Win-win-win Territory Community Redefinition

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L-D METHODOLOGY: A WIN-WIN-WINTERRITORY-COMMUNITY REDEFINITION

Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis (Ph. D)

Professorex. Director of School of Management & Economics TEI-K

ABSTRACT

The paper deals with the territory-community term redefinition , as adiscerned localized sub-spatial unity by both, the political-ideological (assolidarity, participation, social cohesion, customs values) and strategicdimension , which paper focuses on : Territory-community is redefined as

the limit of the sensitization process, which should be seen as a form of 3-person integrated information in the bargain, based on knowledge creationand knowledge transfer diffusion and their conversions, suggestedby thenew trends in Regional Policy. A 3-person integrated Information is thepower factor for each participant in the bargain with sensitization as itsthird-invisible side [ the best for me according to my expectations from thebargain, which may coincides with the best for my competitor AND the bestfor the territory-community, as a sub-spatial unit] The proposed model(win-win-win) has been based on bargaining instant reflections strategies(Nashswin-win) or behaviors, in which sub-unity participates as the third or invisiblepart of negotiations between two bargainers. (Nash Theory extension) This

could be done in only one position, i. e the limit of the sensitization process.Territory-Community term should be redefined on this limit.Key-words: Territory-Community, Discerned Localized sub-Spatial Unity,bargaining, information, knowledge creation-knowledge diffusion(dissemination), sensitization, winning strategies, instant reaction, teambehavior

1. Introduction: Necessity of Territory Community term redefinition

Development trends during the last decades of the 20 th century and early the21st reflect two contrasting features: The first is sustained improvement in theliving conditions in many countries captured by declining mortality rates, risingper capita incomes better nutrition, improved education levels, a moreimpartial judicial and legal system and broader civil and political freedom It isbeing increasingly recognized that development is about the quality ofpeoples lives and expansion of their ability to shape their own futures. Itinvolves more equitable education and job opportunities, greater genderequality better health and nutrition cleaner and more sustainable naturalenvironment (W. B Report, 2000). The second feature consists of setback toreal terms of the development due to wealth concentration, regional and localinequalities ((Krougman Paul 2003, Lados M. 2003) , the absolute poverty

(Misseau Yves, 2005): in large parts of the planet, lack of food and medicalcare in these parts, increasingly children mortality, increasingly economic

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migration trends, dramatic climate changes, due to human activities, armedconflicts, terms confusion(Torreta Gullietta (1997,Tagieff Pierre Antre 2000)Over the second half of the 20th century, we have seen the continuoustransformation of the world's population from rural to urban (KennethWilkinson, 1991, Ramonet Ignacio, 2000, ), and this change is likely to

continue in decades to come. This phenomenon goes beyond migrationstatistics. Its difficult to make a dichotomy between rural / urban (Cinneide M.O 1991, Gannon A. 1990).To start with development term, it is necessaryto redefine it, in the frame of the Globalization (Walras S.1980) andInformation Ages conditions: Definitions given during the industrial Age arenot acceptable in the post-industrial period; what kind of development isneeded, now? How market should eliminate the increasingly inequalities?How technological changes (Fischer M.M 2002), should contribute in wealthdistribution? These are questions/ challenges for the development planners.They firstly, have, to redefine the field of planning intervention policy; i. ecyberspace could be included in area terminology? Or, What a region is?

The expansion of big cities or the metropolitan centers provides us with newdata, on terms as regional, or local which have be redefined during theindustrial period. Terms like territory, place, community, space spatialanalysis etc given during the industrial period, for meeting industry needsseems to mean nothing during the globalization period, in whichdevelopment comes from up, instead from below (Friedmann J and WeaverC. 1979),: People are moved from one place to other. They live, for examplein Athens, but they have to offer their job in Kalamata. (Also, see at fictitiousworkers, in virtual enterprises (Martinat Stanislav 2001) who live in a xplace and offer their job in a y place through the cyberspace). In aglobalizing world, big cities, local/ rural communities etc have to be redefineddue to market rules as population size, establishing place etc (Laidi Zaki(2000), Berger John 2005)

2. The Concept

It is therefore- necessary, to redefine territory-community term as adiscerned localized spatial unity by both, the political- ideological (FriedmannJ and Weaver C. 1979), and the strategic dimension (Gannon Agnes

1990) thus meeting the market rules, which paper focuses on: In particularit is necessary to be proved that territory- community unit redefinition mustbe seen as the limit-end of a continuous sensitization process. For thisreason, the hypothesis of a transferred perception from space to territoryand from relations to bargain is necessary. A sub-spatial unity (i. e society,community) may be defined by the bargaining instant reflections strategies(Kuhn H.W and Nasar S. 2001) or behaviors, in which this unity participatesas the third or invisible part of negotiations between two bargainers. Thiscould be done in only one position, (or equilibrium point) i. e the limit of thesensitization process (Papakonstantinidis, 2003). Territory-Community termshould be defined on this limit. It is, therefore, necessary to start with the new

trends in regional development policy / The New Innovation Theory (N. I. T)- (M. M Fischer, 2000).N. I. Tprovides us with useful methodological tools as

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knowledge creation and knowledge transfer. Using these tools in thebargaining problem, it is necessary to analyze pure individual winningstrategies (Nash Non-cooperative Game Theory- win-win model) in thebargain. Information may be the link between knowledge creation andbargaining process. In particular, Information is a power factor in pure

individuals winning strategies. The more information, the more possibilities forsomeone to win in the bargain Redefinition of the territory-communityterm is achieved by using what we call Integrated Information; it is acombination of answers given to each of participants in the bargain, meetingthree different questions in the same person, especially, what is the best forme, in relation with the best of the other AND the best of this sub-spatial unity/community (as the third-invisible part of the bargain) the 3-personinformation (or the win-win-win model). Each of the participants, using theintegrated, or 3-person information in the bargain, then, a new bargainingbehavior (the win-win-win behavior) may be created: It seems to be closerto pure cooperation, than competitiveness . The last one may be concerned

as a survival need: During next decades, climate conditions may be proved tobe the only one player, or competitor against human activities (U. NEnvironmental Committee Report, February 2004).On this limit-pointterritory-community term redefinition meets fluent situation /evolution in thepost-industrial period, as the outcome of this win-win-win process. Theconcept, based on the Modern Innovation Theory, analyses the decisionmaking under the prism of the sensitization process, developing in thebargain, in order to produce social cohesion and solidarity which are thepillars of the territory-community term. Territory-community term hastherefore to be redefined, in a new by the limit-end of the integratedinformation through the sensitization process, leading to social behavior

3. The proposed step-by-step approach

Negotiation may be concerned as the base of our economic and social life.Each of us actively participates in thousand of negotiations even noobviously: Driving in traffic, actively participating in the market (buyer/sellers)relations between husbands-wives, or even the love game may be forms ortypes of negotiation, / or game, according to Non Cooperative GamesTheory, thus replacing the win-lose or zero sum, two players game. (vn

Neumann John, Morgenstem Oscar (1944, Arrow Kenneth Debrew Gerard1954),The main characteristics of such a bargain, in a strict math definition may bethe absolute competitiveness between the two players, especially (Kuhn H.Wand Nasar S. 2001) the follow: (1) each of the two players startingnegotiations with another expects to get a profit. (2) each of the two playersknows the rules of the negotiation; otherwise he she/ has no interest toparticipate as negotiator in negotiations/ or game [ player according toGames Theory). He (she) knows a priori that the other negotiator (or player) isas clever as he is. He/she has to respect that the other person /S. M. E maybe as clever as he is. (3) Each of them does not regret for his/her choice (4)

each of them, participating in a negotiation has to take a decision (or to makea choice) in relation with the other negotiators decision, or reacting to others

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choice He/she has to decide according to his/her expectations, as well as toinstant reflection In real terms, he/she has to make and follow a strategy: [Weneed to trust each-other (see at Contract Social J. J Rousseau, butnowadays conditions overcome State Rules, so we must go directly tobargaining problem, in terms of reacting mobilized by instant reflection

recognising competitors instead of people who will to cooperate. (5) It isobvious that individual choices (strategies) may be characterized byinterdependence as well as by interaction to others choices during thebargaining problem. In its math expression (Nash 1951) An n person gameis a set of n players or positions, each with an associate finite set of purestrategies and corresponding to each player i a payoff function pi which mapsthe set of all n-tuples of pure strategies into the real numbers. Each ofnegotiators has, therefore to double think (2-person anticipation) accordingto his & the others expectations so both to win, maximising the outcome ofnegotiation (win-win) (6) a two 2person anticipation is based on utilities.According to Nash Theory ( Kuhun- Nassar, 2001, Van Damme Eric, 1990), a

unique solution exists that maximises the of participants utilities (7) there is,therefore an interaction between utilities and strategies In particular, utilityexpresses individual choices based on individual necessities (real or fantastic)Strategies express choices + will in personal level, taking into account theinteraction factor (the others choices) Utility is the subjective and strategy isthe objective factor of the same anticipation (8) negotiation may lead either inagreement or disagreement Utility expresses the constraint or the fear factorof disagreement for whom needs the agreement more than the othernegotiator(Papakonstantinidis, 2002). Who needs more, negotiation to be ledin agreement expects more utility, but probably he has to loose in terms ofshares, due to risk lack In the opposite, who is indifferent about agreementor not expects more utility /per unit he has- to win in shares under thedogma the more risk, the more profit (9) (In math terms (Utility Theory): If A& B represent two individual alternative anticipations and small letters (a &b)represent real numbers then the utility function will satisfy the followingproperties u(A)>u(B) is equivalent to A is more desirable than B If 0


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Share (%)

Share (%)

Utility Utility Utility AXB

100 0 71 0 0

90 10 70 1 70

80 20 68 5 34070 30 64 10 960

60 40 60 16 960

50 50 52 23 1196

40 60 40 31 1240( max )

30 70 24 40 960

20 80 12 50 600

10 90 4 61 244

0 100 0 80 0

J. F Nash highlighted the payoffs of the bargain, out of personalexpectations

Note :a) Utility is a personal matter: Utility units are not compared. b) Utility unitsexpressed the fear of disagreement (no shares for anyone).c) If A needsmore the agreement than the payoff, then he should be ready to accept anyform of agreement. d) If A has decide not to accept agreement, then herisks more but at the same time- wins more from the agreement e)The utilityrange expressed the optimist instant reflection for each part

4. The Utility Function

Suppose that winning strategies [Pi, Qi] are in a fine ratio with the players(bargainers) Utility is a math function. It corresponds 1-1 to bargainersUtility Function (Kuhun Nassar, 2001 & Varoufakis Y.2001), under the dogmathe more decisive to break the agreement down, the more satisfied from thebargain leading to this agreement That is true: Bargainers expectations are1-1 to their expected utilities for each of them, coming from the bargain.From the other hand, bargain gets its own rules out of cooperation People arecompetitive rather, than co-operative: Winning strategies are led by

bargaining rules (rules of pure competition).Nash has described thebargaining problem not by expectations, but, directly, by the results (pay-offof the bargain)In math form:

Pi x QiUa + Ub = maxIf

Ua = x, Ub = (100-x)k

Then

Ua+ Ub=max [ x(100-x)k] = 0Then

x (100-x) + x [ (100-x)

k

] = 0then

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1(100-x) + x k (100-x)k-1 = 0then

xk (100-x)k-1= - 1(100-x)k

thenx k (100-x)k-1 = - 1 (100-x)k-1 (100-x)1

thenxk = (100-x)1 (100-x)10k-1 : [- 1 (100-x)k-1]

if (100-x) # 0, thenxk = 100-xxk + x =100

thenx(k+1) = 100

in real terms, x(k+1) = -100[the (-) defines the opposite interests of bargainers]

Finally:

Cases:

If k=0 , then each of a, b may win the 100% of bargaining result (output)If k=1 , then each of them (a and b) my win the 50%

If k>1 then a may win a percentage >50%

If k50%

In our example, the crucial point [ the utilities multiple max] is 1240 (40x31) :this is the point of final agreement led by the bargain. On that point the sharesare: 40% for A and 60% for B. On that point, personal satisfaction or utilityunits are 40 units for A and 31 units for B : Thats the point of agreement,expressed fear of breaking down the agreement for player A and risk ofbreaking down the agreement for the player BThat is the main reason, that injury has prevailed in our days, all over theworld.

In an 2-person anticipation, each of two (2) bargainers may ask themselvesone question, as the result of good strategies [instant reflection thinking] inthe bargain i. eWhat should be the best for me, taking into account that the other person(bargainer in a negotiation) should try for the best for himself thusrecognizing that the other person may be as clever as I am.

Constructing the proposed paper methodology

The following methodology is adopted by the paper

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x = 100 /


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knowledge creation creating a non conflict behavior inserting

sensitization integrated information creation uncertainty due to negative

entropy thus, smoothing potential conflictsclosing differences in the

competitive bargainpayoff-utilities & shares, influencing behavior in the

bargain /individual winning strategies influencing by a new behavior in theopposite, the more decisive, the more risk ,should derive more profit in a

globalizing world but inserting sensitization in the bargainthus smoothing

the conflict strategies taking into account the C factor converting a

bilateral conflict into a 3-part negotiation leading to a new socialperception , the win-win-win perception, including a real cooperation

6 Information as the bargaining power factor

The above bargaining analysis may lead us to the follow conception:(a) in the Age of Information (nowadays), the information factor is the most

important: The more information, the more preparation in negotiation, themore power in the bargain (b)information has to be formed by knowledgeconversion (c) According to the New Innovation Theory , knowledgeconversion is introduced corresponds [1-1] to a specific type of information,Possible cases/orders, between tacit and codified knowledge produce thefour (4) major processes of knowledge conversion, leading to types ofbehavior (see below):

Scheme1 : Knowledge Creation/ Information/ Types of Behavior

Papakonstantinidis, 2003

Also, (a) Introducing the sensitisation process in suggested Model we havemore possibilities to create a new form of information, called the integratedinformation in the bargain (b) Integrated Information (Knowledge plussensitization) (Papakonstantinidis, 2004) may be concern as a new termintroduced to the suggested model, thus leading to a new social condition i. e

the socialization condition (c) The introduced information (knowledge plussensitization) creates a new behavior type. This type called socialization let

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tacit SocializationSympathetic


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us introduce the C factor (Community, World Values, social cohesion,solidarity, may GOD) in a two-players bargain, as the third or invisible part ofthe bargain. Thus Sensitization may be proved to be a useful planning tool,especially, in those less developed rural areas. (d) By introducing the Cfactor in the bargain it is succeeded a bilateral relation to be transformed into

a three part relation (A & B competitors and the C part- the invisible part),thus smoothing the corners of a competitive conflict in a 2-poles perceptionduring the bargain at least locally.

7. Proposal

Suppose that the more Information, the more uncertainty for the Future the more need for cooperation, according to the modeling factor as well as :

Pi(&) :Sum of all the winning strategies(&)[pick-points] coming from thechoices of the bargainer A, based on information given while reaching the

Qi(&):Set of all the winning strategies(&)[pick-points] coming from the choices ofthe bargainer B, based on information given while reaching the

Ri(&): Set of all the winning strategies(&)[pick-points] coming from thechoices of the bargainer C, [ the Community , concerned as the third orinvisible partner] based on information given while reaching the

There is a link between utilities and the individual winning strategies that

means , (u) (&),where, & is a set of good individual strategies.

Max PQR = max of payoffs PQRTHEN:

limPi(&)Qi(&)Ri(&)=maxPQRi

The proposed system (new equilibrium point) could lead to a purecooperation situation, between the 2 involved parts (players) in thebargain (individuals and the Community which could be seen as thethird-invisible part in a two-persons bargain) ; this could occur as theresult of an instant individual reaction due to given information(transferred knowledge). From this point of view, the proposedmethodological tool may facilitate competitors to understand each-otherssituation, thus improving the quality of the bargain, as a new socialexistence in a globalizing world. Otherwise, a 3-person non cooperativebargaining game may form in its limit pure cooperation conditionsbetween the involved parts, as integrated information let them create a3-band codified knowledge, at the same time i. e It is obviously, that n ourdays Community is the weak partner in the bargaining game between thetwo players, in the world market but this situation should be conversed,under the networking local SMES, in terms ofcollective choice.

TABLE 2THE SUGGESTING WIN-WIN-WIN SHARING VS NASH SHARING

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The Suggesting Sharing between A , B and C

Share

(%)

Share

(%)

Utility Utility Utility

AXB

Share

C(%)

Utility

C

Utility

AXBXC

90 4 71 1 71 6 1 71

80 13 70 2 140 7 2 280

70 22 68 5 340 8 3 1020

60 31 64 10 640 9 4 2560

50 40 60 16 960 10 5 4800max

41 50 52 23 1196 9 4 4784

32 60 40 31 1240 8 3 3720

23 70 24 40 960 7 2 192014 80 12 50 600 6 1 600

Note :1. C is the Community , as the third invisible part in the bargain- &2. The less shares for A + B the more share for the invisible player or

bargainer calling it as the C Factor

By introducing the C Factor , i. e the Community, as the third or invisiblepart of negotiations between TWO players, we have now, a new situation asfollow

Let, a, b the bargainers and c the invisible part

Then, let us to define utilities:Ua = x

Uc = lx, when l = is a factor of the x proportionUb = (100-x-lx)k

It is obvious according to example 1- that :

Ua + Ub = Uc = max x [ (100-x-lx) k ] = 0

then

x (100-x-lx)

k

+ x [(100-x-lx)

k

] = 0then1(100-x-lx)k + xk (100-x-lx)k-1= 0

thenxk (100-x-lx)k-1 + 1(100-x-lx) k = 0

thenxk (100-x-lx)k-1 + 1(100-x-lx)k-1(100-x-lx) = 0

thenxk (100-x-lx)k-1 = -[1(100-x-lx)k-1(100-x-lx)]

if (100-x-lx) # 0, thenxk = -[ (100-x-lx)]

thenxk +x +lx = 100 .... (really ...= -100)

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[the (-) defines the opposite interests of bargainers]x(k+1+l) = 100

finally

Cases

If k=0 , l = 0, then each of a, b, c bargainers may win the 100% ofbargaining result (output)

If k=1 , l=0 then each of the a and c may win the 50% and the bargainer bnothing at all

If k=1 , l=1 then each of the a, b and c bargainers may win the 33.33 %(equal portions) : This is the best point- fair sharing

If k>1, l>1 then a and b may win a percentage >33.33%, but there is aportion for the Community- C

(as the third-or invisible part of the bargain between TWO)If k


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community may be self-defined by social cohesion and solidarity developingby introducing the sensitization process in the bargain under globalizationconditions- in local level, thus transferring a pure competitiveness into a purecooperation among local peopleThe win-win-win perception, converting a bilateral bargain into a 3-part

negotiations including the Community as the third/ invisible part may bepresented as scheme 2, below

Scheme 2A

C

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Berger,John (2005)Points on Political Orientation - Le Monde Diplomatique-18.11.2005

Cinneide M. O (1991) Points on what Rural Areas are Center forDevelopment Studies Press, University College Galway (U.C.G) IRLCinneide M. O (1991) Points on what Rural Areas are Center forDevelopment Studies Press, University College Galway (U.C.G) IRLFischer M.M (2002), Learning in neural spatial intervention models: Astatistical perspective Journal of Geographical Systems, issue 4 (3) p.p 30-38Friedmann J and Weaver C. (1979),Territory and Function U.C.L.A Press(U.S)Gannon Agnes (1990) Rural Development-Strategic Objectives F. A. OEd,Krougman Paul (2003) European Future in the Age of GlobalisationAthens, Greece: The Economist Conference-2003

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Kuhn H.W and Nasar S. (2001) The essential John Nash PrincetonUniversity Press, pp. 31, 43, 56, 85-89, 99-103 .Lados M. (2003) Report on SMEs local capacities building special issue-Nov 2003, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Department of RegionalStudies.- head of the Department

Laidi Zaki (2000) Malaise dans la Mondalisation, Texuel Ed, 1997Martinat Stanislav (2001) Virtual Enterprise: A Model of Information ,Institute of Geonics-special issue, Czech RepublicMisseau Yves, 2005: End of Shining Future- Monde Diplomatique,29.11.05)Nash John Forbs (1951) Non Co-operative Game/Princeton University Ed,Neuman (von) & Morgenstern (1947) Game Theory and EconomicBehavior The Princeton University Press U. S

Papakonstantinidis L. A (2003, Nov) Building the Social Capital and LocalCapacities in Rural Areas special issue of Hungarian Academy of

Sciences- Department of Regional Studies, Nov, 2003Papakonstantinidis L. A (2004) Sensitization and Involvement theCommunity: A Rural Tourism Application of the win-win-win Model Review ofEconomic Sciences-TEIEP, issue 6Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) Knowledge Creation and the win-win-winmodel Scientific Review of Applied Economics TEIPI Ed, Jan 2004Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004, Jan) Rural Tourism: win-win-win Journal ofHospitality and Tourism , issue 2 , IndiaPapakonstantinidis L.A (2004)Sensitization as a form of knowledgecreation and the Win-Win-Win Model Scientific Review of AppliedResearch, Vol VIII, No 2 /2003, pp 89-108, ISSN 1106-4110Papakonstantinidis L.A (2004) Rural Tourism: Win-Win-Win- case studyWomen Cooperative Gargaliani,Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Volume1, issue 2, /2003 pp 49-70, ISSN 0972-7787 www.johat.comPapakonstantinidis L.A (2005) Operations Management by a hyper-cube &win-win-win perspective: A Local Development Approach Journal of AppliedEconomics and Management, Volume 2, issue 2,/ 2004, pp 111-130, ISSN0972- 8937, JAEM- Institute of Economic and Finance BundelkhandUniversity, JansiPapakonstantinidis L.A (2005)Win-Win-Win Model and SensitizationProcess-Journal of Space and Community- Hungarian Academy of

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APPENDIX

1. The Utility Function f(u) = u 1/2

f (u) = o U (A) + U (B) = max

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2The g function (the strategic growth function) f (x) = x 2

Max PQR = max of payoffs PQRTHEN:

limPi(&)Qi(&)Ri(&)=maxPQRi

Comments

Utility function (f (u) equivalent to Growth Strategy function ( f (g)

Utility expresses expectations(subjective factor), Individual Strategiesreflect on how personal expectations should to be realized f(u) = 0 , then f (A) + F (B) + max, equivalent to the optimist strategy= the

absolute cooperation

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Win-win-win Territory Community Redefinition