WINNING WITH AUSTRALIAN AIR POWER ..

IN DIVERSE CULTURES

Relating National Culture to Air Power voctrffm& Interoperability and Effects-Based Operations

Relating National Culture to Air Power Doctrine, Interoperability and Effects-Based Operations

DAVID JEFFCOAT

2003 CAF AEROSPACE FELLOW

AEROSPACE CENTRE RAAF BASE FAIRBAIRN

O Copyright Commonwealth of Australia 2004

This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without permission from the publisher.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this work are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defence, the Royal Australian Air Force or the Government of Australia. This document is approved for public release; distribution unlimited. Portions of this document may be quoted or reproduced without permission, provided a standard source credit is included.

National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry

Jeffcoat, David Winning with Australian air power in diverse cultures: relating national culture to air power doctrine, interoperability and effects-based operations.

Bibliography ISBN 0642 26589 5

1. Air power. 2. Air power - Australia. 3. Air power - Indonesia. 4. Air warfare. I. Australia. Royal Australian Air Force. Aerospace Centre. 11. Title.

Published and distributed by:

Air Power Development Centre Churches Centre Tuggeranong ACT 2904 Australia

Tel: (02) 6287 6563 Fax: (02) 6287 6382 E-mail: airpower@defence.gov.au

The Aerospace Centre, formerly !mown as the Air Power Studies Centre, was established by the Royal Australian Air Force at its Fairbairn Base in August 1989 at the direction of the Chief of Air Force. Its function is to promote a greater understanding of the proper application of air power within the Australian Defence Force and in the wider community. This is being achieved through a variety of methods including development and revision of doctrine, the incorporation of that doctrine into all levels of RAAF training, and increasing the level of air power awareness across the broadest possible spectrum. As of 1 January 2004, the Aerospace Centre was renamed the Air Power Development Centre. The move away from the tern 'aerospace' was directed by CAF, and acknowledges that the main focus of the RAAF is on the provision of air power rather than space power. Comment on this publication or enquiry on any other air power related topic is welcome and should be forwarded to:

The Director Air Power Development Centre Churches Centre Tuggeranong ACT 2904 Australia

Telephone: +61 2 6287 6563 Facsimile: +61 2 6287 6382 E-mail: airpower@defence.gov.au

David Jeffcoat joined the Royal Australian Air Force in 1977 as an Engine Fitter before transferring to the Officer Corps and graduating in 1981 as a Navigator. Initially serving on the P-3B Orion, he later converted to the P-3C Orion on all sensor and navigation stations, culminating in the position of Tactical Coordinator. Ten years of operations and exercises throughout Australia, South-East Asia, South-West Pacific, Canada and the US with No 92 Wing was briefly interrupted with a short posting to Canberra. His final appointment at No 92 Wing was as Flight Commander on No 10 Squadron. He was then posted to an Electronic Warfare staff position in Headquarters Air Command. After two brief postings in Canberra in Headquarters and Public Affairs, he was selected to attend the Indonesian Air Force Command and Staff College (SESKOAU) in Lemhang, Indonesia. Upon graduation from Class 37 of SESKOAU in 2001, he was posted to Headquarters Northern Command in the plans area. In 2002, he was selected as the 2003 Chief of Air Force Aerospace Fellow to study cultural influences on air power. From January 2004 he will be the Commanding Officer of No 27 Squadron. David Jeffcoat is an Indonesian linguist who has a Masters in Business Administration through the University of New England, and is currently studying for a Master of Defence Studies through the University of New South Wales.

Some references used in this paper are only available in the Indonesian language. The author has done the translations where this is the case. The main translation reference used by the author was Echols, J.M. & Shadily, H. (eds.), Karnus Indonesia Inggris An Indonesian-English Dictionaly, Edisi Ketiga 31d Edition, PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta, 1997. The author has the following language qualifications:

Advanced Diploma of Indonesian Language, issued 29 January 2003; ADF Indonesian linguist rated at 2+ (intermediate) on the ADF Language Proficiency Rating Scale for speaking, listening, reading, writing and interpreting, as tested on 20 August 2002; and Graduate of the Indonesian Air Force Command and Staff Course in May 2001.

I thank the staff of the RAAF Aerospace Centre under the leadership of Group Captain Ric Casagrande and the visiting fellows from the Philippine Air Force for their assistance and support in the production of this paper. Particular thanks go to Mr Sanu Kainikara and Professor John McCarthy for their gentle criticism and guidance throughout my time as the 2003 CAF Aerospace Fellow. I am also gratell to Mrs Suzanne Fewell from DSTO for her discussions on interoperability maturity models. For her constant support and encouragement in this and all my other endeavours, I give special thanks to my wife, Leeanne.

The painting depicted on the front cover is by Colonel Xing Jun-Qin of the People's Liberation Army and is titled The ColourJirl Clouds (Cai Yun). The artist has granted the RAAF Aerospace Centre permission to use an image of his artwork on the cover of this book. The artist has described this work by stating '...while the painting is about a military aircraft, the theme is a desire for peace. As the body of the aircraft reflects the landscape on the ground, the people who operate the military tools must bear in mind their motherland and its well being.' The original of this painting is hanging in the librav of the Australian Defence Force Academy.

About the Author

Author's Note

Acknowledgments

List of Figures and Tables

Structure of Paper

Air Power Doctrine

National Air Power Doctrine Australia Bangladesh Britain Canada India Indonesia Philippines

Air Power Doctrine and National Financial Wealth

Influences on Air Power Doctrine

Cultural Influences Deriving Different Lessons from the Same Conflict

The Case For and Against Culture Influencing Military Behaviour

CHAPTER 2 - STRATEGIC THOUGHT, AVIATION AND CULTURE

Strategic Thought, Culturalists and Realists

Culturalists

Strategic Culture

Six Reasons in Support of Strategic Culture

Statist Military Logic and National Strategic Traditions

A Framework for Analysing Strategic Culture

A Framework of Strategic Culture Geography History Political Culture

Aviation Culture

The Substitution Debate

Airmindedness and Aviation Culture

Aviation Culture and the Development of Air Forces Development of the Luftvvaffe Development of the USAF Development of the Soviet Air Force Development of the Communist Chinese Air Force

A Framework of Aviation Culture Geography History of Aviation Education Aviation Services Aviation Industry

CHAPTER 3 -LINKING CULTURE AND AIR POWER DOCTRINE

Doctrine's Political Dimension and Culture

Stephens' Approach Terminology National Security Policy Economic Constraints and Resources for Defence Support for Local Industly Inter-Service Rivalry Enduring Principles, Lessons Learned from Past Conflicts and National Interpretation of History

Boyne's Approach Air Force Budgets Perception of Major Threats Level of Aviation Technology National Politics Influential Individuals

Current Doctrine

Linking National Culture and National Air Power Doctrine

Air Power Doctrine Drivers Dominant Air Power Roles Support to National Development Influence of Land and Sea-Based Forces Non-state Influences

Sumnary

CHAPTER 4 - CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON AIR FORCE COALITION OPERATIONS AND EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS

The Australian Approach to Warfare

Winning the Peace Indonesia Singapore Thailand

Pressuring the Adversary's Will and Manoeuvre Warfare

Concept of Coalition Operations

Cultural Influences

Nations Selected

Interoperability

Network-Centric Warfare Organisational Interoperability Maturity Model

Applying the OIMM to Coalition Operations A Maturity Model Interoperability Between Organisations Availability of Input Data

National Culture Data Hofstede's Dimensions of National Culture

Applicability of Hofstede's Dimensions to Selected Air Forces NATO Student Officers Senior NATO Defence College Major Aircraft Accidents in NATO Air Forces Large Passenger Aircraft Accidents Commercial Airline Pilots

The Air Force Coalition Interoperability Model Enabling Attributes in the AFCIM OIMM Versus AFCIM

Effects-Based Operations

Australia and EBO

National Culture and EBO

Targeting and EBO Value Based Targeting

Applying the Model to an EBO National Values Original Behaviour and Outcome Target Value Sets Desired Behaviour and Outcome

Summary

vii

CHAPTER 5 - CASE STUDY - REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Republic of Indonesia

Strategic Culture

Geography Geographical Aspects of Indonesia's Strategic Culture

History Dutch Occupation Japanese Occupation Allied Occupation and the Strnggle for Independence Independence, External and Internal Conflicts Post-1965 Historical Aspects of Indonesia's Strategic Culture

Political Culture National Identity Identification with One's Fellow Citizens Governmental Output Process of Making Decisions Political Aspects of Indonesia's Strategic Culture

Aviation Culture

Geography

History of Aviation Aviation in the Stmggle for Independence AURI and President Sukarno TNI-AU

Education

Aviation Services International Airline Travel

Aviation Industry

Air Power Doctrine Drivers of Indonesia

Indonesia's Strategic Culture

Indonesia's Aviation Culture

Air Power Doctrine Drivers Dominant Air Power Role Support to National Development Influence of Land and Sea-Based Forces Non-state Influences

Basic Doctrine of TNI-AU Basic Functions of TNI-AU Doctrine and Stated Capabilities of TNI-AU

Summary

CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION

Case Study - Republic of Indonesia

APPENDIXES

A Fundamental Principles of Air Power from Five Nations

B Organisational Interoperability Maturity Model

C National Scores for Power Distance

D National Scores for Individualism Collectivism

E Culture and Coalition Operation Interaction Model

F Air Force Coalition Interoperability Model

G Map of Indonesia

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURES

2.1 Model ofNational and Strategic Culture

2.2 Model of National, Strategic and Aviation Cultures

3.1 Culture and Air Power Doctrine Interaction Model

4.1 Culture EBO Targeting Interaction Model

5.1 Airline International Passenger and Freight Loads for Year 2000

Appendix B DSTO Organisational Interoperability Maturity Model

Appendix E Culture and Coalition Operation Interaction Model

Appendix F Air Force Coalition Interoperability Model

Appendix G Map of Indonesia

T~BLES

Appendix A Fundamental Principles of Air Power from Five Nations

Appendix C National Scores for Power Distance

Appendix D National Scores for Individualism Collectivism

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

To participate in, or to lead, a coalition, Australia requires detailed knowledge of coalition partners, including their military affairs and language, politics and culture.

The Australian Approach to parfare'

In an Effects-Based Operation ... the ADP will need to develop a more sophisticated understanding, among a wider range of people, of the structures and culture of other countries.

Force 202d

Whether fighting with them or against them we must know and understand them. This is a constant theme in both The Australian Approach to Warfare andForce 2020. The requirement to know your enemy has been a perennial exhortation by militav strategists for centuries, from Sun Tzu onward^.^ Knowing your coalition partners and your adversruy requires more than just information about their equipment or troop numbers. Knowing them also implies knowledge of how they behave, their beliefs, their values-their culture. But the all-encompassing nature of culture and its varied definitions demands that any analysis of culture be undertaken within clearly defined boundaries using paradigms with strong intellectual foundation^.^ Without clear boundaries an analysis of culture could include everything and thus reveal nothing.' There already exists a significant body of literature, expertise and sound theories concerning the culture of groups of people and how an understanding of culture can shed light on the type of decisions they generally make.6 This body of knowledge has the potential to assist airmen, particularly at the strategic level.

' Departmenl of Defence, The Ausnalion Approach to Warfare, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2002, p. 25. Department of Defence, Force 2020, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2002, p. 22. S. Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Tholnas Clealy, Sharnbhala, Boston, 1988, p. 82. h. Desch, 'Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies', in Znternotionol

Seczlrip, Vol. 23, No. I , Centre for Science and International Affairs, Hmard University, Cambridge, Summer 1998, pp. 150-152.

* ibid.

Boston, 1995: A. Bozeman. Strategic InteNi~ence & Stotecrali SelededEssav.~. Brassev's (US) G. " , ~, , ~ , , New York, 1992; A.1. Johnston, 'Thinking About Strategic Culture', in International Securip, Vol. 19, No. 4, Centre for Science and International Affairs, Spring 1995, Harvard University, Cambridge, pp. 32-64; M. Thompson, R. Ellis & A. Wildavsky, Cultural Theory, Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, 1990; P. Bebutawski, 'Strategic Implications of Cultures in Conflict', in Parameters. US A m y War College Quarterly, Spring, 1996; K. Crider, Strategic Implicafions of Culture: Historical Analysis of China's Culture and Implications for United States Policy, Air Command and Staff College Wright Flyer, Paper No. 8, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama,

Winning Wifh Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

STRUCTURE OF PAPER

This paper will examine how national culture influences air power doctrine and how this understanding can be applied in both coalition operations and operations against an adversary. Applicable aspects of national culture will be identified and explained. Linkages between national culture and national air power doctrine will also be identified and explained. The conceptual models derived from these explanations will be applied in the area of interoperability between air forces in coalition operations and Effects-Based Operations (EBO). The frameworks identified for analysing national culture and national air power doctrine are then applied in a case study of the Republic of Indonesia.

AIR POWER DOCTRINE

All aircraft operate according to a set of laws. The rules of flight, propulsion, sensors and weapons are universal and fixed, no matter where the aircraft is designed, manufactured, repaired, operated, or who does these tasks. However, the principles that guide the way aircraft are used and how they will be used are not in accordance with universal rules. Indeed, the inherent flexibility of aircraft almost defies any attempt to formulate rules on how they should be used. Nevertheless, it does seem the fundamental principle that guides the use of military aircraft in air forces or air corps is the defence of national interests.' National interests may be political, territorial, militav, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, or any other interest or combination of interests a nation may wish to define. Actions to defend these interests may include developing an indigenous aviation industry; conducting strategic offensive action within or outside a nation's borders; supporting the army, navy, police or paramilitary forces; disaster relief; development of airspace and aviation infrastructure; transporting civilian passengers or cargo; supporting another nation or organisation; conducting surveillance or reconnaissance; a combination of any of these; or numerous other tasks that aircraft and their supporting organisations are capable of. A more precise statement of the fundamental principles that guide an air force can therefore only be articulated by referring to the nation it sewes.

NATION^^. AIR POWER DOCTRINE

The fundamental set of principles that guide air forces is broadly called air power doctrine.' This doctrine may be explicit and published as official air force policy or implicit. Implicit air power doctrine may only exist within the inarticulated thinking of the head of the air force, only becoming evident in major decisions taken on his or her authority. Either way, all major decisions concerning the development, sustainment and operation of an air force are made based on a set of fundamental principles unique to that nation.

September 1999, http://research.au.af.mil/js/paperddisplayahstract,sp?guidlis=2O8, accessed 24 January 2003. ' The general term 'air force' will he used throughout this paper to refer to organisations that operate military aircraft. Also called aerospace power doctrine or aerospace doctrine.

Mackenzie contends that 'doctrine that is not widely disseminated is pointless', while Buachuen commenting on his own Royal Thai Air Force doctrine argues it is currently invalid in part because it is classified and not widely di~seminated.~ From 1921 to 1991, the RAAF did not have explicit air power doctrine that was either officially endorsed or locally sourced. From 1957 to 1984, the British manual titled Operations was used. However, the diaries of Air Vice-Marshal H.N. Wrigley, spaning the period 1915 to 1928, indicate that even before the R A M was formed in 1921, senior Australian airmen had sound appreciation of the central concepts and operational practices of air warfare as it then existed.''

The following provides a brief summary of the national air power doctrine of seven nations to illustrate the diversity within air power doctrines:

Australia

The RAAF defines aerospace power as 'the ability to project military force in the third dimension by or from a platform above the surface of the earth'. Emphasis is placed on aerospace power forming a 'fundamental part of the overall national power capability for Australia'. Those capabilities provided by Australian aerospace power include maintaining control of the air, contributing to the overall control of information, and supporting 'the Anny and Navy in control of the land and sea and in wider joint operations'."

Bangladesh

The air power doctrine of the Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) is based on total defence of the airspace and preserving its defensive forces. Two principle tasks of the BAF are to counter the enemy air threat using both active and passive defence, and supporting land and maritime based forces.''

Britain

The Royal Air Force (RAF) defines air power as 'the ability to project military force in air or space by or from a platform or missile operating above the surface of the earth. Air platforms are defmed as aircraft, helicopter or unmanned air vehicle'. The core capabilities of British air power are information exploitation, control of the air, strategic effect, joint force employment, combat support air operations, force protection and sustainability.')

S. Mackenzie, Strategic Air Power Dochine for Small Air Forces, Air Power Studies Centre, Depdment of Defence, Canberra, 1994, p. 9; S. Buachuen, TkeRoyal Thoi Air Force Doctrine and Its P~oblems, unpublished presentation to the Aerospace Centre on 25 September 2002, pp. 2,4.

' O A. Stephens & B. O'Laghlin (eds.), The Decisive Factor: Air Power Doctrine by Air Vice-Marshal X N Wrigley, AGPS, Canberra, 1990, p. xiii.

" Royal Australian Air Farce. Fundamenfah o f Australian Aerosoace Power. Aeros~ace Centre. ~e ia rbnen t of Defence, ~anberra, 2002, pp. 3,'18, 155.

I* S. Hussain & A.E. Uddin, 'Conceptualisation of Air Power Within South Asian Military Doctrines (A Bangladeshi Perspective)', in Proceedings of Seminar on Air Powev, held at Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, unpublished, undated, held in AeC 12011711712/P3, p. 25.

" Directorate of Air Staff, AP 3000 British Air Power Doctrine. 3" Edition. Ministry of Defence. Norwich, 1999,pp. 1.2.1, 1.2.16, 1.2.17.

Winning With Australian Air Powev in Diverse Culfures

Canada

The Canadian Forces (CF) recognises aerospace power as one of the three components of national military power. Aerospace power is considered by the CF as 'the capability to use platforms for military purposes operating in, or passing through the aerospace'. Applications of aerospace power are divided into peacetime and wartime applications. Peacetime applications include deter aggression, support, sustain life, and observe andlor verify. Wartime applications include respond to escalation, deny, destroy, dislocate, divert, delay, observe, and demoralisation.14

India

The Indian Air Force (IAF) defines air power as 'the ability of a nation to assert its will through the dimension of the air'. The application of IAF air power is categorised according to the security situation of peace, crisis or war as fo~lows:'~

In peacetime, air power is applied through preserving peace, disaster relief, sustaining ground forces and sustaining civil populations in inhospitable terrain.

Air power is applied through deterrence, political signalling, punitive air strikes, supporting friendly foreign governments, and evacuation of Indians from crisis zones in crisis situations.

In war, it is applied through reconnaissance, destruction, denial, diversion, delay and demoralisation.16

Indonesia

The Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU - Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Udara) defines air power as the ability of a country to use vehicles that operate in or through the air, including space, to safeguard national interests.I7 The required capability of Indonesian air power is divided into a prosperity function and a defence and security function. The prosperity function includes air transport services, search and rescue, flight safety and weather, and industry and aerospace services; while the security and defence functions are described as an ability to overcome on land, sea and air, and includes basic, special and support capabilities.18

Philippines

The Philippine Air Force (PAF) defines air power as 'the ability to project military forces in the third dimension-which includes the environment of s p a c e b y or from a platform above the surface of the earth'. The PAF categorises its air power roles by relating them to peace, crisis and war. These roles are as follows:

'"ational Defence, Out of the Sun: Aerospace Doctvine for the Canadian Forces (B-GA-400- 0001AF-OOO), ht~:llwww.airforce.forces.gc.cailibrad0~~lIibrary5~e.htm, pp. 6 , 9-12, accessed 10 March 2003.

l 5 Air HQ, Doctrine of the Indian Air Force IAP 2000, War Strategy Cell, Air HQ, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 28, 35. ibid., pp. 3540 . '' K. Kardi, 'Air Power Sebagai Kekuatan Militer (Combat Power)', in K. Kardi &H. Subroto (eds.), Air Power Kekuatan Udara, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 2000, p. 233.

18 P.S. Muljono, 'ProFessional Mastery: The View of Indonesian Air Power', in K. Brent (ed.), Regional Air Power Workrhop RAAF Edinbuugh, 6-8 October 1998, Air Power Studies Centre, Department of Defence, Canbeira, 1999, p. 179.

Introduction

Promoting international relations and providing reassurance are peacetime roles.

Crisis roles include 'deterrence, warning, signalling, supporting friends, international rescue, inject stability, non-lethal coercion, punishment'.

Wartime roles are 'observation, destruction, lethal coercion, denial, dislocation, delay, diversion, demorali~ation'.'~

A cursory analysis of these summaries of national air power doctrines may conclude national financial wealth is the most significant determinant of air power doctrine. This view is rejected. National wealth is one of many factors influencing national air power doctrine. The more significant cultural factors influencing national air power doctrine will be discussed later in this paper. For now, a brief comparison between the air power doctrines of two nations with similar levels of national wealth-Australia and Canada-illustrates national financial wealth is not the most dominant infl~ence.~'

The most notable differences between Australian and Canadian air power doctrines are in the areas of application of air power, defence against ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons. In Canadian doctrine, the application of aerospace power is divided into peacetime and wartime applications, while emphasising that aerospace power can he an instrument for both 'preserving peace and managing cr is i~ ' .~ ' Australian doctrine makes no distinction between peacetime and wartime applications when listing aerospace power capabilities and roles. Peace building, enforcement, peacekeeping and operations other than war are briefly referred to in Australian aerospace power doctrine, but only in the context of the spectrum of conflict and the demands these operations place on people.22 Strategic aerospace defence operations are given significant prominence in Canadian doctrine, whereas there is scant mention of either ballistic missiles or their defence in Australian doctrine. Canadian doctrine defines strategic aerospace operations to 'include all measures which are designed to nullify or reduce the effects of aerospace attacks on a nation's heartland and power base'.23 Six pages are devoted to this subject in the Canadian publication. Inter- continental ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles, among others, are identified as their primary aerospace threats. Australia's doctrine only refers to the communications and intelligence capabilities offered by space and a short summary of three space roles." Canadian doctrine has a page on nuclear operations whereas nuclear weapons are only mentioned as part of the evolution of air power in Australian d~ctrine.~' Australia's and Canada's differing geography, history and

19 Philippine Air Force, Air Power Manual (Condensedl, Office of Special Studies, Headquarters Philippine Air Force, Pasay City, undated, pp. 5, 7.

20 In 1999, Canada's GDP per capita was approximately US$23,300 while Australia's GDP per capita was approximately US$22,200 for the same year. Canada has a larger land area (9,976,140 sq km) and population (31.0 million) than Australia's (7,682,300 sq km and 18.8 million). See SBS World Guide, 9" Edition, Hardie Grant Books, South Yarra, 2001, pp. 41,48, 139, 143.

21 National Defence, Out of the Sun; Aerospace Docbine for the Canadian Forces, pp. 9-12. 22 RAAF, AAP 1000Fundumentals ofAusfralian AerospacePoweu, pp. 93,95,266,267. '' National Defence, Out of the Sun: Aerospace Docbine for the Canadian Forces, pp. 9-15. " RAAF, AAP IDDO Fundamentals ofAustra2ionAerospace Power, pp. 220-221. 21 National Defence, Out of the Sun: Aevospace Doctrine for the Canadian Forces, pp. 18-19; RAM,

AAP I000 Fundamentals ofAustralian AerospacePower, pp. 51-52.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

politics seem the more powerful explainers of the differences noted between the air power doctrines of these two nations.

INFLUENCES ON AIR POWER DOCTRINE

Doctrine captures the fundamental principles by which military forces or elements guide their actions in support of national objective^.'^ An organisation's doctrine often serves to define what it is that makes it different from other similar organisations. This was illustrated by the seven different national power doctrines summarised earlier. As an amalgam of teachings, principles and collective advice, all doctrine is influenced and often derived from a range of factors. Stephens argues that doctrine is derived from the 'lessons of the history of war; theory (which is the outcome of strategic thought); and demonstrated or desired technological improvement'.27 The most important factors influencing air power doctrine therefore seem to be strategic thought and aviation. Each of these factors has a host of other influences, but these two factors seem to best capture the most significant influences on air power doctrine. Often these influences are so embedded within the doctrine and accepted as given by the doctrine's authors they are invisible. But outside observers often need to understand them before they can fully understand the doctrine itself.28

The overall offensive strategy adopted in 1914 at the beginning of World War I was reflected in how at least Britain and Germany employed their respective air arms, though air power was considered irrelevant to strategic policy at the time.29 For example, in 1915 Trenchard, on assuming command of the Royal Flying Corps, ordered them to take the war over German positions as the German air force was now taking the war over England by conducting attacks on London using

Culture, as both professional norms and traditions, shapes preference formation by military organizations by telling organization members who they are and what is possible, and thereby suggesting what they should do. In this way, culture explains why military organizations choose the structures and strategies they do, and thus how states generate military power.

Theo ~ a r r e l l ~ '

26 A. Delbridge, & J.R.L. Bemard (eds.), The Macquarie Concise Dietionay, 3" Edition, The Macquarie Library, Macquarie University, 1998, p. 22.

'' A. Stephens, In Seuvch of the Knock-Out Blow: The Development of Air Power Doctrine 1911-1945, Paper No. 61, Air Power Studies Centre, Department of Defence, Canberra, February 1998. DD. 1-2.

' 2 .

ibid., p. 8. " P. Rixon, 'The Develovment of Air Doctrine During the War', in K. Brent (ed.), A Chapter of Endless Possibilities: The Birth ofAustralian MilitaG Aviation, Aerospace Centre, ~epartmcnt of Defence, Canberra, 2001, p. 30.

'"bid., pp. 4649; H. Higham, Air Power A Concise History, St Martins, New York, 1972, p. 55. " T. Farrell, 'Culture and Military Power', in Review of Ixternntional Studies, British International

Studies Association, 1998, p. 416.

Introduction

Australian air power doctrine argues an important component of doctrine is culture, and without an understanding of the relevant culture it is difficult to fully understand the doctrine or why a particular set of fundamental principles were chosen over another.32 Different lessons from history can be gleaned from viewing the same conflicts through the eyes of different cultures. Different cultures have differing perceptions of what militaty forces should and should not do. Different cultures place different values on what is important in an air campaign. Nations adopt differing national security strategies. In short, while humans continue to make decisions regarding air power and strategy, the cultural dimension of humans-that is, their 'values, attitudes, beliefs, orientations and underlying assumptions'-will continue to impact on every air power doctrine influence.33 The study of culture is not a science, however, and does not offer itself to easy interpretation. These apparent differences must also be reconciled with the universal physiolo ical sciences by which every human body functions, no matter its origin or culture. 3 f

Deriving Different Lessons from the Same Conflict

Chinese and Australian air power theorists and militaty strategists derived lessons from Operation Allied Force that were hoth similar and different.35 In general, Australian commentators focused their lessons learnt from NATO forces that applied the air power, while Chinese commentators seemed to derive their lessons learnt from hoth NATO and the ~ugoslavs. '~ Both Australian and Chinese commentators highlighted the predictable nature of a US dominated air campaign and the US' overwhelming superiority in precision-guided stand-off munitions, space-based information systems, and electronic warfare as demonstrated in Operation Allied ~ o r c e . ) ~ The lesson Australian commentators derived from these observations was speculation of how a less capable air force could be truly interoperable with US aerospace forces.38 In contrast, Chinese commentators highlighted the requirement for China to close the technology gap between Chinese and American weapons, increase their expertise in science and technology, and develop their own asymmetric combat theory and tactics able to counter US aerospace power?9 ~ 0 t h commentators recognised the importance placed by NATO on avoiding own casualties, though differed on collateral effects of the bombing campaign.40 Chinese commentators asserted that many non-military targets-such as homes, schools and hospitals, including their embassy-were bombed as part of a deliberate psychological

" M E , AAP l000 Fundamentals ofAustralian Aerospace Power, pp. 10-1 1. S.P. Huntington, Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, Basic Books, 2000, p. xv.

j4 C. Geertz, Thehterpretation of Cuhuues, Harper, New York, 1974, p. 22. '' J.D. Peny, 'Operation Allied Force: The View from Beijing', in Aerospace Power Journal,

Summer 2000, Air University, l~ttp:llwww.alrpowe~.maxwell.af.miWairchronicles/~pjl~pjOOlsumOOl perry.htm, accessed 28 January 2003; A. Stephens, Kosovo, Or the Future of War, Paper No. 77, Air Power Studies Centre, Department of Defence, Canberra, August 1999; K. Cochrane, Kosovo Targeting. A Buveaucratie and Legal Nightmare: The Implications for US/Australian Interoperabiliv, Paper No. 3 , Aerospace Centre, Department of Defence, Canberra, June 2001; RAAF, AAP lOOOFundamentals ofAustralian AerospacePoweu, pp. 58, 99,208. Perry, 'Operation Allied Force: The View from Beijing', p. 8.

37 Stephens, Kosovo, Or the Future of War, pp. 12-15; Perry, 'Operation Allied Force: The View from Beijing', pp. 3-5. Stephens, Kosovo, Or the Future of War, pp. 14-15.

" Peny, 'Operation Allied Force: The View fmm Beijing', pp. 4-5. 40 Stephens, Kosovo, Or the Future of War, p. 10; Peny, 'Operation Allied Force: The View from

Beijing', p. 6.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

operation!' Australian commentators highlighted both the precision of the bombing campaign and industrial targets struck by NATO forces as a deliberate and valid part of a psychological warfare Australian commentary on the hitting of non- military targets by NATO forces acknowledged such attacks were made, but focused on the legal dimensions of the targeting-though many were mistakes, such as the Chinese Embassy, in the context of USIAustralian legal i n t e r ~ ~ e r a b i l i t ~ . ~ ~ Overall, Australian air power lessons derived from Operation Allied Force concentrated on the problems of maintaining operational and legal interoperability with US aerospace forces.44 Chinese air force commentators, however, concentrated on the need to improve their ground-based air defence network, networking their command system and emulating the success of Yugoslav forces in mobility, camouflage and deception.45

THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST CULTURE INFLUENCING MILITARY BEHAVIOUR

Attributing a particular 'way in warfare' to a state or group of states has been a recurrent theme in strategic studies and military history, but there is little consensus amongst scholars in security studies of the true influence of culture in its broadest sense on military behavi0ur.4~ For example, Rosen supports the view that culture does not affect military behaviour. He highlights a series of studies concerning apparent differences of military behaviour between American forces and the Japanese during World War 11, apparent differences between Chinese and European classical militaly thought as portrayed by Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, and apparent differing attitudes to war and casualties between Americans and Asians. After World War 11, analysis of Japanese and American war plaming suggested that American and Japanese leaders did exhibit real cultural differences, but at the same time each leader could accurately emulate the actions of the other when they chose to think and act like them. In the comparative analysis of Sun Tzu's Art of War and Clausewitz On War, obsemed differences were concluded to relate more to the fact that 'Clausewitz focused on fighting battles and military campaigns while Sun Tzu was more concerned with strategic problems of national level leadership.' Where there did seem to he a distinctive Chinese way of thinking, analysis showed American civil war commanders who did not have access to Sun Tm's writings exhibited similar styles of thinking. The apparent disregard of own casualties by the Japanese during World War I1 and by the Chinese in their human wave attacks during the Korean War raised questions as to apparent Asian indifferences towards human life. This needs to be compared with the huge losses of troops by European armies in World War 1 and by American military units in the Civil War conducting what could be interpreted as human wave attacks. Rosen therefore contends it is difficult to argue there were real differences between

Peny, 'Operation Allied Force: The View f o m Beijing', pp. G 8 . '' Stephens, Kosovo, Or the Future of War, p. 10; RAAF, AAP 1000 Fundamentals of Australian

Aerospace Power, pp. 207-208. " Cochrane, Kosouo Targeting, A Bureuucratic andLegal Nightmare, pp. 1&20. 44 Stephens, Kosovo, Or theFuture of War, p. 21, Cochrane, Kosovo Targeting, p. 19. 45 Peny, 'Operation Allied Force: The View from Beijing', pp. 8-9. 46 K. Booth and R. Trood (eds.), Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, Macmillan Press

Limited, London, 1999, p. 5; for a British way of warfare see B. Liddell Hart, The British W q in Wafare, Adaptability and Mobility, Penguin, Hamondsworth, 1935; D. French, The British Way in Wa@re 1688-2000, Unwin Hyman, London 1990; for a Soviet way of warfare see W. Baxter, The Soviet Way of Warfare, Brasseys, London, 1986; and for an Arab way of warfare see K.M. Pollack, Arabs at War, Milita,y Efiectiveness 1948-1991, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2002.

Introduction

each protagonist's relative attitude to human life in ~a r t imz .~ ' These studies show few differences in military behaviour based on national culture.

In contrast, Bozeman argues that non-Western and communist societies do have different ways of thinking about conflict. Bozeman identifies the 'irreducible substance' of the West as classical Greek thought, Roman jurisprudence and Christianity; then goes on to argue that because of this non-westem societies value the individual differently, view political organisations differently and have sacred texts that seem to accept the inevitability of conflict. Concepts of peace, war, diplomacy and conflict resolution seem to be accepted as universal truths, whereas the historical evidence suggests these are concepts foreign to at least the traditional societies of Africa and Asia. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Bozeman argues that death is not personalised, war was endemic in all areas, and war ensured the continuous identity of tribes. The holy texts of the Jews and Arabs that are generally taken for their literal meaning by their followers seem to exhort the chosen ones to 'cast out, smite, utterly destroy and extirpate the many "others"'. Indian society's similarity to the Mahabharata society suggests that winning is everything in foreign relations and that recourse to the rod of punishment for governing men is acceptable. Bozeman goes on to argue that Chinese society accepts the idea of war as a necessary part of government and, like the traditional game of wei-ch'i, conflict is a protracted series of battles across many dimensions over long periods of time. For South-East Asian societies, Bozeman argues rulers depended for their power not on secure borders or material powers, but rather on their compliance with cosmological constitutions and significant royal regalia, for which it was acceptable that other leadership contenders, by acts of cunning or violence, could seize thus transferring authority to them. Early occupations by the Indians and Chinese in South-East Asia also influenced how some of these societies viewed conflict.48 In a similar vein, Huntington suggests that understanding modem conflict within a paradigm of a clash between groups of differing cultures, or civilisations, is more successful than using other paradigms not based on culture. In particular, he notes that 'Slightly less than half of the forty eight ethnic conflicts in the world in early 1993, for example, were between groups from different civilisation^.'^^ ~ 0 t h Huntington and Bozeman seem to conclude that national culture is a significant factor in identifying differences in behaviour associated with conflict and security.

This paper will avoid these differing views of the influence of culture by focusing subsequent discussion on narrow, clearly defined aspects of national culture using widely accepted concepts and theories. Criticisms of the selected concepts and theories will be highlighted to ensure the reader is aware of the differing views.

" Rosen, 'Military Effectiveness: Why Society Mallers', pp. 8-1 1. 48 Bozeman, Strategic Intelligence & Sfafecuaft, pp. 10-12, 53, 58-62, 64-66, 67-13. 49 S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, The Free Press,

Sydney, 2002, pp. 36-39.

~-p-~-~-~~~-~- ~~ ~ -. -~ ~~ ---~-p~~~-~- ~ ~ ~ ~ - ~~ ~~ ~~ l / ~ - - _ _ _

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

CHAPTER 2

STRATEGIC THOUGHT, AVIATION AND CULTURE

Wars are not tactical exercises writ large.. . they are... conflicts of societies, and they can be fnlly understood only if one understands the nature of the society fighting them.

Michael ~ o w a r d '

Strategic thought and aviation have been identified as two important factors influencing air power doctrine. Each of these factors will be further analysed to identify the cultural influences that impinge on them. Theories and paradigms from the field of security studies will be investigated to determine those most suitable to further develop the concept of how culture influences strategic thought, and thus air power doctrine. A paradigm to investigate cultural influences on aviation will then be presented and explained.

STRATEGIC THOUGHT, CULTURALISTS AND REALISTS

In the arena of security studies there are many competing theories on why nations adopt various strategies that form the basis of their strategic thoughts. These theories can be grouped under the broad headings of realism, liberalism and cnltura~.~ Realist theories include balance of power and security dilemma; liberalisms include theories such as collective security, democratic peace thesis and human security; whilst cultural theories include organisational culture, organisational structure and strategic cu~ture.~ The most dominant of these theories are those grouped under the realist heading.4 Realist theories emphasise factors such as the material balance of power, whilst postulating there is an unrelenting competition among nations for power and ~ecuri ty .~ These theories contend nations are primarily concerned with maximising their utility, that is their power, within the confines of their geography and capability, whilst refraining from actions that threaten their ~urvival .~ Implicit in realist theories is that all strategic decision-makers are rational actors who will act in a similar way, no matter their background or beliefs. The deployment of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union and US, along with their accompanying strategies, suggested to many practitioners that both nations were making similar choices on the threat or use of force. The end of the Cold War caused a reassessment of these generalist theories and

I M. Howard, 'The Use and Abuse of Military Histoly', in Parameters; US Army War College Quarterly, March 1981, p. 14. A. Berpin, School ofPolitics 2003 Semester I Global Securih, APOL 7307: A Guide For Students. ~niver i i ty ~ a l l e g e , ~ ~ u s h a l i a n Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 2003.

' ibid., pp. 7-32. Farrell. 'Cullure and Militam Power'. D. 407. h . u l r l . I , I : I i 11 l . I S . I p p . 141. 14,

' l n l . c ~ ~ t ~ r ~ . ' l l ) ! r~L~n$ \b.~.r SII.KC,.!K Lolt-I:'. 1,. 35 .

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

a resurgent interest in more culturally based explanations of strategic beha~iour .~ Generally these cultural theories implied or asserted that 'different states have predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experience of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the hilosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites'.

CULTURALISTS

Practitioners of these cultural theories were called culturalists to distinguish them from realists. Critics of these cultural theories highlighted the imprecise nature of culture and thus the difficulty of testing the theory's applicability across a range of variables. Theories that are unable to predict outcomes in a range of conditions were claimed to be of limited value to either policymakers or critics seeking to test the validity of such theories.' After comparing and contrasting a wide range of cases involving the use of force by nations, Desch concluded it was difficult to identify cases where the culturalists were able to provide superior explanations to the realists. Despite this he did not advocate a rejection of all cultural theories, but rather a guarded acceptance of them balanced by the theories of realism." Perhaps the most damaging argument against the use of cultural theories to explain strategic choices made by nations is while distinctive national cultures may exist, they may not have any measurable effect on behaviour. Also, any influence culture has on behaviour may he confined to decisions at the national, not the international level where other factors may he more dominant. After highlighting these concerns, Johnston concluded that done well, cultural analysis can 'help policymakers establish more accurate and emphatic understandings of how different actors perceived the game being played, reducing uncertainty and other information problems in strategic choice'." Theories explaining nations' behaviours based on their general cultural alignment are gaining respect, such as Huntington's Clash of Civilisations. Their usefulness in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of a nation over a period of time seems also to be accepted."

For example, Legro argues only a culturally based theoly could correctly predict the different emphasis placed on strategic bombing by Britain and Germany during World War 11. Germany did not develop the expertise, equipment or doctrine to conduct long-range bombing campaigns, though the Lufhyaffe was an independent air force like the RAF. Instead, emphasis was placed on supporting the land forces even after their principle target, France, was defeated. In contrast, there was a strong RAF culture of strategic bombing developing in the interwar years, which influenced Churchill to order the one hundred bomber strike on Berlin the day after London was accidentally bombed by the Lufmaffe on 24 August 1940." Kier also supports the assertion that, compared to the British Army, the RAF had a strong culture focused

' Desch, 'Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies', pp. 145, 148. Johnston, 'Thinking About Strategic Culture', p. 34. ibid., p. 153.

'O Desch, 'Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies', pp. 141, 152-153, l<<-lh9 1711 . - . -,, . , -.

" Johnston, 'Thinking About Shalegic Culture', pp. 55, 64. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, p. 155.

" J.W. Legro, 'Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War 11', in International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 126-131.

Strategic Thought, Aviation and Culture

on combat operations during the interwar years. While British Army infantty manuals concentrated on drill, RAF training manuals concentrated on technical issues. Training in character was emphasised in established British Army colleges at the expense of professional studies on war fighting.I4 In contrast, Desch argues because the bomber offensive was the only way Britain could strike back at Germany before 1944, and Germany's geographical position demanded a land-based strategy, the differing emphasis on strategic bombing can also be adequately explained by reference to realist theories.''

STRATEGIC CULTURE

... in strategic culture one is 'discerning tendencies, not rigid determinants.'

Ken ~ 0 0 t h ' ~

Strategic culture now seems the most widely accepted cultural theoly in the security studies field.I7 It was f ~ s t used within the context of national security by Snyder in 1977 to explain Soviet and US predispositions towards the use of nuclear force.18

Strategic culture's basic assumption:

... is that there exists a distinctive and lasting set of belief, values and habits regarding the threat and use of force, which have their roots in such fundamental influences as geopolitical settings, history and political culture. These beliefs, values and assumptions constitute a strategic culture, which persists over time, and exeas some influences on formation and execution of strategy.19

Strategic culture can also be defined as:

... the fundamental and enduring assumptions about the role of war (both interstate and intrastate) in human affairs and the efficacy of applying force held by political and human elites in a ~ountry.~'

SIX REASONS IN SUPPORT OF STRATEGIC CULTURE

Perhaps the strongest proponent of strategic culture in the field of security studies is Booth, who argues strategic culture 'helps shape behaviour on such issues as the use

E. Kier, Imagining War French and British Military Dochine Between the W m , Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997, pp. 116-139.

l 5 Desch, 'Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies', pp. 159-160. 16 K. Booth, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed', in C. Jacobsen (ed.), Strategic Power:

USA/USSR, Macmillan, London, 1990, p. 127. l7 Johnstan, 'Thinking About Strategic Culh~e ' , p. 32.

J. Snyder, The Soviet Slvalegic Culture: Implications for LimitedNuclear Operations, R-1254-AF, Rand Santa Monica, 1977.

l9 Booth & Trood (eds.), Strategic Culfures in the Asia-Pacific Region, p. 8. " A. Scobell, 'China and Strategic Culture', in Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, May 2002,

hnp://ww.carlisie.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2OO2/~u1t~re/~~1~~e.htm, accessed 25 January 2003, p. 2.

Winning With Austraiinil Air. Power in Diveuse Cid1ta.e~

of force in international olitics, sensitivity to external dangers, civil-military relations P, and strategic doctrine'. According to Booth, there are six reasons why strategic culture should be regarded as a key concept.22 These are:

reducing ethnocentric tendencies;

better 'appreciation of another nation's behaviour';

importance of history;

breaking down barriers between the domestic political environment that is the source of all policies and the external security environment;

helping explain what at first may seem irrational behaviour by foreign actors; and

improved insight into how potential adversaries think and behave.23

Booth, Macmillan and Trood caution against using strategic culture on its own to fully explain outcomes in advancing the use of strategic culture as a concept to fully understand a state's strategy. To account for all the variables of a state's strategy, two interlocking variables of 'statist militaty logic' and 'national strategic traditions' should be con~ ide red .~~

Statist militiuy logic refers to those actions all nations take to ensure they remain nations within an international system built upon the central notion of the nation as a political entity. Examples include maintaining an ability to defend one's interests, increasing the price of aggression against your nation, and maintaining only those defensive abilities you are able to afford. There is little room for cultural interpretations within such an entrenched nation-based system.25 For air power doctrine, statist military logic refers to the common base level of all air power doctrine of the use of aircraft to defend the nation's interests.

In the area of national traditions strategic culture has a significant role. It is this area of strategic thought that creates the outlooks or habits which are mostly accepted without uestion within the nation, but which to an outsider may appear exotic or 1 u n ~ s u a l . ~ In the context of air power doctrine, national traditions are relevant to the following:

Why does that air force emphasise this role over another?

Why is that air force so heavily involved in developing the state's economy over purely defence issues?

Why has this country adopted an overall offensive air power doctrine?

Why is this air force operating these types of aircraft that way instead of another?

Booth, 'The Concept of Strategic Cullure Aff~med', p. 121. 'l ibid., p. 125. 23 ibid., pp. 125-126. 24 A. Macmillan, K. Booth & R. Troad, 'Strategic Culhlre', in Booth & Trood (eds.), Strategic

Cultuues in the Asia-Poc$eRegion, p. 13. '' ihid.

Strategic Thought, Aviation and Culture

The concept of strategic culture will go a long way to identifying the strategic thoughts that determine answers to these types of questions.

Distinctions between statist military logic and national traditions also reflect Boulding's views on the relative status of human values. At the outer core of an individual are universal values that most humans share, no matter their ethnicity or background. The example given is the common response of all humans to rescue a baby from a burning building. This outer core of values is equivalent to statist military logic. While the inner core of human values is equivalent to national traditions where those values that have been shaped by our own experiences, how we differentiate ourselves in the world and how others respond to us are shaped and sustained. These values are shaped by other factors such as ethnicity and ba~kground.~'

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING STRATEGIC CULTURE

'Putting oneself in the enemy's place' means not merely putting oneself in his shoes, but in his hat as well.

Yitzhak ~ l e i n ~ ~

The most important factor to consider when proposing a framework for analysing strategic culture is knowledge of the thoughts, preconceptions and biases of the strategic decision-maker, rather than the context in which strategic decisions are made. These preconceptions and biases are accepted and seem logical and complete for the person making the decision, but they may seem like a jumble of disconnected and illogical ideas and thoughts to someone with a different set of values and beliefs.29

In their instructions to those describing various strategic cultures, Macmillan and Booth requested they include sections on the 'sources of strategic culture ... political culture and strategic culture ... traditional strategic culture ... contemporiuy strategic policy' and 'strategy and peace'. The most significant of these were 'sources of strategic culture' that were further divided into 'Geography and resources ... History and experience' and 'Political structures and defence ~r~anisat ions ' . '~ Booth and Trood's definition of strategic culture specifically refers to geo olitical settings, P, history, and political culture as the fundamentals of strategic culture. &er and Legro suggest cultural values are more the product of recent experience than past history. Johnston argues shared beliefs on such issues as efficacy of the use of force, role of war and nature of the adversary are rooted in past history rather then recent e~~e r i ences . ' ~ The unwavering nature of geography and immediate closeness of one's neighbours demands geography be included in any consideration of what shapes a

21 - . ~ b ~ d . , pp. 14-15; K. Boulding, Confiict andDefense: A General Theory, Harper & Row, New York, 1962.

>B Y. Klein, 'A Theory of Strategic Culhlre', in Compavative Strategy, Vol. 10, Taylor & Francis, UK, 1991, p. 9. ibid.

" A. Macmillan 81 K. Booth, 'Appendix: Strategic Cultur+Framework for Analysis', in Booth & Trood (eds.), Stmtepic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Repion. DD. 365-371. .. , . I l l . . 1 r / . l . I ' . i K . p. h. l.c;r\. .v K I ~ ~1~1ot:d 111 J.>II~I\I.I~I 7 ,uuk . I / . S ~ # I .51r,1t% 1 'id,(,r'. pp 11, 4f1.

Winning With Austrolinn Air Power in Diverse Cultures

nation's strategic thinking. Most scholars that support the culturalist view highlight the importance of analysing internal national political culture as a source of strategic thinking, though Legro suggests military cultures are more influentia~.~~ Pye suggests the 'notion of political culture assumes that the attitudes, sentiments and cognitions that inform and govern political behaviour in any society are not just random congeries, but represent coherent patterns which fit together and are mutually re inf~rc in~ ' . '~ Booth and Macmillan highlight the problem of differentiating between political and strategic cn~tures.?~ This paper takes the view political culture is one element of strategic culture.

The framework of analysis for strategic culture chosen for this paper consists of geography, history and political culture. This does not restrict other factors that may be considered important, such as major economic or resource shocks, but it does assert that any analysis of a state's strategic culture should include these three factors at a minimum. These factors are further explained as follows:

Geography

Geographical factors impinge on almost every aspect of a nation's strategic thinking. The nature of a state's borders, whether they are oceans or disputed land boundaries, is significant. Geography defines the areas of most concern to a nation. Geographic factors often influence the relative importance of one branch of the armed forces over another.36 Air power, as the branch of military power least constrained by geographical factors, often assumes a greater priority when geographic factors can adversely impact national security. Pakistan's lack of strategic depth as a long narrow country against India has been suggested as one reason Pakistan invested significant resources and endured widespread criticism developing an indigenous nuclear capability.37 Lingering uncertainties and past conflicts-both within Malaysia and along its varied and often-disputed borders with Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei-have influenced Malaysian strategic thinking and thus Malaysian air power. Countering the threat of communist forces within the Malay peninsular during the period 1958 to 1970 required Malaysian air power to focus exclusively on supporting ground forces, and inculcated into Malaysian strategic thinking the acceptance of an internal security role for the Malaysia's armed forces. In 1968, the Royal Malaysian Air Force's (RMAF) air defence deficiency was highlighted with the withdrawal of British forces from the region; revival of a Philippine claim on Sabah that coincided with violations of Malaysian airspace by the PAF; ongoing acrimony between Malaysia and Singapore after their split in 1965; and superior combat aircraft held by the PAF and the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF). The RMAF subsequently developed an air defence system of

33 Desch, 'Culture Clash', p. 142, quotes Kier, Katzenstein, Okawa, & Johnston as affirming the

importance of political culture; Legro, 'Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II', pp. 109-141. " L. Pve & S. Verba (eds.). Political Culture andPolitica1 Develo~rnenf, Princeton University Press, , ,. Princeton, 1965, p. 7. Macmillan & Booth, 'Appendix: Strategic Culture-Framework for Analysis', p. 366.

'' ibid., pp. 365-366. 31 NTI Countv Ovevviews: Pakistan, hnp:/lwww.nti.org/e~~esear~h~e1~aki~tan~l.html, accessed

3 April 2003.

Shafegic Thought, Aviation and CulIure

ground-based radars and integrated air defence artillery, along with 10 Sabres given by the Australian Government, and accepting the basing of two squadrons of RAAF Mirages in Butterworth in 1969.1~

History

Each civilisation has their own perceptions on the basic concepts surrounding conflict, such as security, death, diplomacy, war and duty. These perceptions are often grounded in deep historical sources such as religious texts or mythical stories. Often they manifest themselves as traditions, such as the traditions associated with the annual anniversary of significant conflicts involving the nation, like Anzac Day in Australian culture. Hobsbawm suggests such traditions are generally invented to 'inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past'. Study of invented traditions offers concrete evidence of important indicators of cultural change, and how historical events are perceived and often used to legitimise current actions and cement group cohesion. This is particularly so for the relatively recent concept of nationhood and its associated phenomena of nationalism with its plethora of national symbols and values?9 Memories of a nation losing or gaining territory and their experience with foreign occupiers or invaders are nation specific, and thus generate a set of beliefs and norms concerning notions of conflict, territorial integrity and relations with former allies or enemies unique to that nation.40 The place of air power within these invented traditions and the use of air power by the protagonists in these conflicts will influence perceptions on the role of air power within a nation's strategic thoughts. For example, British air power doctrine specifically refers to the influence of World War I, World War 11, the Cold War and ~ u l f In particular, the requirement for control of the air was highlighted in Wodd War I and in World War I1 where it was perceived RAF success in gaining control of the air over Britain and the Channel during the Battle of Britain saved Britam from invasion.42 Air power theorists also trace the formation of the RAF, and the subsequent development and employment of their long-range bomber force during World War 11, from the 52 German aircraft and airship raids on Britain during World War The most significant of these were the daylight raids on London by German Gotha G.IV bombers on 13 June 1917 and 7 July 1917 that killed 216 and injured 622."4

" Y.P. Choy, Air Power Development: The Royol Malaysian Air Force Experience, Air Power Shldies Centre, Canberra, and Universitas Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, 1997, pp. 1, 12,24,25. E. FIohshawm & T. Ranger (eds.), The l~vention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 1, 12-13.

" Macmillan &Booth, 'Appendix: Strategic Culhlre-Framework far Analysis', pp. 365-366. 4 ' Directorate of Air Staff,AP 3000British Air PowerDoehiwe, pp. 3.12.2-3.12.10. 12 . . ibld., pp. 3.12.2, 3.12.7; M. Knight, 'The BaRle of Britain Lessons for Today', in Air Clues,

September 1999, p. 324, highlights German thinking at the time, which suggests their loss of the Battle of Britain adversely effected their plans for invading Britain, while A. Crescitelli, The Battle of Britain andHistorica1 Truth, unpublished Master of Defence Paper, 1995, suggests the Battle of Britain alone did not save Britain from invasion.

43 W.F. Craven & J.L. Gates (eds.), The Army Air Forces in World War Il, Vol. 1, Washington, 1948, p. 92; R. Overy, 'Air Warfze', in The Oxford Nlustroted History of Modern War, Oxford, 1997, pp. 231-232; N. Jones, The Beginnings of Strategic Air Power: A Histoy of the British Bomber Force 1923-39, Frank Cass & Co Ltd, London, 1987, pp. 11-21; A. Stephens, 'Air Power in World War I 1914-1918', in A. Stephens (ed.), The War in The Air 1914-1994, Aerospace Centre, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1994, p. 8.

'"ones, The Beginnings ofStri~tegic Air Power, pp. 11-12.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cullures

Political Culture

A nation's political culture 'consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place'.45 By focusing on political culture, rather than political attitudes, attention is focused on attitudes held by all citizens, rather than just attitudes held by individuals or certain groups of individuals, like political parties.46 In proposing a way to study political culture across national cultures, Verha's approach is to define a set of belief dimensions crucial to any political system, 'then ask whether or not members of a political system share attitudes on these dimension'!' These dimensions are as follows:

National Identiq. National identity refers to the extent citizens identify themselves as members of their nation. Without a strong sense of national identity the political system loses its legitimacy, is unable to appeal to the common good when change or sacrifices are required, and the political elite has no power to improve the nation. Nations are unlikely to address many important issues until a strong sense of national identity is a~hieved.~' For example, Jeshurun contends that before the 1980s, Malaysia had been so preoccupied with building a strong sense of national identity, it could not meet any of its long-term strategic goals. This poor sense of national identity can be traced back to their divided geography, the impact of Christian and Japanese invaders, and their struggle for independence. Malaysia is physically divided with the Malay Peninsula in the west with its history of battling kingdoms, and the island of Borneo to the east with its many hill tribes. The Christian Portuguese invasion in 151 1 of the Islamic Malacca Sultanate remains a significant event in Malaysian history, while the ethnic tensions that erupted after the Japanese Occupation in 1945 are still a recent memory for many Malaysians. During these ethnic tensions, alleged collaborators of the Japanese, mostly Malays, were targeted by the mostly Chinese-origin members of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, who were also members of the Communist Party of Malaya. The desire for an increased sense of national identity under the term Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian Nation is an important suh-text in Prime Minister Mahathir's goals for Malaysia in 2020. 46 Identification with One's Fellow Citizens. Identification with one's fellow citizens refers to the horizontal dimension of that sense of oneness citizens have with other individuals within their society. This is different to the vertical dimension of national identity as a sense of oneness with their society as a whole. The level of trust and confidence between individuals, particularly with members of the political elite is the important element in this dimension. Without this sense of trust, citizens are unlikely to bestow the required authority and power on their elites, thus encouraging the elites in turn to use more forceful measures to ensure compliance with government directions. Trust within the political elite is also important. High levels of trust ensure smooth transitions of power and a basic level of continuation of policies, while low

'' S. Verba. 'Camoarative Political Culhlre'. in L. Pye & S. Verba (eds.), Political Culture and PoliticalDevelopment, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1965, p. 513.

46 . . ~bld., U. 525. 47 ihid. ~~-~

ibid., p. 533. 4g C. Jeshurun, 'Malaysia: The Delayed Birth of a Strategic Culture', in Booth & Trood (eds.),

Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pac$c Region, pp . 226229,242-243.

Strategic Thought, Aviation and Culhm

levels may generate traumatic changes of power and widely differing policies amongst the elite.jO The citizens of Myanmar seem to exhibit the traits associated with people who have a low sense of identification with their fellow citizens. Myanmar's 'multi-cultural, multi-ethnic. .. multi-religious' society has not transformed into a supra-ethnic Myanmar nationality. The travails of establishing first the Bamar nation; the struggle for independence from the British, then the Japanese; through to a civil war, then continuing multiple insurgencies has left a divided nation. The militaq elite of Myanmar has effectively ruled the nation since 1962, when they overthrew the elected government. This continues under the guise of the State Law and Order Restoration Council, which also repressed the winners of the 1990 election. Since 1962, there seems little inhibition in the use of force by the Myanmar elite to maintain internal order and stability. The dominance of the military and their demands of subservience have been the overriding influence on Myanmar political culture.51

Goverrzmental Output. Expectations about what a government will provide comprise the third dimension of political culture. The transition from no expectation that government will affect their lives to an expectation the political system will produce changes in society may 'represent one of the most significant stages in the development of a political culture'. Not all government outputs are goods or services-some outputs are regulations and taxes. The extent of compliance with regulations and taxes indicates the level of respect for the political structure, which is an important value within political culture.s2 Within the Philippines there seem to be generally low expectations government will be instrumental in improving the lives of Filipinos. The concentration of wealth and power in the Philippines has spawned a level of personal and family patronage Pye suggests is unsurpassed within Asia. The resultant value system accepts there is unequal access to economic and political power. These problems provided fertile grounds for the establishment and subsequent growth of the Communist New Peoples Army and secessionist movements in the Muslim dominated Mindanao provinces. The ongoing difficulties of these internal security challenges and the deep suspicion by many Filipinos of their military, who are also heavily involved in this political culture of patronage, translates to a strategic culture that eschews conflict as an instrument of national

The Process of Making Decisions. Beliefs about the way government decisions are made comprise the last dimension of political culture. The presence or absence of these beliefs within a society is the main indicator of this dimension. The political culture of societies without strong beliefs on the process of government decision-making can be characterised as one that considers citizens subjects of the government, rather than participants of it. These beliefs often manifest themselves through consensus or otherwise on the rules governments abide by when making decisions. Beliefs about the role of the individual non-elite in this process vary from active intervention to one that stresses the futility and illegitimacy of such interventi~n.'~ Japanese political culture can be characterised as one that excludes the

' O Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture', pp. 535-537. " T.M.M. Than, 'Myanmar: Myanmar-ness and Realism in Historical Perspective', in Booth & Trood

(eds.), Strategic Cullures in the Asia-Pac$c Region, pp. 165-166, 169-170, 173-176. Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture', pp. 538, 541.

'' W. Villacolta, 'Philippines: Nationalism and Regionalism', in Booth & Traod (eds.), Strategic Culfures in the Asia-PacEfic Region, pp. 186, 187, 191, 192.

54 Verba, 'Comparative Political Culhlre', pp. 541-542.

l ~ ~ - ~ " ~.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

non-elite from government decision-making. In the isolated and monocultural society of Japan, individualism is strictly prohibited and subjugation to the appropriate authority expected. Sajima contends the existence of these self-imposed restrictions combined with deficiencies in their school curriculum about Japan's role before and during World War I1 has produced an insular strategic outlook post World War 11. Despite their economic wealth, Sajima's contends Japanese society has not been able to develop more appropriate strategic policies in line with changes in the international security environment post World War 11. Their current confusion and debate over the most appropriate use of their Self Defence Force in UN sponsored peacekeeping roles is perhaps one example of the impact of this aspect of their political

The following provides a model representing strategic culture within the context of national culture as previously described. This model's precise and ordered portrayal of the various aspects of national culture should not be misconstrued as implying such precise and ordered divisions exist in real life. Instead, the model provides a simple conceptual framework for representing aspects of national culture deemed most relevant in the context of air power doctrine. The model will be further developed in this paper to include other aspects relevant to cultural influences on air power doctrine:

NATIONAL CULTURE ....................................................................

STRATEGIC CULTURE

8 Features National idenhly / Neighbours Identification with / I Distance between Occupiers one's fellow citizens ; I major cenlres Territory Government output / Disputed territory Process af making /

decisions

....................................................................

Figure 2.1: Model of National and Strategic Culture

AVIATION CULTURE

Air power is not composed alone of the war-making components of aviation. It is the total aviation activity--civilian and military, commercial and private, potential as well as existing.

General 'Hap' h o l d s 6

'' N. Sajima, 'Japan: Strategic Cultue at a Crossroads', in Booth & Trood (eds.), Strategic Culiuves in the Asia-Pocgic Region, pp. 70-77,83-85,87-89.

56 General H.H. Amold, 'Air Power and the Future, 1945', in E.M. Emme (ed.), The Impact of Air Power: Notionol Sectrriw and World Politics, D. Van Norstrand Company Inc, Princeton, 1959, p. 305. General Amold was the Commander of the US Army Air Force during World War I1 and subsequently became a 5-star General.

Strategic Thought, Aviation a n d Culture

All air power doctrine refers to objects made by humans operating above the surface of the earth. This is the element that sets air power doctrine apart from all other forms of military doctrine. Such objects are central to any consideration of air power doctrine whether they are lighter or heavier than air, inhabited or uninhabited, fixed-wing or rotary wing, vertical or conventional take-off and landing, air breathing or non-air breathing. The design, operation and sustainment of these objects are not the exclusive reserve of air forces or even the militaly. A significant proportion of aircraft, helicopters and space craft are designed, operated and sustained by civilians for commercial purposes only. The same is true for the necessary supporting infrastructure of airfields, ATC systems, maintenance and logistic organisations, manufacturing and training. Before World War 11, General Arnold encouraged people to not think of aviation as just a collection aircraft, but instead to think of it as combining 'manufacture, schools, transportation, aerodrome, building and management, air munitions and armaments, metallurgy, mills and mines, finance and banking, and finally, public security national defen~e'. '~ The continuing high financial cost of air and space vehicles and supporting infrastructure limits their use to specific areas where they can generate significant financial profit or significant benefits on behalf of a nation. The use of military specific air and space vehicles and infrastructure is further limited by their restricted availability. For example, numerous companies are able to provide air and space vehicles at short notice to meet a range of civilian services, such as transportation of passengers and cargo as well as reconnaissance or communications, subject only to cost considerations. There are very few companies, however, able to provide military specific services, such as the delivery of offensive combat power by air and space vehicle^.'^ Provision of these services is almost the exclusive domain of air forces. A nation's perceptions of the benefits of military air and space vehicles are therefore significant influences on an air force's ability to provide air power.

The high cost and limited availability of military specific air and space forces and their supporting elements demands nations make decisions regarding their acquisition, sustainment and employment balanced by the capabilities offered by land and

'' From an address given by Brig Gen H.H. Amold to the Western Aviation Planning Conference on 23 September 1937, quoted in MS. Sherry, Planning for the Next War: American Plans jbfbr Posiwar Defense, 1941-1945, Yale University Press, 1977, p. 123.

18 Examples of private companies that have provided offensive combat power include Ibis Air and Sukhoi. Ibis Air is the privale air force of Executive Outcomes (EO) and its affiliate Sandline Intemalional. In 1993-1994, E 0 provided attack and transport helicopters as well as combat training for Angola~~ Armed Forces MiG-23, SU-22 and PC-7 crews for the purpose of combat operations against local rebels, while in 1995 in Sierra Leone they provided attack and transport helicopter capability to iight rebels. In 1997, Sandline International demonstrated thelr ability to provide a complete attack and transport helicopter capability to the PNG Government for use in military campaigns against rebels on Bougainville Island. In the late 19905, Sukhoi sold Ethiopia a wing of Su-27 fighters complete with over 250 pilots, mechanics and ground personnel which later took part in a successful campaign against the Erihean Army. See P. Singer, Corporate Warriors: l7ze Rise of the Privatized M i l i t a ~ Indushy, Comell University Press, Ilhaca, 2003, pp. 105, 106, 173, 193, 253; Human Rights Inlemet in partnership with the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 'Papua New Guinea Thematic Reports', in For the Record 1998; The United Nations Human Rights System, http:/lwww.hri.cahrthereco1dl998/vol3/ papoanewguineatr.htm, accessed 11 February 2003; World Air Powev Journal, Vol. 28, Spring 1997, Aerospace Publishing Ltd. London, 1997, pp. 3849 .

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

sea-based vehicles. Debate on where this balance lies within the militaw is captured in the substitution debate where one form of combat power can substitute for another.59 1n the earliest example of this debate Trenchard, then CAS of the RAF, in 1929 proposed control of some areas of British colonies could be done more efficiently by the RAF using aircraft instead of the Army. Aircraft could more efficiently apprehend slaving vessels in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, while coastal defence guns could be replaced by RAF bombers.60 Another early example of this debate was the decision by the Nationalist Chinese at the National Aviation Conference in Nanjing in April 1931 to further develop their fledgling air force at the expense of their m y and navy, because the air force offered the best way of unifying their large country, and their navy could not be built up in time to counter a feared Japanese invasion. With assistance from American and Italian aviation advisers and instructors, the Nationalist Chinese Air Force expanded to nine flying squadrons, more than 700 pilots and 600 aircraft of various types by the end of 1936.6' This substitution debate continues today in the wider context of broader demands on national budgets and an average six per cent increase every year on the cost of all military equipment.b2 Perceptions held by a nation on the worth of air power compared to other forms of national power are significant influences on the air force's ability to provide air power.

AIRMINDEDNESS AND AVIATION CULTURE

The ability and tendency of a nation to acquire, sustain and employ air and space vehicles over laud and sea-based vehicles depends in part on their perception of the relative efficacy of aviation. As military aviation is only the smaller part of a state's total aviation capability, these perceptions are largely informed by factors outside the sphere of air forces. At the core of this perception conceming aviation are the beliefs and values held by a nation conceming aviation. These beliefs and values form an aviation culture. Aviation culture is defined as those values and beliefs held by a nation that influences their perception of the benefits of aviation. Airmindedness is also a term used to capture a nation's character in regard to the supporting elements of aviation.63 The term 'airmindedness' was originally coined by General Arnold in 1945, to distinguish a style of thinking for airmen that was different to the surface perspective.64 Initially airmindedness seemed to be a populist term for air power

19 1. McCarthy, 'Notes on Seminar 3', in Aerospace Seminor Program 2003, Aerospace Centre, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2003. H. Trenchard, 'The Further Employlnent of Air Power in Imperial Defence, 1929', quoted in McCarthy, Aerospace Seminar Program 2003.

61 After a brief battle with the Japanese at Shanghai in 1932, added impetus was given to developing the nationalist air force, see X. Zhang, Red Wings over the Yalu, China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, 2002, pp. 16-17. M.J. Annitage & R.A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age, 1945-84: Theov and Pmctice, 2"d Edition, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1985, p. 252.

" ibid. " General H. Amold, 'Third report of the Cnmnanding General of the Army Air Forces to the

Secretwy of War, Baltimore, l2 November 1945', in College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education, Ainnindedness; An Example, p. 70, http://ww.cadre.mnaxwell.af.mil/ariMENTOWvoll/ sec09.pdf, accessed 26 September 2003.

Strategic Thought, Aviation and Culture

d~ctrine.~' It has since been used to describe a set of beliefs that values aviation.66 Nations with low airmindedness are less likely to have the capability to exploit their air power because their supporting elements do not exist. Nations with high airmindedness have the elements required to support aviation and thus more likely to have the capabilities required to fully exploit their air power. The term aviation culture is used in this paper rather than airmindedness. This is to clearly distinguish a set of beliefs and values concerning aviation, a culture, from a set of principles that guides a military force, a doctrine.

AVIATION CULTURE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIR FORCES

The clearest examples of this concept of aviation culture can be found in the early histories of air forces. During this period government intervention, or at least their active support, was needed to develop not only their air force, but also their aviation capability in the form of an industry, infrastructure and expertise. Such intervention and support required advocates of aviation to articulate their beliefs and values concerning the value of aviation to the nation to gain the support required. This articulation revealed the aviation culture of that nation. The following provides selected examples across a range of national cultures that reveal the essential beliefs and values concerning aviation that were key factors in subsequent actions taken in the early development of a range of air forces.

Development of the Lufmaffe

During Germany's period of enforced air disarmament, required by Articles 198-202 of the Treaty of Versailles signed on 28 June 1919, German leadership took a series of deliberate actions to increase the perceived benefits of aviation to the nation that were strong foundations for the subsequent development of the ~u f?a f f e .~ ' These actions included the development of a national flying club in 1920, the Deutsche Luftfahrt- Verband; the airline Deutsche LuP Hansa in 1926 that dominated European skies; secret bases in the Soviet Union, such as Lipetsk in 1924; and a Junkers aircraft factory at Fili near ~ o s c o w . ~ ~ On 8 March 1934, the German Air Minister Goering gave a speech titled 'A Nation of Fliers' at the conclusion of the Annual Competition Flight Around Germany. In this rousing speech he applauded the race, drew links between the spirit of flying and the rise of the new Germany, spoke of the necessity to develop an air service in response to the bombers possessed by other nations, and exhorted Germany to become a nation of pilots and thus regain her proud and rightful spirit.69 Development of the flying clubs, airlines, secret bases, aircraft factories and Goering's speech are strong indicators of Germany's desire for a stronger aviation

In its original fonn, airmindedness was used to reinterpret the principles of war fcom an airman's perspective, such as objective, the offensive, unity of command, security, surprise, simplicity, mass and manoeuvre, and economy of farces, see ibid., pp. 97-106.

46 P.S. Meilinger (ed.), The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Air Powev Theory, School of Advanced Air Power Studies, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1997, pp. 17, 101, 188-189.

67 The Versailles Treaty, hnp:/lwww.histoty.acusd.eddgen~text/~e1~ai11e~treaty/verl59.html, accessed 23 July 2003. W. Boyne, The Inf2uence ofAir Power Upon History, Pelican Publishing Company, Gretna, 2003, pp. 154157.

69 El. Goering, 'A Nation of Fliers', in E r n e (ed.), The Impact of Air Power, National Secuuiw and WorldPoiitics, pp. 55-57.

Winning With Austvnlian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

culture despite the prohibitions they were under. It can be argued Goering, as German Air Minister, was fostering those values that lie within aviation culture to the maximum extent possible, within the bounds of the treaty he was ostensibly complying with. On 9 March 1935, Germany publicly repudiated the Treaty of Versailles, and on 9 October 1939, Hitler assessed the Lufizvaffe had sufficient superiority to defeat France.?'

Development of the USAF

Perhaps the earliest advocate of air power in the US was Brigadier General 'Billy' Mitchell. Four years after his bombing exhibition of ex-German warships in 1921 and one year before his court martial in 1926 he wrote about the need to develop US air power doctrine. In his writings he defined air power simply 'as the ability to do something in the air'.?' He argued 'a strong national morale', young men who were both educated and athletic, a strong aeronautical industry and a supply of raw materials were all required to develop an efficient air force.72 In 1946, General Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, in his report to the Secretary of War following World War 11, wrote the quote featured at the beginning of this section emphasising air power was 'not just the war-making components of aviation'.73 He also wrote 'military air power depends for its existence upon the aviation industry and the air-mindedness of the na t i~n ' . '~ In 1948 Cooper, lawyer and former Vice-President of Pan American Airways, defined air power as 'the total ability of a nation to fly'. He went on to emphasise 'national factors' important in realising the potential of air power. These national factors included the 'economic and natural resources available for the construction, operation and maintenance of air fleets, military and civil, together with necessary airports and ground facilities'. In this mix he also included young men and women with technical skills, raw materials and the technological ability of the nation.75 In 1949 Possony, a Professor of International Politics and consultant to the USAF, argued air power was a complex of 15 different elements. These elements were 'raw materials and fuel, industrial potential ... bases and protective forces, communications and electronics, logistics and supplies, auxiliary services, airborne forces, guided missiles and atomic weapons, aircraft, manpower, training, moral, research and inventiveness [and] tactics-strategy-

The indivisible nature of at least the US Army Air Force, then the USAF, and the US' total capacity for aviation is a constant theme in these reports, starting from the pioneering efforts of Brigadier Mitchell through to those written after aviation's most extensive baptism of fire in World War 11.

70 B. Liddell Hart, Liddell HartS History of the Second World War, Pan Books Lid, London, 1970, n. 37. W: Mitchell, 'The Development of Air Power', in Emme (ed.), The Impact of Air Power, National Securirv and WorldPoIitics. v. 171. . .

72 ibid., PP. 174-175. 73 Amold, 'Air Power and The Future', pp. 303, 305 74 . . ~bld.. o. 312. , . '' J. Cooper, 'The Fundamentals of Air Power', in Emme (ed.), The Impact of Air Power, National

Security and Wo~orldPolities, pp. 129, 133-134. 16 S. Possony, 'Elements of Air Power', in Emme (ed.), The Impact of Air Power, National Security

and WorldPolitics, D. 136.

Strategic Thought, Aviation and Culture

Development of the Soviet Air Force

In 1957 Whiting, a research historian at the US Air University Research Studies, reported on the close relationship between civilian and militaly aviation organisations in the Soviet Union. In 1927 The Society of Friends of Aviation, Chemical Defence and Chemical Build up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Society for Assistance in Defence merged to create Osoaviakhim, which was designed to increase the aviation and technical capabilities of Soviet youth. This program was a success as most Soviet pilots, mechanics, radio operators, and other technicians during World War I1 had come from Osoaviakhim. During World War 11, Soviet civil aviation flew more than 3.5 million hours canying 2.3 million passengers and around 300,000 tons of freight, flying behind enemy lines supporting partisans, conducting aeromedical evacuation and transporting war material. 1950s era Soviet-designed civil aircraft were closely related to their military aircraft-such as the Tu-114 civilian transport and Tu-116 long-range reconnaissance a i r c r a~ .~ ' The indivisible nature of the Soviet air force and the Soviet's total aviation capability is clear in this early analysis of Soviet air power. It can be argued the existence of a strong Soviet aviation culture facilitated the development of the Soviet air force during World War I1 and subsequent years.

Development of the Communist Chinese Air Force

Early developments of Communist Chinese air power demonstrate how many elements of an aviation culture can be imported where there is no industty, little infrastructure, low levels of education, but a strong desire.78 Communist China's strong desire for a significant aviation capability can be traced back to the following events:

Their Red Army suffering frequent bombardments and losing many senior party leaders to the Nationalist air force up until the early 1 9 5 0 s . ~ ~

Requirement to support planned am hibious operations against the Nationalists in Taiwan and to take control of Tibet. t o

Conclusions reached by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949:

Aviation was the single most effective tool to overcome the large distances within China.

Aviation could assist China's economic development.

A powerful air force could be developed quickly that would symbolise the modernisation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and threaten massive retaliation against surrounding enemies8'

7' K. Whiting, 'Soviet Civil and Paralnilitiuy Air Power', in Emme (ed.), The Impact of Air Power, Narional Securip and World Polities, pp. 578, 582-584. Zhang, Red Wings over the Yalu, p. 30.

79 ibid., p. 20. The amphibious operation against Taiwan was postponed by the Communist Chinese in July 1950, when the US Seventh Fleet enlered the Taiwan Strait. When the Red Army marched into Tibet in early 1950, PLA Air Force hallsport aircrafl flew 1282 sorties and dropped 2236 tons of materials between April 1950 and November 1952, see ibid., pp. 30,59,233.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Culfures

From 1924, the Communist Chinese fulfilled these desires by seconding former Chinese-based Nationalist and Japanese pilots, engineers, aircraft, infrastructure and petroleum as well as receiving significant assistance from the Soviets in the form of advisers, pilots, engineers and aircraft.82 The significant levels of Soviet assistance continued until the PLA Air Force made their combat debut as a largely independent air force in North Korea in July 1 9 5 2 . ~ ~ From a set of firm beliefs and values concerning aviation, the Chinese communists developed a significant air force using largely imported trainers, advisers, aircraft and raw materials.

The above examples from a range of diverse cultures point to similar themes that can he used to construct a framework to evaluate and identify the beliefs and values a nation has concerning aviation. Geography was a significant factor for the US, China and the former Soviet Union. Their relative experiences with aviation, both in war and peace, were also significant factors. Education, industry and aviation services were important for all nations. The following factors should therefore be analysed to discern the beliefs and values held by a nation concerning their perceptions of the benefits of aviation.

Geography

Geography is an important consideration in strategic culture as previously mentioned. Aviation's unique ability to traverse varied terrain in short periods of time, however, necessitates its inclusion in aviation culture as well. It was often the demands of speedy delivery of airmail between centres of responsibility that provided the initial boost for a nation's aviation capability. Important factors to consider within geography are size of the nation, distance between areas or centres of responsibility, and type of terrain.

History of Aviation

The role of aviation in a nation's history is important in shaping citizens' beliefs concerning the value of aviation in their nation. Aviation was freqnently the primary tool used to unify fledgling nations through the provision of airmail, passengers, and other specialist services, such as the flying doctor for outback Australia.

Education

The design, operation and maintenance of aircraft and their associated propulsion systems, sensors, and support systems have invariably been at the leading edge of their respective technologies. The inherent flexible nature of aviation also responds

P- P

I infer the reference in the original text to 'massive retaliation' to mean the air delivery of nuclear weapons. thoueh nuclear weapons are not mentioned in the original text, see ibid., p. 30. China exploded its first nuclear device on 16 October 1964.

-

ibid., pp. 18-30, 34-54,78, 106, 145. '' Zhane asserts the first Chinese pilots that foueht in Korea did so on 28 December 1950. but were " later wilhdrawn only to return back in September 1952 under close Soviet supervision, then finally in June 1952 as an increasingly independent roroe up until the armistice on 27 July 1953, see ibid., pp. 18-30,34-54,78, 106, 145.

Stategic Thought, Aviation and Culture

best to disciplined creative thinking about its operation and support. High levels of education are thus required to both operate and exploit the full capabilities of an aviation capability. All those involved in aviation depend on a common education system to provide firm foundations of expertise and skills they will build on through specialist education and training.

Aviation Services

The level and extent of aviation services in a nation is a good indicator of both citizens' perceptions about the benefits of aviation to them and as an indicator of support the nation provides for aviation. Statistics on utilisation of aviation; such as membership of aero clubs, private aircraft ownership, and passenger travel on international and domestic airlines; provide strong indications on the extent citizens actually use and benefit from aviation. Indications of support the nation provides for aviation can be assessed by noting aspects such as quantity and quality of airfields available, extent and sophistication of ATC, and navigation aids and strength of an aviation regulatory body.

Aviation Industry

Aircraft and their propulsion systems demand a high technology industry to not only design and manufacture them, but also to operate, maintain and modify them. These industries may not be exclusively for aircraft, but they will generally be associated with high technology.

The following conceptual model shows the previous national culture model expanded to include aviation culture:

NATIONAL CULTURE

........................ ~----------------~~~~....-------------

STRATEGIC CULTURE

Occupiers Territory

decisiolls

'..-.....-...............-............---.....................!

Figure 2.2: Model of National, Strategic and Aviation Cultures

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

SUMMARY

The inherent flexibility of air power allows nations to define their own air power doctrine according to their own set of national beliefs and values. By its very nature, all air power doctrine will at least include the requirement to defend their nation's interests by the use of vehicles operating above the surface of the earth. Using ideas from the field of global security, the concept of strategic culture offers the best means to identify how a nation's culture influences their approach to defending their national interests, and thus air power doctrine. Strategic culture is the fundamental and enduring belief held by a nation conceming the use of force. The strategic culture of a nation can be identified by analysing its geography, history and political culture. National beliefs and values conceming the use of vehicles operating above the surface of the earth are captured in the concept of aviation culture--a term derived from airmindedness. Geography, history of aviation, education, aviation services and aviation industry are included within the framework of aviation culture. Applying concepts of strategic culture and aviation culture will assist those with a differing set of beliefs and values avoid ethnocentrism, and better understand the important influences on another nation's national air power doctrine.

CHAPTER 3

LINKING CULTURE AND AIR POWER DOCTRINE

Like other forms of combat power doctrine.. . air power doctrine does not develop in isolation.

Alan stephensl

There is a symbiotic relationship between air power doctrine and the nation in whose name it represents. Nations require their air forces to do different things in response to their own unique circumstance^.^ Such differences are not confined to just the type of aircraft flown. More importantly, these differences manifest themselves in how air forces operate and the sort of air power capabilities they consider more important than others. What is different is that which is taught, their body of instruction, that is, their air power do~tr ine.~

National air power doctrine is formulated by people, mostly born, raised, educated, selected, and rewarded within a particular national culture. Most of these people are more closely identified with their national culture than other cultures by virtue of their membership in a disciplined organisation sworn to serve the national government. National air power doctrine, whether explicit in a book or implicit in the type of capabilities emphasised, must also be justified to the nation's government. Wrong aircraft purchases are embarrassing and failures in battle are national disgraces governments are keen to avoid. In essence, national air power doctrine must at least make sense to those formulating it and be agreed by the national government. Only doctrine that reflects the values and beliefs of those formulating it and acting on it is likely to be agreed. These values and beliefs must therefore be aligned with the nation's national culture, as it is the nation in whose name the air force, which embodies the air power doctrine, serves.

DOCTRINE'S POLITICAL DIMENSION AND CULTURE

Dr Stephens, in his paper Air Power Doctrine Revisited, brings to the fore doctrine's political dimen~ion.~ Stephens contends that doctrine, as a combination of theoly and practice, is inevitably a human activity and therefore cannot be divorced from its political dimen~ion.~ Boyne, in his book The Influence of Air Power Upon History, demonstrates the influence of this political dimension by showing how Great Britain, Italy, US, Germany, France, Soviet Union and Japan during the inter-war years translated the air power theories of exponents such as Douhet, Trenchard and

I A. Stephens, Air Power Dochine Revisited, Paper No. 44, Air Power Studies Centre, Department of Defence, Canberra, May 1996, p. 4. Armitage & Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age, pp. 5-6. ' Directorate of Air Staff, AP 3000 British Air PoweuDoclvine, p. 3.1 1.1. Stephem, AirPowerDoctrineRevisifed, p. 2. ibid., pp. ILL1 1.

Winning With Austrulinn Air Power in Diverse Ctii1ze.i.s

Mitchell, to their own air power doctrines.' Boyne does not use the term air power doctrine, but he does describe a national 'air-power position' as the culmination of five factors that have moulded air power theory.' It can therefore he argued that Boyne's air-power position, as a combination of theory and practice, is actually air power doctrine as defined by Stephens. Boyne's five factors seem to be all part of Stephens' politics of d~ct r ine .~ Stephens' and Boyne's approach to the politics of air power doctrine will be further explored to illustrate the influence of national culture on air power doctrine.

Stephens contends doctrine has a political dimension because it is a human activity. Like all political activities, however, this dimension exists within a set of beliefs and values unique to the national culture of those conducting the activity. Often these values and beliefs are left unstated, though their influence is pervasive. Within this political dimension, Stephens argues there are issues concerned with terminology and external forces. The external forces are national security policy, economic constraints, support for local industry, and inter-service rivalry. Stephens and British air power doctrine also refer to other influences on air power doctrine, such as the impact of enduring principles, lessons learned from past conflicts, national interpretations of history, and resources available for d e f e n ~ e . ~ These influences are shaped by the beliefs and values inherent in the national culture interpreting them. Each of these factors will be expanded upon and their relationship with national culture highlighted in the following:

Terminology

Stephens refers to previous Australian air power doctrine that used forceful language to make political statements concerning the RAAF's status as a separate service. Use of forceful language within the doctrine was explicit recognition of an emergent belief that perhaps the effective employment of air power did not depend on a separate service. Evidence for this belief was the Government's decision to transfer control of helicopters from the RAAF to the Army. This decision was viewed by some as a sign political and military leaders had beliefs and values contrary to the RAAF's.'~ This example of the thinking behind the use of deliberately provocative terms shows how potentially ambivalent national attitudes and beliefs towards a fundamental principle of air power impacted air power doctrine.

National Security Policy

National security policy is referred to as the most senior influence of this political dimension. Within national security policy, defence, foreign affairs and economic

Walter 1. Boyne is a retired USAF Colonel fighter pilot, former director of the National Air and Space Museum, and has written 29 books on aviation topics, see Boyne, The Injiuence ofAiv Power Upon History, end note.

' ibid.. VD. 123-168. ... ibid., pp. 125-126. Stephens, Air Power Doctrine Revisited, pp. 1, 2, 9-16; Directorate of Air Staff, AP 3000 British Air Power Doelrine, p. 3.1 1.2.

10 Stephens, Air Power Docbine Revisited, p. 2.

Linking Culture and Air Power Doctrine

posture are considered the most important." For example, Australia's signing of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prevents an consideration of the use of z nuclear weapons within Australian air power doctrine. Reaching further back, it can be argued Australia's decision to sign up to this treaty can be linked to Australia's culture, that accepted its external defence was partly dependent on strong allies who possess nuclear weapons which the NPT did not affect.13

Economic Constraints and Resources for Defence

Economic factors plainly impinge on air power doctrine, with Stephens arguing no air force in the Asia-Pacific region has the range of capabilities deemed essential in their doctrine.14 Most nations have desires beyond their economic capabilities, but not every nation apportions the same percentage of their resources towards their air force. The amount apportioned to an air force is highly dependent on the nation's beliefs about the relative worth of their air force compared to other demands on the national budget. The quantity and quality of any air force's most important resource-its people-is also dependent on the beliefs and values a nation places on its education system, as well as the system of recmitment available to an air force. All these beliefs and values lie squarely within a nation's national culture. For example, it can be argued the Israeli Air Force is far superior to similar sized air forces because of its ability to pick the best of Israel's youth in a conscription system where the air force has first c h o i ~ e . ' ~

Support for Local Industry

Government requirements to support local industries can result in an air force required to accept locally produced equipment that can be either uncompetitive and expensive, or innovative and adaptable to local conditions. Stephens argues the RAAF has been disadvantaged by being forced to accept inferior locally produced equipment. Conversely, the RAF gained a significant advantage during the Falklands War of 1982 by C-130 and Nimrod gaining an air-to-air refuelling capability within weeks due to locally produced modifications.16 Communist China's emphasis on self-reliance as a fundamental concept of national defence can be traced back to their perception of the Soviet Union as an unreliable ally during the Korean war.17 Political imperatives for local jobs, using acquisition of military aircraft to improve a nation's economy, and a desire for an organic source of armaments are reflections of a nation's beliefs and values.

Inter-Service Rivalry

Inter-Service rivalry is the fourth external force impacting on doctrine. The history of air power across most nations begins with subordination to the army and navy, then a

" ibid., p. 5. 12 1. Harvey, Conventional Deterrence and National Securiw, Air Power Studies Cenh.e, Department

of Defence, Canberra, 1997, p. 1. l 3 G. Cheeseman, 'Australia: The White Experience of Fear and Dependence', in Booth & Troad

(eds.), Strategic Cunures in the Asia-Pacific Region, p. 286. l4 stephem, Air Power Doctrine Revisited, p. 5. Is P. Rie~iks, Human Factors in Air Force Combat Effectiveness, Paper No. 3, Air Power Shldies

Centre, Department of Defence, Canhem, December 1991, p. 10. 16 Stephens, Air Power Doctrine Revisited, pp. 5-7. l7 Zhang, Red Wings over the Yalu, p. 208.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

usually reluctant ceding of control and resources to an independent air force. The reluctance of many land and naval commanders to cede equal place to air force commanders continues, despite overwhelming evidence of the war-winning impact of air power from Normandy in 1944, Bosnia in 1995, and the Gulf in 1999." This past and ongoing inter-Service rivalry is a manifestation of the dominant beliefs present in a nation concerning air power. Such beliefs form part of a nation's culture.

Enduring Principles, Lessons Learned from Past Conflicts and National Interpretation of History

Enduring principles of air power implies a continuing unchanging set of universally agreed principles in regard to air power. While Australia and Britain share many common beliefs and values, their respective principles of air power are different. This is despite them both acknowledging the strong influences of Douhet, Mitchell and Trenchard on these enduring principles.'g Canada, India and the Philippines also refer to a differing set of principles of air power than Britain or Australia. Appendix A provides a list of these different air power principles. These five nations only share six principles of air power across the 15 for Australia, 17 for Britain, 16 for Canada, 15 for India, and 15 for the ~ h i l i ~ ~ i n e s . ~ ' Classical teachings, lessons from past conflicts, and national interpretations of history that influence enduring principles, and thus doctrine, are always viewed through the prism of one's own culture where some lessons are taken as solid and irrefutable, while others are discarded as irrelevant. Chapter 2 highlighted the different lessons learned by Australian and Chinese air power theorists from Operation AJliedForce.

Boyne has put forward five factors operating up to the mid-1950s that moulded air power theory. These five factors are air force share of military budget, perceived security threats, level of aviation technology, national politics and influence of individual^.^^ The major influence in each of these factors is national culture. Boyne illustrates how national culture impacts these factors by investigating how they shaped the air power doctrine of Great Britain, Italy, US, Germany, France, Soviet Union and Japan. Each of these factors will he further expanded and their relationship to national culture highlighted.

Air Force Budgets

Both the size of the defence budget and the relative share allocated to the air force are both significant determinants of air power doctrine, as well as indicators of the beliefs and values a nation has concerning its air force. Despite the presence of the classical air power theorist Douhet in their ranks, the Regiu Aeronautica (Italian Air Force) of the 1920s and 1930s was essentially a defensive arm of their army and navy. Italy was

Stephens, Air PowerDochineRevisited, p. 7 . 19 W, AAP 1000 Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power, pp. 3640; Directorate of Air

Staff, AP 3000 Bvitish Air PowerDodrine, pp. 3.12.3-3.12.5. 20 RAAF, AAP 1000 Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power, p. 123; Directorate of Air Staff,

AP 3000 British Air Power Doctrine, pp. 1.2.3-1.2.9; Air HQ, Dochine of the Indian AiuForce IAP 2000, pp. 28-32; National Defence, Out of the Sun: Aerospace Doctrine for the Canadian Fouces, pp. 6-9; Philippine Air Force, Air Power Manual (Condensed), pp. 5 4 . '' Boyne, The InJiuence ofAir Powev Upon History, pp. 125-126.

Linking Culture and Air Power Dochine

a very poor nation over this period, so build up of the air force required by Douhet could only have occurred if the army and navy was reduced to zero. Despite Mussolini's embrace of an aggressive defence posture and an affinity for aircraft, it was politically impossible to reduce the army and navy to this extent because of their backing by Italian royalists.22

Perception of Major Threats

Identification of major threats requires judgements and assessments about the capabilities and intentions of other nations. Like doctrine itself, this is an essentially human activity and thus heavily influenced by a nation's beliefs, values and experiences. 23

Level of Aviation Technology

The level of technology achieved usually reflects the amount of expertise and resources a nation devotes to aviation. The Japanese achieved a high level of aviation technology through utilising foreign industrial assistance before World War I I ? ~ This was despite the deep divisions between the army and navy conceming the operation of aircraft and lack of an independent air force. Combat air experience gained by their army and navy in China in 1932 and improvements in the quality of aircrew combined with longer range bombers, fighters and an impressive camer aviation capability were key factors for Japan achieving rapid and early success using air power in the initial stages of World War 11. Allied ignorance of the extent of Japanese technological developments in the field of aviation was also ~ignificant.~'

National Politics

Politics of the national rnlers influences overall security policy, which in turn impacts on air power doctrine. For example, in the US President Roosevelt in 1940 realised that war was inevitable with Germany and Japan, and thus ordered the production of 50,000 aircraft in anticipation, despite the US' ostensibly neutral policy at the time.26

Influential Individuals

Individuals within a military or air force command structure have the potential to exert significant influence on doctrine. In the US, Mitchell was perhaps the most significant individual concerning air power doctrine. Apart from his writings, perhaps his most significant impact was through other individuals who believed in his ideas, and further developed his belief on the overriding importance of the bomber-first in the Air Corps Tactical School, then later as key commanders in the US Army Air Corps and USAF.~'

ibid., p. 140. 23 ibid., P. 126. '"bid., p. 166.

R. Pelvin, Japanese Air Power 1919-1945: A Case Study in Milifaw Dysfunction, Air Power Shldies Cenhe, Department of Defence, Canber~a, April 1995, pp. 7-17.

26 Boyne, The Influence ofAiv Power zlpon Histow, p. 150. " ibid., p. 151.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diveme Cultures

The politics of doctrine is alluded to in current Australian and British air power doctrine publications by their inclusion of at least one chapter devoted to a history of the development of their air forces and past examples of the application of air power peppered throughout to illustrate various concepts.z8 History is arguably the clearest illustrator of the impact the political dimension has on air power doctrine.

LINKING NATIONAL CULTURE AND NATIONAL AIR POWER DOCTRINE Air power doctrine is shaped by a wide range of factors, such as enduring principles, lessons learned &om past conflicts, national interpretations of history, resources available for defence, national security policy, support for local industry and inter-service rivalry. All these factors are in turn influenced by national culture. Chapter 2 identified the areas of national culture with potentially the strongest influence on air power doctrine: strategic culture and aviation culture.

Establishing a link between national air power doctrine and national culture requires the pursuit of themes that bring together factors included within Stephens' political dimension of air power doctrine, influences noted in Australian and British air power doctrine, and Boyne's five factors that have moulded air power theory. In pursuit of this objective a set of broad themes have been selected which are both the result of strategic culture and aviation culture, and also have the effect of influencing or driving air power doctrine. These broad themes or air power doctrine drivers incorporate the aforementioned approaches by Stephens and Boyne within a broader framework, able to be applied across a range of national cultures. Inclusion of these air power doctrine drivers between national culture and air power doctrine facilitates a better understanding of the link between these two concepts.

Air power doctrine drivers are defined as a set of broad air power themes where national beliefs and values pertaining to the use of force and aircraft coalesce and form drivers that shape national air power doctrine. Identifying these drivers is useful in gaining an increased understanding of the air power themes or preferences resulting from a nation's national culture, that are subsequently translated into air power doctrine. Nations with similar dominant air power doctrine drivers should have very similar air power doctrines. Where national air power doctrine is not known or unclear, an analysis of the strategic and aviation cultures should reveal a set of air power doctrine drivers from which national air power doctrine can be deduced. Identification of these air power doctrine drivers may also assist in predicting future force structure decisions. These air power doctrine drivers comprise dominant air power roles, support to national development, influence of land and sea-based forces

RAAF. AAP l000 Fundmentals ofAustralian A e r o s ~ a c e Power. no. 2742. 72. 74. 75. 92. 99. -- -

loo, 101,102,105,10~112,122, i24,125, i28,i30,'i3i,i32,1ii,'134,137; 152,1j4,164,'168; 169, 173, 175, 178, 179, 182, 183, 186, 187, 192, 198, 200, 206; Directorate of Air Staff, A P 3000 Brifish Ai rPowerDochine , pp. 2.4.4, 2.4.7, 2.5.4, 2.5.5, 2.5.6, 2.6.3, 2.6.4, 2.6.8, 2.6.9, 2.6.11, 2.8.3,2.8.8,2.8.10,2.8.11,2.9.4,2.10.52.10.9,2.10.12,3.12.1-3.12.11.

Linking Culmre ond Air Power Doctrine

and non-state influences. The relationships between national culture, air power doctrine drivers and national air power doctrine are shown in Figure 3.1.

NATIONAL CULTURE ................................................

STRATEGIC CULTURE

Figure 3.1: Culture and Air Power Doctrine Interaction Model

Aviation Culture

Dominant Air Power Roles

Both strategic and aviation cultures tend to favour one or more air power roles over others. For example, the product of a strategic culture with a history of militav operations, far away from a nation with generally secure borders with large land or maritime areas, would tend to coalesce around louger-range air power roles. The resultant doctrine would then favour long-range air power roles such as strategic strike and reconnaissance with perhaps an emphasis on an expeditionary concept of operations. Close support roles may have a lesser emphasis in the doctrine and subsequent force structure decisions. A nation with a history of insecure land borders or strong internal threats in a comparatively small area will probably have beliefs and values that coalesce around short-range roles. Their air power doctrine would thus favour short range, direct support roles over the more strategic roles.

pp

After 300 years of colonial domination by the Spanish, then the Japanese, and finally the US, Filipinos have a strong sense of nationalism and dislike of a strong military. Their dislike of a powerful military stems from perceptions their military is heavily politicised, particularly under President Marcos; the practice of patronage where military officers align themselves with politicians to ensure promotion; their continuing involvement in internal security; and their reliance on other forces, such as the US, for external security. Filipinos also tend to avoid conflict in interpersonal relations. This attitude has transposed to the external security agenda where the Philippines, over a number of presidents, have chosen a conciliatory rather than

V

Dominant air power roles Support to national development

Influence of land and sea-based farces Non-state influences

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

confrontational approach to disputed territorial claims. Accordingly, their Constitution renounces war as an instrument of national policy. Their ongoing internal security problems also continue to attract attention and resources away fiom issues concerned with external security.29 The non-confrontational nature of their strategic culture, combined with their ongoing internal security problems, suggests their beliefs and values will coalesce around air power doctrine drivers that emphasise short-range army support and purely defensive roles. The analysis suggests that even in vely favourable economic conditions, these roles will remain dominant in Philippine air power doctrine.

Support to National Development

The political reality for most nations demands the high cost of purely defence function of expensive air power assets and their highly-trained personnel be at least partly offset by their contribution to other issues of concem to the nation. The nature and extent of these contributions varies significantly from nation to nation. Some examples include indigenous manufacture, assemble, or repair of aircraft or components; surveillance of activities of concem; resource mapping; fighting insurgents; air transport; aerial survey; provision of medical aid; guarding designated certain areas; search and rescue (SAR); assistance in natural disasters; support to the national airline; and aero-medical evacuation. The extent in which air power supports national development depends on the values and beliefs held by the nation concerning the role of air forces within their society.

Supporting national development affects national air power doctrine in a number of ways. Nations that believe all their aircraft should be built and supported indigenously usually pay a substantially higher premium than for the same aircraft acquired directly from the original manufacturer. For example, the estimated cost to India of indigenous production of their MiG-21 was 193 per cent more than its imported cost.30 These beliefs affect doctrine by potentially limiting the air power roles adopted by a nation because they are unable to acquire the imported equipment necessaly to fulfil this role. For example, the RAF persisted with the 1960s vintage Avro Shackleton Airborne Early Warning (AEW) until 1991 at detriment to their overall AEW and Control (AEWC) capability, while their Nimrod AEW 3 went through an extended period of development that was ultimately abandoned at considerable cost in favour of US-built NATO-operated E-3D Conversely, indigenous production and maintenance increases the potential flexibility of air power assets, thus permitting a nation to adopt a more flexible and independent air power doctrine. For example, Pakistan is able to include nuclear weapons within its doctrine because Pakistan decided to support their F-16s independently of the US after the US Government prohibited any support for these aircraft because of their later confirmed suspicion that Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons. National beliefs that air power should support the nation in other areas such as regular transport of passengers or freight, aerial surveillance and SAR also affect air power doctrine. Inclusion of these roles within air power doctrine may affect the emphasis placed on delivering offensive

29 W.V. Villacorta, 'Philippiues: Nationalism and Regionalism', in Booth & Trood (eds.), Shategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region, pp. 184-192, 196.

'O N. Smith, An Industvial Strategy in Support of Fighter Aircroj? for Indushiolly Developing Notions, Paper No. 41, Air Power Shldies Centre, Department of Defence, Canberra, February 1996. p. 16.

" BAe/GEC Marconi Nimrod AEW 3, http:l lwww.geocit ies.com/lucktam/awacsinim, accessed 15 May 2003.

Linking Culture andAivPowevDoctrine

combat power. For example, less emphasis may be placed on the war roles of transport aircraft because the extra training and equipment required for offensive operations at night over hostile terrain caimot be justified by their national development role alone.

Influence of Land and Sea-Based Forces

The relative value and utility of air power has invariably been challenged by long established beliefs and values concerning land and sea power, the older brothers of air power. The luxury of incumbency and lesser financial and technical demands of land and sea power have often combined to reduce the perceived value of air power, especially within nations whose citizens have little dealings with or understanding about aviation, that is, a low aviation culture. The almost natural tendency of armies and navies has been to resist the establishment of another separate service because of the consequent reduced influence and resources that flow from such decisions. Technically, air power doctrine also refers to those air power elements within the army and navy. However, history has shown when air power doctrine is subordinated to land and sea power doctrine, it will be impeded from providing the guidance required for air power to be used to its full potential. For example, the increased importance the Lufmaffe seemed to place on army cooperation over strategic bombing before World War I1 has been traced back to:

the influx of non-flying army officers into the Luftwaffe in the 1930s,

the untimely death of Major General Wever in 1936 who advocated a more independent role for the Lufmaffe, and

Hitler's beliefs on air power.32

Non-state Influences

Non-state influences capture all those aspects of national culture that do not benefit the nation. These influences are assessed to be detrimental to all air power doctrines, no matter the national culture. Any influence on air power doctrine that does not result in benefits to the nation; whether the benefits are economic, social, defence or humanitarian; will cause that doctrine to be biased away from its fundamental role of defending the nation's interests. Examples of this type of influence include corruption; doctrine copied from other nations without consideration of local factors; and acquisition of inajor equipment for reasons other than benefits to the nation.

Comption can bias major equipment decisions to requirements not supported by doctrine. This affects doctrine by forcing the doctrine to integrate equipment into the armed forces at the expense of other more relevant paas of the doctrine. For example, the doctrine may place equal emphasis on air defence and ground attack roles, but an air defence only fighter is chosen over a more multi-role combat aircraft because of corruption in the selection process. The ground attack role may therefore receive less emphasis in the doctrine because the role is not evident in training, exercises or operations, thus reducing its perceived importance within the armed forces. There are reliable indicators of the overall level of corruption within certain nations, but it is

B. Posen, Sources of Military Dochine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars, Cornell Univ Pr, 1984, pp. 208-215; Emme (ed.), The Impact ofAir Power, pp. 181-185.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

difficult to find clear examples of corruption influencing doctrine as cases of corruption are usually well hidden? Note that corruption is different to support for national development. Slavish copying of doctrine from other nations without regard to own nation circumstances also adversely affects doctrine, as it will emphasise roles and principles of little relevance to the nation acquiring it. This can occur in nations with a low regard for their own ability or that do not promote an open environment of questioning their own fundamental principles and reasons for operating. Before 1989, it could be argued that Australia's national culture exhibited traits that encouraged slavish copying of other nation's doctrine. A strong belief within Australian national culture was that US and British values and thinking were far superior to Australia's. It can be argued these beliefs coalesced around the air power doctrine driver of non-state influences, with the result that official Australian air power doctrine from 1946 was US air power doctrine and from 1957 to 1989 was British air power doctrine in ~ ~ 1 3 0 0 . ~ ~ Another non-state influence can be the gifting of major items of air power assets to a nation. These gifts are often made primarily for the benefit of the giver to gain greater influence, though they can also benefit the receiving nation. If they do not benefit the receiving nation they have the same influence on air power doctrine as corruption. A positive influence associated with gifting was the 10 Sabre jets and a simulator given by Australia to Malaysia in 1969. The RMAF acknowledged these gifts were essential in their development of an indigenous air defence capability in response to perceived threats from Philippines and singapore?'

SUMMARY

Air power doctrine is the product of human enterprise, and thus reflects human values and beliefs. National air power doctrine is the endorsed product of a nation's citizens, and thus reflects the beliefs and values of that nation, that is, their national culture. Strategic culture and aviation culture are the two aspects of national culture most influential in air power doctrine. British and Australian theorists have identified a range of specific factors that influence their respective air power doctrines. Boyne also identified five factors, shaped by national culture, which have moulded air power theoly. A set of themes which strategic and aviation culture coalesces around to form air power doctrine drivers, that in turn influence air power doctrine, was proposed. These air power doctrine drivers are dominant air power roles, support to national development, influence of land and sea-based forces, and non-state influences. The culture air power interaction model at Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between national culture, air power doctrine drivers and national air power doctrine. The model is vely useful in conceptualising the relationship between national culture and national air power doctrine that will seme to increase an outsider's understanding of the fundamental principles that guide another nation's air force.

For a good report on the extent of corruption within a range of nations, see R. Hadeds, T. Inowlocki & T. Wolfe (eds.), Tmparency International Global Corruption Report 2003, Profile Books, Landan, 2003; Transparency Iniernational, hnp:/lwww.transparency.org, accessed 16 May 2003

34 A. Stephens, Going Solo: The Royal Ausivalian Air. Force 19461971, AGPS Press, Canberra, 1995, p. 43.

'' Y.P. Choy, Airpower Development, p. 25.

CHAPTER 4

CULTURAL INFLUENCES ON AIR FORCE COALITION OPERATIONS AND EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS

Culture may well be a soft factor, but it can certainly have hard consequences.

Joseph Soeters and Peter ~ o e r '

The Australian approach to warfare requires commanders and their staff to have a good understanding of the beliefs and values of friendly forces, neutral parties and adversarie~.~ Figures 2.2 and 3.1 provided conceptual models demonstrating how national culture influences the fundamental principles that guide air forces and those aspects of national culture that should he analysed to achieve this understanding. This chapter expands on these models to include other aspects of national culture that widen the utility of these models into understanding how national cultures impact on key Australian warfighting concepts. These expanded models offer one way airmen at the strategic level can gain a better appreciation and understanding of the beliefs and values of their coalition pamers and adversaries.

THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH TO WARFARE

The Australian perspective on warfare is derived from an understanding of Australian constitutional processes, 'geo-strategic influences national identity and culture tempered by lessons from past conflicts'.' This approach in turn reflects Australia's geographic environment, resource constraints, opportunities offered by technology and the professionalism and fighting spirit of the Australian Defence Force (ADF). These factors combine to form an Australian way of warfare. Key concepts within this Australian way of warfare are as follows:

integration of navy, army and air force capabilities into joint operations;

early resolution of the conflict allowing Australia to win the war, and the peace;

maximisation of physical and psychological pressure on the adversary's will to continue fighting;

mobility of forces and well-directed firepower; and

effective coalition operations.4

I J. Soeters & P. Boer, 'Culture and Flight Safety in Militaw Aviation', in The International Journal ofAviotion Psychology, 10 (2), Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 2000, p. l l l . Departmen1 of Defence, The Australian Approach to Warfare, p. 26.

' ibid., p. 23. ibid., pp. 23-24.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

WINNING THE PEACE

The concept of winning the peace recognises Australia's post conflict relationships will be impacted by the conflict. To maintain or enhance these relationships, it is important all national cultures impacting on the conflict are understood. This will ensure the values of coalition partners are upheld and only adversary behaviour is impacted. For example, Australia's ability to include Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member forces in International Forces East Timor (INTERFET) and maintain good relations with these nations after INTERFET depended on Australia understanding the following issues concerning these nations:

Indonesia

Indonesia sought substantial ASEAN participation in INTERFET to minimise Australia's heavy influence in East Timor, which Indonesia saw as antithetical to their own. This desire was a reflection of Indonesian concerns about the presence of US aligned forces operating so close to their borders. Indonesia's desires were accommodated through a Thai Deputy Commander and one quarter of WTERFET forces coming from ASEAN member states. Arguably, Indonesia was neither an adversiuy or coalition partner for WTERFET, but every country, including Australia, had the strong desire to maintain good relations with Indonesia after INTERFET.'

Singapore

The unwillingness of Singapore to risk casualties in their largely conscript infantry forces meant Singapore only contributed a small force of landing ships and medical teams to INTERFET. This stance reflects Singapore's strategic culture that places great emphasis on a total force concept. Casualties amongst their conscripts in East Timor could have caused significant fissures in their total defence policy.6

Thailand

Thailand's decision to provide a substantial contribution of forces to INTERFET was most probably a direct result of recent attempts to change their culture of military involvement in domestic politics. Their initial offer of troops was thus larger than expected.7

PRESSURING THE ADVERSARY'S WILL AND MANOEUVRE WARFARE

In the concepts of Australian warfare concerning adversary's will and manoeuvre warfare, emphasis is placed on rapidly applying force to that part of the adversary sufficient to change their behaviour or break their will to continue fighting, in terms favourable to Australia. This is contrasted with attrition warfare where emphasis is placed on more broad scale destruction of adversary resources to break their To understand where and how to apply physical and psychological pressure requires a

' A. Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis', in Ausfralian Journal of Inteunafional Affaivs, Vol. 54, No. 2, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2000, p. 166. A. Ryan, Primav Responsibilities and Primav Risk: Australian Defence Fovce Participation in the International Force East Timor, Study Paper No. 304, Land Warfare Studies Cenlre, Canberra, November 2000, pp. 48,49, 129.

' ibid., pp. 50, 129. Department of Defence, The Australian Approach to Warfaue, p. 24.

Culiuml Zfifluenees on Air Force Coalition Operations and Effects-Based Operations

good understanding of the adversary's values and their perception of Australia's actions. For example, the support given to Yugoslav's President Milosevic by factoly owners Nikola Sainovic and Dusan Matkovic was identified by US and British forces as a key influence on the President's continuing grip on power and thus his ability to resist NATO's demands to withdraw his forces from Kosovo in early 1999. US and British forces sent Sainovic and Matkovic e-mails, faxes and mobile phone messages warning them of attacks on their factories by US forces. These warnings came true on 15 May 1999, when a flight of B2 bombers attacked the steel plant at Smederevo owned by Matkovic and the copper smelter managed by Sainovic at Bor in East Serbia. This operation was designed to encourage Matkovic and Sainovic to cease their support for President Milosevic while he resisted NATO demands, or risk their sources of income being destroyed.' The available references do not state whether or not Matkovic and Sainovic ceased their support for Milosevic after these raids. On 3 June 1999, President Milosevic indicated he would accept European peace proposals, though there seems little consensus on what the key factors were that brought Milosevic to acccpt these peace proposals.10

CONCEPT OF COALITION OPERATIONS

Australia requires detailed knowledge of coalit~on partners' doctrine, language, politics and culture to either lead or participate in coalition operations." Australian doctrine defines a coalition operation as 'an operation conducted by forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mi~sion' . '~ The most significant impact national cultures and values have on coalition operations is in the area of interoperability. Interoperability is defined as 'the ability of systems, units or forces to provide the services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the forces so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together'." This paper does not cover the technological aspect of interoperability such as compatibility of data links, radio links and information technology systems. Instead, this paper focuses on the human aspects of interoperability; such as the way information is conveyed and received between individuals and groups from differing national cultures. For example, during INTERFET even coalition partners from English-speaking nations, such as an Irish Lieutenant Colonel, struggled to understand Australian briefings because of their fast pace and tendency for briefers to only address their fellow Australians through eye contact, ignoring the blank looks from non-Australians. Thai Colonels also stated they often could not pose questions after the briefing because the briefing was wrapped up while they were still formulating their own questions and they did not wish to appear ntde by interrupting the process.'4

W. Arkin & R. Windrem, The Other Kosovo War, 29 August 2001, hnp:llwww.msnbc.com/newsI 607032.asp, accessed 21 February 2003.

10 A.H. Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2001, pp. 32, 33, 89, 246-247.

" Deparrment of Defence, The Australian Approach to Warlive, p. 25. " Department of Defence, Executive Series ADDP 00.3 Coalition Operations, Defence Publishing

Service, Canberra, 2002, p. 2-2. 11 Department of Defence, Austraiian Defence Force Publication Staff Duties Series ADFP 101

Glossay, Defence Centre, Canberra, 1994, p. 1-8. l4 Ryan, Primay Responsibilities and Primary Riskr, pp. 91-92.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

CULTURAL INFLUENCES

National cultures need to be understood in the differing contexts of coalition partner and adversary. This chapter divides these aspects into Interoperability and Effects- Based Operations (EBO). The interoperability section proposes a model to assess the level of interoperability likely to be achieved amongst coalition partners, then provides the means to discern and input cultural values into this model from 15 nations. The EBO section proposes a way to view EBO in the context of targeting for air forces and national culture that will enable commanders and their staff to better understand the targeting process for EBO as part of a national effects-based approach.

NATIONS SELECTED

Selection of the nations referred to in this chapter was based on their identification in Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force and availability of relevant cultural data. Unfortunately, cultural data relevant to this chapter was not available for the smaller nations identified in Defence 2000, such as East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Cambodia, Brunei and nations in the South-West Pacific. Nations identified in Defence 2000 where there is relevant cultural data available include Australia, Canada, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, NZ, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, UK, USA and ~ietnam."

INTEROPERABILITY

The multinational nature of coalition operations makes them particularly susceptible to fracturing through misunderstandings or unresolved differences in national objectives. This may be a critical vulnerability which hostile forces will target .... It is therefore important for the coalition leader to invest whatever resources and efforts are needed to foster trust and understanding.

Executive Series ADDP 00.3 Coalition ~ ~ e r a t i o n s ' ~

Provision of a model for assessing the people dimension of interoperability will enable commanders and their staff at the strategic level to better assess, clarify and focus their efforts in overcoming the inevitable issues that accompany interoperability amongst groups from diverse cultures. Use of this model, combined with the means to discern and quantify the influence of differing national cultures, will assist commanders and their staff at the strategic level to gain a better understanding of cultural factors that affect interoperability.

'' Department of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future Defe~ce Force, Commonwealth of Australia, 2000, pp. 33-45.

l6 Department of Defence, Executive Series ADDP 00.3 Coalition Operations, pp. 5-1, 5-2.

Culhrral Influences on Air Force Coalition Ope~atior?~ nndEffects-Based Operations

NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE

Interoperability is also applicable to the emerging concept of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) that the ADF has identified as a significant contributor to the future warfighting concept of Multi-dimensional warfare." The human dimension of NCW in particular is most applicable to this section on interoperability. NCW assumes a high level of trust will exist within the force and supporting agencie~. '~ Issues of trust, collaboration and shared understanding are important in NCW and are also at the heart of the problem of interoperability amongst forces Gom nations with differing beliefs and value^.'^

Clark, Fewell and Jones from the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) have developed an Organisational Interoperability Maturity Model (OIMM) with the aim of being able to take account of the organisational, doctrinal and cultural aspects of interoperability in militaly operations. The OIMM was designed to 'evaluate interoperability at the organisational level'.20 They recognised the multi- dimensional and human activity of interoperability makes quantifying interoperability difficult. One approach is to establish a suitable scale by defining categories that usefully describe different states of what is being measured. Their OIMM is based on the maturity model approach, which has been widely used for monitoring and evaluating interoperability. Other examples include the US technology-focused Levels of Information System Interoperability (LISI), NATO Levels of Interconnectivity and NATO Interoperability Sub Degrees (NISD).~' The OIMM was developed from a range of activities including intetviews, acquired knowledge of analysts in Command and Control (C2) and brainstorming. Clark used the INTERFET operations to illustrate use of the OIMM for evaluating organisational interoperability in a coalition operation. The model was also used to:

evaluate the levels of interoperability between Australia and US Pacific Command and US Central Command as part of the AS-US interoperability review during the Multinational Limited Objective Experiment 2 (MNLOE2); and

identify issues that impacted on interoperability between these organisations.22

l 7 Department of Defence, Future WarJighting Concepts, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2003, p. 29; Department of Defence, Enabling Multidimension Manoeuvre: The Australian Defence Force Neiwork-Centric Warfare Concept, Discussion Paper for ADO Network-Cenhic Warfare Conference, 20 May 2003, p. 1.

18 . . ~brd., p. 7. I 9 . . ~ b ~ d . , p. 12; Department of Defence, Executive Sevies ADDP 00.3 Coalition Operations, p. 5-1.

The first version of this model was T. Clark & R. Jones, 'Organisational Interoperability Maturity Model for C2', Proceedings of the 1999 Command and Control Research Technology Symposium, Newpolt, RI, June 1999; also see Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 151, NovemberIDecember 2001, pp. 25-42, for a summary of this version. The latest version is S. Fewell & T. Clark, Organisational Interoperability: Evaluation and Further Development of the OIM Model, DSTO, paper presented at the 8Ih ICCRTS Conference, Washington, June 2003, see e-mail T. Clark to author on 31 July 2003.

21 US Department of Defense, Levels of Information Systems Inferoperabiliy (LZSI), C4TSR Architecture Working Group, 30 March 1998, p. 2-1

'' Fewell & Clark, Ovganisational Interoperability, pp. 2-10.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

The OIMM consists of five levels of organisational interoperability down the y-axis and four enabling attributes across the x-axis. These enabling attributes, along with their broad underlying questions, as described by Fewell and Clark, are as follows:

Preparation. 'How well prepared are the participating organisations to perform the goals of this collaboration?' The preparation athibute includes the 'legal and doctrinal framework for the collaboration' as well as 'education training and experience'.

Understanding. 'How well developed is the level of inutual understanding and knowledge between the participating organisations?' The understanding attribute includes 'knowledge, experience and familiarity.. . information and knowledge sharing capabilities.. . [and] value of the communication and information exchanged'.

Command and Coordination. 'How well do the participating organisations tit into the command structure and adapt to the command style?' The command and coordination attribute includes 'command arrangements.. . [and] command and leadership style'. This attribute examines how well participating organisations fit into the command structure and adapt to the command style by examining how responsibilities and authority are delegated and shared and the level of unity of command. It also examines issues related to the command leadership style.

Ethos. 'What impact do socio-cultural factors have on the level of collaboration needed to achieve the goals?' The ethos attribute includes 'goals ... external constraints.. . personnel arrangements and organisational factors.. . [and] perceived levels of trust and respect'.

By assessing each of these attributes and matching their rating with the word pictures described in the OIMM, a level of interoperability is deduced. The overall level of interoperability corresponds to the lowest level achieved by any one of these attribute^.'^ The OIMM is reproduced at Appendix B.

APPLYING THE OIMM TO COALITION OPERATIONS

The OIMM is an attractive model to adapt for evaluating interoperability amongst coalition partners because of the extensive research and evaluation that has already been undertaken, but the OIMM also seems to have limitations in this role.

A Maturity Model

The OIMM is a maturity model focused on interoperability between organisations. A maturity model implies arriving at a level of interoperability that with additional resources or training will be in~reased.'~ This approach is rejected for a model assessing levels of interoperability between nations. The extent enabling attributes such as command and coordination, and ethos differ between nations is largely fixed. It is ethnocentric to suggest these attributes will fundamentally change with education or exposure between coalition partners. Instead, the differences noted through this model must be recognised and accepted, then ameliorated using a range of techniques.

23 . . ~ b ~ d . , pp. 7, 16-19. 24 US Department of Defense, Levels ofInSonnalion Systems Interopevabilily (LZSI), pp. 2-1.2-2.

Culrural Znpi(ences on Air Force Coalition Operations andEffects-Bared Operations

For example, Headquarters INTERFET took the following measures to overcome some of their interoperability problems:

Extensive use of liaison officers.

Assigning some national contingents their own area of responsibility.

Use of simpler and more robust communications and operating procedures.25

Interoperability Between Organisations

The OIMM is focused nu organisations and makes no distinction whether these organisations are from the same or different national cultures. A model for interoperability between coalition partners does make this clear distinction. Making this distinction may serve to reduce the range of issues required to describe the level achieved for each attribute as compared to the OIMM.

Availability of Input Data

The OIMM has been developed and validated through extensive research, detailed questioning, and observation of participants from a number of organisations conducting C2 exercises. Without this level of intrusion into the exercise and cooperation from the participants it is difficult to envisage how the information required by this OIMM could be procured before the event. The composition and aim of the next coalition operation the RAAF will be involved in is unknown. ADF planners and their commanders at the strategic level are still required to make judgements on the level of interoperability likely to be achieved in the coalition operation well before the coalition has conducted any exercises or training. An interoperability model using more readily available national cultural data and air power dochine should therefore be more useful to commanders and their staff at the strategic level than the OIMM.

Discerning and quantifying cultural data will always be subject to interpretation. However, there is significant literature available in the social sciences area that attempts to identify and measure beliefs and values. Hofstede's dimensions of national culture scores is perhaps the most widely quoted, and more importantly, most widely replicated, set of national cultural data a~ailable.'~

Hofstede's Dimensions of National Culture

Over the period 1967 to 1973, Hofstede was involved in an IBM international employee attitude survey. This survey produced answers to 116,000 questionnaires from 72 countries in 20 languages from seven occupational categories in the marketing and service division of IBM's worldwide offices.27 Analysis of the results of this survey led to Hofstede deriving four dimensions of national culture he called Power Distance (PD), Individualism Collectivism (IDV), Uncertainty Avoidance

" Ryan, Primary Responsibilities andPrimary Risks, p. 90. " G. Hofstede, Culture's Conseguences, 2"* Edition, Sage Publications, California, 2001, p. 73. 27 . . ibld., p. 41; R.L. Helmreich & A.C. Memitt, Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine: National,

Organizational andProfessssiond Influences, Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Burlington, 1998, p. 56.

Winning With A~~strulian Air Poivev in Diverse Cullure.~

(UA) and masculinity femininity. These dimensions were further validated as national dimensions through nine other national-level economic, geographic and demographic indicator^.^' An additional dimension of long-term versus short-term orientation was added in 1985 following a cross-national Chinese Values Survey conducted by ~ o n d . ' ~ Hofstede describes PD, IDV and UA as follows:

Power Distance. PD is the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a nation expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. PD is a measure of the interpersonal power between a boss and subordinate as perceived by the less powerful of the two--the subordinate. Within the work situation of low PD nations, subordinates expect to be consulted and managers rely on personal experiences, whereas in high PD nations subordinates expect to be told and managers rely on formal rules. Low PD nations are Australia and NZ, while high PD nations are Malaysia and ~ h i l i ~ ~ i n e s . "

Individualism Collectivism. IDV describes the relationship between the individual and the collectivity that prevails in a given society. Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between the individuals are loose. Everyone is expected to look after themselves and their immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which throughout their lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. In low IDV nations there is a belief in collective decisions, employees perform best in groups, and the employee has to be seen in the family and social context. In high IDV nations there is a belief in individual decisions and employees perform best as individuals. Low IDV nations are Indonesia and South Korea while high IDV nations are US and~us t ra l ia .~ '

Uncertainty Avoidance. UA is not the same as risk avoidance. More than towards an escape from risk, UA leads to an escape from ambiguity. UA is defined as the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations. In low UA nations there is scepticism towards technological solutions, top managers are involved in strategy and teachers may say 'I don't know'. In high UA nations there is strong appeal for technological solutions-top mangers are involved in operations and teachers are supposed to have all the answers. Low UA nations are Singapore and Vietnam while high UA nations are Japan and South ~ o r e a . ~ '

Over 200 more studies have been conducted since the original IBM survey on a range of varied occupations that have largely supported the dimensions of UA, IDV and PD and their relationship to nations as measured by ~o f s t ede . ' ~ Of most relevance to air

Hofstede, Culture's Consequences, p. 41. ~ o n g term orientation stands for the fostering of v i a e s orientated towards future rewards, in particular, perseverance and thrift Its opposite pole, short term orientation, stands for the fostering of values related to the past and present, in particular, respect for tradition, preservation of face and fulfilling social abligatibns, see ibid., pp. 41, 359, 366, 500. ibid., pp. 83,98, 107, 500. '' ibid.. VD. 209. 225,244. 500. ib id . ; i . 148; 161; 169; 500.

13 . . ~bld., p. 503; Helmreich & Memtt, Culture at Work in Aviation andMedicine, p. 61

Culruml Influences on Air Force Coalition Operations andEffects-Based Operations

power and air forces, the following studies have also validated at least two of Hofstede's dimensions and replicated their original rankings.

NATO Student Officers

In a paper published in 1997, Soeters reported on the results of a value survey module received from 664 student officers in the Army Academies of US, UK, Canada, Germany, France, Denmark, Nonvay, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Belarus and Netherlands. The results reflected the differences based on national culture first observed in the IBM surveys for UA and PD. Overlaying this national differentiation was also a common attitude of student officers that was more institutional and occupational than their civilian counterparts. Similar results were arrived at in another report by Soeters and Recht that included aspects of discipline.34

Senior NATO Defence College

Soeters and Rechter studied the values of 185 participants of five courses of a six-month NATO Defense College in Rome in 1995, 1996 and 1997. This course is offered to Lieutenant Colonels and above as well as equivalent civilian employees fiom NATO and Partnership for Peace nations. The course is designed to develop a general knowledge and understanding of strategic issues among course members and is conducted using small multi-national groups in English and French. Through this and other courses NATO hopes to contribute to the development of these officers adopting less ethnocentric attitudes as part of their preparation to work in a multi-national NATO Headquarters. Questionnaires were administered to course participants both pre and post course to assess any difference in values according to Hofstede's cultural dimensions and their attitudes towards strategic military issues and international affairs. The results indicated no change in any of the cultural dimensions during the course but changes in their attitudes and opinions on strategic issues.35

Major Aircraft Accidents in NATO Air Forces

In 2000, Soeters and Boer published the results of their analysis of the relationship between aircraft destroyed per 10,000 hours for 1988-1992 and 1991-1995 of 14 NATO air forces, as reported by the NATO Air Forces Flight Safety Committee Europe, and Hofstede's original four dimensions.'?he data for 1991-1995 was also analysed in relation to percentages of mechanical failure. Apart from the Netherlands Air Force, which had a certain problem with F-16 engines over this period, the percentage of mechanical failures was a constant 2&25 per cent, thus supporting the idea the majority of accidents were caused by humail factors. The intent of their research was to discover whether a type of supranational NATO air force culture had

'9. Soeters, 'Value Orientation in Military Academies: A Thirteen Country Shldy', in ArmedFovces andSociery, Vol. 24, No. 1, Fall 1997, pp. 7-32; 1. Soeters & R. Recht, 'Culture and Discipline in Militarv Academies: An International Comnarison'. in Journal o f Political and Militarv Sociolom. - Vol. 26, No. 2, Winter, 1998, pp. 168-189.-

35 1. Soeters & R. Recht, 'Convergence or divergence in the multinational classroom? Experiences from the Militarv'. in International Journal o f Intercultural Relations 25. Elsevier Science Ltd. ~ ~~~~~~

2001, pp. 423440.' ' h i 1 forces studied were from Denmark. Gemanv, Beleium. UK. Canada. France. Netherlands, US.

Greece, Turkey, Italy, Nonvay, Spain and ~o&gal. Note that for Canada and US, only data 'fro& their units stationed in Europe was used.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

left meaningless any sense of national cultural differences as demonstrated by Hofstede within IBM. Amongst NATO air forces all aircraft are designed in accordance with a NATO standard, there are significant exchanges of personnel, combined NATO exercises, common flying and operations training establishments and similar organisational structures. Soeters' and Boer's analysis showed national differences in culture were indeed replicated within NATO air forces, particularly in the dimensions of UA, IDV and PD. The study found the higher the IDV score, or more individualistic the nation, the lower the chance of total aircraft loss; and conversely the Inore collectivist air force culture, or lower IDV score for that nation, the higher the chance of aircraft accidents. The study also found the relationship between PD and accidents is lower than the relationship between UA and IDV on the one hand and rate of aircraft accidents on the other.37

Large Passenger Aircraft Accidents

In 1994, Weener and Russel from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group presented a study that analysed the relationship between total passenger aircraft loss per million departures over the period 1959-1992 and 33 airline nationalities along with Hofestede's cultural dimensions. The results showed clear correlations with the PD and IDV dimensions. The higher IDV scores corresponded to lower aircraft accident rates and higher PD scores corresponded to higher accident rates for nations within the group of 15 used in this chapter. Hofstede has analysed this data and argues there is a stronger correlation between these accident statistics and national GNP per capita rather than his cultural dimension^.^^

Commercial Airline Pilots

Over the period 1993-1997, Helmreich and Merritt collected the results from 15,454 civilian airline pilots across 36 airlines from 26 nations of a Flight Management Attitude Questionnaire (FMAQ) they devised. The FMAQ was 'an exploratory cross cultural 82 item questionnaire designed to measure pilots' attitudes towards command, communication, stress, rules, automation, organisational climate and work values'. Helmreich and Merritt accepted Hofstede's cultural dimension scores but questioned whether the national differences at the centre of these scores also applied to airline pilots who were typically at the technological forefront of their nation's workforce, operated in a highly regulated international based environment, and regularly travelled between nations. For PD and IDV there was very high correlation between the relative ranking of PD and IDV scores amongst nations and the ranking of airline pilots from these nations. However, the airline pilots all scored higher PD scores than their own nation scores derived from IBM. Similarly for IDV scores, airline pilots exhibited a generally higher set of IDV scores for their nation than those derived from I B M . ~ ~

'' I. Soeters & P. Boer, 'Culture and Flight Sarely in Military Aviation', pp. 11 1-133. 38 E. Weener & P.R. Russell, 'Aviation Safety Overview: Regional Perspectives', paper presented at

the 22"' International Air Transport Association Technical Conference, Seattle, 1994, as quoted in I-Iofstede, Culfuue's Consequences, 2"d Edition, pp. 115, 131; P. Phelan, 'Cultivating Safety: Cultural Differences in the Cockpit', in Flight International, 24 August 1994; D. Phillips, 'Culture May Play a Role in Flight Safety: Baeing Study Finds Higher Aviation Accident Rates Among Nations Where Individualism is Not the Norm', in The Washington Post, 22 August 1994.

39 Helmreich & Merritt, Culture at Work in Aviation and Medicine, pp. 53-105.

Cultural InJiiences on Air Force Coalition Operations andEfects-Based Operations

In summary, the results from the studies outlined above clearly show the following in relation to Hofstede's original survey and subsequent analysis of cultural dimensions for UA, PD and IDV:

Over 200 subsequent surveys since 1977 across a range of different occupations demonstrates the original IBM survey still contains valid information some 36 years later.

The surveys reported by Soeters confirms Hofstede's conclusions and analysis of IBM employees are largely replicated within at least NATO armed forces, despite their supranational NATO identity.

Helmreich and Merritt's extensive survey of 15,454 airline pilots across 26 nations confirms three of Hofstede's dimensions and their relationship to nationality also applies in the civilian airline industry.

These results suggest Hofstede's analysis in relation to the dimensions of UA, PD and IDV can be applied with a great deal of confidence to air forces from the 15 nations referred to in this chapter. Significantly more confidence could be placed in the results of a similar study to the airline pilots targeting just the air forces from these 15 nations, but this task is outside the scope of this paper. Appendixes C and D contain charts displaying the IBM and airline pilot PD and IDV scores for the 15 nations of interest to Australia. A conceptual model depicting the relationship of strategic culture, aviation culture, Hofstede's cultural dimensions, air power doctrine drivers, national air power doctrine and coalition operations is provided at Appendix E.

A new model, the Air Force Coalition Interoperability Model (AFCIM) is proposed to assess the level of interoperability likely to be achieved between air forces from different nations. The AFCIM:

builds on the extensive research and evaluation already conducted for the OIMM by using the OIMM as its foundation;

applies previous analysis presented in Chapters 2 and 3 on culture and air power doctrine as a tool to assess interoperability;

takes advantage of Hofstede's readily available cultural data that has been validated across a range of nations and occupations relevant to air forces; . focuses on differences between national cultures; and

is not a maturity model.

The AFCIM, like the OIMM, comprises five levels of organisational interoperability down the y-axis and four enabling attributes across the x-axis. The AFCIM is shown in Appendix F. The essential defmitions of the enabling attributes from the OIMM have been retained in AFCIM. The same levels of interoperability have also been retained. The AFCIM incorporates a numerical rating system that quantifies the level of interoperability for each of the attributes. Simple arithmetic is used to add the ratings for each attribute of the coalition partners to produce the sum level of interoperability that relates to the values specified for the level of interoperability

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

achieved. Quantifying the level of interoperability for each of these attributes allows the result to be graphed. This graph will show the enabling attribute where the lowest level of interoperability is likely to be achieved. Justification is thus presented for this area to attract increased attention from commanders to allocate resources into overcoming this area of potential concern using a range of techniques, such as wider use of liaison officers and modified operating procedures.

Enabling Attributes in the AFCIM

The AFCIM includes the enabling attributes from the OIMM but uses national air power doctrine and Hofstede's cultural dimension as inputs to assess the levels of interoperability for these enabling attributes. The relationships between these inputs and the attributes is explained as follows:

Preparation. Key concepts in the preparation attribute are the doctrinal framework for collaboration and their level of education, training and experience.40 Air power doctrine seems the strongest influence for this attribute of preparation. An analysis of the relevant doctrines of the participating nations should reveal issues such as organisational processes, war-fighting philosophy, and command and coordination, as well as some information on education and agreements with other nations. For example, British air power doctrine devotes a chapter each to British war fighting and air power philosophy as well as command and contr01.~' Logistic agreements with other nations are also briefly referred to.42 Australian air power doctrine refers to Australian principles of war as well as the command and coordination structure of the R A A F . ~ ~ Alliances, education and training are also briefly covered in Australian doctrine."

Understanding. Ke concepts in the understanding attribute are information and knowledge sharing3 The most obvious national cultural difference of language is assessed as a reliable national cultural indicator for the understanding attribute. With a common language and common procedures the level of information and knowledge sharing is likely to be high. Air forces will have the advantage in this regard because of the common language of English and common operating procedures mandated in the international ATC system which at least aircrew must be familiar with.

Command and Coordi~tatiorz. The attribute of command and coordination explores how well coalition partners fit into the overall command structure and adapt to the coalition command style.46 Hosfstede's dimension of PD seems the most applicable to this attribute. The survey questions Hofstede used to measure PD directly address decision-making styles and subordinate's reactions to disagreements with superiors. Studies on command styles such as concentration of authority, management style, and levels and shapes of the hierarchy in work organisations' situations were analysed by Hofstede and found to correlate with the PD dimen~ion.~' An example of PD at work

40 Fewell & Clark, Organisotionnl Inferoperabiliv, p. 16. " Directorate of Air Staff, AP 3000BritishAirPuwerDoch.ine. DD. 1.1.1-1.3.10. . . " ibid.,p.2.10.11. " RAAF, AAP IOOOFundamenfals qfA~,sh&n AerospacePower, pp. 105-1 11,244-251 44 ibid.. o. 264.

" ~ofs tede, Culfurei. Consequences, pp. 79, 102, 103, 105. 150, 166, 167,500.

Cultural Infiuences on Air Force Coalition Operations andEffecfs-Based Operations

in a coalition operation was provided by Ryan and highlighted earlier where Thai Colonels expressed a reluctance to question their Australian briefers at Headquarters INTERFET.~' Ryan, and the Thais, indicated the cause of this reluctance was a language problem combined with the speed of the brief er^.^^ The Thais 'tended to remain silent out of politeness rather than slow down the process'.5o The specific reference to politeness suggests the problems were more related to command style, or PD, rather than language. Australia has a very low PD of 36 compared to Thailand's high PD of 64." Citizens from high PD nations tend to defer more readily to those in authority than citizens from low PD nations.52 This is what was probably occurring with the Thais as they were more reluctant to question their briefers, or even to request the briefings be slowed down, than perhaps expected by the Australian INTERFET briefers and Ryan, their Australian interviewer.

Ethos. The ethos attribute in the OIM incorporates concepts of trust, culture, values and goals.53 IDV is assessed to be the dimensions most applicable in the area of ethos. Hofstede's 14 survey questions used to measure IDV refer to work goals. Studies on worlc goals conducted previous to Hofstede's IBM study have since shown to correlate strongly with IDV.'~

OIMM Versus AFCIM

Unlike the OIMM, the AFCIM has not been evaluated beyond the analysis presented in this paper. The other significant limitation of the AFCIM is it does not capture all the information deemed essential in the OIMM for each attribute. This must be balanced with the likelihood of actually acquiring all this information and the requirement for this breadth of information when considering interoperability just between nations, not between all organisations. These limitations of the AFCIM must also be balanced with previous limitations of the OIMM noted earlier when used to assess interoperability between groups from different nations.

Ryan, Primary Responsibilities andPrimay Risla, pp. 92-94. 40 . . ~ b ~ d . , p. 92. 10 - - ~ b ~ d . . U. 93. . . l' Hofstede, Culture's Consequence$, p. 500. 12 - - rb~d., pp. 102-107.

Fewell & Clark, Organisational Interoperahility, pp. 18-19. 14 Hofstede, Culftire's Consequences, pp. 158, 159, 214,228, 229, 500.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS

Effects-based operations focus on the mind of man.

Edward smithss

Air power offers the opportunity to bypass the tactical land and sea battles, and operate against a wide range of tactical and strategic targets. Air power theorists and practitioners have thus devoted considerable effort into selecting the right target, or usually set of targets, that when operated against, will achieve the outcome desired. Air power's potential to achieve strategic effects out of proportion to its mass has placed the responsibility on air forces to carefully assess the impact their target and weapon selection will have on adversaries. An effects-based approach offers a way to better understand this impact to ensure desired outcomes are achieved.

AUSTRALIA AND EBO

Current Australian doctrine refers to using a 'national effects-based approach' and its operational component, Effects-Based Operations (EBO), as a future warfighting concept and as part of the ADF in 2 0 2 0 . ~ ~ In these future concepts EBO is defined as 'the application of militaq and non-military capabilities to realise specific and desired strategic and operational outcomes in peace tension, conflict and post conflict- sit~ations'.~' However, the fundamental concepts of an effects-based approach and EBO are not new." For war at least, Clausewitz emphasises the 'political object is the goal'.s9 1t can be argued good Australian air marshals, generals, diplomats and national leaders have always utilised an effects-based approach since formation of the Commonwealth of Australia-applying Australia's capabilities to achieving outcomes desirable to Australia's national interest across the spectmm from peace to war. If the reader glanced at one of Australia's larger newspapers today they would find articles describing how Australia was taking action through multi-national or bilateral fora to achieve a better political, military, social, environmental, or economic outcome for Australia. On this day, the RAAF would also be interacting with other air forces through air force attaches; operational exchanges, training exchanges, intelligence exchanges and hosting foreign officers, to mention a few-all with the aim of achieving an outcome that supports Australia's national interests. The RAAF has also applied force to achieve outcomes favourable to Australia. Other nations and their air forces are conducting similar activities that are also designed to achieve better outcomes for their own nation. The basic tenets of an effects-based approach are therefore not new.

E. Smith, Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis and War, Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program, Washington DC, November 2002, p. xxxvi.

IG Department of Defence, Future Wa6ghting Concepts, pp. 11-12; Department of Defence, Force 2020, p. 22.

57 Department of Defence, Future Warfihting Concepts, p. 12. Smith, EfSects BasedOperations, p. 103.

59 C.V. Clausewitr, On Wau, edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Parel, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1976, p. 87.

Culturn1 Influences on Air Force Coalition Operations andEffects-Based Operations

East Timor's recent struggle for independence provides perhaps the best and most recent example of Australia taking a range of actions, including force, in a range of fora to achieve outcomes beneficial to Australia. These actions included the following:

Prime Minister Howard writing a letter to Indonesia's President Habibie in December 1998, suggesting it may be an opportune time to resolve the issue of East Timor's future to remove an impediment in the bilateral relationship.60

Australia taking further diplomatic actions with both Indonesia and the UN that culminated in the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission in East Timor to conduct the popular c~nsultation.~'

Following the popular consultation and the ensuing violence, Australia took further actions through the UN and other international anisations to gain authority for UN intervention through a UN sanctioned force.

At an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting, Australia intensified its diplomatic actions for an international force in East Timor and supported efforts by the International Monetary Fund and US to encourage Indonesian acceptance for such a forceF3

On 20 September 1999, Australian-led INTERFET forces entered East Timor and achieved success in stabilising the security situation through the application of military force.64

This summary of events demonstrates the range of actions taken by Australia, each of which could be considered part of an effects-based approach, that directly contributed to Australia's desired outcomes of good relations with ASEAN member nations and East Timorese able to live free from violence.

This paper will henceforth concentrate on EBO as the operational component of an effects-based approach. This distinction is made to separate EBO carried out by the armed forces through a targeting selection process, and diplomatic or economic actions taken by other government departments as part of an overall effects-based approach-though it is recognised targeting selection is largely accomplished at the strategic level rather than at the operational level.

NATION& CULTURE AND EBO

The shaping of another nation's behaviour is the essence of an EBO. It is these behaviours which are translated into actions and decisions by other nations that affect Australia's national interests. To ensure these actions and decisions are in line with

60 Rvan. Primarv Res~onsibilities andPrimarv Rish. o. 12. ' L ' S ~ ~ ' K c ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ l ~ n ~ . l 2 l t 1 lv,J5, 7 k I . j I ? ~ ~ < / ' J Y ! l l Juns 1 ~ ~ 1 1 p 2 , , l . L : . " ' ( ' I ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ . .AI 111: \\ ~111r1.'' ~11.1 HO~I.L~II.~~I,III lnt;r\.~,imtl. .\u..tr;iI~.~'s II~,>I,LIIICIII \ u t l >

INTEWET', in ~ntemat iono l~ea~ekeep in~ , Vol. 8, No. 3, Autumn 2001, London, 2001, p. 7. 63 . . ~ b ~ d . , p. 8; W. Maley, 'Australia and the East Timor Crisis: Some Critical Comments', in Australian

Journal qjIntemationnlAffairs, Vol. 54,No. 2, p. 158. 64 Ryan, Primay Responsibilities and Primay Risks, p. 69; I . Boslock, 'Briefing, East Timor: An

Operational Evaluation, By the Book', in June's Defence Weekly, 3 May 2000, p. 23; UNTAET Chronology 2003, 'The United Nations and East Timor: A Chronology 1999-2000-2001-2002', http:lIwww.un.orglpeace/etimor/Untaetchrono.htm, accessed 23 April 2003.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cullurcs

Australia's desired outcomes, various Australian capabilities are used to influence or shape the behaviour that led to them. These may include political, economic and military capabi l i t ie~.~~ Another definition of EBO has therefore been proposed which states EBO 'are a coordinated set of actions directed at shaping the behaviour of friends, neutrals and foes in peace, crisis and war'.66 This definition's focus on EBO shaping behaviour rather than achieving outcomes, as in the Australian definition, clarifies what EBO impacts most directly: behaviour. For the outcome to be altered to a more desired outcome, it is the behaviour leading to that original outcome that must be modified or shaped. The requirement to shape behaviours leads to the cognitive domain of the human, as it is within this cognitive domain behaviour is formulated, rationalised and enacted. However, not all humans come to the same understanding of a situation, decide on the same response, then react the same.67 But they all do act rationally according to their own values and experiences. National culture embodies many of these values that inform behaviour. While EBO are carried out largely in the physical domain, it is in the cognitive domain EBO must impact if behaviours, and therefore outcomes, are going to be altered. Commanders and their staff must therefore have an understanding of both the origins of an adversary's behaviour they wish to modify and the impact they will have on the adversary's behaviour as part of their EBO. Actions taken by another nation's leaders will be rational, but this rationality may not be the same as our own.@ The cardinal sin in EBO is ethnocentricity, that is, to assume another nation will perceive, assimilate and react the same way as us to actions or stimuli.

An understanding of national culture, in particular strategic culture, offers the best way to discern the values and influences that shape a nation's strategic behaviour. Chapter 2 offers an explanation of strategic culture and its components of geography, history and political culture. Hofstede's dimensions of culture also offer a way to recognise and quantify differences between national cultures that can assist identifying influences that affect another nation's behaviour. The model presented in Figure 2.1 and Hofstede's dimensions will be used for the culture EBO model used in this chapter.

TARGETING AND EBO

Targeting is the process the RAAF uses to identify targets and determines the attack system to capture, destroy, degrade or neutralise them.69 Identifying the most important enemy Centre of Gravity (COG) in a given time, place and situation that eventually become targets has been the prevailing concern of most air power theorists. In 1921, Douhet first proposed population centres were the COG that could ensure victory. The Air Corps Tactical School argued bottlenecks were the COG that could cripple a nation because of the nation's dependence on its industrial web. Slessor argued lines of supply and communications were the most important COG. Boyd's OODA (Object, Orient, Decide, Act) loop placed a time dimension on targeting while emphasising the adversary's mind as an important element in targeting. Warden's five

" Smith, Effects Based Operations, pp. 103-104 66 . . ~ b ~ d . , p. 108. 67 . . ~ b ~ d . , pp. xv, xvi. 68 . . ~bld., D. 187. 69 ~ e p 2 m e n t of Defence, Australian Defence Force Publication StaJf Duties Series ADFP 101,

Glossary, p. T-3.

Cultural Influences on Air Force Coolition Operations nndE&!cts-Based Operations

rings emphasise the enemy leadership at the centre and surrounded him or her with the leadership's essential supporting elements, such as the communications network, electricity grid and the road and rail system. Increased awareness of the differing rationalities of nations and their attitudes to conflict has led air power theorists to consider more the will of the enemy, rather than just a nation's ~a~abi l i t ies . '~ Will is defined as the 'the power of choosing one's own actions'?' Perhaps this dimension of will was first recognised by Douhet who identified population as the most important COG and argued their annihilation by air forces would make their leaders sue for peace. Nevertheless there remains a lively debate on whether adversary will or capabilities should be regarded as important COG and thus important targets. This paper takes the view it is the will of the enemy that is of overriding importance.

The manifestation of will is behaviour. The act of choosing one's own actions, or will, results in a set of activities or behaviour. While national leadership may have the collective will to occupy another nation's territory, it is generally the manifestation of that will, their behaviour, in actually occupying territory that is the issue of concern that generally leads other nations to respond with force. These behaviours are influenced by values. Value is a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs.72 In occupying another nation's territory, national leadership is influenced by values that place greater weight on the benefits to be gained from occupying temtoly than any perceived harm that may resnlt from such behaviour. If these values were altered, that is, the extent of actual or potential harm was greater than expected and the benefits of occupation were less than expected, the original will to occupy this territoly may be altered with the resultant behaviour of withdrawal from this territory. This simple explanation serves to emphasise the role of values and behaviour within discussions concerning will. Wijninga and Szafranski consider values to be so important in altering the will of an adversaly's leadership, they have coined the term 'value targeting'?3 This is to distinguish itself from previous notions of utility targeting that were largely directed at infrastructure and capabilities as utilities of war fighting.

Value Based Targeting

Value based targeting aligns with EBO. EBO is about shaping behaviour that is influenced by values. To modify or shape this behaviour will therefore require the values that impact on this behaviour to be affected. The location of most existing values that impact on behaviour has been identified within the cognitive domain of national culture. It is in this cognitive domain of adversaly national culture that value based targeting must be designed to impact and through that, shape or modify behaviour. This concept is illustrated in the following simple model of adversary national culture, subject to value based targeting in order to change behaviour.

70 P. Meilinger, 'Air Strategy Targeting For Effecl', in Aerospace Power Journal, Winter, 1999, Air University, h t t : l / w w w . a i r p o w e r . m a x w e l l . a f . m i l / a i r c ~ , accessed 28 January 2003, pp. 1-8.

71 Delbndee & Bemard reds.). The Macauavie Concise Dictionam. o . 1347. , ,. , . . " Hofstede, Culture's Consequences, 71 P. Wiininpa, 8i R. Szairanski, 'Beyond Utility Targetine Toward Axioloeical Air O~erations'. . - -

i n ~ e r i s ~ i c e Power Jouunal, Winter 2000, Air University, htrp:llwww.air~ower.ma~ell.af.mili airchronicles1apjiapj001win001s~afran~ki.h accessed 28 January 2003, p. 4.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

ADVERSARY NATIONAL CULTURE

, .................................................... Hofstede's

Strategic Culture Cultural Dimensions

L 8

, l ....................................................

Figure 4.1: Culture EBO Targeting Interaction Model

In Figure 4.1, RAAF tactical operations are shown targeting those aspects of adversiuy national values that most influence the original behaviour producing outcomes against Australia's national interest. The outcome desired by Australia is labelled desired outcome. To achieve this desired outcome certain behaviour is required which is labelled desired behaviour. Values that have the potential to influence the original behaviour are shown as 'target value sets'. These values are defined as target values because these are the values that must be impacted for the EBO to be effective. For Target Value Set A the impact desired is one of strengthening, while for Target Value Set B the impact required is to weaken these values. The complementa~y nature of these push-pull values does not seem to be recognised in much of the literature concerning EBO that concentrates on the

Cultural InJluences on Air Force Coalition Operations andEfSects-Based Operafionr

weakening effects of EBO, such as breaking the enemy's will and Smith's list of the four kinds of effects in EBO: chaos, entropy, foreclosure, and shock and psychological attrition.74 The focus on these weakening effects seems to ignore the impact positive effects can potentially have on shaping behaviour. Within the air power context these positive reinforcements could be conducted through air dropping of supplies or psychological operations such as leaflet dropping that highlight the benefits of taking a different course of action.

APPLYING THE MODEL TO AN EBO

Recalling the example provided earlier of US and British forces targeting Milosevic's supporters in 1999, the following provides an example of the values, behaviours and outcomes as they apply to this example of an EBO and the model in Figure 4.1.

National Values

The national values were those embodied in the national culture of Serbia as espoused by President Milosevic. This national culture placed a very low value on the worth of Kosovars in Serbia and a high value in them leaving Serbia. He also placed a very high value on the material support provided to him by the industrialists Sainovic and Matkovic. Sainovic and Matkovic in turn placed a very high value on their relationship with Milosevic and the source of their wealth, that is, their factories in east Serbia.

Original Behaviour and Outcome

Milosevic adopted behaviours of violence towards the Kosovars that resulted in a great number of refugees and persecution of Kosovars. These behaviours and outcomes were unacceptable to the US and British governments who conducted a number of political, economic, and finally military actions against Milosevic in order to change his behaviour to the desired outcome of not oppressing the Kosovars.

Target Value Sets

The Target Value Set B for Milosevic was identified as the material support provided by Sainovic and Matkovic, that in turn depended on the factories as sources of wealth. US and British forces attempted to reinforce the link between these parts of the target value set by sending e-mails and faxes warning these industrialists their factories would be destroyed if they continued supporting Milosevic, thus weakening the strength ofthis value set.

Desired Behaviour and Outcome

The destruction of their factories was designed to change the behaviour of Milosevic by depriving him of the support of these industrialists. In the conceptual domain, the effect was to weaken the values helping Milosevic resist other attempts by US and British forces to alter his behaviour to one more amenable to the US and Britain. The EBO identified these factories as the physical target sets that could potentially alter these values.75

Smith, Effects Based Operations, p. 257. '' Arkin & Windrem, The Other Kosovo War

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Culiures

EBO are complex tasks that must be planned, conducted and evaluated across the physical, information and cognitive domains within foreign cultures. Linkages between these domains must also be identified and understood, as it is only in the physical and information domains that targeting can be conducted. There are also a range of other influences both within and external to a nation that are usually context dependent which must also be recognised and accounted for when planning, conducting and assessing EBO.'~ Figure 4.1 provides a simple model that offers a way to better understand the relationships between EBO, national culture, and targeting within the most difficult dimension of the cognitive domain. In short, it conceptually locates the effect in Effects-Based Operations.

SUMMARY

Australian warfighting concepts require commanders and their staff to have a good understanding of the cultures of friendly forces, neutral parties and adversaries. Previous chapters proposed conceptual models and explanations on how to view and understand national culture and its influence on air power doctrine. These models have been used in this chapter for coalition partners and adversaries to assist commanders and their staff achieve an improved understanding of culture in the context of interoperability and EBO. The DSTO OIMM is a model that offers a way to assess levels of interoperability likely to be achieved between organisations working together. The limitations identified in the OIMM when applied to air force coalition operations were identified and a new AFCIM, based on the OIMM, was proposed that overcame these limitations. Hofstede's cultural dimensions and national air power doctrine were identified as valid inputs to this model. The AFCIM will enable Australian commanders and their staff, particularly at the strategic level, to assess levels of interoperability across a range of nations using readily available and validated cross-cultural information. A conceptual model was proposed for EBO that demonstrates where concepts such as will, values, behaviour, culture and outcomes are placed within the context of targeting as understood by air forces.

For more on dealing with this complexity and more complex examples of how EBO may be considered, see Smith, Effects Based Operations, pp. 23 1408.

58

CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDY - REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

This chapter will identify the strategic and aviation cultures of the Republic of Indonesia using the frameworks described in Figures 2.2 and 3.1. The applicable air power doctrine themes will then be identified. The relationship between these air power doctrine drivers and Indonesian air power doctrine will be analysed. This analysis is limited to the Republic of Indonesia only. It should not be seen as representing some sort of generic South-East Asian strategic or aviation culture.'

REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

The Republic of Indonesia came into existence on 17 August 1945, and even then took another four years before the majority of its claimed territory was free of occupying forces. It has the largest population of Muslims in the world, yet is also home to the largest Buddhist monument in the world.' It is Australia's closest and most significant neighbour, yet most of its physical and ethnic characteristics are very different to ~ustral ia 's .~

Indonesia has a unique set of national beliefs and values which accepts force may be required to prevent disintegration of the nation, responds well to authoritarian leadership, and places their armed forces in a central role within their society to enhance security and facilitate national development. Indonesia does not seem to have strong beliefs that promote the concept of aviation. The origin of these and other significant beliefs and values that comprise Indonesia's strategic and aviation cultures will be analysed and described in the following paragraphs.

STRATEGIC CULTURE OF INDONESIA

Indonesia's strategic culture is dominated by two fears. The first is that the Unitary Republic of Indonesia will break up and cease to exist as a n a t i ~ n . ~ Their second fear

' For overviews of other strategic cultures in Sauth-East Asia, see Booth & Traod (eds.), Strategic Culfures in the Asia-Pac@c Re~igion, which covers the nations of China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Myanmar, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. Approximately 188 million Indonesians, or 87 per cent of the population, are Muslims; see SBS World Guide, p. 354. Borobudur, built over the period AD 780 to 850, located on the island of Java, is the largest Buddhist monument in the world, see E. Oey (ed.), Java, Periplus Editions (HK) Ltd, Singapore, 1997, pp. 184185. Indonesia is an archipelagic nation made up of mostly fertile islands with many still active volcanoes, while Australia is predominantly a single land mass with largely barren soil and extinct volcanoes. GDP per head of population Australia in 1999 was US$22,200, while Indonesia's was US$2800. Avnage population density of Indonesia is 107 persons per sq km, while Australia's is 2.3 persons per sq km. See SBS World Guide, pp. 41,48, 354, 358.

"he official name of Indonesia is the Republic of Indonesia, though the nation is often referred to in semi-official Indonesian Government communications as the Unitary Republic of Indonesia

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Culfures

is their anned forces are unable to guarantee Indonesia's independence and territorial integrity without significant involvement by the populace.5 The roots of these fears, and thus their strategic culture, can be traced to Indonesia's ethnic and geographic diversity; a history of foreign domination and exploitation by at least two major powers in the last hundred years; and their struggle for independence. Each of these issues will be further analysed using the strategic culture framework of geography, history and political culture.

GEOGRAPHY

Indonesia sits astride the equator at a significant junction of the world. In previous times Sinic, Hindu, Islamic and Western civilisations met and interacted within and in the vicinity of this archipelago. In more recent times Indonesia has found itself 'between the concentration of industrial, technological, and military power in North-East Asia, the Indian sub-continent and the oil resources of the Middle East, and Australia and the South-West ~ a c i f i c ' . ~ Indonesia is the world's largest archipelagic nation with more than 17,000 islands, though some 60 per cent of the 216 million inhabitants live on the island of Java.' There is at least 370 different ethnic groups and 67 primary languages with Bahasa Indonesia the official language.8 Muslims comprise 87 per cent of the total population but there are provinces where Muslims are the minority, such as Bali with 93 per cent Hindu, West Timor with 90 per cent Christian, and lrian ~ a ~ a ~ with 87 per cent ~hristian."

The larger Indonesian islands of Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Irian Jaya are characterised by mountainous volcanic terrain covered by dense equatorial rainforest." The island of Java has less rainforest, more arable land and is the most

(Negnua Kesatuan Republik Indonesia or NKRI). It can be argued this emphasis on unity in official rzferences to the nation is in itself an indication of their fear the nation is not in fact united. D.F. Anwar, 'Indonesia: Ketshanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara, Hankamrata', in Booth & Troad (eds.), Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacr$c Region, p. 199. A. Rabasa & P. Chalk. Indonesia's Transfomation and the Stabiiini o f Southemt Asia. RAND. , .. Santa Monica, 2001, p. 1. ' SBS World Guide, p. 354. I. Gayo (ed.), Buku Pinlav Seri Senior (Senior Studies Book), Upaya Warga Negara, Jakarta, 2000, pp. 7-8. The Indonesian province located to the west of PNG on the island of New Guinea was named West Irian by Indonesia, after the Dlltch relinquished canhol over the area they called West New Guinea in 1963. In 1973, the name was formally changed to Irian Jaya. On 16 September 1999, President Habibie under Law No. 45 (UU No. 45 1999) divided lrian Java into three ~rovinces of Irian Java

~ a h f d endorsedchanging the name of lhesiprovinces from Irian Jaya to Papua. This decision was again disputed within the Indollesian parliament. Under Presidential lnshuction (Inpres) No. 1 of 2003 President Megawati called For lrian Jaya's three new names, according to the changes made in 1999, be recognised by the parliament. This decision also does not seem to have been fully endorsed by the parliament. For an excellent summay of all the issues involved in the naming of this area o f Indonesia: see Indonesia Briehe. Dividinp Paaua: How Not To Do It. International

~ -

Asia, p. 2. " SBS WorldCuide, p. 354.

Case Study - Republic ofIndonesia

densely populated at 826 persons per square kilometre." Indonesia is rich in mineral resources with the 13" largest gas reserve in the world, 22nd largest proven oil reserves and seventh largest gold producer in the world.13 A map of Indonesia is provided at Appendix G.

Geographical Aspects of Indonesia's Strategic Culture

Indonesia is a diverse archipelago of mountainous tropical islands with abundant natural resources inhabited by a wide range of diverse ethnic groups, each with their own native language, located alongside one the great trading and communication routes of the old and modem world.

First Buddhist, and later Hindu-Buddhist empires controlled much of the archipelago from the l" Century to the mid-1400s. From 1293 to 1453, the most dominant was the Majapahit Empire centred in Java. Indian Hindu epics introduced by this empire, such as the Mahabharata and Ramayana, have survived Islamisation and has since been adopted by Indonesians with their characters taking on local heritages.14 Examples of this include their use by the Japanese to spread messages supporting Japanese values during their occupation; Sukarno's manipulation of the symbols in these epics to support his concept of guided democracy in the 1950s; and the allusion to a strong character in these epics by Suharto when he took over as President in 1966.'' Today, these epics are most obvious in traditional story telling; Javanese and Balinese art and drama, such as shadow-puppet theatre or wayang; and use of Sanskrit, an ancient Indian language, in national slogans such as Bhinekka Tunggal Ika (Unity in ~ i v e r s i t ~ ) . ' ~ The introduction of Islam into the area by traders from the Middle East coincided with the Majapahit Empire's decline.

Dutch Occupation

The Portuguese, then the Dutch began to assert a greater control over Indonesia and surrounding regions in pursuit of commercial gain." By 1602, the Dutch United East India Company was formed in Batavia (now Jakarta) and had gained control over Java and surrounding islands.18 Dutch control was briefly relinquished to the British as a result of the Napoleonic wars in 1811, but was returned to Dutch control in 1814. The return to Dutch control was not welcome by the locals, who responded with armed

12 . . ~bld., p. 354. '' BP Statistical Review of WorldEnera, http:/lwww.bp.com, accessed 10 August 2003. The Freeport Grasberg mine in Irian Jaya is the largest single gold producing mine in the world and accounted for 62 per cent of Indonesia's gold output in 1999, see P. Plowden & G. Wilde, Burning Bright, The Impovtance of Gold Mining to the Asia-Pacific Region, World Gold Council, Public Policy Centre, 27 September 2001, http:llwww.gold.orglp~hi~ehtml/27-09-Olhtml, pp. 30, 31, accessed l l August 2003.

l4 0. Wolters, Histov, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1999; M. Ricklefs, A History of M o d m Indonesia Since c.1300, 2"* Edition, Macmillan Press Ltd. London. 1993. D. 52. . .

'I ibid., pp. 202,258, 289. Ricklefs, A Histov of Modern Indonesia Since c.1300, p. 53.

l 7 . . ~bld.. U. 21: Anwar. 'Indonesia: Ketahanan Nasional. Wawasan Nusantara. Hankamrata'. in Booth ,. . & Trood (eds.), Strategic Culture8 in the Asia-Pacific Region, p. 201

'' SBS World Guide, pp. 354-355.

Winning With Anuralinn Air Power in Diverse Cult~ors

rebellions lasting five years that were brutally suppressed by Dutch forces.19 The Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL), a mercenav army similar to the French Foreign Legion, was formed in 1830 in response to this rebellion.20 The Dutch continued to exploit both the natural resources and indigenous population of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) that bad now become vital to the economic health of the etherl lands.^'

In 1901, Queen Wilhelmina announced the Ethical Policy, which resulted in better health care, improved education and expanded infrastructure for N E I . ~ ~ This policy produced well-educated Indonesians, such as Sukamo and Hatta, who became key figures in Indonesia's struggle for independence. Their initial frustration at managing local affairs under close supervision of the Dutch led them to become leaders of various nationalist movements and their subsequent imprisonment. Islamic-based nationalist organisations, such as Sarekat Islam, started to appear in 1912 in response to Christian missionaries and aggressive Chinese business comnpetition. In 1928, the concept of one people, one nation and one language (Bahasa Indonesia) was first articulated at the second Youth Congress in Batavia. By 1941, there was 20 indigenous KNIL officers with some four years of military training who later became key figures in Indonesia's armed forces2'

Over 300 years of Dutch rule left a largely uneducated indigenous population mostly excluded from leadership roles in local civilian and military organisations. To both the indigenous population and few local leaders, 'Dutch colonialism represented a burden which must never again he to~era ted . '~~

Japanese Occupation

In just 59 days, from December 1941, the Japanese gained effective control of the archipelago froin an allied force made up of mostly Dutch forces.25 Like the Dutch,

'' I. MacFarling, The Dual Function of the Indonesian AnnedForces Military Politics in Indonesia, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2001, pp. 14.

20 . . ~ b ~ d . , pp. 14-15. 21 . - 1b1d In the mid-1800s, revenue from NE1 paid far as much as one third of the Dutch Government's

budget, see I. MacFarling, 'The Background to the War of Nalianal Libemtion in the Indonesian Archipelago 1945-1949', in K. Brenl (ed.), Air Power and Wars of National Liberation; The Proceedings of the 2002 RAAF History Conference, Aerospace Centre, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2003, p. 55.

" I. Macparling, 'The Background to the War of National Liberation in the Indonesian Archipelago 1945-1949'. p. 55.

23 . . ~bld., pp. 5658 ; B. Yorke, Political Culture and the Indonesian AnncdForces: Demythologising the Origins of Zxdonesian Military Values, unpublished sub-thesis, School of Politics, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 2002, pp. 27-28.

24 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since e. 1300, p. 195. " From 15 January 1942 to 25 February 1942, the campaign to defend NE1 was led by a British

General who commanded the America-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) Command. Before the ABDA the Dutch were in command and in the majority with Australian, British and US forces based in the area. Many of the non-Dutch farces arrived too late and there was little coordination amongst these forces, even under the ABDA Command. About 3000 Australian troops under the command of Brigadier Blackburn VC assisted the 25,000 Dutch troops defend Java. Most of these Australians were later taken as POW following the 'brutally efiicient' Japanese advance. See 'ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) Command' and I. Coates, 'Netherlands East Indies Campaign', in Dennis, P,, Grey, l., Morris, E., Prior, R. & Connor, J. (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1995, pp. 3, 418-420.

Case Sfudy - Republic of Indonesia

the Japanese co-opted the indigenous population into administering the archipelago. However, unlike the Dutch, the Japanese also modernised the archipelago through mass mobilisation and the development of disciplined youth movements and armed militias. PETA was the most significant of these armed militia^.'^ PETA was an independent force responsible only to the Japanese Supreme Commander, territorially based, required to fight to the death in defence of their territoly, and comprised only indigenous ~ndonesians.~' Organisations like PETA were established to inculcate Japanese propaganda and ease the burden of Japanese soldiers defending this part of their Greater East Asia CO-prosperity Sphere. They later became the foundation of many nationalist institutions. Japanese styles of discipline, an institutional framework and the primacy of violence were introduced to more than 1.5 million youths through militaly training by the end of World War 11. This compares with just 20,000 who received military training in KNIL. Japanese values of a fighting spirit and primacy of violence were also introduced into other non-military youth organisations. The inculcation of these Japanese militaristic values into Indonesian society were acknowledged more than 50 years later in the official history of the Indonesian armed forces as the genesis of Indonesian's tendency to achieve goals by the use of f o r ~ e . ' ~ In the eyes of indigenous Indonesians, the swift Japanese victory over their long time oppressors, the Dutch, amply demonstrated the success of these values. Yorke contends that through a process of localisation, these Japanese values are now an integral part of the Indonesian militiuy culture of today.29

In early 1945, the Japanese started to lose control of their militia and came to more fully realise Indonesian's hunger for independence. Sukamo was able to unify the disparate nationalist movements under Japanese promises of independence within the Greater East Asia CO-Prosperity Sphere. A key attraction of his call to unity was articulation of five principles, ~ r ~ a n c a s i l a , ~ ~ that became Indonesia's official national philosophy and the preamble of every one of Indonesia's three constitutions. Two days after Japan surrendered, Sukamo proclaimed the independence of the Republic of Indonesia by reading a simple five line statement in Jakarta then raising a red and white flag. A central Republican government was hastily established which adopted Undung Undung Dasar I945 (UIJD 45) as their constitution and appointed Sukamo as President with Hatta as Vice President. However, it took another four years before the Republic could rid itself of foreign forces. Ricklefs contends the preceding 'three and a half years of Japanese occupation constitute one of the most crucial periods of Indonesian history'."

The Japanese occupation left an indigenous population trained in militaly affairs, inculcated with a fighting spirit and a taste of independence while demonstrating Europeans could be defeated by Asians. However, they were also another occupying power that many Indonesians again suffered under.

26 Tenfora SttIiauela Pembela Tanah Air (PETA) (Volunteer Armed Forces Defender of the Homeland); see MacFarling, The Dual Funcfiox of the Indonesian ArmedForces, pp. 20, 21.

21 - - ~ b ~ d . , pp. 20,21. 28 As auoted in Yorke. Political Culluve and the Indonesian A m e d Forces: Demytholopisinp the . .

Origins of Indonesian Militay Values, p. 33. 29 . . rbld., pp. 32-35, 56-59. ' O These orinci~les can be summarised as belief in God. nationalism. humanitansm. social iuslice and . .

democracy, see Ricklefs, A Hislovy of Modevn ~ndonesia Since c.1300, p. 209. " ibid., pp. 199,210-211.

Winning With A~stralion Air Power in Diverse Ctrilures

Allied Occupation and the Struggle for Independence

The only factor uniting the many armed groups and self proclaimed nationalist leaders in the Republic's early years was a common desire for independence. Aims of the Allies after World War I1 were to return all allied Prisoners Of War (POW) and return Indonesia to the status quo before the war; Dutch rule. Key differences among the competing Indonesian groups related to whether or not to negotiate with the Allies over sovereignty or fight for it as independence was not negotiable; and whether or not their army was an autonomous body or answerable to the civilian government. In the first Dutch military action in June 1947 against the Indonesian National Army (TNI), the Dutch took control of the cities and main highways but not the countryside. TNI's disunity, infighting with the politicians and lack of technological superiority were the main factors in this defeat. The main Indonesian political opposition was a revitalised Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). PKI's unsuccessful attempt at seizing political power in September 1948 spawned deep distmst of all things cominunist in at least the army elements of TNI that continues through to today. The second Dutch attack in December 1948 led to the capture of the entire Republican Government who 'went meekly into captivity'.32 Their meekness going into captivity infuriated senior TNI leaders and was the beginning of a deep distrust between senior TNI leaders and the civilian govemnent that also continues to this day. Many Indonesian leaders and academics assert that TNI must serve the nation first, not the government. However, many other leaders and academics firmly believe TNI must first serve the government. The events of 1948 and subsequent incidents crystallised these sharp differences of exactly where TNI's true loyalties should lie.33

Rebellions andMoney. Bowing to international pressure in 1949, the Dutch agreed to relinquish sovereignty over most of the archipelago. After a brief flirtation as the Federal Republic of ~ndonesia,)~ the archipelago was reunited as the Republic of Indonesia under another constitution on 17 August 1950. Notable exceptions were West New Guinea (now Irian Jaya) under Dutch control, and East Timor under Portuguese control. Within TNI, the officer corps was racked by internal division between KNIL trained officers with a professional behaviour based on hierarchy and disinterested discipline, and PETA trained officers with a revolutionary behaviour based on dash and ardour. By 1955 the revolutionaries had won. Meanwhile the PKI had become more powerful with an active grass roots organisation that translated to significant gains in provincial elections. In 1957, military commanders in Central Sumatra, North Kalimantan and Sulawesi launched a series of unsuccessful coups that resulted in the ~ ~ ~ l / ~ e r r n e s t a ~ ~ rebellion, partly due to TNI's internal rivalries and President Sukamo's proposals to reform the political system due to gains made by PKI. The US provided clandestine support in the form of arms, including combat aircraft, to the PRRI/Perrnesta rebels and proposed to Sukarno the landing of US Marines, ostensibly to protect US citizens and property in the oil fields of ~ u m a t r a . ~ ~ Sukarno rejected this offer and promptly secured the oil fields with Indonesian troops. Martial law was declared by Sukarno and the rebellion put down in 1958. Several

' h a c ~ a r l i n g , The Duo1 Funcfion of the Indonesian ArmedForces, p. 40. " ibid., pp. 35-41. 34 Republic Indonesia Seriiiat JRIS) (The Allied Republic of Indonesia). 35 Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRl)/ Piagram Pcrjuangan Semesta Alam

(Pemesta) (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of 1ndanesiaNniversal Struggle Charter). 36 US support was provided to these rebels as they were seen to be opposing an increasing powerful

communist influence in Indonesia.

Case Study - Republic of Indonesia

thousand lives were lost during this rebelli~n.~' The rebellion led to stronger central control of TNI regional commanders and inflamed leadership fears of foreign powers exploiting Indonesia's internal problems for their own ends that continues to exert a strong influence on the Indonesian psyche. In December 1957, TNI gained effective control of Dutch property, assets, machinety and oil concessions worth $1.5 billion due to strong anti-Dutch feeling aroused because of a failed UN resolution on lrian Jaya and TNI's increased powers under martial law. TNI now had access to significant sources of financial revenue independent of government controls, which continues to this day.38

Guerrilla Warfare and Islamic Insurgents. From 1948 to 1962, the Republic was also in conflict with internal Islamic insurgents. The most significant of these was the West Java based Dam1 Islam (DI) insurgency and its militaty wing the Indonesia Islamic Army (TII). The aim of D1 was the creation of an Islamic state of Indonesia based on Q'uranic sharia law. In the 1950% DIITII controlled most of the nual areas of West Java with its own administration, army, police and tax c~ l l ec to r s .~~ TNI's inability to gain control of these rural areas and their defeats at the hands of the more technologically advanced Dutch in 1947 encouraged TNI to adopt guemlla warfare as their preferred defence strategy. Essential elements of this strategy were local government operating independently and local TNI units operating in isolation with the support of the local population. Under the local Military Sub-District (KODM) Commander there were two parallel sets of staff, one under the sub district civilian head, the other under the KODM chief of staff. Without the support of the local people the system would not work. On this basis, senior TNI leaders continue to this day to claim legitimacy in domestic politics because TNI was 'from the people, owned by the people, and part of the people'.40 Kilcullen contends this style of guerrilla warfare was an important factor in the successful defeat of DIJTII by TNI in 1959 and was also used with less success against local insurgents in East Timor up until 1999.4'

Indonesia's perception of itself is heavily influenced by their struggle for independence. The following enduring values within Indonesia's strategic culture seem to have their roots in the crucible of this struggle:

Total defence where TNI is at one with the people. This is where TNI and the populace fight side by side, blurring the distinction between soldier and citizen.

The continuing tensions between whether TNI should be serving the Republic or the government of the day.

Firm suppression of groups opposed to the unity of the Republic of Indonesia, whether they be communists, separatists, religious extremists or army regional commanders.

37 Ricklefs, A History of Modem Indonesia Since ~ 1 3 0 0 , pp. 262-263. ibid., pp. 261-265; MacFarling, TheDualFunction of the Indonrsian AumedForces, pp. 39-50. D. Kilcullen, The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1945-99, unpublished PhD dissertation, School of Politics University College, The University of New South Wales, Canberra, 2000, pp. 50, 142.

40 MacFarling, The Dual Function of the Indonesian AumedForces, pp. 4142 . 4, Kilcullen, The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1945-99,

pp. 78, 116, 132.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Culrures

An abiding resentment of foreign interference, often perceived as a potential occupying power.

Acceptance of TNI co~ltrolling private enterprises and TIC7 using the benefits derived from them.

Independence, External and Internal Conflicts

It was perhaps not surprising that Indonesia's period of parliamentary democracy faltered with martial law being declared in 1957. Not surprising because most Indonesians were still illiterate and poor while the nation itself only had 'the traditions, assumptions and legal structure of a police state' they inherited froin the nlltch and ~ a ~ a n e s e . ~ ~ With the increasing popularity of PKI, there were competitions for power between PKI and army elements that dominated TNI. In the late 1950s, Sukarno increased the power of the previously small Indonesian Air Force and Navy through major equipment acquisitions and the placing of senior air force and navy officers into influential positions. These actions were part of Sukarno's preparations for the forceful annexation of Irian Jaya from the Dutch and to reduce the political influence of the army. However, it was international pressure that eventually saw this area transferred to Indonesian sovereignty in 1963 as Irian

President Sukarno, buoyed by his success with Irian Jaya, turned his attention to Malaysia where he saw 'Western neo-imperialists ... creating a puppet state on the Malay Peninsula' and no& coast of ~ o r n e o . ~ ~ He saw Indonesia surrounded by hostile nations with pro-British nations to the north and pro-Australian nations to the south and east. A small-scale border war on the island of Borneo ensued under the command of Air Marshal Omar Dani, Chief of the Indonesian Air Force. The Indonesian army was a reluctant participant. With the world now deep in the Cold War, President Sukarno angrily rejected offers of US economic aid, removed Indonesia from the UN, actively courted Communist China and made room in both the government and the armed forces for the increasingly powerful PKI. By this time PKI was aligned with Communist China and actively supporting villagers seizing land from landlords, many of whom were bureaucrats and army officer^.^'

Post-1965

On the night of 30 September 1965, PKI allegedly launched a coup against the Government with the tacit assistance of the Indonesian Air This poorly planned and inept attempt at a coup was promptly quashed by the army. Public perceptions 01 the events of this night mixed with a good dose of political opporlunism resulted in the brutal suppression of PKI with more than 500,000 of their

" Ricklefs, A his to^ of Modem Indonesia Since c1300, p. 237. " ibid., pp. 266278. j4 ibid., p. 265. " ibid., pp. 265-280. " For over 30 years under the Suharto regime, this was the essence of the official story about that

night. It can therefore be argued this myth, not the reality, has the most influence an Indonesian national culture. In reality, the most objective and cumulative evidence indicates a coup was anempted that was mast probably instigated by a number of disaffected senior army officers with minor PKI involvement and some air farce support, see ibid., pp. 280-282. A. Katoppo, A4enyingkap Kabut Halim 1965 (Exposing The Fog at Halim 1965), Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1999, provides an air force perspective of the events of that night, published post the Suharto regime.

Care S t u d y Republic of Indonesia

members and supporters slain throughout the Repuhlic and the ascension of then Major General Suharto to President in 1968.~' Under his Presidency the army dominated Armed Forces of the Repuhlic of Indonesia (ABRI), which now included the police, gained effective control of most civilian administration, was granted a significant number of seats in the national legislature and increased their involvement in private enterprises. In 1975, Indonesia annexed East Timor following indications Portugal intended to permit this area of the archipelago to gain independence.48 Major aid donors and neighbours accepted this annexation with little protest, though it was never recognised by the UN. Under the Suharto regime ABRI defined their role in Indonesian society through the concept of dwi firngsi (dual function). Under this concept ABRI was required to defend the archipelago against internal and external threats and perfonn a social political function.49 This social political function provided ABRl with a licence to be involved in virtually every aspect of Indonesian life. In 1992, approximately 14,000 ABRI officers were involved in non-military tasks."

Following the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and widespread student riots, Suharto reluctantly stood down as President. Under the next three Presidents of B.J. Hahibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarno Putri, Indonesia:

allowed East Timor to become independent; . removed the dwi fungsi role of ABRI;

renamed ABRI to TNl;

separated the police from TNI;

reduced the armed forces' formal role in the legislature and civil administration; and

in varying ways, addressed the problems of separatists in Aceh, Irian Jaya and the ~ o l u c c a s . ~ ~

Historical Aspects of Indonesia's Strategic Culture

The period post-independence strengthened Indonesian values concerning security and their armed forces that were fxst clystallised during their struggle for independence. TNI's deep involvement in all aspects of society was strengthened through dwi fnngsi and their control of private enterprises. Their deep-seated fear of foreign intervention was reinforced through US support for the PRRI/Permesta rebellion, Chinese support for the PKI and suspicions concerning Australia and the separation of East Timor. Fears about the disintegration of Indonesia were also reinforced through the PRRI/Permesta rebellion establishing an alternate government, ongoing actions by separatists in Aceh, Irian Jaya and the Moluccas and the separation of East Timor.

" SBS World Guide, D. 355. 48 ~bld., . . pp.,28&303.-

MacFarlmg, The Dual Function of the Indonesian ArmedForces, p. 127 10 - . ~bld.. no. 127. 145: non-militarv tasks were karvawan tasks.

Winning With Ausrvnlian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

The fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime on 21 May 1998 held out the promise of a new set of beliefs and values concerning politics in Indonesia. In June 1999, Indonesia held its first open election since September 1955, with most citizens free to choose their representatives from 48 political parties.52 The armed forces' formal roles within society and government were reduced with the abolishment of dwi fungsi, separation of police from TNI, and a reduction in the number of seats reserved for TNI in the national legislature. Many other significant changes have also occurred within the Indonesian political system since May 1 9 9 8 . ~ ~ However, there remains a political culture within Indonesia that, despite these changes, is likely to remain constant. For example, in a series of polls conducted for a leading Indonesian news magazine, TEMPO, in April 2003, most respondents stated there were few differences under Suharto, Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati in the areas of legal certainty, public services, civilian military relationship, clean governance, quality of ministers, and quality of other national institution^.^^ Most respondents also reported feeling 'just the same' on a range of quality of life indicators under Megawati compared to ~uharto." This section will provide a brief summary of the enduring aspects of Indonesia's political culture using Verha's framework introduced in Chapter 2.

National Identity

After centuries living as separate communities, each with their own language; 300 years of Dutch occupation and a traumatic struggle for independence; the 57 year old nation of Indonesia has a very low sense of national identity. This is most evident, paradoxically, in constant official exhortations on the need for national unity, while the armed forces are conducting military campaigns against disparate groups of citizens whose only common themes are their desire for separation and unfair treatment by the central leadership.56 Verba suggests nations are unlikely to address many important issues until a strong sense of national identity is achieved.57

Identification with One's Fellow Citizens

Indonesia's ranking as one of the more corrupt nations suggests Indonesians have a very low sense of oneness with their fellow Some Indonesian commentators also suggest the Javanese, the dominant Indonesian ethnic group, undermine all others apart from their immediate family and close acquaintances.59 Indonesia's recent history is replete with examples of the elite using force to ensure

Members of ABM, and later TNI, were prohibited from voting in national elections. T. Friend, Indonesian Destinies, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, London, 2003, p. 405.

'' Changes include removing restrictions on the press, allowing the importation and publication of communist publications, decentralising same authority to provincial governments, removing or reducing subsidies on many industries and products, pennitling presidential style elections in 2004 and empowering human rights and anti carmption commissions.

" Dala was collected from 1050 respondents in six Indonesian cities, see B. Harymurti (Editor in Chief). TEMPO. No. 37/III/ 20-26 Mav. Jakarta. 2003. no. 22-25.

55 . . " . . ...

~bld., p. 25. H. Crouch, 'Human Rights, Money and TNI Reform', in TEMPO, p. 19.

'' Verha, 'Comparative Political Culture', p. 533. 58 Transparency Intematiowl rated Indanesia as 1.9 in their 2001 Comrption Perceptions Index where

0 is highly corrupt and 10 highly clean (in comparison Philippines was 2.9 and Singapore 9.2), as quoted in Friend, Indonesian Destinies: p. 508.

59 See ibid., pp. 492498 for comments from a range of Indonesians and others on this subject.

Case Study - Republic ofIndonesia

compliance with government directions, which Verba suggests is a key indicator of a low level of identification with one's fellow citi~ens.~' Verba contends that without a high level of trust, there will he little continuation of policies between governments, frequent traumatic changes of power and scant compliance with government directi~n.~'

Governmental Output

Indonesians seem to have few expectations their government will produce significant change in their society. The high level of corruption within Indonesian society seems to indicate a low expectatioil of beneficial govemment output without presumably some form of extra payment or benefit to the relevant official, including the j~diciary.~' Perhaps another indication of lack of faith in government services is the high level of vigilante killings in Indonesia, which human rights organisations estimate at 1000 for the year 2000.~' Many of these vigilante killings seem to involve local community members identifying and catching a suspected thief then summarily executing them by setting them on fire before calling the police.

Process of Making Decisions

For 32 years under Suharto, decision-making was confined to the elites, and the general population had little influence over who comprised that elite.64 Sukanlo could also be viewed as an authoritarian leader. His speeches broadcast throughout the archipelago were said to be significant motivators for many indigenous Indonesians in their struggle for independence. Many Indonesians today still seem to refer an

. . autho~itarian style of national leadership, albeit one with honest leaders. This is despite the five years of reformation since Suharto's downfall that featured the first open elections in 44 years. A clear preference for an authoritarian and honest style of leadership indicates that perhaps Indonesians have strong beliefs concerning the process of making decisiolls within their society.

Political Aspects of Indonesia's Strategic Culture

In summary, Indonesia's political culture:

restricts the ability of the govemment to act decisively on behalf of the nation, unless led by an authoritarian leadership;

has traumatic changes of leadership and little continuation of policy between regimes; and

provides few government services.

60 Some examples are: official encouragement of the slaying of suspected communists from October 1965; the Suharto endorsed program of ABRI summarily executing suspected criminals and exhibiting their corpses in major cities in 1982-1983 (calledPetrus), see ibid., pp. 185-186; and the Trisakti shootings of 12 May 1998, where four protesting university students were shot dead and two wounded by suspected police or m y snipers during a demonstration in Jakarta calling for Suharto to resign. see ibid., on. 326-327. . . Verba, ' ~ o r n ~ k i t i v e Political Culture', pp. 536-537. Friend, Indonesian Destinie,s, pp. 471472; Harymurti, T E W O , pp. 9495,98-99, 100-101 '' Friend. Indonesian Destinie,~. nn. 487488. ~ . r r ~ ~~

64 ~arykur t i , TEMPO, p. 9. " About 68 Der cent of resoondents to the oreviouslv ~uoted TEMPO s w e v indicated an . .

aulhoritarian leader able to uphold the truth was needed to save Indonesia in the future, ibid., p. 24.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Divewe Cultures

AVIATION CULTURE

Aviation has been a prominent feature of the archipelago's history. Aviation has been most consistently used to enable communications within the widely diverse archipelago-first through Dutch airlines, Japanese and Allied transports before independence, then national airlines, aircraft industries and satellite communications post-independence. Indonesia's aviation culture will be analysed in more detail using the framework of analysis introduced in Chapter 3.

Only aircraft have been able to sinlultaneously cross the dividing seas and mountainous terrain that are central features of Indonesia's geography. Indonesia has also traversed these features through satellite communications by becoming the third nation in the world to use a satellite, Palapa, for domestic communications on 17 August 1 9 7 6 . ~ ~

HISTORY OF AVIATION

The first concept of flying in Indonesian culture was Raden Haqa Gatotkaca, a big strong warrior with the supernatural power of flying. He is from the Mahabharata epic that contains many moral and philosophical teachings adopted by Javanese. Gatotkaca was the air force of Pandawa who was engaged in a war to end conflict with Kauruwa. Gatotkaca was very effective in this battle.67 Gatotkaca is a central figure in traditional Indonesian story telling that remains very popular. The entrance to the main lecture theatre at the Indonesian Air Force Command and Staff College features a large mural depicting Gatotkaca in battle.

Aviation in the Struggle for Independence

The Dutch airline KLM, then its NE1 subsidiary K L I M N , ~ ~ offered the first regular flights to and from the archipelago in 1928 with a Fokker Fl8. In fear of a Japanese attack, the KNIL was bolstered by the deployment of fighter aircraft, bombers and flying boats to NE1 in the late 1930s. The Dutch only trained a few Indonesians as pilots before World War 11. Of the two trained in the Netherlands, one was killed in 1942; the other became the Indonesia's fust chief of air force.

follow in^ World War I1 the RAF. RAAF and Netherlands East Indies Air Force

The system included forty earth stations and cost a quarter of the entire national budget for that year. The name Palapa was taken from the oath of Gajah Madah, chief minister of the 14" Century Majapahit Empire, see Friend, Indonesian Destinies, pp. 241-242.

67 Mahrrbhu~uta, http:i/www.info-indo.comiwayan$mahabhaWm, accessed 4 September 2003; The S t a y of Bharatayuda, http:i/www.angelfire.com/nt2/oz2002indo/storyhharata~da.h~, accessed 4 September 2003. Koninklijke Nederlandsch-lndische Luchmvnurt Maatschappij.

49 The NElAF was initially completely under RAF and RAAF control; see G. Casius, 'The Use of Air Power in the National Liberation Struggle in Indonesia, 194549', in K. Brenl (ed.), Air Power and Wars of Nationai Liberation, p. 69.

Care Study -Republic of Indonesia

operations. The NEIAF quickly expanded in 1946 with significant RAAF support and additional aircraft. Their biggest burden was the air transport task with up to 60 C-47 Dakotas and even B-25s (with 15 passengers jammed in) operating as a virtnal internal airline.70

Meanwhile, the Indonesian Air Force ( A U R I ~ ~ ) had officially formed on 9 April 1946 with about 35 ex-Japanese planes. Neutralising AURI, destroying Indonesian radio stations and supporting ground forces were the NEIAF's objectives in the first Dutch military action in July 1947. AURI lost 20 aircraft on the ground during these attacks but managed to conduct minor counterattacks at three locations in central Java with ~ u n t a i ~ ~ and ~ u r e n ~ ~ ~ aircraft. On 17 December 1947, AURI conducted a paradrop using a C-47 in Kalimantan with the aim of establishing a radio station and organising local resistance. In December 1948lJanuary 1949, the Dutch launched their second military action with the NEMF conducting coordinated paradrops and attacks on airfields. Indonesia's national airline Garuda Indonesian Ainvays, traces its origins back to 26 January 1949, when it operated two C-47s into Sumatra in defiance of a Dutch blockade in support of the independence m~vement.'~ On 1 March 1950, the NEIAF transferred all its bases, aircraft7' and 10,000 trained personnel to A U R I ~ ~ following the official transfer of Dutch sovereignty to ~ndones i a .~~

The experiences of both AIJRI and Garuda in this crucial part of Indonesia's history has enabled both organisations to claim symbolically important credentials as active participants in Indonesia's struggle for independence. Unlike the army, however, AURI was heavily dependent on external assistance, like the ex-NEIAF personnel and aircraft, to become a viable organisation.

AURI and President Sukarno

In the 1950s, the AURI operated an air 'ansport service which, along with Garuda, played an important role unifying the fledgling Republic by transporting mail, money, civil servants, servicemen, teachers and books. In Februa~y 1958, AURI played a significant role in putting down the PRRZ/Permesta rebellion by striking at three PRRl installations. In May 1958, AURI was able to provide definitive proof of covert US support for the remaining PRRZ rebels, when a US B-26 on a bombing mission was brought down and the pilot revealed to be an employee of the CIA. AURI's success in these actions contributed to Sukamo actively favouring AURI over the m y and navy to the extent he wore pilot wings on his military uniform even though he never

7"bid., pp. 71-75. " From 1946 to 1965, Indonesia's air force was called AURI; after 1965 the name was changed to

Tentara Nasional Indonesia - Angkatan U d m VNI-AU) '"he Guntai was most probably a Mitsubishi Ki.5lb 'Sonia' (Army type 99 assault plane), the

bomber variant of a 1930 Japanese light attack bomber, all metal single radial engine monoplane, two crew, three machine guns and external bombs, see ibid., p. 81.

" The Cureng is the Yokosnka K5Y1 'Willow' aircraft, a 1933 Japanese all metal single radial engine biplane designed as an intermediate trainer, see ibid., p. 81.

74 Galuda Indonesia, Garuda Indonrria'x History, http:i/www.garuda-indonesia.com/about/ history.php, accessed 20 August 2003.

7' Aircraft transferred included 30 P-51s, 25 B-25s, C-47s and Calalinas. 76 FOI a brief period the official name of the Indonesian air force was Angkatan U d m Republik

Indonesia Sevikat (AURIS), following Indonesia's then name as RIS. 77 Casius, 'The Use of Air Power in the National Liberation Struggle in Indonesia', pp. 72-87;

R. Lowry, The AnnedForces ofIndonesia, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1996, pp. 102-103.

Winning With Atisfualian Air Power in Diverse Ctrltures

qualified as a pilot.7"his favouritism manifested itself in Sukarno, allowing AURl to acquire a range of advanced military aircraft in preparation for anticipated military actions against the Dutch to take control of Irian Jaya. By the 1960s, AURI's inventory included C - I ~ O B S , ~ ~ C-140 Jetstars, An-12B transports, MiG-15NTs, MiG-l7s, MiG-17PFs, MiG-19s, B-25 Mitchells, B-26 Invaders, P-51 Mustangs, Tu- 2 light bombers, IL-28 tactical bombers, Tu-16 strategic bombers, Tu-16KS-1 maritime strike with AS-I (Kennel) anti-shipping missile, PBY-SA Catalinas, Mi-4 and Mi-6 helicopters, and SA-2 SAMs. On paper, this inventory made AURI the strongest air force in South-East ~ s i a . ~ ' However, AURl probably lacked the capability to fully exploit the significant capabilities offered by these very advanced combat aircraft given their rapid acquisition, AURI's relative immaturity and Indonesia's nascent education system.81

At the height of AURI's operational capability in 1965, their basic doctrine revealed a continuing involvement in consolidating Indonesia's stnggle for independence. AURI's three fundamental functions in 1965, according to this doctrine, were as follows:

A tool of the revolution. This included functions such as politics, diplomacy, economy, industry, communications, distribution, social, education, culture, national character building, and religion.

A tool for defence. This included the conduct of offensive air actions to break the lifelines of imperialism and strengthen the progress of the revolution both internal and external to the nation.

A pioneer for the establishment of a secure national airspace and outer space. This included the development of aviation, rocket and space industries, developing mining, oil and electronic capabilities, increasing education, and cooperation with other nations to exploit space for the good of human kind."

TNI-AU

After the alleged communist coup on the night of 30 Septeinher 1965, over 300 air force officers were arrested and their chief, Air Marshal Omar Dani, was placed on trial. His death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment because ofthe air force's alleged complicity in this coup and the air force's previous close relationship with the communists at Sukamo's dire~tion.'~ From about 1969 the majority of TNI-AU's

See official picture of Sukarna in MacFarling, The Dual Fuizction of rhe Zi~donesian ArmedForces, p. 119. The C-130Bs were reportedly provided by the US in exchange for the US CIA pilot shot down by AURl in May 1958, see Scramble, Indonesian Air A m s Overview, 14 June 2003, htlp:llwww.scramble.nWmiW2ltniauimain.htm accessed 27 August 2003.

80 Stephens suggests AUWs perceived capabilities at this time generated the original requirement for Australia to acquire the F-1 11, see A. Stephens, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Vol. 2, The Royal Australian Air Force, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 285.

81 Lowry, The AmedForces of Indonesia, pp. 106105; H. Subato, 'Meneropong Air Power Alam Operasi Udara di Timor Timur', in K. Kardi & H. Subrata (eds.), Air Power Kekuatan Udava, Pustaka Sinara Harapan, Jakarta, 2000, pp. 175-1 77. Departemen Angkatan Udara RI, SWA BHUWANA PAKSA (Doktrin Dasar AURI) (Basic Doctrine orthe lndonesian Air Force), Pusat Penerangan, 1965, pp. 29,34-37. Omar Dani was released from prison on 16 August 1995.

Case Shrdy - Republic of Indonesia

Soviet origin aircraft were unserviceable with only 69 of the previous 400 Soviet advisers still in Indonesia and the 2000 Indonesians training in the Soviet Union mostly recalled.84 TNI-AU became the junior service under Suharto who strongly favoured the US over the communists. Dwi&ngsi and continuing suspicions (mostly groundless) of communist allegiances within TNI-AU were the most notable influences on TNI-AU under Suharto. Aircraft from the US became dominant in TNI-AU culminating in the acquisition of 12 F-16 in 1989, which partially restored its prestige. In 2003, TNI-AU announced the acquisition of two Su-27SK, two Su-30KI and two Mi-17 aircraft from Russia. This announcement came after four years of ongoing political difficulties with the US over the supply of parts and training for US-built combat air~raft.~'

Civilian and military aviation have played significant roles in the key iconic events of Indonesia's recent history. Aviation's role in national development and unification has been decisive, but its role in defeating armed aggression has not been as decisive. It was international pressure, not the threat or use of armed aggression, that led to Indonesia gaining sovereignty over Irian Jaya, even though AURI was the strongest air force in the region at the time. Their history suggests higher values would be placed on an air transport capability and air support for ground forces rather than long-range strike or extended air superiority within an overall set of national values. It is difficult to envisage any future change in these values without a strong national leader who favours aviation, such as Sukarno.

Indonesia has a very poor record in education. Before the 1900s, basic levels of education were practically unobtainable for most of the indigenous population. By 1930 the overall adult literacy rate was 7.4 per cent. Continuing education during World War I1 was virtually impossible because of the Japanese ban on Dutch and English books. By the 1960s education was a high priority. In 1961, the literacy rate for Indonesians over ten years old climbed to 46.7 per cent due to a common language and increased participation rate in schools. Overall education levels continued to improve under Suharto with 329,300 Indonesians enrolled in tertiary institutions in 1973.'~ The overall literacy rate in 1995 was 84 per cent."

The increased levels of education under Suharto are noteworthy but should be tempered by understanding the omnipotent presence of the national philosophy of pancasila within the education system. This overriding emphasis on nationalism and orderliness resulted in the higher education system focusing on economic and social development studies at the expense of creativity and intellectual independence. Studies in science and technology were also not encouraged under this system.88

~ ~~ ~~

84 LOW^, The AvmedForces oflndonesia, pp. 10G105. 81 . . ~ b ~ d . , pp. 105-108; M. Farrer, 'Sukhois Could Change the Balance of Power', in 1. Kerr (ed.), Asia-

Pacific Defence Reporter, Vol. 29, No. 4, June 2003, pp. &7. Ricklefs, A his to^ of Modern Indonesia Since c.1300, p. 286.

'' ibid., pp. 155, 159, 160, 201,238, 286, 305; SBS WovldGuide, p. 359. A. Vervoorn, RE ORIENT Change in Asian Societies, 2'Id Edition, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2002, pp. 139-140, 296; National Office of Overseas Skills Recognition, Country Education Profiles: INDONESIA - A Comparative Study, z " ~ Edition, Department of Employment,

Winning With Aurhalian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

Aviation, in all its forms, demands a high level of technological competence. It is difficult to see how an education system that has not emphasised creativity and sciences can provide the fm foundations required for this level of technological competence. Indonesia's emphasis on nationalism and discipline in their education system may be an indication that Indonesia places a low value on the education required for high technology capabilities, like aviation.

Analysis of Indonesia's airfields and national airline reveals a level of aviation services that seems significantly less developed than Australia's. This is significant for such a geographically diverse nation with about ten times Australia's population. Indonesia has 153 airports with paved runways but only four are longer than 3047 metres, compared with Australia that has 294 airports with paved runways and ten are longer than 3047 metres. There are also 478 airports with unpaved runways in Indonesia where 450 are less than 914 metres, while Australia has 150 airports with unpaved runways where only 14 are less than 914 metres. The majority of Indonesia's airports are located in the eastern provinces.89

International Airline Travel

Passenger and freight data for the national airlines of Indonesia, Singapore and Australia also indicates a less developed civilian aviation service than Australia or Singapore. Figure 5.1 provides statistical data from the International Airline Transport Industry (IATA) for the year 2000 for the national carriers of these nations:

Na~ion A~rlin? Total Internation~l Total I~~lernatin~ial Scheduled Schcdulcd rreigbt I'3zscngrrs C.lrried 'lonncs Carried

I I I ~ ~ ~ I I ~ > I J Gxru.I:l 2 U65 '13 1 61 356 Singapore Singapore Airlines 14 874 000 967 930 Australia Qantas 6 884 196 245 692

Figure 5.1: Airline International Passenger and Freight Loads for Year 2000.

The limited level of aviation services present in Indonesia seems to indicate an inability or perhaps unwillingness by Indonesians to fully exploit the potential of aviation in Indonesia.

Education and Training, Aush-alian Government Publishing Service, Canberia, September 1995, p. 30. CIA - The World Fact Book: Indonesia, 1 August 2003, http://www.cia.gov/cialpublications/ factbooWgeos/id.html, p. 12, accessed 5 September 2003; CIA T h e World Fact Book: Australia, 1 August 2003, hnp://ww.cia.govlcia/publications/factbooWgeos/as.html, accessed 5 September 2003; Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Southeast Asia, INFRASTRUCTURE, Indonesia, 4 December 2002; Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment: Oceania, INFRASTRUCTURE, Australia, 25 April 2002. IATA GABI-Data Table, hnp://m.iatagabi.org/ai~lines.htm, accessed 24 March 2003.

Cox Srudy - Republic oflndonesio

AVIATION INDUSTRY

Serial aircraft production in Indonesia commenced in 1961 in Bandung, with the licence build of 44 Polish PZL-104 Wilga aircraft, later known as Gelatik (Rice Bird) by LPIP.~' In the 1950s and 1960s, a number of Indonesian students were offered scholarships to go to Europe and the US to gain further education related to high technology industries. The most notable of these was B.J. Habibie. He spent 20 years in Germany and gained a doctorate in aeronautical engineering, then later became Vice President of Messerschmitt in erm man^.^^ With the encouragement of President Suharto, a personal friend of Habibie, more Indonesians were sent to Germany to work and study in science and technology. Ln January 1974, Habihie returned to Indonesia and was appointed Adviser to the President in the area of technology. In September 1974 an agreement was signed with MBB (formerly Messerschmitt) and CASA Spain for production of the BO-l05 helicopter and NC-212 twin-engine light transport. A number of other high technology companies joined forces on April 1976 and founded I P T N . ~ ~ In 1978, Habibie was appointed Minister of State for Research and Technology. With significant govemment subsidies IPTN went on to produce or assemble under licence French and US helicopters, Boeing 737 components, German torpedoes, Swiss and Belgian rockets, as well as gaining effective control of other i ndu~ t r i e s .~~

Habibie 'enjoyed Suharto's patronage' but was at odds with ABRI who in 1984 stated they only required 'assault rifles; military transports capable of take-off and landing on short airstrips; highly manoeuvrable helicopters; radio phones and telephones3." In 1993, economists estimated these 'strategic industries' were consuming nearly US$2 billion a year in state resources.96 However, funding for universities and research institutions, incubators of the expertise required for these industries, seemed to have been ignored in Suharto's quest for a high technology future. In 1989, the National Research Council budget was US$140,000 while 90 per cent of the 47 state universities had no research budget." In 2000, IPTN changed its name to I A ~ , ~ ' and is in the process of large scale restructuring following the curtailment of govemment subsidies after the 1997 Asian financial cri~is."~ 1Ae's future as an aircraft production company is in serious doubt.

The Indonesian aircraft industry has not fulfilled its promise of sustained aircraft production, despite the significant levels of government assistance it enjoyed. The generous subsidies are strong indicators at least Suharto and Habibie placed a high

91 Lembnga Persinpan Indusfri Penerbangan (LPIP) (Body for the Preparation of an Aircraft Industry) was an organisation associated with the Indonesian air force.

92 Friend. Indonesian Desfinies. D. 242.

built aircraft in 1965. In 1985, the name was changed& PT Industri Pesawnt Terbang Nusaxtarn (Archipelago Aircraft Industry), see Dirgantara Indonesia: Our Histov, http://www.indonesia- aerospace.comlhistory, accessed 5 August 2003.

94 . . ibid., Chapter 11; Friend, Indonesian Destinies, pp. 242-243. '' Friend, Indonesian Destinies, p. 243.

K . O'Rourke, Refonnasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Suharfo Indonesia, Allen & Unwin, CrowsNest, 2002, p. 141. Friend. Indonesian Destinies. no. 243-244.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Culhrres

value on aircraft industries. Arguably, this support was misdirected into just IPTN at the expense of other sectors, such as education. The value placed on high technology industries by today's leaders seems significantly less than under Snharto, even allowing for Indonesia's currently depressed economy.

AIR POWER DOCTRINE DRIVERS OF INDONESIA

Analysis of Indonesia's history, geography and political culture has revealed a set of distinctive beliefs and values concerning the threat or use of force, that is, their strategic culture. Similarly, an analysis of Indonesia's geography, aviation history, education, aircraft industry and aircraft services has revealed a distinctive set of beliefs concerning the value of aviation in Indonesia. Identification of these beliefs and values identifies a set of air power doctrine drivers which enable those not familiar with Indonesia to more readily identify how these beliefs and values drive or influence Indonesia's air power doctrine.

INDONESIA'S STRATEGIC CULTURE

Fears of disunity within the Republic of Indonesia and potential inability of TNI alone to resist foreign aggression are central features of Indonesia's strategic culture. The diverse communities that inhabit this fragmented archipelago have long histories of separation by terrain, language, religion and ethnicity. The relationships between these communities and the central authority, invariably located in Jakarta, has been a source of significant tension for the Dutch, Japanese, and Indonesians. Indonesians feel especially vulnerable when external powers are perceived to be capitalising on these internal tensions for their own ends. Beliefs born by experience that only TNI in cooperation with the people, not necessarily the government of the day, can effectively deal with these tensions led to TNI's central role in Indonesian society. Attaining a true sense of national unity has been a difficult task and this continues to impede the central government acting on behalf of the nation. There is little trust between Indonesians who seem to believe their govemment will provide few services. Great value is also placed on strong and honest leaders.

Indonesia seeins to have a weak aviation culture and is therefore unlikely to favour aviation over other forms of mobility. Indonesia's terrain is conducive to aviation and the ability of aircraft to cross this terrain has been highly valued by Indonesians. However, this unique ability to bridge terrain has not been sufficient for Indonesia to place higher values for aviation in areas such as education, aircraft industry and aviation services. The exceptions are AURI in the early 1960s and IPTN in the early 1990s. Indonesia's positive acceptance of strong leadership first identified in political culture seems the most significant factor in these exceptions. Both Sukarno in the early 1960s and Hahibie advising Suharto in the early 1990s placed a high value on Indonesia's air force and aircraft industry respectively.

Cose Study - Republic of Indonesia

In Chapter 3, the air power doctrine drivers of dominant air power roles support to national development, influence of land and sea-based forces and non-state influences were identified. Each of these will be analysed in relation to the values and beliefs identified in Indonesia strategic and aviation cultures.

Dominant Air Power Role

Indonesia's dominant air power roles will be those perceived to be of direct benefit to other non air power functions, such as support to the land forces or economic development. Long-range roles are likely to be supported because of Indonesia's strong beliefs about bridging their varied terrain over the length and breadth of their nation. Should the potential for air insertion or air strike by an external aggressor be identified, then the dominant air power roles are likely to shift to those most able to counter this aggression, though greater value will be placed on defending Java than other islands, to the extent they may tolerate an opposed landing and engage the occupiers in guerrilla warfare. Indonesian air power doctrine is therefore likely to emphasise support to the land forces and transport roles at the expense of strike and air control roles.

Support to National Development

Indonesia places great value on their armed forces supporting the nation's development. This reached its peak under dwi fungsi, when ABRI members could be found in every aspect of Indonesian society. Active involvement in national development is believed to directly contribute to Indonesia's success in guerilla warfare and counter insurgency. This is a fundamental and enduring aspect of Indonesia's strategic culture. Indonesia's political culture suggests that recent attempts to change these beliefs in the name of democracy or increased professionalism are unlikely to succeed. Indonesia's air power doctrine is therefore likely to place emphasis on the air force contributing to the development of the nation through measures such as fostering unification, opening up new areas for tourism and encouraging high technology industries and services.

Influence of Land and Sea-Based Forces

The army has exerted a significant influence in all aspects of Indonesian society, apart from a brief period in the early 1960s. Indonesia places very high values on army operations and army training. The brief domination of air force over army in the early 1960s is associated with instability and turmoil with no significant gains. The domination of high technology industries was brief and turned out to be unsustainable. Strong support to the army and less emphasis on independent air operations such as long-range strike and air control are likely to feature in Indonesian air power doctrine.

Non-state Influences

Lack of trust amongst fellow citizens and the tacit approval of TNI controlling private enterprises indicate non-state influences are likely to influence Indonesian air power doctrine. The low value placed on creativity within the education system also suggests that Indonesia's air power doctrine may not be a dynamic document that accounts for the extraordinary flexibility of air power and its rapid pace of development. An absence of original thinking to cater for Indonesia's unique circumstances or bias

Wi~lnning With Ausivaliori Air Power in Diverse Cu1lur.e.s

towards functions not in direct support of the nation are likely to be indicators of these non-state influences within Indonesian air power doctrine.

These air power drivers suggest Indonesia's air power doctrine may lack original thinking and tend to emphasise the following:

Army support roles and long-range transport tasks over long-range strike and air control roles.

Functions that will directly contribute to the development of the nation.

BASIC DOCTRINE OF TNI-AU

In 2000, TNI-AU published two publications that provide information on the air power doctrine of Indonesia. These two publications are Buku Petunjuk Dasar TNI Angkatan Udara (Basic Book of Instruction for The Indonesian Air Force), and Doktrin TNI-AU Swa Bhuwana ~aksar '@@ (Indonesian Air Force ~oct r ine) . '~ ' Only the Basic Book of Instruction was available to the author. This publication provides the basic stated functions of TNI-AU as well as the stated capabilities of TNI-AU derived from their doctrine publication.

Basic Functions of TNI-AU

The four functions of TNI-AU are as follows:

Defend the national airspace and integrity of the people while upholding the mle of law within the national airspace.

Develop the potential of the airspace by strengthening the security of the national airspace.

Conduct national welfare tasks such as the provision of assistance after natural disasters.

Active1 contribute to the efforts of the UN in their mission of bringing world peace. ,a:

The influence of the air power doctrine drivers seems evident in these four functions of TNI-AU. The second and third functions indicate an emphasis more on development tasks than purely defence tasks. This is in accordance with their strategic culture that features a strong link between the concept of security and national development and TNI's role as a central participant in this concept. These and other aspects of their national culture have coalesced around the air power doctrine driver of national development to significantly strengthen the power of this driver in the resultant list of TNI-AU basic functions.

loo Swa Bhwana Paha is the motto of TNI-AU and is sansknt for Air Guard of the Nation. ''l K. Haryono, 'Dokhin TNI-AU Swa Bhuwana Paksa 2010', in K. Haryono (ed.), Prognya Karya

Wiratarna No IAS-XIV TH.2003, Seskoau, Bandung, 2003, pp. 150-152. 102 Buku Petunjuk Dasar TNI Angkaian Udaro, Tentara Nasional Indonesia Markas Besar Angkatan

Udara, Jakarta, 2000, pp. 6 5 .

Case S f u d y Republic of Indonesia

Doctrine and Stated Capabilities of TNI-AU

The Basic Book of Instruction lists the following TNI-AU capabilities developed from Indonesian air power doctrine:

Core Capabilities:

Control of the air, which includes offensive air operations and defensive air operations.

Air strike, which includes strategic air strike, combat air support (supporting land and sea-based forces), air interdiction (striking enemy lines of communication and support), and airborne surveillance of land and sea-based installations.

Air transport, which includes air bases, aeromedical evacuation, search and rescue, airborne infiltration of enemy area, and social welfare tasks.

Additional capabilities, such as airborne surveillance, electronic warfare, airborne refuelling, and command and control.lo3

Aircraft and Capabilities. At first glance this comprehensive list of capabilities does not seem to follow the predicted air power doctrine drivers derived from Indonesia's strategic and aviation cultures. One explanation for this may be the presence of foreign air force officers in Indonesia's air power doctrine development cell for the last five years.'04 In addition, a review of the TNI-AU combat aircraft inventory for 200212003 reveals an air force that does not display the range of capabilities listed in their doctrine. Instead, the inventov displays the influences predicted in the air power doctrine drivers derive from their strategic and aviation culture.

In 2002, the combat aircraft inventory of TNI-AU consisted of the following:

71 fighter and ground attack aircraft with infra-red air-to-air missiles and short-range air-to-ground missiles,

15 reconnaissance aircraft,

3 long-range refuelling aircraft,

23 long-range transports,

40 fixed-wing short-range transports, and

48 helicopters.los

This inventory displays a clear emphasis towards the transport role with a bias towards short-range transport. It is difficult to discern any evidence of a strategic

l'' ibid., pp. 1tL15. Io4 From 1998 to 2003, RAAF Wing Commanders have been working in the air power doctrine cell of

the Indonesian Air Force Command and Staff College School in Lembang, Indonesia. ' O S Fighter and ground attack-AIMYP Sidcwinders, AGM-65 Mavericks, 14 X A-4s, 10 x F-16s, 7 X

Hawk Mk 109s, 28 X Hawk Mk 209s and 12 X F-5s; Reconnaissance--12 X OV-10 and 3 x B737- 200. Aerial Refuelling-3 x KC-130B; Fixed-Wing Transpotf--18 x C-130, 3 x L100-30, 1 x B707,4 x Cessna 207, 5 x Cessna 401,2 x C-402,6 x F-27-400M, 1 x F-28-1000,2 x F-28-300, 10 X NC-212 and 10 X CN-235; Helicopters-l0 x S-58T, 10 X Hughes 500, 11 X NAS-330,5 X NAS- 332L, 4x NBO-105CD and 8 x EC 120B, see The International Instimte for Strategic Studies, The Milita~Balance 2002.2003, Oxford University Press, London, 2003, p. 150.

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

strike capability within this inventoty, despite their doctrine referring to it as a core capability. The absence of long-range air-to-air missiles is also an indication little emphasis is placed on counter air tasks. In summary, the inventory displays the tendencies predicted in the air power doctrine drivers.

Indonesia's currently depressed economic circumstances and political restriction on access to US combat aircraft may in part explain this limited inventoly. This may be a valid explanation for their current aircraft operational rate of just 45 per ceut.lo6 It does not seem a valid argument, however, to explain the tendencies shown in their combat aircraft inventoly. Indonesia's last f o u years of a depressed economy must also be balanced with their previous 25 years of sustained economic growth with an average annual GDP growth rate of almost 7.0 per cent.''' They also had very good access to US combat aircraft and training over this period. It can also be argued their current low rate of combat aircraft operational is an indication of Indonesia's low aviation culture.

SUMMARY

The strategic and aviation cultures of the Republic of Indonesia reveals a unique set of national values that influence the way air power is applied in Indonesia. Indonesia will not hesitate to apply force against both internal and external adversaries who attempt to break up the Republic. Authoritarian leadership will be the most effective in guiding change within Indonesian society. There is an acceptance that to conduct their essential defence and security tasks, TNI must be closely involved in many aspects of Indonesian society. This closeness is seen as beneficial for national development. Indonesia's national culture does not feature strong beliefs on the overall value of aviation to the nation. The resultant air power doctrine drivers suggest an air power doctrine biased towards transport and army support tasks. While their doctrine does not seem to display these tendencies, their combat aircraft inventoly certainly does.

106 . . ~bld., p. 150. l'' Friend, Indonesian Destinies, p. 510

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

War is a cultural phenomenon. Greg lson'

The constant dictum from Sun Tzu to Force 2020 has been to know and understand other air forces, whether we are fighting with them or against them. Understanding their culture offers a way to understand them. But culture can include everything and therefore explain nothing. Culture is difficult to quantify and thus hard to verify. This paper has overcome some of these limitations by using accepted concepts and theories relating to culture, derived largely from the social sciences discipline, and applying them to the concept of air power doctrine to better understand how culture affects air forces. With this understanding airmen, particularly at the strategic level, will be able to better understand why other air forces are organised the way they are, why they emphasise some capabilities over others, and how these air forces conduct operations. With this increased knowledge, airmen at the strategic level will be able to better understand how a future coalition partner's air force may interact with their own force as part of a coalition operation and the effect that may be achieved when tactical operations are conducted against an adversary.

Aircraft and their associated weapon and surveillance systems operate according to a set of f ~ e d rules and laws, no matter who designs, produces, operates or maintains them. But how they are operated depends entirely on the people that operate them. The inherent flexibility of aircraft provides their operators with a wide range of choices on their employment. For air forces, the fundamental principles that guide these choices lie in their air power doctrine. This air power doctrine may be explicit in a published form or implicit in the context of major decisions made on behalf of the air force. Fundamentally, all air power doctrine has the common element of the use of aircrafi to defend the nation's interests. Beyond this common element there are a range of factors which shape air power doctrine. The end result is that air power doctrine is not universal across nations. This was illustrated in Chapter 1 where the national air power doctrines of seven nations was summarised, and in Appendix A where only five principles of air power were found to be common amongst five national air power doctrines that each listed up to 17 principles.

The cultural aspect of the influences on air power doctrine is revealed when this common element of air power doctrine is discerned. The most significant influence on the use of aircraft is aviation while the most significant for the idea of defending national interest is strategic thought. Turning first to strategic thought, in the area of security studies, there are many competing theories on why nations adopt certain strategies as the basis of their strategic thought. The most significant cultural theory in this milieu of theories is strategic culture. The basic assumption of strategic culture

' G . Ison, Cross Cultural Connedionr: Australian Defence Relations in the Asia Pacr3c, Australian Defence Srudies Centre, Canberra, March 1997, p. X.

Winning With Auslralinn Air Powsr in Diverse Cultures

is there exists a distinctive and lasting set of beliefs and values regarding the threat or use of force that have their roots in influences such as geography, history and political culture and thus influence a nation's strategy.' Political culture refers to attitudes held by all citizens rather than just attitudes held by one group, such as a political party. The dimensions of political culture are national identity, identification with one's fellow citizens, governmental output and the process of making decisions? For aviation, the term airmindedness has been used in the past to encapsulate those beliefs that value aviation. Derived from airmindedness, the term aviation culture has been coined to refer to the values and benefits held by citizens of a nation that influences their perception of the benefits of aviation. Factors to consider when assessing a nation's aviation culture include geography, history of aviation, education, aviation services and industly. From the wide range of beliefs and values that comprise national cultures, those beliefs and values within the framework of strategic and aviation culture are assessed to be the most relevant to air power doctrine.

Establishing a causal link between national culture and air power doctrine requires further identification of those broad themes that impact directly on air power doctrine. Four broad themes have been identified and are grouped under the term air power doctrine drivers. Air power doctrine drivers are a set of broad air power themes where national beliefs and values pertaining to the use of force and aircraft coalesce and form drivers that shape national air power doctrine. These themes are dominant air power roles, support to national development, influence of land and sea-based forces, and non-state influences. Figure 3.1 is a conceptual model showing the relationships between national culture, strategic culture, aviation culture, air power doctrine drivers and national air power doctrine.

The Australian approach to warfare, with its emphasis on winning the peace, pressuring the adversary's will, manoeuvre warfare and coalition operations, requires commanders and their staff to have a good understanding of their coalition partners and adversaries. Interoperability is the key issue within coalition operations where issues relating to national culture will most likely arise, while EBO offers the best way to demonstrate how considerations of national culture can be applied by air forces conducting operations against adversaries.

An AFCIM was developed to better understand and assess the issues associated with interoperability between air forces from differing national cultures required to work together in a coalition operation. The AFCIM was derived from the DSTO OlMM using Hofstede's cultural dimensions and air power doctrine as key inputs to derive levels of air force interoperability on the y-axis according to a set of enabling attributes along the x-axis. The enabling attributes are preparation, understanding, command and coordination, and ethos. The final result of the AFCIM can be displayed as both a graph and a numerical total. The graph will highlight those attributes that score the lowest and which therefore should attract the most attention and resources to ameliorate. The numerical total indicates an initial overall assessment of interoperability. The AFCIM is shown in Appendix F. Appendix E shows a conceptual model of coalition operations demonstrating how previous

Booth & Tmod (eds.), Spategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region, p. 8. ' Verba, 'Comparative Political Culture', pp. 513-542.

Conclusion

models on national culture and national air power doctrine relate within a coalition operation.

Air power's ability to strike at a wide range of targets has led air power theorists and practitioners to become deeply involved in target selection. EBO, as the application of a national effects-based approach, offers a way to relate targets with desired effects and is therefore most applicable to air forces. Understanding the beliefs and values within an adversary's national culture is an essential frst step in understanding the essential linkages between the mostly physical effects of target engagement and the cognitive domain of desired effects. Figure 4.1 shows a conceptual model displaying these linkages by showing original and desired behaviours, original and desired end states, values that influence these behaviours, national culture and associated RAAF tactical operations. This model shows while some tactical operations may produce a negative effect such as destruction, other tactical operations may be required that produce a positive effect, such as selected humanitarian relief, as part of an overall EBO designed to alter an adversary's behaviour. Importantly, these effects are located within the adversary's national culture, not in Australia's.

CASE STUDY - REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

The Republic of Indonesia is a very young nation occupying an archipelago with significant ethnic and physical diversity. Indonesia has a unique set of national beliefs and values which accepts force may be required to prevent disintegration of the nation, responds well to authoritarian leadership, and places its armed forces in a central role within society to enhance security and facilitate national development. Indonesia does not seem to have strong beliefs that promote the concept of aviation, except when they are held by senior national leaders. Their air power doctrine drivers suggest army support roles and support to national development will dominate their air power doctrine, though their doctrine may he influenced by other air power doctrines through the presence of foreign air force officers in their doctrine centre. The influence of these drivers can be discerned in TNI-AU's list of basic functions, hut seems not as obvious in their published air power doctrine. However, analysis of their aircraft inventory reveals a close correlation with these air power doctrine drivers derived from Indonesia's strategic culture and aviation culture.

ADF warfighting guidance requires ADF members to possess detailed knowledge of the culture of our potential adversaries and coalition partners. This paper will assist RAAF personnel to gain this increased understanding by:

demonstrating how national culture influences the fundamental principles (doctrine) that guide all air forces and the linkages between them;

identifying specific areas within national culture that should he understood along with a framework to analyse them;

.ippl! i ~ ~ g t11c ;sn:<pru;il rnu(lzl.; . I I ~ I \ ~ ing culu~rc .ind air pu\\,cr tu thc pr.~hlcins o i int~ropcrjbllil! in ;sr.tlition openlldns. ;ink1 I H 0 \r.llr~n dc:tli~tg \\ lth adr.ers.iric\:

identifying the levels interoperability likely to be achieved between different air forces through application of the AFCIM at the strategic level; and

showing how these concepts of strategic culture, aviation culture and air power doctrine drivers apply to the Republic of Indonesia.

~~p

riming With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

APPENDIX A

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF AIR POWER FROM FIVE NATIONS

' RAAF, AAP l000 Fundamentals of Australian Aerospace Power, p. 123. Directorate of Air Staf f , AP 3000 British Air PowevDoctrine, pp. 1.2.3-1.2.9. ' National Defence, Out of the Sun: Aerospace Doctrine for the Canadian Forces, pp. 6-9. ~ i r HQ, Doctrine of the Indian Air Force IAP 2000, pp. 28-32. Philippine Air Force, Air Power Manual (Condensed), pp. 5-6.

APPENDIX B

ORGANISATIONAL INTEROPERABILITY MATURITY MODEL'

4. Unified r 3. Combined L

integiated integrated preparation knowiedge buildinq

Preparation

resulting in normal day to day working.

interpretation

Understanding Command and Co- ordination

Common doctiine covers all aspects of operations. AII other agieements in place.

High ievels of

systems, tools and agreed operational

~am'nunication and information 'ystem capabilities correspond to LlSl enterprise level.

integiated training and experience using common doctrine, communication and information system, tools, and agreed operational processes.

A high level of preparation. Most other agreements are in place.

Common doctrine covering most aspects of operations.

Moderately high levels of training and experience using comrnoli doctrine, comnunicatian and infmation

I processes. I

High levels of infomaiian exchange and integrated knowledge building.

Shared interpretation.

Communication and information system capabilities correspond to LISl domain level.

Homogeneous command struchue with a single chain of command.

No difference in command and leadership style.

One chain of command but with interaction with home organisation.

At most a few minor problems with fitting into the command structure.

Minimal differences in cotnmand and leadership styles.

Ethos I commitment to shared goals.

Minimal impact of external constraints.

Complete trust and respect.

Minimal impact from differences in personnel arrangements and organisational culhlre.

commitment to goals.

Litlle impact from external constraints.

High levels oftrust and respect. Little impact from differences in personnel uangements and organisational cullure.

I Fewell & Clark, Organisational Znteroperabilify: Evaluation andFurthev Development of the OIM Model, pp. 20-21.

86

1. Cooperative

0. Independent

Shared purpose.

Moderate level of commiment to goals.

At most, a few moderate impacts t o m external sources.

Moderate levels of trust and respect.

A f w impacts fiom differences in personnel arrangements and organisational culhlre.

2. Collaborative

Separate reporting lines of responsibility.

Sharing of information and howledge

to specific topics.

Some shared i,terpretarion.

Communication and information system capabilities correspond to LISI functional level.

General doctrine in place.

Some formal and informal agreements.

Same combined training and experience.

General guidelines in place.

Some informal agreements in place.

Limited combined wining and experience.

Almost no preparation.

Co-ordination only at the highest levels.

Separate reporting lines of responsibility

with a single command chain.

At most, a few major problems with fitting into the command smcnue.

May be some differences in command and leadership styles.

Exchange of infamation restricted.

Little shared interpretation.

Cammunicaiion and information system capabilities correspond to LISI connected level.

Almost no exchange of information.

Communication and information system capabilities correspond to LISI isolated level.

Significant differences in command and leader ship styles.

Separate command struchlres with little interaction.

Major differences in command and leadership styles.

Shared purpose.

Some major impacts from differences in personnel and organisational culhlre.

Limited shared purpose.

Minimal trust and respect.

Some major impacts from differences in personnel and organisational culrure.

Note. In this chart, zero swre regmsmts no data and the airline pilot PD scores displ ed are scores regressed fnrm the raw airline pitot and IBM scores.' C

l I POWER MSTAWCE (pD)

raw scans and the M e s used fm this m g w i ~ n , ak ibid., pp. 128-127.

Note. displr

APPENDIX D

NATIONAL SCORES FOR INDIVIDUALISM

n this chart zero score rep-* no data and the airline p i l o t ~ ~ m s ad are scores regressed from the raw airline pilot and IBM score^.^

AIR POWER DOCTRWE DRIVERS

COALITION OPERATIONS

CAPABILITY CAPABILITY

CULTURE AND COALITION OPERATION INTERACTION MODEL

OWN NATIONAL CULTURE COALITION PARTNER NATIONAL

AIR FORCE COALITION INTEROPERABILITY MODEL

Level 4

Unified

~ ~ t i ~ ~ :

l7 20

Combined

~ ~ t i ~ ~ :

l2 l6

Level 2

Collaborative

~ ~ t i ~ ~ :

l2

Preparation Air power doctrine of coalition partner has the same:

War fighting philosophy, Command and control procedures, Bilateral agreements, and Education and training philosophy.

Rating: 5 Air power doctrine of coalition partner has similar:

War fighting philosophy, . Command and control procedures, Bilateral agreements, and Education and training philosophy.

Rating: 4

Air power doctrine of coalition partner has a compatible:

War fighting philosophy, . Command and control procedures, Bilateral agreements, and Education and training philosophy.

Rating: 3

Understanding Common native language with coalition partner, and excellent English for ATC.

Rating: 5 Common second language with coalition partner, and good English for ATC.

Rating: 4 Common third language with coalition partner, and good English for ATC.

Rating: 3

Command and Coordination Difference between each coalition partner's airline pilot score (or IBM score if unavailable):

PD less than l 0

Rating: 5 Difference between each coalition partner's airline pilot score (or IBM score if unavailable):

PD less than l5

Rating: 4 Difference between each coalition partner's airline pilot score (or IBM score if unavailable):

PD less than 20

Rating: 3

Ethos Difference between each coalition partner's airline pilot score (or IBM score if unavailable):

IDV less than l 0

Rating: 5 Difference between each coalition partner's airline pilot score (or IBM score if unavailable):

IDV less than 15

Rating: 4 Difference between each coalition partner's airline pilot score (or IBM score if unavailable):

IDV less than 20

Rating: 3

Level 1

Cooperative

~ ~ t i ~ ~ :

5 to 8

Level 0 Independent

Rating:

0 to 4

Ethos Difference between each coalition partner's airline pilot score (or IBM score if unavailable):

IDV less than 30

Rating: 2 Difference between each coalition partner's airline pilot score (or IBM score if unavailable):

IDV greater than 30

Rating: 1

Preparation Air power doctrine of coalition partner has few compatibilities in the areas of:

War fighting philosophy, Command and control procedures, Bilateral agreements, and Education and training philosophy.

Rating: 2

Air Power doctrine of coalition partner is not compatible in the areas of:

War fighting philosophy, Command and control procedures, Bilateral agreements, and Education and training philosophy.

Rating: 1

Understanding Only common language with coalition partner is reasonable English for ATC.

Rating: 2

No common language and only basic English for basic ATC.

Rating: 1

Command and Coordination Difference between each coalition partner's airline pilot score (or IBM score if unavailable):

PD less than 30

Rating: 2 Difference between each coalition partner's airline pilot score (or IBM score if unavailable):

PD greater than 30

Rating: 1

ABBREVIATIONS

ADF

AEW

AEWC

AFCIM

AS

ASEAN

ATC

AURI

BAF

C2

CAS

CF

COG

D1

DOD

DSTO

EBO

GDP

IAF

IATA

IBM

IDV

INTERFET

IPTN

IT

KLM

KLIMN

KNIL

Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)

Australian Defence Force

Airborne Early Warning

Airborne Early Warning and Control

Air Force Coalition Interoperability Model

Australia

Association of South-East Asian Nations

Air Traffic Control

Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Air Force)

Bangladesh Air Force

Command and Control

Chief of Air Staff

Canadian Forces

Centre of Gravity

Darul Islam (World of Islam)

Department of Defence

Defence Science and Technology Organisation

Effects-Based Operation

Gross Domestic Product

Indian Air Force

International Air Transport Association

International Business Machines

Individualism Collectivism

International Forces East Timor

PT Industri Pesawaf Terbang Nurtanio Wurtanio Aircraft Industry); post 1985 PTIndustri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara (Archipelago Aircraft Industry)

Information Technology

Koninklijke Nederlandsch Luchtvaart Maatschappij (Dutch Airlines)

Koninklijke Nederlandsch-Indische Luchtvaart Maatschappij (Dutch East Indies Airline)

Koninklijke Nederlandsch-Indische Leger (Dutch East Indies Army)

Winning With Australian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

KODIM

LlSI

L 0

NATO

NCW

NE1

NEIAF

NPT

NZ

OIMM

OODA

PAF

PD

PETA

PKI

PLA

POW

PRRI/Permesta

RAAF

RAF

RMAF

RSAF

SAM

TII

TNI

TNI-AU

UA

UK

US

USAF

UN

Komando Distrik Militer (Military District Command)

Levels of Information Systems Interoperability

Liaison Officers

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

Network-Centric Warfare

Netherlands East Indies

Netherlands East Indies Air Force

Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty

New Zealand

Organisation Interoperability Maturity Model

Observe, Orient, Decide, Act

Philippine Air Force

Power Distance

Tentara Sukareln Pembela Tanah Azr (Volunteer Armed Forces Defender of the Homeland)

Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)

People's Liberation Army

Prisoner Of War

Pemerintah Revolusioner Repnblik Indonesia/Piagram Perjuangan Semesta Alum (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia/Universal Struggle Charter)

Royal Australian Air Force

Royal Air Force

Royal Malaysian Air Force

Republic of Singapore Air Force

Surface-to-Air Missile

Tentara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Army)

Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Armed Forces)

Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Udara (Indonesian Air Force)

Uncertainty Avoidance

United Kingdom

United States

United States Air Force

United Nations

GLOSSARY

The following provides a list of definitions used by the author of selected terms and words in this paper for the ready reference of readers:

air force A branch of the armed forces of any country concerned with military aircraft.'

airmindedness A set of beliefs that values a~ ia t i on .~

air power doctrine drivers A set of broad air power themes where national beliefs and values concerning the use of force and aircraft coalesce and form drivers that shape national air power dochine.

aviation culture The values and beliefs held by the citizens of a nation that influences their perception of the benefits of aviation.

behaviour Manner of behaving or acting.3

belief Something that is be~ieved.~

coalition operation An operation conducted by forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mis~ion .~

combined operation An operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mi~s ion .~

culture Total set of beliefs, attitudes, customs, behaviour, social habits, etc of the members of a particular society.'

doctrine Fundamental principles by which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objective^.^

I A. Delbridge & J.R.L. Bemard (eds.), The Macquarie Concise Dictionary, 3'd Edition, The Macquarie Library, Macquarie University, 2000, p. 22. P. Meilinger (ed.), The Paths of Heaven: The Evolufion ofAirpower Theory, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1997, pp. 17, 101, 188-189. Delbndge & Bemard, The Macquarie Concise Dicfionary, p. 92. .

"bid., p. 93. Dcparhnent of Defence, Australian Defence Force Publicafion Staff Dufies Series ADFP 101, Glossary, p. C-7. ibid., p. C-10. ' Richards, Plan & Plan, Longman Dicfionary of Language Teaching and AppliedLinguistics, p. 94.

Winning With Austvnlian Air Power in Diverse Cultures

dwi fungsi Dual function.

effects Are the physical, functional or psychological outcome, event or consequence that results from specific militaly or non-military actions at the tactical, operational and strategic level.9

Effects-Based Operation A coordinated set of actions directed at shaping the behaviour of kiends, neutrals and foes in peace, crisis and war.''

interoperability The ability of systems, units or forces to provide the services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the forces so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together."

joint Connotes activities, operations, organisations, etc in which elements of more than one Service of the same nation participate.'2

pancasila Indonesian national philosophy that can be summarised as belief in God, nationalism, humanitarianism, social justice and democracy.'3

strategic culture A set of beliefs, values and habits concerning the threat and use of force which are distinctive, ersist over time and exert some influence on the formation and execution of strategy. i

value A broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs.''

will The power of choosing one's own actions and the act of using this power.'6

Deoarhnent o f Defence, Australian Defence Force Publicadon Staff Duties Series ADFP 101; ""

Glossary, p. D-8. * Department o f Defence, Future Warfighting Concept, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2003 0.11

' O 'Smith, Effects BasedOperations, p. 108. " Dmamnent o f Defence. Australian Defence Force Publication Staff Duties Series ADFP 101 Glossary, p. 1-8.

l2 ibid., p. 1-1. I3 Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1300, p. 209. 16 Booth & Trood (eds.), Strategic Cultures in the Asia-PacifcRegion, p. 8. IS Hofstede, Culture S Consequences, p. 5. 16 Delbridge & Bemard, The Macquarie ConciseDictionay, p. 1347.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Air Headquarters, Doctrine of the Indian Air Force IAP 2000, War Strategy Cell, Air Headquarters, New Delhi, 1995.

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NNING WITH AIR POWER

N DIVERSE CULTURES

1 Pmm Sun Tzu to Force 2020, armed forces have been hminded of the military necessity to know and understand both our partners and adversaries. Understanding their mlture offers a way to understanding them. But culture can encompass almost everything that is done and therefore

This book presents a range of models and concepts that will assist airmen to gain a better understandimg of the relevant ueas of mlture of potential adveffaries and coalition

l partners. This book identifies those a sp% of national

1 culture most applicable to airmen due to their influence on 1 the fundamental principles that guide all air forres. l ' These models and concepts have been practically applied 1 in this book to the p r o ~ m s of ink~prabilify in coalition

speratiom and targeting within Effects-Based Operations.

1 These model6 and compfs are then applied to a case study I of the Republic of Indonesia.