Wittgenstein and Derrida On Meaning

8/10/2019 Wittgenstein and Derrida On Meaning

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Wittgenstein and Derrida on MeaningAuthor(s): Mark RowlandsSource: Behavior and Philosophy, Vol. 20/21, Vol. 20, no. 2 - Vol. 21, no. 1 (1993), pp. 37-47Published by: Cambridge Center for Behavioral Studies (CCBS)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27759282 .Accessed: 18/12/2014 23:23

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Behavior and Philosophy, Double Issue 1993, VoL 20, No.2/VoL 21, No. 1

WITTGENSTEIN AND DEEKEDAON MEANING

Mark RowlandsThe University of Alabama

I

In Signature Event Context, Derrida attacks a theory of meaning that he

associates with Condillac.1 According to this theory, people have thoughts, ideas or

representations,and these have a

signifiedcontent.

Speakingis

essentiallyan

activity of giving expression to these thoughts. When we speak, we communicatethe content of our thought, dress it in auditory garb, so to speak, and thus makethis content accessible to others. Writing serves essentially this same

communicative purpose but extends it in obvious ways. Both speaking and writingtransmit, communicate, the inner content; and the same inner content can be

expressed through these distinct media.Derrida argues that the theory of meaning implicated in Condillac's work is

importantly mistaken. The mistake is most obvious in the case of written language,but it also applies to speech. Consider writing. In order for a written mark toconstitute writing, it must, according to Derrida, remain readable despite the

disappearance? the absence ? of the context in which it was originally produced

(Derrida, pp. 7ff). If, for example, I inscribe on paper I think I am having a cardiacarrest and then subsequently die, my thoughts, ideas, representations, experiences,and my conscious intentions die with me; they become absent. Nevertheless, the

inscription can exist and function apart from this context. And it is preciselybecause it can that we regard it as an example of writing. The capacity of an

expression to exist and function in contexts other than the one in which it wasoriginally produced

? a capacity essential to that expression qua expression?

Derrida calls the iterability f the expression. Iterability snot simply repeatability:Such iterability

? (iter, again, probably comes from itara, other, in Sanskrit, and

everything that follows can be read as the working out of the logic that ties alterityto repetition). (Derrida, p. 10, pp. 46-47) The iterability of a sign involves, inaddition to repetition, a, perhaps small, but nonetheless ineliminable, transformationof that sign as it breaks from one context and associates with another. The

iterability of a sign must be understood as a hybrid structure, made up of both

repetition and alterity, where these are inextricably bound together.

Author's note:

Please address correspondence to, Professor Mark Rowlands, Department of Philosophy, The Universityof Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487.

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WITTGENSTEIN AND DERRTDA

There is, in principle, no limit to the variations in contexts of iteration. If,for example, the person for whom I intended the inscription died instead of me, sothat she, and her conscious thoughts, ideas, etc. were now absent, this does not

mean that the inscription becomes unreadable. Indeed, if the whole world, save forthe inscription, were suddenly obliterated, the inscription would still be readableeven if, in fact, it were unread. This iterability of the inscription is essential to it

qua token of writing.The same comments also apply to spoken utterances.2 If, instead of inscribing

it on paper I had uttered the sentence, I think I am having a cardiac arrest, myutterance would not be rendered meaningless by my subsequent demise. Thus, theabsence of my conscious intention to communicate would not render my spokenutterance

meaningless.Nor would the absence of the intended

receiver,or the

absence of any states of conscious understanding which she might possess.

Iterability applies equally to both written and spoken utterances (Derrida, p. 9).What is important here is not the rejection of Condillac's theory of meaning,

but the iterability which forms the basis of that rejection. One obvious consequenceof the iterability of linguistic expressions is that for a

? written or spoken? mark

to count as a token of language itmust be capable of functioning in the absence ofthe consciousness of the sender/receiver, and, in particular, in the absence of the

speaker's conscious intention to say what she means (Derrida, pp. 8 ff.). Therefore,

according to Derrida, the meaning of the expression cannot be located in, or derived

from, any person's consciousness, and, a fortiori, not in or from her conscious

intention to say what she means.

The iterability of written and spoken expressions has further consequences.Derrida argues that, in order for a written or spoken mark to count as an

expression of language, it must be capable of functioning in the absence of anyfeature which might be thought to be a determinant of its meaning (Derrida, pp.10-12). He argues, for example, that essential to a linguistic sign's being a sign is

its capacity to function in the absence of a real referent, in the absence of objectivesignification, and even in the absence of grammaticality. Whether Derrida is rightabout this I do not propose to address here. I shall focus, instead, on the way the

concept of iterability is used to attack accounts which locate the meaning of a signin the conscious states of a sign user.

It could be replied that, although the inscription can be understood in theabsence of any present intention on the part of the inscriber, we need, in order tounderstand the inscription, to know what the inscriber intended at the time (Searle,1977). This reply, however,

merelypostpones the issue.

Anyintention,

accordingto Derrida, is itself a relation to a sign. And, as such, it inherits the sign'siterability. Thus, iterability is just as essential to the inscriber's intention as it isto the inscription which is its product. Thus, the intention cannot be identified

with a conscious experience which might be, so to speak, before the mind of the

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person who has the intention; the iterability of the intention entails that this personcould have the same intention in the absence of that experience.

This point is crucial. Derrida is not, at least not here, attacking the relevance

of intention to meaning. He says,

I must first recall that at no time does Sec [i.e. Signature Event Context ] invoke the

absence, pure and simple, of intentionality. Nor is there any break, simple or radical, with

intentionality. What the text questions is not intention nor intentionality but their telos,which orients and organizes the movement and possibility of a fulfillment, realization, andactualization in a plenitude that would be present to and identical with itself (Derrida, pp.55-60).

As this indicates, Derrida is attacking neither intention nor intentionality but

a certain picture of these things. The view of intention as a conscious experienceprovides one example of this picture. Any conscious experience is, it is commonly

thought, wholly accessible?

present? to its subject at the time of its occurrence.

But such a view of intention is untenable because of the iterability of intention:

...intention or attention, directed towards something iterable which in turn determines itas being iterable,will strive or tend in vain to actualize or fulfill tself, or it cannot, byvirtue of its very structure, ever achieve this goal. In no case will it be fulfilled,actualized, totally present to its object and to itself. It is divided and deported in advance,by its iterability, towards others, removed in advance from itself... Intention is a priori(at once)

differante: differingand

deferring,in its

inception(Derrida,

pp.56).

The notion of iterability entails a nominalist view of meaning and intention.3It is usual to distinguish token expressions of a sign from the type of which those

tokens are instances. Thus, while two sign tokens are numerically distinct, theycan, nonetheless, be instances of the same type. The type, in this way, provides a

principle for unifying numerically distinct tokens. We might express Derrida's

position thus: There are only the tokens, as long as we are careful to note two

things: Firstly, tokens should not be understood as instances of types (Derrida, pp.

56). Secondly, as will become clear, Derrida's conception of a sign-token differs inimportant ways from the orthodox conception.

As a first approximation we can say this: For Derrida there are onlyindividual, concrete, utterances or inscriptions, concrete particular uses of a sign.If we use a sign in one context and then use what we take to be the same sign ina distinct context, this is not because of any common feature

? essence, meaning,

animating conscious intention, etc.? which the two individual signs share. That

there is not is a direct consequence of the iterability of signs. For any sign S,

whatever featureone

citesas

being (allegedly) the feature which type-identifies thevarious token utterances or inscriptions of S, the iterabilility of S entails that anytoken of S could exist and function as the sign it is in the absence of that feature.

The notion of iterability, therefore, records the fact that S can be used?

repeated? on distinct occasions which have no common feature. Iterability, in this way,

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encompasses not only the repetition of S but also its alterity? its capacity for

alteration ? on distinct occasions.

Iterability necessitates a revision in our understanding of the notion of the

same sign. The idea of the identity through time of a sign is not abandoned byDerrida. Nor should it be, since iterability is, in part, constituted by the repetitionof the same sign. Identity is retained, but reinterpreted, and records not literal

(type) identity but, rather, the fact that we take various concrete occasions of

linguistic use as being expressions of the same sign.4 The sign, we might say, is

recognizably the same (where recognizable identity does not imply literal identity).Let us use the expression 'identity^ to denote recognizable identity in this sense.

If we are to understand the 'identity^ relation, we can not do so by appeal to

Vertical1 connections between concrete uses of asign

and aunifying type.

Such

appeals are ruled out by iterability, which ensures that, whatever vertical connectionis cited, the sign can exist and retain its identityr in the absence of that connection.In constructing a notion of identityr we can appeal only to horizontal connectionsbetween the use of a sign on a particular occasion and the use of what we take tobe the same sign on different occasions.

This feature of iterability allows the derivation of two other central Derridean

concepts? the trace, and differance. Consider, first, Derrida's concept of a trace.

Since the identityr of a sign S as it is used on a particular concrete occasions is a

function of the relations which obtain between S on that occasion and (what is

recognizably) S on other occasions, and since these relations will typically beextended in time and space, Derrida claims that the identity (i.e. identity^ of a signS on a given occasion of use is constituted by the trace of non-presence. That is,if I use a sign S on a given occasion, the identityr of that sign as S depends on itsrelation to other uses of S on other occasions, where these are absent from the

present occasion in that they are extended from it in both space and time. Thus,what is present, the sign S, is dependent for its identityr, on what is non-present.

This trace-structure of the sign is, therefore, a consequence of its iterability.5Secondly, consider the notion of differance, an amalgam of difference and

deferral. Each sign is constituted by difference in the sense that its identityr is, in

part, constituted by its relation to other signs which are distinct, or different fromit. Furthermore, the iterability of a sign means that the sign is constituted bydeferral. The identityr of each sign on any given occasion of use depends, in part,on the use of what is recognizably that sign on other occasions. The identity of the

sign is, thus, something which can be wholly constituted by any particular occasionof use, but depends on repeated use, on what happens before and after it. It is

divided, spread out in time, or, in Derrida's sense, deferred.The rest of this paper will argue that the three central Derridean notions of

iterability, trace, and differance also feature inWittgenstein's approach to linguisticmeaning.

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n

The theory of meaning attacked by Derrida also provides a focus for the

writing ofWittgenstein. The assimilation of meaning to a conscious inner item is,inWittgenstein's view, not somuch a theory ofmeaning as a pre-theoretical picture

which provides the starting point for much theorizing and exerts a pervasiveinfluence over it. He subjects this picture to repeated analysis and criticism. I shallfocus on just one of his critical themes.

According toWittgenstein, one reason why meaning cannot be assimilated to

any sort of conscious item is that the presence of any particular conscious item inone's mind (so to speak) is not necessary for one to mean something by a sign. To

appreciate this point, Wittgenstein claimed, allwe

have to is look and see. Suppose,for example, my wife asks me where I have put the car keys (Malcolm, pp. 133-58).I could form an image of the keys in the top drawer of the kitchen. I say,

The keys are in the kitchen drawer. That is the way it could have happened.However, it could also have happened in countless other ways. Suppose I am

writing a paper, and feel irritated by my wife's untimely interruption. I could say,The keys are in the kitchen drawer, while turning over a phrase in my head. Or

suppose I have a mistress and am talking to her on the telephone. Disturbed bymy wife's unexpected appearance I could say, The keys are in the kitchen drawer,all the while hoping that she doesn't ask who is on the telephone.6 These sorts of

examples could be multiplied indefinitely. And in many of these cases I simply willnot form mental images of the keys or kitchen drawer. Instead, I could form

images of other sorts, or no conscious image at all. Thus, although it is correct to

say that, in uttering The car keys are in the kitchen drawer, Imeant that the car

keys are in the kitchen drawer, there need be no feature of my conscious experiencewhich regularly accompanies this utterance.7

A great variety of images, feelings, and so on may accompany one's meaning

something by a sign. But no one of these features is essential. It is true that mymeaning something by a sign might have typical experiential accompaniments.When I utter, The keys are in the kitchen drawer, Imight typically form an imageof the keys in the drawer. But my image of the keys in the drawer, although an

experiential accompaniment, cannot constitute my meaning that the keys are in the

drawer, for I am capable of meaning that even when I form no such image.As this shows, there can be any number of experiential accompaniments to

meaning, but these experiential items cannot be the meaning itself (Wittgenstein,#33-35). Failure to appreciate this point stems from concentrating upon the most

typical kinds of accompaniment and elevating this correlation into a necessity. This

error, in turn, arises from assuming that meaning must consist in a distinctive sortof experience. But introspection, Wittgenstein argues, undermines this theoretical

assumption. If you look and see, you will find that there is no invariant

accompaniment to meaning something by a sign. Indeed, introspection often fails

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to identify any kind of experience when one means something by a sign. Wesometimes mean or intend a sign in a particular way without any item comingbefore our mind, when our mind is, so to speak, a blank.

If we look and see, then, we will realize that it is possible to mean somethingby a sign in the absence of any particular conscious experience, indeed, even in the

absence of all conscious experience. The introduction of absence, here, indicates the

first point of comparison between Wittgenstein and Derrida. And this reference to

absence is indicative of more profound similarities.

Wittgenstein's advice to look and see alerts us to the iterability of signs.Bewitched by a certain (oversimplified) view of language, we might expect there tobe some common feature running through all contexts in which a given sign has

application. The speaker's or writer's conscious intention is one, historicallyimportant, suggestion as to what this common feature might be. If, however, we

look and see, we will realize that our use of a given sign need not be grounded in

any such common feature. The iterated sign can have the meaning that it has inthe absence of any iterated candidate for the essential common feature. In this way,the advice to look and see alerts us to the iterability of linguistic signs. When

Wittgenstein tells us to look and see, he is pointing out the multiplicity and

heterogeneity? the alterity

? of contexts and situations in which it is appropriateto use a given sign, i.e., in which the use of that sign can be repeated.

This line of comparison can be pushed further in a way which takes us tothe heart of Wittgenstein's thought. Iterability is a function of both alterity and

repetition. Two structural elements of Wittgenstein's later philosophy reflect thesetwo concepts. Further, both these elements are, in effect, pointed out by the adviceto look and see.

The first is Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance (Wittgenstein, #65-71).Roughly described, the idea is this. A term T is a family resemblance term only ifthere is no common feature shared by all and only contexts, cases, or situations in

which it would beappropriate

toapply

T.And, then,

aconcept C is

afamilyresemblance concept if it is expressed by a family resemblance term. Consider, for

example, the concept of a game. Wittgenstein argues that there is no one feature

possessed by all and only games.

Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass tocard-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many commonfeatures drop out, and others appear. When we pass to ball games, much that is commonis retained, but much is lost. Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts andcrosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Thinkof patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ballat the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared... And the result of thisexamination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping andcriss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail(Wittgenstein, # 66).

I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'familyresemblance'; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features,

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WITTGENSTEIN AND DERRTDA

colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. AndI shall say: 'games' form a family (Wittgenstein, #67).

Thus, for any family resemblance term T, the contexts, cases, or situations inwhich it would be appropriate to use T are not united by some common essential

feature, and T, therefore, does not serve to pick out any such feature. The notionof family resemblance expresses a form of nominalism or anti-essentialism about

certain terms or concepts. Furthermore, the notion alerts us to the alterity involved

in the use of certain signs. A family resemblance sign straddles or encompasses this

kind of alterity, or divergence, in the contexts, cases, or situations in which the signcan be employed. The family resemblance character of certain signs becomes

evident once we look and see.

The second structural feature ofWittgenstein's approach to linguistic meaningis the concept of a custom, practice, or form of life. One of the features of

language use which Wittgenstein wants to highlight by way of these labels is the

regularity, the repetition, which is essential to the existence of meaning. A custom

is something which is established through repeated application of a procedure.

It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyeda rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a reportwas made, an order given or understood; and so on. To obey a rule, make a report, to givean order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions) (Wittgenstein, #199).

On the contrary, I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign post only in so faras there exists a regular use of sign posts, a custom (Wittgenstein, # 198).

So, the connection between custom and repetition inWittgenstein's thoughtis pretty clear. It is also clear that Wittgenstein thinks this sort of repetition is

essential to language:

Let us imagine that the people in that country carried on the usual human activities and

in the course of them employed, apparently, an articulate language. If we watch theirbehaviour we find it intelligible, it seems 'logical.' But when we try to learn their

language we find it impossible to do so. For there is no regular connection between what

they say, the sounds they make, and their actions; but still these sounds are not

superfluous, for if we gag one of the people, it has the same consequences as with us;without the sounds their actions fall into confusion ? as I feel like putting it. Are we to

say that these people have a language: orders, reports, and the rest? There is not enoughregularity for us to call it 'language' (Wittgenstein, #207).

Wittgenstein's notion of a custom reminds us of the repetition which is

necessary for the existence of meaning. When we look and see, we grasp the

multiplicity of situations and cases in which the application of a given sign is

appropriate. But to speak of a multiplicity of cases and situations in which it is

appropriate to use a given sign is to suppose that the sign can be repeated.Not only are the concepts of alterity and repetition central toWittgenstein's

approach, but, as with Derrida, there is an essential connection between the two.

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Without grounding in the notion of a custom, the family resemblance thesis makeslittle sense. One problem it would face is what I shall call the problem of wide opentexture. Anything is similar to anything else in some respect or other. A fork is

similar to a knife in that they are both used for eating, but a knife is similar to ascrew driver in that they are both metallic, but a screw driver is similar to an

umbrella in that they are both long and thin, but an umbrella is similar to a

parachute, and so on. The problem here is not that family resemblance conceptsare blurred, that they have, in some sense, vague boundaries, but rather, that therewill be no boundaries whatsoever ? precise or imprecise

?separating concepts.

Since everything is similar to everything else in some respect, all family resemblance

concepts will collapse into one. In order to avoid this problem, restrictions must be

placedon the

typesof

similaritywhich are to be considered relevant.

Wittgenstein'sclaim is that these restrictions are constituted by custom, by community practice.Part of belonging to a given custom involves being trained to regard certain sortsof similarity (in certain contexts) as relevant and certain other sorts as irrelevant.In this way, the alterity represented by the notion of family resemblance, and the

repetition represented by the notion of a custom are essentially connected.

Therefore, Derrida's notion of iterability is represented in Wittgenstein'sphilosophy by the interplay between the notions of family resemblance and custom.For Wittgenstein, a sign expresses a family resemblance concept if it can be appliedin situations or contexts which exhibit a mutual alterity or divergence. And acustom or practice is essential to a sign because the functioning of a sign essentiallyinvolves repetition. Therefore, it seems that the logic which ties family resemblanceto form of life in Wittgenstein's philosophy is the same logic as ties alterity to

repetition in the work of Derrida.

in

The notions of trace and differance are also, I think, clearly applicable toWittgenstein's work on meaning and intention. The concepts of trace and differanceare consequences of iterability in the sense that iterability necessitates a certainrevision in our notion of identity as it applies to linguistic signs. The revised senseof identity

?identityr

? makes the existence of any sign S, on any particularoccasion of its use, dependent on other occasions of use of S which are extended inspace and time from the present occasion. Thus, S, on any occasion of use, is (atleast partly) constituted by the trace of what is not present on that occasion. And,furthermore, since S is constituted by different occasions of use, where these extendin space and time from the present, the existence of S as the type of sign it is is

deferred', its existence and identityr is essentially spread out in time. Thus S ischaracterized by differance. I think the notions of trace and differance apply to

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Wittgenstein's work in much the same way. That is, they are consequences of

iterability, realized in this case by the relation between family resemblance andcustom.

The following passage from Zettel poses the sort of question which occursmany times in Wittgenstein's writings:

If I have two friends with the same name and am writing one of them a letter, what doesthe fact that I am not writing it to the other consist in? In the content? But that mightfit either (I haven't yet written the address) (Wittgenstein, #7).

Suppose both my friends are named 'Bill,9 one lives in Baltimore, the otherin Buffalo. In what does my writing to the Bill in Baltimore, rather than Buffalo,

consist? We will suppose that I have not yet written the address, nor made anyother sort of mark that might determine who the letter is for, and we will assumethat the content of the letter is appropriate to both. In this case, what makes theletter meant or intended for Baltimore Bill?

Wittgenstein's treatment of this issue is, in effect, guided by the notion of

iterability. The iterability of the letter as a linguistic sign ensures that no factabout myself, the writer, is necessary for the letter being meant for Baltimore,rather than Buffalo, Bill. I could, for example, have a mental image of BaltimoreBill as I write the letter, ut the letter ould still bemeant for altimore Bill in theabsence of this image. The same considerations apply no matter what feature of

my conscious life is picked out. The iterability of the letter (as a structured

linguistic sign) ensures that it could still be meant or intended for Baltimore Billeven in the absence of any particular conscious item, indeed, even ifmy mind is an

experiential blank.The iterability of the letter also blocks the attempt to identify the

intentionality of the letter with behavioral facts about me. No aspect of mybehavior can be necessary for the letter being meant or intended for Baltimore Bill.

Whatever behavior, actual or dispositional, is cited, the iterability of the letterensures that the letter could be intended for Baltimore Bill in the absence of that

behavior. However, relative to certain contexts, psychological or behavioral featurescan count as criteria for the letter being meant for Baltimore, rather than Buffalo,Bill. For example, I might remark to someone I am [/have been/will be] writingto Bill, I hope he still lives in Baltimore. In this context, such an utterance wouldbe criterial for the letter being meant for Baltimore Bill. Or, I might have madeno such utterance, but it is also true that if I had been asked to whom I was

writingthe letter, I would have

replied,to Bill in Baltimore. This counterfactual

fact about me, Wittgenstein thinks, can, in this sort of context, be criterial for theletter being meant for Baltimore Bill.

The criterial relation is, according to Wittgenstein, at least a partialdeterminant of the meaning of a sign. However, it is distinct from the relations ofboth inductive confirmation and logical entailment. The reason for this stems from

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the context-relative character of criteria. For example, whether or not my utteringI am writing to Bill. I wonder If he is still in Baltimore counts as a criterion for

the letter being meant for one Bill rather than the other only if the other Bill does

not also live in Baltimore. In general, if the context changes, the criterial status ofX relative to Y can also change. So, on the one hand, Wittgenstein claims that

criteria are at least partial determinants of the meaning of linguistic signs: If X

provides a criterion for the application of sign S, then X is at least a partialdeterminant of the meaning of S. On the other hand, whether or not X counts asa criterion for S is a context-sensitive matter: It depends on facts extended in both

space and time. The inevitable conclusion seems to be that what S means on any

given occasion will depend not just on what happens on that occasion, but also on

whathappens

before and after that occasion. Themeaning

of asign

isessentiallyspread out in space and time.

If this is so, then the notions of trace and differance will also apply to

Wittgenstein's approach to meaning. Firstly, the meaning of S on any occasion will

in part be constituted by facts which are extended in space and time. The meaningof S on that occasion, therefore, is constituted, in part, by what is not present onthat occasion. S, therefore, has trace-structure. Secondly, since the meaning of S

is, in this sense, spread out in both space and time, its meaning is in this sense

deferred and, thus constituted by what is spatially and temporally different from S.

The meaning of S is, in this sense, characterized by differance.

Conclusion

A similar pattern of thought operates in the work of Derrida and

Wittgenstein. Derrida identifies iterability as an essential feature of linguisticsigns, and this entails a revision in the way we think about the identity of signs:

The identity of signs (evident in their repetition) cannot be divorced from their

inevitable contextual alteration. Thus, the notion of literal identitymust

bereplaced by something like recognizable identity, identityr. And identityr entailsthat each linguistic sign is, on any occasion of use, characterized by the trace of

what is not present, and by differance, an amalgam of difference and deferral. In

Wittgenstein's work, the notion of iterability is realized by the interplay between

family resemblance (representing the element of alterity) and custom

(representing the element of repetition). As a result, Wittgenstein offers analternative account of the meaning of linguistic signs which is based on thenotion of criteria. The context-sensitivity of criteria entails that linguistic signsfor Wittgenstein are also characterized by the notions of trace and differance.

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REFERENCES

Brand, M. and Walton, D. (Eds.). (1976) Action Theory (Dordrecht: D. Reidel)

Derrida, J., (Ed.). (1988). Limited Inc.. (Northwestern University Press)

Malcolm, N. (1977). Thougfit and Knowledge (Cornell University Press).

Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical Investigations (London: Blackwell)

Wittgenstein, L. (1967). Zettel (London: Blackwell)

NOTES

iI will focus almost entirely on this paper and its offspring, Limited Inc abc ...H Both papers appearin

Graff,1988.

2Derrida often refers to the iterability f linguistic igns in a way which is likely omislead theuninitiated: Speech is prior to writing. In making this claim, Derrida appears to be making analmost certainly false empirical claim about the relationship between written and spoken language.Not so. His claim is a logical or conceptual one. When Derrida uses the word 'writing,' he is

referring o the iterability f a sign both written and spoken and claiming that this iterability san essential feature of that sign. The claim that writing is prior to speech, amounts therefore, tothe claim that iterability is a necessary condition of both written and spoken language.

JThis is not to say that the notion of iterability is equivalent to a nominalist view. As I shall argue,the iterability of linguistic signs has some consequences for the nature of sign tokens which, to someextent, distance Derrida from classical nominalism. Thus, while

iterabilityentails nominalism, it is

not clear, to me at least, that the converse entailment holds.

*Thus, Derrida would reject all property-exemplification accounts of particulars. An example of thesewould be Jaegwon Kim's view of events as exemplifications of properties by objects at times. SeeBrand & Walton, 1976. Derrida would regard this sort of approach to particulars as an example ofan error which he calls the metaphysics of presence.

5That is to say, Derrida can be seen as providing us with a less misleading account of the identity of

linguistic signs. He also, in effect, provides us with a less misleading account of intention. Thisstrategy

?distinctly anti-revisionistic in character

?corresponds to the dimension of deconstruction

which Derrida terms mimesis. This connects up with Derrida's claim that deconstruction ...ne veutrien dire. The comparison between this sort of anti-revisionism and Wittgenstein's claim that

philosophy ...leaves everything as it is is, in my view, worth pursuing. (In fact, I do pursue thisview in my Leave the Bloody Thing Alone: Wittgenstein and Deconstruction, in progress.)

^he example is inspired byMalcolm, pp. 133-158,pp. 146-47. I have spiced the examples up a little,with just a hint of sex and violence.

7Two notes are in order here to avoid besmirching my hitherto unsullied image. Firstly, my wifewould like me to point out that I do not, in fact, have a mistress. And I would like to point out thatI never get irritated if my wife interrupts my work. Not me.

*I shall assume, I think with some foundation, that Wittgenstein used these notions interchangeably.

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Wittgenstein and Derrida On Meaning