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The Gordian Knot of Turkish Politics: Regulating Headscarf Use in PublicEvren elik Wiltse

Online Publication Date: 01 June 2008

To cite this Article Wiltse, Evren elik(2008)'The Gordian Knot of Turkish Politics: Regulating Headscarf Use in Public',South EuropeanSociety and Politics,13:2,195 215

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SOUTH EUROPEAN ATLAS

The Gordian Knot of Turkish Politics:Regulating Headscarf Use in Public

Evren Celik Wiltse

The Justice and Development Party of Turkey passed two constitutional amendments in

2008, in order to lift the headscarf ban in higher education. This act of Parliament stirred

up Turkeys perennial debate over the role of religion in a secular republic. This article

attempts to clarify the sides of the debate, and present an accurate account of their

arguments. It places this topical issue in a historical context by discussing briefly the

evolution of political Islam in Turkey, and the legal background of the headscarf issue.

Finally, the article draws connections between the current headscarf debates and theendemic problem of gender inequality in Turkey.

Keywords: Turkey; Justice and Development Party; Political Islam; Headscarf; Gender

Inequality

Introduction

In February 2008, the conservative right-wing Justice and Development Party

(Adalet ve Kalknma Partisi AKP) passed two constitutional amendments in the

Turkish Parliament. Their purpose was to lift the headscarf ban in higher education.Even though the amendments received strong support in the legislature (approved by

411 out of 550 MPs, representing more than 70 per cent of the electorate), they

triggered an avalanche of reactions from the rest of the society. Almost all the TV

channels, newspapers and other news media venues were saturated with arguments

over this issue. The highest body regulating the Turkish university system, the Higher

Education Council (better know by its Turkish acronym: YOK), publicly split into two.

The universities, as the central hub of the debate, splintered into at least three different

ISSN 1360-8746 (print)/ISSN 1743-9612 (online) q 2008 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/13608740802158923

South European Society & Politics

Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2008, pp. 195215


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factions: the freedom camp, the secularism camp, and the freedom and secularism

camp.1 Thus, saying that 2008 will be the year of Headscarf Wars in Turkey would

not be too much of an over-statement.

Before the headscarf issue dominated the national agenda, the country was busy

with the details of a new Constitution. There was almost unanimous consent in the

society about the shortcomings of the existing Constitution, which dates from 1982.

It had been more or less dictated by the generals of the 1980 coup, and has been

amended numerous times since then. The authoritarian aspects of the 1982

Constitution became the target of seven EU harmonization packages. However, most

analysts agreed that it was difficult to change the spirit of the text through such

piecemeal measures. Heartened by the strong popular mandate after the 2007 elections

(when it received more than 46 per cent of the vote), AKP initiated the process ofdrafting a new, civilian-made Constitution.

The party advocating a new Constitution was itself a new phenomenon in Turkish

politics. AKP was established in 2001 due to the splintering of the established Islamist

movement of Turkey. Thus, it undoubtedly had conservative and religious elements

in its ideological fabric. Yet, by effectively portraying a more reformist and

centrist-leaning outlook, AKP managed to construct a broad coalition.

Its unorthodox combination of agendas, such as endorsing religious conservatism

as well as strongly supporting Turkeys membership to EU, successfully blended

seemingly opposite issues. This kind of thinking-outside-the-box strategy

combined with successful economic policies once in government was appreciated

by a significant portion of Turkish voters. Exit polls revealed that substantial numbers

of votes from the stagnating centre-right and even centre-left parties had flocked toAKP, both in the 2002 and 2007 general elections (Ozbudun 2006). The party also

received 41 per cent of the vote in the 2004 local government elections and elected

mayors in 60 of the 81 cities, including most metropolitan centres like Istanbul and

Ankara. As of today, AKP is the governing party and controls 62 per cent of the seats

in the Parliament.

Soon after its July 2007 victory, AKP drafted prominent social scientists and

constitutional law experts to work on a proposal for new Constitution. Towards

the end of 2007, the draft was made available to the public and a vibrant public

debate broke out, headed by different civil society organizations. Even though the

draft received as much criticism as support, this lively public debate maintained its

civic tone, and thus, was a significant milestone for the maturity of Turkish

democracy.Suddenly, however, the debates on a new civilian Constitution came to a halt when

AKP pulled a whole new card from up its sleeve. Instead of trying to assemble a grand

coalition in support of the new Constitution, AKP took up the issue of headscarf ban

in higher education. It forged a haphazard alliance with the nationalist right-wing

party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi MHP) and passed two constitutional amendments

in order to open up the university gates to headscarf wearing women. This pushed the

system into institutional division and gridlock.

196 E. Celik Wiltse


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The judiciary branch already had a track record of precedents that banned headscarf

use in higher education. Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights also

concurred with the Turkish courts on this issue. Thus, this act of the legislative branch

was squarely against the established position of the judiciary. As of this writing, some

universities have liberalized the dress code while most others continue the ban.

The issue is still in a limbo, because the amendments to the Constitution are rather

vague statements. They do not address the specific laws, such as the Article 17 of YOK

Law, that regulate dress codes in higher education.

Who Says What? The Sides of the Debate

The role of religion in public life has been a perennial issue for the modern TurkishRepublic. For the conservative and more religious sectors of society, Kemalist

secularism was too harsh on religious expression and particularly punitive towards

women. Thus, the liberalization of the dress code for women was a long overdue

measure. In fact, from this perspective, the amendments barely addressed the tip of an

iceberg. More reforms are needed to fully integrate these women into all aspects of

public life. Even after these two amendments, women wearing a headscarf would still

be excluded from employment in the public sector as judges, doctors, nurses or

teachers. In short, the religious sectors of the society were only partially satisfied with

the reform.

The attempts of AKP to liberalize headscarf use in universities were met by a strongly

dissenting coalition, composed of the universities, the Higher Education Council

(YOK), the military and the judiciary. Incidentally, these institutions have come to bethe bastions of secularism, especially since the 1990s when political Islam became a more

visible power in Turkey. Other members of the dissident camp included the Republican

Peoples Party (Cumhuriyetci Halk Partisi CHP) as the main opposition party with

strong secular credentials; most of the Kemalist, secular civil society organizations;

organizations of retired military officers; and some fringe leftist parties. An important

characteristic of all these groups which adamantly oppose the liberalization of headscarf

use is that they all take secularism as their defining cause (Turan 2006). For them, the

amendments present a clear and imminent danger. The constitutional changes are

seen as serious attempts to reorganize the rules of the state according to the dictates of

Islam (Arat 2001, p. 40). Because of this, the secularists do not regard them as some

benign amendments, but as signs of AKPs hidden agenda: that is, to bring sharia to

Turkey and turn the country into an Islamic Republic, one amendment at a time.Aside from the staunch supporters and opponents of the headscarf amendments,

a third group also emerged in the public debate. Even though it is very difficult

to pigeonhole them, this group includes influential journalists, columnists and

prominent members of the Turkish intelligentsia. As a whole, they represent the rare

breed of liberal democrats in the country. In general, this group was highly supportive

of AKP and its reformist and pro-EU outlook during its first four years in power.

In terms of their lifestyles and lebensraum, the liberal group has more in common with

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the countrys secular establishment. However, there is a fundamental difference in the

way in which the two sides read AKP and what it stands for. While the staunch

secularists consider AKP synonymous with the rise of political Islam and the

assault of reactionary/counter-revolutionary forces on westernization, the liberals

conceptualize the same phenomenon as signs of transformation, progress and an

alternative modernity.

The headscarf issue seems to be splintering the liberal camp into at least two. While

some of them continue to support AKPs headscarf initiative without any reservations,

others voice concerns over the way in which the amendments were carried out and

their potential social consequences. The first group considers the lifting of the ban a

long overdue measure. They subscribe to the basic rights and freedoms discourse of

AKP and argue that the headscarf ban was a violation of both the freedom ofexpression and of the right to equal access to education. The critical liberals, however,

express more of a disappointment with AKP for relegating the constitutional debates

to the back burner. They disapprove of AKPs pragmatic coalition with the extreme

nationalist MHP a party with a highly dubious record on rights and liberties just

to pass the amendments. More importantly, they feel offended by this piecemeal

expansion of rights by tinkering with two articles of the 1982 Constitution. What this

group was expecting was a comprehensive reform package introduced alongside the

new Constitution initiative. Therefore, they felt let down by AKP and its token

liberalization attempt which appeased only its conservative constituency.

Brief Historical Background

The history of current debates on the headscarf can be taken all the way back to the

modernization attempts of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century. Even in the late

Ottoman years, it was not uncommon to hear the elites discussing the regressive

impacts of Islam. Religion was associated with lethargy, fatalism and superstition, and

was seen as the main culprit of social backwardness. When the modern Turkish

Republic was established in 1923, the founders went at great lengths to regulate and

contain religion, due to this perennial concern for development and progress.

The Republican elites began to redraw the boundaries between state and organized

religion. From the 1920s on, a series of reforms was implemented to change the

outlook of the state and the nation towards a more secular one. The institution of the

Caliphate was abolished in 1924. In 1925, for the first time a political party was closed

down for its affiliation with religious fundamentalism. In the same year, the religiousbrotherhoods were permanently closed and the first dress code regulation took affect.

The Hat Law, enacted in 30 November 1925, banned the public use of the fez for men.

In 1926, a new Civil Code took affect, which granted equal rights to all women.

In 1928, statement that the religion of the nation is Islam was removed from the

Constitution. This meant that the new Turkish Republic no longer had an official

religion. In the same year, the alphabet was changed from Arabic to Latin, further

signalling the new direction of the Republic (Ahmad 2007, 106109).

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During the Republics early years, one can observe the deliberate efforts of state

elites to improve the lot of women. In fact, some of the political rights granted to

Turkish women were more progressive then their counterparts in Europe. In the case

of the dress code, the area remained largely unregulated. The fez law was only

applicable to men. In practice however, the Republic did endorse a modern, western

outlook for women. In the upper echelons of society, among higher-ranking

bureaucrats, at schools and urban centres, women did not sport traditional dresses nor

did they cover their hair. Yet, an important point to keep in mind is the level of

development in the country at the time. Up until the 1970s, the majority of the Turkish

society still lived in rural areas. Traditional outfits and particularly the headscarf were

thus more or less confined to the rural geography. From the 1970s on, socio-economic

dynamism began to reverse the urban/rural ratio. As the impoverished ruralpopulation flocked into the cities in search of jobs, education and better living

standards, they also brought their own lifestyles. Thus, it is not a surprise to see the

emergence of the first Islamist party in 1970 under the leadership of Professor

Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan and his National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi, later

renamed National Salvation Party, MSP) claimed to be the spokesperson of these

newly urbanized lower and middle classes who wanted to maintain their traditional

values.

The growing visibility of conservative lifestyles in Turkey is frequently explained

by the above-mentioned modernization thesis. According to this perspective,

socio-economic development stirs up the silent traditional sectors of the society. When

they move into urban centres, they can only be partially assimilated into modern life.

They adapt to certain aspects of modernity (capitalist economy, cosmopolitan urbanlife, consumerism, etc) but continue to cling to some of the traditional assets as well

(family bonds, womens traditional role as homemaker, etc). Nonetheless, certain

other variables are also necessary for these sociological factors to translate themselves

into full-blown conservative political movements. Consequently, when we try to

understand the rise of political Islam in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, we

also need to look at political institutions and party dynamics at the time.

The first two and a half decades of the Turkish Republic was marked by a single

party regime under CHP. Established by the founders of the Republic, CHP came to be

known as the party of the Centre, representing the Republics modernizing and

progressive ethos. Due to both domestic and international dynamics (rising popular

discontent against CHP and the post-WWII global democratic wave respectively)

Turkey moved to a two-party system in the 1950s. The main contender against CHPwas the Democratic Party (DP), which presented itself as the party of the Periphery.

The DP and its populist rhetoric tried to appeal all sectors of society which were

discontented under the single-party rule, namely small businesses, merchants,

peasants, and urban and rural conservatives. This strategy worked and the DP gained

overwhelming popular support in the 1950 and 1954 elections (53.6 and 58.4 per cent,

respectively). Meanwhile CHP votes dropped from 39.9 to 35.1 per cent. At the

time, the electoral regime that converted these votes into seats was a pluralist one.



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Consequently, the electoral success of the DP was inflated even more, and a highly

skewed distribution emerged in Parliament with the DP getting 503 seats while CHP

had only 31 (Zurcher 1994, 234).

In collective memory, the 1950s came to be known as the decade of the DP. The party

came to power claiming to be the voice of the silent majority, which remained at the

peripheryof politics during the single-party era. Very soon however, the DP rule itself

evolved into an excessively majoritarian and oppressive regime. The political excesses

of the DP, its systematic oppression of the universities and the judiciary, purges in the

bureaucracy, censorship of the press and intimidation of dissident voices, eventually

paved the way for the first military coup in Turkish history in 27 May 1960.

Soon after taking power, the coup leaders closed down the DP and prosecuted its

top leadership. In a very sad chapter of Turkish multi-party history, the three leaders ofthe DP, including the then Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, were executed after trial

by a military court. Afterwards, the coup leaders tried to establish certain institutional

checks over the elected governments, in order to curb potential excesses and prevent

the degeneration of the executive branch into a tyranny of the majority. They also tried

to protect basic individual rights and freedoms through constitutional guarantees.

The 1961 Constitution was prepared with these concerns in mind and it became the

locus of a more liberal, pluralist political life in Turkey thereafter.

When the military closed down the Democrat Party, the confounded voters of

the periphery split their votes between two parties, each of which claimed to be the

true successor of the DP. The DPs unnatural death, coupled with the switch from

plurality to proportional representation (PR) system in the 1961 elections, increased

the level of party fragmentation in the early 1960s (Sayar 2002, 12). From the1960s on, the Turkish political spectrum became more diverse, fragmented and

polarized. Numerous smaller and more ideological parties came out of the closet

(in Kalaycoglus terms). Extreme right, extreme left and religious parties joined the

electoral race. In this new era, the conservative and Islamist elements were represented

by Prof. Erbakans MSP (Kalaycoglu 2005, 122).

Rise of Political Islam

Throughout the 1960s and particularly in the 1970s, the major political cleavage in

Turkey followed the left-right axis. As a result, the gradually increasing popularity and

electoral power of the religious MSP was not considered an alarming develop-

ment. In fact, the MSP participated in numerous governing coalitions, thanks to theproportional representation system and the inability of mainstream centre-right and

left-of-centre parties to win governing majorities.

The coalition governments in Turkey were not formed on the basis of a negotiated

and mutually compromised programme. Rather, the party leaders were sitting down

and vigorously fighting over the partitioning of ministries. When they reached a deal, a

coalition was formed. From then on, each ministry was run solely by the party that

controlled it, as if it were a completely autonomous entity. Each ministry was treated

200 E. Celik Wiltse


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as a deep pocket to dive into and dole out patronage to party loyalists. As a result, there

was no coherence in government policies. The success rate of coalition governments

was very low, given the fact that the coalition partners political agendas and priorities

were never in sync with each other.

Between the 1960 and 1980 military coups, Turkey had twenty different cabinets,

and the office of the prime minister changed hands for fifteen times (Aksin 2007,

619620). Especially in the 1970s, failed coalitions became a fact of daily life. The party

system was highly fragmented and showed no signs of consolidation. Each party, no

matter how small, knew that pretty soon the coalition government would fail and they

would have a real chance to be in the next one. Two of the largest parties on the right

and left of centre could not reconcile their differences. Unable to form a grand

coalition, they fell hostage to the smaller and more extremist parties in order toestablish a governing majority. This gave disproportionate powers to the smaller, more

ideological parties, such as the nationalist MHP (Nationalist Action Party) and

the Islamist MSP (Sunar 2004, 84 86; Zurcher 1994, 275 276). They achieved

critical positions in the government, packed the bureaucracy with their supporters

and channelled resources to their sympathizers. Having extremists in charge of

the government further polarized the political atmosphere and contributed to the

escalating violence in the country.

Political Islam kept a relatively low profile during the 1970s, as the left-right division

dominated the national political arena. Universities, public bureaucracy, labour and

business associations were all politicized and highly polarized along the left-right axis.

Expansion of political and associational rights after the 1961 Constitution, combined

with the international dynamics of anti-imperialism, resulted in massive student andlabour demonstrations, strikes and lockouts across the country. Eventually, political

violence replaced civic rhetoric and assassinations of prominent professors,

journalists, intellectuals and activists overwhelmed the headlines. Ethnic and sectarian

violence also erupted across the country. In the case of the Maras massacre

(December 1978), right-wing militants seized control of the city and, according to the

official figures, killed 109 Alevis (members of a heterodox Muslim minority known for

their support of leftist ideas) and wounded hundreds more. The country rolled into

another episode of chaos and turmoil, which ended abruptly with the military coup of

12 September 1980.

Most analysts highlight the 1980 military regime as an important turning point in

terms of the Turkish states re-accommodation of religion (Guvenc 1991). Weary of

decades of long ideological conflict between left and right, the military rulers thoughtthat what the country needed most was unity. They advocated the Turkish-Islamic

Synthesis, a strategy that called for a startling return of religion in public life, including

public education. The military commissioned the State Planning Organization

(Devlet Planlama Teskilat, DPT) to operationalize this new strategy. The DPT came

up with the National Culture Plan (1983), which effectively reversed most of the

secular traits in national education.



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Moreover, the 1982 Constitution required compulsory religion classes at primary

and secondary schools, a measure completely at odds with the secularism principle of

the Republic (Toprak 1990). The numbers of vocational schools (from 6th grade to

high school) that trained imams and preachers rocketed after the 1980 coup.

Conservative families preferred the religious vocational schools as a convenient

alternative to the secular ones, and sent their children in increasing numbers. This

created a dual track national education system secular and non-secular a problem

that remains unresolved to this day. In theory, the students of these schools were

trained to become imams and preachers. In practice, however, the number of

graduates far superseded the actual need of the nation for imams and preachers.

All of these measures were part and parcel of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which

aimed to create a loyal and obedient generation that is less inclined to follow divisiveideologies.

Another peculiar regularity of Turkish politics is the periodic closing down of

political parties with each military coup, and their subsequent re-incarnation under

different names. Political Islam and its parties were not immune to this pattern either.

Yet, when Erbakans MSP was shot down by the 1980 coup and re-opened in 1983

under the banner of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), it capitalized on this

atmosphere of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. In the 1984 local elections, the RP received

only 4.4 per cent of the vote but progressively increased its share from then on. In the

1991 general elections, the RP received 16.9 per cent (62 seats) and four years later

emerged as first party (21.4 per cent, 158 seats), leaving all the mainstream centre-right

and centre-left parties behind (Turkish Statistical Institute).

The electoral triumph of the RP in 1995 was nothing short of a political earthquakefor the Turkish party system. Even though it could not participate in the first round of

coalition making in a highly divided Parliament, the RP became the senior partner in a

governing coalition with the centre-right True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi DYP)

formed on 29 June 1996 (Ahmad 2007, 207).

The Road to the Postmodern Coup and Other Legal Battles

Emboldened by its electoral success, and empowered by its coalition leadership, the

RP began to push the limits of the regime. Erbakan made his first visits to Libya

and Egypt in his official capacity as the Prime Minister. He deliberately chose these

destinations as Muslim countries, but both visits turned out to be diplomatic

humiliations for him and his entourage. The ever-unstable Kaddafi put up a show byhosting the envoy at a desert tent, and the Egyptian leader, Husnu Mubarak, kept

them waiting for hours.

Back home, Erbakan suggested Turkeys withdrawal from its most established

strategic alliance, NATO, and proposed a similar security pact solely with Muslim

countries. He also proposed an Islamic monetary union and an Islamic currency to

replace the US dollar in transactions among Muslim countries. Aside from the

disturbing rhetoric of its leader, local RP branches were also engaged in activities

202 E. Celik Wiltse


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that provoked the secular regime. The most famous of those probably took place at

Sincan, when the mayor and the local party affiliates organised an event called

Jerusalem Night. They invited the Iranian Ambassador to give a speech and chanted

slogans praising militant groups like Hizbullah and Hamas.

Political tension continued to increase across the country, as the RP-DYP (Refah-Yol)

coalition carried on. Newspaper headlines frequently mentioned stories about the

RP-affiliated mayors not respecting the statues of Ataturk, members of militant religious

sects performing rituals on streets (Aczimendiler), and RP parliamentarians calling for an

Islamic Revolution in Turkey, either through bloodshed or the ballot box. Regarding our

topic, the headscarf, there was a visible increase in its popularity at the universities. At a

public rally, Erbakan said that pretty soon, the university Rectors would be compelled to

salute headscarf-wearing girls. Women wearing black chadors were spotted at theuniversities and rumours that some of them were refusing to speak with male teaching

assistants and professors began to circulate on the grape wine.

All of these developments finally triggered a harsh response from the gatekeepers of

the secular regime. At the National Security Council (NSC) meeting on 28 February

1997, military members of the Council issued an ultimatum to Prime Minister

Erbakan. Subsequently, Erbakan stepped down, and handed over the leadership of

the coalition to his junior partner, Tansu C iller. The February 28 incident included

a series of measures aimed at curbing the growing impact of political Islam. It resulted

in purges of hundreds of employees from the military as well as the civilian

bureaucracy most of whom were spotted through their headscarf wearing wives.

Also at this historic meeting of the NSC, compulsory education was extended from five

to eight years. This act was particularly aimed at the religious vocational schools thatused to admit children in the 6th grade. With the implementation of the eight-year

rule, their middle schools were shut down, resulting in more years of schooling in

secular institutions and a later exposure to religious training (beginning in the 9th

grade instead of the 6th).

The post-modern coup of 28 February 1997 also initiated another round of legal

battles between the secular regime and political Islam. In 1998, the Constitutional

Court found the Welfare Party in violation of the democratic and secularist principles

of the Republic (Article 68 4) as well as the law on political parties (Article 103).

The Court closed down the RP and banned its top leadership from politics for five

years.2 When the party took the case to the European Court of Human Rights

(ECHR), they received a surprising outcome.

Generally speaking, Turkey has a notorious trail of lost cases in front of the ECHR.Yet, on this particular case of party closure, the Court in Strasbourg concurred

with the decision of the Court in Ankara. Among other reasons, the ECHR reached

this judgment by taking into account the importance of the principle of secularism for

the democratic system in Turkey.3 Thus, secularism was internationally recognized

as the sine qua non of Turkish democracy, and political activism that amounted

to a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam was categorized as being outside the

protection of universal democratic rights and liberties.



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Throughout the 1990s, the decisions of the EHRC by no means pleased the Islamist

movements in Turkey. A second case that has left its mark to this day was brought up

by Leyla Sahin, a fifth year student at Cerrahpasa Medical School in Istanbul.

She received disciplinary measures due to her attempts to enrol in classes and

participate in exams wearing her headscarf and sued the University in the Turkish

courts. Having lost those cases and exhausted domestic judicial channels, she took her

case to the EHRC. The case went all the way to the Grand Chamber and in its final

judgment the EHRC decided that the headscarf ban at Turkish universities did not

constitute a violation of freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9 of the

European Convention on Human Rights). Nor was it considered a violation of the

right to education or to freedom of expression.4

When deliberating the religious freedoms aspects of the Sahin Case (Article 9), theEHRC provided a detailed account of the decisions by Turkish Higher Courts. It stated

that through numerous cases, the Turkish Higher Administrative Courts (Danistay)

had established consistent, binding and accessible precedents that wearing the Islamic

headscarf at university was not compatible with the fundamental principles of the

Republic.5 The Grand Chamber of the EHRC also concurred with the Chamber over

the necessity of the secularism principle in order to protect the democratic regime in

Turkey.

The EHRC decision on the Sahin case set the precedent for subsequent headscarf

cases from Turkey. Immediately after this decision, the wife of current President

Abdullah Gul withdrew her headscarf related case from the EHRC. AKP and its

conservative constituents could not find a hospitable ally in the international human

rights institutions. Regardless of this serious judicial blow, the issue remained on thedomestic agenda due both to the large number of headscarf wearing women and to the

high levels of popular support for the liberalization of the dress code.

Popular Support Dilemma: Majoritarianism versus Basic Rights Discourse

Numerous public opinion surveys conducted in Turkey in recent years have revealed

solid popular support for lifting the headscarf ban in public institutions. Approximately

70 to 75 per cent of Turkish society is critical of this restriction.6 The strong popular

support for lifting the ban even encouraged some politicians within AKP ranks,

including current President Abdullah Gul to suggest plebiscitarian solutions to the

problem. Lets hold a referendum and do what the people say was the gist of this

populist position. Its utilitarian understanding of public input in collective decisionmaking notwithstanding, there was another significant shortcoming of this line of

thinking. On the one hand, it placed the headscarf issue within the fundamental rights

discourse. Yet on the other, it counted on the consent of the majority to grant this

fundamentalrightto the headscarf-wearingwomen.This was a highly flawed wayof legal

reasoning. By this logic, if the majority of the Turkish society were to favour the death

penalty (abolished in 2002), should Turkey go ahead and re-implement capital

punishment? Clearly, trusting the instincts of the majority was not the safest way

204 E. Celik Wiltse


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to guarantee basic rights and liberties, even in a democracy. Eventually, the advocates of

the referendum realized the slippery slope they were on and the headscarf debates were

muted for a while. The issue kept a low profile until it resurfaced with the constitutional

amendments.

When AKP won the 2002 elections, there were rising expectations within its conser-

vative constituency for the expansion of religious liberties. However, the tumultuous

relations between the military and AKP did not leave much room for AKP elites to cater to

the demands of their core constituency. Rather, the party consolidated its efforts to

undertake the crucial economic and political reforms required to maintain Turkey on the

EU track. Its historic success in the 2007 general elections and subsequent political victory

in electing Abdullah Gul to the Presidency provided the necessary winds for AKP sails.

The headscarf issue was a burning problem for the core AKP constituency. Eventhough the party was a diverse coalition of rural population, artisans, small traders in

cities, urban slum-dwellers, and the rapidly rising Islamist bourgeoisie (Ozbudun

2006, 547), those who established the party were a splinter faction from the hard-liner

Islamist party of Necmettin Erbakan. As the young, reformist and innovative faction of

the movement, the founders of AKP pushed the new party much further to the

political centre. In terms of its programme and general outlook, AKP began to reflect

qualities more in common with centre-right parties than previous Islamist parties

(Ozbudun 2006; C arkoglu 2007). Both at discursive and policy levels, the party

re-invented itself as the party of the centre, and endorsed the conservative democrat

label to reflect its new position.7 These centrist characteristics notwithstanding, AKP

still had a major dilemma. This was how to hold onto the traditional constituency

while still appealing to the larger voter pool around the centre-right of the politicalspectrum? In this regard, the liberalization of the headscarf legislation became a viable

topic for the AKP since it has the support of both the majority of the public as well as

of the traditionalist/conservative AKP core.

Politics of Practicality: Establishing Coalitions for Reform

The attempts to partially liberalize the use of the headscarf should be understood

as a delicate game of interlocking coalitions and power balancing. AKP has to

simultaneously appeal to its traditionalists without alienating the centrists. It also

needs to secure a working coalition in Parliament to pass the amendments, and at the

same time not trigger too strong a reaction from the military and secular-bureaucratic

gatekeepers of the Republic. Finally, AKP has to win the hearts and minds of liberalintellectual circles, since this is an important block that contributes to the public

legitimacy of the partys reformist agenda.

All of these concerns and calculations are reflected in the way in which the amend-

ments are framed. A key point, for example, is the way in which AKP tiptoes

around the issue of freedom of religion. While most conservative AKP supporters

conceptualize the headscarf ban as an infringement of the right to religious expression,

current constitutional amendments place the issue in the framework of legal equality



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and educational freedoms. The amendment to Article 10 (Equality Before the Law)

includes that the state has to respect the equality of all citizens when receiving public

services. The second amendment to Article 41 (Right to Education) states that, no one

can be denied his/her right to higher education for any reason, except for the

restriction defined by law. There are also deliberate efforts by AKP to allow only

headscarves, but not the more radical forms of covering, such as black chadors or

burqas. Taken together, the amendments aim to end the humiliation of headscarf

wearing women at the university gates, without alarming the rest of the society that a

regime change is on the way.

The liberal and democratic sectors of society and particularly their spokespersons in

the media were expecting a larger reform package from the current AKP government.

There were a number of pending reforms on freedom of speech (Article 301), propertyrights of non-Muslim foundations (Vakiflar Kanunu), and on gender equality

and further expansion of political, cultural and linguistic rights, all waiting to get

the governments attention. When AKP established a working coalition with MHP on

a fringe subject like the headscarf, these groups felt rather disappointed and

even betrayed. Second, some liberals and democrats regarded a constitutional amend-

ment on this issue as a case of overkill, when changing just the lower level laws and

regulations would have sufficed. As the amendments target a specific group of women

with strong religious identification, liberals are worried that such constitutional

amendments might be abused to grant special rights to other illiberal groups as well

(Arat 2001).

An important point to keep in mind is the limited combinations of a coalition

matrix within the current Parliament. The arithmetic on the floor does not give AKPmuch room to manoeuvre when it comes to establishing a grand coalition for massive

democratic reform. As revealed in numerous incidents, the second largest party in the

Parliament, CHP, has consolidated its image as a status quo party. It displays no

significant interest in expanding the boundaries of democracy in Turkey or in being

part of a reform-oriented coalition (Ayata & Ayata 2007). If anything, CHP tries to

curb any attempt to expand liberties on the grounds that they compromise the unitary

nation-state status of Turkey (Turan 2006, 565). The uncooperative attitude of

CHP leaves AKP with potential parliamentary support only from the nationalist

MHP and the independent Kurdish MPs (most recently called the Democratic Society

Party DTP). Clearly, it is very difficult to reconcile these two groups which occupy

opposite ends of the political spectrum. Thus, AKP faces significant odds when it tries

to build a coalition for democratic reform. As a result, it is inclined to follow apragmatic, piece-by-piece path to reform.

What is Next? A Liberal Democratic Heaven or the Doomsday Scenario

The secular sectors of the Turkish society do not consider the headscarf amendments as a

minor symbolic gesture of AKP for political gain. Rather, this debate is a head on collision

between two different conceptualizations of Turkeys identity and future. For the

206 E. Celik Wiltse


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secularists, the confrontation goes back to the core issues of what Turkey is and where it

belongs: a secular, modern nation and a part of Western civilization versus a conservative,

Muslim nation and a part of Eastern civilization. The secularists highlight the

progressively growing incidents of public intimidation of women sporting moder-

n/western outlooks and lifestyles.According to thisgroup, the amendmentsare not about

extending liberties to a disenfranchised group, but about elevating public displays of

religion and at the same time tacitly condemning women who choose not to cover.

The secular groups try hard to not come out as anti-religious in their discourse.

In fact, some even directly invoke verses of the Quran and argue that not covering your

hair does not preclude you from being a good Muslim. They also call for a less rigid

interpretation of the Quran that takes into account the circumstance of modern times.

They are proud of Turkeys place as the only majority Muslim country with suchprogressive gender relations anddo notwant to fall back to the ranks of Egypt, Malaysia

or Iran. When the foremost Turkish sociologist, Serif Mardin, displayed ambivalence

in his response to an interview question on whether Turkey would become like Malaysia

(where the state endorses Islam as its official religion), it provoked serious concern

among the secularists that the threat of Islamism is real. On top of this, in the same

interview Mardin coined the term mahalle basks (neighbourhood pressure), referring

to the potential communal pressure over secular lifestyles when more pious and

conservative ways of living are the predominant patterns in ones immediate

environment (Arman 2007).

While the secular groups, particularly CHP, try to block the amendments by judicial

means (taking the issue to the Constitutional Court) and by increasing public awareness

through mass demonstrations, certain liberal sectors of the society consider these actionsmostly as a false alarm. In her highly publicized works, sociologist Nilufer Gole interprets

the rising economic, political and intellectual power of Islam as the emergence of

counter-elites, against the established Republican centre. According to her, these are all

healthy signs of a periphery that is no longer a passive recipient of the top-down

modernization project of the secular elites (Gole 1997). Yet, their very resistance is also

marked with alternative, non-traditional ways. Women wearing headscarves, for

instance, do not want to confine themselves to the traditional realm of their households,

but want to actively participate in public life by getting an education and acquiring

professional skills. Thus, their deployment of an Islamic symbol in public institutions,

such as the headscarf, is actually a modern phenomenon in this regard (Gole 1996).

Other analysts place the phenomenon of rising political Islam in Turkey in a wider

spectrum of globalization. From this perspective, this is not a religiousmovementper se,but a much larger socio-economic dynamic intimately connected with neo-liberal

globalization. When nation-states began to dismantle their welfare regimes under the

pressures of global capitalism, they became less and less capable of delivering to the

excluded sectors of the society. Contrary to the classical modernization theories,

religion did not become obsolete as societies developed. In fact, it became a new source

of authenticity, group identity and even tangible benefits as the modern age gave way to

a post-modern one (Gulalp 2001). Consequently, it would be a mistake to categorize the



15/22

recent resurgence of political Islam as the heir of an age-old ideological rift between the

secularists and the Islamists. This is a new phenomenon, and is part and parcel of

Turkeys socio-economic progress, enveloped in an alternative, post-modern identity.

Endemic Gender Problem of Turkey: Is AKP Part of the Problem or the Solution?

No matter how the headscarf debates are framed, it is clear that conservative women

are progressively becoming a formidable force in Turkish politics. They are ever more

organized, vocal and politically conscious. Today, the critical role of womens branches

in the electoral success of the Welfare Party is well-documented by leading political

scientists. According to these studies, the grass roots mobilization and door-to-door

campaigning of women played a crucial role in translating what was previously aprivate concern (i.e. the decision to wear headscarf) into a public one. Moreover, their

efforts were vital for the partys transformation from a fringe, extremist party to one

with mass appeal (Arat 2007).

The activism of the WPs womens branches inspired other parties, and was largely

replicated by AKP after the closure of the WP. Their mobilization at the grassroots

level, door-to-door campaigns, commitment to charity and social work all contributed

to the mass appeal of AKP. Their proven track of commitment and hard work

notwithstanding, women in AKP are still faced with systematic discrimination. In their

meticulous fieldwork, Tur and C tak illustrate the numerous ways in which the women

in the party are placed at a disadvantaged position vis-a-vis the men. First, the party in

practice segregates women into Womens Branches by discouraging their participation

in other groups, such as the Youth Branches. Second, there is discrimination againstheadscarf-wearing women within AKP. Party members admit that the percentage of

women with headscarves increase as you move down the party rank and file. Third, the

status of women in the party seems to be purely at the discretion of its leader, Recep

Tayyip Erdogan. He personally requests the participation of the heads of Womens

Branches in local party meetings, despite the disgruntled voices of the male party

members (Tur & C tak 2006).

AKPs approach is marked by a certain amount of reluctance to offer systematic and

institutionalized solutions to Turkeys endemic gender problems. Its rhetoric touches

upon gender inequality and in the 2007 elections the party made a concerted effort to

place women in electable positions on the party lists. This resulted in a slight

improvement in thenumber of womenmembers in the legislature (upto 9 percent from

4 per cent in 2002).8 However, AKP is by no means convinced of the need to adoptproactive measures, such as quotas for women in politics, an optionwhich AKP leaders,

including the only woman minister, Nimet Cubukcu, adamantly reject. When asked

about this issue by the President of thelargest womensNGO of Turkey, whopointed out

that even Rwanda has quotas for women in politics, Prime Minister Erdog an snapped

back at her and said: Do you want to be like Rwanda? Go ahead!. 9

Empirical studies by reputable social scientists of Turkey reveal that two of the most

important hurdles facing womens upward mobility are social conservatism and the

208 E. Celik Wiltse


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economic constraints of the family. Nearly half of the girls (49 per cent) who complete

the compulsory eight years of schooling cannot go on to high school simply because

their families, father or brothers do not want them to. The percentage of women who

could not get a university diploma due to economic problems, marriage or family

oppression far outnumber those who had to drop out of university due to their

headscarves (Kalaycoglu & Toprak 2004). Based on these statistics, Turkey seems to

have an army of house-girls with no chances of self-realization, who stay at home and

wait for prospective husbands. Under these circumstances, those who are not directly

affiliated with AKP (liberals, secularists, etc) begin to suspect the bona fide intentions

behind the recent amendments. They argue that there are more pressing issues that

impact the lives of greater number of women, such as the vast education gap and the

employment gap between the sexes. By prioritizing the issue of headscarf use inuniversities, AKP is distracting the public from these more compelling problems.

Where Do We Stand? Economic and Educational Status of Turkish Women

Comparative statistics reveal dismal results regarding the status of women in

education and job force in Turkey. Tables 1 and 2 below are taken from the European

Social Survey. The Survey offers ample opportunity to compare European societies on

numerous issues, including their approaches to gender equality. The respondents are

asked whether men should have priority over women in employment, if jobs are scarce

in the country. Here, Turkish participants display an astoundingly high approval rate

(over 72 per cent), when compared to Greece (58 per cent), Poland (40 per cent), Spain

(30 per cent) and the UK (26 per cent).The results for Turkey might be even more alarming for some, when broken down

along party lines. As Table 2 indicates, those who voted for AKP overwhelmingly

support (82 per cent) the preferential treatment of males in the job market when jobs

are scarce. The level of support declines as one moves from the right of political

spectrum to the left, with CHP voters scoring 68 per cent approval. The most

interesting result here is probably the scores of the ethnic Kurdish party DEHAP,

which seems to be the most egalitarian party in terms of gender, based on this

particular variable.

Table 1 Question: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women?(Cross-tab for selected countries)

Germany Britain Spain Poland Greece Turkey

Agree strongly 4.5 6.2 8.6 12.9 14.8 34.4Agree 17.0 20.6 22.0 27.3 33.5 38.1Neutral 22.8 22.2 13.6 20.3 20.2 10.9Disagree 34.5 36.8 32.7 30.9 20.6 12.7Disagree strongly 21.2 14.1 23.1 8.6 10.9 3.9

Source: European Social Survey Round 2 (2005)



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Empirical studies on Turkey highlight the seriousness of gender issues at the social,cultural and economic levels. Due to its conservative constituency, AKP has to fight an

uphill battle in order to educate its own constituency and familiarize its followers

with the notions of gender equality that its top leadership is currently endorsing. To the

degree that the party achieves this and establishes consensus for a progressive reform

agenda on gender equality, it could become the part of solution. However, if

short-term electoral concerns dominate its agenda, then AKP might inevitably become

more of a status quo party and appease conservative constituents.

Figures 1 and 2 below illustrate the severity of the gender problem in Turkey, when

compared with selected members of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation

Table 2 Question: When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women?(Turkey only: cross-tab for 2002 parliamentary vote)

AKP DYP MHP CHP DEHAP

Agree strongly 42.6 34.9 31.8 31.4 13.6Agree 39.9 38.1 50 37.3 30.3Neutral 9.4 11.1 10.6 6.54 27.3Disagree 6.3 14.3 6.1 16.3 22.7Disagree strongly 1.7 1.6 1.5 8.5 6.1

Source: European Social Survey Round 2 (2005)

Figure 1 Employment rates of women in select OECD countries average annual growth(%) 1992 2005. Source: OECD Factbook 2007.

210 E. Celik Wiltse


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and Development, OECD. In Figure 1, Turkey scores the worst performance out of

35 OECD members, with its 22.26 per cent annual growth in womens employment

between 1992 and 2005. This means a real drop in the percentage of working women

from the 1990s onwards. Far from bridging the existing gap, such a trend wouldfurther exclude women from the work force and undermine their socio-economic

empowerment. Therefore, effective measures to encourage womens participation in

the labour market (job training, tax incentives, child care subsidies, etc.) should be

high on the agenda of any government that claims to care about gender issues.

Conclusions

Turkey is likely to spend significant political capital on the headscarf issue in the

coming years. These debates however should not obscure the larger problem of gender

inequality in the country, particularly in the critical spheres of employment and

education. Comparative empirical studies illustrate the compelling need for the state

to adopt proactive measures if Turkey wants to secure a place among the league ofadvanced democratic nations. AKP has a great chance to silence the allegations that it

is a reactionary Islamist movement, should it decide to undertake progressive reforms

that improve the lot ofallwomen.

Another important point to mention is that the headscarf itself is a moving target,

hence very difficult to regulate if/when the liberalization takes affect. It is by no means

frozen in time and immune to the general social transformation and progress of

Turkish society. For instance, during the height of the WP-DYP coalition, typical

Figure 2 Unemployed, unschooled percentage of youths (15 19) in selected OECDCountries in 2004. Source: OECD Factbook 2007.



19/22

headscarf dimensions were 110 110 centimetres, draped over long coats in

subtle colours. Today, typical models are 90 90 in dimensions, with a lot more

vibrant colours and numerous stylish ways to tie. In fact, there is a wide range of ways

to tie the headscarf, from the so-called Anatolian way (folded in a triangle and both

ends loosely tied under the chin), to the version with black bands on the forehead, pins

under the chin and wrapped ends around the neck. Thus, there is a whole spectrum of

styles for wearing a headscarf, each with a different socially and class-bound

symbolism.

In recent debates, when the legislators suggested that only a standardized model of

scarf should be allowed on campuses, the headscarf-wearing women were the first

to protest. The legislators were proposing the Anatolian model as a compromise

solution, yet the students frowned upon it by calling it the grandma style. Someheadscarf-wearing students said they would rather uncover their hair than walk

around dressed like their grandmothers. Meanwhile, a small but articulate group

emerged as the spokeswomen of headscarf wearing university students. This group

criticized the homogenization of all women under the headscarf, deconstructed the

normal vs. pathological dichotomy that tacitly dominates the secularism debates and

finally, voiced their support for freedom to all marginalized sectors, including

homosexuals (Selcuk 2008). In this regard, they reject the collective pressures of both

the religious institutions and the secular state apparatus over their individual choices.

Yet, an important problem is the lack of political skills and institutional flexibility to

accommodate these demands. Second, and more importantly, there are the vast

majority of girls and women who lack the means and skills to articulate their demands

in a democratic society. Unfortunately, the current AKP administration does not seemto prioritize the empowerment of these large but silent sectors of women.

The severity of the gendered aspect of the headscarf problem notwithstanding,

current developments on the judiciary front suddenly turned the situation into an

existential problem for AKP. In April 2008, the Constitutional Court of Turkey decided

to take up a case regarding AKPs closure and a political ban on the 71 leading figures

of the party. The public prosecutors case charges AKP as a centre of anti-secular

activities. There is little doubt that the recent headscarf amendments acted as a catalyst

for the filing of the suit. Though tensions with the judiciary have been common

throughout AKPs tenure as the ruling party, this is by far the most serious threat to

date. The closing down of the party and a political ban on its entire leadership could

effectively eliminate this movement from the democratic arena.

Since splintering from Erbakans hardliner Islamist movement, the leaders ofAKP had displayed a thorough understanding of Turkeys centre-periphery cleavage.

On the one hand, they muted their Islamist rhetoric and tried not to overtly confront

the military and bureaucratic establishment. On the other, they carefully anchored

themselves on the EU track through a series of democratic reforms. This way, AKP

was able to buttress itself domestically with its increasing electoral support, and

internationally with the sympathetic EU opinion. However, in the last couple of

years, AKPs democratization efforts became sluggish, thus weakening the EU anchor.

212 E. Celik Wiltse


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Despite its massive electoral success, AKP has been seriously intimidated by the filing

of the Constitutional Court suit, and is desperately trying to mend its bridges with the

EU by passing another comprehensive democratic reform package. Getting back on

the EU membership track could not only strengthen its credentials as a mainstream

centrist party, but also could trim some of the non-democratic excesses of the Turkish

state. Yet again, how much of these reforms are due to political expediency, and

whether or not they can take root and help prevent the partys closure remains to

be seen.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Hakan Yilmaz for our discussion on coalitions for democratic reform,

David Wiltse for his help with the European Social Survey data and the figures, and Peri Uran for

her clarification of the convoluted legal jargon. I am also grateful to Susannah Verney for her

incisive editorial suggestions and to the journals two anonymous referees for their constructive

comments.

Notes

[1] These three groups became more apparent due to their publicized petition campaigns. The first

group of scholars supports the amendments and calls for a complete freedom of headscarf use on

campuses. The second group argues that allowing such an obvious religious symbol on

campuses would constitute a serious breach of the secularism principle and would disregard all

the court precedents. The third group argues that students should be allowed to wear

headscarves at university campuses, but also that the state should jealously guard the secularism

principle as well.

[2] The Constitutional Court of Turkey, Decision Date: 9 January 1998; Decision Number: 1998/1,

publication date in the Official Gazette (Resmi Gazete): 22 February 1998.

[3] TheEuropeanCourtof Human Rights,Case of Refah Partisi(The Welfare Party)and Others v.Turkey,

Application #s: 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, Judgment Date: 31 July 2001, paragraph 42.

[4] The European Court of Human Rights, Case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Application # 44774/98.

[5] Article 4 of the Law on Higher Education (2547) states the purpose of higher education in

Turkey. The first purpose listed is to educate students who respect the Kemalist reforms.

The Administrative High Court frequently invoked Article 4, as well as the transitional section

17 (freedom of dress code in higher education institution, unless it violates the existing laws) in

its decisions to continue the headscarf ban on campuses. Consequently, the governments

current attempts to amend section 17 falls short of eliminating the legal barriers, because there is

still Article 4 that requires universities to pursue education in light of secularism and Kemalist

principles.

[6] For a solid academic study on these numbers, see C arkoglu, A. & Binnaz, T. 2000. Turkiyede Din,

Toplum ve Siyaset [Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey]. Istanbul: TESEV Publications; For

more current public opinion results, see the survey conducted by the TV news programme 32.

Gun and the A & G Polling Company, Radikal (Turkish daily), 28 September 2007.

[7] AKP organized a major conference and invited prominent members of the academic world to

flesh out the concept a conservative democrat, International Symposium on Conservatism and

Democracy, 1011 January 2004, Ankara, AKP Headquarters. The full text of the proceedings

was published by the party.



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[8] The total number of women MPs in 2002 and 2007 was 24 and 50, respectively.

www.konrad.org.tr

[9] This tense exchange between the Prime Minister and the President of the Association to Support

and Educate Women Candidates (Kadn Adaylar Destekleme ve Egitme Dernegi, KADER)

occupied the headlines and occupied the press for some time. See Radikal, 4 5 October 2007

and most other newspapers of this date.

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