WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDSOF THE PEOPLE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IN

AFRICA

Outline of the Presentation1. INTRODUCTION1.1. Definition of terrorism1.2. Why focus on the hearts and

minds?2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations2.2. Historical evolution of terrorism2.2.1. Postmodern terrorism3. TERRORISTS’ DEMOGRAPHICS3.1. Terrorists’ Educational and family

Backgrounds3.2. Age and Gender of Terrorists4. EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT FUEL

TERRORISM

5. WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS5.1. Military - Community Outreach5.2. Tolerating ordinary Citizens5.3. Using Intelligence to weaken terrorists5.4. Using IT Facilities for surveillance5.5. Fighting terrorism with de-radicalization5.5. The need for participatory governance.5.6. Adopting a holistic approach

SECTION ONE - INTRODUCTION 1.1. Definition of terrorism

1.2. Why focus on the hearts and minds?

1.1. Definition of terrorism In Gregory (2005), terrorism is defined as:

The illegitimate, premeditated use of politically motivated violence or the threat of violence by a person or group against persons or property with the intent to coerce a government by instilling fear amongst the populace.

1.1. Definition of terrorism -- 1• The insurgents generally belong to small and often

unconnected groups.• They hide their identities and surface only briefly to

carry out terrorist attacks. • The problem with fighting terrorism is finding the

enemy on a battlefield that has no boundaries.• The terrorists are in the business of creating and

spreading fear. • They want people and nations to feel helpless. • They are happy when people fear that attacks come

randomly and without warning.

1.2. Why focus on the hearts and minds? • Terrorists celebrate when people adopt defeatism as a

philosophy.• Terrorism will fall of its own weight when enough hearts

and minds are won. • Terrorism is weakened when its leaders lose popular

support, and people actively oppose them. • The social media are the strongest tool terrorists use to

recruit members and raise funds. • It is noted elsewhere that the terrorist group, ISIS, has put

out over 100 million tweets. • They have succeeded in winning many hearts and minds,

through social media.

1.2. Why focus on the hearts and minds? --1 • Terrorism is asymmetric warfare, involving the use

of random/unpredictable violence. • Terrorists capitalize on social media propaganda

and surprise attacks. • Fighting terrorists is similar to waging a war against

an indescribable enemy.• The most effective counterterrorism strategy will

involve:– discrediting the insurgents by every possible

means, and– attacks based on discreet superior intelligence.

1.2. Why focus on the hearts and minds? --2 • Ordinary people can be influenced easily by peers

or cultural in-groups. • Civil society groups can effectively counter the

media campaigns of the terrorists.• Winning the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens

will reduce violent strikes and counterstrikes.• The war on insurgency has to be put in its proper

context as an ideological war.• It will be won in the hearts and minds of the people• By subduing the adversary’s ideology and methods.

SECTION TWO - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations2.2. Historical evolution of terrorism2.2.1. Postmodern terrorism

2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations• Civil–military relation (CMR) describes the

relationship between the civil authority and the military.

• The classical thinking is that the civil authority and the military are fundamentally different from each other.

• The focus is to professionalize the military through sound technical training.

• The military was meant to remain in the specialized arena as experts in the use of force.

• Huntington believes the civilian government should maintain objective control over their armed forces.

2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations -- 1• The objective control is indicated by the following

factors: – the military adopts its ethos and discipline, and

recognizes the boundaries of professional roles;– Civilian leadership formulates strategic military policies;– Civilian leaders recognize the military’s political

neutrality and professional autonomy.

• For Huntington the relationship between the two institutions should be managed.

• There is a tendency for a country to be conservationist with military threat and liberal in peace times.

2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations -- 2• Janowitz argues that the orientation of both

institutions can converge with time.• There will either be a civilianization of the military

or militarization of society;– or both institutions will shift to converge at a point.

• Huntington sought to control the difference, but Janowitz believes the difference will diminish.

• Charles Moskos goes further to developed the institutional/occupational (I/O) hypothesis.

• The I/O hypothesis is used to explain the post Cold War civil-military relations.

2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations -- 3• For the I/O hypothesis, the military has become less

institutional and more occupational in nature. • An institutional military is divergent, while an

occupational military is more convergent. • The agency theorists argue that the military should

remain the "masters of the profession of arms." • The agency theory reinforces Huntington's view of

strengthening military professionalism.• The concordance theory by Rebecca L. Schiff calls

for collaborative civil-military relations.

2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations -- 4• Schiff believes that the military, political elites, and

the civil society should agree on four key issues:– Social composition of the officer corps– The political decision-making process– The method of recruiting military personnel– The style of the military

• Agreement of the three partners on the issues can check domestic military intervention.

• Schiff applies her theory of concordance to explain a number of civil –military conflicts.

2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations -- 5• The extant literature on CMR is pre-occupied with

managing civil authority-military conflicts.• Neither Huntington, Janowitz, Moskos nor Schiff

focused on CMR for the war on terrorism.–An asymmetric war that cannot be won with

the barrel of the gun alone.• Winning the war without frontlines calls for a

paradigm shift in CMR.• The current focus should be how both institutions

should collaborate to win hearts and minds.

2.1. Rethinking Civil–Military Relations -- 6• Both parties need to bridge the information and

cultural gap existing between them.• As Schiff rightly noted the military, political elites,

and the civil society should work together.• This will lead to greater connectivity (contact and

understanding) among the key stakeholders.• All sides should strive for cooperation, dignity for

the human person, and respect for the rule of law. • Dismantling the mental and social structures that

support terrorism is not negotiable.

2.2. Historical evolution of terrorismThe present postmodern terrorism is distinguished by:

- determination to reverse civilizations and change human history.

- Destroy the perceived enemy by every means, and takeover whole territories.

Modern terrorism sought to press home a point, often using indirect approaches.

Classical terrorism aimed at specific targets with few casualties (e.g., assassinations) or wreaks havoc on “non-significant” facilities. - The damage was fairly low because the terrorist aimed

to achieve a specific political objective.

2.2.1. Postmodern terrorismAttributable to “clash of civilizations” - primarily the

clash of Americanization with traditional religious cultures.

• It is a clash of ideals and ideologies, for example; – USA seeks to globalize Western values, – Islamism desires to replace sovereign states with over-

arching caliphates.• The Islamists or radical fundamentals attack

churches and mosques alike.• They consider themselves accountable only to God,

and take responsibility for their acts of destruction.• They desire to de-modernize the world!

2.2.1. Postmodern terrorism -- 1• They are opposed any type of negotiation; they do

not want to seat at the table: – instead, they seek to destroy the table and those sitting

around it.

• A difference needs to be made between Islamic and Islamist: – Islamic means “Muslim- related,” a religion that believes

in peace.– Islamist is an extreme version of radical fundamentalism

associated with terrorism. – A majority of Muslims condemn radical fundamentalism

2.2.1. Postmodern terrorism -- 2• Terrorist groups operate in small cells that are ultra-

flexibly networked.• Less hierarchical organizations connected by means of

modern IT infrastructure. • Hydra-headed – can scatter, regroup, and adjust easily

in different directions. • Oliver Roy notes that terrorists may lack the resources

to realize their stated goals;– But to dismiss them as insignificant extremists would be a

grave mistake because they can and will create disorder, on a vast scale.

– Their strategy is to win the fight against nation states by exhausting their individual and collective military power in multiple theaters.

SECTION THREE - TERRORISTS’ DEMOGRAPHICS

3.1. Terrorists’ Educational and family Backgrounds

3.2. Age and Gender of Terrorists

3.1. Terrorists’ Educational and family Backgrounds • Many terrorists come from mainstream educational

and family backgrounds. • More belong to middle class families, with a large

percentage being engineers and physicians. • Many have been exposed to Western culture and

lifestyle. For instance: – Mohammed Atta came from a middle-class Egyptian

background. – He was a well-respected academic in Germany., – He was a suspected mastermind of the September 11, 2001

attacks. – He was flying the plane that crashed into the North Tower.

• Osama bin Laden came from a family with exceptional wealth in Saudi Arabia.

3.1. Terrorists’ Educational and family Backgrounds

• Sageman (2004) notes that most jihadists married and had children.

• Terrorism is not necessarily a result of personal poverty or deprivation.

• Sageman found also that many jihadists’ wives shared or adopted the beliefs their husbands.

• Marriage provided a supporting environment for jihadist views, and not a restraining influence, in a number of cases.

3.2. Age and Gender of Terrorists• Mahan and Griset (2007) note that terrorists are

typically male aged 17 to 23. • Pape (2005) found that the average age of suicide

bombers ranged from 21.1 to 29.8 years. • Majority of women have been intellectual drivers

and followers. • Harmon (2000) notes that about 30% of

international terrorists are women, and• females participate actively in nearly all

insurgencies.

4. EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT FUEL TERRORISM

4. External Factors that fuel Terrorism • Globally, the proliferation of arms favors violence as

the principal means for resolving disputes.• Continued tension in the Middle East and other war

theaters will popularize further terrorism.• A growing number of failed and fragile states pose a

significant threat to international security.• The globalization of information technology will

continue to make it easy to export cultures.• The clash of ideas and ideologies will continue to be

a source of tension.

5. WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS5.1. Military - Community Outreach5.2. Tolerating ordinary Citizens5.3. Using Intelligence to weaken terrorists5.4. Using IT Facilities for surveillance5.5. Fighting terrorism with de-radicalization5.5. The need for participatory governance.5.6. Adopting a holistic approach

5.1. Military - Community Outreach • Security agencies can build public trust and gather

intelligence, through community outreach programs.• But the citizens should not see the programs as a

means for gathering intelligence.• Outreach efforts can support counter-radicalization

operation.• Outreach can give marginalized groups an

opportunity to speak out.• The military has all professions – doctors, nurses,

teachers, engineers, pilots and so on.

5.1. Military - Community Outreach -- 1• In China many roads, rail lines, houses etc. are built

by the military.• A good percentage of “Made in China” goods are

produced by military corporations.• Nothing stops the navies of African countries from

transporting citizens by ships and boats.• Why should the military of African countries not have

corps for road building, rail construction, mass transportation, and manufacturing?

• The air force can run commercial air transport and monitor the airspace at the same time.

5.1. Military - Community Outreach -- 2• The military can deploy its discipline and expertise

productively in the public sphere.• This can win hearts and minds. • A stronger citizens - military bonding makes

intelligence gathering easier.• Military outreach programs will enhance communities'

roles in “affecting positive change”:– through reporting crimes– seeking protection and intervention from the police, – volunteer community policing and providing vital

intelligence.•

5.2. Tolerating ordinary Citizens • Some years ago, Al Jazeera aired a news item

showing Israeli soldiers forcefully ejecting Israelis who illegally occupied Palestinian land.

• The citizens fought their armed soldiers; they shouted, threw stones, and held their uniforms.

• The soldiers successfully evacuated them without hitting anyone.

• A few days after Israeli soldiers shot and killed a stone-throwing Palestinian.

• They tolerated their compatriots but dealt ruthlessly with the “enemy”.

5.2. Tolerating ordinary Citizens –1 • It will be pleasing to see the African military make

such distinction between citizens and the enemy.• Treating entire communities as potential criminals

distances the people from security operatives.• Terrorists are not conventional criminals - it is more

effective to pre-empt and prevent attacks . • Gathering and using intelligence effectively can

successfully weakening the insurgents.• And ordinary citizens can be the best source of

intelligence when treated appropriately.

5.3. Using Intelligence to weaken terrorists

• Intelligence is needed to pre-empt and disrupt terrorist activity.

• The 4 Ps of Intelligence:– Prevention: addressing underlying causes of terrorism

and protecting the citizens.– Pursuit: disrupting and apprehending the terrorists. – Protection: ensuring that reasonable security

precautions are taken.– Preparedness: putting resources in place to respond

effectively to a terrorist attack.

• Ensuring adequate information sharing.

5.3 Using Intelligence to weaken terrorists --1• Hunting for information should be the most important part of

the war on terrorism. • A key aspect of intelligence gathering is to identify and track

terrorism financing .• Several financial transactions in Africa occur in the informal

sector where banks are unable to track.• Foreign exchange is bought principally from the black market,

despite the growing number of banks.• Terrorism finances can also come through such informal

channels. • The solution is not to criminalize and clamp down the informal

operators, but to encourage them to formalize.

•

5.3. Using Intelligence to weaken terrorists --2

• 50 percent of the war on insurgents will be won if the hearts and minds of non-bank financial operators are won.

• Counterterrorism effort need the active support of influential indigenous opinion shapers, community leaders, and NGOs.

• A single article or TV appearance by such persons can have a more profound impact than a year's government public enlightenment effort.

5.4. Using IT Facilities for surveillance • Insurgency cannot be resolved by treating the

entire population as suspects. • Terrorists are comparatively rare, often well-

disguised, and difficult to distinguish from other persons.

• Using modern digital technologies effectively help avoid mass labeling of whole communities as terrorists.

• IT systems can be used to track individuals that people have cause to suspect.

5.4. Using IT Facilities for surveillance --1 • Mohanty et al (2015) proposes Citizens’

Intelligence Gathering & Intelligence Information Interlinking (CIGIII) system for India.

• CIGIII has two components - – Citizen’s Intelligence Gathering System (CIGS) and– Intelligence Information Interlinking (III).

• CIGS deploys IT to create channels for collecting and verifying intelligence from citizens.

• III system links the different users of information to the source.

5.4. Using IT Facilities for surveillance –2 • CIGS gathers intelligence from the population on

terrorist suspects and operations. • Civil society groups are deployed to verify the

information.• In many African countries, intelligence networks

often fail to penetrate sections of the society. • Similarly, the intelligence network is weakened by

in-house corruption. • Many officers disclose confidential national security

information across the line of control.

5.4. Using IT Facilities for surveillance –3 • Terrorist operation may spread over several areas

and security operatives are thinly stretched on the ground.

• More terrorist gangs find safe havens in remote rural areas where security networks are weakest. – It is there that the major terrorist plans are

contemplated and executed in towns.

• Accordingly involving citizens and citizens’ based groups for intelligence gathering is very essential.

• Mohanty et al (2015) proposes that toll free phone lines be provided to citizens.

5.4. Using IT Facilities for surveillance --4 • Many persons may not want to expose their

identification.• A special module can be incorporated in the

system to identify each informant.• Informants who gave useful information should be

identified and rewarded.• Their identity should not be exposed publicly.• Potential informants keep back vital intelligence for

fear of being exposed. • Others fear that they will not be rewarded.

5.5. Fighting terrorism with de-radicalization • Some marginal terrorists may want to opt out if their

safety is guaranteed.• The security community must make efforts to

penetrate the ranks of terrorist gangs.• High-level intelligence about a criminal gang usually

requires insider knowledge.• In fighting insurgency, troop “numbers” is important,

but troop “type” is more essential.• Africa’s military should be well versed in intelligence

engineering and psychological warfare. • It should be possible to identify the terrorists by

working through key informants.

5.5. Fighting terrorism with de-radicalization --1

• Security operatives would need to appeal to the consciences of “moderate” militants;– many of whom joined extremist groups for financial

considerations.

• The goal is to turn the insurgents against their leaders and win some to the side of government.

• This approach will certainly not require thousands of additional troops; – but compact units of shrewd intelligence operatives.

• However troops will need to be deployed for containment.

5.6. The need for participatory governance • The fight against terrorism requires team work and

widespread collaboration.• Security agencies, the financial sector, the diplomatic

service and health organizations have roles to play.• The key to success is organization, cooperation and

coordination. • Good governance is central to the effective conduct of

the war against terror.• The rule of law should be maintained and defended.• Development of strong civil society movements is very

essential.• Terrorism is fuelled by public dissatisfaction and

ignorance.

5.7. The need for participatory governance -1 • A sustained strategy for educating the local population

is important. • Out-of-school youths should be positively socialized,

trained and empowered.• Platforms should exist for the relevant state and non-

state stakeholders to share ideas.• Such interactions can result in small but highly

significant successes, and future collaborations.• Good governance will make fighting terrorism much

easier and more successful.

5.8. Adopting a holistic approach • The underlying factors that give birth to VEOs should

be addressed.• Deploying the military may tackle the symptoms; but

the root causes should be addressed. • Since terrorism has become a regional issues, an

African-led solution is required.• African governments must deal effectively with

economic mismanagement.• It is high time we outgrow the nostalgias our different

colonial pasts. • Close cooperation between Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad,

and Niger will bring a quick end to Boko Haram.

5.8. Adopting a holistic approach --- 1• A strategic vision for fixing the needs of Africa’s

growing youthful population should be in place.• Unmet aspirations for education and employment are

the manure for the growth of VEO.• Communities suspected of harboring terrorists should

not be punished collectively. • Doing so encourages further radicalization and hiding

away of vital intelligence information.• Terrorism, like other global social problems, has to be

dealt with. • There are no easy solutions. Indeed, short-term,

reactive responses are dangerous. • Counter-radicalization may take years to bear fruits.

THE END

THANK YOU

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