thirteen different

forms of women’s policy agencies. Even far from that. States with the largest

range of different forms of women’s policy agencies employ for 2007–2010 maximal

eight or nine different forms of women’s policy agencies. The cases with eight

different forms of women’s policy agencies are: Peru, Colombia, and Brazil and

with nine forms, Spain. Consequentially, there is no institutional architecture

currently having all four sectors with all 13 different forms of women’s policy

agencies. Furthermore, there is no institutional architecture covering all forms of

women’s policy agencies in three or two sectors. For instance for two sectors: from

an Unit in Top Level Government (E1) to an Coordinating Body (E4) and from

Human Rights Body (J1) to Working Group in the Judiciary (J3).

There are only a small number of states having all three or four forms of

women’s policy agencies in one sector; Spain, Poland and Italy have all four forms

in the executive sector, Costa Rica has all three forms in the judiciary sector and

Vietnam and Laos all three forms of women’s policy agencies in the outside sector.

There is even no case having all three forms of women’s policy agencies of the

legislative sector.

Even though states employ a wide range of forms of women’s policy agencies,

they rarely employ all forms per sector. Accordingly, states do not have a fully

186

comprehensive institutional architecture. They rather pick one and seldom two

forms of women’s policy agencies per sector.

8.1.4 Comprehensiveness of Institutional Architecture

The 13 different forms of women’s policy agencies are distinguished to exist beside

each other and to deal with a specific gender equality issue or a target women’s

empowerment topic. So, they are meant to cover the full range of specific action a

state has in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality. An institu-

tional architecture is defined as the entirety of all women’s policy agencies in one

state. Thus, an institutional architecture with the full range of all different forms

of women’s policy agencies has 13 different forms of women’s policy agencies. This

conceptual size is classified into six levels of comprehensiveness of institutional

architecture (see Section 6.2.3). This perspective gives a more aggregated way of

measuring variation of institutional architecture on a global level (see Table 8.3).

There are currently no states with a encompassing or a big comprehensive

level of institutional architecture. Only the four lowest levels are present at the

end of the first decade of the 21st century. Data shows that conceptual size of

institutional architecture defined in this way is really small in most cases. 53 per

cent of states have a bottom level institutional architecture, with between one and

three different forms of women’s policy agencies. 40 per cent of states dispose a

rudimentary institutional architecture, with four to six different forms of women’s

policy agencies. The currently highest level of comprehensiveness is reached by six

per cent of states by having between seven and nine different forms of women’s

Range Level of Comprehensiveness of IA Number Percentage

0 No 1 0.71–3 different Bottom 80 53.04–6 forms Rudimentary 61 40.47–9 of Noticeable 9 6.0

10–12 WPAs Big 0 0.013 Encompassing 0 0.0

Table 8.3: Number of states with comprehensive level of institutional architecture.

187

policy agencies (Noticeable level). The already mentioned state without any form

of women’s policy agency and therefore no level of comprehensiveness of institu-

tional architecture represents 0.7 per cent of the sample. Hence, more than half

of the states have less than four different forms of women’s policy agencies. Even

the current biggest institutional architecture does not have the whole range of

possibilities at disposal to fight gender inequalities. Even the current biggest insti-

tutional architecture contains at most nine of thirteen different forms of women’s

policy agencies. There remains unimplemented almost 30 per cent of the possible

spectrum.

Empirical and Conceptual Relevance of Levels of Comprehensiveness

Relevance of each of the six levels comes from different sources. The lowest com-

prehensive level of institutional architecture is relevant due to historical reasons. A

century ago all states had this level of comprehensiveness of institutional architec-

ture: women’s policy agencies did not exist. During the last century its empirical

relevance declined from the main level to a few cases and to one single case at the

end of the first decade of the 21st century. This marginal empirical relevance does

not dismiss its conceptual relevance as the absolute bottom line.

Institutional architecture of the second level, the bottom comprehensive in-

stitutional architecture is empirically the main level currently. More than half of

states have a bottom comprehensive institutional architecture. Such a small size of

institutional architecture indicates the current marginality of a broad approach to

fight gender inequality. Another forty per cent of states have a rudimentary com-

prehensive institutional architecture. This second large group has an institutional

architecture. However, it is far from a broad approach.

The fourth level, the noticeable comprehensive institutional architecture is the

best level achieved by states currently. Institutional architecture on this level of

comprehensiveness is accessible to analysis of its content in the sense of composi-

tion. The fifth and the sixth level of comprehensiveness of women’s policy agency

are not reached yet. They are conceptually possible and relevant. Nonetheless,

they are without empirical cases between 2007 and 2010.

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8.1.5 Patterns over Types

Comparison of all thirteen types reveals that there is a common pattern. For each

sector there is a widely used form of women’s policy agency. Taken together there

are four common threads running through current specific state capability. The

term common thread is used instead of backbone to describe in a metaphorical

manner that a particular pattern is not always present in each type. However, as

can be seen by the grey-shadowed parts in Table 8.2 in the next section there is a

pattern observable.

A Unit in a Ministry (E3), a Legislative Committee (L2) or Legislative Caucus

(L3), an Equality Authority (J2), a Commission (O1) or alternatively a Monitor-

ing Body (O3) are common threads running though all types. Even though not all

four are present in every type, they are common forms of current institutional ar-

chitecture. Those four common threads do not signify that other forms of women’s

policy agencies are irrelevant. The other forms of women’s policy agencies are less

frequent and are less likely to form the common feature of specific types.

The main common thread is a Unit in a Ministry (E3). This common thread

goes through almost all types. Measured in terms of quantity the common thread

in the outside sector, is the Commission (O1) or alternatively the Monitoring Body

(O3). Several types do not have this common thread; the state administrative-

legislator-judiciary type, the state administrative-legislator type, the state admin-

istrative-judiciary type, the exclusively state administrative type the exclusively

legislator type and the type zero (ELJ, EL, EJ, E, L and Type Zero). But in

all other types it is present in many cases. In the legislative sector the common

thread is a Legislative Committee (L2) or alternatively Legislative Caucus (L3).

In the judiciary sector it is the Equality Authority (J2) or alternatively the Human

Rights Body (J1).

8.1.6 Summary

Separation of different types of institutional architecture is possible and theoret-

ically gainful. States employ with 13 a wide range of the 17 possibilities of the

typology of institutional architecture. The not used types are marked by the ab-

sence of the executive sector. In general, states cover mainly the executive and the

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outside sector. In contrast, the legislative and the judiciary branch of government

are of much smaller empirical relevance.

States do not cover the full range of all thirteen forms of women’s policy agen-

cies or all forms of more than one sector of governmental action. There are a

few cases employing all three or four forms in a sector. The comprehensiveness of

the institutional architecture is in most cases bottom or rudimentary. Only nine

cases (6%) have a noticeable comprehensive institutional architecture; meaning a

conceptual size between seven and nine different forms of women’s policy agencies.

In almost all types states witness a pattern of absence and occurrence of a part

of the forms of women’s policy agencies. The common threads running through

many types are: Unit in a Ministry (E3), a Commission (O1) or alternatively a

Monitoring Body (O3), a Legislative Committee (L2) or Legislative Caucus (L3)

and an Equality Authority (J2).

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8.2 13 Types of Institutional Architecture

This section discusses features of each type in detail. The features are variation

within the type, the number of identical cases and the sample of cases showing

this type.

For nine types it was possible to separate a couple of variants of the general

pattern to discuss the variation within each type. Variants are distinguished by

using the sorting function of Excel and by highlighting the existence and absence of

the different forms of women’s policy agencies. The following Table 8.2 is already

sorted in this manner. The above discussed common threads are visible in such a

sorting. The last column gives the name of the variant. There are two or three

variants and two to three sub-variants. The variant with the biggest number of

cases is the main variant V1a. Other sub-variants are numbered with V1b, V1c,

and V1d. The second variant is V2. If there are further differentiations within the

second variant those sub-variants are named V2a, V2b, and V2c. There are two

types where there is variant V3 with the sub-variants V3a and V3b.

In Table 8.2 the states given in italics have a combination of different forms

of women’s policy agencies which is identical with at least one other state. The

column ‘WPAs’ gives the nominal size and the column ‘Diff. WPAs’ the conceptual

size of the institutional architecture, the number of different forms of women’s

policy agencies. In the column ‘Group’ the types are separated into six groups,

depending on their number of occurring sectors. An alphabetically sorted list of

states is available in Appendix C 9.9.1 on page XIX.

191

States / Territory E1 E2 E3 E4 L1 L2 L3 J1 J2 J3 O1 O2 O3 WPAs Diff. WPAs Type Group Variant

Spain 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 25 9 Type ELJO 1 V1a

Greece 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 10 7 Type ELJO 1 V1a

Peru 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 10 8 Type ELJO 1 V1a

Czech Republic 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 7 6 Type ELJO 1 V1a

India 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 9 6 Type ELJO 1 V1a

Luxembourg 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 9 6 Type ELJO 1 V1a

Hungary 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 7 6 Type ELJO 1 V1a

Guatemala 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 7 6 Type ELJO 1 V1a

Slovakia 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 9 6 Type ELJO 1 V1a

El Salvador 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 11 7 Type ELJO 1 V1a

Costa Rica 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 12 7 Type ELJO 1 V1a

Cyprus 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 8 5 Type ELJO 1 V1a

*Puerto Rico 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 8 6 Type ELJO 1 V1a

Panama 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 10 6 Type ELJO 1 V1a

Croatia 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 4 Type ELJO 1 V1a

Serbia 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 4 Type ELJO 1 V1a

Ukraine 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 7 6 Type ELJO 1 V1b

South Korea 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 8 6 Type ELJO 1 V1b

Colombia 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 10 8 Type ELJO 1 V1b

Philippines 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 15 7 Type ELJO 1 V1b

Brazil 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 10 8 Type ELJO 1 V1c

Dominican Republic 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 7 6 Type ELJO 1 V1c

France 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 8 5 Type ELJO 1 V1c

Ireland 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 12 6 Type ELJO 1 V2

Poland 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 8 7 Type ELJ 2 V1a

Finland 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 Type ELJ 2 V1a

Romania 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7 4 Type ELJ 2 V1a

Latvia 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 4 Type ELJ 2 V1b

Afghanistan 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 5 Type ELJ 2 V2

Australia 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 9 6 Type EJO 2 V1a

Sri Lanka 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 4 Type EJO 2 V1a

Sweden 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 4 Type EJO 2 V1a

United States 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 13 5 Type EJO 2 V1a

Table 8.4: Attribution of states and *territories to thirteen types.

Identical cases in italics.

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*Hong Kong 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 3 Type EJO 2 V1a

Azerbaijan 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 3 Type EJO 2 V1a

Bulgaria 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 8 3 Type EJO 2 V1a

Iceland 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 3 Type EJO 2 V1a

Malta 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 3 Type EJO 2 V1a

Moldova 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5 3 Type EJO 2 V1a

Switzerland 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5 3 Type EJO 2 V1a

Egypt 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 6 4 Type EJO 2 V1b

Tunisia 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 8 6 Type EJO 2 V2a

Honduras 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 6 5 Type EJO 2 V2a

Paraguay 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 8 5 Type EJO 2 V2a

Kazakhstan 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 4 Type EJO 2 V2a

Mexico 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 6 5 Type EJO 2 V2b

Venezuela 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 Type EJO 2 V2b

Nepal 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 5 3 Type EJO 2 V3a

Nicaragua 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 6 4 Type EJO 2 V3b

Turkey 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 8 6 Type ELO 2 V1a

Iran 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 8 6 Type ELO 2 V1a

Bangladesh 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 9 6 Type ELO 2 V1a

Portugal 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 5 Type ELO 2 V1a

Israel 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 12 5 Type ELO 2 V1a

Belgium 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 5 Type ELO 2 V1a

Belarus 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 3 Type ELO 2 V1a

Bhutan 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 4 Type ELO 2 V1a

Suriname 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 4 Type ELO 2 V1a

Tajikistan 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 4 Type ELO 2 V1a

Uruguay 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 5 Type ELO 2 V1a

Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 4 Type ELO 2 V1b

Germany 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 4 Type ELO 2 V1b

Argentina 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 6 5 Type ELO 2 V2a

Thailand 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 5 Type ELO 2 V2a

United Kingdom 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 5 Type ELO 2 V2a

*Cook Islands 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 3 Type ELO 2 V2b



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Malaysia 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 5 Type ELO 2 V3a

Indonesia 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 3 Type ELO 2 V3a

Russia 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 3 Type ELO 2 V3b

Viet Nam 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 7 5 Type O2 3 V1a

Laos 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 6 Type O2 3 V1a

*Palestine 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 5 Type O2 3 V1a

Cambodia 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 7 5 Type O2 3 V1a

China 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 5 Type O2 3 V1a

Korea, North 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 Type O2 3 V1b

Cuba 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 Type O2 3 V2a

Syria 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 Type O2 3 V2a

United Arab Emirates 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 Type O2 3 V2a

Uzbekistan 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 Type O2 3 V2c

Libya 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 3 Type O2 3 V2b

Myanmar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 2 Type O2 3 V2b

Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 Type O2 3 V2b

Montenegro 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 Type EL 3 V1a

Kyrgyzstan 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 Type EL 3 V1a

Lebanon 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 Type EL 3 V1a

Macedonia 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 Type EL 3 V1a

Bahrain 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Type EL 3 V1b

Bolivia 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type EL 3 V2

Lithuania 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 4 Type EJ 3 V1

Netherlands 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 4 Type EJ 3 V1

Norway 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 4 Type EJ 3 V1

Austria 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 3 Type EJ 3 V1

Denmark 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 Type EJ 3 V1

Estonia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 Type EJ 3 V1

Slovenia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 2 Type EJ 3 V1

East Timor 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 Type EJ 3 V2

Fiji 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 Type EJ 3 V2

Trinidad and Tobago 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 Type EJ 3 V2

New Zealand 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type EJ 3 V2



194


Italy 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 10 6 Type EO 3 V1

Chile 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 5 Type EO 3 V1

Mongolia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 3 Type EO 3 V1

Japan 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 4 Type EO 3 V1

Tonga 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 4 Type EO 3 V1

Albania 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 4 Type EO 3 V1

Belize 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 4 Type EO 3 V1

Samoa 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 4 Type EO 3 V1

Jordan 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 3 Type EO 3 V1

Morocco 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 3 Type EO 3 V1

Algeria 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 3 Type EO 3 V1

Maldives 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 3 Type EO 3 V1

Nauru 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 3 Type EO 3 V1

Pakistan 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 3 Type EO 3 V1

Barbados 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 Type EO 3 V1

Brunei 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 Type EO 3 V1

Jamaica 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 Type EO 3 V1

Kiribati 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 Type EO 3 V1

Oman 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 Type EO 3 V1

Papua New Guinea 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 2 Type EO 3 V1

Vanuatu 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 Type EO 3 V1

Qatar 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 Type EO 3 V2

Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 Type JO 4

Singapore 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Type E 5 V1a

*American Samoa 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E 5 V1a

Andorra 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E 5 V1a

Bahamas 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E 5 V1a

Grenada 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E 5 V1a

Guyana 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E 5 V1a

Liechtenstein 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E 5 V1a

Marshall Islands 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E 5 V1a

Micronesia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E 5 V1a

Palau 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E 5 V1a



195


Tuvalu 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E 5 V1a

Antigua and Barbuda 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Type E 5 V1b

Armenia 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type E 5 V1b

Canada 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type E 5 V1b

Dominica 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type E 5 V1b

Saint Kitts and Nevis 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type E 5 V1b

Saint Lucia 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type E 5 V1b

Saint Vincent + Grenadines 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 Type E 5 V1b

Solomon Islands 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type E 5 V1b

Sudan 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 Type E 5 V1b

Yemen 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 Type E 5 V1c

Kuwait 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E 5 V2

Haiti 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 Type E 5 V3

Iraq 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 Type E 5 V3

Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type L 5

*Macao 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 Type O 5

San Marino 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 Type O 5

Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 Type O 5

Monaco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Type Zero 6



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States have particular preferences for some forms of women’s policy agencies.

The form of women’s policy agency which is occurring most in each sector is named

first. If there is a second one having a particular empirical relevance it is named

second and termed alternatively.

8.2.1 The State Administrative-Legislator-Judiciary-

Advocacy Type

The institutional architecture of the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advo-

cacy type (Type ELJO) has not only the pattern of the four occurring sectors.

Diversity is more limited in the sense that particular forms of women’s policy

agencies exist more often in certain sectors than other forms. The common threads

which run through all four sectors in the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-

advocacy type are Unit in a Ministry, Legislative Committee or Legislative Caucus,

Equality Authority or Human Rights Body, and Commission or Monitoring Body.

The state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type is with 24 cases one of

the largest types. There are two variants (V1 and V2) and three sub-variants of

variant one (V1a, V1b, and V1c).

Variants

Discussion of variants highlights major patterns inside types of institutional ar-

chitecture. As mentioned above variant V1 is always the variant with the most

cases, the main variant. In the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy

type fifteen states have variant V1a with the pattern Unit in a Ministry, Legisla-

tive Committee, Equality Authority and Commission (E3L2J2O1). Those states

have in common that they have a potentially weak agency in the executive and

the outside sector, and two potentially medium powerful agencies in the legislative

assembly and in the judiciary. Croatia and Serbia have solely this basic pat-

tern of different forms of women’s policy agencies. Five states show the pattern

Unit in a Ministry, Legislative Committee, Human Rights Body and Commission

(E3L2J1O1) of variant V1b. This pattern is slightly stronger as it contains a poten-

tially strong agency in the judiciary instead of the medium Equality Authority of

variant V1a. Three states have the pattern Unit in a Ministry, Legislative Caucus,

197

Equality Authority and Commission (E3L3J2O1) of variant V1c. This variant is

the weakest common combination in the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-

advocacy type. Ireland is the only state having the variant V2 with the pattern

Unit in a Ministry, Legislative Committee, Equality Authority, and Monitoring

Body (E3L2J2O3). This combination is with a weak entity in the executive and

medium agencies in the three other sectors strong. As such it is comparable with

the strength of variant v1b. Nonetheless, overall those common patterns are more

often weak than medium or even strong.

Most states have beside the basic pattern of the variant, one to five different

forms of women’s policy agencies. Some have Unit in Top Level Government, Com-

petence Centre in the Legislative Assembly, Legislative Caucus, Working Group

in the Judiciary, or Monitoring Body. Several have Ministry or Minister, Coor-

dinating Body, or Human Rights Body. That signifies, that states in the state

administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type employ beside the named com-

mon threads a variety of forms of women’s policy agencies. However, measured

on the clustering on the common threads the combination of different forms of

women’s policy agencies, the institutional architecture, of the different cases are

rather homogeneous.

Size and Peculiarities

The nominal and the conceptual size of the institutional architecture differ in many

cases to a large extent. That implies, a large number of states employ particular

forms of women’s policy agencies many times. Spain, Costa Rica, the Philippines,

and Ireland are the most visible cases. Spain and Costa Rica are special due to

another dimension. They are the only states which employ all forms of women’s

policy agencies in a particular sector. Spain has all four forms in the executive

and Costa Rica all three forms in the judiciary sector.

Human Rights Body (J1) is present in half of the institutional architecture

in the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type. Considering that

the Human Rights Body is a rather new form of women’s policy agency then the

extension of institutional architecture with Human Rights Body (J1) alongside the

existing Equality Authority (J2) indicates a strengthening of the judiciary in the

198

last decade. The four cases with a Human Rights Body (J1), without any Equality

Authority (J2), have a Unit in a Ministry (E3) and a Coordinating Body (E4) in

the executive sector or a Ministry or Minister (E2) and a Unit in a Ministry (E3).

Identical Cases

There is a surprising high number of identical cases in the state administrative-

legislator-judiciary-advocacy type. There are eight cases in four different sorts

of combinations (see Table 8.9). Three of them have one form of women’s policy

agency more in the executive sector than is needed for the basic pattern of the state

administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type. The institutional architecture

of Croatia and Serbia do not only have the identical combination of different forms

of women’s policy agencies. Their institutional architecture is even identical in

nominal size. In both cases there are three Units in a Ministry, and one Legislative

Committee, Equality Authority, and Commission. Their institutional architecture

is fully identical.

Sample of Cases

A heterogeneous sample of cases employ institutional architecture of the state

administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type. There are ten European, nine

Latin American and three Asian and two ECE plus states. The region ESCWA has

no state with an institutional architecture of the state administrative-legislator-

judiciary-advocacy type. The most comprehensive type does not occur in all re-

gions. Hence, the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type is not a

globally available type of institutional architecture.

8.2.2 The State Administrative-Legislator-Judiciary Type

The common threads which run through all three sectors in the state administrative-

legislator-judiciary type (Type ELJ) are Unit in a Ministry, Legislative Commit-

tee or Legislative Caucus, Equality Authority or Human Rights Body. The state

administrative-legislator-judiciary type is with five states one of the empirically

medium relevant types. There are two variants (V1 and V2) and two sub-variants

of variant one (V1a, and V1b).

199

Variants

Three states employ variant V1a with the pattern Unit in a Ministry, Legislative

Committee and Equality Authority (E3L2J2). This is with a weak agency in the

executive and medium forms in the legislative and judiciary a comparable strong

combination. Finland is the only case with this basic pattern of different forms

of women’s policy agencies. One state shows the pattern Unit in a Ministry, Leg-

islative Caucus and Equality Authority (E3L3J2) of variant V1b (Latvia). This

combination is weaker, as there are two weak forms of agencies in the executive and

the legislative and a medium strong one in the judiciary. One state has the pattern

Unit in a Ministry, Legislative Committee and Human Rights Body (E3L2J1) of

variant V2 (Afghanistan). Based on the potential strength of the various agen-

cies this is the strongest combination so far (potentially weak executive, medium

legislative and strong judiciary). However, on average each sector has a medium

form of agency. Overall, those variants are between medium minus and medium

plus.

Beside Finland, all states have next to the basic pattern of the variants, one to

four different forms of women’s policy agencies. Some have Unit in Top Level Gov-

ernment, Coordinating Body, Legislative Caucus, or Human Rights Body. Several

have Ministry or Minister, or Monitoring Body. That signifies, that states in the

state administrative-legislator-judiciary type employ beside the named common

threads a couple of forms of women’s policy agencies. Measured on the cluster-

ing of the common threads the combinations of different forms of women’s policy

agencies are rather homogeneous.


The nominal and the conceptual sizes of the institutional architecture do not differ

in those cases. Poland is a special case as it has all four forms of women’s policy

agencies in the executive sector.

Identical Cases

There are no identical combinations of different forms of women’s policy agen-

cies in the state administrative-legislator-judiciary type. Hence, every state with

200

an institutional architecture of the Type ELJ has a unique combination with dif-

ferent forms of women’s policy agencies. This internal heterogeneity is usual for

empirically medium relevant types.

Sample of Cases

The sample of cases in the Type ELJ is much more homogeneous than for instance

in the case of the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type. Four

states come from (Eastern) Europe and Afghanistan is in the Asian region. That

is a geographically connected group of regions. Hence, the Type ELJ does not

occur in the regions ECLAC, ECE plus and ESCWA.

8.2.3 The State Administrative-Legislator-Advocacy Type

The institutional architecture of the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type

(Type ELO) has three occurring sectors. The common threads which run through

all three sectors in the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type are Unit in

a Ministry or Ministry or Minister or Coordinating Body, Legislative Committee or

Legislative Caucus, and Commission or Monitoring Body. The state administrative-

legislator-advocacy type is with 20 cases one of the larger types. There are three

variants (V1, V2 and V3) and two sub-variants in each variant. Succinctly, the

state administrative-legislator-advocacy type is a rather heterogeneous type.

Variants

Eleven states have variant V1a with the pattern Unit in a Ministry, Legislative

Committee and Commission (E3L2O1). With a weak agency in the executive and

the outside sector and a potentially medium strong agency in the legislative as-

sembly this is a rather weak common thread. One state has this basic pattern

(Belarus). Two states show the pattern Unit in a Ministry, Legislative Commit-

tee and Monitoring Body (E3L2O3) of variant V1b. In the state administrative-

legislator-advocacy type this is the strongest common pattern with a weak agency

in the executive and a medium in the legislative and the outside sector. How-

ever, on average the agencies are medium minus. Three states have the pattern

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Unit in a Ministry, Legislative Caucus and Commission (E3L3O1) of variant V2a.

That is clearly a weak common pattern with three weak agencies. One territory

has the variant V2b with the pattern Unit in a Ministry, Competence Centre in

the Legislative Assembly and Commission (E3L1O1) (Cook Islands). This vari-

ant is of comparable strength to variant V1a; a weak agency in the executive

and the outside sector and a potentially strong agency in the legislative assembly.

The variants V3 are weak plus. Variant V3a is held by Indonesia and Malaysia

and consists of the basic pattern Ministry or Minister, Legislative Caucus and

Commission (E2L3O1). That stands for a medium agency in the executive sec-

tor and weak agencies in the legislative and the outside sectors. Whereas Russia

has variant V3b with Coordinating Body, Legislative Committee and Commission

(E4L2O1). The weak agencies are in the executive and the outside sector and the

potentially medium strong agency in the legislative sector of government. Over-

all, the common patterns in the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type are

rather weaker than the one in the state administrative-legislator-judiciary type.

All variants are below medium strength.

Four states have only the basic pattern of their variant. The other states have

additional to the basic pattern of their variant one to three different forms of

women’s policy agencies. Several have Coordinating Body, or Monitoring Body.

Some have Unit in Top Level Government, Ministry or Minister, or Compe-

tence Centre in Legislative Assembly. That signifies, that states in the state

administrative-legislator-advocacy type employ beside the named common threads

some other forms of women’s policy agencies. Measured on the clustering on the

common threads the combination of different forms of women’s policy agencies are

rather heterogeneous.


Usually, in cases with the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type the nom-

inal and the conceptual size of the institutional architecture differ. There is no

case having all four or three forms in a sector in the state administrative-legislator-

advocacy type. However, Israel with a nominal size of twelve women’s policy agen-

cies and a conceptual size of five different forms of women’s policy agencies has an

202

exceptional large difference between the two.

Identical Cases

There is a number of identical combinations of different forms of women’s pol-

icy agencies in the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type. There are seven

identical cases distributed to three different combinations. All three sorts of com-

binations have two forms in the executive sector and in one combination there

are in addition two forms in the outside sector. However, none of this identical

combinations has exactly the same institutional architecture in the sense of the

same number of different forms of women’s policy agencies.

Sample of Cases

The sample of cases having the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type is

heterogeneous. There are seven states from Asian, six European, and four ECE

plus. In other words, the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type does not

occur in the region of ECLAC and ESCWA.

8.2.4 The State Administrative-Judiciary-Advocacy Type

The institutional architecture of the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type

(Type EJO) has three occurring sectors. The common threads which run through

all three sectors are mainly Unit in a Ministry (and to the smallest possible extent

Ministry or Minister or Unit in Top Level Government), Equality Authority or

Human Rights Body, and mainly Commission or alternatively Monitoring Body.

The state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type is with 20 cases one of the larger

types. There are three variants (V1, V2 and V3) and two sub-variants in each

variant. That signifies, the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type is a rather

heterogeneous type.

Variants

Eleven states have variant V1a with the pattern Unit in a Ministry, Equality

Authority and Commission (E3J2O1). This is a weak plus combination. Seven

203

of them have this basic pattern. One state shows the pattern Unit in a Ministry,

Equality Authority and Monitoring Body (E3J2O3) of variant V1b (Egypt). This

is on average a medium combination as it entails a weak agency in the executive,

a strong one in the judiciary and a medium agency in the outside sector. Four

states have the pattern Unit in a Ministry, Human Rights Body and Commission

(E3J1O1) of variant V2a. This combination is weaker, as it has a two weak agencies

in the executive and the outside sector and a potentially strong agency in the

judiciary. Two states have the variant V2b with the pattern Unit in a Ministry,

Human Rights Body and Monitoring Body (E3J1O3). This variant is as strong as

V1b. Variant V3a is held by Nepal and consists of the basic pattern Unit in Top

Level of Government, Human Rights Body and Monitoring Body (E1J1O3). That

is the strongest possible combination. It entails strong agencies in the executive

and the judiciary and a medium agency in the outside sector. Whereas Nicaragua

has variant V3b with Ministry or Minister, Human Rights Body and Monitoring

Body (E2J1O3). This combination is weaker, but in comparison to others rather

strong. It is medium plus consisting of medium agencies in the executive and the

outside sector and a strong agency in the judiciary. The variants vary largely in

their potential strength.

Eleven states have only the basic pattern of their variant. The other states

have additional to the basic pattern of their variant one to three different forms

of women’s policy agencies. Several have Ministry or Minister, or Coordinating

Body. Few have Unit in Top Level Government, Human Rights Body, Working

Group in the Judiciary, or Monitoring Body. That signifies, that states in the

state administrative-legislator-advocacy type employ beside the named common

threads a small number of other forms of women’s policy agencies. Measured


women’s policy agencies of the different cases are rather homogeneous.


The nominal and the conceptual size of the institutional architecture differ in some

cases to a large or a small degree and in others it does not differ at all. There

is no case having all four or three forms in a sector in the state administrative-

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judiciary-advocacy type.

Identical Cases

There is a large number of identical combinations of different forms of women’s

policy agencies in the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type. There are

nine identical cases distributed to two different combinations. One combination

has the basic pattern of a variant (E3J2O1, V1a). There are seven states with this

combination. The other identical combination has two cases and encompass two

forms of women’s policy agencies in the executive sector (E2E3J2O1).

There are three pairs of cases which have exactly the same institutional ar-

chitecture by having the same number of the different forms of women’s policy

agencies. Azerbaijan and Hong Kong have each Unit in a Ministry, Equality Au-

thority, and Commission. Iceland and Malta have two Units in a Ministry and one

Equality Authority and one Commission. Moldova and Switzerland have three

Units in a Ministry and one Equality Authority and one Commission. In conclu-

sion, the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type is a largely homogeneous

type.

Sample of Cases

The state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type occurs in all regions in at least

two cases. There are six European states, five Latin Americans, four Asian, three

ECE plus and two Western Asian. The state administrative-judiciary-advocacy

type is a globally available type.

8.2.5 The Legislator-Judiciary-Advocacy Type

The legislator-judiciary-advocacy type (Type LJO) is missing. There are no states

in 2007–2010 having this combination of sectors. The combination of external su-

pervision by a Commission (O1), and initiating and controlling function by legisla-

tive and judiciary branch of government is not found. An institutional architecture

without any form of women’s policy agencies in the executive sector seem to be

illogical for current states.

205

8.2.6 The SWO-governed Type

The SWO-governed type (Type O2) is a hybrid type in the sense that it transgress

the neat order of the single occurrence of the four distinct sectors executive (E),

legislative (L), judiciary (J), and outside (O). The common threads which run

through all four sectors in the SWO-governed type are State-run Women’s Orga-

nization (SWO), Coordinating Body, and Commission. The SWO-governed type

is with 13 cases one of the medium types. There are two variants (V1 and V2).

There are two and three sub-variants (V1a, V1b, V2a, V2b, and V2c).

Variants

Five states have variant V1a with the pattern Coordinating Body, Commission

and State-run Women’s Organization. One state has the variant V1b with the

pattern Coordinating Body and State-run Women’s Organization (E4O2) (North

Korea). Three states have the variant V2a with the pattern Unit in a Ministry and

State-run Women’s Organization. Three states have variant V2b with an agency

and a State-run Women’s Organization. One state has the variant V2c with solely

a State-run Women’s Organization (Turkmenistan). The small internationally

available knowledge on the strength of State-run Women’s Organization foreclose

the possibility to judge the strength of those combinations. The variants are are

rather weak.

There is one state with the basic pattern State-run Women’s Organization

(Turkmenistan). All other have between one and three forms of women’s policy

agencies, additional to the basic pattern of the variant. Most states have beside the

basic pattern of the variant one to five different forms of women’s policy agencies.

Few have Unit in Top Level Government, Unit in a Ministry, Competence Centre

in Legislative Assembly, Legislative Committee, Legislative Caucus, Commission

or Monitoring Body. Several have Ministry or Minister, or Unit in a Ministry.

Absent in any case are women’s policy agencies in the judiciary. The absence of

the judiciary branch of government is striking.

To sum up, there is a variety of different forms employed by a small number of

states with the SWO-governed type. A State-run Women’s Organization does not

seem to go well with forms of women’s policy agencies in the judiciary. Measured

206


women’s policy agencies of the different cases are rather homogeneous.



cases and not in others. Vietnam and Laos are peculiar in the sense that they have

all three forms of women’s policy agencies in the outside sector.

Identical Cases

There are five identical cases distributed on two sorts of combinations. Cuba,

Syria, and United Arab Emirates have the combination E3O2. Cambodia and

Palestine have the combination E2E3E4O1O2. Due to varying number of the

different forms of women’s policy agencies there are no completely identical insti-

tutional architecture.

Sample of Cases

A heterogeneous sample of cases have the SWO-governed type. There are six

Asian, four ESCWA, two ECE plus, and one Latin American case. Hence, the

SWO-governed type exist in all regions, except Europe.

8.2.7 The State Administrative-Legislator Type

The common threads running through all two sectors of the institutional architec-

ture of the state administrative-legislator type (Type EL) are Unit in a Ministry

(alternatively Unit in Top Level Government or Ministry or Minister), and Leg-

islative Committee or alternatively Legislative Caucus. The state administrative-

legislator type is with six cases one of the medium types. There are two variants

(V1 and V2) and two sub-variants in variant one (V1a, and V1b).

Variants

Four states have variant V1a with the pattern Unit in a Ministry and Legislative

Committee (E3L2). Macedonia is the one with this basic pattern of different forms

207

of women’s policy agencies. This variant is intermediary strong between weak and

medium. It has a weak agency in the executive sector and a potentially medium

strong agency in the legislative assembly. One state shows the pattern Unit in Top

Level Government and Legislative Committee (E1L2) of variant V1b (Bahrain).

This combination is much stronger. It is intermediary between medium and strong,

as it entails a strong agency in the executive sector and a medium agency in the

legislative sector. One state has the pattern Ministry or Minister and Legislative

Caucus (E2L3) of variant V2 (Bolivia). This variant is similar in strength than

variant V1a. All three variants are intermediary; two between weak and medium

and one between medium and strong.

Half of the states have one form of women’s policy agencies more than the

basic pattern of the variant. Unit in Top Level Government, Ministry or Minister,

and Coordinating Body are employed once. That signifies, that states in the state

administrative-legislator type are rather small in conceptual size of institutional

architecture. The cases are rather homogeneous.

Size, Peculiarities and Identical Cases


cases and not in others. There are no identical cases in the state administrative-

legislator type, as it is the case for most of the types with a medium number of

states.

Sample of Cases

The state administrative-legislator type is held by a heterogeneous sample of

states. It is employed by cases in three regions; three ECE plus, two ESCWA,

and one Europe. That is a geographically connected group of regions. None of

the Asian and the Latin American states have an institutional architecture of the

state administrative-legislator type.

8.2.8 The State Administrative-Judiciary Type

The state administrative-judiciary type (Type EJ) is with eleven cases one of the

larger types. The common threads which run through both sectors in the state

208

administrative-judiciary type are Unit in a Ministry or Ministry or Minister, Equal-

ity Authority or Human Rights Body. There are two variants (V1 and V2) and no

sub-variants.

Variants

Seven states have variant V1 with the pattern Unit in a Ministry and Equality

Authority (E3J2). Estonia and Slovenia have solely this basic pattern of different

forms of women’s policy agencies. This variant is intermediary between weak and

medium, as there are a weak agency in the executive and a medium agency in the

judiciary. Four states show the pattern Ministry or Minister and Human Rights

Body (E2J1) of variant V2. New Zealand is the sole state having this pattern.

This variant is stronger. On average it is between medium and strong, as it has

a medium agency in the executive and a strong agency in the judiciary sector of

government. The two variants are intermediary; one between weak and medium

and one between medium and strong.

Most states have one or two forms of women’s policy agencies more than the

basic pattern of their variant. Some have Ministry or Minister, Unit in a Ministry,

Coordinating Body, or Human Rights Body. Hence, states in state administrative-

judiciary type employ only a small variety of other forms of women’s policy agen-

cies. Measured on the clustering on the common threads the combination of dif-

ferent forms of women’s policy agencies and the small number of variants the cases

are rather homogeneous in the state administrative-judiciary type.



cases and not in others.

Identical Cases

Majority of cases in state administrative-judiciary type are identical cases. There

are four sorts of identical combinations of different forms of women’s policy agen-

cies. Two have two and one three forms in the executive sector. The combinations

are: E2E3E4L2, E2E3J1, and E2E3J2, and E3J2. East Timor and Fiji do not

209

only have the identical combination with different forms of women’s policy agen-

cies. They also have exactly the same number of each of the different forms of

women’s policy agencies. Consequently, their institutional architecture are com-

pletely identical.

Sample of Cases

The sample of cases is less heterogeneous than in other types. The state administra-

tive-judiciary type is regionally segmented. There are seven cases from Europe,

three from Asia and one from Latin America.

8.2.9 The State Administrative-Advocacy Type

The state administrative-advocacy type (Type EO) is with 22 cases one of the

largest types. The common threads which run through both sectors in the state

administrative-advocacy type are Unit in a Ministry, and Commission and in one

case Ministry or Minister and Monitoring Body. There are two variants (V1 and

V2) and no sub-variants.

Variants

Twenty-one states have variant V1 with the pattern Unit in a Ministry and Com-

mission (E3O1). There are seven cases with solely this basic pattern. With two

weak agencies this is a weak combination. One state has variant V2 with the

pattern Ministry or Minister and Monitoring Body (E2O3) (Qatar). With two

medium agencies this is a medium combination. The common patterns are either

weak or medium. Many states have beside the basic pattern one to three differ-

ent forms of women’s policy agencies. Some have Unit in Top Level Government,

Ministry or Minister, Coordinating Body, or Monitoring Body. That signifies, that

states in the state administrative-advocacy type employ beside the named common

threads only a small variety of forms of women’s policy agencies. Measured on the

clustering on the common threads the combination of different forms of women’s

policy agencies are really homogeneous.

210


The nominal and the conceptual size of the institutional architecture differ in

many cases to a large extent. In other cases there is no or only a small difference.

Italy is a particular case in another dimension. It is the only case in the state

administrative-advocacy type which has all four forms of women’s policy agencies

in executive sector.

Identical Cases

There are eighteen cases in five different sorts of combinations (see Table 8.9). The

combinations are: E1E2E3O1, E2E3E4O1, E2E3O1, E3E4O1, and E3O1. There

are two instances of identical combinations where two states have completely the

same institutional architecture. That are Nauru and Pakistan (E2E3O1) and

Barbados and Brunei (E3O1).

Sample of Cases

The state administrative-advocacy type is a global type. It exist in all regions to

various degrees. There are eleven Asian, five ESCWA, four Latin American, one

European and one ECE plus state showing this type.

8.2.10 The Legislator-Judiciary Type

The legislator-judiciary type (Type LJ) is missing as well. There is no state em-

ploying this combination of sectors in 2007–2010. An institutional architecture

solely with women’s policy agencies with initiating and controlling function by

legislative and judiciary branch of government is not found.

8.2.11 The Legislator-Advocacy Type

The legislator-advocacy type (Type LO) is missing. There are no states in 2007–

2010 having this combination of sectors. An institutional architecture solely with

women’s policy agencies with initiating and controlling function by legislative

branch of government and for instance a advocatory or supervising function by

211

a Commission or Monitoring Body is conceptually not illogical. However, no cur-

rent state is employing such a combination of an institutional architecture.

8.2.12 The Judiciary-Advocacy Type

There is only one state employing an institutional architecture of the judiciary-

advocacy type (Type JO): Ecuador. Its pattern is Human Rights Body and Com-

mission. There are no further forms of women’s policy agencies. Given the empiri-

cal weight of different forms of women’s policy agencies this particular combination

is not the most likely one. The combination Equality Authority and Commission

would be more probable. However, the combination of a Human Rights Body and

a Commission is peculiar. They both can have a supervising function. The only

case of the judiciary-advocacy type comes from the Latin American region.

8.2.13 The Exclusively State Administrative Type

The exclusively state administrative type (Type E) is with 24 cases one of the

largest types. The common thread which runs through the executive sector is

mainly Unit in a Ministry and in four cases Unit in Top Level Government or

Ministry or Minister. There are three variants (V1, V2 and V3) and three sub-

variants of variant one (V1a, V1b, and V1c).

Variants

Eleven states have variant V1a with the pattern Unit in a Ministry (E3). Ten of

them have solely this basic pattern. This is a rather weak pattern. Nine states show

the pattern Ministry or Minister and Unit in a Ministry (E2E3) of variant V1b.

This pattern is stronger. In all those cases there are no further forms of women’s

policy agencies. One state has the pattern Unit in Top Level Government, Unit in

a Ministry and Coordinating Body (E1E3E4) of variant V1c (Yemen). This is a

intermediary combination between weak and medium, as there are of a potentially

strong and two weak agencies. This is the strongest combination and the broadest

pattern in the exclusively state administrative type. Kuwait is the only state

having the variant V2 with the pattern Unit in Top Level Government (E1). Two

212

states have the variant V3 with the pattern Ministry or Minister (E2). States

in the exclusively state administrative type employ no further forms of women’s

policy agencies. There are two exceptions using a Monitoring Body. In brief,

measured on the clustering on the common thread the combination of different

forms of women’s policy agencies of the different cases are homogeneous.


The nominal and the conceptual size of the institutional architecture does not

differ in most cases. If it differs, then only slightly by one or two women’s policy

agencies. Many cases have the smallest possible nominal and conceptual size of an

institutional architecture of one.

Identical Cases

Twenty-one of the twenty-four cases in the exclusively state administrative type

have an identical combination of different forms of women’s policy agencies. There

are three sorts of combinations (E3, E2E3, and E2). The first two are with nine and

ten cases comparably large. It is probable that there are higher number of identical

combinations in institutional architecture with only one sector. Additionally, the

sector is predestinated to have more identical cases as there are four different forms

of women’s policy agencies which are also empirically more widespread than other

forms. However, the large number is still surprising. There are many states which

such a limited institutional architecture.

Sample of Cases

A heterogeneous sample of cases have the exclusively state administrative type.

The exclusively state administrative type exists in all regions. There are nine Latin

American, seven Asian, four ESCWA, three European, and one ECE plus states

part of the sample. The exclusively state administrative type is a global type of


213

8.2.14 The Exclusively Legislator Type

There is only one case with an institutional architecture of the exclusively legislator

type (Type L): Georgia. Its pattern is Legislative Committee. There are not

further forms of women’s policy agencies. Georgia is part of the region ECE plus.

8.2.15 The Exclusively Judiciary Type

The exclusively judiciary type (Type J) is missing. There are no states in 2007–

2010 having at least one form of women’s policy agency in the judiciary sector.

Current states seem to regard an institutional architecture with solely controlling

function in the judiciary as not thinkable.

8.2.16 The Exclusively Advocacy Type

The exclusively advocacy type (Type O) is with three cases one of the smaller

types. The common thread running through all cases in sectors O is Commission.

There are no variants. The three cases have an identical institutional architecture.

The exclusively advocacy type is the only type where all cases are identical cases

and even of the same sort of combination. In addition, the three cases have a com-

pletely identical institutional architecture, because their nominal and conceptual

size is one. So, they have all the same number of this one form of women’s policy

agency. The sample of cases is heterogeneous. One is an European state, one of

the ESCWA and one of the Asian region.

8.2.17 The Type Zero

States in the type zero have no women’s policy agencies at all. Logically there

are no sectors occurring. There is one case in type zero: Monaco. Nominal and

conceptual size of this institutional architecture is zero. Monaco is part of Europe.

It is a reasonable question if a case without any form of women’s policy agency

does have an institutional architecture. On the one side no. A state without

any form of women’s policy agency has no institutional architecture. On the

other hand, do we understand religious behaviour today, if we just look at persons

attributing them-self to a religion denomination? Given that societies undergo a

214

process of secularisation, do groups of persons not attributing themselves to one of

the religious denomination have an impact on the attribution of those who want

to attribute oneself to one of the religion denominations?2 Then, transfered to

specific state capability, do the states without any form of women’s policy agencies

influence the ones with women’s policy agencies? I argue yes. Or put it differently,

the type exists conceptually and empirically. There is at least one state without

any forms of women’s policy agency. The conceptual possibility has an impact on

the other states. Measured on a global scale, there is the smallest possible number

of states without any form of women’s policy agencies. Still, it is possible to have

no women’s policy agencies, it is part of the possibility space.

There are three reasons why it makes sense to consider the absence of any form

of women’s policy agency as a separate type of current institutional architecture.

First, historically all states were once without any form of institutional architec-

ture. For some, this time is decades ago, for others a couple of years. Social

phenomena have historical legacies, and historical contexts are relevant. Second,

nominal and conceptual sizes of institutional architecture show rather small ranges.

A lot of cases are very near to the type zero. 53 per cent of states have less than

four different forms of women’s policy agencies. Thirdly, further development is

open. States have the possibility to decide that they would like to have a smaller

institutional architecture or no forms of women’s policy agencies at all. The com-

plete dismantling of institutional architecture is a political option in the political

discourse of a lot of states. This option is available and used.

8.2.18 Summary

The different types of institutional architecture differ in their empirical relevance

and internal homogeneity. The state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type (Type

EJO), the state administrative-advocacy type (Type EO) and the exclusively state

administrative type (Type E) are types of institutional architecture available in all

regions. The most comprehensive type, state administrative-legislator-judiciary-

advocacy type, is not globally available (absence in Western Asia). While the

2The opposite relation is beyond controversy; that the ones with a religious denominationhave an impact on those refraining of attributing oneself.

215

special case of SWO-governed type is almost globally available (absence Europe).

The occurrence of type zero in Europe and its absence in all other regions is

peculiar.

216

8.3 Heterogeneity of Institutional Architecture

This section explores different perspectives on the institutional heterogeneity of

current institutional architecture. First, is the discussion of the heterogeneity of

types employed in Europe and among the neighbours of Switzerland. Second,

comes the numbers of identical and unique combinations of different forms of

women’s policy agencies.

8.3.1 Heterogeneity of Europe

Earlier research asserts that there is a heterogeneity of institutional architecture in

OECD-states and European states (McBride and Mazur 2010, 48, 64; Mazur 2002,

175-176). As the much wider sample of this study shows in Table 8.5 this informa-

tion is appropriate. There are ten different types of institutional architecture in

forty-three European states. Absent are the SWO-governed type (Type O2) and

rare types, such as the judiciary-advocacy type (Type JO), and the exclusively

legislator type (Type L). Hence, European states employ a wide range of types of


Types States with this Type

Type ELJO Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Hungary,Ireland, Luxembourg, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine

Type ELJ Finland, Latvia, Poland, RomaniaType ELO Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, Portugal, Russia,

Turkey, United KingdomType EJO Bulgaria, Iceland, Malta, Moldova, Sweden, SwitzerlandType EL Macedonia, MontenegroType EJ Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Netherlands, Norway, SloveniaType EO Albania, ItalyType E Andorra, LiechtensteinType O San MarinoType Zero Monaco

Table 8.5: Types of institutional architecture in Europe.States of the RNGS-sample in italics.

There are few commonalities. With two exceptions they have the executive

217

sector (E) in common. So the same is true for European states as for most of

the states in the sample as a whole: the executive sector is the predominant and

most widespread sector of institutional architecture. The sector outside (O) is

widespread, but does not occur in all states.

OECD-State Outside Europe Type

South Korea Type ELJOIsrael Type ELOAustralia Type EJOMexico Type EJOUnited States Type EJONew Zealand Type EJChile Type EOJapan Type EOCanada Type E

Table 8.6: Types of institutional architecture in OECD-states outside of Europe.States of the RNGS-sample in italics.

The OECD-member states outside of Europe have a similar pattern (see Table

8.6.) The nine states show six different types. Commonality is the wide range of

types of institutional architecture and the employment of types with an executive

sector (E). In conclusion, heterogeneity of types of institutional architecture is the

main feature for European states as well as for OECD-states outside of Europe.

States analysed in the sample of the RNGS-project are set in italics in both

tables. The states of the RNGS-sample display a similar range of different types of

institutional architecture. They employ the same types as the larger European and

the OECD-sample.3 Concluding, the diagnosed heterogeneity is not a consequence

of the RNGS-sample selection, the RNGS-sample is not sample biased.

8.3.2 Heterogeneity Among Neighbours of Switzerland

Those features are present in the case of the neighbour states of Switzerland as

well. Every one of the five neighbouring states has another type of institutional

3The rare the exclusively advocacy type and the type zero and the exclusively state admin-istrative type do not occur among the RNGS-sample. Solely the state administrative-legislatortype which is held by two South Eastern Europe cases is not present in the RNGS-sample.

218

architecture. Still, there is one commonality going together with the coexistence of

heterogeneous types of institutional architecture: all five types share the executive

sector.

Neighbours Types

France Type ELJOGermany Type ELOSwitzerland Type EJOAustria Type EJItaly Type EOLiechtenstein Type E

Table 8.7: Institutional architecture types of neighbour states of Switzerland.

Therefore, the sample selection of the RNGS-project did not coincidentally

provide the result that the institutional architecture of states are heterogeneous.

Institutional architecture are heterogeneous on a global and regional level and on

the level of the case selection of the RNGS.

8.3.3 Identical and Unique Institutional Architecture

This subsection discusses identical and unique institutional architecture. The iden-

tical and the unique institutional architecture are based on the combination of dif-

ferent forms of women’s policy agencies without aggregating them into four sectors

of governmental action as it is done with the types of institutional architecture.

States with an identical institutional architecture have exact the same combination

with different forms of women’s policy agencies. A state with an unique institu-

tional architecture has a combination of different forms of women’s policy agencies

which is not found in any other state.

On a conceptual level, the two categories identical and unique make both a

statement about a relation between different cases. In addition, this relation is

qualified by the number of empirical cases. For example: Switzerland and Iceland

have the same combination of different forms of women’s policy agencies: Unit

in a Ministry, Equality Authority and Commission (E3J2O1). That means, that

those two cases share an identical institutional architecture. As is visible in Table

219

8.9 and Table 8.2 there are five other states with the same identical combination

of institutional architecture. In view of that, those seven cases are related to each

other by employing the same identical combination. The qualifier is that there are

seven of them. In contrast, France has a unique combination of women’s policy

agencies: Unit in a Ministry, Legislative Caucus, Equality Authority, Commission,

and Monitoring Body (E3L3J2O1O3), a unique institutional architecture. In other

words, no other state has this combination with different forms of women’s policy

agencies. For unique cases the qualifier is therefore always a one. The relation

to other cases is, that they have other combinations of different forms of women’s

policy agencies.

Overall

At the end of the 21st century the 151 states employ 95 combinations of insti-

tutional architecture. That implies two things. First, states do not employ 151

different combinations. Even though they could choose from 7,814 combinations.4

Hence, there is no full idiosyncrasy. However, there is a large amount of institu-

tional diversity, because 95 sorts of combinations on 151 cases are a wide range of

institutional architecture. Consequently, some states employ the same combina-

tions of institutional architecture as other states.

Second, 95 different sorts of combinations on 151 states implies that there are

theoretically on average less than two cases per combination. In other words,

among the states with identical combinations there have to be a wide range of

different sorts of identical combinations in use.

Identical Institutional Architecture

From those 95 combinations 24 combinations are employed by more than one

state. These are the identical combinations, the identical institutional architec-

ture. There is even among the cases with identical combinations a wide range

4In principle, there are 8,192 possible combinations of institutional architecture: 213 = 8,192(existence and absence of 13 different forms of women’s policy agencies). In reality, states utilizea much smaller range of combinations. They employ between zero and nine different forms ofwomen’s policy agencies. Hence, there are no institutional architecture with more than ninedifferent forms of women’s policy agencies. That leads to a reduction of the empirically possiblepossibility space to 7,814 combinations ( 8,192 - (

(1313

)+

(1312

)+

(1311

)+(1310

)) = 7,814).

220

of institutional heterogeneity. Hence, institutional architecture is strongly frag-

mented by a large number of different sorts of identical combinations. There are

80 states employing those 24 combinations. That indicates, that there are usually

small numbers of cases with the same identical combination; on average, 3.3 cases

per identical combination.

As the Table 8.8 shows, a good third of states share the same combination

with only one other state. Thus, two cases per identical combination. In a further

quarter of cases there are three or four states with the same combination. 40 per

cent of cases have a combination in common with seven to ten states.

Identical institutional architectureNo.

Percentage Percentage ofwith of identical cases all cases

two cases 14 35 18three or four cases 6 24 13seven to ten cases 4 41 22

Total number of cases with identical24 80 cases: 100% 53%

institutional architecture:

Table 8.8: Percentage of different identical institutional architecture variants andtheir empirical size

In other words, on the one side, a large minority among the states with identical

institutional architecture shares a small number of identical combinations. On the

other side, a majority of identical cases employs a wide range of combinations, but

shares this combination with only one, two or three other states.

Figure 8.2 illustrates the empirical relevance of the different identical combina-

tions currently employed by states. Table 8.9 shows the states sharing an identical

combination (column three). It gives the employed combination (column two) and

the attribution to types of institutional architecture (column one). The widely

used identical combinations are among the types with fewer sectors of governmen-

tal action. Identical combinations occur over the whole spectrum of types and

vary in numbers of different forms of women’s policy agencies.

In almost all types with identical combinations there are at least two different

sorts of identical combinations. For instance, cases in the exclusively state admin-

istrative type utilize three different sorts of identical combinations: Ministry or

221

Typ

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222

Figure 8.2: Word cloud visualising frequencies of identical combinations offorms of women’s policy agencies.

Minister (E2), Ministry or Minister and Unit in a Ministry (E2E3), and Unit in

a Ministry (E3) (see Table 8.9). There are 21 cases with identical combinations.

That are 88 per cent of all cases of the exclusively state administrative type. Only

in one type, the exclusively advocacy type all states in this type have the same

identical combination of institutional architecture. That implies, the types are

heterogeneous within and there is no single identical combination of institutional

architecture predominant in a particular type.

Table 8.10 shows that there are two up to five different sorts of identical com-

binations within a type. In other words, even though the cases in the same type

have similar combinations there is heterogeneity within the types, because there are

varying numbers of unique and identical combinations and there is in most cases a

variety of identical combinations within the types. There is institutional diversity

within the similar combinations of different forms of women’s policy agencies. In

other word, the types are not congruent with identical combinations of women’s

policy agencies. Types are broader categories. It makes sense to distinguish these

two perspectives.

Overall, there is little institutional mono-cropping, because there are only two,

223

three or four combinations with different forms of women’s policy agencies in

use. Among the states with identical combinations mono-cropping in the sense

of Evans (2004) is less a problem as can be expected by 53 per cent identical

combinations. The reason is that there are 24 different combinations in use by

those 80 states. Therefore, there is large amount of variety among the states with

identical combinations of different forms of women’s policy agencies. In the light

of these finding “confusing heterogeneity” was a good label of earlier research. In

summary, there is neither full idiosyncrasy, nor a few models. What is observable

is a large range of institutional diversity shared by different numbers of states.

Unique Institutional Architecture

The counterpart to identical institutional architecture is unique institutional ar-

chitecture. As Table 8.10 shows the share of unique combinations varies between

different types of institutional architecture.

Number Percentage Percentage Number No. differentType of unique identical identical identical

cases combinations combinations cases combinations

Type ELJO 24 33% 67% 8 4Type ELJ 5 0% 100% - -Type ELO 20 35% 65% 7 3Type EJO 20 45% 55% 9 2Type O2 13 38% 62% 5 2Type EL 6 0% 100% - -Type EJ 11 82% 18% 9 4Type EO 22 82% 18% 18 5Type JO 1 0% 100% - -Type E 24 88% 13% 21 3Type L 1 0% 100% - -Type O 3 100% 0% 3 1Type Zero 1 0% 100% - -Total 151 53% 47% 80 24

Table 8.10: Unique and identical variants of institutional architecture types.

In general, 47 per cent unique institutional architecture is a large number

of idiosyncrasy. However, this figure does not represent the various shares in

224

different types. The smaller, but widely used the state administrative-judiciary

type, the state administrative-advocacy type and E have less than 20 per cent

unique combinations.

The other types have more than 50 per cent unique combinations. However, the

most comprehensive type, the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy

type (Type ELJO), does not exhibit a generally larger number of idiosyncrasy

than the smaller types of institutional architecture. Due to logical reasons, the

types with only one case have only unique combinations.

225

8.4 Global Blueprints

This section discusses global blueprints of current institutional architecture and


8.4.1 Global Blueprints of Institutional Architecture

There are five global blueprints of current institutional architecture. First of all,

all states in the sample have an institutional architecture. There is only one

case (Monaco) having an institutional architecture without any form of women’s

policy agency. This pattern is counted as a type of institutional architecture as

well: Type Zero. In other words, institutional architecture is a globally available

phenomenon. It is neither constricted to Europe, nor to OECD-states.

Second, states do not deliver information about the resource endowment of

all their women’s policy agencies and the institutional architecture in general (see

Section 5.2.1). Beside the maintenance of structures such information are relevant

to judge the commitment of states to make a continuous contribution to women’s

empowerment and promotion of gender equality. The suggestion to prescribe a

fixed percentage of state budgets for state action in women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality of Honculada and Ofreneo (2003, 139) might increase

transparency and global comparability of state behaviour.

Thirdly, states employ a wide range of different types of institutional architec-

ture. 13 of 17 types are in place currently. They vary in their empirical importance.

However, there is complex institutional heterogeneity observable.

Fourth, states prefer one sector of governmental action conceptually and em-

pirically over the other three: the executive sector (E). Conceptually, there are

four different forms of women’s policy agencies in executive sector, whereas there

are three different forms of women’s policy agencies in each of the other sectors.

Empirically, all types with executive sector are in use. All absent types have no

executive sector. Occurring types without E have fewer cases than types with

executive sector.

And last, but not least, there is a remarkable heterogeneity of the samples of

states having the same type of institutional architecture. For instance: Ukraine,

226

Singapore, Brazil and Spain have all the same quadro-sectoral type of institutional

architecture, the most comprehensive one, the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-

advocacy type. Those heterogeneous state samples offers researchers a wide range

of challenging research questions.5

8.4.2 Global Blueprints of Specific State Capability

However, the global blueprints for specific state capability differ slightly. In the

used sample there are 150 states with a specific state capability. There is an

institutional architecture without any form of women’s policy agencies: the Type

Zero. With Monaco this type has even one case (0.7 per cent of all cases). Hence,

specific state capability is almost a global phenomenon. It is neither restricted

to Europe, nor to OECD-states. One state on 151 states is marginal. However,

measured over the nominal and conceptual size of institutional architecture current

specific state capability is small. In two thirds of states there are less than seven

women’s policy agencies per state and less than five different forms of women’s

policy agencies.

5For instance: reasons for historical origins, path dependencies, interaction similarities, mostsimilar system design as well as most different system design, sample and case selection.

227

Chapter 9

Explaining Variation in


This explanatory chapter describes the results of the testing of the seven hypothe-

ses. The research question to be answered here is: How can we explain the vari-

ations in permanent and specific state capability in women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality uncovered in the course of this study and discussed

above? The identified variations are only partly explained by the tested explana-

tions; Hypotheses H1 (gender equality history), H2 (bloc confrontation) and C2

(population size) were refuted. Hypotheses H3 (governmental system), H5 (ge-

ography) and C1 (economic wealth) were partly refuted. Hypothesis H4 (policy

diffusion) consists of 30 smaller hypotheses. Seventeen of these sub-hypotheses

were refuted, one was proven partly and twelve were confirmed. Succinctly, a

small number of hypotheses appear to apply in part and several sub-hypotheses

were confirmed.1

9.0.3 Testing Hypotheses by Reading Tables

A particular procedure of reading tables was applied to test hypotheses. For

each hypothesis two tables were ‘read’. I explain this procedure at the case of the

introduction of universal suffrage for women. That is the first sub-hypothesis of the

hypotheses H1 (gender equality history). As explained in Chapter 3, all hypotheses

1Limitations of data in the individual state is shown in Table 9.9.1.

228

were tested in three ways: in general, only the fit of a particular explanation

and the institutional variety. The other two ways are the two different causal

relationships: Direction a) stands for the link of the explanatory indicator to the

various types in regard to the specified hypothesis (Indicator → Type). Direction

b) analysed the connection of the various types to the explanatory variable (Type

→ Indicator). The procedure was applied in the same way for all five hypotheses

and the two controlling hypotheses.

Direction a)

First, the hypothesis is tested in direction a). For example, let us take a look at

the information in Table 9.1. There are four categories of states; early movers,

mass, late and no universal women’s enfranchisement. It was analysed for each

category of introduction of universal women’s suffrage if and how strong each

type is present. The first question is: Which types are present in all categories?

In the example that are the state administrative-advocacy type (Type EO) and

the exclusively state administrative type (Type E). The second question is: Which

types are present in only one category? In Table 9.1 this are the judiciary-advocacy

type (Type JO) and the exclusively legislator type (Type L) in the category of the

early movers, type zero in the category mass and the exclusively advocacy type

in the category of no women’s enfranchisement. That is not surprising, because

all of them have only one case and are therefore unable to occur in more than

one category. Those rare types of institutional architecture (<5 cases, see Section

8.1.2) are marked by brackets. The third question is: Which category has the

largest range of types? Early movers and mass have both eleven types. If the rare

types are excluded, then both types have nine types of institutional architecture.

That means both categories have an even number of various types of institutional

architecture. The fourth question is: Does any or several categories show patterns

in regard to a particular type (preference/exclusivity)? For instance, are the more

comprehensive types in the category of the early movers and the less comprehensive

types in the later categories (mass, late or no universal women’s suffrage)?

In the example, the later categories have from the less comprehensive types

the ones which occur more often, such as the state administrative-advocacy type

229

Suffrage for all women → TypesCategorised UNIVSFFRG Type Frequency Percentage

Type ELJO 9 20.0Type ELJ 3 6.7Type ELO 8 17.8Type EJO 6 13.3Type O2 4 8.9

early movers Type EL 1 2.2(until 1940) Type EJ 7 15.6

Type EO 3 6.7(Type JO) 1 2.2Type E 2 4.4(Type L) 1 2.2Total 45 100.0

mass (1941–1981)

Type ELJO 14 15.4Type ELJ 2 2.2Type ELO 11 12.1Type EJO 13 14.3Type O2 7 7.7Type EL 5 5.5Type EJ 3 3.3Type EO 15 16.5Type E 19 20.9(Type O) 1 1.1(Type Zero) 1 1.1Total 91 100.0

late (1982–2010)Type EO 1 50.0Type E 1 50.0Total 2 100.0

no women’s suffrage

Type O2 1 16.7Type O2 1 16.7Type EO 3 50.0Type E 1 16.7(Type O) 1 16.7Total 6 100.0

missing

Type ELJO 1 14.3Type ELO 1 14.3Type EJO 1 14.3Type O2 1 14.3Type EJ 1 14.3Type E 1 14.3(Type O) 1 14.3Total 7 100.0

Table 9.1: Empirical evidence for explanation: Suffrage for all women → Types.

230

(Type EO) and exclusively state administrative type (Type E). However, those

types are not restricted to the later categories. The answers to the four questions

and further observations are noted. In the view of the presumption of the (sub-

)hypothesis I draw the conclusion for direction a) and wrote it down; in a worldwide

comparison, there is no connection between the early introduction of universal

women’s suffrage and the diversity of institutional architecture. Both, early movers

and mass have a wide range of types of institutional architecture at their disposal.

Direction b)

Then comes the testing of direction b). Table 9.2 gives for each type of institutional

architecture the number of states within a particular category of introduction of

universal women’s suffrage. The first question is: Are there particular types of

institutional architecture which are more widespread in particular categories of

universal women’s suffrage? For that, I marked in each column the absent cases

(number zero). The Table 9.2 shows that almost all types have cases among the

early movers (first column). The same holds for the second column, the states

which introduced universal women’s suffrage with the mass of states. The third

column, the late movers, has only few cases. Here, many types have no cases among

the late movers. The two types founds in all categories, in all periods, are the state

administrative-advocacy type (Type EO) and exclusively state administrative type

(Type E). They are among the less comprehensive types. The fourth column, the

none-introducers of universal women’s suffrage, finally shows that only a few types

have any such cases at all.

The second question deals with the relations of numbers over the various

categories. For each type the majority of cases are analysed. For instance,

the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type (Type ELJO) has nine

cases among the early movers and fourteen cases among the mass. That means

a majority of cases with an institutional architecture of the state administrative-

legislator-judiciary-advocacy type is not among the early movers in introducing

universal women’s suffrage. The majority of states with the state administrative-

legislator-judiciary-advocacy type have introduced universal women’s suffrage in

the same time period as most other states. In general, it is more likely that a ma-

231

Types → Suffrage for all womenno women’s

early movers mass late suffrage(until 1940) (1941–1981) (1982–2010) (until 2010) Total

Type ELJO 9 14 0 0 23Type ELJ 3 2 0 0 5Type ELO 8 11 0 0 19Type EJO 6 13 0 0 19Type O2 4 7 0 1 12Type EL 1 5 0 0 6Type EJ 7 3 0 0 10Type EO 3 15 1 3 22(Type JO) 1 0 0 0 1Type E 2 19 1 1 23(Type L) 1 0 0 0 1(Type O) 0 1 0 1 2(Type Zero) 0 1 0 0 1Total 45 91 2 6 144

Table 9.2: Empirical evidence for explanation: Types → Suffrage for all women.

jority of cases of a type is present among the mass, due to the sizes of the different

categories. For the sub-hypothesis of universal women’s suffrage this applies for the

most comprehensive type (Type ELJO), as well as for most of the other frequent

types. It does not apply to the state administrative-legislator type (Type EL).

The second question asks: Is there a tendency of the more comprehensive types to

an earlier point in time? In the example, there is no such tendency. Only the state

administrative-judiciary type has a majority of its cases among the early movers

(seven) and a minority among the mass (three cases). The third question is: Are

there types of institutional architecture present in all categories? The answer is:

only the state administrative-advocacy type (Type EO) and the exclusively state

administrative type (Type E) have cases over the whole spectrum of categories.

However, the centre is in the category mass. Again, all those answers and further

observations were written down. In the light of all the answers in the direction

b) in regard of the presumption of the (sub-)hypothesis I draw the conclusion for

direction b) and wrote it down.

232

The third step is the overall consideration of those two tables in respect to

the hypothesis. The sub-hypothesis is: States moving towards gender equality

at an earlier point in time have similar types of institutional architecture. The

sub-hypothesis is not confirmed by the information in the two tables. On the

contrary, the sub-hypothesis is refuted. There is a wide heterogeneity of types of

institutional architecture in use by many states; early movers as well as the mass

of states introducing universal women’s suffrage. Observations and conclusions are

written down.

9.1 Gender Equality History

Hypothesis H1 links the gender equality history of a particular state and its per-


gender equality. More precisely, states which took measures against gender in-

equality at an earlier point in history were assumed to share more similar types of

institutional architecture. Those states undertaking measures to promote gender

equality later on were assumed also to disclose similar types among themselves,

although less comprehensive types than the states starting earlier. Therefore, Hy-

pothesis H1 is: States moving towards gender equality at an earlier point in time

have similar types of institutional architecture.

Indicator Hypothesisa) b)

Indicator → Type Type → Indicator

Women’s suffrage influence (adapt.) some influence some influenceFemale stand for election influence (adapt.) some influence some influenceFirst female MP some influence some influence influenceFirst f. head parliament no influence some influence some influenceFirst female president no influence no influence no influenceFirst f. prime minister no influence no influence no influenceRatification CEDAW no influence no influence no influence

Table 9.3: Results of testing of hypothesis H1.

This hypothesis was mainly refuted.2 There were several indicators tested for

2For the sub-hypotheses of the first hypotheses the continuous text does not entail all used

233

hypothesis H1. All seven tested sub-hypotheses were proven false (see Table 9.3).

Still, the reasons for their disconfirmation vary. For some, a link exists between

gender equality history and type of institutional architecture (Suffrage and Stand

for election), however, not the relation implied in the hypothesis. Some influence

was uncovered in regard to two sub-hypothesis (First female MP and First female

head of parliamentary body). For three indicators hypothesis and presumptions

were refuted (First female prime minister, First president and CEDAW). In other

words, no link between gender equality history and variety of different types of

institutional architecture could be established in this analysis.

9.1.1 Relations: Women’s Suffrage and Right to Stand for

Elections

The sub-hypotheses were proven false for the indicators Women’s Suffrage and

Right to Stand for Elections. Women’s Suffrage (UNIVSFFRG) denotes the period

in time in which a particular state granted all women the rights of suffrage.3 Right

to Stand for Elections (UNISTAND) denominates the period in time in which a

particular state granted all women the right to stand for election.4

Yet, the links between these variables and types of institutional architecture

are converse to that expressed in the hypothesis. A broader variety of types of

institutional architecture can be found among the states in the first and second

group granting all women suffrage rights (UNIVSFFRG) or granting all women

the right to stand for elections (UNIVSTAND), than among later groups of states,

which employ mainly the state administrative-advocacy type and exclusively state

administrative type. An earlier start in gender equality history has led to a wide

range of types, a larger institutional variety.

The states which evoked change later and the states which have yet to grant

women these rights employ mainly the two small types; the state administrative-

advocacy type and the exclusively state administrative type. A majority of states

tables. Due to layout reasons, they are displayed in Appendix E (see Section 9.9.1).3Coding: 1 = early movers (until 1940); 2 = mass (1941–1981); 3 = late (1982–2010); and 4

= until now (1995), no women’s enfranchisement.4Coding: 1 = early movers (< 1941); 2 = mass (1941–1981); 3 = late movers (> 1981); and

4 = until now (1995), women are not allowed to stand for election.

234

with the state administrative-legislator-judiciary and state administrative-judiciary

types (ELJ and EJ) have granted all women the right to vote and to stand for elec-

tions at an earlier point in time, before 1941. A majority of states with the types of

state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy, state administrative-legislator-

advocacy, state administrative-judiciary-advocacy and state administrative-advo-

cacy (ELJO, ELO, EJO and EO) introduced these rights with most of other states

between 1941 and 1981. This indicates that it is not necessary to have a long record

in gender equality history to develop most of the comprehensive types.

Two particular types, the state administrative-legislator-judiciary type and the

state administrative-judiciary type of institutional architecture are more wide-

spread among the earlier movers, that is, states granting women’s rights to stand

for election up until 1981. However, not only states belonging to the early movers

(until 1940) currently make use of the larger institutional architecture of the

state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy, state administrative-legislator-

advocacy and state administrative-judiciary types (ELJO, ELO and EJ). At the

other end of the spectrum, institutional architecture of the state administrative-

advocacy type and exclusively state administrative type are also used by states

which have failed to grant all women the right to vote and to stand for elections.

9.1.2 Weak Relations: First Females on Top of Parliament

and First Female Member of Parliament

The situation is different for the indicators First female head of parliamentary

body and First female Member of Parliament. In both instances, the connections

are rather weak. First female head of parliamentary body (FRSTHDPRLMT) de-

nominates the period in time where in a particular state the first female was elected

as head of parliamentary body.5 First female Member of Parliament (FRSTMP)

denotes the period in time, in which in a particular state the first female was

elected to parliament.6

States in which the first female head of parliamentary body was elected in the

5Coding: 1 = early (before 1990); 2 = later (in 1990s); and 3 = until now (2000), no womanbecame president of parliamentary body.

6Coding: 1 = early movers (1900–1939); 2 = mass (1940–1989); 3 = historical (1990–1999);4 = late mover (2000–2009); and 5 = until now (2004), no woman became Member of Parliament.

235

same general time period do not utilize similar types of institutional architecture.

Hence, this hypothesis was proven false. A large number of states (two thirds)

have yet to have a woman elected as head of the parliamentary body. However,

there appears to be a certain influence between time period of first female head of

parliamentary body and a particular type of institutional architecture (direction

a). All states with the SWO-governed type have yet to have their first female head

of parliamentary body. States which cleared this hurdle in their gender equality

history do not have a SWO-governed type of institutional architecture. This is

not a surprise as states with limited political freedom may not elect the head of

parliamentary body.7

Furthermore, there is some difference between the states employing a more

comprehensive type of institutional architecture and the states employing less com-

prehensive types. Among the more comprehensive types, half of the states have

seen the first female head of parliamentary body. Among the less comprehensive

types, this percentage is lower. Hence, there is a larger tendency for states with

more comprehensive types to elect the first female head of parliamentary body

than among the states with less comprehensive types.

The case of the first female Member of Parliament (FRSTMP) is a bit differ-

ent. In this instance, the hypothesis holds for a particular period of time. States

which have seen their first female member of parliament before 1945 employ a

smaller number of different types of institutional architecture than later groups of

states. The different time groups all employ a wide range of different types of in-

stitutional architecture (a). However, the group of states which had not yet seen a

female member of parliament employs smaller types than the other groups of states.

All states with bigger types, such as the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-

advocacy, the state administrative-legislator-judiciary, the state administrative-

legislator-advocacy and the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy types (ELJO,

ELJ, ELO, and EJO) had their first female member in parliament before 1999.

7From the 42 states in the sample with limited political freedom only Venezuela elected afemale head of parliamentary body. All other states have not done this step yet.

236

9.1.3 No Influence: First Female Prime Minister,

President or Ratification of CEDAW

The three indicators that did not show a relation between gender equality his-

tory and types of institutional architecture are: First female prime minister, First

female president and CEDAW.8

First female prime minister (FRSTPM) denominates the period in time in

which a woman was initially elected prime minister in a particular state.9 First

female president (FRSTPRES) denominates the period in time in which a woman

was elected president for the first time in a particular state.10 CEDAW denomi-

nates the period in time in which a particular state ratified the CEDAW.11

States which have elected either the first female prime minister or president,

or have ratified the CEDAW, have not developed similar types of institutional

architecture in comparison to states which have introduced these changes in other

time periods. In other words, concurrence of the phase in gender equality history

in which states introduce such reforms does not automatically lead to conformity

in institutional architecture among those states. And vice versa, varying time

periods of states electing the first female prime minister, president and/or the

ratifying the CEDAW does not perforce imply that the institutional architecture

in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality will be distinct from

those architecture of states following through with these reforms later on.

There are different reasons that these indicators appear to have little influence

on the types of institutional architecture. Regarding the CEDAW, 140 of the states

in the covered sample have ratified this international convention since 1979; these

ratifiers are quite heterogeneous with regard to social and state structures, norms

and values. It can only be assumed that other factors have stronger influence on

the institutional architecture. Concerning the election of female heads of state,

8For details about the coding see Subsection 3.6.1.9Coding: 1 = early (before 1990); 2 = later (from 1990 on); and 3 = until now (1998), no

woman became prime minister.10Coding: 1 = early (before 1990); 2 = later (from 1990 on); and 3 = until now (2000), no

female president.11Coding: 1 = Ratification between 1980 and 1988; 2 = Ratification between 1989 and 2000;

3 = Ratification between 2001 and 2010; 4 = signature, no ratification (not yet member ofCEDAW); 5 = until now (2013) no signature, no ratification (not member of CEDAW).

237

only few states have elected their first female prime minister or the first female

president thus far – less than 20 per cent. Hence, the big majority of states

vary widely in the employment of institutional architecture; therefore it is hard to

scrutinize their influence on other gender equality processes.

To sum up, states taking the same steps in gender equality history employ a

wide variety of types of institutional architecture. It can be generally said that the

state administrative-legislator-judiciary and state administrative-judiciary types

(Type ELJ and EJ) are more widespread among the early movers; however, states

do not need to be among the early movers in regard to gender equality history to

employ comprehensive types of institutional architecture. States which have yet

to undertake the steps in gender equality history discussed above (non-movers) are

more likely to employ the state administrative-advocacy type and exclusively state

administrative type. Finally, states with more comprehensive types of institutional

architecture are more likely to take the discussed steps earlier in their gender

equality history.

9.2 Bloc Participation

My second hypothesis draws a connection between the ideological division during

the Cold War12 and the permanent and specific state capability in women’s em-

powerment and promotion of gender equality. The alliance of second and third

world countries in the International Labour Organization (ILO) achieved several

legal improvements in the area of gender equality in the competition with the First

World. This rivalry may have made an impact on the institutional architecture.

More precisely, countries belonging to the different (former) geopolitical blocs

may have developed, and therefore employ today different types of institutional

architecture. The hypothesis H2 is: Former members of different geopolitical blocs

have dissimilar types of institutional architecture.

This hypothesis was proven false as the three different blocs of states all employ

a wide range of diverse types of institutional architecture. The empirically relevant

types can be found in states associated with all three geopolitical blocs.

12Coding: 1 = first world; 2 = second world; and 3 = third world.

238

Bloc → TypesBloc Frequency Percentage

first world

Type ELJO 6 18.8Type ELJ 1 3.1Type ELO 6 18.8Type EJO 6 18.8Type EJ 6 18.8Type EO 2 6.3Type E 3 9.4(Type O) 1 3.1(Type Zero) 1 3.1Total 32 100.0

second world

Type ELJO 6 16.7Type ELJ 4 11.1Type ELO 4 11.1Type EJO 5 13.9Type O2 5 13.9Type EL 3 8.3Type EJ 3 8.3Type EO 3 8.3Type E 1 2.8(Type L) 1 2.8(Type O) 1 2.8Total 36 100.0

third world

Type ELJO 12 14.6Type ELO 9 11.0Type EJO 9 11.0Type O2 8 9.8Type EL 3 3.7Type EJ 2 2.4Type EO 17 20.7(Type JO) 1 1.2Type E 20 24.4(Type O) 1 1.2Total 82 100.0

not classifiedType ELO 1 100.0

(2 Germanys)

Table 9.4: Empirical evidence for explanation: Bloc → Types.

239

Types → Blocfirst world second world third world Total

Type ELJO 6 6 12 24Type ELJ 1 4 0 5Type ELO 6 4 9 19Type EJO 6 5 9 20Type O2 0 5 8 13Type EL 0 3 3 6Type EJ 6 3 2 11Type EO 2 3 17 22(Type JO) 0 0 1 1Type E 3 1 20 24(Type L) 0 1 0 1(Type O) 1 1 1 3(Type Zero) 1 0 0 1Total 32 36 82 150

Table 9.5: Empirical evidence for explanation: Types → Bloc.

At least today, there is no observable legacy deriving from the ideological divi-

sion of states during the decisive years in which current institutional architecture

were shaped.

Three types do not follow this pattern. On the one side are the two em-

pirically less relevant types, such as the state administrative-legislator-judiciary

type (Type ELJ) and the state administrative-legislator type (Type EL). They do

not cover all three blocs. There are no third world countries employing the state

administrative-legislator-judiciary type (Type ELJ). The state administrative-

legislator type cannot be found in any first world countries. This can be explained

by their low frequency. On the other side, the SWO-governed type is a more sig-

nificant exception of the general pattern. This special type is not employed in

states of the former first world.

In short, there is no distinction between the states which were divided during

the second half of the 20th century by the ideological competition between the

major geopolitical blocs. However, while the institutional architecture of the state

administrative-legislator-judiciary type is only to be found in former first and

second world states, the state administrative-legislator type and SWO-governed

240

type are only found in the Second and Third World. All other types of institutional

architecture are employed by states belonging to all three former geopolitical blocs.

9.3 Governmental System

Hypothesis H3 links the governmental system13 of a particular state to its per-


gender equality. More precisely, I expected to find that states which are bound to

democratic rule have more comprehensive types of institutional architecture than

those with an autocratic governmental system. The hypothesis H3 reads: Different

governmental systems have different types of institutional architecture.

This hypothesis has been refuted in part. The state administrative-legislator-

judiciary-advocacy type (Type ELJO) occurs only in the more democratic govern-

mental systems and SWO-governed type only in anocratic and autocratic govern-

mental systems. Nevertheless, the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type,

the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type, the state administrative-advocacy

type, and the exclusively state administrative type (ELO, EJO, EO and E) can

be found in all three regimes. The empirically less relevant types; the state

administrative-legislator-judiciary type (Type ELJ) and the state administrative-

legislator type (Type EL) show different patterns: the state administrative-legislator-

judiciary type surfaces only in more democratic states, whereas the state administra-

tive-legislator type has developed in more democratic as well as in autocratic gov-

ernmental systems.

Due to their low frequencies this pattern might be accidental, while the limita-

tion of the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type and the SWO-

governed type are significant.

13Coding: 1 = democracy (polity = 10 to 6), more democratic; 2 = anocracy (polity =5 to -5), anocratic; 3 = autocracy (polity = -10 to -6), autocratic.

241

Governmental system → TypesGovernance regime Type Frequency Percentage

democratic(> 5 polity)

Type ELJO 22 29.3Type ELJ 4 5.3Type ELO 11 14.7Type EJO 11 14.7Type EL 5 6.7Type EJ 10 13.3Type EO 7 9.3Type E 4 5.3(Type L) 1 1.3Total 75 100.0

anocratic(-5 ≤ x ≤ 5)

Type ELO 5 22.7Type EJO 4 18.2Type O2 2 9.1Type EJ 1 4.5Type EO 4 18.2(Type JO) 1 4.5Type E 5 22.7Total 22 100.0

autocratic(< -5 polity)

Type ELO 2 10.5Type EJO 2 10.5Type O2 10 52.6Type EL 1 5.3Type EO 2 10.5Type E 1 5.3(Type O) 1 5.3Total 19 100.0

missing

Type ELJO 2 5.7Type ELJ 1 2.9Type ELO 2 5.7Type EJO 3 8.6Type O2 1 2.9Type EO 9 25.7Type E 14 40.0(Type O) 2 5.7(Type Zero) 1 2.9Total 35 100.0

Table 9.6: Empirical evidence for explanation: Governmental system → Types.

242

Types → Governmental systemdemocratic anocratic autocratic

Total(> 5 polity) (-5 ≤ x ≤ 5) (< -5)

Type ELJO 22 0 0 22Type ELJ 4 0 0 4Type ELO 11 5 2 18Type EJO 11 4 2 17Type O2 0 2 10 12Type EL 5 0 1 6Type EJ 10 1 0 11Type EO 7 4 2 13(Type JO) 0 1 0 1Type E 4 5 1 10(Type L) 1 0 0 1(Type O) 0 0 1 1Total 75 22 19 116

Table 9.7: Empirical evidence for explanation: Types → Governmental system.

In summary, most types of institutional architecture can be found in vari-

ous governmental systems. Nonetheless, two types – the state administrative-

legislator-judiciary-advocacy type and the SWO-governed type – have in fact de-

veloped only in a specific system of governance; thus, H3 can only be seen confirmed

in part.

9.4 Policy Diffusion

Hypothesis H4 has been split into 30 sub-hypotheses concerning international or-

ganizations and international treaties. Of these 30 hypotheses, seventeen were

refuted, one was confirmed in part and twelve were confirmed. Table 9.4 gives

general results of testing.

The focus of this hypothesis lies on the impact on institutional architecture by

state’s membership in various international organizations through policy diffusion.

There were a large number of sub-indicators to test in this regard: specifically,

the influence of twenty-seven international organizations and three international

treaties on institutional development. More precisely, I assumed that states which

243

Hypotheses Directions (a) (b)

Refuted 17 No influence 15 6Partly confirmed 1 Some influence 3 11Confirmed 12 Influence 12 13

Table 9.8: Explanations and hypotheses.

are member of the same international organization or which have ratified the same

international treaty would produce similar types of institutional architecture. The

hypothesis H4 therefore reads: States with the same international organization

membership are more likely to exhibit similar types of institutional architecture in

comparison with non-members.

The membership in Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Organi-

zation of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its first optional protocol, Council

of Mutual Economic Assistance, Commonwealth of Independent States, Central

Eastern Treaty Organization, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-

opment, Council of Europe, World Trade Organization, the International Court of

Justice, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe, NATO Partnership for Peace, International Organization

of the French-Speaking World or Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation appears to

have no influence on the variety of institutional architecture to be found in the

states analysed. Interestingly enough, however, I was able in part to establish

a link between North Atlantic Treaty Organization and institutional architecture.

Finally, states with membership in Commonwealth of Nations, Arab League, Coun-

cil of Arab Economic Unity, and Organization of the Islamic Conference, Nordic

Council, Alliance of Small Island States, Caribbean Community, Pacific Islands

Forum, Organization of Central American States, Southern Common Market, Eu-

ropean Union and Warsaw Pact shared similar institutional architecture with other

members of the same international organization. Table 9.9 shows the testing re-

sults in detail.

Nevertheless, the reasons for confirmation, refutation or partly refutation of

the sub-hypotheses differ. For the following discussion, I have organised the sub-

244

hypotheses into eight groups according to my testing results and with regard to

their content link.

9.4.1 Influence of Commonwealth of Nations:

Type EO and E

A clear relation between membership in the Commonwealth of Nations (COMW),

the British Commonwealth, and particular types of institutional architecture was

established. Commonwealth states favour two types of institutional architecture:

the state administrative-advocacy type (Type EO) and the exclusively state ad-

ministrative type (Type E) (each 12 cases). 70 per cent of Commonwealth states

employ one of those two small, but empirically relevant types. In addition, the state

administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type (Type ELJO) represents an ex-

ceptional case among states of Commonwealth of Nations: only India employs this

type of institutional architecture. Other empirically relevant types occur among

Commonwealth states, but there is only a small range of different types in use.

Nine per cent of institutional architecture documented in the Commonwealth

states utilizes the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type (Type ELO), the

state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type (Type EJO), or the state administra-

tive-judiciary type (Type EJ); with three cases in each type. The United King-

dom, for example, together with Bangladesh and Malaysia, employs the state

administrative-legislator-advocacy type. Evidently, the type utilized by the United

Kingdom does not serve as a model for most other Commonwealth states.

Furthermore, there appears to be a clear relation between type of institutional

architecture and not being member of the Commonwealth. The SWO-governed

type and the empirically less relevant state administrative-legislator-judiciary type

and state administrative-legislator type are not employed by the members of the

Commonwealth.

In brief, the Commonwealth has two favourite types of institutional archi-

tecture in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality: the state

administrative-advocacy type and the exclusively state administrative type. Look-

ing at it from the opposite perspective, the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-

advocacy type can be considered an exception in Commonwealth states, and the

245

SWO-governed type, the state administrative-legislator-judiciary type, and the

state administrative-legislator type (O2, ELJ and EL) are only found in Non-

commonwealth States.

9.4.2 AOSIS, CARICOM, and PIF favour Type E and EO

In this study, a relation between the membership in the Alliance of Small Island

States (AOSIS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Pacific Islands

Forum (PIF) and certain institutional architecture was established. Between two

thirds and three quarters of the members of these organizations favour either the

exclusively state administrative type or the state administrative-advocacy type.

In fact, the great majority of those states employing the exclusively state ad-

ministrative type (two thirds) worldwide are member of the Alliance of Small

Island States. Several other smaller, though empirically relevant types are utilized

as well. Contrariwise, state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type, the

state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type and the SWO-governed type are not

to be found in these states. This indicates that the small island states favour two

empirically relevant, although small types of institutional architecture.

This finding is not a surprise, given the fact that already Berkovitch pointed to

the relevance of ministries in states, in particular small island states, getting their

independence in the 1960s of the 20st century (Berkovitch 1999, 164-165). Such

a finding is usually overlooked due to the exclusion of states with a population of

less than 500,000.

9.4.3 Arab League, Council of Arab Economic Unity,

Organization of the Islamic Conference, and OPEC

Membership in the three organizations Arab League (ARABLEAGUE), Council

of Arab Economic Unity (ARABCOUN) and Organization of the Islamic Confer-

ence (OIC) also shows a relation with certain types of institutional architecture.

However, no such trend is detectable for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC).

As illustrated in Figure 9.1, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

246

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Arab CouncilArab League

Fig

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9.1:

Sta

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247

member states employ a wide variety of types of institutional architecture – mainly,

those with more empirical relevance worldwide. This is more or less the case for the

members of the Arab League, the Council of Arab Economic Unity and the Orga-

nization of the Islamic Conference as well. All four have in common that none uti-

lize the most comprehensive the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy

type. Instead, in these states the medium sized or smaller types of institutional

architecture are widely in use: ELO, the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy

type (Type EJO), the SWO-governed type (Type O2), the state administrative-

advocacy type (Type EO) and the exclusively state administrative type (Type E).

However, it must be noted that the focus in regard to types of institutional

architecture most likely to be employed differs between the organizations. For

example, members of the Council of Arab Economic Unity employ in a third of

cases the SWO-governed type or the exclusively state administrative type. Several

members of the Arab League also utilize these two types as well as the state

administrative-advocacy type. In contrast, the state administrative-advocacy type

is the most relevant type for the Organization of the Islamic Conference members

(25%). In comparison less often found are the state administrative-legislator-

advocacy type (19%), SWO-governed type (17%), exclusively state administrative

type (14%) and state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type (11%).

Clearly, the Organization of the Islamic Conference members do not limit them-

selves to employing small types of institutional architecture. Nevertheless, the

more comprehensive types of institutional architecture are rare among the states

of the Arab Council and the Arab League; the exceptions here are Egypt and

Tunisia.

9.4.4 Nordic Council: Type ELJO Missing

A significant relation showed up between type and membership in the Nordic

Council (NORDIC). However, surprisingly and contrary to general expectations,

the most comprehensive type of institutional architecture, the state administrative-

legislator-judiciary-advocacy type, is not utilized by any of the five Nordic states.

The three types to be found in those countries are: the state administrative-

judiciary-advocacy type (2 cases), the state administrative-legislator-judiciary type

248

(1 case), and the state administrative-judiciary type (2 cases). This is an unusually

large variety of institutional architecture for such a small number of cases. In

worldwide perspective, the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type is a widely

used type. However, this does not hold true either for the state administrative-

judiciary type, or for the state administrative-legislator-judiciary type. The others,

the exclusively state administrative type, the state administrative-advocacy type,

and the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type (Types E, EO, and ELO)

utilized globally are missing in the Nordic Region.

One explanation for the set of types of institutional architecture found here

is that the state administrative-legislator-judiciary type, the state administrative-

judiciary-advocacy type, and the state administrative-judiciary type (ELJ, EJO

and EJ) have a particular configuration in common: the combination of the exec-

utive and judiciary sector. Potentially, this is a more powerful configuration than

a configuration of the executive and the outside sector.

Summarizing, members of the Nordic Council employ more comprehensive

types of institutional architecture, while at the same time, the most comprehensive

type, the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type (Type ELJO), is

not utilized by these states. Nevertheless, all types employed by member states of

the Nordic Council have an institutional architecture that merges executive and

judiciary sectors.

9.4.5 Relations: Spanish and Portuguese Organizations

A relation between membership in the Organization of Central American States

(CENTRAMER) as well as in the Southern Common Market (Spanish: MERCO-

SUR, Portuguese: Mercosul), and institutional architecture was confirmed in this

study. Conversely, this did not hold true for member states in the Organization of

American States (OAS).

Amongst the seven members of the Organization of Central American States

(CENTRAMER), there is a clear favourite type: the majority (4 cases)14 utilize

the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type. The others member

states employ the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type (2 cases) and the

14Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Panama.

249

Indicator Hypothesis a) b)

COMW influence influence influence

ARABLEAGUE influence influence influenceARABCOUN influence influence influenceOIC influence influence influenceOPEC no influence no influence some influenceOAS no influence no influence some influence

NORDIC influence influence influence

AOSIS influence influence influenceCARICOM influence influence influencePIF influence influence influence

CENTRAMER influence influence influenceMERCOSUR influence influence influence

ACHR no influence no influence some influenceICCPR no influence no influence no influence

(adapted)ICCPR1 no influence influence influence

WARSAW influence influence influenceCOMECON no influence no influence no influenceCIS no influence some influence some influence (adapted)CENTO no influence some influence influence

EU influence some influence some influence (adapted)NATO some influence no influence some influence (adapted)OECD no influence no influence some influence (adapted)COE no influence no influence some influence (adapted)WTO no influence no influence some influenceICJ no influence no influence some influenceASEAN no influence no influence some influenceOSCE no influence no influence no influenceNATO PfP no influence no influence no influenceFRANC no influence no influence no influenceAPEC no influence no influence no influence

Table 9.9: Detail results of hypothesis H4.

250

state administrative-advocacy type (1 case). The common denominator of these

three types of institutional architecture is the combination of the executive and the

outside sector. This is not a potentially strong configuration of sectors. In contrast,

the strong empirical relevance of state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy

type in this region, the most comprehensive type globally, is remarkable.

In contrast, the six members of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)

employ the more widely used types: the state administrative-legislator-advocacy

type (2 cases), the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type (2 cases), the state

administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type (1 case), and the state administra-

tive-legislator type (1 case). Despite their small number, they utilize a wider

variety of types of institutional architecture and, for the most part, the more

comprehensive types among the empirically more relevant types.

The 35 member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) utilize

practically all types of institutional architecture with the exception of the state

administrative-legislator-judiciary type. However, it must be noted that most

types can only be found once. That indicates that a very broad spectrum of types

is in use. The most commonly used type among the Organization of American

States member states is the exclusively state administrative type: 29 per cent (10

cases). Although the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type and

the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type are prominent as well.

In short, members of Spanish and Portuguese free trade organizations tend to

utilize the more comprehensive types of institutional architecture, in particular

with the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type. In contrast, Or-

ganization of American States member states tend to favour the exclusively state

administrative type; many Organization of American States members are small

island states. Nevertheless, Organization of American States members employ in

general a wide range of types of institutional architecture.

9.4.6 International Human Rights Treaties:

ACHR, ICCPR and ICCPR1

Various relations can be found between types of institutional architecture and/or

ratification of the three human rights treaties. The small group of 21 non signa-

251

tories of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), for

example, confirm the hypothesis that there is a relationship with a particular type

of institutional architecture: Nearly all states which have ratified the ICCPR utilize

the empirically relevant types, with the exception of the exclusively state admin-

istrative type. In contrast, the exclusively state administrative type is prominent

solely among the non-ratifiers of ICCPR. Half of the non-ratifying states utilize the

exclusively state administrative type. ICCPR none ratifiers also employs smaller

types of institutional architecture such as the state administrative-advocacy type.

Interestingly enough, the non-adopters of the first optional protocol to the IC-

CPR (referred to here as ICCPR1) reveal a slightly different relation. In contrast

to the ICCPR non-ratifiers, all empirically relevant types of institutional architec-

ture can be found both in states which have yet to ratify the ICCPR as well as

those states which ratified the ICCPR’s first optional protocol. However, in this

case, a split between the more comprehensive and the less comprehensive types is

noticeable: the majority of states which ratified ICCPR1 favour the larger types.

Of all states in which the state administrative-judiciary type is employed 80 per

cent (9 cases) ratified ICCPR1 and only two did not. Clearly, among the states

using the state administrative-judiciary type, the ICCPR1 ratifiers can be consid-

ered the norm. The exception on the other end of the spectrum is India, which did

not ratify the optional protocol, but employs the state administrative-legislator-

judiciary-advocacy type.

Considering the smaller types in general, a majority of states with the exclu-

sively state administrative type, the state administrative-advocacy type, and the

SWO-governed type did not adopt the first optional protocol, even though they

did ratify the ICCPR. Among the non-adopting states the state administrative-

advocacy type and the exclusively state administrative type are prevalent. In

contrast, there appears to be little relation between types and the 24 signatories

of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). In fact, the signatories

utilize a wide variety of types of institutional architecture, whereas in most cases,

they usually employ per type only one case. More relevant types of institutional

architecture have three to four cases. Thus, heterogeneity of institutional archi-

tecture appears to be the norm. Nevertheless, American Convention on Human

Rights signatories did show a type preference: one third of these states employ the

252

state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type (8 cases).15 This regional

preference of the most comprehensive type of institutional architecture in women’s

empowerment and promotion of gender equality challenges ethnocentric views on

women’s policy agencies and adds to hypothesis five tested below.

9.4.7 Variety among Former Warsaw Pact, COMECON,

CIS and CENTO

The four international organizations Warsaw Pact (WARSAW), Council of Mutual

Economic Assistance (COMECON), Central Eastern Treaty Organization, also

known as Baghdad Pact (CENTO), and Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS), incorporate Eastern Bloc legacies. While the first three organizations listed

were abandoned after 1990, the Commonwealth of Independent States was created

in 1991.

Interestingly, my hypothesis was confirmed only in regard to the Warsaw Pact.

The former eight member states of the Warsaw Pact employ mainly the more

comprehensive types today. Half of them even utilize the most comprehensive

type: the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type.

In contrast, no relation could be found between the Council of Mutual Eco-

nomic Assistance (COMECON) and a variety of institutional architecture. Former

members utilize all empirically relevant types today. The state administrative-

legislator-judiciary-advocacy type (6 cases), the state administrative-legislator-

judiciary type (4 cases) and the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type (4

cases) with four or six cases are employed by a majority of former Council of

Mutual Economic Assistance member (56 per cent, 14 cases). This absence of

any relation is noteworthy, as this implies that a considerable proportion of states

formerly under state socialist rule introduced similar institutional architecture. A

majority even uses the more comprehensive types.

Of the six former members of Central Eastern Treaty Organization, none

employs the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type. However, a

diversity of four types is employed by these six states. In addition, the state

15Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, andPeru.

253

administrative-legislator-advocacy type is used by half of them.16

The twelve members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) employ

a wide variety of types of institutional architecture. Nevertheless, empirically rel-

evant types – for instance, the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy,

the exclusively state administrative, and the state administrative-advocacy (ELJO,

E, and EO) – are rare in this group. Half of the Commonwealth of Independent

States member states utilize the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type and

the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type (each 3 cases). Two utilize the

SWO-governed type. This pattern is unusual.

9.4.8 Minimal Relations: EU, NATO, OECD, Council of

Europe, WTO, ICJ, and ASEAN

This subsection discusses mainly organizations in which the assumption that states

with the same international organization are more likely to exhibit similar types of

institutional architecture in comparison with non-members (H4) was refuted. Of

the international organizations examined here, only one (the EU) shows a weak

relation with some institutional architecture.

The European Union (EU) appears to have a certain influence on chosen types

of institutional architecture, however no set model for all member states. Seven

types are employed by European Union members. Of these seven, five have at least

four cases among the European Union member states. The state administrative-

legislator-judiciary-advocacy type is utilized by 32 per cent (9 cases) of European

Union member states. This indicates that the state administrative-legislator-

judiciary-advocacy type has some prominence under European Union members,

but it is far from being the dominant type within the European Union. The mem-

ber states of the European Union mainly utilize the more comprehensive types of

institutional architecture. Nevertheless, I found no type restricted solely to Euro-

pean Union member states. This leads to the conclusion that there is no European

Union-model for institutional architecture. It should also be noted that the SWO-

governed type, the state administrative-legislator type and the exclusively state

administrative type occur only in non European Union states.

16Iran, Turkey and United Kingdom.

254

The members of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization for Eco-

nomic Cooperation and Development, Council of Europe, World Trade Orga-

nization, the International Court of Justice, and the Association of Southeast

Asian Nations all employ a wide variety of institutional architecture. This diver-

sity among the members is similar to that among non-members. In addition to

this explicit aspect, the organizations do tend toward certain preferences. The

SWO-governed type and the state administrative-legislator type, for example, are

only employed by non-members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The

state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type has some empirical rele-

vance among the North Atlantic Treaty Organization states, although with 29 per

cent (8 cases) it cannot be considered empirically dominant. The most common

characteristic is the wide variety of types in use.

In the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the

exception is the state administrative-advocacy type, which is less prominent among

its members (3 cases, 9%) than among non-members of Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (19 cases, 17%). The absent of the SWO-governed

type among the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development mem-

bers is explainable. The preamble of Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development charter declares the support of democracy as the common goal of

its member states. States with limited political freedom are historically less likely

to become members. The SWO-governed type is also missing among Council of

Europe (COE) members. Nevertheless, certain types of institutional architecture

are more widespread: the majority of institutional architecture in Council of Eu-

rope member states are comprised of the two less empirically relevant types, such

as the state administrative-legislator-judiciary type and the exclusively state ad-

ministrative type. The state administrative-judiciary type is even among the four

most empirically relevant cases among the Council of Europe members.

In the case of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a slight relation with types

employing the combination of executive and judiciary was determined; with one

or two exceptions, the states utilizing the types of state administrative-legislator-

judiciary-advocacy, state administrative-judiciary-advocacy and state administra-

tive-judiciary types (ELJO, EJO or EJ) are members of World Trade Organization.

Both states which have acknowledged the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-

255

national Court of Justice (ICJ) as well as those which have not recognised the the

International Court of Justice, employ a wide range of types of institutional archi-

tecture. However, these two groups of states do so to differing degrees. While a

small majority of states acknowledging the the International Court of Justice com-

pulsory jurisdiction utilize the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy,

the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy and the state administrative-judiciary

types (ELJO, EJO and EJ), the majority of states rejecting the International Court

of Justice jurisdiction utilize other empirically relevant types. All states using the

state administrative-legislator type, and to a lesser extent SWO-governed type, do

not recognise the International Court of Justice authority.

Finally, the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN) all utilize the more widespread types of institutional architecture. In

most instances, there is only one case per type. In addition, seven the Association

of Southeast Asian Nations members employ one of the two, the SWO-governed

type and the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type. Hence, a slight relation

between type and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations membership can be

confirmed. However it must be noted that both types of institutional architecture

encompass the majority of cases among the non-members of the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations.

9.4.9 No Relations: OSCE, NATO PfP, FRANC and APEC

No relations could be established between the memberships in the following four or-

ganizations: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO

Partnership for Peace (NATO PfP), the International Organization of the French-

Speaking World (FRANC) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

The member states of these organizations employ a wide variety of types of insti-

tutional architecture, mainly the empirically more relevant types. This pattern is

similar to that found among the non-members.

256

9.5 Geographical Diffusion

Hypothesis H5 draws a link between the geographical proximity of states and

their specific state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender

equality. This hypothesis was tested by means of visual mapping. More precisely,

states which are neighbours or geographically in close proximity to each other were

assumed to have more similar types of institutional architecture. The hypothesis

H5 reads: Neighbour states have the same type of institutional architecture.

Type ZeroType OType LType E

Type JOType EOType EJType ELType O2

Type ELOType EJO

Type ELJType ELJO

Types of Institutional Architecture

Figure 9.2: Types of institutional architecture on a world map.

This hypothesis was refuted in part, due to the fact that neighbouring states

generally do not utilize the same types of institutional architecture. Nonetheless,

certain patterns were uncovered: Several neighbouring states in a particular region

do actually employ the same types of institutional architecture; nevertheless, this

particular institutional architecture was also employed by other clusters of neigh-

bours in other regions. Hence, it was determined that types are not restricted to

257

particular regions. Or, in other words, the regions do not employ particular types

exclusively. Thus, presumption a) was confirmed; there is some relation between

geographical closeness and type of institutional architecture.

The main pattern is that of heterogeneity among neighbouring states; more

comprehensive types exist next to less comprehensive types. In contrast, the pre-

sumption b) was refuted in part. There appears to be some influence between type

of institutional architecture and geographical proximity. The empirically more rel-

evant types have clusters of neighbouring states in several regions.

9.6 Alternative Explanations

There are two alternative explanations for variations in institutional architecture

in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality. In Hypothesis C1,

the impact of economic wealth17 on the variety of institutional architecture was

tested. The first alternative hypothesis draws a relation between the economic

wealth of a particular state in comparison to other states and its institutional

architecture. The hypothesis C1 reads: States with comparable economic wealth

have more similar types of institutional architecture. States with a lesser economic

wealth may have less comprehensive types of institutional architecture than states

with greater economic wealth.

The hypothesis could only be confirmed in part as all three groupings of eco-

nomic wealth employ a wide range of different types of institutional architecture.

Contrary to expectations, the less comprehensive types of institutional architec-

ture are not restricted to states with little economic wealth, and comprehensive

types are not limited to wealthy states.

The hypothesis could only be confirmed in part because there are two types of

institutional architecture with a limited range: the state administrative-legislator-

judiciary-advocacy type and one of the empirically less relevant types, the state

administrative-judiciary type, occur only among states with medium or large

economic wealth. The most comprehensive, the state administrative-legislator-

17Coding: Ten years mean of the gross national income (GNI) p.c., PPP, current internationalDollar: 1 = small (<2,000$); 2 = medium (2,000$ ≤ x < 10,000$); and 3 = large economicwealth (≥ 10,000$).

258

Economic wealth → Types10 years mean GNI (1999–2008) Type Frequency Percentage

small wealth(< 2,000$ p.c., PPP)

Type ELJ 1 7.7Type ELO 2 15.4Type EJO 1 7.7Type O2 4 30.8Type EL 1 7.7Type EO 1 7.7Type E 3 23.1Total 13 100.0

medium wealth(2,000 ≤ x < 10,000 $p.c., PPP)

Type ELJO 12 18.2Type ELJ 1 1.5Type ELO 8 12.1Type EJO 11 16.7Type O2 4 6.1Type EL 4 6.1Type EJ 2 3.0Type EO 13 19.7(Type JO) 1 1.5Type E 9 13.6(Type L) 1 1.5Total 66 100.0

large wealth(≥ 10,000$ p.c., PPP)

Type ELJO 11 18.6Type ELJ 3 5.1Type ELO 9 15.3Type EJO 8 13.6Type O2 2 3.4Type EL 1 1.7Type EJ 9 15.3Type EO 7 11.9Type E 7 11.9(Type O) 2 3.4Total 59 100.0

missing

Type ELJO 1 7.7Type ELO 1 7.7Type O2 3 23.1Type EO 1 7.7Type E 5 38.5(Type O) 1 7.7(Type Zero) 1 7.7Total 13 100.0

Table 9.10: Empirical evidence for explanation: Economic wealth → Types.259

Types → Economic wealth

Typesmall wealth medium wealth large wealth

Total(< 2,000$) (2,000 ≤ x < 10,000) (≥ 10,000$)

Type ELJO 0 12 11 23Type ELJ 1 1 3 5Type ELO 2 8 9 19Type EJO 1 11 8 20Type O2 4 4 2 10Type EL 1 4 1 6Type EJ 0 2 9 11Type EO 1 13 7 21(Type JO) 0 1 0 1Type E 3 9 7 19(Type L) 0 1 0 1(Type O) 0 0 2 2Total 13 66 59 138

Table 9.11: Empirical evidence for explanation: Types → Economic wealth.

judiciary-advocacy type is not employed in states with little economic wealth.

That indicates that here is a certain relation between economic wealth and insti-

tutional variety (a) in regard to two types. All other empirically relevant types

are employed by states in all three categories of economic wealth. The relation

between particular types of institutional architecture and particular categories of

economic wealth (b) is more significant. Certain types of institutional architecture

can be found more often in states with a particular level of economic wealth than

in others. The SWO-governed type is with 31 per cent the most widespread type

among states with small economic wealth; nevertheless, it cannot be considered

dominant. The state administrative-advocacy type is the most widely used type

of institutional architecture among states with medium economic wealth (20%).

The state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type is represented with 19

per cent in the states with great economic wealth. In brief, some preferences are

noticeable, but mainly a wide range of types of institutional architecture are in

use by states with differing levels of economic wealth.

In Hypothesis C2, the impact of the population size18 was tested on the variety

18Coding: 1 = small population (<1 million persons); 2 = medium population (1 ≤ x < 60

260

of institutional architecture. The second alternative hypothesis draws a connection

between the size of the population of a particular state in comparison to other

states and its institutional architecture. The hypothesis C2 reads: States with

comparable size of population have more similar types of institutional architecture.

States with a smaller population have less comprehensive types of institutional

architecture than states with larger populations.

This hypothesis was refuted due to the fact that states of varying popula-

tion sizes utilize a wide variety of types of institutional architecture. Most states

have a medium-sized population (63%). However, presumption a) (effect of pop-

ulation size on variety) was only partly refuted. The population size appears to

have a certain influence on the range of types of institutional architecture em-

ployed. The empirically less relevant types, such as the state administrative-

legislator-judiciary type, the state administrative-legislator type and the state

administrative-judiciary type, occur only in states with small and medium popu-

lations. The state administrative-legislator-judiciary type exists only in countries

with medium-sized populations.

In states with large populations, a much smaller range of types of institutional

architecture are used than in states with medium sized populations. They em-

ploy the more widespread among the more comprehensive types, such as the state

administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy, the state administrative-legislator-ad-

vocacy, the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy, the SWO-governed and the

state administrative-advocacy types (ELJO, ELO, EJO, O2 and EO). The widespread

exclusively state administrative type does not occur in countries with large pop-

ulations. Of all states employing the exclusively state administrative type, two

thirds have small populations.

States with a certain population size do appear to favour particular types of in-

stitutional architecture. Eighty per cent of all states with the state administrative-

legislator-judiciary-advocacy type have a medium sized population. The SWO-

governed type occurs only in states with a medium or large population; how-

ever, it is mainly a phenomenon of states with medium sized populations. Of

the states with large populations, 39 per cent utilize the state administrative-

legislator-advocacy type. Despite the wide variety of types employed by states of

million persons); and 3 = large population (≥ 60 million persons).

261

Size of population → TypesPopulation (mean 1999–2008) Type Frequency Percentage

small(≤ 1,000,000)

Type ELJO 1 2.6Type ELO 2 5.3Type EJO 2 5.3Type EL 2 5.3Type EJ 2 5.3Type EO 10 26.3Type E 16 42.1(Type O) 2 5.3(Type Zero) 1 2.6Total 38 100.0

medium(1,000,000 ≤ x < 60,000,000)

Type ELJO 19 20.2Type ELJ 5 5.3Type ELO 10 10.6Type EJO 15 16.0Type O2 11 11.7Type EL 4 4.3Type EJ 9 9.6Type EO 10 10.6(Type JO) 1 1.1Type E 8 8.5(Type L) 1 1.1(Type O) 1 1.1Total 94 100.0

large(≥ 60,000,000)

Type ELJO 4 22.2Type ELO 7 38.9Type EJO 3 16.7Type O2 2 11.1Type EO 2 11.1Total 18 100.0

missing Type ELO 1 100.0

Table 9.12: Empirical evidence for explanation: Population → Types.

262

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263

all population sizes, there is a certain relation between size of the population and

variety of institutional types (a).

In regard to the assumed link between type of institutional architecture and

population size (b), certain preferences were confirmed. The exclusively state ad-

ministrative type is the most widespread type of institutional architecture (42%)

among the states with small populations. Although this represents a fairly large

percentage, it still cannot be considered dominant. Of the states with a medium

population, 20 per cent employ the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy

type. 39 per cent of institutional architecture by states with large populations is

the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type. Here too, the percentage is quite

high, but cannot be seen as dominant.

9.7 Similarities and Differences

The findings for the different types of institutional architecture can also be ar-

ranged according to similarities and differences, which yield two groups of three

(triade) as well as two pairs.

9.7.1 Spectra of Divergence: Type ELJO, Type Zero and

Type O2

The first triade encompasses the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy

type (Type ELJO), the type zero (Type Zero) and the SWO-governed type (Type

O2). There are two spectra of divergence. In both spectra is the most comprehen-

sive type of institutional architecture, the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-

advocacy type at one end. The latter two types represent each another end of a

particular spectrum.

Type ELJO: Large, More Democratic States

At the one end of those spectra of divergence one finds the state administrative-

legislator-judiciary-advocacy type. This study encompasses a total of 24 cases with

institutional architecture of the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy

264

type. Although a state does not have to be an early mover in its gender equality

history to have developed the most comprehensive type of institutional architec-

ture; nevertheless, the states employing this type have taken three initial steps

in gender equality history: granting all women the right to stand for elections,

and the election of the first female member of legislative assembly. 70 per cent of

the states fulfilling these criteria also ratified the CEDAW within the first decade

after its passage in 1979. Some of these states have since elected their first female

head of parliamentary body, prime minister and/or president. Half of the cases

were part of the former ‘third world’, and a quarter each to the second and the

first world. This type of institutional architecture is restricted to more democratic

governmental systems19 of medium and large economic wealth with medium and

large-sized populations. 26 per cent of member of the Council of Europe have an

institutional architecture of the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy

type. The state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type is also a favoured

or widespread type among the members of the Organization of Central American

States (23%), AHCH ratifiers (33%), the former members of the Warsaw Pact

(50%), the European Union (32%), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(29%). A small majority of states with an institutional architecture of the state

administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type authorises the jurisdiction of the

International Court of Justice.

In other words, the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type is

popular among former East European state socialist states as well as among other

European, Central and South American states. Therefore, it cannot be considered

solely the predominant type of European states. Conversely, one exceptional case

of the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type can also be found

in India which belongs to Commonwealth states and has yet to ratify the IC-

CPR. Furthermore, the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type is

not employed by the members of Arab League, Council of Arab Economic Unity,

and Organization of the Islamic Conference, Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries, Nordic Council, Alliance of Small Island States, Caribbean Community,

Pacific Islands Forum, Central Eastern Treaty Organization, and Commonwealth

of Independent States. Succinctly, states using the state administrative-legislator-

19In comparison to anocratic and autocratic governmental system as defined above.

265

judiciary-advocacy type tend to be relatively large and have a more democratic

political system in comparison to other states.

Type Zero: Small, Wealthy, More Democratic and European But

“Dragging its Heels” in Gender Equality History

Conceptually, type zero is to be found on the other end of the spectrum of state

administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type, due to the absence of women’s

policy agencies in any sector of governmental action. In the course of my study, I

only found one case with the type zero: Monaco. Controversy, Monaco20 is part

of the former first world, yet has a small population and is located in Europe.

It completed the three early steps in gender equality history with the majority

of other states. It has yet to elect a female president, prime minister or head of

parliamentary body – as 80 per cent of states worldwide have yet to do. Monaco

ratified the CEDAW in the 2000s, long after many other states. In brief, Monaco is

a small, rich European state, which is only reluctantly taking steps towards more

gender equality. This single case is definitively on the other end of the spectrum

of the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type in regard to gender

equality history.

Type O2: The Exceptional Type of Institutional Architecture

In this study, 13 cases of the SWO-governed type were found. These cases have

diverse courses of gender equality history. There are states which did take some

steps towards more gender equality early, while others carried out these steps in

concert with the majority of states; finally, and some states have proven to be

laggards in regard to gender equality processes. Three quarters of the states with

cases of the SWO-governed type of institutional architecture ratified CEDAW in

the first or second decade after its passing. One state still fails to provide basic

human rights to women as the right to stand for elections (United Arab Emirates).

The SWO-governed type is not found in the former first world. 80 per cent of

the states utilizing this type of institutional architecture have an autocratic, 20 per

20The data used in this study contains no information on the governmental system and theeconomic wealth of Monaco. In a worldwide comparison, however, it has a more democraticgovernmental system and is among the richer nations.

266

cent an anocratic governmental system. In other words, despite limited political

and civil liberties, surprisingly enough, not all of these states are autocratically

governed. The SWO-governed type is among the more widely used types among

the members of the Council of Arab Economic Unity (33%, 4 cases), Organiza-

tion of the Islamic Conference (17%, the same 4 cases), and Commonwealth of

Independent States (17%, 2 cases). Majority of states with the SWO-governed

type did not adopt the first optional protocol to ICCPR, nor has the majority

acknowledged the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

The SWO-governed type are not to found among the members states of the

Commonwealth, the Alliance of Small Island States, Caribbean Community, Pa-

cific Islands Forum, European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Orga-

nization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Organization for Security

and Cooperation in Europe, and Council of Europe. This type remains an excep-

tion. On the one hand, it is the most widespread type among states with small

economic wealth. On the other hand, it occurs only in states with medium or

large populations. That this type is restricted to anocratic and autocratic govern-

mental systems is part of its construction of rationality.21 The component of the

governmental system position the SWO-governed type (Type O2) and the state

administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type at the end of a spectrum. Still,

regarding doing steps in gender equality history; the SWO-governed type does

not represent the other end of the spectrum to the state administrative-legislator-

judiciary-advocacy type. At the end of this other particular spectrum is the type

zero situated.

9.7.2 Paired in Similarities: Type E and Type EO

The pair of the exclusively state administrative type and the state administrative-

advocacy type is different. Those two small types are mainly employed by small

states, members of the Commonwealth of Nations and laggards in gender equality

history. Furthermore, they both employ women’s policy agencies in the executive

sector (E). Currently, states do not employ types without an executive sector.22

21See Section 5.2 for more details.22See Table 8.1 for more details.

267

Therefore, the occurrence of the executive sector is the absolute minimum cur-

rently. Both are empirically relevant types. They have a share of thirty per cent

of the states covered in this analysis.

Type E: Small Islands, Commonwealth and Laggards

There are 22 cases of institutional architecture of the exclusively state administra-

tive type (Type E). Some states with this type have completed several steps in

gender equality history, for the most part, together with the majority of the other

states. Three have not yet elected a woman into parliament (Micronesia, Palau

and Kuwait – as of 2004). Kuwait has yet to grant women the right to stand for

elections.23 Nevertheless, 80 per cent of these states ratified the CEDAW in the

first two decades after its passing.

The exclusively state administrative type is the favoured type among the mem-

bers of the Alliance of Small Island States (67%), Caribbean Community and Pa-

cific Islands Forum, Commonwealth of Nations (35%), the non-ratifiers of ICCPR

as well as the non European Union states. It is not found in states with large pop-

ulations; two thirds of the states employing the exclusively state administrative

type have small populations. Rather, it is the favoured type among small island

states, Commonwealth of Nations states and some gender equality laggards.

Type EO: Laggards With Smaller Populations

There are 22 cases of the state administrative-advocacy type (Type EO) in this

study. Several of these states still fail to grant women the right to stand for elec-

tions24; congruously, they have yet to elect the first female Member of Parliament

(Qatar, Brunei and Oman)25. The other states encompassed in this group have

introduced reforms in concert with most states. Half of the states employing the

state administrative-advocacy type ratified CEDAW in the second decade after its

passing, but not all states have ratified it by 2012.

The state administrative-advocacy type is the most widespread type in the

Commonwealth (35%), Organization of the Islamic Conference (25%), among the

23Data till 1995.24Data till 1995.25Data till 2004.

268

not adaptors of ICCPR and none members of the Organization for Economic Co-

operation and Development. It is mainly employed in states with small or medium

populations (90%) and in states with medium economic wealth. Succinctly, this

type of institutional architecture occurs mainly in smaller and medium states,

which are laggards in introducing gender equality into their society.

9.7.3 Triade in Similarities: Type EJO, Type EJ and

Type ELJ

A triade of types of institutional architecture which is more inclined to implement

gender equality are the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type (Type EJO),

the state administrative-judiciary type (Type EJ) and the state administrative-

legislator-judiciary type (Type ELJ). Their commonality in the executive sectors

(E) and the judiciary (J) may separate them from other types. On a global scale,

women’s policy agencies in the judiciary (J) are less widespread than forms in

other sectors.26

Type EJO: the Intermediate Moving

There are 20 cases of the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type. Those

states have completed initial steps to advance gender equality such as granting the

right to some and all women to stand for elections, and electing the first woman into

their parliament. Some have even elected the first female head of parliamentary

body, prime minister and / or president. Sixty-nine per cent of these states ratified

CEDAW in the first decade after its passing.

The state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type is to be found with a few

cases in both Commonwealths, Organization of the Islamic Conference, Nordic

Council, Organization of Central American States, Southern Common Market, Or-

ganization of American States, Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and World

Trade Organization. A small majority of states with the state administrative-

judiciary-advocacy type declare the International Court of Justice as applicable

to them. A majority of these states has a medium economic wealth and medium-

26See page 152.

269

sized populations. The state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type is not to be

found among small island states, which are members of the Alliance of Small Is-

land States, Caribbean Community or Pacific Islands Forum. To brief, the state

administrative-judiciary-advocacy type is employed by intermediary states, which

taken several initial steps towards gender equality in the past and move on.

Type EJ: Wealthy and Early Moving with Smaller Population

Eleven cases of the state administrative-judiciary type (Type EJ) of institutional

architecture were found. Most of those states are among the early movers in gen-

der equality history worldwide. The number of states, however, that continues to

advance gender equality in their societies decreased over time. In the more recent

past, only five have elected the first female head of parliamentary body. Hence,

a part is still moving. A little over half of the state administrative-judiciary-

advocacy type are part of the former first world and ninety-one per cent have

implemented a form of democratic governmental system. Eighty-two per cent

have a large economic wealth. Two thirds are members of Organization for Eco-

nomic Cooperation and Development, Organization for Security and Cooperation

in Europe and Council of Europe. A small majority is member of the European

Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Eighty per cent ratified the first

optional protocol to ICCPR and a little more than half acknowledge the Inter-

national Court of Justice jurisdiction. The state administrative-judiciary type is

one of the most frequently used types of institutional architecture in the Nordic

Council states (2 cases) and one of the more frequently types employed in states

of the Commonwealth of Nations (3 cases).

The state administrative-judiciary type is found only in states with medium

or large economic wealth and with small and medium populations. In short, it

encompasses wealthy and early moving states with a smaller population.

Type ELJ: North Eastern with Medium Population

There are five cases with the state administrative-legislator-judiciary type (Type ELJ)

in this study: Afghanistan, Finland, Latvia, Poland and Romania. Three of those

states were early in granting some and all women the right to stand for elections,

270

in electing the first female Member of Parliament and in ratifying the CEDAW.

Lately, two of these states have elected the first female head of parliamentary

body, prime minister and/or president. Most of the states employing the state

administrative-legislator-judiciary type are members of the Council of Europe, the

European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, North

Atlantic Treaty Organization and NATO Partnership for Peace and/or of the Or-

ganization of the French-Speaking World. Latvia, Poland and Romania all for-

merly belonged to Council of Mutual Economic Assistance; however, they are not

members of the Commonwealth of Nations.

The most striking feature of the members of this type of institutional architec-

ture is the geographical concentration of those states on the north eastern part of

Europe, with the exception of Afghanistan. The state administrative-legislator-

judiciary type exists only in medium sized populations in the former first or second

world. Three states have a large, one a medium and one a small economic wealth.

Today, four of the five states employing the state administrative-legislator-judiciary

type have a rather democratic governmental system.27

9.7.4 Paired in Divergence: Type ELO and Type EL

The last pair of types of institutional architecture to be discussed here demon-

strates a contrast. Even though the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type

(Type ELO) and the state administrative-legislator type (Type EL) share their

positioning within the executive and legislative sector, they are divergent in their

speed of advancing gender equality.

Type ELO: the Larger, Moved States

This study encompasses 20 cases of the state administrative-legislator-advocacy

type. Those states have implemented initial steps towards gender equality such

as granting all women the rights to vote, to stand for elections and electing of the

first woman into parliament. Sixty-five per cent of these states ratified CEDAW

in the first decade after its passing. Some have also elected the first female head

27In this item the data set contains no information about Afghanistan.

271

of parliamentary body, prime minister and/or president. Hence, they have accom-

plished much towards advancing gender equality in the past. Authority of the

International Court of Justice is recognised by a third of these states. The state

administrative-legislator-advocacy type is employed in the United Kingdom, but

it does not serve as a strong model for other Commonwealth states. It is used in

half of the member states of Central Eastern Treaty Organization (3 cases), 25 per

cent of the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (3 cases), a third

of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations states (3 cases) and ten per cent

of Commonwealth of Nations (3 cases). In other words, the state administrative-

legislator-advocacy type is to be found in a wide range of states which are mem-

bers in a wide variety of international organizations; it is however not restricted

to member states of a particular international organization.

Ninety per cent of states utilizing the state administrative-legislator-advocacy

type have medium or large economic wealth and a medium or large sized popula-

tion. More precisely, 39 per cent of the states with large populations employ the

state administrative-legislator-advocacy type. It can therefore be concluded that

the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type is popular among larger states

which achieved several steps in gender equality history.

Type EL: Reluctant Reformers with Smaller Population

Six cases of the state administrative-legislator type (Type EL) could be identified

in this study. The states linked with this type have taken initial steps towards

gender equality; however, these measures, such as the first female member in

parliament and the ratification of CEDAW, were implemented at a later point in

time than in other states.

The state administrative-legislator type is found in the former second and third

world states with small and medium sized populations. Half of the states are mem-

ber of the International Organization of the French-Speaking World. States utiliz-

ing an institutional architecture of the state administrative-legislator type are not

members of European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the major-

ity does not recognise the compulsory jurisdiction of the the International Court

of Justice. Sixty-seven per cent have a medium economic wealth. However, the

272

state administrative-legislator type is not to be found in anocratic governmental

systems, only in democratic or autocratic regimes.

In brief, states using the state administrative-legislator type are reluctant in

taking up steps towards gender equality and they have a smaller population.

9.7.5 The Rare Types

Little has been said so far about the states using institutional architecture of the

exclusively advocacy type (Type O) (3 cases), and the solitary case types: the

judiciary-advocacy type (Type JO) and the exclusively legislator type (Type L).

Due to lack of sufficient data to test the different hypotheses, a comparison of the

states of the exclusively advocacy type (Type O) was not possible.

The judiciary-advocacy type (Type JO) is a type of institutional architecture

employed only in Ecuador. Ecuador was among the early states implementing

the first three steps in gender equality history and it ratified CEDAW in the first

decade after its passing. However, Ecuador is neither Organization for Security

and Cooperation in Europe member, nor does it recognise the jurisdiction of the

International Court of Justice.

The exclusively legislator type (Type L) is utilized in Georgia. This Eurasian

state was among the early states granting women the right to stand for elections,

but it only ratified CEDAW in the second decade after its passing. It was part

of the former second world and according to POLITY IV data it has a more

democratic governmental system. It is presently a member of the Council of Eu-

rope, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and NATO

Partnership for Peace and recognises the jurisdiction of the International Court of

Justice. Economic wealth and population are of medium size.

9.8 Dominance of Heterogeneity

Testing of possible explanations for the variation of institutional architecture had

a twofold objective. On one hand, by testing hypotheses explanations with little or

no empirical foundation could be discarded. On other hand, the hypotheses were

used as a guideline to better understand the emerging discrepancies in regard to

273

specific hypotheses. After testing seven hypotheses and thirty-six sub-hypotheses

discussed above, one particular observation needs to be underscored: institutional

heterogeneity of current institutional architecture is empirically relevant.

Regarding the first objective, all hypotheses advanced in this study were re-

futed or refuted in part due to the fact that all the diverse groups of states analysed

in reference to a particular indicator mainly employ a wide range of types of insti-

tutional architecture. It is the primary feature of current permanent and specific

state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality that

states similar in political structures, gender equality history and membership in

international organizations actually utilize a wide range of types of institutional

architecture, an institutional heterogeneity of institutional architecture. This is

the main pattern that has emerged.

In Figure 9.3, the types of institutional architecture analysed in this study are

arranged along the gender equality history divide. On the left side are the laggards

and reluctant movers, on the right side the types encompassing early movers and

movers. Furthermore, the types are organized according to the contrasting and

similar pairs and triades discussed in the section above. The states with identical

combinations of different forms of women’s policy agencies are listed together in

accordance with the graphical depiction in Chapter 8.4. All states employing the

combination of different forms of women’s policy agencies are depicted in separate

boxes named by type of institutional architecture, for instance, Argentina and

Thailand in the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type (Type ELO).

The bold lines between particular types indicate which types are most remote of

one another equivalent to the complementary occurrence of governmental sectors.

The SWO-governed type (Type O2) is by definition more distant to any other

type.

It is not surprising that prior research spoke of confusing heterogeneity. Nonethe-

less, the testing of possible explanations combined with the other analyses of this

dissertation provided some new evidence. As showed in the last section, hetero-

geneity is delimited for certain types of institutional architecture and particular

explanations. The attempt to better understand the emerging discrepancies in

regard to specific hypotheses resulted in a split of the collective of states. They

have been divided into movers, reluctant movers and laggards relating to gender

274

States and Territories* Combination Type Type Combination States and Territories*Yemen E1E3E4 LJO - no casesKuwait E1 LJ - no casesSingapore E3E4Armenia, Antigua and Barbuda, Canada, E1E3E4J1O3 MexicoDominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, E1E3J1O1 KazakhstanSaint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the E1E3J2O3 EgyptGrenadines, Solomon Islands, Sudan E1E4J1O1 NicaraguaHaiti, Iraq E2 E2E3E4J1J2O1 AustraliaAmerican Samoa*, Andorra, Bahamas, E2E3E4J1O1O3 TunisiaGrenada, Guyana, Liechtenstein, E2E3E4J1O1 HondurasMarshall Islands, Micronesia, E2E3E4J2O1 United StatesPalau, Tuvalu E2E3J1J3O1 ParaguayItaly E1E2E3E4O1O3 E2J1O1 NepalChile E2E3E4O1O3 E3J1O3 VenezuelaMongolia E3O1O3 E2E3J2O1 Sweden, Sri LankaQatar E4O3 E3J2O1 Azerbaijan, Iceland, Switzerland, Malta

Japan, Tonga E1E2E3O1 E2J1 New ZealandAlbania, Belize, Samoa E2E3E4O1 E3E4J1J2 LithuaniaAlgeria, Nauru, Maldives, Pakistan E2E3O1 E2E3E4J2 Netherlands, NorwayJordan, Morocco E3E4O1 E2E3J1 East Timor, Fiji, Trinidad and TobagoBrunei, Barbados, Kiribati, Jamaica, E2E3J2 Austria, DenmarkOman, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu E3J2 Estonia, Slovenia

Georgia L2 L E1E2E3L2O1O3 Turkeyno cases - LO E1E2E3L3O1 United Kingdom

E1E2E4L3O1 MalaysiaE1E3E4L2O1 IsraelE1E3L1L2O1O3 IranE2E3E4L2O1O3 BangladeshE2E3E4L2O1 Belgium

no cases - J E2E3L2O1O3 PortugalE2L3O1 IndonesiaE3E4L2L3O1 UruguayE3L1O1 Cook Islands*E3L2O1 BelarusE4L2O1 Russia

Lebanon E1E3L2 E3E4L3O1O3 Argentina, ThailandBahrain E1L2 E2E3L2O3 Bosnia and Herzegovina, GermanyMontenegro E2E3L2 E3E4L2O1 Bhutan, Tajikistan, SurinameBolivia E2L3 JO J1O1 EcuadorKyrgyzstan E3E4L2 E1E2E3E4L2L3J2 PolandMacedonia E3L2 E2E3E4L2J1 Afghanistan

E2E3L3J2 LatviaMacao*, San Marino, Saudi Arabia O1 O E3E4L2J2 Romania

E3L2J2 Finland

E1E2E3E4L2J2J3O1O3 SpainE1E3E4L2J1J3O1O3 Colombia

Monaco no WPAs Zero E2E3E4L1L2J2O1O3 PeruE2E3E4L2J1O1 South KoreaE2E3E4L2J2O1 Luxembourg

Uzbekistan E1O2 E2E3E4L2J2O3 IrelandLaos E2E4L3O1O2O3 E2E3E4L3J1J2O1O3 BrazilViet Nam E3E4O1O2O3 E2E3L1L2J1O1 UkraineChina E4L1L2O1O2 E2E3L2J1J2O1O3 GreeceNorth Korea E4O2 E2E3L2J2J3O1 HungaryLibya L1L2O2 E2E3L3J2J3O1 Dominican RepublicMyanmar O1O2 E3E4L2J1J2J3O1 Costa RicaTurkmenistan O2 E3E4L2J1J3O1O3 PhilippinesCambodia, Palestine* E2E3E4O1O2 E3E4L2J2J3O1O3 El SalvadorCuba, Syria, United Arab Emirates E3O2 E3L2J1J2O1 Cyprus

E3L3J2O1O3 FranceLegend: E1E3L2J1J2O1 Slovakia, GuatemalaType more distant to other type E2E3L2J1J2O1 Czech Republic, IndiaType O2 more distant to every other type E3E4L2J2J3O1 Puerto Rico*, Panama

E3L2J2O1 Croatia, Serbia

ELJ

O2

ELO

EL

E3EJO

EE2E3

E3O1

EO

EJ

ELJO

Figure 9.3: Contrasting and divergent types showing all cases and indicating theidiosyncratic and identical combinations.

275

equality history (H1), in former first, second and third world (H2), and finally, in

democratic and autocratic governmental systems (H3). Institutional heterogeneity

prevails with regard to most international organizations and human rights treaties

(H4); in a small number of sub-hypotheses further details for the second purpose

of the hypotheses testing surfaced. Concerning hypotheses H5, it was shown that

clusters of types occur in all regions and sometimes they are neighbouring states.

However, for the most parts, neighbouring state will employ various types of in-

stitutional architecture. The alternative hypotheses tested the influence of states’

economic wealth (C1) and population size (C2).

Hypotheses testing followed a modest purpose. A better understanding of the

phenomenon was fostered by pointing out the different features of states with the

same types. The main finding is the abundance of heterogeneity. The proceeding

allows so far little predictions about future development of current state capability.

Heterogeneity is shown to be a worldwide feature of the phenomenon. It is

not simply the result of a particular sample selection (see also Section 8.3). The

34 member states of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

employ seven different types of institutional architecture. The 19 states of the

RNGS sample encompass these same seven types. As another example, European

Union member states employ six types of institutional architecture. All these types

are also found in the RNGS sample. On the one hand, this may come as a relief

for RNGS researchers. On the other hand, the need to take this heterogeneity into

account signifies an additional burden for further studies (see future research on

page 287).

9.9 Nominal and Ordinal Types of Institutional

Architecture

The long-term goal beyond this study is to develop an empirically based theory of

the structural abilities of states to provide state feminism. The previous chapters

showed that institutional variety is a dominant feature both of women’s policy

agencies and institutional architecture. The typology of institutional architecture

is formidable to exhibit this variety. However, the typology provided little theo-

276

retical explanations. Heterogeneity of covered states is large and impedes definite

statements. Testing of hypotheses provided several interesting small results, but at

large the refutation of hypotheses is disappointing. A bigger lacuna remains; the

theorization of the state, in particular a feminist state theory of state feminism.

Further research may close this gap. This work highlights the extent of permanent

structural action of states in this area. Therefore I introduce an ordinal typology

of institutional architecture.

Further conceptual development of the typology of institutional architecture is

one of the paths to advance such an objective. Basically, the typology of insti-

tutional architecture introduces nominal types. Their ordering along the compre-

hensiveness of states’ approach to fight gender inequality by the number of sectors

of governmental action (cf. Section 6.2.3) does not change this nominal character

of the labels.

9.9.1 Four Ordinal Types of Institutional Architecture

The aim of the ordinal typology is to separate institutional architecture by their

embedding within the state. Institutional architecture of states are differentiated

along their integration in institutional broadness and institutional depth. How is

a institutional architecture embedded between and within sectors of governmental

action? The dimension of institutional broadness measures the amplitude of states’

approach over the various sectors of governmental action to implement women’s

empowerment and promotion of gender equality policies. The dimension of insti-

tutional depth quantifies the integration of such policies within a particular sector

of governmental action.

The dimension of institutional broadness separates between concentrated and

dispersed integration into sectors of governmental action. The dimension of in-

stitutional depth separates between small and large coverage of forms of women’s

policy agencies within a sector of governmental action. A small coverage stands

for a limited institutional depth of an institutional architecture. A large coverage

stands for a large institutional depth.

Table 9.14 introduces the four new types of institutional architecture on a

conceptual level. Type I consists of little integrated institutional architecture.

277

Inst

ituti

onal

Bro

adnes

s

Type III Type IVdispersed dispersed integrated fully integrated

few-broad many-broad

Type I Type IIconcentrated little integrated concentrated integrated

few-focused many-focused

small largeInstitutional Depth

Table 9.14: Ordinal types conceptually.

There are few women’s policy agencies per sector of governmental action and they

are agglomerate in one or two sectors of governmental action. In contrast, Type

II and III are partly integrated institutional architecture. Type II entails the

concentrate integrated institutional architecture. Cases with this type have many

women’s policy agencies agglomerated in one or two sectors of governmental action.

The many agencies are focused on few sectors. Type III consists of the dispersed

integrated institutional architecture. There are few women’s policy agencies and

they are distributed over a large range of sectors of governmental action (three or

four). The institutionally most demanding type is Type IV, the fully integrated

type. Institutional architecture of this type entail many women’s policy agencies

dispersed over three or four sectors of governmental action. The Tables 17 to

20 in the Appendix provides the attribution to ordinal types according to the

institutional depth and broadness for all cases.

Coding of Dimensions and Counting

Both dimensions are coded as one of degree. An institutional architecture is dis-

persed if there are women’s policy agencies in three or four sectors of governmental

action and it is concentrated if there are women’s policy agencies in nil, one or two

sectors. The threshold between concentrated and dispersed institutional broadness

278

is 2.5 sectors of governmental action.

A large coverage is when all forms of women’s policy agencies per sector are

present in this sector. If there is none or few forms of women’s policy agencies

per sector then the coverage is small. The zero up to three points per sector are

attributed according to the Table 9.15.

The institutional depth of an institutional architecture is the sum of the insti-

tutional depths of the various sectors. The highest possible sum over all sectors

is 12. Twelve means a particular state has an institutional architecture which has

in each sector all forms of women’s policy agencies. Zero to six points are a small

institutional depth. 6.25 up to 12 points are a large institutional depth.

Number of Institutional Depth Per Sector InstitutionalWPA Forms Executive Legislative Judiciary Outside Depth

4 forms 3.00 - - - 12.003 forms 2.25 3 3 3 11.252 forms 1.50 2 2 2 7.501 form 0.75 1 1 1 3.750 forms 0.00 0 0 0 0.00

Table 9.15: Coding of coverage of different forms of women’s policy agencies withinparticular sectors (institutional depth).

If a particular case has two different forms of women’s policy agencies in the

executive sector, one in the legislative and one in the outside sector, then it has

an institutional architecture of the state administrative-legislator-advocacy type

(Type ELO). Its institutional depth can be calculated with the Table 9.15. The

two different forms in the executive sector provides 1.5 points, the single form

in the legislative 1 point and the form in the outside sector adds another point.

Consequently, the institutional depth is 4.5 (=1.5+1+1) points. In comparison to

the overall possibility of 12 points for all forms in all sectors of governmental action

the institutional architecture of the example has a small institutional depth.

Figure 9.4 shows the empirical distribution of cases for the end of the first

decade of the 21st century. The size of the bubbles gives the number of cases with

an institutional architecture with a particular institutional depth and broadness.

The centre of the bubble assigns the ordinal type of institutional architecture

279

A bit more than half of the states (80 cases, 53%) have an institutional archi-

tecture of the little integrated type (Type I). Examples are Algeria, Jordan and

the Maldives. There are no cases in Type II, the concentrated integrated type.

Almost 40 per cent or 59 cases have a dispersed integrated institutional architec-

ture (Type III). Cases are for instance Belgium, China, the United Kingdom and

the United States. There is a small number of cases with a fully integrated insti-

tutional architecture (Type IV) (12 cases, 8%). Examples are Greece, El Salvador

and the Philippines.

= 1 state = 10 states

4

3

1

0

2

1211109876543210

Inst

itutio

nal B

road

ness

conc

entra

ted

disp

erse

d

Institutional Depthlargesmall

Type III

Type II

Type IV

Type I

Figure 9.4: Distribution of cases into four ordinal types of institutionalarchitecture.

The absence of concentrated institutional architecture (Type II) is striking.

Focused coverage does not seem to be of interest for states. Figure 9.4 also shows

280

that states do not employ the whole range of possible forms of women’s policy

agencies. Half of the possibility space of Type IV is empty (between nine and

twelve forms of women’s policy agencies. Hence, at the end of the first decade of

the 21st century no state has a maximal integrated institutional architecture.

281

Discussion and Conclusions

The final chapter summarises significant findings and major contributions of this

study, discusses their relevance and implications and outlines further research.

Seven key results and the three major contributions are discussed in the following.

Main Findings and Major Contributions

All three initial thesis statements discussed in the introduction (page 6) concern-

ing current permanent and specific state capability in women’s empowerment and

promotion of gender equality were confirmed in the course of this study: women’s

policy agencies are globally available; they are a global concept which was sedi-

ment into state structures. Patterns of institutional architecture were identified;

institutional architecture is a global phenomenon and there is strong institutional

heterogeneity worldwide. Specific state capability is practically globally available,

although in many states it is very limited.

New Definition of Women’s Policy Agency

The first major contribution to research in the field of state feminism is the new

definition of women’s policy agency. The reconceptualization of women’s pol-

icy agencies entails several aspects. The operational definition of women’s policy

agency differs from prior research by means of its broader focus in relation to scope

(all entities per state), coverage of activities (all governmental action), locations

of action (state and public administration), main stakeholder (state), broadness of

mission (women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality) and the cov-

erage of cases (global). This widening of focus was necessary to identify women’s

282

policy agencies in heterogeneous contexts worldwide. Then again, there is a nar-

rowing of focus: concentrating on structures of women’s policy agencies in the

state, and more precisely, on permanent and specific structures only.28

Hidden Assumptions in Research

One of the key outcomes of this research is the discovery of hidden assumptions

in prior research, such as external orientation, core administration, permanency

and specificity of structures. They are observable in prior classifications and in the

discourse of reporting states. Those previously hidden assumptions shape what

is regarded as a women’s policy agency. Their disclosure and active justification

strengthen selectivity of the definition of women’s policy agency. It also demon-

strated how difficult it is to dismiss an unjustifiable assertion, like the external

orientation, in the light of the limited existing data. It also became evident that

a clear concept how subnational entities can be integrated into a comparative

framework is lacking.

Classification of Forms of Women’s Policy Agencies

The second major contribution of this study has been the development and appli-

cation of the new classification of the various forms of women’s policy agencies.

Currently, there are 13 different forms of women’s policy agencies. Conceptually,

they exist in all sectors of governmental action. In fact, almost all states em-

ploy women’s policy agencies. They are truly a global phenomenon. Hence, the

first thesis statement applies. However, states concentrate their women’s policy

agencies particularly at the lower hierarchical level in the executive sector.

Typology of Institutional Architecture

My third major contribution to research has been the development and applica-

tion of a typology of institutional architecture applicable for global comparisons.

28Evaluation of women’s policy agencies effectiveness has explicitly been left for further re-search.

283

All 151 states covered in the analysis employ some sort of institutional architec-

ture. Conceptually, there are 17 types of institutional architecture. Currently,

states are employing 13 types. States utilize the whole spectrum from no women’s

policy agencies (the type zero) to the most comprehensive type of institutional

architecture, in which states employ women’s policy agencies in all four sectors of

governmental action (the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type).

Not presently in use are types focusing on the legislative and judiciary sectors

of government without employing women’s policy agencies in the executive sec-

tors, such as the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy, the legislator-advocacy,

the judiciary-advocacy, and the exclusively judiciary (Type LJO, LO, LJ and J).

A further development of the nominal typology towards an ordinal typology of

institutional architecture is outlined.

Heterogeneity of Institutional Architecture

Another main finding of my study is the relevance of heterogeneity. This hetero-

geneity concerns several aspects of institutional architecture. First of all, with

13 different forms of women’s policy agencies states actually have a wide range

of ‘building blocks’ to assemble the institutional architecture. Second, there is a

broad spectrum of types of institutional architecture in operation. Third, groups

of states using the same type of institutional architecture are drawn together with

states of diverse history, political systems and structures, norms and values. What

do states such as Azerbaijan, Sweden, Egypt, Iceland, Nepal, Malta, the United

States and Switzerland have in common, apart from the same type of institu-

tional architecture, the state administrative-judiciary-advocacy type (Type EJO)?

Could it just be a coincidence that Spain, Panama, South Korea, India, Ukraine

and Cyprus all employ an institutional architecture of the state administrative-

legislator-judiciary-advocacy type (Type ELJO)? Those different aspects of het-

erogeneity are difficult to distinguish and explain. However, the first and the

second aspects of heterogeneity discussed here corroborate prior research. The

third aspect of heterogeneity appears to be influenced by the increased sample size

to include a greater diversity of states. Even though much of heterogeneity can be

explained by institutional diversity, this does not negate the strong pattern found

284

here. Hence, I assert that the second thesis statement applies.

Specific State Capability

A further key result of this study is the verification that not all states currently have

a permanent and specific state capability in women’s empowerment and promotion

of gender equality. One state covered in this analysis (Monaco) was without any

state capability in this domain. Nevertheless, practically all – 150 of 151 states

– currently exhibited some form of permanent and specific state capability. This

confirms the third thesis statement that permanent and specific state capability in

women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality is a global phenomenon.

However, an emphasis must be placed on some form. In many states, permanent


equality is quite limited.

Some Explainable Types, but no Model

The hypotheses testing underscored doubly that the states using the same type

of institutional architecture can be quite heterogeneous. The patterns of institu-

tional variety of institutional architecture in women’s empowerment and promotion

of gender equality remain remarkable. Clearly, there is no fixed model for institu-

tional architecture. None of the types identified are restricted exclusively to certain

behaviour patterns to be found in the course of the states’ gender equality history,

as the result of the geopolitical division of Cold War, in regards to a particular

governmental system or policy diffusion processes, or even to a particular world

region. Alternative explanations for patterns of types of institutional architecture

and state groupings such as economic wealth and population size did not provide

comprehensive explanations either. The core pattern is the heterogeneity.

However, the tested hypotheses offer up some explanations for some states and

certain institutional architecture: The more comprehensive types of institutional

architecture are more likely to have developed in states which have implemented

more steps in the gender equality history than the less comprehensive types. In

general, the more comprehensive types are also more common among the richer and

more populated states. Conversely, the state administrative-advocacy type and

285

the exclusively state administrative type are favoured among small island states,

members of the Commonwealth of Nations and laggards in gender equality his-

tory. The SWO-governed type is not to be found in more democratic governmental

systems; however, it is not limited to autocratic governmental systems alone. Its

counterpart is the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type, which

is more widespread among larger and more democratic states. On the other end of

the spectrum is the type zero, which, surprisingly, has only one case. Remarkable

here is that Monaco is part of the former first world and among the economically

wealthy states; only its small population contrasts sharply with the states utilizing

the state administrative-legislator-judiciary-advocacy type. With the exception of

Afghanistan, states employing the state administrative-legislator-judiciary type

are geographically concentrated in the North East of Europe. Those states and

the states with the state administrative-judiciary type tend to be politically pro-

gressive in regard to their gender equality history, whereas states using the state

administrative-legislator type demonstrate a degree of reluctance to advance gen-

der equality in their societies.

Relevance and Implications

In the following, relevance and implications of the developed tools and the sub-

stantive empirical findings are discussed from a conceptual as well as an empirical

perspective. I argue for a conceptual broadening of the focus regarding the assess-

ment of state actions in light of the advancement of women’s empowerment and

gender equality and the recognition of the institutional heterogeneity.

Broadening the Phenomena Under Investigation

In various ways, this analysis indicates a need for a conceptual broadening of the

phenomenon under study. To begin with, researchers need to acknowledge that

there is a wider range of forms of women’s policy agencies within the state than

examined in prior research. This applies to possible settings of women’s policy

agencies within state and public administrations as well, as to possible sectors of


286

Notwithstanding, researchers were not wrong in earlier studies to focus on

women’s policy agencies in the executive sector, because states continue to con-

centrate their services in this sector. Nonetheless, in light of the fact that gender

inequality appears to be integrated into practically all societal structures, appro-

priate measures to fight it must be established in many places. A more complete

picture is obtainable by taking the whole of a state capability into focus. Doing

so, one challenge is to expose hidden assumptions, weakening their unjustifiable

assertions with new facts as far as possible and justifying the accuracy of alterna-

tive assumptions. Another challenge is to take into account that, in a worldwide

perspective, states are dealing with varying stages of the gender equality debate.

The tools suggested in this study are open and adaptable to a multitude of those

debates and trends without unitizing them and without ignoring different time

lags.

Nevertheless, a broadening of the sample size is not required. Future research

can use any sample size suitable to answer research questions. But sample size has

applied limitations to the findings of this study. Even though the covered states

are three quarters of all current states, conceptually and factually a relevant part

of current states were not included: more precisely, most states on the African

continent. Whether my findings would apply to those cases as well has to be

examined in future research. It remains an open question, to what extent and how

subnational entities can be included in the framework developed here.

Recognising Institutional Heterogeneity

Factually, the typology shows that there are many types possible and states employ

a large part of those different types of institutional architecture. That explains

the confusing heterogeneity of structures diagnosed in prior research (Mazur 2002,

175-176; McBride and Mazur 2010, 48). This institutional diversity is a challenge

for researchers and policy specialists alike; as those types are not easy to compare.

Nonetheless, my analysis at least for the structures of women’s policy agencies

delivers several frameworks (e.g. classification and typology) to distinguish sim-

ilarities and differences between different forms of women’s policy agencies and

types of institutional architecture.

287

Still, we have to be aware that states utilize almost the whole spectrum of

types of institutional architecture; from the small to the most comprehensive.

There is no clustering of states in the more comprehensive types, or a standardised

normal distribution. With one exception, all states have a specific state capability

in women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality. The bad news for

citizens and researchers29 is that many states have a small state capability. The

inordinate character of the heterogeneity of state groupings is a challenge for future

research.

Future Research

This last part outlines five areas for future research.

Future Development and Application of

Classification

The first area for future research is the classification of different forms of women’s

policy agencies. Conceptually, there are three instances which all would require

better data. Conceptual development of the classification could aim to further

reduce the grip of the detected assumptions of core administration and external

orientation of women’s policy agencies. Secondly, further thinking is necessary

about ways to integrate the subnational level into the framework. The third fur-

ther development is the most demanding one: Are there forms of women’s policy

agencies suggested by feminists, which states do not employ currently?

Next to those further conceptual developments, there are empirical questions.

Is the classification applicable to any sample size (single case, small n and large

n)? Does the separation between specific and unspecific, permanent and temporary

hold, when applied to other data? Is it possible to integrate this classification in

a bigger research frame? For instance, the one of equality architecture suggested

by Walby et al. (2012)?

29Heterogeneity as a challenge for research is discussed in more detail in Scheidegger (2014).

288

Future Development and Application of Typology

The second area for future research is the typology of institutional architecture.

Conceptually, there is space for future institutional development. The depiction of

empty building blocks can be used to deduce what is missing in current state action

against gender inequality. Are the 13 different forms of women’s policy agencies

really the range, or are there forms of women’s policy agencies overlooked by

prior research? The empty building blocks can serve as a guide to find overlooked

forms. Analogous to the periodic table of the elements in chemistry.30 There,

empty squares were reserved for elements not yet discovered. The framework of

the periodic table was used to forecast features of such elements.

Furthermore, the typology is at the junction between a more parsimonious and

a more complex path. The parsimonious path attempts to reduce the number of

types to one, two or three similarly to ordinal typology of institutional architecture

outlined above. On the one hand, this would make the framework more accessible

and easier to apply. On the other hand, its analytical potential may be hampered

by an increase of the heterogeneity among the states in the same type of insti-

tutional architecture. The more complex path uses the combination of different

forms of women’s policy agencies employed by different states as the unit of analy-

sis. The questions could be: Which combinations deliver more gender equality and

why? Such a fine-grained analysis may reveal insights into the working of whole

networks of women’s policy agencies per state. However, different states become

difficult to compare because they are conceptualized as different.

Future research on the typology of institutional architecture may reveal if the

typology is applicable to other data. If this is the case, the question to be answered

is whether those different women’s policy agencies are simply a set of structures

existing at the same time in the same state or whether they actually act as a

configuration.

A wide range of researchers utilize women’s policy agencies as proxy in studies

on gender inequality. Whether the suggested frameworks are suitable as proxies

has to be proven. Just coding the types of institutional architecture into large

data sets cannot be the solution. Such an attempt must begin with a careful

30Tip came from James Davis.

289

conceptualizing to determine to what extent those structures could best serve as

proxy.

Moving from State Capability to State Capacity?

The third area for future research I see, is the further development of permanent


equality to specific state capacity in this domain. At this stage, research on state

capability deals with structures of women’s policy agencies and their occurrence

in four sectors of governmental action. However, those structures do not represent

the true potential of states to act in women’s empowerment and promotion of

gender equality. Resources such as political commitment, skilled employees, and

competences have been omitted from the picture. The same holds true for factors

such as legal frameworks, and policies. Further research has to clarify those inter-

sections. Possible frameworks are ‘equality architecture’ of Walby et al. (2012) as

a wider theoretical framework and, on the operational level, the grid of dimensions

developed by McBride and Mazur McBride and Mazur (2010, 48, 51-52)31.

History of Current Situation of State Capability

A fourth area of research that calls for a closer look is the time dimension. How

exactly has the permanent and specific state capability in women’s empowerment

and promotion of gender equality evolved in the last five decades? My current

research simply reflects a point in time influenced by states’ perception at the

end of the first decade of the 21st century. We have no global information on

the phases of expansion and reduction of state capability in the different states.

We need to ask, which forms of women’s policy agencies were replaced by other

forms or changed through internal shifts (path dependencies) in the process? For

such an analysis, reliable longitudinal data would be required. Furthermore, if

this work could be continued, a more dynamic appraisal of the current situation is

conceivable rather than a simple snapshot in time. This would require continuous

flow of data instead of single reports every five years.

31Among others: appointment of agency head, policy orientation, proximity to decision-makingpower, policy making power, leadership, and administrative resources.

290

Travelling and Arrived Concepts

Clearly, women’s policy agencies as a travelling concept arrived in current state-

hood. They became a standard feature of current statehood. However, the poten-

tially stronger forms, such as Ministry or Minister, Legislative Committee, Equal-

ity Authority, and the Monitoring Body are less widespread than the potentially

weaker forms such as Commission or Unit in a Ministry. In view of that, some

form travelled further than others. This analysis showed further that newer forms

such as Human Rights Body or Monitoring Body emerge and start to travel. The

idea of the institutional architecture in its broadest form, with the full range of

women’s policy agencies in all four sectors of governmental action is far from be-

ing empirically realised yet. The idea of the institutional architecture exists and

it travelled to almost all states. However, states only partly implemented the idea

of a broad approach. Consequently, women’s empowerment and gender equality

persist nomadic.

How to Improve Gender Equality

Last, but not least future research could make a further attempt to answer the big

recurrent question: How do we improve gender equality? This study represents one

small step to improve evaluation research on women’s policy agencies and action

of states in view of women’s oppression and gender inequality. Future research

may show to what extent the provided tools are able to improve the comparability

of single women’s policy agencies, different forms of women’s policy agencies and

types of institutional architecture. Structures encompass only one part of the

picture, however – as the wine glass shapes the wine – structures must be included

of the overall picture. Future research may show whether those frameworks are

suitable for case selection and improve possibilities for theoretical testing.

At the end of the day, most research on gender inequality must answer the

recurrent question of citizens: Will it improve existing gender equality? I argue

that the it in this legitimate question has to focus more on the state than just on

the individual women’s policy agencies.

291

Appendices

292

Appendices

Appendix A: Further Details about Coding of Data

This section entails further details about the coding of some of the entities reported

by the states. It supplements information of Section 5.2. There are no further

information required about the entities Unit in a Ministry (E3), Coordinating

Body (E4) and Equality Authority (J2).

Part of Top Level Government (E1) An entity is categorised in the category

Part of Top Level Government if its name or the column notes is unambiguous.

This classification is conservatively used. In cases of doubt entities were classified

as ministries or ministers.

Even though the classification of Jahan indicates the possible existence of enti-

ties on the top level of government states did not report all of them as a separate

entity. If there were at least two agreeing information, suggesting that there is

an entity on top level of government, this entity is enlisted in an own row in the

data set. It is possible that there are currently more entities near the top level of

government, than there are named in the data.

Ministry or Minister (E2) Human right in the name of a ministry or a min-

ister is counted as specific enough to count this entity as a women’s policy agency.

Human rights comprehends women’s rights and gender equality. The same is the

case if empowerment appears in the name. Ministry of Labour, Public Adminis-

tration and Empowerment is counted as specific enough to be regarded as women’s

policy agency. Only Solidarity is not enough to regard an entity as specific. In

this logic the Minister of National Solidarity is classified as Not specific enough.

I

Competence Centre in Legislative Assembly (L1) An entity is categorised

as Competence Centre in Legislative Assembly if it is unambiguous that it is located

in the legislative branch of government and that its name or the note column indi-

cates that the entity works for the legislative assembly as a whole or for women’s

empowerment and promotion of gender equality policies within the legislative as-

sembly. That constitutes, it is not sufficient if an entity is in the legislative branch

and neither one of the two following categories: Legislative Committee or Legisla-

tive Caucus.

Empirically, there is a spectrum from very visible to almost invisible specific

state capability. However, the following examples are all categorised as Compe-

tence Centre in Legislative Assembly. A univocal and visible case is the Ukraine

with its 27 focal points in the 27 secretariats of the parliamentary committees and

commissions. Nearest to the description of the category are the General Office

of Women Affairs in Legislative Power in Iran and the Office for Workers, Youth

and Women in China. In contrast, the Bureau of Parliamentary Women of the

Congress of the Republic in Peru and the Secretary for Women of Parliamentary

Caucus in Tanzania are working for a specific group within the legislative assem-

bly. In the case of the Cook Islands the specific structure is invisible in the name

of the structure; the Parliament Services Government of the Cook Islands.

Legislative Committee (L2) An entity is categorised as a Legislative Com-

mittee (L2) if it is part of the legislative branch of government (visible in column

Location (support) (Abdurazakova 2010; Fernos 2010a) or Parliament (Tavares da

Silva 2010)). Usually, the name or the description of the entity is unambiguous.

If not, an entity is searched on websites.

Coding is conservative in view of the location of the entity in the legislative

branch of government. In case of doubt, the entity is categorised as Commission

(O1) in the outside sector. Coding is more docile in view of the names of those

entities. If a state describes an entity as a women’s policy agency in the legislative

branch of government, this is taken for granted. Even, if its name indicates no

evidence of the duty. There are only a few cases where the name includes Family

or Social Affairs without other key terms; such as women, gender, discrimination,

emancipation, equal opportunities or equality. There are two cases where it is

II

not visible in the name: Standing Committee for Education, Science, Culture and

Social Development (Belarus) and Secretariat of the General’s People’s Committee

for Information and Culture (China). Both are classified as Not specific in the

subcategory Not specific enough.

For the purpose at hand the classification does not a priori differentiate between

unicameral and bicameral parliamentary assemblies. However, if two entities in

parliamentary assembly are indicated in the data, they are counted as two. If there

is one entity, or a joint-unit for both chambers, it is counted in both cases as one

entity.

Legislative Caucus (L3) An entity is categorised as Legislative Caucus if it is

part of the legislative branch of government and has the name or description of a

caucus or network. If it is unclear, whether an entity in the legislative branch is

a Legislative Committee or a Legislative Caucus, then the entity is categorised in

the category of the institutional less demanding form of Legislative Caucus.

Human Rights Body (J1) Human Rights Body is conservatively coded. This

implies, there have to be at least two according information showing clearly that

the entity has the duty to contribute to human rights from a judiciary perspective.

Working Group in Judiciary (J3) An entity is categorised as Working Group

in Judiciary if it is located in the judiciary and if it is not merely dealing with

law suits such as the categories Human Rights Body and Equality Authority. It

is not further distinguished between the possible names of such entities such as

commission, committee, and council, working group or round table.

Commission (O1) An entity is categorised as Commission if one of the words

commission, committee, council, or board appear in the name or if the structure or

note column describe such a role. Commission is the residual category for ambigu-

ous entities. Classification does not distinguish between commission, committee,

council, and board. Empirically, boards are rarely mentioned. If an entity consists

solely of persons from public administration it is categorised as Coordinating Body

(L4).

III

State-run Women’s Organization (O2) In addition to the requirement of a

state with limited political freedom (value of five or higher in the freedom house

index (Freedomhouse 2010a;b)) an entity has to qualify as a women’s organization

to become categorised as a State-run Women’s Organization. In some cases there

is also further information in the data that this entity is a women’s organization

guided by the state. For instance: In the column Note: “Stand-alone body set up in

1994 as a ‘societal’ organization, with more than one million women-members (the

biggest ‘mass organization’ in the country) and branches throughout the country

at all administrative levels” (Abdurazakova 2010, 70). Or in the same case in the

column Mandate: “Support and implement state policy”.

Monitoring Body (O3) An entity is categorised as Monitoring Body if the

name, the information in the columns structure or note agree with each other

about a knowledge generating or monitoring role.

Additional Information about Ignored Entries

The following paragraphs provide additional information about the coding of the

ignored entries.

Subnational An entity is classified as Subnational if it is described as such in

the columns name, structure, or note. For instance with words such as provin-

cial, federal, territorial, state, regional, prefectural, county, district, municipal,

local, town, or village level. There are also specified language communities32 or

a specified part of a state territory, such as state or islands33. States may run

on subnational level all forms of women’s policy agencies from all four sectors of


Not Permanent An entity is classified as Not Permanent if the name entails

words such as working party, working group, group, steering group or steering

committee, task force, working table, round table, project, program, or conference

32E.g. German and Walloon in the case of Belgium.33E.g. in the United Kingdom among others England, Wales and Scotland and in Cook Islands

the Women Development Officers at Outer Islands level.

IV

or if the note column names a temporary character, for instance by giving years

(e.g. 2006–2010). Not Permanent entities can be thematically general or sectorial,

such as Gender Mainstreaming Working Group or Coordinating Multidisciplinary

Group for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.

Not State An entity is classified as Non state if it is visible in the columns

name, structure or note that it is a non-governmental organisation, an alliance of

non-governmental organisations, group, development centre, network of university

graduates and researchers, or an entity within trade union or political party.

A State-run Women’s Organization (SWO) is distinguished from a non-govern-

mental organisation due to its embedding into the state apparatus. A SWO may

have access to state resources, has to spread state ideology or may be a mean

to control society. Degree of dependence is not considered by the classification.

There are qualitative differences (see Subsection 5.2.2).

WPA Component A board or a governing council in an entity in a ministry

are regarded as a WPA Component. Such entities may play a role internally to

the women’s policy agency. They are ignored for further analysis as there may be

an underreporting of such components.

Service Delivery States implement different ideas how to deal with violence

against women. Some states have specialist entities such as the Women and Child

Protection Unit (WCPU) in Bhutan or the Domestic Violence Unit in Samoa.

Other states have whole networks such as the Regional crisis service network in

Hungary or the Networks for the care and prevention of domestic violence in Costa

Rica. India runs Women’s Police stations and in the Philippines there are Women

and Children’s Desks (WCPD) in police stations. Other states do not name the

function of a specific body explicitly. For example the National Centre for Women

and Children (NCWC) in Tonga or the 25 Women’s Centres in Pakistan.

Educational efforts for state bureaucrats such as diplomas for gender main-

streaming in administration are not mentioned by the states. Where the com-

petences for applying gender mainstreaming come from is not represented in the

data. Existence of gender mainstreaming competence centres or education bodies

V

are not mentioned whether for within (internal education), nor outside of state

administration (further education). It has to be assumed that there is an underes-

timation of efforts, even if it has to be taken into account that the UN Division for

the Advancement of Women survey did not ask for such information. States do not

seem to count them under women’s policy agency. With this data it is impossible

to estimate extent of state delivery, its accessibility nationwide, the permanency

of the delivery.

Coding Rigidity

Coding rigidity varies over the four sectors of governmental action due to the re-

ported amount of entities. States reported the biggest amount of entities in the

executive sector. In comparison, reporting of entities for the legislative and judi-

ciary branch of government are rare. A high number of reported entities in the

executive sector are classified as ignored entries. The proportion of ignored entries

in the legislative and judiciary branch of government is much smaller. In the exec-

utive branch the coding is stricter. An entity has to be permanent and specific and

designated to women’s empowerment and promotion of gender equality. Whereas

the categories Legislative Committee does not have to be as explicitly specific,

the category Legislative Caucus does not have to be permanent in all cases, the

Human Rights Body is not as specific, and the Working Group in the Judiciary is

more temporary than comparable entities in the executive branch of government.

Procedure of Coding

The decision to which category an entity is attributed is made in view of the

available information in data set one. It is an authoritative decision on the basis of

limited information. First of all, an entity is attributed to one of the four sectors

of governmental action (executive, judiciary, legislative, outside administration)

and then in one of the 13 categories.

The decision about the attribution of a specific entity into one of those 13

categories is mainly made on the name of the structure and the information pro-

vided in the column “structure” (Abdurazakova 2010, 58-74; Fernos 2010a, 3-31;

SDD 2010, 77-112) or “form” (Jad 2010, 63-67). For ECE states the columns

VI

“Central/Federal Government”, “Decentralized Government”, “Parliament”, and

“Independent + Other Bodies” (Tavares da Silva 2010, 68-80) were considered.

In cases of ambiguous information further columns are considered together:

“Mandate”, “Other Mechanisms” and “Other agencies” (SDD 2010, 77-112), “Lo-

cation”, “Mandates”, “Notes”, and “Roles/Functions” (Abdurazakova 2010, 58-74;

Fernos 2010a, 3-31). For ESCWA states that was the column “Main mechanism”

and the rows “Legal Affiliation” and “Women’s Question”.

Appendix B: States

This section entails further information about the selection of the population of

states and the attribution of states to regions.

The list of covered states is given in Table 9.9.1. The population (Grundge-

samtheit) of countries under research are the 192 entities recognised as states and

member of the United Nations (UN). The list of abbreviations for countries is

taken from the ISO-3166-1 list (ISO-3166-1 2010). There are more entities with

abbreviation in the ISO-3166-1 list than widely recognised states. The purpose of

the list is to have all the current (2007–2010) existing states, without entities that

dissolved at the beginning of the 1990s. Therefore the ISO-list was cross-checked

with the most topical (2006) English and German list of sovereign states (English

State List 2011; German State List 2011).

In this lists an entity qualifies as a state if it fulfils the following three or four

qualifications: a) a permanent population, b) a defined territory, c) government

and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states (Osterud 2011, 2511;

English State List 2011, 31). All 192 entities qualifying after these criteria as

states are also member of the United Nations. As the Vatican City governed by

the Holy See is not a member of the United Nations, despite meeting the mentioned

qualifications, it is not considered as a state. It is only a permanent observer in

the United Nation (English State List 2011, 31). If there was doubt between

the English and the German list of sovereign states the English list overruled the

German one (see Table 1).

For the year 2010 there are ten not widely recognised states after this list:

Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Palestine, Sahrawi Arab

VII

Entities which are part of recognised statesAmerican Samoa Part of the United States of AmericaBermuda Part of the United KingdomFalkland Islands Part of the United KingdomFrench Guiana Part of FranceFrench Polynesia Part of FranceGreenland Part of DenmarkGuam Part of the United States of AmericaHong Kong Part of ChinaMacao Part of ChinaPuerto Rico Part of the United States of AmericaReunion Part of FranceSaint Martin Part of FranceSaint Pierre and Miquelon Part of France

Table 1: Territorial entities in states.

Democratic Republic, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Taiwan and Transnistria (En-

glish State List 2011; German State List 2011). Due to its association with New

Zealand the Cook Islands are not yet regarded as a state. Mainly non recognised

states are not part of the data due to their not reporting. If they reported entities

qualified as women’s policy agencies those territories were covered in the analysis.

This is the case for Cook Islands, American Samoa, Hong Kong, Macao, Palestine

and Puerto Rico. In brief, the whole population was one hundred ninety-two states

and ten territories. The data set contains information about one hundred forty-six

states and six territories.

Attribution of States and Territories to Regions

For the analysis of Section 7.3 the states were separated to regions along their

coverage in the regional reports. The regions are: ESCAP stands for Asia and

the Pacific, ECE stands for Europe, ECLAC stands for Latin America and the

Caribbean, ECE plus stands for South-East, Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Cen-

tral Asia, and ESCWA stands for Western Asia (Maghreb and Arabian Peninsula).

VIII

State or *territory ESCAP ECE ECLAC ESCWA ECE+

Cook Islands* 1 0 0 0 0

American Samoa* 1 0 0 0 0

Hong Kong* 1 0 0 0 0

Macao* 1 0 0 0 0

Palestine* 0 0 0 1 0

Puerto Rico* 0 0 1 0 0

Afghanistan 1 0 0 0 0

Albania 0 0 0 0 1

Algeria 0 0 0 1 0

Andorra 0 1 0 0 0

Antigua and Barbuda 0 0 1 0 0

Argentina 0 0 1 0 0

Armenia 0 0 0 0 1

Australia 1 0 0 0 0

Austria 0 1 0 0 0

Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 1

Bahamas 0 0 1 0 0

Bahrain 0 0 0 1 0

Bangladesh 1 0 0 0 0

Barbados 0 0 1 0 0

Belarus 0 0 0 0 1

Belgium 0 1 0 0 0

Belize 0 0 1 0 0

Bhutan 1 0 0 0 0

Bolivia 0 0 1 0 0

Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 0 0 1

Brazil 0 0 1 0 0

Brunei 1 0 0 0 0

Bulgaria 0 1 0 0 0

Cambodia 1 0 0 0 0

Canada 0 1 0 0 0

Table 2: Attribution of states and territories* to regions.

IX

State ESCAP ECE ECLAC ESCWA ECE+

Chile 0 0 1 0 0

China 1 0 0 0 0

Colombia 0 0 1 0 0

Costa Rica 0 0 1 0 0

Croatia 0 1 0 0 0

Cuba 0 0 1 0 0

Cyprus 0 1 0 0 0

Czech Republic 0 1 0 0 0

Denmark 0 1 0 0 0

Dominica 0 0 1 0 0

Dominican Republic 0 0 1 0 0

East Timor 1 0 0 0 0

Ecuador 0 0 1 0 0

Egypt 0 0 0 1 0

El Salvador 0 0 1 0 0

Estonia 0 1 0 0 0

Fiji 1 0 0 0 0

Finland 0 1 0 0 0

France 0 1 0 0 0

Georgia 0 0 0 0 1

Germany 0 1 0 0 0

Greece 0 1 0 0 0

Grenada 0 0 1 0 0

Guatemala 0 0 1 0 0

Guyana 0 0 1 0 0

Haiti 0 0 1 0 0

Honduras 0 0 1 0 0

Hungary 0 1 0 0 0

Iceland 0 1 0 0 0

India 1 0 0 0 0

Indonesia 1 0 0 0 0


X


Iran 1 0 0 0 0

Iraq 0 0 0 1 0

Ireland 0 1 0 0 0

Israel 0 1 0 0 0

Italy 0 1 0 0 0

Jamaica 0 0 1 0 0

Japan 1 0 0 0 0

Jordan 0 0 0 1 0

Kazakhstan 0 0 0 0 1

Kiribati 1 0 0 0 0

Korea, North 1 0 0 0 0

Korea, South (Republic of Korea) 1 0 0 0 0

Kuwait 0 0 0 1 0

Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 1

Laos 1 0 0 0 0

Latvia 0 1 0 0 0

Lebanon 0 0 0 1 0

Libya 0 0 0 1 0

Liechtenstein 0 1 0 0 0

Lithuania 0 1 0 0 0

Luxembourg 0 1 0 0 0

Macedonia 0 0 0 0 1

Malaysia 1 0 0 0 0

Maldives 1 0 0 0 0

Malta 0 1 0 0 0

Marshall Islands 1 0 0 0 0

Mexico 0 0 1 0 0

Micronesia 1 0 0 0 0

Moldova 0 0 0 0 1

Monaco 0 1 0 0 0

Mongolia 1 0 0 0 0


XI


Montenegro 0 0 0 0 1

Morocco 0 0 0 1 0

Myanmar 1 0 0 0 0

Nauru 1 0 0 0 0

Nepal 1 0 0 0 0

Netherlands 0 1 0 0 0

New Zealand 1 0 0 0 0

Nicaragua 0 0 1 0 0

Norway 0 1 0 0 0

Oman 0 0 0 1 0

Pakistan 1 0 0 0 0

Palau 1 0 0 0 0

Panama 0 0 1 0 0

Papua New Guinea 1 0 0 0 0

Paraguay 0 0 1 0 0

Peru 0 0 1 0 0

Philippines 1 0 0 0 0

Poland 0 1 0 0 0

Portugal 0 1 0 0 0

Qatar 0 0 0 1 0

Romania 0 1 0 0 0

Russia 0 0 0 0 1

Saint Kitts and Nevis 0 0 1 0 0

Saint Lucia 0 0 1 0 0

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0 0 1 0 0

Samoa 1 0 0 0 0

San Marino 0 1 0 0 0

Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 1 0

Serbia 0 0 0 0 1

Singapore 1 0 0 0 0

Slovakia 0 1 0 0 0


XII


Slovenia 0 1 0 0 0

Solomon Islands 1 0 0 0 0

Spain 0 1 0 0 0

Sri Lanka 1 0 0 0 0

Sudan 0 0 0 1 0

Suriname 0 0 1 0 0

Sweden 0 1 0 0 0

Switzerland 0 1 0 0 0

Syria 0 0 0 1 0

Tajikistan 0 0 0 0 1

Thailand 1 0 0 0 0

Tonga 1 0 0 0 0

Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 1 0 0

Tunisia 0 0 0 1 0

Turkey 0 1 0 0 0

Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 1

Tuvalu 1 0 0 0 0

Ukraine 0 0 0 0 1

United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 1 0

United Kingdom 0 1 0 0 0

United States 0 1 0 0 0

Uruguay 0 0 1 0 0

Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 1

Vanuatu 1 0 0 0 0

Venezuela 0 0 1 0 0

Viet Nam 1 0 0 0 0

Yemen 0 0 0 1 0

Total 44 39 33 18 17


XIII

Appendix C: Attribution of States and Territories

to Types

This section contains more information about data behind the typology of insti-

tutional architecture explained in the Chapters 5 and 8. Table 9.9.1 gives the

states and *territories alphabetically and shows their entities and attribution to

types of institutional architecture. The Table 8.2 sorted along the different types

of institutional architecture is found in Section 8.1.5.

XIV

State or *territory E1 E2 E3 E4 L1 L2 L3 J1 J2 J3 O1 O2 O3 WPAs Diff. WPAs Type Region

*Cook Islands 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 3 Type ELO ESCAP

*American Samoa 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E ESCAP

*Hong Kong 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 3 Type EJO ESCAP

*Macao 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 Type O ESCAP

*Palestine 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 5 Type O2 ESCWA

*Puerto Rico 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 8 6 Type ELJO ECLAC

Afghanistan 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 8 5 Type ELJ ESCAP

Albania 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 4 Type EO ECE+

Algeria 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 3 Type EO ESCWA

Andorra 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E ECE

Antigua and Barbuda 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Type E ECLAC

Argentina 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 6 5 Type ELO ECLAC

Armenia 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type E ECE+

Australia 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 9 6 Type EJO ESCAP

Austria 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 3 Type EJ ECE

Azerbaijan 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 3 3 Type EJO ECE+

Bahamas 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E ECLAC

Bahrain 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Type EL ESCWA

Bangladesh 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 9 6 Type ELO ESCAP

Barbados 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 Type EO ECLAC

Belarus 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 3 Type ELO ECE+

Belgium 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 5 Type ELO ECE

Belize 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 4 Type EO ECLAC

Bhutan 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 4 Type ELO ESCAP

Bolivia 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type EL ECLAC

Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 4 Type ELO ECE+

Brazil 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 10 8 Type ELJO ECLAC

Brunei 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 Type EO ESCAP

Bulgaria 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 8 3 Type EJO ECE

Cambodia 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 7 5 Type O2 ESCAP

Canada 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type E ECE

Chile 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 5 Type EO ECLAC

China 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 5 5 Type O2 ESCAP

Table 3: Alphabetical attribution of states and *territories to Types

(identical cases in italics).

XV


Colombia 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 10 8 Type ELJO ECLAC

Costa Rica 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 12 7 Type ELJO ECLAC

Croatia 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 4 Type ELJO ECE

Cuba 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 Type O2 ECLAC

Cyprus 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 8 5 Type ELJO ECE

Czech Republic 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 7 6 Type ELJO ECE

Denmark 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 Type EJ ECE

Dominica 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type E ECLAC

Dominican Republic 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 7 6 Type ELJO ECLAC

East Timor 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 Type EJ ESCAP

Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 Type JO ECLAC

Egypt 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 6 4 Type EJO ESCWA

El Salvador 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 11 7 Type ELJO ECLAC

Estonia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 2 Type EJ ECE

Fiji 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 Type EJ ESCAP

Finland 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 Type ELJ ECE

France 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 8 5 Type ELJO ECE

Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type L ECE+

Germany 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 4 Type ELO ECE

Greece 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 10 7 Type ELJO ECE

Grenada 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E ECLAC

Guatemala 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 7 6 Type ELJO ECLAC

Guyana 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E ECLAC

Haiti 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 Type E ECLAC

Honduras 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 6 5 Type EJO ECLAC

Hungary 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 7 6 Type ELJO ECE

Iceland 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 3 Type EJO ECE

India 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 9 6 Type ELJO ESCAP

Indonesia 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 3 Type ELO ESCAP

Iran 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 8 6 Type ELO ESCAP

Iraq 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 Type E ESCWA

Ireland 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 12 6 Type ELJO ECE

Israel 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 12 5 Type ELO ECE



XV

I


Italy 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 10 6 Type EO ECE

Jamaica 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 Type EO ECLAC

Japan 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 4 Type EO ESCAP

Jordan 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 3 Type EO ESCWA

Kazakhstan 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 4 Type EJO ECE+

Kiribati 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 Type EO ESCAP

Korea, North 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 Type O2 ESCAP

Korea, South (Republic of Korea) 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 8 6 Type ELJO ESCAP

Kuwait 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E ESCWA

Kyrgyzstan 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 Type EL ECE+

Laos 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 6 Type O2 ESCAP

Latvia 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 4 Type ELJ ECE

Lebanon 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 Type EL ESCWA

Libya 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 3 Type O2 ESCWA

Liechtenstein 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E ECE

Lithuania 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 6 4 Type EJ ECE

Luxembourg 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 9 6 Type ELJO ECE

Macedonia 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 Type EL ECE+

Malaysia 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 5 Type ELO ESCAP

Maldives 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 3 Type EO ESCAP

Malta 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 3 Type EJO ECE

Marshall Islands 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E ESCAP

Mexico 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 6 5 Type EJO ECLAC

Micronesia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E ESCAP

Moldova 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5 3 Type EJO ECE+

Monaco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Type Zero ECE

Mongolia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 3 Type EO ESCAP

Montenegro 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 Type EL ECE+

Morocco 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 3 Type EO ESCWA

Myanmar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 2 Type O2 ESCAP

Nauru 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 3 Type EO ESCAP

Nepal 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 5 3 Type EJO ESCAP

Netherlands 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 4 Type EJ ECE



XV

II


New Zealand 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type EJ ESCAP

Nicaragua 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 6 4 Type EJO ECLAC

Norway 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 4 Type EJ ECE

Oman 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 2 Type EO ESCWA

Pakistan 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 3 Type EO ESCAP

Palau 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E ESCAP

Panama 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 10 6 Type ELJO ECLAC

Papua New Guinea 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 2 Type EO ESCAP

Paraguay 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 8 5 Type EJO ECLAC

Peru 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 10 8 Type ELJO ECLAC

Philippines 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 15 7 Type ELJO ESCAP

Poland 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 8 7 Type ELJ ECE

Portugal 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 5 Type ELO ECE

Qatar 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 Type EO ESCWA

Romania 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 7 4 Type ELJ ECE

Russia 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 3 Type ELO ECE+

Saint Kitts and Nevis 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type E ECLAC

Saint Lucia 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type E ECLAC

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 Type E ECLAC

Samoa 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 4 Type EO ESCAP

San Marino 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 Type O ECE

Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 Type O ESCWA

Serbia 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 4 Type ELJO ECE+

Singapore 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Type E ESCAP

Slovakia 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 9 6 Type ELJO ECE

Slovenia 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 2 Type EJ ECE

Solomon Islands 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 Type E ESCAP

Spain 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 25 9 Type ELJO ECE

Sri Lanka 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 4 4 Type EJO ESCAP

Sudan 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 Type E ESCWA

Suriname 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 6 4 Type ELO ECLAC

Sweden 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 4 Type EJO ECE

Switzerland 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 5 3 Type EJO ECE



XV

III


Syria 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 Type O2 ESCWA

Tajikistan 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 4 Type ELO ECE+

Thailand 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 7 5 Type ELO ESCAP

Tonga 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 4 Type EO ESCAP

Trinidad and Tobago 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 Type EJ ECLAC

Tunisia 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 8 6 Type EJO ESCWA

Turkey 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 8 6 Type ELO ECE

Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 Type O2 ECE+

Tuvalu 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Type E ESCAP

Ukraine 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 7 6 Type ELJO ECE+

United Arab Emirates 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 Type O2 ESCWA

United Kingdom 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 5 Type ELO ECE

United States 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 13 5 Type EJO ECE

Uruguay 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 7 5 Type ELO ECLAC

Uzbekistan 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 Type O2 ECE+

Vanuatu 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2 Type EO ESCAP

Venezuela 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 Type EJO ECLAC

Viet Nam 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 7 5 Type O2 ESCAP

Yemen 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 Type E ESCWA



XIX

Appendix D: Data Behind Testing of Hypotheses

Using data for 151 states was a challenge, as many small states are not covered

in scientific data sets. There were not for all states data about all hypotheses.

Table 9.9.1 shows limitation of data and to what extent hypotheses testing was

applicable in the individual state.

XX

State or territory* H1 H2 H3 H4 C1 C2 Remarks

American Samoa* 1 0 1 1 1 0 only H2, & C2 tested

Cook Islands* 1 0 1 1 1 1 only H2 tested

Hong Kong* 1 0 1 1 0 0 H1, C1 & C2 tested

Macao* 1 0 1 1 0 0 H1, C1 & C2 tested

Palestine* 1 0 1 1 0 0 H2, C1 & C2 tested

Puerto Rico* 1 0 1 1 0 0 H2, C1 & C2 tested

Afghanistan 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Albania 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Algeria 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Andorra 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Antigua & Barbuda 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Armenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Bahamas 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Bahrain 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Barbados 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Belize 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Bhutan 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Bolivia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Bosnia & Herzegovina 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Brunei 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Cambodia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

China 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Table 4: Data limitations Chapter 9 (1 = no data available,

0 = data available).

XXI


Colombia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Cuba 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Dominica 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Dominican Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

East Timor 1 0 0 0 0 0 H1 not tested

Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

El Salvador 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Fiji 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

France 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Grenada 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Guatemala 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Guyana 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Haiti 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Honduras 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Iceland 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

India 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Iran 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested



XXII


Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Jamaica 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Jordan 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Kazakhstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Kiribati 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Korea, North 0 0 0 0 1 0 C1 not tested

Korea, South (Rep. of Korea) 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Kuwait 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Laos 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Liechtenstein 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Luxembourg 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Macedonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Maldives 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Malta 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Marshall Islands 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Micronesia 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Moldova 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Monaco 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Mongolia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Montenegro 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Morocco 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Myanmar 0 0 0 0 1 0 C1 not tested

Nauru 0 0 1 0 1 0 H3 & C1 not tested

Nepal 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested



XXIII


New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Nicaragua 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Oman 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Palau 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Panama 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Papua New Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Paraguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Peru 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Qatar 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

St Kitts & Nevis 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

St Lucia 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

St Vincent & Grenadines 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Samoa 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

San Marino 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Serbia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Solomon Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Sri Lanka 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Sudan 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Suriname 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested



XXIV


Syria 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Tajikistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Tonga 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Trinidad & Tobago 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Tunisia 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Turkey 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Tuvalu 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

United Kingdom 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

United States 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Vanuatu 0 0 1 0 0 0 H3 not tested

Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Viet Nam 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Yemen 0 0 0 0 0 0 fully tested

Number of states7 0 35 6 5 1

with limited data



Appendix E: Testing of Hypotheses

The Tables 9.1 till 9.13 give the results of the testing of hypotheses discussed in

Chapter 9. For each indicators there are two tables giving both directions of testing

(a and b). The indicators are sorted along the numbering of the hypotheses. The

60 tables for hypotheses H4 are available on request by the author.

XXV

Right for all women to stand for elections → TypesCategorised UNIVSTAND Type Frequency Percentage

early movers(< 1941)

Type ELJO 8 18.2Type ELJ 3 6.8Type ELO 9 20.5Type EJO 6 13.6Type O2 3 6.8Type EL 1 2.3Type EJ 7 15.9Type EO 3 6.8(Type JO) 1 2.3Type E 2 4.5(Type L) 1 2.3Total 44 100.0

mass(1941–1981)

Type ELJO 15 16.3Type ELJ 2 2.2Type ELO 10 10.9Type EJO 13 14.1Type O2 8 8.7Type EL 5 5.4Type EJ 3 3.3Type EO 15 16.3Type E 19 20.7(Type O) 1 1.1(Type Zero) 1 1.1Total 92 100.0

late movers(> 1981)

Type EO 1 50.0Type E 1 50.0Total 2 100.0

Until now, womenare not allowedto stand for election

Type O2 1 16.7Type EO 3 50.0Type E 1 16.7(Type O) 1 16.7Total 6 100.0

missing


Table 5: Empirical evidence for explanation: Right for all women to standfor elections → Types.

Types → Right for all women to stand for electionsUntil now, women

early movers mass late movers are not allowed Total(< 1941) (1941–1981) (> 1981) to stand for election


Table 6: Empirical evidence for explanation: Types → Right for all women tostand for elections.

XXVII

First woman elected to parliament → TypesCategorised FRSTMP Type Frequency Percentage

early movers (1900–1939)

Type ELJO 4 20.0Type ELJ 2 10.0Type ELO 4 20.0Type EJO 4 20.0Type EJ 5 25.0Type E 1 5.0Total 20 100.0

mass (1940–1989)

Type ELJO 14 16.9Type ELJ 2 2.4Type ELO 10 12.0Type EJO 12 14.5Type O2 8 9.6Type EL 1 1.2Type EJ 2 2.4Type EO 16 19.3(Type JO) 1 1.2Type E 15 18.1(Type O) 1 1.2(Type Zero) 1 1.2Total 83 100.0

historical (1990–1999)

Type ELJO 5 16.7Type ELO 5 16.7Type EJO 3 10.0Type O2 2 6.7Type EL 4 13.3Type EJ 3 10.0Type EO 3 10.0Type E 4 13.3(Type L) 1 3.3Total 30 100.0

Until now,no womanbecame MP

Type O2 1 11.1Type EL 1 11.1Type EO 3 33.3Type E 3 33.3(Type O) 1 11.1Total 9 100.0

missing

Type ELJO 1 11.1Type ELJ 1 11.1Type ELO 1 11.1Type EJO 1 11.1Type O2 2 22.2Type EJ 1 11.1Type E 1 11.1(Type O) 1 11.1Total 9 100.0

Table 7: Empirical evidence for explanation: First woman elected toparliament → Types.

Types → First woman elected to parliamentUntil now,

early movers mass historical no woman Total(1900–1939) (1940–1989) (1990–1999) became MP


Table 8: Empirical evidence for explanation: Types → First woman electedto parliament.

XXIX

First women elected as prime minister → TypesCategorised FRSTPM Type Frequency Percentage

early (before 1990)

Type ELJO 1 14.3Type ELO 3 42.9Type EJO 1 14.3Type EJ 1 14.3Type EO 1 14.3Total 7 100.0

later (from 1990 on)

Type ELJO 1 10.0Type ELJ 1 10.0Type ELO 2 20.0Type EJO 1 10.0Type EJ 2 20.0Type E 3 30.0Total 10 100.0

Until now, no womanbecame primeminister

Type ELJO 20 21.5Type ELJ 3 3.2Type ELO 12 12.9Type EJO 15 16.1Type O2 9 9.7Type EL 6 6.5Type EJ 7 7.5Type EO 11 11.8(Type JO) 1 1.1Type E 7 7.5(Type L) 1 1.1(Type O) 1 1.1Total 93 100.0

Table 9: Empirical evidence for explanation: First woman electedas prime minister → Types.

XXX

Types → First woman elected as prime ministerUntil now

early later no woman became Total(before 1990) (from 1990 on) prime minister


Table 10: Empirical evidence for explanation: Types → First woman electedas prime minister.

XXXI

First woman elected to president → TypesCategorised FRSTPRES Type Frequency Percentage

pioneer(until 1990)

Type ELJO 2 16.7Type ELO 2 16.7Type EJO 3 25.0Type O2 1 8.3Type EL 1 8.3Type EO 1 8.3Type E 1 8.3(Type O) 1 8.3Total 12 100.0

after pioneers(after 1990)

Type ELJO 1 20.0Type ELJ 1 20.0Type EJO 2 40.0Type E 1 20.0Total 5 100.0

Until now,no femalepresident

Type ELJO 20 15.7Type ELJ 4 3.1Type ELO 17 13.4Type EJO 14 11.0Type O2 11 8.7Type EL 5 3.9Type EJ 10 7.9Type EO 21 16.5(Type JO) 1 0.8Type E 21 16.5(Type L) 1 0.8(Type O) 1 0.8(Type Zero) 1 0.8Total 127 100.0

missing


Table 11: Empirical evidence for explanation: First woman elected topresident → Types.

Types → First woman elected to presidentpioneer after pioneers Until now (2000), Total

(until 1990) (after 1990) no female president


Table 12: Empirical evidence for explanation: Types → First woman electedto president.

XXXIII

First woman elected to head of parliamentary assembly → TypesCategorised FRSTHDPRLMT Type Frequency Percentage

early (before 1990)

Type ELJO 3 18.8Type ELO 2 12.5Type EJO 3 18.8Type EL 1 6.3Type EJ 2 12.5Type EO 2 12.5Type E 2 12.5(Type O) 1 6.3Total 16 100.0

later (in 1990s)

Type ELJO 8 29.6Type ELJ 3 11.1Type ELO 3 11.1Type EJO 5 18.5Type EJ 3 11.1Type EO 2 7.4Type E 3 11.1Total 27 100.0

Until now, no womanbecame president ofparliamentary body

Type ELJO 12 11.9Type ELJ 2 2.0Type ELO 14 13.9Type EJO 11 10.9Type O2 12 11.9Type EL 5 5.0Type EJ 5 5.0Type EO 18 17.8(Type JO) 1 1.0Type E 18 17.8(Type L) 1 1.0(Type O) 1 1.0(Type Zero) 1 1.0Total 101 100.0

missing


Table 13: Empirical evidence for explanation: First woman elected tohead of parliamentary assembly → Types.

Types → First woman elected to head of parliamentary assemblyUntil now, no

early later woman became president Total(before 1990) (in 1990s) of parliamentary body


Table 14: Empirical evidence for explanation: Types → First woman elected tohead of parliamentary assembly.

XXXV

Ratification of CEDAW → TypesRatification of CEDAW Frequency Percentage

Ratification between1980 and 1988

Type ELJO 16 23.5Type ELJ 3 4.4Type ELO 13 19.1Type EJO 13 19.1Type O2 4 5.9Type EJ 4 5.9Type EO 5 7.4(Type JO) 1 1.5Type E 9 13.2Total 68 100.0


Type ELJO 6 11.1Type ELJ 1 1.9Type ELO 5 9.3Type EJO 5 9.3Type O2 5 9.3Type EL 4 7.4Type EJ 6 11.1Type EO 11 20.4Type E 9 16.7(Type L) 1 1.9(Type O) 1 1.9Total 54 100.0


Type ELJO 1 5.6Type ELJ 1 5.6Type ELO 1 5.6Type O2 3 16.7Type EL 2 11.1Type EJ 1 5.6Type EO 4 22.2Type E 3 16.7(Type O) 1 5.6(Type Zero) 1 5.6Total 18 100.0

signature, no ratification Type EJO 1 100.0

no signature,no ratification

Type ELO 1 20.0Type EO 2 40.0Type E 2 40.0Total 5 100.0

missing

Type ELJO 1 20.0Type EJO 1 20.0Type O2 1 20.0Type E 1 20.0(Type O) 1 20.0Total 5 100.0

Table 15: Empirical evidence for explanation: Ratification of CEDAW → Types.

Typ

es→

Rat

ifica

tion

ofC

ED

AW

Typ

eR

atifi

cati

onR

atifi

cati

onR

atifi

cati

onsi

gnat

ure

,no

sign

ature

,T

otal

1980

–198

819

89–2

000

2001

–201

0no

rati

fica

tion

no

rati

fica

tion

Typ

eE

LJO

166

10

023

Typ

eE

LJ

31

10

05

Typ

eE

LO

135

10

120

Typ

eE

JO

135

01

019

Typ

eO

24

53

00

12T

yp

eE

L0

42

00

6T

yp

eE

J4

61

00

11T

yp

eE

O5

114

02

22(T

yp

eJO

)1

00

00

1T

yp

eE

99

30

223

(Typ

eL

)0

10

00

1(T

yp

eO

)0

11

00

2(T

yp

eZ

ero)

00

10

01

Tot

al68

5418

15

146

Tab

le16

:E

mpir

ical

evid

ence

for

expla

nat

ion:

Typ

es→

Rat

ifica

tion

ofC

ED

AW

.

XXXVII

Appendix F: Ordinal Types of Institutional

Architecture

The Tables 17 till 20 give the attribution of states to the ordinal typology of

institutional architecture. Within each ordinal type the states are ordered

alphabetically.

XXXVIII

CaseInstitutional

Ordinal TypeDepth Broadness

American Samoa* 0.75 1.00 Type IMacao* 1.50 1.00 Type IPalestine* 4.25 2.00 Type IAlbania 3.75 2.00 Type IAlgeria 3.00 2.00 Type IAndorra 0.75 1.00 Type IAntigua and Barbuda 1.50 1.00 Type IArmenia 1.50 1.00 Type IAustria 2.50 2.00 Type IBahamas 0.75 1.00 Type IBahrain 1.75 2.00 Type IBarbados 2.25 2.00 Type IBelize 3.75 2.00 Type IBolivia 1.75 2.00 Type IBrunei 2.25 2.00 Type ICambodia 4.25 2.00 Type ICanada 1.50 1.00 Type IChile 5.25 2.00 Type ICuba 1.75 2.00 Type IDenmark 2.50 2.00 Type IDominica 1.50 1.00 Type IEast Timor 2.50 2.00 Type IEcuador 2.50 2.00 Type IEstonia 1.75 2.00 Type IFiji 2.50 2.00 Type IGeorgia 1.00 1.00 Type IGrenada 0.75 1.00 Type IGuyana 0.75 1.00 Type IHaiti 0.75 1.00 Type IIraq 0.75 1.00 Type IItaly 6.00 2.00 Type IJamaica 2.25 2.00 Type IJapan 3.75 2.00 Type IJordan 3.00 2.00 Type IKiribati 2.25 2.00 Type IKorea, North 1.75 2.00 Type IKuwait 0.75 1.00 Type IKyrgyzstan 2.50 2.00 Type I

Table 17: Attribution of states and *territories to ordinal types (Table I).

XXXIX

CaseInstitutional


Lebanon 2.50 2.00 Type ILibya 3.00 2.00 Type ILiechtenstein 0.75 1.00 Type ILithuania 3.50 2.00 Type IMacedonia 1.75 2.00 Type IMaldives 3.00 2.00 Type IMarshall Islands 0.75 1.00 Type IMicronesia 0.75 1.00 Type IMonaco 0.00 0.00 Type IMongolia 3.75 2.00 Type IMontenegro 2.50 2.00 Type IMorocco 3.00 2.00 Type IMyanmar 2.00 1.00 Type INauru 3.00 2.00 Type INetherlands 3.25 2.00 Type INew Zealand 1.75 2.00 Type INorway 3.25 2.00 Type IOman 2.25 2.00 Type IPakistan 3.00 2.00 Type IPalau 0.75 1.00 Type IPapua New Guinea 2.25 2.00 Type IQatar 2.25 2.00 Type ISaint Kitts and Nevis 1.50 1.00 Type ISaint Lucia 1.50 1.00 Type ISaint Vincent and the Grenadines 1.50 1.00 Type ISamoa 3.75 2.00 Type ISan Marino 1.50 1.00 Type ISaudi Arabia 1.50 1.00 Type ISingapore 1.50 1.00 Type ISlovenia 1.75 2.00 Type ISolomon Islands 1.50 1.00 Type ISudan 1.50 1.00 Type ISyria 1.75 2.00 Type ITonga 3.75 2.00 Type ITrinidad and Tobago 2.50 2.00 Type ITurkmenistan 1.00 1.00 Type ITuvalu 0.75 1.00 Type IUnited Arab Emirates 1.75 2.00 Type I

Table 18: Attribution of states and *territories to ordinal types (Table II).

XL

CaseInstitutional


Uzbekistan 1.75 2.00 Type IVanuatu 2.25 2.00 Type IViet Nam 4.50 2.00 Type IYemen 2.25 1.00 Type ICook Islands* 3.25 3.00 Type IIIHong Kong* 3.25 3.00 Type IIIPuerto Rico* 6.00 4.00 Type IIIAfghanistan 4.25 3.00 Type IIIArgentina 5.50 3.00 Type IIIAustralia 5.75 3.00 Type IIIAzerbaijan 3.25 3.00 Type IIIBelarus 3.25 3.00 Type IIIBelgium 4.75 3.00 Type IIIBhutan 4.00 3.00 Type IIIBosnia and Herzegovina 4.00 3.00 Type IIIBulgaria 3.25 3.00 Type IIIChina 4.75 3.00 Type IIICroatia 4.25 4.00 Type IIICyprus 5.25 4.00 Type IIICzech Republic 6.00 4.00 Type IIIDominican Republic 6.00 4.00 Type IIIEgypt 4.00 3.00 Type IIIFinland 2.75 3.00 Type IIIFrance 5.75 4.00 Type IIIGermany 4.00 3.00 Type IIIGuatemala 6.00 4.00 Type IIIHonduras 4.75 3.00 Type IIIHungary 6.00 4.00 Type IIIIceland 3.25 3.00 Type IIIIndia 6.00 4.00 Type IIIIndonesia 3.25 3.00 Type IIIIreland 5.75 4.00 Type IIIIsrael 4.75 3.00 Type IIIKazakhstan 4.00 3.00 Type IIIKorea, South 5.75 4.00 Type IIILaos 5.50 3.00 Type IIILatvia 3.50 3.00 Type IIILuxembourg 5.75 4.00 Type III

Table 19: Attribution of states and *territories to ordinal types (Table III).

XLI

CaseInstitutional


Malaysia 4.75 3.00 Type IIIMalta 3.25 3.00 Type IIIMexico 4.75 3.00 Type IIIMoldova 3.25 3.00 Type IIINepal 3.25 3.00 Type IIINicaragua 4.00 3.00 Type IIIPanama 6.00 4.00 Type IIIParaguay 5.00 3.00 Type IIIPoland 6.00 3.00 Type IIIPortugal 5.50 3.00 Type IIIRomania 3.50 3.00 Type IIIRussia 3.25 3.00 Type IIISerbia 4.25 4.00 Type IIISlovakia 6.00 4.00 Type IIISri Lanka 4.00 3.00 Type IIISuriname 4.00 3.00 Type IIISweden 4.00 3.00 Type IIISwitzerland 3.25 3.00 Type IIITajikistan 4.00 3.00 Type IIIThailand 5.50 3.00 Type IIIUkraine 6.00 4.00 Type IIIUnited Kingdom 4.75 3.00 Type IIIUnited States 4.75 3.00 Type IIIUruguay 5.00 3.00 Type IIIVenezuela 3.25 3.00 Type IIIBangladesh 6.25 3.00 Type IVBrazil 8.25 4.00 Type IVColombia 8.25 4.00 Type IVCosta Rica 7.00 4.00 Type IVEl Salvador 7.50 4.00 Type IVGreece 7.50 4.00 Type IVIran 6.50 3.00 Type IVPeru 8.25 4.00 Type IVPhilippines 7.50 4.00 Type IVSpain 9.00 4.00 Type IVTunisia 6.25 3.00 Type IVTurkey 6.25 3.00 Type IV

Table 20: Attribution of states and *territories to ordinal types (Table IV).

XLII

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CV Christine Scheidegger

Mittelstrasse 68

CH-3012 Bern

+41 31 331 43 25

[email protected]

July 30, 2013

Professional Experience

2009–2013 Institute of Political Science, University of St. Gallen.

2007–2011 Mandate for Swiss National Councilor.

2005 Centre for further academic education, University of Bern.

2003 Placement in women’s policy agency of canton of Basle-Land.

Education

2009–2013 PhD in Political Science, University of St. Gallen.

2004 Student exchange to University of Lund, Sweden.

2002–2006 Gender Studies (1st minor), University of Basle.

1999–2008 BA and MA in Political Science, University of Bern.

1984–1999 Mandatory schools and college (science type) in Zofingen.

Languages

English Fluent

French Fluent

German Native language

Swedish Fair

LXIII

Publication

Scheidegger, Christine, 2008: Rahmenbedingungen fur die Entstehung und

Weiterexistenz von kantonalen Fachstellen fur Gleichstellung zwischen

1990 und 2005. Ein Quervergleich. Lizentiatsarbeit Politologie Bern, Uniprint,

Fribourg.

Conference Participation

Comparing WPAs Globally: Classification for the 21st century. Paper

given on the third European Conference on Politics and Gender, Barcelona, Spain.

March 22 2013, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

State Capability in WEGE: Worldwide comparison with a structure-

based approach. Paper given on the third European Conference on Politics and

Gender, Barcelona, Spain. March 22 2013, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.

Swiss WPAs: 1970–2007. What is there?. Paper given on the second Euro-

pean Conference on Politics and Gender, Budapest, Hungary. January 14 2011 at

Central European University, Budapest. Paper given on the Annual Congress of

Swiss Political Science Association, Basle, Switzerland. January 13 2011, Univer-

sity of Basle.

Women’s Citizenship in Switzerland: What Can we Learn from the In-

stitutionalization of Women’s Policy Machinery (WPM)?. Paper given on

the Annual Congress of Swiss Political Science Association, Geneva, Switzerland.

January 8 2010, University of Geneva.

Pathways to Swiss State Feminism. Paper given on the international and

interdisciplinary conference: Engendering Policy and Politics – International and

comparative challenges and perspectives of the Gender Research Network of the

School of Social Sciences of University of Manchester, Manchester, United King-

dom. June 21 2007, University of Manchester.

LXIV

Selbststandigkeitserklarung

“Ich erklare hiermit,

- dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit ohne unerlaubte Hilfe und ohne

Verwendung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel verfasst und bei

keiner anderen Universitat eingereicht habe,

- dass ich samtliche verwendete Quellen erwahnt und gemass den

gangigen wissenschaftlichen Regeln korrekt zitiert habe” (Schlegel

2010).

Bern 29. Juli 2013: Unterschrift:

LXV

Documents

Women's Policy Agencies and Institutional Architecture in ...FILE/dis4238.pdf · Women’s Policy Agencies and Institutional Architecture in Comparison: Building Blocks for Equal