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Who are the guilty
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WHO ARE THE
GUILTY ?
Report of a Joint Iquiry into the
Causes and Impact of the
Riots in Delhi
from 31 October to 10 November 1984
PEOPLE'S UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS
PEOPLE'S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES
Index
* A Brief 3
* Introduction 5
* Socio-Economic Composition of the Assailants 8
* Role of Police 10
* Role of Administration 12
* Role of Army 15
* Role of Congress (I) 19
* Role of Media and Opposition 22
* Role of Public 23
* Case Studies 26
* Relief and Rehabilitation 34
* Conclusion 37
* Demands 38
* Annexure I - Chronology of Events 39
* Annexure II - Eye Witness Accounts 42
* Annexure III - Official Pronouncements & 48
News Reports on Events
* Annexure IV - List of People Identified 55
by Survivors
* Annexure V - Relief Centres Recognised 64
by Delhi Administration
List of Camps not recognised by
Delhi Administration
Acknowledgement
The People’s Union for Democratic Rights and the People’s Union for
Civil Liberties would like to place on record their gratitude for the valuable
information given by the survivors of the carnage at tremendous risks to
their lives, the volunteers of the Nagrik Ekta Manch and many others who
by their dedicated work made possible the investigation and publicaton of
this report.
Who are the Guilty - 2
A Brief
Report of a Joint Inquiry into the Causes and Impact of the Riots in
Delhi from 31 October to 10 November.
In terms of sheer impact, this is arguably the greatest report brought
out by an NGO anywhere in the country. A lot of that impact is because of
the timing of its release. The small booklet was brought out within a month
of the November 1984 holocaust. The findings of two leading human rights
organisations, People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR) and People’s
Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) were on the lips of everybody. The book-
let created an instant buzz because it came out when the country was amidst
an election under the shadow of Indira Gandhi’s assassination and the sub-
sequent massacre of Sikhs in Delhi.
The Opposition parties seized on it because the booklet contained a list
of 16 Congress members identified by survivors as having “instigated vio-
lence and/or protected alleged criminals.” The list included three leaders
who were fielded as Congress candidates in the December 1984 election:
H.K.L. Bhagat, Jagdish Tytler and Lalit Maken. Not surprisingly, the Con-
gress party reacted adversely to the whole report and called it “the black
book” as its cover was anyway all black. The Congress party also ex-
pressed fears that the report provided Sikh militants with a hit-list. Whether
that was indeed the case or not, two of the leaders listed in the report were
subsequently shot dead in the summer of 1985 - Arjun Dass and Lalit Maken.
The chief merit of the report lay in the fact that it was the first attempt
by anybody to make a comprehensive study of the violence that raged in the
Capital. Given the speed with which the report was put together, it did
inevitably make some factual mistakes. Take, for instance, the list it gave of
13 police officials “allegedly responsible for negligence of duty and/or abet-
ment of participation in violence.” The SHO of Kalyan Puri police station
figures in the list because Trilok Puri, the locality which saw the worst
massacre in the whole of Delhi, falls in his jurisdiction. But then the list also
makes a separate mention of “SHO in Trilok Puri.” Survir Singh Tyagi is
referred to as “Survir Singh” in the entry pertaining to the SHO of Kalyan
Puri and simply as “Tyagi’’ in the entry specifying Trilok Puri, i n a d -
vertently making two persons out of one.
But such confusion over minor details does not in the least detract from
the larger findings of “Who are the Guilty?” : that the violence was organised,
that Congress (I) leaders were seen leading mobs, that the police and ad-
ministration displayed a callous lack of concern at the happenings in the
Who are the Guilty - 3
Capital, that there was a deliberate delay in deploying the Army.
On the stength of this report, PUDR subsequently moved the Delhi
High Court seeking a direction to the Govt. to set up a judicial inquiry into
the massacre. But the High Court turned down the prayer on the technical-
ity that it was entirely up to the executive to decide whether an inquiry
should be ordered or not. In retrospect, the narrow view taken by the high
court in the face of thousands of killings seems outdated given the forays
otherwise made by the judiciary in the realm of executive policy for far
lesser reasons. The courage displayed by PUDR and PUCL in bringing out
this report in the most adverse of circumstances still stands out as a fine
example of civil society’s resistance to state sponsored violence.
Who are the Guilty - 4
Introduction
A fact-finding team jointly by the People’s Union for Democratic Rights
(PUDR) and People’s Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) in the course of
investigations from Nov. 1 to November 10, has come to the conclusion that
the attacks on members of the Sikh Community in Delhi and its suburbs
during the period, far from being a spontaneous expression of “madness”
and of popular “grief and anger” at Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination as made
out to be by the authorities, were the outcome of a well-organised plan
marked by acts of both deliberate commissions and omissions, by important
politicians of the Congress (I) at the top and bay authorities in the adminis-
tration. Although there was indeed popular shock, grief and anger, the vio-
lence that followed was the handiwork of a determined group which was
inspired by different sentiments altogether.
Experiences of individual members of the term as well as their exten-
sive interviews with the (i) victims of the riots; (ii) police officers who were
expected to suppress the riots; (iii) neighbours of the victims who tried to
protect them; (iv) army personnel; and (v) political leaders, suggest that the
attacks on the Sikkhs followed a common pattern, whether they took place
in Munirka in the south, or Mangol Puri in the West, or Trilok Puri in the
East. The uniformity in the sequence of events at every spot in such far-
flung places proves beyond doubt that the attacks were master-minded by
some powerful organised groups. As a senior army officer deployed in Delhi
during the recent riots said, “This arson is the work of an expert”. Newspa-
per reports suggest that this pattern is similar in all Congress (I) ruled states.
There was also a definite pattern discernible in the choice of the vic-
tims made by the assailants. According to the 1971 census, Sikh males in
the age group 20-50 number figures approximately 100,000. The Sikhs who
were killed in the recent riots largely belonged to this age group. The official
estimate of only 325 killed (including 46 Hindus) till November 7 (Hindustan
Times, November 11) sound ridiculously low compared to the magnitude of
arson, lynching and burning alive of people in the resettlement colonies alone.
On the basis of information gathered from various sources, including eye-
witnesses, survivors and relatives of the dead, the team estimates that the
number of those killed of more than a thousand.
From our talks with the victims and their neighbours in almost every riot
hit spot, we could reconstruct the sequence of events, which followed a
stereotyped pattern everywhere. The first phase was marked by the float-
ing of a set of rumours on the evening of October 31, following the an-
Who are the Guilty - 5
nouncement of Mrs. Gandhi’s death. The rumours were three. First, Sikhs
were distributing sweets and lighting lamps to celebrate Mrs. Gandhi’s death.
(Later during our investigations when we asked the residents of the ef-
fected localities whether anyone from among them had actually seen such
things, almost everyone admitted that they had not personally witnessed it,
but had heard from someone else. We did however come across a few
people who while expressing revulsion at the incidents of assaults on the
Sikhs, added that they had seen in some places some Sikhs expressing their
glee at Mrs. Gandhi’s death by demonstrative gestures. We have report
that some isolated groups of non Sikhs also exhibited similar behaviour.
From the information that we have gathered from various sources, our im-
pression is that such cases were few and isolated). The second rumour was
that train-loads of hundreds of Hindu dead bodies had arrived at Old Delhi
Station from Punjab. Third, water was poisoned by the Sikhs. As for the
two latter rumours, we came across evidence of policemen in vans touring
certain localities and announcing through loudspeakers the arrival of the
train and the poisoning of water. In certain areas, we heard that police
officials had rung up residents advising them not to drink water. These
rumours (the last two were officially repudiated later) contributed to the
shaping of a public mind that acquiesced in the attacks and murders that
took place soon after.
The second phase began with the arrival of groups of armed young
people in tempo-vans, scooters, motorcycles or trucks from the night of
October 31 and morning of November 1 at various places like Munirka,
Saket, South Extension, Lajpat Nagar, Bhogal, Jangpura and Ashram in the
south and south-east; the Connaught Circus shopping area in the centre and
later the trans - Yamuna colonies and resettlement colonies in other areas in
the north. With cans of petrol they went round the localities and systemati-
cally set fire to Sikh houses, shops and Gurdwaras. We were told by the
local eye-witnesses in all the areas we visited, that well known Congress (I)
leaders and workers (their names are to found in Annexure - I) led and
directed the arsonists and the local cadres of the Congress (I) identified the
Sikh houses and shops. A senior police official who for understandable rea-
sons does not want to be named, pointed out : “The shop signs are either in
Hindi or English. How do you expect the illiterate arsonists to know whether
these shops belongs to Hindus or Sikhs, unless they were identified to them
by some one, who is either educated or a local person ?” In some areas, like
Trilok Puri, Manglo Puri and the trans-Yamuna colonies, the arsonists con-
sisted to Gujjar or Jat farmers from neighbouring villages, and were accom-
Who are the Guilty - 6
panied by local residents, some of whom again were Congress (I) activities.
In these areas, we were told, Congress (I) followers of the Bhangi caste
(belonging to the scheduled caste community) took part in the looting. In
South Delhi, buses of the Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC) were used by
the miscreants to move from place to place in their murderous journey.
How could the DTC allow its buses to be used by criminals ?
The attacks in the resettlement colonies (e.g. Trilok Puri in the trans-
Yamuna area and Mangol Puri in the west, where the maximum number of
murders took place, again displayed in same pattern. The targets were pri-
marily young Sikhs. They were dragged out, beaten up and then burnt alive.
While old men, women and children were generally allowed to escape, their
houses were set on fire after looting of valuables. Documents pertaining to
their legal possession of the houses were also burnt. In some areas of Mangol
Puri we heard from the survivors that even children were not spared. We
also came across reports of gang-rape of women. The orgy of destruction
embraced a variety of property ranging from shops. factories, houses to
gurudwaras and schools belonging to the Sikhs. In all the effected spots, a
calculated attempt to terrorize the people was evident in the common ten-
dency among the assailants to burn alive the Sikhs on public roads. Even
five days after the incidents, on November 6, in the course of one of our
regular visits to Mangol Puri we found that although the ashes had been
cleared, the payment in front of the Congress (I) office was still blotched
with burnt patches, which the local people had earlier pointed out to us as
spots where four Sikhs were burnt alive.
Who are the Guilty - 7
Socio-Economic Composition
of the Assailants
The team members on the basis of extensive interviews in different
parts of the city were able to piece together the characteristics of the mobs
that were responsible for the looting, arson and killings.
In some cases the mobs were brought from outside the locality (where
they were set loose by local political leaders) and Jats & Gujjars from
neighbouring villages. They were transported in vehicles. A large number of
Scheduled Castes people were also a part of the mob.
More important; in the areas which were most affected, such as Trilok
Puri, Mangol Puri and Sultan Puri, the mobs were led by local Congress (I)
politicians and hoodlums of that locality. These areas, it will be recalled,
were set up in the urban resettlement drive initiated by the Congress (I),
and have since been active support bases of the Congress (I). These areas
have also in the recent past provided the Congress (I) rallies in the city
substantial numerical support. In other words, there exists in such areas an
established organisational network through which masses are mobilised for
demonstration of Congress (I)’s ostensible popular support. A veteran poli-
tician based in Delhi put it very crisply when he said that these resettlement
colonies “are the keeps (rakhel) of the Congress (I)”.
The participation of the Jats and Gujjars from the so-called “urban vil-
lages” of Delhi played a very strong role in adding to the numbers of rioters
and in adiding the riots, murders and lootig. They were particularly domi-
nant in West and South Delhi. Most of these villagers who once owned land
in Ber Sarai, Munirka, and Mohammad Pur, for instance made a tidy sum of
money after their land was taken away for the urban expansion of New
Delhi. The land owned by these villagers was generally of a very poor
quality with no irrigational facilities. For this reason the villagers in these
areas had to augment their resources through non-agricultural means, not
least of them being brigandage. After their lands were acquired by the
government they suddenly became prosperous and began to exert them-
selves politically as well. It is a known fact that if one is to make any
headway in an election the Gujjars and Jats of these areas have to be on
one’s side. Unfortunately, much of the police force which is stationed in this
area and around is drawn from these communities. For this reason, on vari-
ous occasions there had been a noticeable complicity in these areas be-
tween the criminals and the police. This truth was brought home starkly
during the recent riots.Who are the Guilty - 8
As for the Scheduled Caste communities who were displaced due to
the acquisition of land for urban expansion those from the Valmiki commu-
nity utilised the benefits of the reservation policy and came into the city
where they found jobs in the polices, UPSC etc. the Bhangis went into the
Corporation, while the third-major group, the Dhanaks, ‘considered the lowest
caste, are engaged in a variety of odd jobs. Among the Scheduled Caste
communities living in the resettlement colonies, the Valmikis are pre-
dominately supporters of Jagjivan Ram, while the Bhangis are solid sup-
porters of Congress-I. Information gathered by us from the trouble xxxxxxxx
areas suggests that the Bhangis - many of them working as xxxxxxx corpo-
ration – comprised the bulk of the local miscreants xxxxxxx Sikhs.
A few words on the composition of Delhi’s population may be relevant
at this point. Hindus comprise 83 percent of Delhi’s population. The present
Sikh population is around 7.5. percent (an estimated 500,000 people). A
majority of them settled in Delhi after the partition, before which their popu-
lation was only 1.2 percent of the total population of the city.
Who are the Guilty - 9
Role of Police
All through the period from October 31 to November 4, the height of
the riots the police all over the city uniformly betrayed a common behavioral
pattern, marked by - (i) total absence from the scene; or (ii) a role of pas-
sive spectators; or (iii) direct participation or abetment in the orgy of vio-
lence against the Sikhs. On November 1, when we toured the Lajpat Nagar
area we found the police conspicuous by their absence while Sikh’s shops
were being set on fire and looted. Young people armed with swords, dag-
gers, spears, steel trishuls, and iron rods were ruling the roads. The only
sign of police presence was a police jeep, which obstructed a peace proces-
sion brought out by a few concerned citizens (who later organised them-
selves into the Nagarik Ekta Manch) on the evening of November 1. When
the procession was on its way to the Lajpat Nagar main market, a police
inspector from the van stopped the procession, warned it not to proceed
reminding its numbers that the city was under curfew and Section 144.
When leaders of the procession wanted to know from the police inspector
why the arsonists and rioters were not being dispersed if curfew was on,
they gave on reply and warned instead that the processionists could go to
the Lajpat Nagar market at their own risk. At the Lajpat Nagar market,
leaders of the procession sought to pacify the mob by pointing out that
innocent Sikhs were not responsible for Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination and
should be protected from the attacks. They raised the slogan : “Hindu-Sikh
bhai bhai.” As the crowed began to listen to the speeches made by the
procession leaders, organised attempts were made by certain groups from
among them to shout down the speakers by raising the slogan: “Indira Gandhi
Zindabad: “Hindu Hindu bhai bhai”. It is significant that wherever we went,
we did not find any sign of mourning or grief on the faces of those who
were participating in the looting and burning. Attempts to pacify them by the
peace marchers were met with derisive laughter. Listening to their raucous
exultation and looking at their gleeful faces, one would have thought it was
a festival, but for the arson and loot that was going on.
In the resettlement colonies, the police came out from their passive role
and directly participated in the violence against the Sikhs. We were told by
survivors that at the first signs of tension, those who felt threatened person-
ally went to the nearby police stations to seek their intervention. But the
police did not respond. In Trilok Puri, the police reportedly accompanied the
arsonists and provided them with diesel from their jeeps. The Station House
Officer (SHO) of Kalyan Puri police station under which Trilok Puri falls,
Who are the Guilty - 10
withdrew the constables who were on duty there when Sikh girls were
being raped. Much later, the higher authorities took action against the SHO
and his two colleagues by suspending and arresting them for criminal negli-
gence of duties. In Sultan Puri, the SHO, one Bhatti, is alleged to have killed
two Sikhs and helped the mob in disarming those Sikhs who tried to resist
the mob.
Several residents of Loni Road in the trans-Yamuna area, who were
camping at Shakar Pur when we interviewed them on November 7, told us
that the police announced on loudspeakers two or three times at night on
November 1, that they would not be responsible for the safety of the Sikhs
and that the latter must look after themselves. One woman from the same
area said she had seen a police jeep full of men and that the stoning of Sikh
shops was conducted from the jeep.
Another resident from the same road said that the police had incited the
looting of a watch shop before it was burnt.
In Kotla Mubarakpur, a domestic worker told our team members that
the police had encouraged the looting. Later, they were reported to have
said to the looters, “We gave you 36 hours. Had we given the Sikhs that
amount of time, they would have killed every Hindu”.
In the Kingsway Camp, residents claimed that seventy percent of the
loot was to be found in the police lines, suggesting that the police took a
leading role in plundering.
When after the destruction and murders, people went to complain and
file FIR’S, the police in many areas refused to record their complaints,
according to information gathered from the Hindu neighbours of the vic-
tims. A respected Sikh professional whose house was burned on 1st No-
vember was not able to register an FIR despite all efforts. In Mangol Puri
we were told, a police officer asked the Hindu complainants why they were
protecting Sikhs and advised them to look after the safety of Hindus. Typi-
cal was the experience of Dharam Raj Pawar and Rajvir Pawar - two
residents of Ber Sarai - who on November 1, went to the Sector IV, R. K.
Puram police station to ask for protection of a Sikh family (which till then
was being sheltered by Hindu neighbours from impending attacks by a mob-
led by a Congress-I man, Jagdiah Tokas). The officer in-charge of the
police station reportedly told them that he could not offer any help. Two
constables later said to them, “You being Jats should have killed those Sikhs.
What are you doing here ? Don’t you know a train has arrived from Punjab
carrying bodies of massacred Hindus ?”
A few individual police official who did try to intervene and stop the
Who are the Guilty - 11
riots found their efforts frustrated primarily through lack of cooperation
from the top. One, senior officer told us that when on October 31 and
November 1 he received reports about some 2000 to 3000 people moving
around the city in scooters and motorcycles without helmets, he contacted
the CID seeking information from them regarding the identity of these people.
Till November 7, when we met him, he had not received any report from the
CID.
While analysing the role of the police during the crucial period we can-
not afford to ignore the responsibility of those in position of authority at the
top, namely the Home Ministry. The Home Minister, Mr. Narasimha Rao,
who was inducted in the new Cabinet by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi soon
after Mrs. Gandh’s death, was empowered in his capacity as a Home
Minister, to deploy the para-military forces (if the Delhi Police force was
found to be inadequate or inefficient) to quell the violence that erupted
following the announcement of Mrs. Gandhi’s death. Mr. Rao is not a new
incumbent who is unaware of the procedural technicalities. We are left with
the question : Why did Mr. Rao, with his past experience as a Home Minis-
ter in the previous cabinet, fail to take the necessary steps and summon the
forces available to him to nip in the bud the communal elements that organised
the riots ?
Role of Administration
Men at the top in the administration and the ruling party displayed re-
peatedly a curious lack of concern often bordering on deliberate negligence
of duty and responsibility throughout the period of October 31 to November
4. From our talks with various Opposition Party leaders and prominent
citizens we found that many among them had got in touch with senior Min-
isters as well as people in the Delhi Administration on October 31 itself,
warning of impending troubles following the announcement of Mrs. Gandhi’s
assassination. The newly sworn-in Home Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao
was said to have assured the BJP leader Atal Behari Vajpayee on October
31 evening that “everything would be brought under control within a couple
of hours” (The Statesman, November 10, 1984). Yet, at the same time of
the same day, Gautam Kaul, Additional Commissioner of Police in front of
the All India Medical Institute, referring to the disturbances which were just
breaking out, said, “We cannot deal with the situation of this nature”. (In-
Who are the Guilty - 12
dian Express, November 1, 1984). Strangely enough, even after this, Mr.
Kaul has been made Additional Commissioner, Security. Inspite of such
warnings given well in advance, those in positions of authority did not seem
to bother to take any firm step. (See Annexure 3).
Soon after the assassination (October 31), we heard from a reliable
source, a meeting was held at 1 Safdarjung Road, the Prime Minister’s
official residence where the then Lt. Governor P.G. Gavai, a Congress (I)
leader M.L. Fotedar and the Police Commissioner among others, met. A
senior police officer present at the meeting expressed the view that the
army should be called as otherwise there would be a holocaust. No atten-
tion was paid to the view.
On November 1, when almost all of Delhi was aflame, an opposition
MP rang up Mr. Shiv Shankar, a Minister in Rajiv Gandhi’s new cabinet,
and the Home Minister Narasimha Rao, to inform them about the situation
in the city and the need for army action. The Ministers were reported to
have assured him that army was about to be called and curfew would be
imposed. (Several citizens including some senior government officials went
to the President of India on the afternoon of November 1, and they were
told that the Government was still considering whether to call out the army).
But our experience on November 1 tells a different story. As already
mentioned earlier, till late night there were no signs of either curfew or
army, while miscreants were on the rampage in front of the police. In the
heart of the city - Connaught Circus - Sikh owned shops were being set on
fire right under the nose of heavy para-military and police pickets. We latter
heard that the DC of Faridabad had asked for army on November 1, but
troops arrived only on November 3.
On November 2, although the newspapers that day announced three
official measures : (i) clamping of an indefinite curfew; (ii) shoot at sight
orders; and (iii) deployment of army since 2 pm the previous day, when we
went around South Delhi in the afternoon of November 2, we found that the
miscreants were not only at large, but had swelled in numbers and had
become more defiant.
In the Lajpat Nagar market, while police pickets sat by idly, hundred of
young men, armed with swords, trishuls and iron rods, blocked the main
road. Around 2 pm an army convoy passed through the road. The miscre-
ants did not scamper or panic. They merely made way for the convey to
pass by temporarily retreating to the bye-lanes, and regrouped themselves
as soon as the convey left and began intimidating a peace march that had
arrived on the spot.
Who are the Guilty - 13
On the morning of November 2, 8.30 am onwards two opposition MP’s
repeatedly requested both Mr. Narasmiha Rao and Shiv Shankar to provide
army protection to trains carrying Sikh passengers arriving from Punjab.
No troops were sent, with the result that every train was left at the mercy
of gangsters who dragged out Sikhs from the incoming train compartments,
lynched them, there their bodies on the platforms or the railway tracks and
many were set on fire. Newspapers report that 43 persons were killed. This
was denied by Doordarshan in the evening. Visiting the Tughlaqabad station
around 3.30 pm the Statesman reporter saw “two bodies still smouldering
on the platform, right in front of the armed force standing on the opposite
platform across the tracks”. (November 3, 1984). The troops had either
arrived after the incident, or the incident took place in front of the troops
who did not intervene.
While analysing the role of the administration, we cannot remain con-
tent to blame the Delhi administration and the bureaucrats only. The Lt.
Governor Mr. Gavai, who was in charge of administration of Delhi during
the period under review and who has been replaced now, could not have
acted on his own-whether they were acts of commission or omission. Both
the Delhi Administration and the Union Cabinet Ministers, including the
Home Minister, were well-informed of the sequence of events beginning
from the evening of October 31, (as evident from the report of communica-
tion between the Opposition Leaders and the Cabinet Ministers as recorded
earlier in this report). We are left wondering whether the Union Minister
failed to direct the Lt. Governor to take action. Or, did the Ministers direct
and the Lt. Governor refuse to abide by their directives ? In that case,
should not the Union Ministry punish the Lt. Governor ? But we were merely
told on November 4 that Mr. Gavai had “proceeded on leave” and Mr.
M.K. Wali had taken over.
What intrigues us further is the appointment of Mr. Wali as the Lt.
Governor. Mr. Wali was the Home Secretary before this new appointment.
The record of what happened in Delhi from October 31 to November 3
(the eve of Mr. Wali’s appointment) is sufficient to prove the failure of the
Home Ministry administrative machinery in suppressing riots. We wonder
why the former Home Secretary, inspite of the proved failure of an admin-
istration of which he was a leading component, has been appointed the Lt.
Governor. As evident from our review of official relief poperations (Chap-
ter III), Mr. Wali’s administration seems to continue the same policy of
callousness and inefficiency towards the refugees as was demonstrated in
the recent past towards the Sikh victims during the riots in Delhi.
Who are the Guilty - 14
Role of Army
Our enquiries made at various quarters ranging from the affected lo-
calities to army sources led us to two questions. First, why was there a
delay in calling out the troops? Second, even when the army was called in,
why were they not effective in imposing a curfew and curbing the violence
?
The authorities at the top, including the four Ministers and senior offi-
cials of the Delhi Administration were repeatedly informed about the exact
situation in the city and its outskirts from the evening of October 31st. Promi-
nent citizens, VlPs and members of the opposition parties and people from
affected localities, both phoned and personally went and informed these
authorities. Yet during seven valuable hours, between the time of the assas-
sination and the time of the news of the death was made public, no security
measures were taken.
As a senior government servant put it, there are standing instruction on
dealing with such situation. The SP and DCs have powers under the Crimi-
nal Procedure Code (Sections 130-131) to call in the armed forces in aid to
civil power. Further, the para-military troops, including the Delhi Armed
Police, CRPF are always available for such a situation. According to our
information one brigade was available at Delhi which could have been req-
uisitioned immediately.
***
Who can call in, the Army ?
Section 130. ‘Use of armed forces to disperse assembly .
(1) If any such assembly cannot be otherwise dispersed, and if it is necessary for
the public security that it should be dispersed, the Executive Magistrate of the
highest rank who is present may cause it to be dispersed by the armed forces.
(2) Such Magistrate may require any officer In command of any group of persons
belonging to the armed forces to disperse the assembly with the help of the armed
forces under hia command, and to arrest and confine such persons forming part of
It as the Magistrate may direct, or as it may be necessary to arrest and confine' in
order to disperse the assembly or to have them punished according to law.
(3) Every such officer of the armed forces shall obey such requisition in such
manner as he thinks fit, but in so doing he shall use as little force, and do as little
injury to person and property, as may be consistent with dispersing the assembly
and arresting and detaining such persons.
Section 131. Power of certain armed forces officers to disperse assembly.
When the public security is manifestly endangered by any such assembly and no
Executive Magistrate can be communicated with, any commissioned or gazetted
Who are the Guilty - 15
officer of the armed forces under his command, and many arrest and confine any
person forming part of it, in order to disperse such assembly or that they may be
punished according to law; but if, while he is acting under this section, it becomes
practicable for him to communicate with an Executive Magistrate, he shall do so,
and shall thenceforward obey the instructions of the Magistrate, as to whether he
shall or shall not continue such action.
-The Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973
***
The troops were alerted on the afternoon of the 31st. This means that
within a few hours brigades from Meerut and Agra could have arrived at
Delhi by the night of the 31st. As senior army officers put it, it is not the
numerical strength of troops that is the crucial factor for imposing curfew.
The crucial factor is clarity of intent, firm and clear instructions.
Despite announcement in the papers, AlR and Doordarshan about shoot
at sight orders and imposition of curfew, the troops were left without spe-
cific information from the police on the exact locations of the riots. No joint
control from was set up.
In contrast, only a few days later, the authorities did not find any diffi-
culty in moving a full brigade of the Indian Army consisting of 3000 men and
another 1000 personnel from the Navy and the Air Force to line up the route
of Mrs. Gandhi’s funeral.
The procedure to call in troops is simple. The Lt. Governor has to in-
form the Home Minister (Mr. Narasimha Rao) of the law and order situa-
tion and the latter informs the Defence Minister (the Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi was holding this portfolio) who gets in touch with the Army to call in
the troops.
An essential ingredient for successful joint army - civilian administra-
tion operation is the setting up of a joint control room. During 1947 riots,
when Lord Mountbatten was requested by Jawaharlal Nehru to control the
communal situation, the former set up a joint control room at Rashtrapati
Bhavan In order to coordinate the efforts of the civil administration and the
armed forces, this precedent was quoted to Narasimha Rao - by an elderly
resident of Delhi, who is well-versed in army operations.
Yet from October 31 to November 4 (the peak period of the riots which
according to old timers were reminiscent of the 1947 riots in Delhi) no
effort was made to set up a joint control room. The Commissioner of Police
was operating from his office at lTO Police Headquarters. The Army area
commander was at the Dhaula Kuan cantonment, and the Lt. Governor
was at Raj Nivas. As a result, even after the deployment of troops, army
people constantly complained about lack of information and cooperation
Who are the Guilty - 16
from the police regarding the areas of tension. Even with the imposition of
curfew, there were no authorities to implement it. An army major com-
plained to a Delhi news reporter on November 4 that his men were not only
getting no cooperation from the Shakarpur police station, but were often
being deliberately misled by the police. The same reporter during a tour of
the city of November 2, came across army personnel ranging from JCOs to
Majors, roaming around pathetically, after having lost touch either with head-
quarters or with their formations.
Army officers complained that they were not provided with scouts by
the police to lead them to the trouble spots. In one instance a Major who
was asking for directions was carrying a map dated 1974, where the re-
settlement colonies (where the violence reached its peak during the period
under survey) did not figure.
One army source told our team members that the deployment of troops
followed a strange pattern. They were deployed by the civil authorities in
stages, and in almost every case they were deployed after houses in the
trouble spots had been burnt to cinders and the massacre was over. This
explains the limited number of army figures (12) and casualties from army
firings (2 deaths and 4 injured) during the entire period, (re: Major Gen. J.S.
Jamwal’s statement of November 7, Indian Express November 8). The
deployment reached toll strength only after the 3,000 troops and vehicles
reserved for the funeral were made available to curb the violence.
The entire nature of using the army as revealed from the above se-
quence of events compels us to suspect whether or not a deliberate design
to keep the army ineffective even after it was called in and that too follow-
ing a long interval during which the arson, looting and massacre were al-
lowed to continue sometimes with the direct connivance of the local police
force.
Whatever might have been the motive for such a curious manner of
utilising the army and whoever might have been responsible for reducing it
to an important observer, the effects of such a policy have been quite disas-
trous for the morale of the army. Every army person we talked to ex-
pressed anguish over the way that the army’s authority was being under-
mined. The 6th report of the National Police Commission has stated: “We
note with concern the growing tendency on the part of the district authori-
ties to seek instructions from higher quarters where none are necessary.” It
appears that the civilian administrators in Delhi although armed adequately
with powers under the law to use the army to supress disturbances, did not
care to use those powers. The omission stands out in sharp contrast with
Who are the Guilty - 17
their use of the army in coping with Hindu-Muslim riots or insurgency in the
north-east.
The question that needs to be probed into is : why did the civil adminis-
tration betray a set pattern of acts of omission, marked by a consistent
failure to take steps against erring policemen and a stubborn refusal to
deploy the army properly ? Further an analysis of the role of the army
during the period under survey leaves us with a few questions that need to
be answered by the people in positions of authority. According to the proce-
dure laid down under the law, the Lt. Governor can request the Home
Minister who in turn can ask the Defence Minister for army deployment.
On October 31, the new cabinet had already been sworn in with the Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi himself in charge of Defence, and Narsimha Rao, as
the Home Minister. We want to know whether, with the growing deteriora-
tion in the law and order situation in Delhi, when by November 1 the local
police machinery had proved its failure to control the situation - either through
negligence or connivance with the rioters - the Lt. Governor requested the
Home Ministry for army aid. Even if he did not, was it not his responsibility
to deploy the army as soon as he realised that the police had failed (which
was quite evident by November 1) ? By removing a few civilian administra-
tors (like Mr. Gavai) or police officers (like the Delhi Police Commissioner,
Mr. Subhash Tandon) how can the government at the centre absolve itself
of the blame of neglecting its obligations to the citizens and its responsibility
to maintain law and order - and this, inspite of several warnings to the effect
that a Hindu - Sikh riot was bound to take place ?
The experience of our team members gives rise to the suspicion that
both the administration and the Cabinet might have abdicated their respon-
sibility and that extra-administrative forces were steering the deployment
and operation of troops. On November 3, a group of concerned citizens
visited Trilok Puri where they were requested by panic-stricken survivors
of a widespread holocaust (described later) to intervene on their behalf and
seek army protection. They tried to get in touch with various people both in
the administration and the Cabinet to convey to them the request of the
Trilok Puri victims. No one was available, either in their offices or homes.
Hoping that opposition MPs might have a better access to the authori-
ties the group approached Mr. Biju Patnaik, Mr. George Fernandes, Mr.
Chandra Shekhar and Mr. Madhu Danvate among others - all of whom told
them that their repeated attempts to contact Ministers and officials have
yielded no results. In a final desperate move accompanied by Mr. Dandvate,
they went to 1 Safdarjung Road, the Prime Minister’s official residence,
Who are the Guilty - 18
and managed to meet a Congress (I) MP - Mr. Arun Nehru. When the
group conveyed to him the request of the Trilok Puri residents, he said that
he would sent a “wireless message” for army deployment. Only after this,
were troops sent to Trilok Puri - but that also again merely for patrolling.
Role of Congress (I)
Our surmise that during the period under survey the legitimate authori-
ties were superseded and decision-making powers were assumed by a few
individual Congress (I) leaders, is confirmed not only by the above men-
tioned incident, but also the experience of residents in the riot hit areas. We
were told both by Hindus and Sikhs - many among the latter Congress (I)
supporters - that certain Congress (I) leaders played a decisive role in
organising the riots. Residents of Mangol Puri told us they saw Mr. Ishwar
Singh, a Congress (I) Corporator among many others (their names are given
in Annexure IV) actively participating in the orgy of violence. All these
people, were described by the local residents as lieutenants of the Congress
(I) MP from the area - Sajjan Kumar. Similarly in Anand Parbat, Congress
(I) councillors like Bhairava, Mahendra and Mangat Ram, considered to be
loyal followers of the Congress (I) MP Mr. Dharamdas Shastri, were named
as the main culprits. In Prakash Nagar, Congress (I) people were found
carrying voter’s lists to identify Sikh households. In the Gandhi Nagar area
again, a local Congress (I) councillor Sukhan Lal was identified by the vic-
tims as the main leader of the assailants. Escapees from the area who we
met at the Shakar Pur relief camp on November 6 blamed the Congress (I)
MP from the area Mr. H.K.L. Bhagat for having masterminded the riots.
On November 1, Satbir Singh (Jat) a Youth Congress (I) leader brought
buses filled with people from Ber Sarai to the Guru Harikishan Public School
at Munirka and burnt the school building and buses and continued looting
and assaults on Sikhs the whole night. Another group of miscreants led by
Jagdish Tokas, a Congress (I) corporator joined the above group in looting
and assaults. In the Safdarjung - Kidwai Nagar area of South Delhi, eye
witness accounts by those who stood in front of All India Medical Institute
from where Mrs. Gandhi’s body was taken out in procession on the evening
of October 31, confirmed the presence of the Congress (I) Councillor of the
area, Arjan Dass at the time when attacks on Sikh pedestrians, bus drivers
and conductors began (Annexure II).
The allegations against these individuals repeatedly voiced by the resi-
Who are the Guilty - 19
dents of the respective localities which we visited, cannot be dismissed as
politically motivated propaganda, since many among the Sikhs who accused
them of complicity in the riots, had been traditionally Congress (I) voters.
Sufferers from Trilok Puri and Mangol Purl resettlement colonies whom we
met looked dazed and uncomprehending when they said to us : “We were
allotted these houses here by Indira ji. We have always voted for her party.
Why were we attacked ?”
Additional indications of the involvement of the above mentioned Con-
gress (I) leaders in the riots was provided later when we heard that the
Congress (I) MPs from the respective areas were putting pressure on the
local police station to release the culprits who had been rounded up on 3-4
November. On November 5, Mr. Dharmadas Shastri went to the Karol
Bagh police station to protest against police “misbehaviour” with those who
were found in possession of looted property. (Indian Express, November 6,
1984). Mr. Shastri however dismissed the report as false. At about the
same time H.K.L. Bhagat, another Congress (I) MP was reported to be
trying to secure the release of several criminals who had been arrested by
the Gandh Nagar police station. Describing the dilemma before the police, a
senior police official said to our team members : “Sher pinjre se nikal
diya: phir kahte hain pakad ke le ao !” (First the tigers are let loose from
their cages and then we are ordered to round them up). When asked who
was releasing them, he gave a knowing smile.
The same official told us that when some Congress (I) leaders came to
a police station, seeking the release of their followers, they were asked to
accompany a police party in a raid on some houses for recovery of looted
property. But these leaders refused when they were told that they would
have to be witnesses.
We also heard of cases where even Sikhs close to the Congress (I)
were not spared. In Sajjan Kuma’s house at Paschim Puri on November 6,
we were introduced to an elderly Sikh gentlemen who claimed to be an old
Congressman whose shop was burnt by miscreants. He said that he knew
who the culprits were. When our team members asked him why he did not
file a complaint with the police, he said he would do it at the right time. Mr.
Sajjan Kumar’s secretary drew us aside and dropped a hint that the RSS
workers had been behind the arson. He however could not name any par-
ticular RSS leader or activist. Mr. Charanjit Singh, a Sikh Congress (I) MP
from Delhi, suffered a loss of Rs. 10 crores when his Pure Drinks factories
were burnt down. Narrating his experience Mr. Singh said : “I telephoned
the Lt. Governor and the Police several times, telling them that mobs were
Who are the Guilty - 20
burning our factories. I was told that the force would be arriving but that
never happened”. He added that he had been a “failure” to his constituents,
since all assistance “was denied to him”. (Statesman, November 10, 1984).
The administration appears to have been persuaded by the decision
makers at the top to treat the alleged criminals with kid gloves. Inquiries at
some of the police stations in the affected areas revealed that the police had
announced that those in possession of looted properly should submit them
within a stipulated time period and would be let off if they did so. A senior
Police officer simply described this to us as a “Voluntary Disclosure Scheme”.
We feel that this is a strange way of dispensing justice. Restoration of the
booty by the looters is no substitute for their punishment. In the absence of
any convincing explanation on the part of the authorities for this extraordi-
narily queer way of dealing with criminals; we are left with the suspicion
that there is a calculated design by some influential forces to protect them.
The Congress (I) High Command’s reluctance to probe into the allega-
tions against their own councillors and other leaders further ends credence
to the suspicions voiced above. Even Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi seems to
dismiss the serious charges being levelled against his party men. On No-
vember 6, when Charan Singh who accompanied a team of Opposition
leaders in a deputation to Mr. Gandhi, drew his attention to the reports of
Congress (I) men pressurising the police to get their followers released,
which appeared in the Indian Express some days ago. Mr. Gandhi said that
he had heard about it and then reported that the Indian Express is the
oppositio’s paper just as the National Herald is Congress I’s. The next day
the AICC-I headquarters came out with a statement saying that the allega-
tions were utterly malicious. On November 8 however, Mr. Gandhi asked
his senior party colleagues to probe into every allegation of Congress-I
workers’ involvement in the violent incidents. But till today, no one knows
what will be the nature of the “probe”.
In fact Mr. G.K. Moopanar, who is incharge of the organisation in the
AICC (I) told newsmen on November 9 that they had not received any
intimation for any such inquiry so far.
It is difficult to believe that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, was unaware
of the activities of important and well known members of his party for full
five days (from October 31 to November 5). Mr. Gandhi had been the
General Secretary of AICC (I) since 1982 and incharge of reorganising his
party. He had been presiding over training camps for Congress (I) workers
at various places. We wonder how after all these training programmes the
cadres of Mrs. Gandhi’s party could go on such a murderous rampage.
Who are the Guilty - 21
Role of Media and Opposition
Although we do not intend at this stage to go into the role of the media
during the riots, a few words in this connection may not be out of place.
The first day’s evening bulletins (October 31) brought out by different news-
paper establishments stated that there were “two Sikhs and one clean shaven
Sikh” among the assailants. The reporters did not clarify whether the news
was from official or unofficial sources. Nor was it clear how a “clean shaven
Sikh” could be identified as a Sikh. In later reports the next day and the
following days, we were told that only two assailants - both Sikhs were
involved. What happened to the earlier reported third one ? No newspa-
per has yet followed up the discrepancy.
But what is of immediate relevance is the question : Should the media
have described the assailants immediately as Sikhs ? Given the background
of the Punjab situation, such mentioning of a community by name was bound
to excite communal passions and inflame communal hatred. It may be worth-
while in this context to refer to a recommendation made at a seminar on
communal writings held in New Delhi in November 1970 under the joint
auspices of the Press Institute of India and the Press Information Bureau of
the Government of India. It was suggested that certain facts which may
aggravate the situation if published straight away should be printed after a
stipulated period.
We were also intrigued to find Doordarshan allowing the broadcast of
highly provocative slogans like ‘khoon ka badla khoon’ (blood for blood)
by some members from the mourning crowd at Teen Murti.
There was a tendency among many reporters to concentrate on the
names of important politicians instead of on earnest efforts made by indi-
viduals or groups. Thus, when a peace march was organised by a group of
concerned citizens in South Delhi on November 2, which was joined by the
Janta leader Mr. Chandersekhar and some of his followers, some newspa-
pers the next day described it as a Janta Party march. This created tempo-
rary misunderstandings and hampered the efforts of the non-party group to
bring together all citizens, many of whom did not want to identify them-
selves with any particular political party. The need to keep party politics out
of ventures like peace marches to put down riots, is yet to be recognised by
our media people who seem to remain obsessed with names of political
personalities.
This brings us to the role of opposition political leaders. We regret to
say that by and large, they failed to rise to the occasion during the crucial
Who are the Guilty - 22
days of October 31 to November 5. Although news of arson and carnage
was pouring into the offices of the political parties every hour, they hardly
made any effort to rush to the spot with their cadres, stop the violence and
organise peace committees in the localities, and remained content with issu-
ing a joint statement with the Prime Minister on November 1 pleading for
peace and amity.
On November 3, when following the carnage at Trilok Puri, the group
of concerned citizens went to the opposition party leaders (referred to ear-
lier), some among the former appealed to the Janta Party leader
Chandrasekhar to lead them in a deputation to Teen Murti and appeal to the
Prime Minister. Mr. Chandrasekhar rose, folded his hands and pleaded : “I
cannot do it. I don’t want to be accused of ruining the late Prime Minister’s
funeral”.
Role of Public
While the disturbances that shocks Delhi from Oct. 31 to Nov. 5 could
be described as an ‘organised disorder’ with signs of meticulous planning
by certain groups in some areas, deliberate laxity on the part of the admin-
istration in other areas and wilful relinquishment of responsibility of senior
Ministers as well as opposition parties on a wider scale, we cannot at the
same time rule out the existence of hostility and suspicion among large
sections of the Hindu population against the Sikhs because of the happen-
ings in Punjab during the last two years.
By not solving the outstanding economic and political issues in Punjab,
by allowing Sikh extremism and Hindu communalism to feed on each other
leading to the army raid in the Golden Temple and antagonising thereby
large sections of the Sikh community, the ruling party at the centre had
sown the seeds of communal division between Hindus and Sikhs.
As a result, when from October 31, organised assaults on the Sikhs
began (as distinct from a spontaneous mass upsurge against Sikhs which
some observers are trying to make it out to be), the Hindu public by and
large appeared to be in a mood that sanctioned such assaults. Comments by
responsible Hindu citizens in Delhi indicate to some extent the popular psyche.
An officer belonging to the IPS was heard to comment that the government
was not preventing the violence so that people could let off steam and the
Sikhs in Punjab would be ‘taught a lesson’. An Indian who works for the
UNO in Geneva, who flew to Delhi for Mrs. Gandhi’s funeral, told a mem-
Who are the Guilty - 23
ber of our team that the orgy of violence had been allowed to ‘teach the
Sikhs a lesson’. When asked about the suffering that this was causing the
common people, he said : ‘Who is suffering ?’ The long record of uninter-
rupted depredations by the Sikh extremists in Punjab had possibly created a
desire for retalitation that blinded even those who are retarded as respon-
sible people among the Hindus.
How did the Sikh victims view this attitude of their Hindu neighbours?
Victims in Gurgaon said : “People stood on their rooftops watching our
houses burning, just, as they do when observing the Republic Day Parade”.
It was this mood again that allowed the Hindu public to believe all sorts
of rumours ranging from the story of poisoning drinking water to that of
armed Sikhs prowling the streets to attack Hindu. The next step from such
belief in rumours is acquiescence in the rampage that had started from the
evening of October 31 and even active participation by the younger and
more aggressive Hindu in some cases.
The anti-Sikh communal partisan feelings had penetrated the lower ranks
of the administration also, as evident from the behaviour of the police force,
who were given the reins for three or four days by their superior officers.
Given this mood of vicarious exultation at the plight of the Sikhs among
the public, it was easy for an organised group enjoying the patronage of the
ruling party to carry out the plan of systematic destruction and killings.
The anti-Sikh sentiments in some areas were also stoked by some iso-
lated expressions of happiness at Mrs. Gandhi’s death among some Sikhs,
and of bravado, and attempts at resistance against depredations by the Hindu
mobs. It is possible that attempts at resistance could have been taken as a
challenge by the marauding hordes who were sure of getting police protec-
tion at every step. We came across reports, corroborated by some respon-
sible residents of a few neighborhoods, of Sikhs dancing the ‘bhangra’ on
the night of October 31. Such incidents reinforced the simmering hostility
against the Sikhs.
But these stray incidents were marginal and do not explain the wide
scale explosion of indiscriminate violence against all Sikhs throughout India
on the same date and the same time, which could be the result of only a well
designed strategy.
The only signs of courage and initiative in an otherwise ominous land-
scape were demonstrated by those Hindu and Muslim neighbours who helped
Sikh families in the affected areas. We came across a large number of Sikh
inmates in the relief Camps who told us repeatedly that but for these
neighbours they would have been butchered.
Who are the Guilty - 24
In a makeshift camp opposite the Kalyan Puri Police Station, on No-
vember 3, we met a Hindu family, whose house was burnt down by the
miscreants because he had given shelter to his Sikh neighbours.
A postal employee living in Bhogal told us how his house was damaged
and partly burnt because he helped two Sikhs. With army assistance he
moved the Sikhs to his village in Faridabad.
Members of a voluntary organisation traced two Sikh families who were
given shelter by Hindus in Khichripur on November 3. Defying a belligerent
mob that stood at the entrance of the lanes, a local Hindu youth led the
members to the house and rescued the families who were being sheltered
by a poor Hindu family. The next day, the volunteers following a request by
a mother in a relief camp went to trace her daughter in Trllok Purl who
was being looked after by a Hindu family. The latter restored the daughter
to the volunteers, kept with them two other Sikh children whose parents
were still untraced. “It is our responsibility to look after them”, they said.
Near Azadpur, a Hindu factory owner hid a Sikh inside the factory
premises. When the Hindus surrounded the factory demanding that the
Sikh be handed over to them, the factory owner persuaded the Sikh to
shave his hair and beard, gave him a cycle which helped him to pass through
the crowd and escape.
On the G. T. Karnal Road, Hindus saved a Gurdwara and a Sikh docto’s
clinic from being burnt down. In the same area, from November 1 to 5,
Delhi University teachers and students kept vigil around the entry points to
lanes where Slkhs lived.
Hindus from Munirka village and residing in Munirka colony provided
protection in their own homes to ten Sikh families.
Thirty Sikh families residing in Mayur Vihar were guarded all through
the period by young Hindu neighbours who resisted attempts by outsiders to
raid the compound.
According to a rough estimate based on information gathered from
different sources, at least 600 Sikhs were saved by Hindus of Trliok Puri.
According to an army officer posted in Shahadara, of the Sikh families he
rescued from different parts of the area, at least 70% were sheltered by
Hindus.
It is these acts of courage, however, few they may be, which reassure
us that sanity still prevails in our country.
Who are the Guilty - 25
Case Studies
1. Sultan Puri
The resettlement colony of Sultan Puri has a mixed population of Hin-
dus and Sikhs employed in various occupations. Many of the Hindus belong
to the lower castes and are employed in various bodies as safai karamcharis.
Among the Sikhs are Sikligars (who specialise in preparing metal gratings
for building construction), charpoy weavers from Alwar, scooter rickshaw
owners, TV mechanics, electricians and shop-keepers. Some also work as
scooter rickshaw drivers, rickshaw pullers, vendors & labourers.
It is significant that the members of the two communities lived in per-
fect harmony prior to the riots. This was testified to by the Sikhs in the
various relief camps. On no occasion in the past had there been any evi-
dence of tensions between them.
The Sikh residents of the colony were taken by surprise when in the
late hours of Thursday (November 1) they were suddenly attacked by vio-
lent mobs. According to eye witnesses the mob consisted of local people
and of outsiders believed to be Jats of neighbouring villages (Mundka is one
such village). The attacks were directed at the men folk and a large number
of Sikh males were killed. Some of the survivors were able to identify these
who played a leading role in the attack. The leaders included local politi-
cians, the police and some local people.
In trying to identify and understand the assailants and arsonists it seems
indubitable that sweeper urchins, beggars, mechanics, drivers, vegetable
sellers etc. from the local areas were involved. But it was not entirely on
their own initiative. Most of the killers in Sultan Puri were led by Pradhans,
who are at the base of the political hierarchy. It was they who incited the
mobs against the Sikhs and helped to identify Sikh houses and establish-
ments. The Pradhans were in turn linked to the local Congress MP. Some
of the Pradhans who were repeatedly held responsible by the survivors for
acts of incitement and for aiding and abetting the rioters were Mr. Chauhan,
Mr. Bagri and Mr. Gupta. The MP who was most common held responsible
for the attacks was Mr. Sajjan Kumar of the Congress (I).
Police connivance with the rioters in Sultan Puri is indicated by the fact
that the SHO by the name of Mr. Bhatti reportedly not only killed a couple
of Sikhs, but also helped the mob to disarm the Sikhs. The police involve-
ment may be summed up in the words of one survivor “Khud mara hai,
miley huey the” (they themselves killed, they were in complicity).
Almost every refugee we spoke to gave an identical version. Also in-
Who are the Guilty - 26
volved in the carnage in Sultan Puri were kerosene suppliers Brahmanand
Gupta, Veranand, Master and Ved Prakash who provided the fuel for the
Sikh funeral as also a Jat doctor Changa.
Others actively participating were the owner of the Hanuman ration
shop, Gajanand, godown owner, Gulab Singh and an auto rickshaw driver
Omi. All these criminals supervised the carnage.
The attacks which began on the Sikh residents on Thursday night went
on relentlessly till Friday afternoon (November 1-2). Among the directions
heard being shouted to the mob were ‘kill them, rape women’. The mobs
were equipped with lathis, iron rods and other weapons and carried kero-
sene with them.
Many Hindu neighbours had sheltered Sikh families and locked them
up in different houses. Unfortunately this did not save them from the loot-
ing, arson, lynching and killing that followed. Houses were being identified,
set on fire, and Sikh males killed; women were seen carrying away loot,
from the houses of better off Sikhs; gold jewellery, TV sets and other things
were carried off. A lot of property including means of livelihood such as
handcarts and rickshaws were systematically destroyed. The killings were
brutal. One Sikh was pushed into a car, which was then set ablaze. Others
were hit, thrown on the ground, doused with kerosene and set on fire.
A pregnant women was stabbed by the rioters and some women are
reported to have been raped. A graphic account is available with certain
members of our team who visited the relief camp at Shakurpur (Rani Bagh).
In a large hall of the Shakurpur Camp, housing the Sultan Puri victims
of the carnage sit a row of women and children huddled together with
shock and grief inscribed on every part of their beings. There is not a single
boy of over ten years in the group and boys are rare. Each group consists of
a woman of the older generation, three or four young widows, a few ado-
lescent girls and the rest are children, ranging from ten years to absolutely
destitute; with one such household consists of 18 people rendered abso-
lutely destitute with not a single earning member left; all four adult males
have been murdered. Two of the younger women have new born babies,
one six day old (it was born a day before the killings) and another 10 days
old. They stared blankly. But the older woman who had lost her husband
and three sons gave vent to her grief bitterly “ab to sabse accha yeh hoga
ki aap ham sab ko jahar dila dain; ab ham ji nahin sakte; kaise jiyenge,
kiske liye jiyenge ?” She was voicing the sentiment of many of the women
present, all the whom had watched their men folk being attacked and cut
down, then doused with kersene and set ablaze. Not one of these were
Who are the Guilty - 27
willing to consider returning to their original homes after the brutal massa-
cre they had lived through. How can they even think of it unless the guilty
are identified and punished ?
The blocks most badly affected were A 4 (65 killed, 15 missing), B 2 &
B 3 (31 killed and 5 missing) and C3 & C4. From an enumeration done in
camp (housing about 2000-survivors mainly from Sultanpuri) the figures are
152 killed, 25 injured and 52 missing from this group alone. This means that
on an average, every second family suffered at least one family member
dead. To an expert it is curious that the member of injured is so few com-
pared to the number of dead. In cases of looting and killing due to mob
frenzy, the number of injured is usually much higher. This implies that the
attackers were not disorderly.
Matters did not end with the events of November 1 and 2. During the
next two days, Saturday and Sunday (November 3 and 4) the SHO is re-
ported to have got a barber brought to a hall where the Sikhs were herded
together (prior to evacuation) and made to pay Rs. 20 each to get them-
selves shaved. They were threatened that they would get shot if they did
not comply. It was reported that the barber made Rs. 500.
Around 5000 Sikhs were herded together till the army evacuated them
three days later. Some 800 are still in Sultan Puri under Army protection.
Attempts at adequate arrangements for their food were still being made by
the Army on Thursday, November 8, a whole week after the terror started.
The survivors at Camp II with a few exceptions do not want to go
back. Reportedly only 100 from the 2000 in this camp went back. But 20
had returned by Nov. 9. Even within the camp they are feeling insecure.
The same sweepers who only a few days ago looted their houses and
killed their husbands and sons have managed to sneak into the camps for
the ostensible purpose of doing the sanitation work. These people are regu-
larly keeping watch on them and spying on their movements.
2. Mangol Puri
The centre of the holocaust was the jhuggi and jhopri colony (JJ Colony)
at Mangol Puri in West Delhi where a large number of Sikhs are concen-
trated in certain blocks. The disturbances started on November 1 evening
after a police van had come to the G Block and announced that water had
been poisoned. The other two rumours - that Sikhs were celebrating Mrs.
Gandhi’s death by distributing sweets and that Hindu corpses had arrived in
trains from Punjab were also soon making the rounds.
Apprehending trouble, several Sikhs from different blocks approached
Who are the Guilty - 28
the police for help. One woman survivor whom we met later at the Shakurpur
relief camp on November 5, told us that when she went to the police station
for protection, the police said, “We cannot do anything - you are now on
your own”. Later, during the riots, the miscreants were seen using diesel
from police vans to set fire to the houses of the Sikhs, One group of survi-
vors from Block X told us that the police took them out from their houses on
the plea of rescuing them and then turned them over to the mob waiting
outside.
According to information gathered from the survivors, the assailants
were from the nearby Jat villages and were accompanied by local Schedule
Caste people - the same composition of the mob which we found in Trilok
Purl. Hovering around the arsonists were local Congress (I) leaders and
followers in jeeps and other vehicles. The survivors identified Mala Ram, a
local Congress (I) leader, who came with about 300 people and personally
supervised the arson, looting and murders. Ishwar Singh, Salim Querishi
and Shaukeen (Congress (I) workers belonging to the Waqf Club), Rajinder
Singh all well known Congress(I) activists were found going around in-
structing the mob, providing kerosene and pointing out Sikh homes.
One single name which cropped up wherever we went interviewing
the residents of Mangol Puri was that of Sajjan Kumar, the Congress (I)
MP of the area. Almost in one voice, they alleged that Sajjan Kumar had
masterminded the violence. Some people accused him of having paid Rs.
100 and a bottle of liquor to each person taking part in the may-hem. The
extent of hatred towards him among the Sikh survivors of Mangol Puri was
evident when Sajjan Kumar visited the Mangol Puri police station on No-
vember 4 where the survivors were waiting to be transported to a refugee
camp. Members of our team were witness to a scene where the Sikhs
abused him openly and held him responsible for the carnage. The Congress
(I) MP tried to pacify them by pleading his innocence. “Why should my
party kill you, who are Congress (I) supporters ?”, he said, and laid the
blame on the Lt. Governor who had been replaced the previous day by a
new successor. A little later when the team visited the Punjabi Bagh camp
where some among the Mangol Puri refugees had arrived, the team was
told that the hungry refugees had refused to touch the foodstuff brought
earlier by Sajjan Kumar.
The violence indulged in by the mob was marked by the most brutal
atrocities. Women survivors told us how their children were ripped apart,
their husbands and sons made to cut oft their hair, beaten op with iron rods
and then burnt alive. Almost all the Sikh houses in the 26 blocks of Mangol
Who are the Guilty - 29
Puri were attacked and destroyed and the main targets of murderous as-
sault were the young male members of the households. Official attempts to
underestimate the extent of killings by giving out the figure of only 9 fatali-
ties are contradicted by the list provided by the Delhi State Committee of
the CPI (M) which from a house-to-house survey in a few blocks alone
found at least 51 killed.
When we visited Mangol Puri on November 5, we were shown spots
were the bodies were burnt and we were taken to a ‘nallah’ between Mangol
Puri and Sultan Puri where we were told several hundred bodies were
dumped.
It was only on the evening of November 3 that the army arrived at
Mangol Puri. Narrating the event, one Sikh whom we met at the Shakurpur
relief camp where he was staying with other refugees, told us that they
were taken out by the mob, made to stand in a park and when they were
about to be set on fire, the troops arrived and saved them. Before the arrival
of troops, the few sources of protection available to the sufferers of Mangol
Puri were the Hindu and Muslim neighbours who at tremendous term to
their lives gave shelter to the Sikhs. They hid them in their homes and shops
and resisted attempts by the mob to trace them out. A Muslim young man in
Nangloi told us how his family saved a number of Sikh men, women &
children and secretly transported them to the relief camps.
The experience of a Hindu, C. Lal of Mangol Puri is revealing. He
passed through the days of the 1947 partition, when he crossed over from
Sialkot to India. He relived the same days during the first week of Novem-
ber when his brother’s shop was looted and burnt, because he gave shelter
to several Sikh families and formed a peace committee in his locality to
protect the Sikhs.
3. Trilok Puri
The happenings in Trilok Puri, a trans-Yamuna resettlement colony in
the east of Delhi, between October 31 and November 2 were a gruesome
picture of the intensity of the butchery. Within just 48 hours, at least 400
Sikhs, mainly young men were burnt alive, with the connivance of the local
police machinery and active participation of an organised group of miscre-
ants led by a Congress (I) Councillor.
As in other areas, here also the carnage was preceded by the usual
floating of the familiar rumour that Sikhs had distributed sweets to ‘cel-
ebrate’ Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination on October 31. The other version which
we heard when we visited Trilok Puri three days later was that a Hindu
Who are the Guilty - 30
mob had come to attack the Gurdwara on October 31, and the Sikhs re-
sisted by waving their swords. When the mob attacked the Gurdwara, stones
were hurled from the top of the temple, and the rampage began. In the
course of our investigation however we could not find any single person
who could claim that he had personally seen the Sikhs distributing sweets.
Some people however corroborated the report about the Sikhs waving swords
from the Gurdwara when the Hindu mob came to attack it.
From accounts related to us by the survivors, by the Hindu neighbours
and by some reporters who visited the spot soon after the incident on No-
vember 2, we could reconstruct the grisly sequence of events.
The beginning of the tragedy could be traced to the night of October 31
when reportedly the Congress (l) Councillor Ashok Kumar, a doctor who
runs a clinic in Kalyan Puri, one kilometre from Trilok Puri, held a meeting
at the latter place. The violence that broke out immediately following the
meeting reached its climax the next morning, when Gujjar farmers from the
neighbouring village of Chilla landed at Trilok Puri, and accompanied by a
group of local inhabitants (described by the residents as Scheduled Caste
people) raided Blocks 28, 32, 33 and 34 and systemically attacked Sikh
houses, dragged out the young men, killed and burnt them and set the houses
on fire. In some cases, the assailants hit the victims with iron rods on their
heads before pouring kerosene on them. Between Blocks 32 and 31, there
are large open spaces where over 50 Sikh families were living in jhuggies
and jhopries. These hutments were burnt down, and the menfolk were killed.
A study of the list of those who were alleged to have taken part in the
loot and killings reveals that a large number of them were notorious anti-
social elements well known in the area. One of them, Somnath of House 10,
Block 32 was responsible for the murder of several Sikhs including Hoshiyar
Singh son of Milap Singh and three other young men whom he locked up in
a house and later killed them with the help of others.
(A detailed list of the alleged criminals and the nature of their crimes of
Trilok Puri during the period under survey is given in Annexure I).
Some of the participants were shop-keepers who supplied kerosene to
the arsonists. Some others among the neighbours of the victims were petty
traders like milkmen, mechanics or dealers in cement. The majority of the
victims were poor Sikh - mechanics, artisans and daily wage labourers.
The role of the Police was on the same lines as found elsewhere in
Delhi during the period. The sanctioned strength of the police in the Kalyan
Puri police station, under which Trilokpari falls is 113, including one Inspec-
tor (who is the Station House Officer) and around 90 constables among
Who are the Guilty - 31
others. The SHO reached Trilok Puri at about 2.30 pm on November 1
when the plunder and killings were taking place. The first thing he did was
to remove the head constable and another constable from the spot, allowing
the criminals to escape whatever little detection there was possible. It was
a continuos spree of arson, rape and murders after that. Later enquiries
conducted by a senior police official revealed that at least four women, their
ages ranging from 14 to 50 were gang raped. Later seven cases of rape
from Trilok Puri were officially reported by the J. P. Narayan Hospital,
Delhi. During the height of the killings however, there was little effort on the
part of the police either to stop the orgy or to check the figures of casual-
ties. On November 2, at around 5.30 pm, Nikhil Kumar, ACP of the Police
received information that “Block 32 mei maar kaat ho rahi hai” (Killings
are taking place in Block 32). The police control room curiously enough
recorded that only three people had been injured. And this was at a time
when already entire rows of houses in several blocks of Trilok Puri were
burning and their inmates killed.
A reporter of a Delhi based newspaper who reached Trilok Puri at
about 2 pm on November 2 was greeted by a belligerent mob in Block 28
which threatened him and stoned his car. When he went back to the Kalyan
Puri Police station, the SHO Surjit Singh told him that ‘total peace’ was
reigning in the area. He however spotted a truck outside the Police Station
with four bodies inside, one of them still alive. When the reporter, out of
despair, turned back to contact the police headquarters, on his way he came
across about 70 Sikh women and children walking along the road under
Nizamuddin bridge. They told him that all their menfolk had been killed in
Trilok Puri, and that they were fleeing for their lives. The reporter’s at-
tempts to seek help from several army personnel on the road elicited little
response, since most of the latter had either lost touch with their respective
headquarters, or had no specific orders. Finally, after reaching the police
headquarters at ITO, he met the ACP, Nikhil Kumar, who told him that he
could not do anything and could only pass his message to the control room.
He described his role as that of a ‘guest artist’.
The reporter revisited Trilok Puri in the evening of the same day and
found the remains of the carnage-burnt houses, dead bodies and the SHO
with two constables walking around. The SHO told him that he did not have
any knowledge of what had happened. When later in the evening the re-
porter visited the police headquarters, he was told by another ACP that
according to the latter’s information there was ‘peace’ in Trilok Puri. The
reporter pointed out that at least 300 people had been burnt and that the
Who are the Guilty - 32
police was only counting dead bodies that were still recognizable ignoring
those which had been reduced to cinders.
It was only around 7 pm on November 2 that senior police officials
reached Trilok Puri. Personnel of the Central Reserve Police Force were
deployed then, and the survivors were rescued from the affected blocks.
When members of our team reached Trilok Puri at about 7 am on No-
vember 3, we found the survivors - old men, women and children, some of
them with severe burns, huddling together in the open on the main road.
Weeping women narrated to us how their menfolk were slaughtered and
alleged that in some cases the police directed the attacks. Many among the
survivors told us that Dr. Ashok Kumar, the local Congress (I) Councillor
had instigated the mob. The entire Sikh community in the area, they said,
was left at the mercy of the mob for two full days till the arrival of CRPF.
As soon as we entered Block 32, we were greeted by a strong stench
of burnt bodies which were still rotting inside some of the houses. The
entire lane was littered with burnt pieces of furniture, papers, scooters and
piles of ash in the shape of human bodies, the unmistakable signs of burnt
human beings. Dogs were on the prowl. Rats were nibbling at the still rec-
ognizable remains of a few bodies.
As we watched the scene, we remembered what we had just read in
the morning newspapers that day. Describing the situation in Delhi on the
previous day - November 2, when the carnage was continuing at Triliok
Puri - the Lt. Governor Mr. Gavai had said that the situation in the capital
was 'under control. From what we witnessed at Trilok Puri, it was evident
that the situation there on November 2 was indeed ‘under contro’, but the
‘control’ was wielded by a powerful group of influential persons who could
mobilise the local police to help them in the may-hem and immobilise the
entire administration for more than 48 hours to enable them to carry out
meticulously their plans of murder and destruction.
The relief to be given to the Trilok Puri victims was not by the authori-
ties but a voluntary group of over two dozen who brought them food, medi-
cal care and concern. Even though a woman had given birth to a child
among the victims, the authorities had not even arranged for medical care
for her or other persons seriously injured more than a day earlier. Members
of this voluntary team rescued Sikh families who were hiding in Hindu homes
as late as 7.30 in the evening. These rescues were made in the presence of
the District Commissioner who had to be cajoled into helping. The authori-
ties assured the victims that they will be given all help and things like blan-
kets though they had none on hand. In fact the authorities have been using
Who are the Guilty - 33
the Farash Bazar Camp (where Trilok Puri victims were sent) to show their
efficiency whereas a great deal of the work there has been done by volun-
tary agencies.
Relief and Rehabilitation
Taking into consideration the extent of violence and arson on the night
of the 31st October, it would be reasonable to expect that the Delhi Admin-
istration would have anticipated the need to set up relief camps. Neither the
Government nor the Administration seemed to be concerned with the prob-
lem and their attitude of deliberate inaction seems to be a continuation of
their stance during the carnage.
The authorities have refused to make realistic estimates of the number
of people killed, the injured, the number of widows and orphans, or the
extent of damage to property. Further, the Administration to date refuses to
recognise most of the people who have taken refuge in the Gurdwaras as
displaced persons entitled to relief and compensation. The Administration
recognises only ten camps whereas a voluntary organisation, Nagrik Ekta
Manch has identified at least 18 others within Delhi and several on the
outskirts. The list of these camps is given in Annexure IV. According to the
Government there are about 20,000 displaced persons. In fact there are at
least 50,000.
The Administration has tried to manipulate figures and thus gloss over
the enormity of the problem. For instance the former Police Commissioner,
Shri Subhash Tandon, at a Press Conference on November 2 said that the
number of dead was between 15 and 20. To this, the then Lt. Governor
Gavai added “things are under control” (Indian Express, November 3, 1984).
The official death toll is now 613 when eye witness accounts speak of
hundreds of bodies lying at Trilok Puri alone.
There was no attempt to do any relief work till November 2nd. On that
day, for the first time the Administration with the help of the Army evacu-
ated people to the police thana or to school buildings. After that there was
no sign of the Administration despite various pious announcements in the
media, by the new Lt. Governor Mr. Wali about giving blankets and mat-
tresses to the refugees for comfort.
Thousands went hungry and had to urinate and defecate in the corri-
dors of the school building. The injured lay in the rooms without any medical
treatment. There was no one to share the horror or the anguish of widows,
Who are the Guilty - 34
to say a word to them. The first initiative for relief came from local commu-
nities, mostly Hindus and from Gurdwaras who brought the first meal and
organised langars. For instance at Farash Bazar the people from Jhilmil
colony brought their own utensils and organised a langar in the face of
threats from the mobs.
The local initiative was followed by the efforts of the voluntary groups
and individuals. Hundreds of students, housewifes, teachers, doctors and
many prominent citizens organised relief camps and collected supplies. The
Administration was nowhere to be seen.
The Delhi Administration appointed a Relief Commissioner to deal with
the crisis on November 4, 1984. On November 6, the Delhi Administration
announced a scheme for rehabilitation and Joint Secretaries from various
Ministries were put incharge of various camps in which a compensation of
Rs. 10,000 was to be given to the next of kin for each dead. Five thousand
was to be given to each seriously injured and a thousand for those who
sustained minor injuries. The same amounts were to be given to those who
had suffered damage to their property. On November 7, the Prime Minister
announced that he was releasing a sum of Rs. 40 lakhs for relief work for
the Union Territory of Delhi from the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund.
The question that arises is where did the money go, for it has not reached
the people at the camps. There is no scheme made for the implementation
of the relief, scheme and no agency has been created for this purpose. The
joint control room at Raj Nivas for relief does not seem to have even got
information about the number of camps in the city.
When the government did move in, they were met with hostility from
the people and atleast on one occasion the people refused to accept the
food brought by a MP because the people felt that he was involved in the
carnage. In fact the arrival of the VlPs was often a hinderance to the relief
work being carried out.
The plight of the displaced persons was pathetic. The army had clear
instructions not to allow anyone to photograph the camps. A member of our
team was roughed up by the army and his film snatched away at the
Shakurpur camp when he took a photograph of the people in the camp.
No attempt has been made to take a census of the people at the camps
and estimate the number of men, women and children. None of these people
have been given identity cards on which basis they could claim the compen-
sation and now they will get entangled in red tapes and possible litigation.
According to Press reports, more than two crores of looted property
has been recovered but no attempt has been made to arrest the looters who
Who are the Guilty - 35
if arrested are released on the intervention of the local leaders.
Further there is no system worked out by which the recovered property
will be returned to its rightful owners. Already VCRs are finding their way
to the market at a ridiculous price.
Within a week the Administration started to forcibly evacuate the dis-
placed persons and sending them back to what used to be their homes,
which are now cinders and ashes. Their houses destroyed, their property
looted, and the murderers and looters wandering free, the people are terri-
fied of returning to the areas which are full of memories of murder and
arson. Officially there have been 2,960 arrests but hundreds of these people
have been released either on intervention of local politicians or are on bail.
The Government did not mobilise all the resources at the command
(e.g. the army) to provide medical care and sanitation, nor did it print enough
forms for compensation claims. A voluntary agency had to have thousands
of forms printed for the camps in their care. The government’s callousness
towards the problem of relief and rehabilitation is in consonance with its
earlier policy of calculated inaction during the carnage. How could the gov-
ernment not have anticipated the need for an effective machinery for relief
and rehabilitation ? Further, now was it that just at the time the government
was announcing the setting up of a Relief Commissioner and the forcible
evacuations of the people started without any assurance to them of their
future security ?
Who are the Guilty - 36
Conclusion
The social and political consequences of the Government’s stance dur-
ing the carnage, its deliberate inaction and its callousness towards relief and
rehabilitation are far reaching. It is indeed a matter of grave concern that
the government has made no serious inquiries into the entire tragic episode
which seems to be so well planned and designed.
It is curious that for the seven hours that the government had between
the time of Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination and official announcement of her
death, no security arrangements were made for the victims.
The dubious role of the politicians belonging to the ruling party has been
highlighted in various press reports. The government, under pressure, has
changed a few faces by transfers and suspension of Junior Officers.
It is important that we do not fall for this ploy, for our investigation
reveals that these are only scapegoats.
The riots were well organised and were of unprecedented brutality.
Several very disturbing questions arise that must be answered :
1. What was the government and the administration doing for seven
hours between the time of the assassination and the announcement
of Mrs. Gandhi’s death ?
2. Why did the government refuse to take cognisance of the reports of
the looting and murders and call in the troops even after alerting
them ?
3. Why have a few individual Congress (I) leaders close to the Prime
Minister been allowed to arrogate to themselves powers belonging
to ministers and officials ?
4. Why was there no joint control room set-up and who was
responsible for not giving clear and specific instructions to the army
on curbing violence and imposing curfew ?
5. Who was responsible for the planned and deliberate police inaction
and often active role in inciting the murder and loot ?
6. Who was responsible for the planned and directed arson ?
7. Why were highly provocative slogans (khoon ka badla khoon,
blood for blood) allowed to be broadcast by Doordarshan during
the recording of the mourning crowed at Teen Murti ?
8. Why has the Congress (I) not set-up an inquiry into the role of its
members in the arson and looting ?
Who are the Guilty - 37
Demands
1. A public high level inquiry into the role of the government and ruling
party in planning, instigating and executing the riots between
October 31 and November first week, and immediate publication
of the report of inquiry.
2. Exemplary punishment of those found guilty by the inquiry
committee, according to the law.
3. A well formulated and clear cut policy on relief and rehabilitation,
and effective machinery for its immediate implementation.
Who are the Guilty - 38
Annexures
Annexure I
Chronology of EventsOctober 31
09.40 Mrs. Indira Gandhi assassinated
10.00 All senior defence officers informed and apprehension of trouble
10.30 Meeting at PM’s house where security discussed and sugges
tion for calling out the army given. Among those present :
Commissioner Police, Lt. Governor of Delhi and M.L. Fotedar.
11.00 AIR announces attempts on PM’s life
12.00 AIR announces PM in hospital
13.30 Radio Australia announces Mrs. Gandhi dead
14.00 Spot news in front of newspaper offices announces Mrs. Gandhi
dead. Special one page editions of dailies announce Mrs.
Gandhi’s assailants as two Sikhs and one clean shaven Sikh.
16.00 Violence starts outside AIIMS. Unarmed persons beat up Sikhs
and burn their turbans in the presence of a large number of
armed forces.
18.00 AIR announces Mrs. Gandhi dead, and soon after swearing in
of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi as PM along with three cabinet ministers.
22.00 Violence and burning in many parts of Delhi.
23.00 Sr. MP phones Home Minister and informs him of situation of
Delhi. Home Minister reportedly said that everything was
under control.
Sometime A top level review of law and order situation by PM’s
late at night Secretariat and Home Ministry.
In the day Army alerted (around 14.00)
November 1
Violence, burning, killing and looting in all parts of Delhi all day and
night. Mourners visit Teen Murti House all day.
Morning Mr. Shiv Shanker, Mr. Narasimha Rao and Lt. Governor
and President contacted by many MPs and prominent citizens
including those with armed forces background report on the
situation in Delhi and the need to call out the army. Home
Minister informed that army will need clear cut instructions
and need for joint centre of operation to coordinate army and
Who are the Guilty - 39
civilian authorities. Killing starts in places like Trilok Puri.
14.00 Army called out
14.30 Shiv Shanker in contact with Gavai; Gavai informs that curfew
being considered.
16.00 Charan Singh meets President to brief him about events and
need for army protection
18.00 Indefinite curfew imposed
18.30 An MP contacts Home Minister to inform of the situation in
Delhi and that troops were not around
20.00 PM informs leaders of opposition that there are not enough
troops in Delhi
Night Large scale killings of Sikhs. Not one round fired by the army
and no flag marches. Rumour that water supply poisoned all
over Delhi and rumour was supported by many police stations.
November 2
The body of PM lies in state. Curfew and shoot at sight orders all day.
Looting and killing continues all day. All Delhi bound trains cancelled. Mourn-
ers visit Teen Murti House all day.
08.30 A senior MP telephones Home Minister regarding the danger
to incoming trains
10.15 A MP contacts Shiv Shankar and asks that protection be given
to trains.
Note : No army protection given and 43 train passengers
reported killed in Delhi (Times of India November 3, 1984)
13.30 A MP contacts Shiv Shankar and informs him about the
situation in the city. Mr. Shiv Shankar tries to contact the Home
Minister, Lt. Governor, Krishnaswamy Rao Saheb and Wali but
none available.
Afternoon Killings continue in areas like Sultan Puri, Mangol Puri.
Few peace marches in the city. Gangs roaming certain areas
with iron rods and trishuls in presence of armed forces.
Evening PM make appeals for peace and states that he cannot and will
not allow violence
Night Killings and violence continue in some parts of the city. Some
victims collect at police thanas. Army did not fire a single round
or conduct flag marches all day.
Who are the Guilty - 40
November 3
Curfew relaxed from 09.00 to 20.00. Sporadic violence around city all
day.
Morning Opposition parties and Congress (I) MP’s contacted by
many citizens about the extent of the problem and killings
in Delhi.
12.30 Funeral procession starts from Teen Murti
Afternoon terror stricken victims of violence collect in thanas and
Gurdwaras
16.00 Funeral pyre lit at Shanti Van
23.30 Lt. Governor P. G. Gavai proceeds on leave / Mr. M.M.K.
Wali appointed Lt. Governer.
November 4
Curfew continues in city.
Super Bazar in West Patel Nagar looted.
Stabbing incidents in Shahdara, Badarpur and Anand Parbat.
Cabinet expanded
Approximately 50,000 Sikhs in relief camps.
Most of the relief organised by voluntary agencies.
November 5
Curfew relaxed from 5.00 to 21.00
Exchange of fire in Chuna Mandi
Two persons burnt alive in Nathu Chowk
Conditions in most relief camps still chaotic
November 6
Curfew relaxed from 05.00 to 21.00
Joint Secretaries put incharge of camps. Civil Administration takes
over from the army the charge of running camps.
Relief schemes announced (but enough forms not available with
government, on November 11, forms printed privately by voluntary
agencies).
Who are the Guilty - 41
Annexure II
Eye-Witness Accounts
1. Dev Dutt, Journalist
By 4.30 p.m. on 31st October, a crowd of about 3,000 to 4,000 had
gathered around the AIIMS in front of the main entrance gate of that insti-
tution. There were slogans mostly in praise of Mrs. Gandhi, and a few
slogans threatening revenge. But there was no tension. There were a num-
ber of Sikhs in the crowd. Their faces showed no fear or apprehension,
although everyone know that a Sikh had assassinated the PM. We talked to
some of them in order to gauge their state of mind. The Sikhs seemed to be
supremely confident about the goodwill of their Hindu brethren. It seems
they nursed no suspicions against the Hindus. They did not show any traces
of nervousness of any kind. The non Sikhs in the crowd did not seem even
to notice the presence of Sikhs and took their presence as normal.
While this crowd waited patiently for the dead body of the PM to be
brought out, the flow of traffic and business in the kiosks around along the
wall of the Safdarjung Hospital went on as usual.
I was standing near the crossing in front of the AIIMS when 30-40
young men emerged out of the crowd and formed a neat column three or
four men deep and ran towards the crossing near the traffic island. Then
the ground moved towards INA market. They caught hold of a scooter and
set it on fire. There was a traffic jam near the petrol pump adjoining the
INA market. The group turned back and moved towards Safdarjung Hospi-
tal on Ring Road and moved towards Sarojini Nagar. They began to pull
Sikhs out of buses and remove their turbans and maltreat them. I saw five
turbans burning in a row on the Ring Road.
There was no police in the area. The group had a free hand. After
some time say 20 minutes or so, a group of kahki clad men arrived and
began to chase away the miscreants.
It is difficult to explain the sudden eruption of violence in the AIIMS
area on the evening of October 31, 1984. Perhaps the unusual normalcy in
that area proved a section of the people assembled there who were deeply
moved by the assassiation of Mrs. Gandhi. But the question is : Who were
these people who came out of the crowd and went on a rampage ?
2. Dipankar Gupta, Assistant Professor, JNU
On November 1 at 11.00 am, I was coming by the Vasant Vihar
Gurdwara (Priya Cinema) where I saw a group of young men (about 60)
Who are the Guilty - 42
attacking the Gurdwara. There were four policemen with guns slung on
their shoulders who at that point turned away from the Gurdwara and be-
gan walking towards the Cinema complex.
On the same day at 9.20 am I was at the JNU (New Campus) gate,
where I found that a number of young men were energetically spreading
the rumour that a band of Sikhs with sten-guns were on the rampage and
were killing Hindus. One ex-JNU student, Bharat Singh, said that he actu-
ally saw Sikhs shoot down Hindus and that there were three bodies lying
between the old and the new campus of JNU. When some students and
teachers offered to go down with him to verify his allegation, he disap-
peared.
Between 9.20 and 10.30 pm on November 1, a Haryana Pradesh Con-
gress Committee (I) car kept making the rounds of the campus. I do not
know if the occupants of the car included JNU students, but on two occa-
sions I noticed that the occupants of the car conversed at length with those
who were spreading the rumour that Sikhs with sten-guns were out to kill
Hindus. At 10.40 a green Ambassador car with a West Bengal number
plate stopped at the gate and three well-to-do people got off. They were in
the age group of 40-50. One of them went up to the students and teachers
manning the gate and said, “I must warn you that Sikhs with nothing in their
heads and with sten-guns in hand are indiscriminately killing Hindus. You
should all go home or you might get hurt.”
3. Prof. Ashwini Roy, HOD, Pol. Sc., JNU
November 1, 1984 at 10 a.m. onwards : There was a police vehicle
with about four policemen in Bhogal market. I came out of the house and
saw smoke billowing out. Heard the sound of a big tyre burst and suddenly
saw the police vehicle come out of the Bhogal market, parked at Mathura
Road, to make way for a truck put on fire and being driven by one of the
arsonists himself. The arsonist jumped out, and the truck bumped into a
railing within 15 meters of the police car on the opposite side of the road.
Policemen were reading newspapers and drinking tea inside the car while
the arson was going on all around. I went to the police car to ask why they
were not stopping the arson and was told to mind my own business. Already
70-80 trucks were burning in Bhogal and the smoke billowing out.
A short while later, I saw a Texla TV Service Centre on fire, radio sets
and TVs being carried off right in front of the parked police vehicle. Some
policemen in the vehicle asked the people to hurry with the loot.
By the time I found an armed mob and a group of Sikhs confronting
Who are the Guilty - 43
each other close to my house. I rushed home to ring up the police but simply
could not get through to the Control Room (100).
Within half an hour of this, I saw the ghastly sight of about 80 Sikhs of
all ages - from toddlers to 80 year olds, including women and children,
crowded on the back verandah of the second floor of a corner house, some
of whom were attempting to jump out. I found to my horror that many of the
houses in this row had been set on fire, with the mob waiting in front with
sticks and weapons for the occupants to emerge out of the houses. Some
citizens managed to help the beseiged Sikhs and give them shelter.
The citizens organised a defence committee. In all this only once at
night, around 10 pm a CRPF patrol marched into the locality and disap-
peared after giving instructions to keep within doors and keep the lights off.
Though it had been agreed by the citizens vigilance committee that some
lights should be kept on, the whole locality obeyed the CRPF which never
visited the area again.
4. Swapan Lahiri, Engineer
On November 1, at around 1.30 pm, I followed from a distance a group
of 50 to 60 people, wielding sticks and iron rods from Parliament Street to
Raisina Road. There, they tried to get into the house of the BJP MP Atal B.
Vajpayee, which was protected by the police and some other men. The mob
abused Vajpayee, and moved towards the Press Club taxi stand, where
some DLY cars and taxis were burnt. When some foreign TV cameramen
tried to take pictures, they were prevented.
The mob then moved to the Congress (I) office on Raisina Road, where
they regrouped themselves. A part of the mob moved out from the office
premises towards Janpath crossing. There they entered the CBI office and
began breaking doors and windows with iron rods.
I saw a taxi coming. The mob stopped it and broke its windowscreen.
The driver pleaded that he was a Hindu, but the mob did not stop. Soon a
jeep with a Congress (I) flag came and a man got down. He gave some
instructions to the mob and left the scene. The mob then began moving in
another direction, and I left. During all these incidents, I saw the police
standing and watching without intervening at any stage.
5. Sudip Mazumdar, Journalist
The police commissioner, S.C. Tandon was briefing the press (about 10
Indian reporters and five foreign journalists) in his office on November 6, 6
pm. A reporter asked him to comment on the large numbef of complaints
Who are the Guilty - 44
about local Congress MPs and light weights trying to pressure the police to
get their men released. The police commissioner totally denied the allega-
tion and when questioned further he categorically stated that he has never
received any calls or visits by any Congress for that matter, any political
leader trying to influence him or his force. Just as he finished uttering these
words, Jagdish Tyler, Congress MP from Sadar constituency, barged of into
the PC’s office along with three other followers and on the top of his voice
demanded from the PC, “What is this Mr. Tandon ? You still have not done
what I asked you to do ?”
The reporters were amused, the Police Commissioner embarrassed.
Tytler kept on shouting and a reporter asked the PC to ask that ‘shouting
man’ to wait outside since a press conference was on. Tytler shouted at the
reporter : ‘This is more important’. However the reporter told the PC that if
Tytler wanted to sit in the office he would be welcome, but a lot of questions
regarding his involvement would also be asked and he was welcome to hear
them. Tytler was fuming. Perhaps realising the faux pas, he sat down and
said : ‘By holding my men you are hampering relief work’. Then he boasted
to some foreign reporters that, ‘There is not a single refugee in any camp in
my constituency. I have made sure that they are given protection and sent
back home’. However the incident left the PC speechless and the reporters
convinced about the Congress (I) interference in police work.
6. Rahul Kuldip Bedi, Indian Express
c/o Indian Express, Bahadur
Shah Zafar Marg, N. Delhi-2
The Lt. Governor, Delhi 5 November 1984
Dear Sir,
I am enclosing a complaint against three senior Delhi Police Officers
through sheer apathy and dereliction of duty became accessories to one of
the most gruesome massacres in post independent India.
I sincerely hope that you will take necessary action.
Yours truly,
Rahul Kuldip Bedi
cc : Union Minster (Home), Home Secretary, Govt. of India,
Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat,
Chief Security Advisor, Cabinet Secretariat,
UNI, PTI, Stateman/Times of India/HindustanTimes/Jansatta/
Patrol/Dainik Samachar/Navbharat Times/Telegraph/ Free Press/
Hindu/ All major newspapers and magazines.
Who are the Guilty - 45
c/o Indian Expres,
Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg,
New Delhi-110002
November 5, 1984.
To,
The Police Commissioner
Delhi Police
Delhi.
Dear Sir,
Following our meeting in your room at the Police Headquarters on Sun-
day, November 4, I wish to register a complaint of criminal negligence against
Mr. H.C. Jatav, IPS, Additional Commissioner of Police, Delhi and Mr.
Seva Das IPS, Deputy Commissioner of Police, East District, for being
responsible through their apathy and severe dereliction of duty for the mas-
sacre in Trilok Puri where over 350 persons were slaughtered in a carnage
lasting over 30 hours, ending on the evening of November 2. You agreed to
look into the matter.
The official figure of the number dead is 95 in Trilok Puri. The follow-
ing are the details of the negligence :
1. On learning of the massacre on 2 morning, I along with Mr. Joseph
Maliakan, reporters, Indian Express newspaper, rushed to Trilok
Puri at 2 pm. Around 500 meters away from Block 32 we met a
police rider and a constable coming form the block where the
killings were still taking place. Stopping the rider and asking him as
to what was going on inside the block, he told us that the situation
was quiet. Only tow people had been killed, he said.
2. On going further, our car was blocked by an angry mob who stoned
us and told us to leave or face the consequences. Block 32, they
said was out of bounds.
3. We went to the local Kalyan Puri Police Station, looking after
Trilok Puri and asked the Sub Inspector on duty for help in getting
into the beleaguered block around 3.30 pm. The Police officer said
that all was quiet in Trilok Puri as his rider had reported the same to
him. Besides, he said, he was short of men.
4. After seeking army patrols in vain, we arrived at the Police Head
quarters at 5 pm. Mr. Nikhil Kumar, manning the telephones in your
room, was told of the situation. He called the central control room,
two floors above; Mr. Nikhil Kumar did nothing to ensure that a
force had been sent other than make the telephone call to the
Who are the Guilty - 46
control room. He asked the control room to inform the captain on
duty inside the control room.
5. On reaching Trilok Puri at 6.05 p.m. we found the Kalyan Puri
Station House Officer (SHO) Mr. S.V. Singh accompanied by two
constables arriving in a Matador van; Mr. S.V. Singh said that he
had radioed his senior officers, specially his DCP, Seva Das. The
DCP was nowhere in sight till after 7 pm.
6. On returning to the police headquarters, we were told by Mr. Nikhil
Kumar that he had done his job by informing the control room.
Meanwhile Mr. Jatav, returning from a tour of the trans Yamuna
areas, including Kalyan Puri police station area (which includes
Trilok Puri) arrived in your room and declared that ‘calm’ prevailed
in his area. His DCP, Seva Das, he said, confirmed this.
7. When we stressed the urgency of the situation Mr. Jatav inquired
from Nikhil Kumar as to why he had not been told of the emer
gency as he was in his office a floor above at 5 pm, when the latter
had marely called the control room. Nikhil Kumar, had no answer,
other than parroting the fact that he had called the control room.
8. Mr. Jatav arrived at the spot around 7.45 pm, over 30 hours after
the killings began on November 1 around 10 am.
I hope suitable action is taken against these police office who through
dereliction on duty became accessories to the butchering.
Sd/- Sd/-
Joseph Maliakan Rahul Kuldip Bedi
Copy received by Subhash Tandon on 5.11.84
7. Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Advocate, Supreme Court of India
On our visit to Pandunagar Gurdwara oin November 3, we saw Mr.
Padam Sharma who identified himself as the DPCC (I) President. He tried
to sent us back saying, ‘Nothing is wrong’, ‘Everything is alright here’. But
since we had been to the Gurdwara a day earlier and wanted to see the
people who were hiding in the place, we insisted on going to the Gurdwara.
When we reached the Gurdwara, there were a large number of people
some of whose relatives were stranded in the colony across the road in
south Ganesh Nagar, and they were anxious that these people should be
rescued. We volunteered to rescue these people from South Ganesh Nagar.
But on our return the same crowed that had earlier guided us to the Gurdwara
turned violent and attacked the car with stones and rods. They said that we
were trying to fortify the Gurdwara and disturb the balance; this was not
Who are the Guilty - 47
going to be tolerated. This group was led by Mr. Padam Sharma. Later a
person from the crowd told us that Mr. Padam Sharma was organising
everything there as this was his constituency and that he did not like any
interference in his area.
Annexure III
Official Pronouncements and
News Reports on the Events
Wednesday, 31st October ’84
Who are the Guilty - 48
Official Pronouncements
Orders were issued late on
Wednesday evening for heavy po-
lice patrolling all over the city. Seciton
144 extended to the entire Union Ter-
ritory … Three companies of the
Delhi Armed Police have been sent
to each of the six police districts for
round the chock patrolling.
According to the notification is-
sued by the police these arrange-
ments will be in force till further or-
ders.- Staff Reporter. The Statesman,
November 1, 1984
The Government late on
Wednesday night alerted this army
and called out the Border Security
Force as the local police failed to
control the widespread rioting and
arson in different parts of the capital
following the assassination of Indira
Gandhi.
Report on Events
Five department, like the citizens,
received on assistance from the po-
lice who were not in evidence in any
of the trouble spots in the city. Dis-
tress calls to emergency numbers
(100) were either not answered or
callers were given the stock reply
that no help could be proffered.
- Express News Service, Indian
Express, November 2, 1984
Even the “deployment” of para-
military forces of the Central Re-
serve Police Force (CRPF) and the
Border Security Force (BSF), an-
nounced by the Government on
Wednesday evening, was nowhere
to be seen. “I have called CRPF and
BSF control rooms every ten min-
utes”, said a deputy officer at the
Nizammudin Police Station, ‘but
each time I am told that there is noth-
ing that can be done.”
- Express News Service, Indian
Express,
November 2, 1984.
Who are the Guilty - 49
A top-level review of the law and
order situation, involving the Prime
Minister’s Secretariat and Home
Ministry continued till late Wednes-
day night to decide on steps to arrest
the spread of sporadic violence in the
wake of Mrs. Gandhi’s assassina-
tion.
- Times of India, News Service
November 1, 1984.
Thursday, November 1, 1984
The Army was called out, indefi-
nite curfew clamped in the city ex-
cept in the New Delhi Police district
and soot-at-sight orders were issued
on Thursday evening after 60 people
were killed and 1000 injured in com-
munal violence following the assas-
sination of Indira Gandhi.
- Express News Service,
Indian Express,
November 2, 1984.
Mr. P.P. Srivastav, the Delhi Mu-
nicipal Corporation Commissioner,
said on Thursday that tap water in
the capital “is absolutely safe for
consumption.”
- PTI, Indian Express,
November 2, 1984.
Higher direction of the law en-
forcement machinery was clearly
lacking and the police was a mute
spectator to the mass violence…..
The Lt. Governor did not call out the
Army on Wednesday even though
the situation showed every sign of
going out of control. He took full 24
hours before doing so and clamping
curfew in some areas.
When the decision to call the
Army was taken on Thursday, the
force made available was only ad-
equate for a token presence. Rein-
forcement were brought in on Fri-
day and Saturday.
Meanwhile, looting and arson
continued.
- Devsagar Singh, Indian Express
November 4, 1984.
Local leaders in several areas
went around on Thursday night warn-
ing people over loud speakers, not to
drink water from municipal taps.
- The Statesman,
November 3, 1984.
Who are the Guilty - 50
Friday, November 2, 1984
Official Pronouncements
Fiddling with figures while the
city burnt, the Police Commissioner,
Mr. Subhash Tandon said at the end
of the day that “Fifteen may be 20
people have died in violation during
the day “To this the Lt. Governor
(Gavai) added “Things are under
control.”
- Express News Service, Indian
Express, November 3, 1984.
Report on Events
Murders led to massacres in the
capital on Friday, one of the bloodi-
est days in the history of Delhi. Hun-
dreds were killed. There was no
count.
The population of whole colonies
was wiped out. At least 500 persons
were killed in East Delhi alone, the
bloodiest place on the day of sense-
less slaughter.
About 200 bodies were lying in
the police mortuary at Tis Hazari.
Reporters saw at least 350 bod-
ies on one street in Trilokpuri.
There were occasional signs of
important Army Officers without any
sanction to check the violence all
around them. The Army have no au-
thority to open fire.
- Express News Service, Indian
Express, November 3, 1984.
Policemen criticised the role of
politicians too. Several councillors
they alleged, interceded on behalf of
violent mobs when policemen tried
to stop arson. Officers wondered
what Mr. Kamal Nath was doing at
Rakabganj.
Besides non-imposition of cur-
few, there was criticism of the lack
of crisp commands from the top.
“Senior Officers only asked what
was wrong over the wireless with-
out once suggesting what could be
done”, one officer said.
- The Statesman,
November 3, 1984.
Who are the Guilty - 51
Saturday, November 3, 1984
Official Pronouncements
The curfew imposed in five of
the six districts of Delhi on Novem-
ber 1 night was relaxed from 9 a.m.
to 8 p.m. today.
- The Times of India
November 4, 1984.
Report on Events
A visit to Mangolpuri on Satur-
day afternoon showed armed groups
of people moving about … States-
man reporters saw people carrying
away the corpse of a child in the area.
On the main street in the Colony, a
corpse could be seen burning on the
footpath....
A reconstruction of what hap-
pened in Mangolpuri would suggest
that police, despite being present at
a checkpost on one end of the colony
and in the lines of the 9th battalions
of the Delhi Armed Police on the
other, could not summon up the nerve
to go inside the colony ...... When
Statesman reporters visited the
Bhogal area (South Delhi) on Satur-
day afternoon, smoke could be seen
from a distance. Policemen and
Army Jawans denied there was and
trouble in the area even as a motor
parts shop could be seen being looted
a few yards ahead.
Here (Bhogal) and elsewhere,
people of all communities agreed that
there had been amity between all
through and that organised gangs of
criminals from neighbouring colonies
and elsewhere had indulged in vio-
lence…. In Bhogal, two sub-
ordinate police officers were said to
have instigated rioters.- The Statesman, Staff Reporter
November 4, 1984.
Who are the Guilty - 52
The Army had moved into
most parts of Delhi by last evening
but the deployment reached full
strength only after the 3,000 troops
and the vehicles reserved for the fu-
neral were made available for con-
trolling the communal violence.
- The Telegraph, Seema Mustafa,
November 4, 1984.
The Executive Magistrates have
been empowered to order shooting
if necessary.
- The Economic Times, Staff Reporter,
November 4, 1984.
The Police Commissioner, S.C.
Tandon claimed that there was an
improvement in the overall situation.
- The Economic Times, Staff Report,
November 4 1984.
The Police Commissioner, Mr.
S.C. Tandon, today ordered an en-
quiry into reporters of large number
of deaths in Mangolpuri in mob vio-
lence since yesterday. The enquiry
will be conducted by an officer of
the rank of a deputy commissioner
of police…. The Police Commis-
sioner said that efforts were being
made to verity the claims of the resi-
dents that the violence in these ar-
eas was “organised the followed a
set-pattern”.
- The Times of India,
Staff Reporter, November 4, 1984.
Sunday, November 4, 1984
Official Pronouncements
In a swift and sudden move fol-
lowing large-scale violence in the
Report on Events
Who are the Guilty - 53
Over 300 people suspected to
have looted property have been
rounded up by the Central districts
police. The Congress-I leaders in-
cluding the local M.P., Mr. Dharam
Dass Shastri, came to the Karol Bagh
Police Station to protest against the
police action.
Mr. Dharm Das Shastri just said
“Let them take away recovered
property, but there is no need to ar-
rest. These people are not criminals”.
- Express News Service, Indian
Express, November 6, 1984
Seven trans-Jammu refugee camps
overflowed with around 25,000 Sikhs
from East Delhi on Monday.
The Administration which has not
opened even one relief camp in the
worst affected area in the city was
moving ponderously, providing mini-
mal aid. Voluntary agencies were,
however, operating in full swing.
- Express News Service, Indian
Express, November 6, 1984
capital, the Union Government last
night announced Mr. Wali’s appoint-
ment in place of Mr. P. G. Gavai, who
has proceeded on leave.
- PTI, The Economic Times,
November 5, 1984.
The Lt. Governor, Mr. M.M.K.
Wali, in his first meeting with the
pressmen after assuming charge ear-
lier in the day said “no measure will
be harsh enough” to prevent fresh
trouble.
…Mr. Wali said that 1, 809 people
had been arrested on charges of ar-
son, rioting and some for breach of
the prohibitory orders.
- The Economic Times,
November 5, 1984.
Mr. Wali said about 20,000 people
had been given shelters in five relief
camps and the administration was
providing free cooked food and medi-
cal aid.
- The Economic Times,
November 5 1984
Arrangements to provide cooked
food to the people in the relief camps
and rescue homes have been made.
They would also be provided blan-
kets and mattresses to spend the
night in some comfort. Medical re-
lief was also being provided to people
living in the relief and rescue camps.
- The Times of India, Staff Reporter,
November 5, 1984
Who are the Guilty - 54
Tuesday, November 6, 1984
A total of 2, 517 arrests had been
made. He (Wali) was unable to give
the number of people who had since
been released on’ bail but pointed out
that bail was a right of every citizen
in particular cases.
The police “had denied” that po-
litical pressure was being brought
upon them as far as making recov-
eries as far as making recoveries
was concerned, he added.
- The Statesman, Staff Reporter
November 7, 1984
Talking to newsmen on Tuesday,
the Lt. Governor of Delhi. Mr.
Madan Mohan Kishan Wali said that
a scheme has been drawn up for re-
lief and rehabilitation… Mr. Wali said
the compensation was only a token
but most of the houses destroyed or
damaged were in resettlement colo-
nies and outlying areas and this
amount would at least enable the
people to put up liveable structures.
- Express News Service,, Indian
Express, November 7 , 1984
Many police officials complained
that his drive was not moving into
top gear because of political pres-
sure. When the Commissioner of Po-
lice was talking to the Press, a local
MP barged in and started shouting
something about his “instructions
being ignored”
Until Tuesday night, there was
no sign of the Government’s pres-
ence at the Tilak Nagar Gurudwara
which is sheitering over 1,000 people
from Uttam Nagar, Nangloi,
Najafgarh, Govindpuri, and
Manglopuri…
The Gurudwara, however, is un-
able to cope with this sudden influx
of people and as in most other such
camps, the sanitation is particularly
inadequate.
- Express News Service,, Indian
Express, November 8, 1984
Who are the Guilty - 55
Annexure IV
List of People Identified by Survivors
1. Politicians
The following is the list of those alleged to have instigated violence and/
or protected alleged criminals.
1. Mr. H.K.L. Bhagat, Minister of State (I & B). On November 5,
reported to have intervened to get miscreants released who were
held in Shahdara Thana.
2. Babu Ram Sharma, Member, Municipal Corporation (Ward No.
58) reported to be the right-hand man of H.K.L. Bhagat. Report
edly responsible for loot, arson and murder in trans-Yamuna areas-
Babarpur, Chajupur Colony, Maujpur, Gonda. Allegedly led people
on motor cycle with megaphone.
3. Sajjan Kumar, Congress MP from Mangol Puri. Reported to have
paid Rs. 100 & a bottle of liquor to each person involved in killing.
4. Lalit Makan, Cong. (I) Trade Union Leader and Metroplitan Con
troller. Reportedly paid to mob Rs. 100 each plus a bottle of liquor.
A white Ambassador car reportedly belonging to him came 4 times
to the G.T. Road area near Azadpur. Instructions to mobs indulging
in arson were given from inside the car.
5. Dharam Das Shastri, Cong. (I) MP from Karol Bagh. Reported to
be carrying voters list with him at Prakash Nagar for identification
of Sikhs. On November 5, according to newspaper reports, he along
with other Congress-I leaders tried to pressurize the SHO of Karol
Bagh Police Station to release the persons who were arrested
during the police raids to recover looted property.
6. Jagdish Tytler, Cong. (I) MP from Sadar Constitutency. On 6th
November 5 pm he barged into a press conference that the Police
Commissioner S.C. Tandon was holding. A journalist reports that
he told the Police Commissioner that “by holding my men you are
hampering the relief work”.
7. Mahendra, Metropolitan Councillor. Reported to have accompa
nied Dharam Das Shastri with voters lists at Prakash Nagar.
8. Mangat Ram Singal, Member of Municipal Corporation (Ward No.
32) was reportedly with Dharam Das Shastri and Mahendra at
Prakash Nagar.
Who are the Guilty - 56
9. Dr. Ashok Kumar, Member of Municipal Corporation, Kalyanpuri.
Reportedly held a meeting in Kalyanpuri, following which violence
broke out immediately. According to many eye witnesses he led
mobs which indulged in loot, murder, arson and rape.
10. Sukhan Lal Sood, Metropolitan Councillor. According to eye
winesses was seen leading mobs, which indulged in loot, arson,
murder and rape. He had come with petrol and serial lists and
addressees of Sikhs in the locality. He came to Shakarpur relief
camp to distribute sweets among the refugees. The women
refugees, recognized him and drove him out.
11. Jagdish Chander Tokas, Member of Municipal Corportion Munirka
(Ward No. 14) reportedly led a mob to R.K. Puram Sector IV & V.
12. Ishwar Singh, Member, Municipal Corporation, Mangolpuri (Ward
No. 37). Allegedly led the mobs that indulged in looting, burning,
rape and murder in Mangolpuri area.
13. Balwant Khokhar, Youth Congress-I Leader, Delhi, identified as
one of the persons responsible for instigating looting and arsons in
Palam Colony area.
14. Faiz Mohammad, Youth Congress-I, leader Delhi named by
refugees in Shakurpur camp and in Mangolpuri for being a part of
the mob including in looting, arson and murder.
15. Ratan, Youth Congress - I leader, Delhi named as having taken part
in violence and looting in Palam Colony area.
16. Satbir Singh, Youth Congress - I. He allegedly brought bus loads of
people from Ber Sarai to Guru Harkrishan Public School (Munirka).
They burnt school buses and parts of the school building. He was
reportedly involved in looting and beating of Sikhs which carried
on throughout the night on November 1.
II. Police
The following is the list of police officials allegedly responsible for neg-
ligence of duty and/or abetment of participation in violence :
1. Malhotra, ACP, East District at Shakarpur (under Shakarpur P.S.)
Reported to have invited mobs. Heard to say “you should have
blown up the Gurdwaras in addition to killing Bhatia (Cong-I worker,
Trilochan Singh Bhatia) of M block, Shakarpur. Mob was accom
panied by Malhotra, who moved with one jeep, station-wagon, two
men with sten-guns and revolvers, petrol-cans and stones. He
supplied weapons to the mob, according to eye-witness accounts.
Who are the Guilty - 57
Reportedly incited mobs at Laxmi Nagar, Guru Angad Nagar
(under Shahdara P.S.)
2. Jai Singh, S.H.O., Allegedly told mobs in troubled area that they
could do what they wanted for three days.
3. Rao Ram Mehar, S.H.O. at Shakarpur reportedly pointed out Sukh
shops and houses to the mob.
4. Hari Ram Bhatti, S.H.O. Sultanpuri P.S. reported to have helped
the mob by disarming the Sikhs. On November 1 and 2 it is alleged
that he himself killed them. On 3 and 4 reported to have had the
Sikhs shaven at gun point.
5. Ravtas Singh, S.H.O. Sadar Thana. Reportedly borke into houses
and indulged in arson.
6. Survir Singh, S.H.O. Kalyanpuri, P.S. He reportedly reached Triilok
Puri (under Kalyanpuri P.S.) at 2.30 p.m. on November 1, when
plunder and killing were going on. He immediately removed head
constable and another constable from the spot, thereby giving the
mob full license to indulge in arson, rape and killing.
7. R.D. Singh, S.I. Information from refugees at Durgapuri Gurdwara,
Loni Road that he abetted mobs, personally beat up and killed people.
8. S.H.O. and Constables, R.K. Puram Sector IV P.S. According to
eye witness account when appealed to by two residents of Ber
Sarai to protect a Sikh family being attacked by a mob in Sector IV
they categorically refused. Further, they are reported to have
delcared that Sikhs should be killed.
The following are the names of other police officials reported to have
abetted/participated in violence in the mentioned areas :
9. Tyagi, S.H.O. in Trilok Puri.
10. Rana, Inspector-in-Trilok Puri.
11. Moolchand, S.I. in Shakarpur.
12. Bakshi, A.S.I. in Trilok Puri.
13. Rajiv Singh, Head Constable, Kalyan Puri, P.S. Trilok Puri.
III. Others Involved
The following is the list of persons allegedly involved in looting arson
and other criminal activities :
Trilok Puri
Block 5 :
1. Papita, one of the ring allegedly involved in murder.
Block 12 :
Who are the Guilty - 58
2. Brahmani (Misrani) Shastri
3. Baleshwar Bhargi alias Bhalu.
4. Bal Kishan
Block 21 :
5. Bihari Dhobi.
Block 25 :
6. B.D. Sharma.
Block 27 :
7. Israi Ali (alias Chunnu).
8. Salim, well know goonda, allegedly involved in murder
9. Massa, opium dealer.
Block 28 :
10. Dr. Yahya Siddiqi, clinic main road block 27, reportedly led the mob.
11. Manu Singh, shop-keeper.
12. Soni, Railway worker.
13. Mukesh, reportedly involved in loot and murder.
Block 29 :
14. Mukri Master, Tailor, allegedly involved in murder.
Block 30 :
15. Om Praksh (Omi), Mason, allegedly involved in murder.
16. Ved Prakash (brother of Om Prakash). Handpump Mistri, allegedly
involved in murder and rape.
17. Nur Jahan, reported to have incited Muslims by spreading the rumours
that mosques have been burnt by Sikhs.
18. Keramat, dealer in Cement.
19. Shabnam, TV shop owner.
20. Damesh
21. Punju.
22. Salim allegedly involved in murder.
23. Abbas son-in-law (see Abbas in Block 32).
24. Mukri, video shop owner.
25. Hasin.
Block 31 :
26. Kamaruddin, Atta-Chakki shop owner, and Furniture dealer.
27. Niyamat Ali.
28. Ninav, Tea shop owner.
29. Dr. V.P. Singh
30. Duli Chand, local leader.
31. Rampal Saroj, Pradhan and Congress - I worker. Allegedly responsible
Who are the Guilty - 59
for killing of Gopal Singh, Ranjha Singh, Mekal Singh. Other charges
against him are instigation, rape and burning.
32. Kishori Lal and his four brothers, Sharawan, Shriya, Chhote, Kamal,
own a Meat shop. Allegedly responsible for killing of Hukum Singh,
Tirath, Sajjan Singh, Soma Singh, Tara Singh.
33. Jagga Sansi and wife Draupadi, allegedly responsible for burning,
murder and rape.
34. Khadak Singh Pradhan.
35. Gaffar Khan, Businessman dealing in Cement.
36. Babu Khan, owns a dairy.
37. Manu Sansi.
38. Aasim.
39. Somnath, allegedly responsible for killing of several persons including
Hoshiar Singh S/o Milap Singh and 3 young men whom he locked in the
house and killed later with other people.
40. Ajit.
41. Kadir.
42. Monga.
43. Sati.
44. Tello Sansi (Draupadi’s sister)
45. Ruplal, allegedly responsible for killing of Labh Singh, r/o 32/121.
46. Omi Chamar, Shoemaker.
47. Morari, owns grocery shop in Block-31.
48. Pahelwan (Brother of Rashid).
49. Bachchan.
50. Aziz.
51. Ansar.
52. Kallo Khan, Dhaba owner.
53. Abbas, owns cloth and chappal shop in Block-27.
54. Dr. Lambo.
55. Bahllo, Sells liquors.
56. Kayamat Ali.
57. Raju (Bhangi), Sweeper.
58. Jaggi.
59. Bhaya.
60. Murli Khan.
61. Sher Khan.
62. Raja Ram, Rickshaw Driver.
63. Bethis Ramesh
Who are the Guilty - 60
64. Bedu Ram, allegedly responsible for killing in 32/99 and 32/97.
Block 33 :
65. Pappu, allegedly responsible for murder.
66. Bhum, local goonda.
67. Gyano, student.
68. Mohammad, cycle shop owner.
69. Birju.
70. Zakir.
71. Kamal Singh, Rickshaw owner.
72. Munshi.
73. Rashi, Cycle Rickshaw shop in Block 32, allegdly involved in murder.
Block 34 :
74. Mahendru.
75. Ratan (brother of Mahendru).
76. Behem Sharma.
77. Mahendra Pal.
78. Sher Singh, shop keeper.
Block 35 :
79. Jeevan.
Block 36 :
80. B.B. Pandey.
Other Blocks :
81. D.R. Lakhani, Youth Congress - I.
82. Abdulla.
83. Two sons of Sitaram, milkman.
84. A Mulla, lives near Mosque in Trilokpuri, teaches children in Mosque.
Allegedly incited Muslims to go to burn two Gurudwaras of the locality.
85. Lakhan.
86. Rohtas, Land owner and Goala.
87. Rishi, Land owner and Goala.
88. Kripal, Land owner and Goala.
89. Brahm (Tea shop owner in Trilokpuri).
90. Chabban & Munim, cloth and Tailoring shop near Mosque. Allegedly
responsible for the death of Duleep Singh.
91. Babu Sharma.
Sultan Puri
92. A. Bagri, Pradhan.
93. Brahmanand Gupta, Pradhan.
94. Nathu Pradhan, Sweeper.
Who are the Guilty - 61
95. Udal Jat.
96. Owner of Hanuman Ration shop.
97. Gayanand,shop owner.
98. Ganpat, Shop owner.
99. Piria (Gujrati).
100. Gurbat Brothers.
101. Islam.
102. Rao.
103. Changa, Doctor.
104. Omi, auto-rickshaw driver.
105. Garib Das.
106. Vermanand, kerosene seller.
Block A-5 :
107. Hasla Ram.
108. Mangla.
109. Satbir.
110. Salam.
Block B-1 :
111. Pal Brahman.
112. Sambhu.
113. Khismvia.
114. Kumar.
Block C-3 :
115. Gopal & Brothers
116. Babbar & Father
117. Tiwari
118. Raghubir, sweeper
119. Pratap, sweeper
120. Wajiz
Block C-4 :
121. Barjilal & sons.
122. Kalaram and 2 sons
123. Prem Singh alias Prem Muchiwal, Property dealer
124. Jai Kishan, sweeper
125. Danny
126. Pappu
127. Raju
128. Ravikaran, Tailor
129. Kannaram.
Who are the Guilty - 62
130. Mohan Lal s/o Thekeda Komal
Block P-3 :
131. Tara Chand, Carpenter.
132. Master, Kerosene seller
133. Radhe Shyam, mechanic
134. Babu Lal, Vegetable seller
135. Brother of Sikandar
136. Gulab Singh, owner of Godown
Mangol Puri
137. Hardwari Lal, Mandal President
138. Narender Singh Congress-I Worker
139. Salim Qureshi, Congress-I worker belongs to Waqf Club
140. Shawkeen, Congress-I worker, belong to Waqf Club.
141. Malaram
142. Rajender of New Star Club
143. Shiv Charan
Maujpur, Gonda
144. Bhisno Joginder, Kerosene seller
145. Trilok, flour mill owner
146. Gupta, Paper seller
147. Delu Ram, Tailor’s Apprentice
148. Ram Kishan, Tailor’s apprentice
149. Bhola, milkman
150. Balbir, milkman’s son
151. Prem, Barber
152. Gyan Malwai
153. Narain’s son
154. Brahm
Shakarpur
155. Bhatia, Congress-I worker
156. Dogra, Congress-I worker
157. Mr. Singh, Congress-I worker
158. Lakshmi Dhoban, Mahila Samiti, allegedly instigated mobs to burn
Sikhs alive.
159. Mr. Ashwini, BJP worker
160. Satpal, owner of 3-star hotel on main Shakarpur highway.
161. Ashok Kumar, owns a flour mill in Shakarpur.
162. Ram Niwas Sharma
163. Rohtas Singh, Shakarpur Village.
Who are the Guilty - 63
Khajuri Khas
164. Kadam Singh, Panchyat Sarpanch
165. Nephews of Kadam Singh
166. Nambat Singh, owns Ration shop in the area.
167. Shyam Lal, retd ASI
168. Jai Singh kerosene seller
169. Jugnu
170. Parsa
Janak Puri
171. Pratap, Pradhan of Sagarpur, allegedly responsible for killing 22
members of the family of Budh Singh of Sagarpur near Janakpuri.
Block C :
172. Dabbu, sweeper
173. Kalia, sweeper
174. Upli, sweeper
175. Son Sasi
176. Mohan Sasi
177. Bhana Sasi
178. Raju, sweeper
179. Malaram, allegedly distributed free kerosene
Mandavali, Unchpur
180. Sachdeva, property dealer
181. Raj Kalia, Cement dealer
182. Gupta, alias Chakki, owns grocery store
183. Ram Prakash, worrks in Khadi Bhawan
184. Dr. Babbar 185. Dharam Pal
186. Kishan Dutt 187. Babu Ram
188. Lal Bahadur Mishra 189. Joshi
190. Mohninder Singh Bargdola 191. Pandit Tara Chand
192. Iswhar Chand Verma 193. Pandit Ram Niwas
R. Bazar
194. Kamal, Dhobi 195. David, Dhobi’s son
196. Vinayak Family
Wazir Pur Industrial Area
197. T.S. Bedi, Factory owner. On Nov. 1 he is reported to have organised
mobs from early morning which became active later. While his
own factory was left untouched, the neighbouring Crown Motors
factory belonging to Sardar Pyara Singh was gutted the same day.
Who are the Guilty - 64
Annexure V
Relief Centres Recognised
by Delhi Administration* Govt. Model School No.1 & 2, Ludlow Castle, Alipur Road
Population : 4,000
* Govt. Boys Hr. Sec. School, (Near Shyam Lal College) Shahdara
Population: 8,000.
* Police Station Farash Bazaar - Population: 1,000
* Sr. Boys Sec. School, Opposite Radhu Palace Cinema P.S. Shakurpur
Population: 1,200
* Bhai Mota Singh school “A” Block, Janakpuri - Population: 1,200
* Govt. Boys Sr. Sec. School, Shakurpur, Rani Bagh - Population: 3,000
* Govt. Girls Sr. Sec. School, Shakurpur - Population: 2,000
* P.S. Subzi Mandi - Population: 100
List of Camps Not Recognised
by Delhi Administration* Bala Sahib Gurdwara, Population : 5,000
* Nanaksar Ashram, Population : 3,000
* Durgapuri Gurdwara, Population : 2,000
* Jyoti Nagar Gurdwara, Population : N.A.
* Baba Banda Bahadar Singh Gurdwara Mehrauli, Population : 20
* Teliwara Gurdwara,Population : N.A.
* Hari Nagar Gurdwara, Population : 500
* Fateh Nagar Gurdwara, Population : 500
* Air Force Station Gurdwara, Subroto Park, Population : N.A.
* Sadar Bazar Gurdwara, Delhi Cantonment, Population : N.A.
* Gurudwara Singh Sabha, Jangpura Extension, Population : N.A.
* Panchsheel Park Gurdwara, Population : N.A.
* Pishouri Gurdwara, Tilak Nagar, Population : 1,800
* Pandav Nagar Gurdwara, Population : 1,500
* Open Sultan Puri Camp, Population : 1,000
* Vinod Nagar area Patpar Ganj, Population : 128
* Hans Raj Model School Camp, Krishna Nagar, Population : 126
* Kalyan Puri Block 13, Population : 300
* Shambu Dayal College, Ghaziabad, Population : 260
* Singh Sabha Gurdwara, Gurgaon, Population : N.A.s