Why Did Israel Surrender the Sinai Peninsula

7/27/2019 Why Did Israel Surrender the Sinai Peninsula

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Two to Tangle:

Israels Constructivist Security StrategyAn evaluation of Israels attempt to construct a culture of

peace with Egypt

Charles D. Lu

Department of Political Science

University of Colorado at Boulder

Ketchum 106, Campus Box 333

Boulder, CO 80309-0333

[email protected]

For the last quarter-century, Israel has existed in a condition of peace with Egypt. While most observers rely on

Realist and material arguments to explain Israels behavior, Israel employed a Constructivist security strategy to

create a socially-shared identity of peace with Egypt. The change in the mutual identity between Egypt and Israe

came about because both states changed their self-identity and the United States provided an umbrella tha

minimized the threats of war that characterized Egyptian-Israeli identity before the Yom Kippur War.

Since the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace accords in Camp David, Israel has existed in a state o

peace with Egypt. This event triggers some curious questions. How was Israel able to conclude a peace treaty

with Egypt in an anarchic system, with the constant possibility of war? Why did Israel surrender the Sina

Peninsula? History indicates that Israel understood precisely the security ramification of the Sinai (Newman

1998 and Sachar 1981, 1996). By the War of Attrition (1969) Israel recognized that it would no longer be

allowed to carry out pre-emptive strikes, and that more than before, the Sinais depth would provide security

(Sachar 1981, 1996). Even though it understood the material security brought by the Sinai, Israel surrendered

the Peninsula for the promise by both Egypt and Israel to recognize the rights of each states territorial integrityand survival. This was the basis of the peace that has existed between Israel and Egypt, but it would never have

occurred had Israel or Egypt not moved from an identity of mutual animosity to one of mutual peace. That is

Begin would never have been able to trade the Sinai for the West Bank and conclude a peace with Egypt unless

Israel and Egypt had already made a mutual identity shift from enemies to co-habitants.

This paper, then, looks at two important questions. First, how do states change from one culture o

anarchy (Wendt 1999) to another? In other words, how do states escape from the Realist world, as Israe

appeared to have with Egypt? Second, how does the system constrain the ability of states to implement policie
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designed to change its socially-shared identity with other states? The first question implies that Egypt and Israe

were able to shift from what Wendt characterized as a Hobbesian to Lockean anarchy (Wendt 1999). Thus

under the constraining influence of anarchy, Israel was able to move from a state of war to a state of peace with

Egypt. The second question focuses on the difficulties states confront in changing their mutual identity. Fo

states, changing identity is accomplished through specific policies, and foreign policies are used to reinforce o

change socially-shared identities. Yet, these policies must be implemented within the confines of existing culture

of anarchy (Wendt 1999).

The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate a Constructivist understanding of foreign policy. Using

Israels foreign policy since its creation in 1948, I hope to explore and highlight Constructivisms implications for

foreign policy and how such policies are affected by socially-shared identities. Thus, I wish to understand how

states can change the norms guiding their behavior through Wendts process of identity change (Wendt 1999)

[1]

An evaluative study will highlight the applicability and obstacles to implementing a policy designed to

change the mutual identity of actors in a system dominated by anarchy. To accomplish this, I will begin by

discussing the regulative and constitutive rules of the international system. Then, I will discuss Wendts proces

of identity change as a way of reforming the regulative rules of anarchy. Finally, I will demonstrate that Israel

security strategy before and after the Yom Kippur War is Constructivist, and show how inducing a new mutua

identity worked, despite obstacles hindering its implementation.

Israeli History and Realism

From the outset, Israeli policy-makers have been keenly aware of the pervasive threat to the

integrity of national borders in the international system and have assumed that over the long run

no state can ever be certain of its security. Israel's foreign policy elite has always perceived the

anarchical nature of international politics. . . . Most Israeli leaders have realized that in the rea

world, threats to national security are omnipresent and that all states attempt to widen theirmargins of security, even at the expense of their neighbors. . . . Thus, within the Israeli politica

elite, political Realism became the dominant conceptual framework for understanding regiona

and international politics (Inbar 1999).

Israels foreign policy history has usually been seen as Realist. Rabin commented in the early 1970s tha

Israel's existence is, 'a dormant war,' waking up every few years and turning into an active war (Inbar 1999).

Israels situation is akin to Hobbess state-of-war, where the constant possibility of war induces states to behave
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in aggressive and expansive manners, thereby eliminating the possibility for cooperation and peace (Brook

1997).

The perception of constant threat is supported by a history of constant warfare between Israel and its

Arab neighbors. Even before Israel was created, Jewish communities were in conflict with the local Arab

communities (Smith 1992). On the day of its creation, Israel fought against an Arab coalition determined to

destroy it. From 1948-1967, Israels security strategy was based on a principle of preventive, pre-emptive, and

escalatory strikes (Sachar 1981, 1996). During this period, Israel suffered from regular Fedayeen attacks

which prompted Israel to reply in an escalatory manner, hoping that disproportional retaliations would force a

halt to the incursions. In 1956, Israel joined the British and French invasion of Egypt to prevent the growth o

Egyptian military power (ibid.). Finally, in 1967, Israel launched a pre-emptive strike against Arab force

massing at its borders. Israeli history is reminiscent of a prisoners dilemma model, or rather a series o

prisoners dilemma models. Thus, each time Israel interacted with its Arab neighbors, it dealt with the conflict in

a one-shot manner, disregarding future gains. For most observers, Israels foreign policy in this period wa

designed to produce a reputation of intolerance to Arab attacks, and to force Arabs to accept the immutability o

Israel.

After 1967, Israels stunning success against what were perceived as overwhelming odds gained i

diplomatic recognition and material rewards (Sachar 1996). Europe, Africa, and Asia became open to Israeland the U.S. was willing to publicly supply Israel with arms. However, in the immediate post 1967 period

Israels attempt to trade conquered lands for peace failed due to Arab refusal to open dialogue with Israe

(Sachar 1981, 1996, Sicker 1989, and Smith 1992). Consequently, Israel returned to its traditional strategy o

pre-emptive, preventive, and escalation strikes. This was demonstrated by Israels use of increasing firepowe

and deep air strikes against Egyptian military positions during the War of Attrition, launched by Egypt in 1968.

Nasser hoped to exploit Israels weakness (a small population) through a strategy of attrition. To prevent this

Israel continued to enlarge its operations against Egypt until the Egyptian military came close to collapse.

However, this strategy of preventive and pre-emptive strikes would also lead to Israels shock in 1973

and the eventual changes within both Israel and Egypt that lead to peace. Israeli policy-makers and leadership in

the period between the Six-Day and Yom Kippur Wars relied on the rationale that Egypt would never launch a

major attack on Israel without greater air power or quality of weapons (Meital 1997, Rafael 1989, and Sacha


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1981, 1996). As long as Israel retained its air and quality superiority, it was safe. Thus, Israel ignored secre

communications from King Hussein of Jordan and intelligence report of a possible Egyptian-Syrian attack

(Lukacs 1997). The counter-intuitive nature of Egypts decision to attack, even when it was inferior in military

strength, took Israel by surprise.

After the war, Israel and Egypt embarked on a tumultuous and difficult road to peace. The question fo

the Realists is: why did Israel take the chance to develop a peaceful relationship with Egypt when their mutua

relationship was based on conflict, distrust, and war? When the stakes were so high, why did Israel take the

chance to develop a socially-shared identity of peace with Egypt?

Neo-Realism

Underlying the Realist strategy are the following assumptions:

First, states are the major actors in world affairs. Second, the international environment severely

penalizes states if they fail to protect their vital interests or it they pursue objectives beyond theimeans; hence, states are sensitive to costs and behave as unitary-rational agents. Third

international anarchy is the principal force shaping the motives and actions of states. Fourth

states in anarchy are preoccupied with power and security, are predisposed towards conflict and

competition, and often fail to cooperate even in the face of common interests (Grieco 1988).

Of these, the principle of anarchy is the primary cause of international insecurity: Among states, the state o

nature is a state of war. This is meant not in the sense that war constantly occurs but in the sense that, with each

state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may at any time break out . . . among states, anarchy or

the absence of government, is associated with the occurrence of violence (Waltz 1979). For Realists, states are

concerned with survival, and in anarchy, Realists prescribe a strategy of self-help: To achieve their objectives

and maintain their security, units in a condition of anarchy . . . must rely on the means they can generate and the

arrangements they can make for themselves (ibid.). In anarchy, there is no one great enough to ensure the

survival of others (Waltz refers to this as a lack of supranational coordination), and, consequently, states that fai

to help themselves are exposed to harm and suffer for it (ibid.).

Brooks (1997) further clarifies the Neo-Realist logic. Brooks identifies Neo-Realisms logical foundation

as the constant possibility of war (ibid.). Because of Neo-Realisms perception that the possibility of war i

constant, states cannot afford to let their guards down, or to risk cooperation. If war can break out at any time

then states must always be prepared for war. Thus, states always seek expansive, aggressive policies to increase

their power. States cannot accept relative gains disadvantage, so if there is the possibility of gaining more powe

through expansion, even if it produces conflict, states cannot afford to take the risk that someone else migh

benefit from it.

However, Neo-Realism leaves very little room for the possibility of peace via non-balance-of-power and


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non-material self-help methods. While Waltz accepts that states may behave contrary to his prescription fo

survival, he claims that these states will be punished by the system (1979). Because of the structure of anarchy

and the constant possibility of war, states become alike in function.[2] Neo-Realism, then, does not take into

account the possibility of a peaceful non-individual approach to peace.

Neo-traditional Realism

Unlike Neo-Realism, Neo-classical Realism offers a possibility for non-violent approach to peace.

Grieco offers perhaps the best Realist account for peace, arguing that the international system is not so dire tha

states must constantly prepare for war, sacrificing long-term needs for short-term security. Instead, states are

effected by their sensitivity to their relative gaps in payoffs, the k value (Grieco 1989). Thus, when the

sensitivity to negative relative gain is high, states will not cooperate. Brooks notes that Neo-traditional Realists in

general believe that the international system offers more security than Neo-Realism provides for (1997)

Consequently, states have the ability to tailor their foreign policies to their needs base on their perception of the

immediacy and gravity of threats. For Neo-traditional Realists in general, when the stakes and threats are high

states are less likely to cooperate with one another. If states perceive that relative disadvantage will harm them

then they will cease to cooperate. Thus, from this position, it is possible for Israel to accommodate Egypt

demands for the return of the Sinai if it would lead to greater security.

Yet this approach is unsatisfactory because it is unclear how states form perceptions of the degree of threa

or stakes involved in any interaction. For example, Wohlforth noted that the end of the Cold War was a Sovie

retrenchment (1994-95). No preventive war occurred because the Soviet Union had always perceived itself a

inferior in terms of military capability to the U.S. Defensive Realists believe that security is more abundant and

that states can pursue a policy of self-restraint for security purposes (Brooks 1997).

But, Neo-traditional Realism fails to provide the mechanism by which states adjust their sensitivity to

relative gains. By providing for the possibility that states can make judgments on the level of threat they face

Neo-traditional Realists have abandoned material power as the sole determinant of state behavior. Relying on

pure materialism results in the balance-of-power proposition, because if material power determines threat, then

states should balance-against-power. To give states the ability to cooperate base on their perception of threa

implies that non-material factors are involved. Ideational factors underlie the ability of states to cooperate.

Thus, the U.S. has yet to face a blocking-coalition, even in a period of hegemony.

This is where I start: before the Yom Kippur War, Israels strategy rested on materialism (self-help and

balance-of-power), but after the war, Israel has rested on an ideational strategy for security. Israels post-Yom

Kippur War security strategy is based on the expectation that both Israel and Egypt would behave in peacefu

and non-violent manners toward each other. Thus, security is provided not by materialism, but by the idea o

peace between the two states.

An ideational security approach requires the construction of a socially-shared identity of peace. To


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demonstrate that Israel has shifted to a non-material strategy for peace, I will first demonstrate how traditiona

material explanations of Israeli security has failed to take into account why Israel would surrender the Sinai and

its material security benefits for a peace treaty and the promise by both sides to not use force.

Failure of Realism

Realists, in general, perceive the international system in static terms. For the Neo-Realists, the

international system exists in a perpetual state-of-war, where the possibility of attack is constant. For Neo

traditional Realists, the international system is not characterized by the constant possibility of war, rather, states

make decisions based on the probability of war (Brooks 1997). War exists, but not constantly, and state

perceive the probability of war. However this is unsatisfactory because Realism, in general, fails to take into

account deep and profound changes within the international system. For instance, since World War II, Germany

has behaved in a cooperative manner. Structuralists credit American power in Europe as the restraining force

that contains German potential for expansion (DePorte 1986 and Mearsheimer 1990). Suppose we remove the

U.S. from Europe, how do the neo-traditional Realists see states behaving in a post-U.S. Europe? Relying on

material assumptions, Europe should become a more threatening place without the U.S. (Mearsheimer 1990).

Without the U.S., Germanys potential for war will increase, and its central location and proximity to othe

European power will increase the level of threat (ibid.). Material explanations fail to grasp the deep ideationa

changes within Europe. European peace is not just a consequence of American power, it is due heavily to the

changes in the way European states see one another. Their mutual identity has changed from one of war and

threat, to mutual cooperation. In other words, what effected the value of Griecos k cannot be explained

without an approach that evaluates the ideational changes that effect the way states perceive their interests based

on sensitivity to relative gains. This underlies the peace in Europe, and is shown by the continued integration o

Europe in the E.U.

Israels adherence to the Realist strategy was visible in its refusal to relinquish the Sinai Peninsula withou

a complete and binding peace between it and Egypt (Sachar 1981, 1996, Sicker 1987). Israeli leaderconsistently proclaimed that Israel would never surrender these lands as long as the Arabs continued to seek its

destruction, as Golda Meir emphasized: There must be certain things a people must stand up for, irrespective o

the costs and risks. There must be a deterrent border so that no Sadat can in five or ten years try again (to

attack Israel) . . . (Sicker 1989). After the Suez Crisis in 1956, Israel withdrew from the Sinai unwillingly unde

severe American pressure (Sachar 1996 and Sicker 1987). Furthermore, as Prime Minister Rabin told

Kissinger in 1974: No Arab ruler is prepared for true peace and normalization of relations in the Middle East


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The Arabs demand a total withdrawal to the June 4, 1967, lines, and those lines were the cause of war. Any

significant military movements in the Arab states confront Israel with a harsh choice of launching a preemptive

attack or running the risk of an invasion. We must have defensible borders, and those are not the same as th

June 4 lines (Rabin 1996). The main theme is that Israel viewed its captured territories as a strategic elemen

that benefited its security. Its continued occupation gave Israel greater material self-help capability. As long a

the Arabs refused to recognize Israel's right to exist, Israel was compelled to hold on to the strategic assets that

the occupied territories represented.[3]

Under Realism, geo-strategic lands are part of the material balance-of-power calculation. Jack Snyde

refers to this when he states how the taking of territory is understandable when viewed as a form of defense:

Geography may make greater or lesser obstacles in the path of the attacker. In land warfare

rough terrain and narrow frontages aid the defender, whereas flat terrain and wide frontages aid

the attacker. In all forms of warfare, the logistical burden of projecting power over a distance

tends to reduce the relative fighting power of the attacker. But if the attacker is invading weakly

defended territories near its own home base and the defender must transport forces to support adistant client, distance will aid the attacker (Snyder 1991).

Following Snyder, the 1973 Yom Kippur War fully demonstrated the strategic benefits of the Sinai Peninsula.

The Sinais depth allowed Israel to forgo its defense until the Syrian threat in the Golan Heights was neutralized.

The Sinais depth allowed for a retreating defense before the Israeli heartland would be in danger. As well, the

Sinai is accessible through two main passageways, which makes defense easier (Sacher 1981 and 1996).

Beyond defense, the Sinai held Israel's newest and largest airfields and oil fields (ibid.). Furthermore, by

controlling the Sinai Peninsula, Israel controlled the strategic city of Sharm el-Shiek, which guards the entrance to

the Gulf of Aqaba, Israels only maritime route to Africa and Asia. It was Egypts closure of the Strait of Tiran

(which is the entrance to the gulf) in 1956 that led to Israel's invasion of the Sinai, and 1967 that precipitated the

Six-Day War.

Underlying Israels desire for defensible borders and the retention of the occupied territories is the

diminutive size of Israel: it leaves no room for error, as a well organized Arab attack can overwhelm its

defenses. Thus Israels small size caused its hypersensitivity to hostilities, as Ben-Gurion responded to a Sovie

critique of Israeli military strategy: Aggressiveness is another term use by the Soviet Union and its satellites to

characterize our efforts at self-defense. It is perhaps easy for a nation possessing one sixth of the earths tota

landmass within its borders to criticize the swiftness that so tiny a nation as Israel must deploy in meeting any

threat to its frontiers. Israel can answer the epithets tossed at it by the self-evident observation that ou


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geography demands we apply the rule: he who strikes first wins the battle (Ben-Gurion 1970). Yet, for all of it

demonstrated value, Israel surrendered the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. This is even more astonishing when

considering that Israel took half of its oil from fields it developed in the Sinai, before it was returned (Sachar

1981and 1996).

Given that states must be self-reliant, why would Israel surrender any of its captured territory? Israels

small size only accentuates its vulnerabilities, so any return of territory makes it more vulnerable to aggression.

Waltzs explanation for why states do not always act to promote their security is that states do not always ac

appropriately. Sometimes states act in a suicidal fashion. The important thing is that states failing to behave

according to the rules of anarchy are selected out (Waltz 1979). This explanation, however, fails to accoun

for the empirical fact that Israel is better off having surrendered the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. Since the peace

treaty, Israel has not had a violent encounter with Egypt. Israels improved security is demonstrated by its ability

to invade Lebanon in 1982 without the fear of leaving its Southern borders vulnerable.

Bandwagoning

One Realist explanation is that Egypt made peace with Israel to bandwagon with the United States, as

proposed by Stephen Walt (Walt 1981). Walt sees the peace between Egypt and Israel as due to changes in

the regional balance-of-power favoring the United States over the Soviet Union. Specifically, the Yom Kippu

War, the inability of the Soviets to help the Egyptians regain the Sinai, and the increasing leverage the United

States held over the politics of the region, made Egypt ally with the U.S. to gain U.S. support for Israels

withdrawal from the Sinai. Walts analysis concludes that Israels withdrawal from the Sinai is a submission to

U.S. power, and that Israel followed U.S. demands for it to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula; thus allowing the

U.S. to solidify Egypts alliance.

But, Walts analysis is problematic because, U.S. pressure was exerted mainly in the first two

disengagement treaties (Sinai I and Sinai II). American pressure was less prevalent in the final drive to peace.

Making disengagement treaties is one thing, but why did Israel eventually complete a peace treaty with Egypt?

Israel could have existed in a peace maintained through mutual suspicion and self-help balance-of-power.

President Sadat makes the clearest assessment of the Israeli-Egyptian move to peace in the last three of his five

principles to peace in his historic 1977 Speech to the Knesset:

"Third, the right of each state in the area to live in peace within secure borders guaranteed by

agreed-upon procedures that would ensure the proper security of international borders, in

addition to appropriate international guarantees. Fourth, all the states of the are should be

committed to conduct their relation with one another according to the aims and principles of the

United Nations Charter, particularly not to resort to the use of force, and to resolve any


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differences among them through peaceful means. Fifth, termination of the present state o

belligerency in the area. (Meital 1997).

As Sadat implied, security for Israel and countries in the region will no longer be a self-help approach, but based

on the trust and expectation that everyone in the region will act peacefully.

That Sadat chose this message to bring to Israel underscore the ultimate objective of Israel's policies

toward Egypt, since the end of the Yom Kippur War, was to create a relationship of peace. This interpretation

is supported by Sadat's claim that he wishes to breach the distrust Israel has of Egypt: "Today through my visit to

you I ask you, why do we not stretch out our hands with faith and sincerity so that together we might remove al

suspicion of fear, betrayal and bad intentions" (Sachar 1987). To regain the Sinai, Egypt was willing to recogniz

Israels right to survive, thereby changing the socially-shared identity from hostility to peace.[4]

Realism holds that peace comes from states maintaining deterrence, and that states should not rely on

others for security. Yet, what Sadat spoke of is an environment where security is provided by mutua

cooperation to not to threaten or use force. By mutually relinquishing their rights to war, Israel and Egyp

established a new form of security guarantee. Neither country needed to have a formal binding peace between

each other to ally with the U.S. For instance, Greece and Turkey are both U.S. allies, yet neither ha

relinquished the right to war if they have a dispute. The U.S. has successfully managed their conflicts to avoid

war, and neither country has shown any desire to move away from the United States. Peace does not have to

mean a pluralistic security community.

American Power

Following Walts argument, some scholars claim that Israel's agreement to the Sinai II Accords was to

guarantee American support (Inbar 1997, Sachar 1987 ad 1997, and Stein 1999). That is, Israel was no

making peace with Egypt, but submitting to U.S. demands for the sake of continued arms sales. Thus, peace

was Israels submission to American power. More importantly, this argument subsumes the entire Egypt-Israe

peace process under the superpower struggle of the Cold War. It was American desire to edge out Sovie

influence in Egypt that led to the demand on Israel to return, first, the Gidi and Mitla passes and the oil-fields

and, second, the rest of the Sinai Peninsula.

This argument is strong because Israeli leaders were indeed concerned about the possibility of the U.S

limiting its arms to Israel (ibid.). Against this Realist claim, I argue that while arms were important, Israels fea

of a U.S. arms embargo was exaggerated. First, Congress and American public opinion supported arms sales to


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Israel (Quandt 1995). Congressional and public scrutiny would help Israel get the arms it needed. Second

Israel knew how to manipulate American politics to procure arms, as demonstrated by Rabins support o

Nixons presidential campaign to place pressure on Johnson to release arms to Israel (Inbar 1999).

Furthermore, Israels strategic benefit to the U.S. was recognized, and acknowledged, by Nixon during the

Jordanian Crisis of 1970, when Israel carried out the American policy of supporting the Hashemite King (Lukacs

1997).

To be sure, the United States played an important intermediary role by lowering the cost to Israel of a

possible Egyptian defection from their peace agreement. This is not problematic for a constructivist strategy, as

mutual identity-shifts require trust between the members, and trust is gained over time. Also, that the U.S

helped in lowering the cost of an Egyptian defection to Israel does not mean that Israel did not want to change its

socially constructed identity with Egypt, nor does it remove the significance of Israels gamble on peace. It wa

Israels decision to pursue a new form of relationship with Egypt and a new security strategy that made peace

possible.

However, the importance of American power signifies the degree to which constitutive and regulative rule

constrain the ability of states to shift from one culture to another. This is a subject I will speak more of later. It i

enough to note that for Israel, American power does not indicate that its strategic policies were no

Constructivist; instead, it merely shows the difficulties of attempting to reconstruct mutual identity.

Retrenchment

The third conventional Realist way to explain why states may surrender valuable material advantages is to

look at the effects of disequilibria between the cost of maintaining a wider security sphere and the resources

available for security maintenance (Gilpin 1981). According to this Realist approach, expansion provides fo

more resources to increase power, so states continue their expansion. However, it reaches a point where th

resources gathered from additional expansion or from current holdings fail to keep pace with the growing cost o

security maintenance. In such instances, states must surrender some territories to diminish the cost of security

maintenance. Only by bringing cost in line with available resources can states hope to maintain security. Fo

instance, states ignoring their inability to pay for the growing cost of security may stretch their military forces too

thin, creating vulnerabilities in their defense. Retrenchments are therefore nothing new; they are a materia

attempt to limit the material cost of security maintenance.

However, Israels withdrawal from the Sinai is not a retrenchment. As I have indicated previously, th

Sinai helped Israel more than it hurt it. The Sinai represented valuable military and economic resources.

Specifically, the Mitla and Gidi passes together guard the Sinai and form a chokepoint to trap enemy forces.


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Also, the Sinai held Israels best and newest airbases and allowed for Israels free use to the Gulf of Aqaba.

Israel, understandably, was very hesitant about the surrender of this territory (Sachar 1981, 1996 and Sicke

1987). Israeli security has increased in the last decade and continues to, as even Prime Minster Rabin assessed

that Israels security after the Gulf War was greater than at any time in its history (Rabin 1996). [5] This only

further reinforces Israels peace with Egypt as a Constructivist security strategy, and not Realist.

Israels Constructivist Security Strategy

As I have already mentioned, the Constructivist security strategy is the creation of a socially-shared identity

of peace. Constructivism allows states to construct their own security environment, not just to respond to

given structure. Constructivists take anarchy not to be an institution as Realists do, but a process (Wendt 1992

1999). That is, the international structure has meaning that states place on it, and respond to. States are no

merely reactants in international relations, but can take appropriate steps to proactively change the condition thathey exist in. Consequently, states may seek new sets of relationships beyond self-help and distrust.

In a constructivist strategy, states construct a socially-shared identity of peace, where mutual renunciation

of war ensures a non-violent existence. In such a relationship, both Egypt and Israel must agree and expect each

other to mutually cooperate to enforce their peaceful co-existence. If Israel and Egypt do not surrender thei

right to force, then both must employ self-help means for security. As Waltz said, there is nothing in anarchy tha

prevents states from going to war. In such a scenario, Israel cannot surrender the Sinai Peninsula. Such a peace

is nothing more than a state of non-belligerency, when states are not at war, but exist with that possibility.

Constitutive and Regulative Rules

To start, Constructivists believe that the international structure is simultaneously constitutive and regulative

(Onuf 1998, Ruggie 1999, and Wendt 1994, 1999). Identities help to shape the culture that states exist in

meaning that the norms that shape expectations are both constitutive and regulative rules (Jepperson et al

1996). Conceptually, international structure can become static. As Wendt notes, structures are sticky and can

last for a long time (1999). This is mainly because structures are self-reinforcing. This phenomenon can be

better understood from the position of rule constructivists (Onuf 1998, Ruggie 1999). Rule constructivists note

that structure is both constitutive and regulative rules. By obeying the regulative rules, states help to constitute the

structure. For example, as long as states behave according to the regulative rules of anarchy, they create

anarchy.

For Wendt, there are three general rules of anarchy, the Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures.

Each culture is both constitutive and regulative rules, but differs in the logic generated:

The Hobbesian culture is constituted and regulated by the rules of independent and selfish decision-

making, in which other states sovereign rights are not fully accepted, and will be violated if it is in a

states material interest. Thus, states are seen as nothing more than means to ends. In this culture


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material self-help, balance-of-power, and relative gain maximization are the prescription for survival. By

obeying these rules, states help to constitute an anarchy that is under constant threat of war.

The Lockean culture is constituted and regulated by the rules of self-defense, cooperation, and

acceptance of others rights to sovereign existence (Wendt 1999). In this culture, states do not have a

right to attack another unless it is in self-defense. They may use force as a form of just punishment, bu

these actions are guided by the principles of Just War (ibid.). Therefore, states war with one anothe

only because they cannot discern what just limits of punishment are.[6]

The Kantian culture is constituted and regulated by the rules of mutual cooperation and concern forothers. Following Kant, this culture has a norm of non-violence, and a cooperation that is more than

Deutschs pluralistic security community. In this culture, states do not use force, and never allow issue

to come to the point of conflict.

These cultures are self-reinforcing, and are difficult to change (ibid.). It is very likely that states will reify

self-fulfilling prophecies, thereby trapping themselves in one culture for a long time. Once these cultures are

established, meaning that a socially-shared identity exists, it is possible to act in a rational manner. Identities

then, shape interests (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Jepperson et al. 1996). Also once interests are establishedactors can employ rationality to achieve their goals (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Therefore, Katzenstein et al

can claim that Neo-liberalism starts where Constructivism ends (Katzenstein et al. 1999). Thus, once identity

and rules are established, states can behave in a rational manner, obeying the rules and, consequently, reinforcing

and reifying the culture of anarchy they exist in. The constitutive and regulative rules of all three cultures then

constitute the structure of sovereignty.

Alter Ego

The way states change their culture is both a social learning and identity formation process. Followin

Wendt's constructivist approach (1992, 1999), Israel and Egypt can be thought of in terms of Alter and Ego.

Their socially-shared idea of each other constructs the nature of their behavior (Wendt 1999). As I have already

mentioned, Alter and Ego can exist in three types of relationships. Alter and Ego can mutually create an

antagonistic relationship (Wendt's Hobbesian culture), a mutual co-existing relationship, without antagonism, bu

with rivalry (Wendt's Lockean culture), and a peaceful, friendly relationship (Wendt's Kantian culture).[7] In a

condition in which Israel's right to exist is not recognized by Egypt, Israel exists in a Hobbesian culture, because

it perceives that Egypt retains the right to harm it (they do not perceive Israel as having any right to exist, so no

such security can exist). When Egypt acts violently against Israel, then Israel's perception of that action hinges on

its learned idea of Egypt as a threat; so Egyptian moves are always interpreted within that frame. Israels desires

in its relationship with the Egypt do not matter, because as long as they refuse to recognize Israel's right to exist

Israel cannot behave in any fashion save a Realist one, as Ben-Gurion noted: "Israel has indeed remained true to
http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/charleslu.html#_ftn7http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/charleslu.html#_ftn6


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the ideas of peace and love of mankind on which the Bible rests. However, it is one thing to love your neighbo

and another to commit national suicide" (Ben-Gurion 1970).

Even though Israel and Egypt may resort to a Realist strategy to ensure security, this is not the only

strategy possible. States, if they mutually accept each other's right to exist in a secure, peaceful environment, can

create a condition of peace. Again, if only one side accepts the other's right to exist without violence, then there

is no constructivist security. Thus, states can employ tactics to construct a peaceful culture as a means to

security. For Israel, it will only surrender its material self-help means to security when it has a guarantee tha

Egypt accepts its right to exist in a peaceful and secure manner. That is the basic tenet of the proclamation: "land

for peace." Israel would have held on to the occupied territories as long as there is no substantive peace

between it and its Arab neighbors.

Culture

Yet, mutual peace is not enough. To change the culture of anarchy, states need to create differen

expectations based on the development of a new socially-shared identity of self and the other as both being

peaceful (Wendt 1999). This identity then creates the expectation of peace. Alter will act based on it

prediction of Egos actions. Ego, by behaving in the way Alter expects it to, reinforces and reifies their culture

(ibid.). This sort of expectation is socially-shared knowledge, or "knowledge that is common and connected

between individuals" (ibid.). Common knowledge is not enough, because it is nothing more than shared ideas

ideas that I have and expect others to share, and know that everyone knows and expects others to have tha

idea (Wendt 1999). Shared knowledge is not enough, because it neither influences nor constrains our action

(Wendt 1999). Common, or shared, knowledge is what everyone knows, but imposes no constraining force on

our actions. Rather, what is needed is collective knowledge, which is common knowledge that creates a

constraining force on behavior (ibid.). In other words, socially-shared knowledge is shared knowledge tha

creates a belief that becomes a constraining force that modifies actors behaviors to reproduce expectations - i

connects individuals. In essence, what Wendt is talking about is culture, which is a structure that constrain

behavior to reproduce itself (ibid.). Culture creates expectations and the possibility of fulfilling those

expectations.

A peaceful culture maintains peace because states have an expectation that members are constrained by

the norm of peace. That is, everyone knows the norm of peace and that everyone shares that knowledge, and

expects all to behave accordingly.

Constructivist Security Strategy

Thus, Israel's security strategy, in respect to the "land for peace" approach, is to create a culture whereby


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both it and its Arab neighbors will share an agreement for and expectation of peace, and will act peacefully

because that shared idea constrains their actions and produces the condition of peace. In short, war is precluded

from their interaction, as Shimon Peres pointed out: "Those who ideologically or psychologically will not or

cannot restructure their thinking to the new reality will be unable to guarantee a secure future for their country.

After all, what is the value of security that only carries us back to the battlefield?" (Peres 1993). He goes on to

say: "Outside of an organized, established social framework, people cannot provide for security and produce

what they need for daily survival. Thus, personal security is tied to and depends on collective security" (ibid.). A

Constructivist security strategy can promote peace and security, because peace is no longer manageable by

states alone, and peace is a security that goes beyond borders. Thus, whereas Jervis (1983) sees regimes a

promoting stability in security issues, and states promote security by abandoning pure individual decision-making

the Constructivists argue that this is only possible when states accept each others self-identity and develop a

socially-shared identity of cohabitation. It takes mutual cooperation for peace when materialism fails.

Theoretically, Israel's actions indicate that states can move between different cultures. States need no

always exist in a Hobbesian, Realist culture, or Lockean/Kantian, liberal culture. Instead, states can change the

structure of that culture to create new sets of expectations of behaviors. Thus, for Israel, while the Arab

threaten it, security is promoted by self-help. But that does not preclude it from attempting to create a new

environment in which it and its neighbors expect each other to behave peacefully. As I hope to demonstrate

Israel was able to escape from a Hobbesian culture with Egypt and create a Lockean culture.

States in Realism have already been socialized to behave in a selfish, competitive, and distrustful manner.

Given this assumption, Realism automatically discounts the possibility that states might move to a Lockean or

Kantian culture. Constructivism allows us to consider alternatives to Realist self-help anarchy, and observe

states change from one culture to another. Thus, by removing Hobbesian socialization from the realm o

assumptions, Constructivism allows for change in the way states seek out security.

Egyptian-Israeli Case

In the following sections, I will focus mainly on Israels return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. I will only

briefly discuss the Constructivist aspects of the period before the Yom Kippur War. Most of my analysis i

dedicated to understanding how Israel applied a policy to change its socially-shared identity with Egypt to

produce peace. The pre-Yom Kippur War period has been discussed in some ways already, and is not th

main focus of this paper.

The Realist Logic

As I have already noted, throughout most of Israels existence, it has lived in a Hobbesian culture. Thi


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culture began early when Egypt refused to recognize Israels existence, and in fact, most Arabs viewed the

creation of Israel as a Western implant (Smith 1992). Second, Egypts self-identity as the leader of all Arab

meant that it could not accept Israels existence, especially when Israel refused to make concessions regarding

the status of displaced Palestinians (Papp 1992). Thus, Israels existence challenged Egypts identity of Arab

hegemony, and was not recognized as a consequence. For Israel, the Arabs demand for refugee repatriation

threatened its self-conceived Jewish identity (Papp 1992). That is, Israel could not have been Israel if the large

majority of its population was Arab. Also, Egypts identity meant that it could not accept Israels hold to Arab

land that was not granted to it by the UN, but taken during the war for independence. Israels refusal to return

to the territory originally demarcated by the UN created the perception by Arabs that Israel was expansionis

(Papp 1992). In the end, in the Lausanne Conference, neither Israel nor Egypt was willing or desired to

formulate a serious peace treaty, for both sides were satisfied with a situation of non-belligerence (ibid.). Thi

status, while precarious, meant that both sides could protect their own identities.

However, this attempt to protect their self-identity created a socially-shared identity of hostility. Whil

Israel was not opposed to the existence of Egypt, as long as Egypt was opposed to the existence of Israel

neither side could exist in a socially-shared identity of peace. Thus, I resort to survival as a basic desire o

states. If Israel seeks to survive with Egypt opposed to its survival, it cannot count on Egypt to refrain from

force. This creates a culture in which neither side can trust the other to refrain from force. For Egypt, its self

identity of anti-Israel meant that it could not trust that Israel would refrain from attacking it, which Israel did in

1954 with the British and the French.

Thus, Israeli foreign policy during the pre-Yom Kippur War, while it relied heavily on materia

deterrence, should not be interpreted as purely Realist. In fact, it is Realist because an Egyptian-Israeli sharedidentity of hostility was already established. Once this identity was created, the constitutive and regulative rule

of Hobbesian culture meant that the strategy to survive was material self-help and balance-of-power. By

obeying the rules of Hobbesian culture, though, states can create and perpetuate the competitive, insecure, and

often violent state-of-nature. Psychologically, this system can trap states from ever breaking free of it, as the

logic of a Hobbesian anarchy can take on a life of its own.[8]

A better description of Israels strategy before the Yom Kippur

War is a Realist-Constructivist Strategy. I mean only that Israels employment of a Realist security strategy wadesigned to promote a socially-shared identity of peace between it and Egypt by forcing Egypt to change its self-

conception from one of challenger to acquiescence of Israels existence. Thus, as Israel's first Prime Minister

David Ben-Gurion, said of Israel's security strategy: Only if the Arab rulers are convinced that Israel cannot be

liquidated, either by military measures or by means of blockade and isolation, will they realize the need for, and

the value of, peace and cooperation with Israel (Zmora et. al 1967). In a situation where neither side wa

willing to fully accept the others self-identity, nor to modify their own identity to accommodate the reflected

identity of the other, both Israel and Egypt created a socially-shared identity of hostility and distrust. Israel


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strategy during the Pre-Yom Kippur War period was designed to forcefully change Egypts self-identity to match

that of Israels, without Israel changing its self-identity to meet Egypts.

Israels Shift in Security Strategies

However, since the Yom Kippur War, Israel has employed a strategy designed to build a socially-shared

identity of peace with Egypt based on both sides accepting the self-identity of others. This is an ideationa

strategy, because it seeks to establish a Lockean culture between Egypt and Israel by using the idea of mutuapeace as a means to security. The difference between the Realist and ideational strategy is that the Realis

strategy aims not to create a mutual peace, but submission peace, in which one side submits to the other.

Ideational security strategy seeks to establish a peace based on mutual acceptance of each sides self

conception. This is accomplished through changing the socially-shared identity of both states; thus, peace come

from the mutual acceptance of the sovereign rights and identity of the other. As Jepperson et al. noted, chang

in identity can precipitate substantive change in interests that shape national security policy (1996). While the

Realist strategy was characterized by material deterrence, the ideational strategy is characterized by the lack o

force or the threat of force as a foreign policy instrument in the interaction between Israel and Egypt.

Israel's desire for a socially-shared identity of peace with Egypt was represented by the strategic

concessions Israel surrendered to Egypt. First, Israel surrendered the strategic Gidi and Mitla passes to Egypt in

return for a promise to end war, as stipulated in the Sinai II Accords (Reich 1995). The Sinai II agreemen

marked the point when Israel would have to choose between the risks of creating a socially-shared identity o

peace, or return to its traditional Realist security strategy:

The second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement (Sinai II) set important precedents in

Arab-Israeli negotiations: it was the first Arab-Israeli agreement not negotiated at the conclusionof a war. Israel exchanged tangible assets in return for confidence that Egypt could be trusted to

make further agreements . . . Sinai II broadened the Egyptian-Israeli non-belligerency

relationship; it was a signed statement of nonuse of force (Stein 1999).

This interpretation is supported by Article One of the Sinai II agreement: "The conflict between them (Egypt and

Israel) and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force, but by peaceful means" (Reich 1995). Th

surrender of the Sinai's strategic values for the promise of both sides to refrain from war showed that Israe

viewed mutual cooperation for peace as a better means to security than the militarily strategic Sinai.

Again, many scholars discount the possibility of Israel's shift from Realist to liberal constructivist strategy

and focus on material inducements provided by the U.S. to force Israel to acquiesce to a global U.S. strategy.

Doing so ignores the fact that Israel surrendered a great material advantage to Egypt for the return of intangible

promises of non-violence:

The territory at stake here, first and foremost, was the Mitla and Gidi passes. Less than forty

miles from the Canal, the two defiles represented the only practical access routes to eastern

Sinai. They also guarded Israel's huge military air base at Refidim and dominated passage to the

Israeli operated Abu Rudeis oil fields . . . and by 1973 provided Israel with nearly half of its


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energy supplies. In possession of Gidi and Mitla, Israel could defend itself, and an importan

part of its economic future, with relatively small forces. (Sachar 1981)

Rather than Realism, what occurred in the post-Yom Kippur War period was an active attempt by Israel to

induce Egypt to mutually create an identity of peace; Israel's desire for peace with Egypt goes beyond American

influence. Take for instance, Israel's voluntary reduction of forces to prevent the collapse of the Sinai I

negotiations:only three days after the failure of Kissinger's March shuttle negotiations . . . Sadat decided to

gamble on a propaganda victory and on economic recovery. He announced that he would open

the Canal on June 4, and would proceed forthwith to rebuild the Canal cities.

As a gesture of their own goodwill, meanwhile, the Israelis announced on June 3 tha

they would match Egypt's decision to open the Canal by pulling back half their authorized tank

and troops some eighteen to twenty-five miles from the waterway" (Sachar 1981).

Afterwards, Kissinger quietly resumed his shuttle diplomacy between the two countries. The main impetus fo

change was Israel's perception that its Realist strategy was not providing it with security, and a desire, thereforeto employ an ideational strategy to produce a socially-shared identity of peace. As Prime Minister Rabin said to

the Knesset in 1975: The Agreement with Egypt which we have initialed is a very hopeful event. Its principa

significance is saliently political. Its principal content is that it has been agreed that force and fighting will not be

the characteristics of Israel-Egyptian relations, that neither side will resort to the use of force against the other

(Sicker 1989).

The Sinai II agreement was meant to further the process of identity shift, for it committed both sides to find

a "final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations . . ." (part of Article I of the Sinai II Accords, Reich

1995). Even though Israel insisted from the very beginning that it would not abandon any land without peace

Israel in the end surrendered the strategic parts of the Sinai in the hope that it would induce Egypt to continue the

process for peace: the agreement gave further impetus to developments already in train, moving Sadat furthe

away from the Soviet Union, depriving the Egyptian army of further supplies of Soviet arms, and widening the rif

between Egypt and Syria. In this manner we hoped to leave Sadat with only one choice: a political solution

(Rabin 1996). Evidence indicates that Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai passes, against its own claims that i

would not do so, was calculated to foster an eventual Egyptian-Israeli peaceful identity.

Israel's turn to an ideational security strategy was observed by the historian Sachar, who noted: "The initia

goal he (Rabin) and his foreign minister, Allon, had in mind was something less than a peace treaty with the

Egyptians, but an understanding at least credible enough to establish an atmosphere of mutual trust in which

peaceful conditions might gradually emerge over the years. The extent of a Sinai withdrawal would be

determined by the range of meaningful Egyptian political concessions: in short, a piece of territory for a piece o

peace (Sachar 1981). The scholar Sicker also supports the argument that Israel's return of the Sinai was a

shift to a non-Realist strategy:


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Israel had no fundamental territorial claims on any part of Sinai. It did have a major and

legitimate concern that security arrangements provided for in a settlement is adequate to protec

its vital interests. Twice before, Egypt had exploited its strategic position to blockade the Gulf o

Aqaba and deny Israel freedom of navigation in the international waterway. Israel wanted

tangible assurances that this would not be done a third time . . . Similarly, Israel was unwilling to

return to a situation whereby the Gaza strip bordered directly on Egypt . . . Nonetheless, all o

Israel's demands were to be considered negotiable within the context of a peace settlement tha

would resolve the Egyptian-Israeli conflict once and for all . . . (Sicker 1989).

Finally, "Rabin revealed Israel's conditions for an agreement with Egypt: 'In exchange for an Egyptian

commitment not to go to war and not to use the threat to use force, the Egyptians could get even the passes and

the oil fields.' Clarifying his negotiating position, Rabin told the Israeli Parliament four days later that Israel would

not withdrawal from the passes or the oil fields 'unless Egypt withdrew from the war'" (Stein 1999). The Land

for Peace approach was the essence of the Sinai II agreement, confirmed by Article I of the Sinai II Accords

(Reich 1995). What these scholars have found is that Israel's decision to withdraw from the Sinai, in pieces, wa

designed to enforce a policy that would eventually create a socially-shared identity of peace with Egypt. Whil

Israel had serious geo-strategic concerns, they were withdrawn to allow for the Sinai II agreement to be

implemented. Israel's policy was shifting away from a Realist to a Liberal constructivist strategy.

The success of this strategy was evidenced by Egyptian President Sadat's historic 1977 speech to the

Knesset in Jerusalem. This is significant because it was Sadats determination to forge a new peacefu

relationship with Israel that led to his watershed visit. The visit, however, came after Israel demonstrated that i

was serious about peace with Egypt. In 1977, Israel voluntarily minimized and restrained its military activities in

the Sinai while Egypt was involved in a border conflict with Libya. After 1975, when Egypt successfullynegotiated the second disengagement agreement with Israel, Libya increased its demand for Egypt to end its

negotiations with Israel. In 1977, Israeli intelligence discovered a Libyan plot to assassinate Sadat (Sacha

1996). During this time, Libya had begun to mass troops along the border with Egypt. After the discovery o

the assassination plot, Egypt attacked Libyas staging areas, and demonstrating that it wanted a new relationship

between the two states, Israel declared that it would freeze all its forces in the Sinai while Egypt engaged Liby

(Sachar 1996). Instead of taking advantage of Egypt's weakness, Israel demonstrated that it would not harm

Egypt's security.

To further demonstrate Israel's intent to form a socially-shared identity of peace, one of the first actions by

Prime Minister Begin, upon taking office, was to have Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan probe the Egyptians for a

possible comprehensive peace agreement. This is significant because Likud was publicly opposed to the Sinai I

treaty. Yet, after the election in 1976, Begin started to look for possibilities of building on the peace with Egyp

(Sachar 1981 and Stein 1999). Further, negotiations after 1976 were more bilateral, as both Egypt and Israe

feared President Carters Geneva-style conference, involving the USSR and Syria, would allow Syria to

sabotage the peace process (Meital 1997, Sachar 1981 and 1996, and Sicker 1987). More importantly, thi


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demonstrates that the desire for peace was not disingenuous; rather, Israel wanted a peace with Egypt tha

would bring it security. Had Israel not been serious about creating a security community with Egypt, it could

have agreed to Carter's proposal and allowed the Soviets, Syrians, and Palestinians to scuttle the peace process

That the peace between Egypt and Israel is a form of socially-shared identity of peace was demonstrated

by the military restraint both countries showed. When Israel invaded Lebanon, or when Israel failed to addres

the Palestinian problem, Egypt refrained from taking military actions. Furthermore, both sides resolved many o

their conflicts peacefully. For instance, when residents of the Sinai settlement Yamit refused to leave the

territory, Israel sent its own army to forcefully evacuate its own citizens, and comply with the terms of the peace

treaty with Egypt (Sachar 1996). Also, when Israel and Egypt disputed the ownership of a piece of territory

known as Taba, neither side used or threatened force. Rather, the issue was finally settled via internationa

arbitration, with Egypt gaining sovereign rights over the territory (Sachar 1996). Even though Egypt recalled it

diplomat when Israel did not fully cooperate to settle the dispute, before the issue went to arbitration, Egypt

never opted for force. Israel dutifully accepted the arbitration. Egyptian President Mubarak captured th

significance of the socially-shared identity of peace when he said in 1989: "God has granted us a mind with

which to think. We fought for many years, but where did we get? The Arabs had lost wealth and many martyr

in the struggle and their situation was still terrible. I am therefore not ready to take more risks . . . Moreover

wars have generally not solved any problem. Regardless of the difficulties or obstacles surrounding the presen

peace process, it was the only way out (Rubin 1994). Finally, Rabin pointed out in 1993 that Israel has had

more peace after the shift to a Constructivist security strategy:

The Yom Kippur War taught us and, pardon the comparison, our enemies as well, the limitations

of military force and the possibilities embodied in a political solution. Following the signing o

the armistice agreements with Egypt and Syria, after signing the interim agreement with Egypt

after the withdrawal of IDF forces from deep inside Egypt and from the heart of Syria and right

until this very day, we have known years of quiet and tranquility on those two fronts. (Rabin

1996)

Reasons for Identity Shift

The ability of Israel to establish a successful mutual identity shift with Egypt is due to two major factors.

One, the self-identity of Israel and Egypt changed to allow for both sides to accept the identity of the other, and

create, consequently, a socially-shared identity of peace. Second, the process of identity-shift, where newnorms are still being established, and old norms still hold sway, was only possible with the involvement of the

U.S. to create the proper condition in which both states were able to disobey the constitutive and regulative rule

of the old Hobbesian culture and try the ideational security strategy.

Yom Kippur and the Shift in Identity

The Yom Kippur War was a trauma that brought to doubt Israels Realist strategy. From th

perspective of both Israeli political elites and historians, without the Yom Kippur War, there would have been no


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peace, because the war shattered Israels illusion of invincibility (Weizman 1994, Rafael 1981, Sachar 1981 and

1996, Shamir 1994, Meital 1994, Allon and Yishai 1986). The wars unique contribution was to force Israel to

rethink its Realist strategy:

Even after the great 1967 victory, Rabin (then Chief of Staff) observed: Our deterrent powe

was not sufficient to prevent war. The 1973 war further sensitized Rabin and the Israeli defense

establishment to the notion that the IDF could not deter an Arab initiated war under al

circumstances. Rabin also understood that Arab rivals might resort to violence even if thechances of invading Israel were low, because achievements in the diplomatic sphere do no

always correspond to results on the battlefield. The Arabs recognized that losing a war did no

necessarily signify a political disaster. (Inbar 1999)

The War demonstrated that the Arabs were willing to fight in a condition of relative weakness. In 1973 Egyp

and Syria combined still did not possess the quality or quantity of weapons necessary to beat Israel. In fact, th

war shocked the Israeli political and military establishments, because neither believed that the Arabs would

attack Israel as long as it possessed a military advantage, especially in aircraft (Meital 1997, Sicker 1987, and

Stein 1999). The war showed bluntly that the Realist security strategy failed to produce security. Neither th

topographical advantages of the Sinai, or Israels military superiority deterred Arab aggression.

Confirming this account, the historian Yarom Meital also believed that Israel doubted its Realist strategy

The Yom Kippur War, as the 1973 war is called in Israel, is linked with labels such as the mekhdal

(omission). This term reflects the political and military leaderships incompetence as well as the over-confidence

dominating most of Israeli society in the six years between the military triumph of 1967 and the outbreak of the

1973 War (Meital 1994). Also, the Arab offensive called into question Israels concept of security and the

reliability of its intelligence services. This remained true despite the fact that Israel eventually gained tactica

military superiority and ended the war holding Syrian territories beyond the 1967 cease-fire line in the Golan . .

as well as large Egyptian areas west of the Suez Canal . . . (Meital 1994). More importantly, after the war

Israels deterrence was found wanting (ibid.). Israel did not feel secure after the war, even though its Realis

strategy had allowed it to survive.

The Israeli shift in strategy was in part a realization that the Realist strategy was not providing deterrence

and gave only a thin notion of security survival. On the contrary, Realism believes that war is a constan

possibility, so peace is never permanent, nor wars avoidable. Rather, wars are part of the security strategy, andstates do all they can to prepare to fight and win them. But, Israel's position contends that peace should not be

ephemeral, and that states can exist in a condition of peace. That Israel should feel so traumatized even after a

stunning demonstration of military superiority indicates that Israel believes that states can exist without constan

violence: Israel could guarantee its physical survival in the region by sheer military force, but it could not secure

political recognition from its neighbors there without political concessions (Sella and Yishai 1986). That Israel

military superiority could not guarantee its long-term peace was fully demonstrated by the results of the

Khartoum Conference after the Six-Day War: "However decisive the military victory, it did not solve Israel's


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security problems. The Khartoum Summit of Arab heads of state produced a declaration of "three noes" toward

Israel - no peace, no negotiation, and no recognition" (Bar-Tal and Jacobson 1998). If Israel wanted long-term

peace and security, other strategies needed to be explored.

While the Yom Kippur War changed the self-identity of Israel from invincibility to humility, that alone wa

not enough to guarantee that Israel would or could implement a policy designed to shift its shared identity with

Egypt. Because Constructivism rests on socially-shared identity, Egypts shift in self-identity was also

necessary. Thus, peace was in part due to Egypts acceptance of Israels right to exist, within the format o

Resolution 242. Further, it was Egypts shift in self-identity from Arab hegemony to cooperation that allowed fo

Israel to deal with Egypt. By relinquishing its identity as the leader of all Arabs, Egypt made a bilateral peace

with Israel possible, without the involvement of other Arab states. As well, the long conflict with Israel and it

submission to Soviet demands sapped Egypt of its vitality and shattered its self-identity of greatness (Meital 1997

and Sachar 1981, 1996). Egypts shift in self-identity was demonstrated when Sadat made the fateful journey to

Israel, in 1977, to try to overcome Israeli psychological obstacles to complete the establishment of a socially-

shared identity of peace. Clearly, no Constructivist strategy is possible without a mutual shift in self-identity tha

allows for shift in socially-shared identity, whether the self-identity change is individual or mutual.

American Involvement

While mutual identity shifts are important in fostering a different socially-shared identity, this alone is

insufficient to guarantee a complete change from one culture of anarchy to another. In the Egyptian-Israeli case

the involvement of the U.S. was also important. Essentially, while Egypt and Israel were making commitments toeach other, they were also making commitments to the U.S., in return for U.S. guarantee to their security in case

of a defection by either side (Inbar 1999 and Sachar 1981, 1996). This implies that, given the existing

Hobbesian culture and its self-help, balance-of-power prescription, states are constrained from disobeying the

constitutive and regulative rules. Even when states may desire a change in the culture of anarchy, there is no

guarantee of change without first addressing the Hobbesian logic. In this sense, if states believe that they exist in

a culture of constant threat and seek survival, then there are no reasons to expect states to risk being taken

advantage of, even when it may create a new shared-identity. In this frame, American involvement wa

important in that it was the socially-shared identity of friendship that the U.S. has with both countries that made i

possible for a successful identity-shift between Egypt and Israel.

Thus, as much as Israel and Egypt tried to shift their socially-shared identity with each other, it was only

possible because their shared identity of the U.S. made it possible for the U.S. to play the guarantor role that i

eventually did. In the final agreement, the U.S. would commit itself to help ensure that both sides remained in

state of peace by monitoring activities around the Israeli-Egyptian border. This, however, is not Realism; rather

it is an example of the complexities and difficulties states meet when attempting to leave the Hobbesian culture.


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After all, it took France and Germany three major and catastrophic wars to escape from the self-fulfilling

prophecy of Hobbesian anarchy.

This final analysis indicates that cultures of friend or foe have a powerful effect on states (Jepperson et al

1996). More importantly, since cultures shape norms and expectations, and state survival is affected by the

culture it exists in, a culture privileging materialism may inhibit the attempt by materially weaker states to change

their socially-shared identity for peace. In a Hobbesian culture, states need to have enough material capability to

guarantee that they will not be harmed when they act in ways contrary to the logic of Realism. Neither Israel no

Egypt, alone or together, had enough material capability to provide a safety net against the possible defection by

the other side from the peace agreement. It was in this context that the involvement of American materia

capability became important to the peace process. Thus, material power has meaning, but it is nevertheless the

product of identities. The key for peace is to not ignore material factors, but to help states redefine them.

Conclusion

This project envisions the possibility of foreign policies designed to change socially-shared identities

between states. I start from the assumption that all foreign policies are ultimately aimed at socially-shared

identities. For example, when Nixon visited China, it was not merely to establish a new foreign policy goal aimed

to increase the pressure against the Soviets, it was an ideational attempt to modify the culture shared by China

and the U.S. The employment of material factors for material ends is ideational, because materialism i

meaningless without defining ideas.

Using Israels policy toward Egypt in the post-Yom Kippur War period shows how states can change

their socially-shared identity to create new sets of norms that shape the way they behave toward each other.Thus, Israels attempt to make peace after the Yom Kippur War shows that states can choose to disobey the

rules they exist in, but face normative and rule constraints. In a the Hobbesian culture, where the norms are

competition and survival at all costs, including the violation of other states right to exist, material self-help and

balance-of-power becomes the method for survival.

It is therefore no small event when states are able to escape the self-fulfilling trap of Hobbesian culture and

generate a new socially-shared identity based on peace. Two factors are important: One, the shift in socially

shared identity requires that agents change their self-identity to a form that is compatible with the development o

a new social identity. This could mean that one side completely capitulates and changes its identity to meet the

other(s), or all of the agents involved change their self-identity to meet the others. When no state is willing to

change its self-identity, then there will be no Constructivist security strategy. Two, states may be so disciplined

by the logic of Hobbesian anarchy that, even if they wanted a new social identity with other(s), they may no

attempt to try if they fear that doing so will harm their survival. In this case, they need enough material power to

overcome the fear induced by the Hobbesian logic. Consequently, in the Egyptian-Israeli peace, it wa

necessary for the U.S., which does not exist in a Hobbesian culture with either Israel or Egypt to help act as a


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guarantor of security during the process of identity shift.

Moreover, the evaluation of Israels constructivist strategy only further highlights the trend of IR theories

toward unification. As Ruggie envisions, the debate in international relations is between Neo-utilitarianism and

Constructivism (1999). Neo-liberalism and Neo-Realism have converged toward Neo-traditional Realism, with

their emphasis on perception, probability of war, and the degree of threat (Brooks 1997, Grieco 1989, and

Taliaferro 2000). Neo-traditional Realism is able to explain both situations of cooperation and conflict through

the evaluation of the threat states perceive. However, Neo-utilitarianism is challenged by Constructivism, which

proves more satisfactory because it is able to explain the mechanism by which states change their perception o

threat. By studying identities, Constructivists can better explain why certain states perceive one another a

threats or friends, and how their shared norms effect their expectations of conflict or cooperation. For Israel,

socially-shared identity of peace with Egypt allowed for both countries to co-exist in peace.

Therefore, I do not believe it is accurate to claim that Constructivism ends where Neo-liberalism starts

because Constructivism does not end. Social construction is a never-ending story. It is identities that allow fo

states to determine Griecos k and behave accordingly, from instances of great threat to stable peace and

cooperation.

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[1]Constructivists, in general, believe norms define socially-shared expectat ion of behavior (Finnemore 1996). This is wha

Onuf and Ruggie meant when they use constitutive and regulative rules (Onuf 1998 and Ruggie 1999). Norms, cultures, and

rules define behavior that is expected from actors, and actors reconstitute the norms by obeying expectat ions. Thus , fo

Wendt, cultures can have both constitutive and causal factors, because by behavior according to expectations, actors

constitute the culture, which defines what are actors and how they should act.

[2]For Waltz, states are already functionally alike prior to structure. They cons titute the international structure of anarchy

which causes s tates to act in a selfish, competitive manner, which reconstitutes anarchy. The problem is, Waltzs system i

static.

[3]According to Realism, whether Israel wanted to employ self-help or not, it had to. Waltz notes that states must follow the

bes t st rategy to survival (self-help) or be eliminated (Waltz 1979: 118). If Israel undertakes a unilateral attempt to promote it

security by completely withdrawing from the lands conquered in the Six-Day War without any Egyptian reciprocal concess ion

or security guarantees, then it will be severely punished, because it will have given valuable material resources to the Arabs

and deprived itself of the benefits those resources could give it. As well, when there is no obs tacle to s tates using war as a

policy, all states mus t promote their own military st rength as a form of deterrence.[4]

To be clear, there were more than material reasons for Egypt's agreement to a security community with Israel. First, Sacha

(1981 and 1996) and Meital (1997) both believed that Egypt was no longer able to afford the conflict with Israel, and that there i

a shift in the des ire of the leadership to take care of the Egyptian population. As well, the lost of the Sinai Peninsula seemed to

have s hifted the focus of Egypt's conflict with Israel from an ideological to a material focus. Losing the Sinai meant that Egyp

was now focused on regaining its sovereign integrity, and not in fighting a against an alien Jewish entity.

[5]Anthony Cordesmans research indicates that quantitatively, while Israel has less than the combined Arab total in arms

(aircrafts, artilleries, tanks, etc), Israel still possess more of these weapons than any other Arab state alone (see Cordesman

1996: 28-75). While Israels quantity of weapons may be less than the Arab states combined, it has a greater edge in quality

where its weapons are more capable and its personnel are better trained to use and maximize the utility of its weapons. Mor

importantly, Cordesman pointed out that Israeli society is more technologically advanced and more geared socially to maintain

and promote that technology than its Arab neighbors, w

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