C U R R E N T T O P I C S

MICHAEL POOLE, ROGER MANSFIELD,

PAUL FROST, AND PAUL BLYTON*

Why Managers Join Unions: Evidence from Britain

MANAGERIAL UNIONISM INCREASED DRAMATICALLY in Western Europe during the seventies. Middle managers in Britain, cadres in France, Dirigenti in Italy, and Zeitende angestellte in West Germany joined unions in large numbers, particularly in the public sector. Academic interest in this phenomenon has grown apace (see, e.g., Bamber, 1976; European Association for Personnel Management [EAPM], 1979; Gospel, 1978; Hartmann, 1974), but the theories generated have not yet been subjected to comprehensive review, nor systematidy tested against empirical evidence.

Broadly speaking, there are three types of existing research on union membership (see Fiorito and Greer, 1982): (1) time-series approaches (e.g., Ashenfelter and Pencavel, 1969; Bain i d Elsheikh, 1976; Elsheikh and Bain, 1978) which trace historical changes in union density; (2) cross-sectional analyses conducted at a high level of aggregation (e.g., Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1972; Elsheikh and Bain, 1980); and (3) individual-level cross-sectional analyses (e.g., Kochan, 1979; Schmidt and Strauss, 1976), usually based on questionnaires or interviews. With respect to managerial unionism, most empirical evidence has been drawn from studies of specific unions (Bamber, 1976; Dickens, 1972; Gill et al., 19771, rather than from representative samples of managers in a range of industries and services.

Here, we examine several theoretical approaches to explaining why managers join unions and assess them with individual-level data taken from a lengthy questionnaire survey of a large sample of managerial personnel in the United Kingdom (Mansfield et al., 1981; Poole et al., 1981). The nature of the data precludes our making any evaluations of long-term historical changes in managerial union membership or ob- servations on the factors affecting aggregate membership density in the U.K. We focus exclusively on issues relating to why managers join unions. The survey results suggest that a limited number of independent variables are crucial in accounting for membership: the presence of a union in the managers’ organization; employment in

*The authors are, respectively, Senior Lecturer and Professor of Business Administration. University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology, Lecturer in Business Studies, Bdghton Polytechnic, and Lecturer in Business Administration, University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Fall 1883). (01883 by the Regents of the University of California. aO19/sS76/83/1015/~6/$10.00

426

Current Topic I 427

the public rather than the private sector; and ideological commitment to unionism. Respondents’ own assessments of their reasons for becoming union members appear to cluster in three orientations: instrumental, political, and institutional.

Theories of Union Membership Five principal approaches to explaining union membership emerge

from the literature. Discussed below in turn, these are: (1) the composite and systematic listing of coterminous factors; (2) the industrial relations approach; (3) traditional analyses by industrial sociologists, based on the study of adaptations in market, work, and status situations; (4) radical analyses by industrial relationists and sociologists, based on a “proletarianization thesis”; and (5) social action models focusing on managers’ orientations and perceptions.

Listing approach. This perspective is atheoretical. Factors which appear to d e c t managerial union membership are identified, but there is no attempt to provide a unifying rationale for these variables. For example, the European Association for Personnel Management (EAPM) sees economic pressures (pay policies, erosion of differentials), fear of exclusion from national level consultationdnegotiations, and the need for job security brought about by industrial restructuring as Ezvoring unionization (EAPM, 1979). Conversely, they identify (EAPM, 1979) principles, fear of losing promotion, fear of losing the trust of employers, and the inappropriateness of unionization for managers’ needs (opposing philosophies and policies) as discouraging membership.

Zndustrial relations approach. Here it is assumed that employers, governments, and unions have a common interest in establishing institutions of job regulation (Dunlop, 1958; Flanders, 1975). When the preferred method is collective bargaining, managerial unionism frequently results. As with white-collar workers, managers’ unionization is hypothesized to be a product of employer recognition of unions, government action (particularly that horing employer recognition), and union initiatives to secure a collective bargaining presence in the enterprise. The relative weight given to these factors varies by study. For example, in McCormick’s (1960) explanation of the rise of managerial unionism in the U.K. mining industry, recognition by employers (and hence the willingness to deal with unions on a regular basis) is vital. Bain’s (1970) account of white-collar union growth, adapted for managers by Bamber (1976) and Gospel (1978), stresses recognition of unions by employers, government action, and employment concentration.

Bain sees aggregate density as a function of the degree of employment concentration and the extent to which employers are prepared to recognize unions. He argues that employment concentration increases union membership because bureaucratization reduces the ability of all grades of employee to influence the making and administration of rules and, secondly, the economies of scale of recruiting in the large-scale enterprise make organizing activity attractive to unions. Bain views employer recognition as reflecting the density of unionism and the extent of government action to promote recognition. Thus, recognition is most likely when a union (backed by government policies) has already built up a strong presence in an employing organization. In a critique of this thesis, Adams (1975, 1977) agrees with Bain’s key variables, but disagrees with his view of their relative strength. Government policy, economic

428 / MICHAEL POOLE et al.

conditions, and union initiative are all important, but the decisive factor in gaining recognition is union initiative.

Tradttional s0dobgica.l analyses. Following Lockwood (1958), mainstream industrial sociologists frequently focus their investigations of unionism on Weber’s (1968) categories of social stratification. Thus, they see the market situation (economic position defined in terms of relationship to the means of production and income), the work situation (covering control and authority in the enterprise), and the status situation (honor or prestige) of employees as factors affecting union membership. These categories have also been used by Gospel (1978) to explain why Western European managers join unions.

Market situation is defined in terms of the manager’s relationship to the means of production, which may be analyzed objectively (ownership of stock or shares) or subjectively (commitment to owners’ or shareholders’ interests). Market situation has also been examined in terms of earnings (notably the narrowing of salary differentials) and security of employment (Bain, 1970; Gospel, 1978). The precise relationship between pay and union membership remains in dispute (cf. Gospel, 1978; Lockwood, 1958; Bain, 1970), but many studies (e.g., Farber and Saks, 1980; Lee, 1978; Maxey and Mohrman, 1980; Duncan and Leigh, 1980) have identified dissatisfaction with pay as a good predictor of union membership among a wide range of occupational groups. Particularly in periods of high unemployment, concern over employment security may also encourage managerial unionism (Gospel, 1978).

The second area of stratification, the work situation, includes hierarchical and bureaucratic control structures, the growing standardization of managerial terms and conditions of employment, and new techniques and specialization which downgrade or eliminate many functions of line managers and reduce the discretionary aspects of their jobs (Gospel, 1978). Analyses that focus on the work situation overlap slightly with the industrial relations approach in the common identification of the effects of employment concentration and bureaucratization. Sociologists stress implications for job satisfactionldissatisfaction and pay little heed to unions’ preference for recruiting in large-scale companies, however. They focus on the extent of control or authority in an administrative role (Prandy, 1965; Crompton, 1976), loyalty to the employer (Blackburn, 1967; Lockwood, 1958; Prandy, 1965), blockage of promotion (Prandy, 1965; Banks, 1978; Mills, 1951; Sykes, 1965), and various general aspects of job dissatisfaction. In terms of job satisfactionldissatisfaction, two elements are crucial: (1) the opportunity to control processes of decision making (whether organizational or task-based); and (2) the capacity for creativity in a work role, including elements of choice and freedom (Cooper and Marshall, 1977; Gowler and Legge, 1975; Marshall and Cooper, 1978). Absence of these characteristics favors unionization, according to Gospel (1978).

Lastly, the status situation refers to the degree of honor or prestige associated with an occupation. Status concerns are seen as an obstacle to the growth of unionism

‘Wider issues of the divorce of ownership h m control are also relevant (see Berle and Means, 1932; Bumham, 1941; Nichols, 1869; Zeitlin, 1974); a high degree of functional separation favors managerial union growth (Bamber, 1976).

*Many of these categories were developed in the context of white-collar unionization. Note also that in the U.S. job dissatisfaction and unionism emerge as related for a wide range of occupational groups (see Farber and Saks, 1980; Getman et al., 1980; Hamner and Smith, 1978; Kochan, 1979).

Current Topic I 429

among managerial and white-collar employees (Blackburn, 1967; Prandy, 1965). (Bain [1970] and Lockwood [1958] dispute this.) To maintain or improve a social position, a group may adopt one of two distinctive strategies: exclusion or usurpation (Weber, 1968; Parkin, 1979). Both involve the closure of an occupation by “restricting access to resources and opportunities to a limited circle of eligibles” (Parkin, 1979, p. 44). Exclusionary social closure leads to the growth of staff associations and professional bodies and involves the creation of a social category of ineligibles or outsiders (Parkin, 1979). Usurpation favors unionization and involves countervailing action by the “neg- atively privileged and the attempt to win a greater share of resources from superior groups. The preference of managers for st& associations and professional bodies which do not engage in collective bargaining (as opposed to labor unions) shows the effects of status.

Radical unalyses . Industrial sociologists have also developed theories of union membership based on what is called the “proletarianization thesis.” Early work deployed a variety of methods and measures and resulted in contradictory findings. The focus was typically on the extent to which union membership was related to the social origins of members of a given occupation, the tendency for an occupation increasingly to recruit personnel from lower socioeconomic origins, and the union experience of fathers (Glass, 1954; Lockwood, 1958; Dale, 1962; Goldstein and Indik, 1963; Kleingartner, 1968; Blackburn, 1967). However, more recent sociological and historical investigations of work and workers by Marxist scholars tend to focus on control issues (see Braverman, 1974; Littler and Salaman, 1982; Littler, 1982; Wood, 1982).

Braverman notes a long-term tendency for de-skilling, involving loss of the right to design and plan work, fragmentation of work, redistribution of tasks, and trans- formation of work organizations (Braverman, 1974; see also Littler, 1982). The loss of technical control in design and also of control over the social and organizational elements of work are seen as radically changing the content of the tasks of the lower ranks of management and producing a collective reaction via unionization (Littler and Salaman, 1982). Other studies emphasize the extent to which a managerial position entails control of the means of production (as well as the actual labor process) on behalf of capital as a key determinant (Crompton, 1976, 1979; Crompton and Gubbay, 1977). Above all, if a managerial position involves the carrying out of both capital and labor functions (including coordination and technical elements), “structural ambiguity” may result. This role confusion is resolved either through a firming up of the relationship with capital or, alternatively, a transfer of allegiance to labor via managerial unionism (Crompton and Gubbay, 1977).

Social action perspectiue . This last explanatory category traces union membership to the prior orientations of managers, i.e., the wants and expectations these workers bring to their jobs and the ways in which they interpret their work (Goldthorpe et al., 1968). From this perspective, the manager’s decision to join a union reflects a conscious choice guided by, e. g., personal commitment to collective rather than individual representation of interests, views on unions generally, and political ideology (see Weir, 1976). In the U. K. a strong commitment to the Conservative government is likely to reflect support for economic liberalism and a lack of sympathy with unions and collective bargaining (Crouch, 1979).

430 / MICHAEL POOLE et d.

These subjective orientations and perceptions of managers may be, in turn, based on such biographical and background factors as social origins, age, sex, marital status, and education. While these “out-of-plant experiences” could be seen as constituting a separate explanatory category, we include them here as a subcategory of the social action perspective. Socioeconomic origins are a measure of the effect of a proletarian background, with a blue-collar environment implying a greater familiarity with union practices and less antagonism to unions (Blackburn, 1967; Curtis, 1959; Lipset and Gordon, 1953). Studies of white-collar unionism have also noted that the “proletar- ianization” of an occupation and the union experience of fithers dkct union membership (Blackburn, 1967; Dale, 1962; Glass, 1954; Goldstein and Indik, 1963; Kelly, 1980; Kleingartner, 1968; Lockwood, 19i56).3 The effects of age are mixed (6. Fiorito and Greer, 1982; Bain, 1970).

That men have a higher level of union density than women is usually attributed to their (supposed) greater attachment to the labor force (see, e.g., Fiorito and Greer, 1982). However, recent investigations offemale union membership in the U.K. (e.g., Boston, 1980; hwenhak, 1977; Soldon, 1978) have produced three arguments: (1) that women are more conservative, loyal to the employer, and retain a stronger domestic allegiance than men, depressing membership density and subsequent activity rates in unions, especially among white-collar workers (Lumley, 1973); (2) that differences between male and female union membership arise solely from the enterprises, in- dustries, and occupations in which these groups are concentrated (Lockwood, 1958; Bain, 1970); and (3) that the “feminization” of an occupation is an index of “prole- tarianization” and thus favors union growth (Kelly, 1980).

Marital status can affect the extent of instrumental commitment to work and hence union behavior (Duncan and Leigh, 1980; Goldsthorpe et a!., 1968; Scoville, 1971). And finally, education may affect union membership (Bain, 1970; Bain et d., 1973; Goldstein and Indik, 1963; Seidman and Cain, 1964). There are three conflicting hypotheses, however: (1) that education leads to more questioning of attitudes and less willingness to accept arbitrary decisions, hence leading to union membership; (2) that because of its positive effects on promotion prospects, a high level of education lowers commitment to unionism; and (3) that there is no relationship between education and unionism (Bain, 1970; Bain et al., 1973).

Variables Each of the five theoretical categories yields certain independent

variables. The effects of these variables on the union membership of managers may be assessed with correlation and regression analyses, and the results used to evaluate the explanatory power of existing theories. Since our data are drawn from surveys, we deal only with why managers join unions and do not address long-term historical trends or structural changes. The factors we test here, grouped by theoretical per- spective, are presented below (see also Table 1). Note that two categories are omitted- the listing approach and radical analyses. Variables pertaining to each are included in other categories (e.g., some control factors are measured with the work situation

3Bain (1970) has argued that there is no clear connection between density of unionization and social origins, however.

Current Topic I 431

aspect of traditional sociological analyses and the social action perspective incorporates certain elements in the listing approach),

industrial relatioiu approach. To assess the effects of presence of a union, we asked respondents two questions-whether there was a union recognized for the purposes of negotiation, and whether the union was one “to which managers at your level belong.” Employment concentration is measured by size of the organization and size of the work-site, using employee bands of 0-99; 100-499; 5WM; 1,000- 9,999; lO,oo0-49,OOO; and 5O,OOO+. Respondents were also asked to indicate whether their organization was in the public or the private sector.

Trudittonal sociological analyses. For market situation, the key variables are income level and employment security. The former is measured by gross salary grouped in five equally spaced bands from less than €S,OOO (roughly $lO,OOO at the time of the survey) to f20,OOO and over. To determine employment security, we asked respondents whether or not they owned stock or shares in their organization; commitment to shareholders’ interests is measured by the respondent’s level of agreement that management should promote this group’s interests (I definitely agree to I definitely do not agree, on a five-point scale). Satisfaction with pay and job security are measured using an abbreviated brm of Porter‘s (1961) Need Satisfiction Questionnaire (discussed in more detail below).

The work situation involves considerably more variables. Level in the organization is used as an index of the degree of managerial control and authority; the levels are board member, senior management, middle management, junior management, and management advisor or staff specialist. The measures for loyalty to employer are the hours worked by respondents (measured in 12 bands, with an interval of five in each case, &om less than 30 to more than 80 hours per week), the years spent with present employer and in present job, and the number of employers for whom respondents had worked. Blockage of promotion is measured by satisfaction with opportunity for promotion in the position. We also examined the perceived effects of union membership on promotion, using a &point scale from definitely hinders promotion opportunities to definitely helps promotion opportunities. Following Evans (1972), we measured overall job satisfaction using an abbreviated version of the Porter Need Satisfaction Questionnaire. Respondents were asked to make three ratings on 7-point minimum- maximum scales with regard to seven job characteristics: feelings of self-esteem, opportunity for personal growth and development, opportunity for independent thought and action, feelings of security, pay, opportunity to develop close friendships, and opportunity for promotion. The three ratings assessed how much of each char- acteristic is associated with the job, how much should be, and how important this was seen to be. Job satisfaction with each characteristic was assessed by taking the negative of the difference between the “should be” and “is currently” scores and multiplying this by the importance score. Overall job satisfaction was determined by summing the scores relating to each of the seven characteristics.

To evaluate the status situation, respondents were asked whether or not they belonged to a staff association. We also assessed commitment to professionalism by asking respondents (on a 5-point scale from yes definitely to no definitely not) whether they regarded themselves as professionals. We also computed variables on the extent to which respondents endorsed particular a i m s of the British Institute of Management. Factor analysis collapsed these variables to two groups. The first involves enforcing

432 / MICHAEL POOLE et aE.

professional norms. Three items loaded heavily on this factor: enforcing professional standards in management, promoting and enforcing standards of training for managers, and establishing a code of ethics for managers. The second is largely concerned with disseminating knowledge and inbrmation. Three items loaded on th is factor: providing courses and/or publishing material of importance to members, dealing with work- related problems of members, and providing a forum for discussion at the local level.

The main elements of the social action perspective include commitment to collective rather than individual representation of interests, views on unions in general, and political ideology. Our measure of the first element is based on a scale developed by Prandy et al. (1974) which assesses the respondent’s views on whether “people like me need . . .(1) no kind of collective representation; (2) a representative body to consult with and advise employers on salaries and conditions; (3) a representative body to negotiate with employers; (4) a representative body to negotiate, which is prepared, if necessary, to take full industrial action.”

We assessed generalized views of unions using 5-point strongly agree-strongly disagree response scales, focusing on a single composite variable--hostility to union poweraerived from factor analysis.‘ Political ideology was examined by asking respondents (on 5-point scales) to what extent they endorsed the British Conservative government’s (197%) policies and declared intentions on a variety of economic, industrial relations, and social security issues that are generally held to be “antilabor” in design. We again used factor analysis to identify three groups of variables. These are, economic issues: to deal with unemployment, not to reintroduce an incomes policy, to hive off parts of nationalized industries, to control the eamomy by controlling the money supply, and to cut public expenditure; labor relations issues: to control secondary picketing, to encourage and facilitate secret ballots of union members, and to make changes in the effect of closed shop agreements; and social security issues: to reduce social security payments to strikers’ h i l i e s and to withdraw earnings- related supplements to unemployment benefits.

For the suhtegory of out-of-plant experiences, we measured socioeconomic origins (using as an index the rank of father’s occupation at the height of his working career), age, sex, marital status, and education. Educational experience was assessed in terms of: (1) attending independent, grammar, or technical schools on the one hand, or elementary, secondary, or comprehensive schools on the other; (2) the possession of ordinary or advanced level qualifications from school; and (3) having received a university education.

Sample Four types of managerial unions co-exist in the U.Ka5 These are: (1)

largely separate managerial unions (e.g., the British Association of Colliery Management

‘The following items comprise the union power variable: unions have more power than management; unions today have too much power; unions are not acting in the country’s economic interest; unions should be solely concerned with pay and conditions; union membership should be purely voluntary; and unions should be prepared to take any form of industrial action which may be effective (negatively).

‘Being independent of employers for negotiations, the finctcona of managerial unions do not differ basically from those of professional, white-collar, and blue-collar unions. But they are distinct from professional associations composed largely of the self-employed (e.g., the British Dental Association; the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales); management professional associations with predominantly education and information objectives (e.g., the Institute of Personnel Management); and “in-house” employee or staff associations which do not engage in collective bargaining.

Current Topic I 433

[BACM]; the Society of Post Office Executives [SPOE]); (2) unions for both managers and professionals (e.g., the Association of Management and Prokssional Stag, [AMPS]; the Engineers’ and Managers’ Association [ EMA]); (3) vertically expansionist white- collar unions (e. g., the Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical, and Computer Statfs [APEX]; the Association of Scientific, Technical, and Managerial Staffs [ASTMS]); and (4) vertically expansionist blue-collar unions (e.g., the Managerial, Administrative, Technical, and Supervisory Association section of the General and Municipal Workers’ Union [MATSA-GMWU]; the Technical, Administrative, and Supervisory Section of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers [TASS-AUEW]). The lack of neat institutional boundaries means that professional employees are frequently in the same unions as managems

In an effort to eliminate professional and White-collar employees without managerial experience, we drew our sample randomly from the fellows and members of the British Institute of Management. The main criterion for a fellow (FBIM) is having board or general management level responsibilities of approved scope and duration (usually for a minimum of two years). Functional managers may also be elected to FBIM but only “where they hold a policy-making board appointment or exercise exceptionally wide management responsibilities” (Mansfield et al., 1981, p. 37). The basic qualification for entry in the grade of member (MBIM) is a “Diploma of Man- agement Studies or an approved equivalent qualification in general management subjects, with at least one year’s management experience as a departmental or functional manager” (ibid.). Given the substantial extent of specialization within management, many of our respondents are not in their firm’s line hierarchy, but have functional management authority instead. Our data are based on 1,058 completed questionnaires posted in July, 1980 and returned from a random sample of 2,018 managers (a response rate of approximately 52 per cent). This is a fair representation of the two classes of membership in the British Institute of Management, but how far it is typical of managers in the U.K. as a whole is not certain.

Taking union experience first, 24.6 per cent of the sample respondents are union members, 8.9 per cent unionized in the private sector, and 60 per cent in the public. Nearly 40 per cent (39.2) report the presence of a union recognized for negotiating purposes; 31.4 per cent report union@) recruiting at their level in the organization. Over 70 per cent note nonmanagerial grades in the same union organization, suggesting the most managers in the U.K. are not in separate managerial unions. This chronic overlapping appears to create a few major difficulties, however, since 70.2 per cent of respondents report no problems at all stemming from this situation, 18.5 per cent minor problems, and only 10.7 per cent serious problems. The view that the unionized manager is typically nonmilitant is sustained, since 51.9 per cent of those who belong to unions indicate that they could not think of any circumstances in which they would take strike action, while only one in three have raised a grievance with a union representative in the 12 months up to the survey. The unionized manager is fairly active in the branch; the average annual attendance at meetings is three times a year.

Respondents are overwhelmingly male (98.3 per cent), married (92 per cent), and have an average age of43.8 years. About 36 per cent are in manufacturing industries,

some countries, this is solved by legislation barring managerial employees from belonging to the same bargaining unit as their subordinates (Bent and Reeves, 1978) or preventing them from holding representative positions in unions organizing lower-level staff (Blum et al., 1971).

434 / MICHAEL POOLE et d.

33.6 per cent in commerce and service industries, 10.9 per cent in public administration, 6.5 per cent in education, and 6.1 per cent in private professional practice and consultancies; most of the remaining 7.1 per cent are active in the armed services. Overall, 68.4 per cent of the sample are in the private sector (including companies quoted on the stock exchange), the rest work in government jobs and nationalized industries. The sample is strongly representative of personnel with high-level re- sponsibilities; nearly 60 per cent of the respondents describe themselves as board members or senior management. There is a considerable spread in salary level, with 13.8 per cent earning less than 27,500 (i-e., approximately $15,000 per annum) and 9.6 per cent earning more than f20,000 (i.e., approximately $40,000 per annum). Moreover, 31.6 per cent of the private sector managers own shares in their employing organizations.

With respect to function, 36.4 per cent of the sample are in general management, 11.2 per cent in sales and marketing, 11 per cent in finance and accounting, 9.7 per cent in personnel, and 8.4 per cent in production. They are employed in organizations of all sizes, ranging from less than 100 employees (16.9 per cent) to those with over 50,OOO personnel (15.4 per cent). Not surprisingly, managers in the public sector have considerably larger employers than their private sector counterparts; over one- quarter are in organizations with more than 50,OOO employees. Although many managers report large employing organizations, relatively few (19.2 per cent) have offices on sites with a substantial workforce (over 1,OOO employees).

Empirical Results Table 1 shows the broad pattern of relationship between the independent

variables and union membership. Whether or not managers join unions is a biserial item and hence both Pearson correlation coefficients and Brogden-Clemens coefficients (Brodgen, 1949) are reported.

The industrial relations approach receives strong s u p p o r t 4 the relevant variables are significantly correlated with membership. The employment concentration effects (size of organization and worksite) are fairly weak compared with recognition of a union for negotiating purposes and employment in the public sector, however. The presence of a union at the managers’ level is the largest single correlate of union membership.

The traditional sociological approach based on the analysis of market, work, and status situations is not confirmed; neither are most aspects of radical.analyses. The effects ofrelationship to the means ofproduction are limited to attitudes (commitment to shareholders’ interests); ownership of stock and shares are irrelevant. Salary satisfadion and feelings of security are significantly (p C .001) related to joining unions, but these variables account for only a trivial part of the variance (1 per cent in each case), while satisfaction with pay has no influence at all. Certain aspects of the work situation are related slightly more strongly, notably the extent of control or authority in a management position (level in the organization); loyalty to employer (in terms of hours worked); and blockage of promotion through union membership (but not dis- satisfaction with promotion prospects). Overall job satisfaction is of no consequence, although there are some small effects indicated for feelings of esteem in one’s job. The further measures of loyalty (years with present employer, years in present job,

Current Topic I 435

TABLE 1 CORRELATION RESULTS: UNION MEMBERSHIP AND GROUPS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES.

Pearson product- moment Brogden-Clemens

Independent variables coefficients coefficients

lndustrfal relations approach Recognition of union for negotiating purposes .59* .75 Public rather than private sector .55* .63

Presence of union at manager's level I 70* .86

Size of organization .20* .31 Size of worksite * 12* .15

Traditional sociob~kal approaches: - . . Market situation O w n s stock or shares Commitment to shareholders' interests Higher rather than lower salary level Satisfaction with pay Satisfaction with feeling of security in job position Work situation Higher rather than lower level in organization Longer rather than shorter hours worked Years with present employer Years in present job Number of employers worked for Satisfaction with opportunity for promotion in job

Union membership perceived to affect promotion

Overall job satisfiction Satisfaction with feeling of self-esteem in job

Satisfaction with opportunity for personal growth

Satisfaction with opportunity for independent

Satisfadion with opportunity to develop close

position

adversely

position

and development in job position

thought and action in job position

friendships in job position Status situation MembershiD in staff association Commitmeit to professionalism Endorsement of enforcing professional norms by

Endorsement of disseminating knowledge and

Social action perspectiue Commitment to collective rather than individual

Hostility to union power Support for government economic policies Support for government labor relations policies Support for government social security policies Out-of-plant experiences Prestige of father's occupation Age Male rather than female Married rather than single Prestige of school attended Possession of '0' or 'A' level education Received a university education

professional body

information by professional body

representation of interests

- .04 - .12* - .12* - .02 -.11*

- .24* - .25* a*** - .01 .01 W***

.27*

-04 .12*

. 01

.a** - .01

.14* - .03 - .05***

- .04

.50*

- .21* - .27* - .14* - I 15. - ,lo* .04 - m***

- .01 - .04

.03 - .01

- .08 -.15 -.15 - -03 -.13

- .32 - -31

.06 - .01 .02 .07

.35

.06

.14

.08

.12

- .01

.23 - .04 - .07

- .07

.62

-.17 - .34 - .20 -.19

-.12 .04

- .08 - .01 - .06 .lo

- .03

'Mer omission of missing values. n = 732 to 1.057. *SigniIlant at .001 level; **significant at .01 level; ***significant at .05 level.

436 / MICHAEL POOLE et d.

and number of employers worked for) are irrelevant to union membership; satisfaction with the opportunities for personal growth and development, independent thought and action, and the development of close friendships can also be excluded. The status situation effects are either against the expected direction or nonexistent: membership in a staff association and belonging to a union are positively correlated, while the variables of professionalism have no appreciable effect.

The social action perspective is not as strongly supported as the industrial relations approach, but it is clearly relevant. Personal commitment to collective rather than individual representation of managerial interests accounts for 25 per cent of the variance in union membership. Views on labor unions generally (extent of hostility to union power) and political ideology (support for the Conservative government's economic, labor relations, and social security policies) are also significantly correlated (p < ,001) with managers joining unions.

The subcategory of out-of-plant experiences show little explanatory value. Socio- economic origins are very weakly related (r = .lo) to union membership, but age, sex, marital status, and prestige and level of education are irrelevant. These items do not appear to have even an indirect influence on union membership, since they do not correlate with commitments to collective rather than individual representation of interests, views on unions as a whole, nor political ideology.

Additional Analysis To test the theories more precisely, we used multiple regression with

actual membership again as the dependent variable. The results are presented in Table 2. Approximately 64 per cent of the variance in union membership is accounted for by the combined effects of the existence of a labor union at the manager's level, personal commitment to collective rather than individual representation, and em- ployment in the public sector. (Other variables added less than 1 per cent to the explanation of the dependent variable.)

The key factor affecting union membership among managers is the presence of a union in the employing organization (Beta = 0.61), although the manager's own commitment to collectivist principles (Beta = 0.18), and the effects of public sector employment (Beta = 0.15) are also important.'

TABLE 2 MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE CORRELATES OF UNION MEMBERSHIP (N = 1,026)

Independent Multiple Square Simple R" Beta variables' R R (correlation)

Presence of union at manager's level 0.77 0.59 0.77 0.61 Commitment to collective rather than 0.79 0.63 0.42 0.18 individual representation of interests

Public rather than private sector 0.80 0.64 0.55 0.15

"Only those variables adding 1 per cent.nr more to explained variance are reported. 'The simple correlations are slightly different fmm those in Table 1 because of a small sample reduction occasioned by missing data.

'Note that recognition of a union for negotiating purposes adds less than 1 per cent to the explanation. This is largely because of the variance taken out by the presence of a union variable (these two correlate at r= 0.76; the partial correlation of recognition with union membership controlling for union presence drops to r = 0.13).

Current Topic I 437

Table 3 shows the pattern of the correlations among certain industrial relations variables and commitment to collective rather than individual representation of interests. Note that the presence of a union at the manager’s level is more strongly related to employment in the public sector and to commitments to collectivism than is recognition for negotiating purposes. Hence union presence, backed by commitment to collective representation, would seem to enable unions for managers to make considerable headway in a nationalized concern, even when recognition is not forthcoming. The slightly stronger effects of size of organization (rather than size of worksite) on the presence of a union at the manager’s level, employer recognition, and commitments to collectivism are also consistent with the industrial relations view that the influence of employment concentration on unionization is better explained by union preference for recruitment in the large-scale enterprise than by job dissatisfaction,

The saliency of the union presence variable suggests that the managers’ own reasons for joining unions merit scrutiny. We asked respondents how important a series of items were in their decision to join a union and then used factor analysis to group their responses. In Table 4, the managers’ commitments to instrumental rather than political or institutional union aims are shown. Concern about the need for collective representation (paralleling the commitment to collective rather than individual rep- resentation of interests variable), concern about rewards (pay, fringe benefits), and job security all emerge as important. Desire to contribute to union policy, to exert influence on government, and commitment to the union movement are minor in- fluences, however. Also, membership does not typically stem from being a condition of a contract of employment.

The case for an “institutional” orientation is more difficult to sustain. The factor loadings are weaker and the variable based on the item “because there was a union recognized to represent people like me” (seen as pertinent in the decision to join) appears in the first rather than third factor. The presence of distinctive orientations further underscores the social action perspective, as do the significant correlations between general political ideology and the variables indicating a political orientation to union membership. Table 5 shows that those less willing to support the Conservative government’s policies on the economy, labor relations, and social security are prone

TABLE 3 CORRELATIONS AMONG VARIABLES OF THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

APPROACH AND COMMITMENT TO COLLECTIVE RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL REPRESENTATION’

Pearson product-moment coefficients 1 2 3 4 5 6

1. Recognition of union for negotiating purposes -

2. Public rather than private sector .39* - 3. Size of Organization .26* ,301 - 4. Size of worksite .22* .15* .57* - 5. Presence of union at manager’s level .76* .47* .27* .21* - 6. Commitment to collective rather than

individual representation of interests .%* .Xi* .16* .W** .33* -

‘ARer omission of missing values, *Significant at .001 level; **significant at .002 level.

n = 857 to 1,043.

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Current Topic I 439

to give political reasons for joining unions. For a minority of managers, an anti- Conservative political ideology partly affects the decision to seek union membership.

Discussion Our results decisively support the industrial relations and social action

approaches against alternative sociological explanations based on market, work, and status situations. The presence of a union at the managers’ level, recognition of the union for negotiations, and employment in the public sector all strongly correlate with managers joining unions (Bain, 1970; Bain et d., 1973; McCormick, 1960, 1979). Thus, the emphasis placed on recognition and the effects of the public sector (including government pressure for recognition) is well-founded.8 Adams’ (1975) refinement, stressing the active presence of a union, is vital. This is by far the most important single influence on managerial union membership. Likewise, the managers’ own reasons for becoming members are typically instrumental rather than political or institutional.

The results associated with variables measuring market, work, and status situations are largely insignificant. In the work situation, level in the organization and hours worked have residual explanatory utility, but virtually all the remaining variables are either insignificant, weakly related, or even associated in directions contrary to the hypotheses. This means that traditional sociological analyses such as Lockwood’s (1956) and Gospel’s (1978) are of suspect explanatory value. Moreover, on the basis of our data, focusing on the relationship to the means of production and ownership of private capital is not warranted. Promotion effects are confined to the negative effects of being in a union, rather than satisfaction with promotion (Prandy, 1965; Banks, 1978); likewise job satisfaction appears to be largely irrelevant.

Radical accounts of the labor process in which the control of both work and or- ganizations is highlighted (Braverman, 1974; Wood, 1982) are not strongly supported, nor are those in which these issues are linked with managers’ relationship to private capital (Crompton, 1976, 1979; Crompton and Gubbay, 1977). Finally, the notion that staff associations and professional bodies represent a form of exclusionary social closure by the status-conscious managers (cf. Prandy, 1965; Blackburn, 1967; Parkin,

TABLE 5 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG VARIABLES OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND

VARIABLES INDICATING POLITICAL REASONS FOR JOINING UNIONS’ ~ _ _ _ _ ~

Support for government . . . Reasons for joining trade unions Economic Labor Social security (Politid) policy relations policy

Because it represented a commitment to the trade union movement - .34 - .35 - .35 To contribute to union policy - .22 - 2 1 - .24 To exert influence on government - .28 - -28 - .24

policy

‘After omission of missing values. n = 269 to 271. Coefficients of .18 or higher are significant at .001 level.

8Note. however, that contrary to Bain’s view, employment concentration does not emerge as a strong indicator of union membership.

440 I MICHAEL POOLE et al.

1979) may also be incorrect, since there is a tendency for union and staff association membership to be weakly but positive2y related.

The social action perspective is far better supported. Managers’ commitment to collective rather than individual means of representing their interests is strongly correlated with membership and is the second most important variable in the multiple regression, Views on unions as a whole and political ideology are significant, but are supplementary rather than direct influences on membership. The social action sub- category ofout-of-plant experiences received almost no support. Social origins, measured by the socioeconomic status of the father, relate to membership, but comprise only a trivial part of the overall explanation. This negates both the “proletarianization thesis” (see Kelly, 1980), and the hypothesis that men and women are not equally willing to join unions (Kelly, 1980). The other variables-age, marital status, and education evince a similar pattern of weak and/or insignificant relationships. Thus, Bain’s (1970) view that these issues are largely irrelevant is confirmed. Additionally, the fact that these variables are typically unrelated to the social action ones indicates that out-of-plant experiences have little impact on orientations and, hence, do not even indirectly influence membership.

Our findings are relevant to the debate over the determinants of blue- and white- collar union membership. The explanatory power of the industrial relations approach to white-collar unionism is stronger than that of the principal sociological approaches, but employment concentration and the extent of choice may well vary between managerial and white-collar employees. At least in the private sector, white-collar employees make up a higher proportion of the labor force of larger enterprises than do managers (Bain and Elsheikh, 1979); consequently, at an aggregate level the effect of size will m o s t certainly be greater for the white-collar group. Whether this applies to comparable samples of white-collar and managerial employees at the individual level cannot be easily determined. It may be that the employment concentration effect, and particularly its alleged association with bureaucratization, has been ov- e r~ ta ted .~ This conclusion is certainly supported by international data, which show a complex pattern for size effects (Fiorito and Greer, 1982; Rose, 1972; Kochan, 1979).

The importance of choice may stem from a lower density of overall unionization among managers. In much of public sector employment and in large-scale manhcturing plants in the U.K., union membership is a condition of employment for blue-collar employees and to some extent white-collar groups as well. A recent national survey reported that “50 percent of trade unionists in manufacturing establishments of at least 50 employees are members of a closed shop: 55 per cent of manuals and 20 per cent of nonmanuals” (see Brown, 1981, p. 54). In a survey of manual employees in Sheffield, England, virtually half the respondents gave “condition of employment” as the main reason for joining a union in the first place (Poole, 1981). This sharply contrasts with our data on managers and strongly endorses the view that choice is greatest in areas where unions are newly recruiting or where unionism has not

O I f this is the case, the slight category overlap between the industrial relations approach and the work situation group of variables could be resolved by placing employment concentration in the latter category in future research designs.

Current Topic I 441

become all but obligatory either through custom or coercion (Kornhauser, 1961).*0 Comparisons are also worth making with U.S. data, where income, employment

concentration, various dissatisfaction measures, and male worker characteristics are seen to favor unionization, and education and government initiatives (e.g., “right- to-work laws) to hinder it (see Fiorito and Greer [ 19821 for a review of the relevant literature). In the U.K., we find all the main demographic variables to have no impact on union membership, income and employment concentration to be significant but weak, and the dissatisfaction measures to have only a very minor influence, if any at all. The direction of the effect of political initiatives may run counter to the U.S. pattern, although there are parallels now that the labor laws currently being enacted in Britain are unfavorable to unions.

The 1977 Quality of Employment Survey, conducted for the U.S. Department of Labor (Kochan, 1979; Quinn and Staines, 1979), merits special attention even though the dependent variable differs slightly (propensity to join rather than actual membership). Our findings do not support this survey’s conclusion that dissatisfaction with pay and economic conditions generally stimulate unionization at the individual level or that, for nonmanual employees, dissatisfaction with job content, scope, and organization is central (Kochan, 1979). Our data, however, do underscore the view of this U.S. study that no specific subgroups (e.g., young, female, and well-educated) are consistently unwilling to join. The differences in employment concentration effects are particularly interesting since the American pattern is for both small and very large companies to have lower propensities to unionize. In the U.K., the significant but weak linear relationship may stem from large British employers (especially in the public sector) not developing to the same extent the sophisticated U.S. techniques to discourage unionization (Kochan, 1979). Further, the impact of government employment appears to be far weaker in the U.S. (Kochan, 1979).

The strong support for the industrial relations approach to explaining why managers join unions underscores the usefulness of the current trend toward more rigorous hypotheses and more precisely specified variables. We need now to develop deeper theories to provide a stronger rationale for the critical impact of such variables as union presence in the organization, employment in the public sector, and commitments to collective rather than individual representation of interests.

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