21
Why a third Critique? Seminar “Kant: Critique of the Power of Judgment” University of Iceland Session 1 18/9/2007 Text: Preface Claus Beisbart

Why a third Critique?

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

Why a third Critique?. Seminar “Kant: Critique of the Power of Judgment” University of Iceland Session 1 18/9/2007 Text: Preface Claus Beisbart. Kant’s critical philosophy – important dates. 1781 Critique of Pure Reason (1 st edition) 1783 Prolegomena - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Citation preview

Page 1: Why a third Critique?

Why a third Critique?

Seminar “Kant: Critique of the Power of Judgment”

University of IcelandSession 118/9/2007

Text: Preface

Claus Beisbart

Page 2: Why a third Critique?

Kant’s critical philosophy – important dates

1781 Critique of Pure Reason (1st edition)1783 Prolegomena1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals1786 The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science1787 Critique of Pure Reason (2nd edition)1788 Critique of Practical Reason1790 Critique of the Power of Judgment1797 Metaphysics of Morals

Page 3: Why a third Critique?

Kant’s critical philosophy – the ansatz

We issue a priori judgments(we reason following a priori judgments)

Before we do so,we should ask ourselves:

Are we able to issue these kinds of a priori judgments?Is this within the range of our cognitive capacities?

Is it legitimate to issue these judgments? Critical examination of our cognitive capacities

Page 4: Why a third Critique?

Kant’s critical philosophy – an example

e.g., metaphysics (metaphysics of nature)(aprioristic)

Substantive questions, e.g.: Is there a God?

Is there free will?

Critical philosophy:Before turning to substantive questions:

Ask yourself: Are you entitled to issue judgmentsregarding the existence of God, etc.?

Page 5: Why a third Critique?

Kant’s critical philosophy – important dates reexamined

1781 Critique of Pure Reason (1st edition)1783 Prolegomena1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals1786 The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science1787 Critique of Pure Reason (2nd edition)1788 Critique of Practical Reason1790 Critique of the Power of Judgment1797 Metaphysics of Morals

1.

2.

2.

1.

Page 6: Why a third Critique?

A priori principles – examples

“Every alteration has its cause” (metaphysics of nature, theoretical philosophy)(principle of universal causation)

Why is it a priori?1. Strict generality: it speaks about every process2. Necessity: Causation means necessitation: the

cause necessitates the effect

Categorical imperative (metaphysics of morals, practical philosophy)“Act only on that maxim through which you can at the sametime will that it should become a universal law.”

Translations: Kemp Smith, Bennett

Page 7: Why a third Critique?

A priori principles – a side remark

Some a priori principles/judgments hold true in a trivial way

e.g. “Every bachelor is unmarried”

A priori, because no experience is needed in order to justify thisjudgment (also: strict generality and maybe also necessity)

It follows from the meaning of the concepts involved. A bachelor is just defined as an unmarried man.

Kant: synthetic and analytic judgments

Def.: A judgment of the form: “[predicate] P applies to [subject ]S” is analytic, if what P says is already entailed in S. It is

synthetic, if it is not analytic

Kant’s concern are a priori principles/judgments that are synthetic

Page 8: Why a third Critique?

A priori principles – justification

General idea: some a priori principles are constitutive principles (p. 55)

What does this mean?

1. Metaphysics of NaturePrinciples are constitutive of Nature/experience

2. Metaphysics of MoralsPrinciples are constitutive of free agency

Page 9: Why a third Critique?

Constitutive principles of experience (I)

Experience is often taken to be a very simple thing. We are just receptive (passive) and receive knowledge from Nature.

Kant:It’s not that simple. We are not only receptive, but

alsospontaneous (active). For instance, we only perceive things in the way we perceive them, and this indicates that we make a contribution ourselves.

Kant’s question: What are the necessary conditions of the possibility of experience?

Page 10: Why a third Critique?

Cf. Kant’s Copernican revolution

How does knowledge work?

Old paradigm: We (the subject) or our thought has to conform tothe object

New paradigm: The subject has to conform to us, to our abilities.

Cf. the Copernican revolution in astronomy

Old paradigm: The sun revolves around the earth.

New paradigm: The earth revolves around the sun.

Page 11: Why a third Critique?

Constitutive principles of experience (II)

How does empirical knowledge arise?

Sensibility

Kant: “Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought” (A51)

Understanding

concepts

NB.: the understanding needs empiric input.

Page 12: Why a third Critique?

Constitutive principles of experience (III)

We need certain concepts to structure and frame our experience.

E.g., for empiric knowledge of objects we need the concept of substance.

Categories of the understanding, e.g. substance, causality

The categories are connected to certain principles.

Justification of a priori principles: They provide the framework for experience, they enfold our conceptual scheme that is priorto experience.

(Transcendental deduction of the categories of the understanding)

Page 13: Why a third Critique?

Constitutive principles of experience (IV)

Kant’s metaphor:

The understanding prescribes something to Nature.(it has a legislation for Nature/gives laws to Nature)

The understanding prescribes something to cognition (of the world)

Summary:

Some a priori principles can be justified as constitutive principles for Nature/experience. They spell out the aprioristic framework for experience.

Page 14: Why a third Critique?

Constitutive principles of experience (V)

Remarks:

1. “constitutive” from Latin, “constituere”=“to build up”

Thus, constitutive principles of Nature provide something like basic building blocks for empiric knowledge.

Kant: “[…] it may well be that even our empirical knowledge is made up of what we receive through impressions and what our own faculty of knowledge supplies from itself.” (Critique of Pure Reason, B 1)

Translation: Kemp Smith

Page 15: Why a third Critique?

Constitutive principles of experience (VI)

Remarks:

2. Kant is not concerned with a temporal analysis of the acquisition of empiric knowledge.

Kant: “But though all our knowledge begins with experience [temporal relation], it does not follow that it all arises out of experience [structural relation].” (B1)

Translation: Kemp Smith

Page 16: Why a third Critique?

A constitutive principle of action

Kant’s justification of the Categorical Imperative (CI):

The Categorical Imperative spells out, what free agency amounts to.

(Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Section III)

Kant’s metaphor:

Reason prescribes something to our will/our faculty of desire.

NB. This time it is reason and not understanding, because no empiric input is needed for the CI.

Page 17: Why a third Critique?

Constitutive principles – summary

understanding

cognition

reason

will/faculty of desire

1st Critique 2nd Critique

theoreticalphilosophy

practicalphilosophy

Prescriptions/legislation

Is there more than this?

Page 18: Why a third Critique?

Constitutive principles – summary

cognition will/faculty of desire

3rd Critique1st Critique 2nd Critique

theoreticalphilosophy

? practicalphilosophy

faculty of pleasure/displeasure

?

understanding reasonpower of judgment

Reason in the broad sense

Page 19: Why a third Critique?

Why a third Critique? – Summary

Reason in the broad senseis the faculty of issuing a priori judgments

Reason in the broad senseencompasses reason (in a narrower sense), understanding and the power of judgment.

Unless the power of judgment of power isn’t examined, the critical assessment of reason in the broad sense is not complete.

Kant: “A critique of pure reason, i.e., of our faculty for judging in accordance with a priori principles, would be incomplete if the power of judgment, which also claims to be a faculty of cognition, were not dealt with as a special part of it.” Translation: Guyer/Matthews, 56

Page 20: Why a third Critique?

The task of the third Critique

Kant: “Now whether the power of judgment […] also has a priori principles for itself; whether these are constitutive or merely regulative […] and whether it gives the rule a priori to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure […]: it is this with which the present critique of the power of judgment is concerned.”

Translation: Guyer/Matthews, 56

NB. Regulative principles have a status different from that of constitutive principles. Roughly, they do not spell out what something amounts to, rather, they set certain tasks.

Page 21: Why a third Critique?

Questions left

What is the power of judgment?

What are its principles?

Introduction