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WhyCivilResistanceWorks
EricaChenoweth,Ph.D.
WesleyanUniversity
April8,2010
SomeConvenBonalWisdoms?
• Insurgentsuseviolencebecause– ItiseffecBve– Itisalastresort
• Nonviolentresistance– IsineffecBveagainstbrutalregimes– IsineffecBveforachieving“tough”demands
– Onlyemergesincontextswhereitislikelytosucceedinthefirstplace
ProjectScope
• TheProjectDoesNot:– Explaintheemergenceofdifferentcampaigns– Examinecasesoutsideofthethreeissueareas(i.e.,civilrights,
anB‐war,etc.)– Arguethatnonviolentcampaignsaremorallysuperiortoviolent
campaigns– Establishaformulaforcampaignsuccess– Focusonthehumanexperienceofconflict
• GoalsoftheProject:– AssesstheempiricalvalidityoftheconvenBonalwisdom– Comparetrendsintheoutcomesofnonviolentandviolent
campaigns– ExplorethecondiBonsunderwhichcampaignssucceedandfail– MakesomeclaimsaboutthestrategicuBlityofdifferent
approachestopoliBcalcontestaBon
IntroducingNAVCO
• NonviolentandViolentCampaignOutcomesDataset– 323campaignsfrom1900‐2006– Idealtypes:nonviolentandviolent– Campaigngoals:regimechange,anB‐occupaBon,secession
– Unitofanalysis:campaignendyear– Examplesoftypicalvariables
• Campaignpeakmembership• SecurityforcedefecBons• Violentgovernmentrepression• Materialsupportreceivedfromaforeignstate• Regimetype,regimecapabiliBes,countrypopulaBon,etc.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
Success ParBalSuccess Failure
Nonviolent
Violent
Figure1.SuccessRatesofNonviolentandViolentCampaigns,1900‐2006
p=.000
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1940‐1949 1950‐1959 1960‐1969 1970‐1979 1980‐1989 1990‐1999 2000‐2006
Nonviolent
Violent
Figure2.SuccessRatesbyDecade,1940‐2006
p=.000
ThePuzzle
WhyhasnonviolentresistancebeenmoreeffecBvethanviolentinsurgencyinthe20thcentury?
TheArgument:ThePrimacyofParBcipaBon
• ThesuperiormobilizaBoncapacityofnonviolentcampaignsadvantagesthemrelaBvetoviolentcampaigns.
• Mass,nonviolentacBonismorelikelytodividetheregime,whereasviolentacBonismorelikelytounitetheregime.
ExplainingParBcipaBoninNonviolentResistance
• Lowerphysicalbarriers• LowerinformaBonalbarriers
• Lowermoralbarriers
• Fewercommitmentproblems
9.5
9.5
9.510
10
1010.5
10
.5
10.511
11
1111.5
11
.5
11.512
12
12Logged Membership, fitted values
Logged M
em
bers
hip
, fitt
ed v
alu
es
Logged Membership, fitted valuesViolent Campaigns
Violent Campaigns
Violent CampaignsNonviolent Campaigns
Nonviolent Campaigns
Nonviolent CampaignsFigure1.TheEffectsofCampaignTypeonCampaignParBcipaBon
p=.00
p=.02
Figure2.TheEffectsofCampaignMembershipontheProbabilityofSuccess
00
0.2.2
.2.4.4
.4.6.6
.6.8.8
.85
5
510
10
1015
15
155
5
510
10
1015
15
15Violent Campaigns
Violent Campaigns
Violent CampaignsNonviolent Campaigns
Nonviolent Campaigns
Nonviolent CampaignsPr(defect)Pr(
defe
ct)
Pr(defect)log members
log members
log members
Figure3.TheEffectsofCampaignMembershipontheProbabilityofSecurityForceDefecBons,byCampaignType
p=.07
TheEffectsofRepression
• Thoughrepressionisquitecommonagainstnonviolentandviolentcampaigns,itseffectsvary– Violentcampaignsfacinggovernmentrepressionarelessthan20%likelytosucceed
– Nonviolentcampaignsfacingrepressionareover46%likelytosucceed• Backfireohenresultsfromgovernmentrepression
• ThestatecannotrepressallofthepeoplealloftheBme.
00
0.2.2
.2.4.4
.4.6.6
.6Pr(Campaign Receives Foreign State Support)Pr(
Cam
paig
n R
ece
ives
Fore
ign S
tate
Support
)Pr(Campaign Receives Foreign State Support)Violent Campaigns
Violent Campaigns
Violent CampaignsNonviolent Campaigns
Nonviolent Campaigns
Nonviolent Campaigns
Figure4.TheEffectsofCampaignTypeontheProbabilityofReceivingExternalStateSupport
TheConsequencesofInsurgency
• Violentcampaignscreate“structuralviolence”longahertheinsurgencyends
• Nonviolentcampaignsaremorelikelytoimprovegovernanceandstability– Democracy
– Civilpeace
Post‐ConflictRegimeType
ViolentCampaigns
NonviolentCampaigns
ProbabilityofBeingaDemocracyFiveYearsa;ertheConflictHasEnded
4% 41%
P=.000
Post‐ConflictRegimeType,ExtantDemocraciesOnly
ViolentCampaigns
NonviolentCampaigns
ProbabilityofBeingaDemocracyFiveYearsa;ertheConflictHasEnded
15% 84%
P=.000
Post‐ConflictCivilWarOnset
ViolentCampaigns
NonviolentCampaigns
ProbabilityofExperiencingaCivilWarwithinTenYearsoftheEndoftheConflict
43% 28%
P=.07
StudyLimitaBons
• Considersonlyidealtypes– Nonviolentandviolentcampaigns– Twobroadcategoriesofgoals
• Over‐aggregatedunitofanalysis– Campaignastheunitofanalysis,ratherthandifferenttacBcalchoices(ornon‐events)
– FailstocapturetheiteraBvenatureoftheconflict(inter‐groupandcampaignvs.stateinteracBons)overBme.
• StaBsBcsshowonlycorrelaBon,notcausaBon.
StudyExtensions
• CollecBngpaneldatafrom1900‐2008.• CollecBngdailyeventsdatafrom1989‐2009.– TextualAnalysisbyAugmentedReplacementInstrucBons(TABARI)
• Includingmanyothervariables,especiallyintra‐organizaBonalvariables.
