WHITE PAPER OF COUNTERTERRORISM

STUDY OF CONTAINMENT OF BOKO HARAM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

‘DEKN International Security Crisis Group’

Dayana BobkoEllen Scherwinski

Katrin HegerNicole Struth

Dr. Matt Bonham12/03/2014

Department of Political Science

Background and Justification

Graph 1: Boko Haram attacks and violent deaths (2006-2013)

Boko Haram has its origin in the Borno region in the northeast of Nigeria and was founded by

Mohammed Yusuf in 2002. The group’s real name is the ‘Sunni Community for the propagation

of the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad’ (Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lidda’awati Wal Jihad) and was

solely nick-named Boko Haram (‘Western education is prohibited’). Devastating poverty, poor

governance, the sense of injustice and hopelessness among the population in the region were

contributing significantly to Boko Haram’s establishment. The strict enforcement of Sharia law

was seen as a way out of the hopelessness and back to social justice which was preached in the

radical lectures of Yusuf. Boko Haram believes in the total implementation of Sharia law, thus a

fundamental change in political regime is necessary since secular statehood and democracy

hinder Sharia law to completely take its place. While their primary focus is within Nigeria’s

borders, and as graph one illustrates most of their devastating violence has taken place in their

state of origin and surrounding states, their influence reaches into transnational territory in the

regions between northern Nigeria, the Republic of Niger, Chad and Cameroon, whose borders

they reject due to its origin in colonization by the United Kingdom, France and Germany (de

Montclos, 2014, p. 6-9).

Graph 2: The Boko Haram crisis: number of deaths caused by insurgents and security forces

Since 2009 Boko Haram has transitioned from its extreme ideology to extreme violence as well.

The graph above illustrates the spike of violence in 2009 when Yusuf was in police custody and

it led to the fragmentation of Boko Haram, its uprising and consequential state repression. This

violence escalated further when Boko Haram’s leader Yusuf was killed on July 30 th 2009 by

Nigerian security forces in public outside a police station. Since 2012/2013 there is an ever

increasing violence trend that emerged with the emergency rule in the states of Borno, Yobe and

Admawa. This emergency rule brought about an increased number of Nigerian forces in the

region that are accused of repression, continued massacres, extra-judicial killings and arrests

without trial which has led to an alienation of the population from the Nigerian soldiers with

increasing amount of people seeking protection from Boko Haram while not sympathizing with

them in the beginning. This also brought about a sharp alleged increase in Boko Haram fighters

from 4,000 in 2009 to about 6,000 and 8,000 in 2014 facing 15,000 Nigerian security forces on

the other side of the conflict (p. 15).

This development of Boko Haram from an extremist ideological group into a terrorist

organization took place rapidly in August of 2009, one month after Yusuf’s death when Imam

Abubkar Shekau claimed to have taken over Boko Haram’s leadership. His followers were all

experienced combatants and thus resembled more a terrorist organization than the ideological

sect with women and children in its midst that Boko Haram had been before. Violence took more

and more the form of sectarian violence following his takeover. Shekau instructed his followers

to target Nigeria’s’ security forces, false converters to Islam and alleged traitors. Boko Haram

also started its suicide attacks on UN buildings and churches, giving Christians a three-day

warning to convert to Islam or leave northern Nigeria. While the violence intensified, there

seemed to be no clear strategy to destabilize the state, however, and violence was directed more

towards local Christian minorities, responding to military assaults and persecuting its direct

opponents (p. 12-13). In August 2014 the took a more decisive step to achieve their political

goals and seeming more confident in their organization by proclaiming a ‘caliphate’ in the local

government area of Gwoza in Borno which is inhabited by around a quarter million people (p.

13).

In that sense, Boko Haram has always adapted to the circumstances, growing out of an economic

desperate situation, to a political transitioning force, to a religious sectarian movement and

finally to an extremist terrorist organization. However, the recent development of the Boko

Haram is cause for major security concerns: Terrorizing civilians with the killing and kidnapping

of hundreds of women and children, Boko Haram constitutes a major security threat to Nigeria

and the surrounding region.1 Official reports put the death toll at well over 4,000 since Boko

Haram began their violent campaign in 2009.2 Over the past several years the group has extended

its geographic reach and increased the sophistication and lethality of its attacks. The Nigerian

government has launched a substantial military offensive against the group but has neither been

able to rescue the abducted nor has it been successful at preventing further kidnapping. Pressure

on the Nigerian government increased, when in April 2014 the abduction of 200 girls from a 1 The group is now becoming a regional threat as well because of their actions in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. http://www.theafricareport.com/West-Africa/nigerias-boko-haram-becoming-a-regional-threat.html

2 See http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/09/world/boko-haram-fast-facts/

school attracted the attention of international media. Recently, Nigeria negotiated a ceasefire

agreement with the terrorist group but this diplomatic effort failed with Boko Haram kidnapping

another 30 children this week.

The US-Nigeria Bi-National Commission is the forum where both the US and Nigeria can

discuss their strategies and collaborate on the implementation annually. The recent developments

concerning Boko Haram and the Commission’s last meeting in September 2014 once more

showed us the pressing need for cooperation, especially with the new elections in Nigeria in

2015 coming up and the likely increased pressure from Boko Haram concerning these.

Current US Policy

Since the kidnapping over 270 girls from their school in Nigeria, the United States has worked

with the Nigerian government to cripple the ability of Boko Haram to continue their reign of

terror and ultimately dismantle the group. In October 2014, the United States released the most

recent information regarding their efforts to assist Nigeria in their crusade against the violent

group. This report indicates that the United States has offered a dynamic approach to dealing

with the threat in Nigeria through advisory support, sanctions, continued engagement with

governments, and support to affected populations.

Advisory Support

One of the most comprehensive forms of assistance provided by the United States is their offer to

share intelligence. At the beginning of this endeavor, the states had difficulty directly sharing

intelligence because there were no established protocols between the two governments.3 The

United States was hesitant to share this information because of alleged corruption in the Nigerian

3 Anne Gearan and Greg Miller, “U.S. eager to help Nigerian search for girls but cautious in sharing intelligence,” The Washington Post (May 15th, 2014). http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-eager-to- help-nigerian-search-for-girls-but-cautious-in-sharing-intelligence/2014/05/15/c5ad010e-dc5c-11e3-bda1-9b46b2066796_story.html

army. A deal was struck between the two states on May 19 th, 2014 which allowed the United

States to share all open source intelligence while raw intelligence will still be confidential.45

In addition to sharing intelligence, Nigeria will be provided with training on intelligence

gathering. It is likely that training for the Nigerian Army will consist of classroom instruction

detailing the intelligence process cycle used by the United States.6 The US will also provide

Nigeria’s army with technical assistance which includes military weapons.7

Advisory support by the United States will also involve a multidisciplinary task force team. This

team was deployed in May 2014 and is intended to advise the Nigerians on how to safely secure

the return of those who have been kidnapped and to encourage a comprehensive approach to

ensuring the security of the region. 8This team consists of a variety of individuals with a diverse

set of backgrounds that include civilian and humanitarian experts, members of the US military,

law enforcement advisers, experts on hostage negotiations, and those skilled in strategic

communication.9

Sanctions

The United States has also utilized sanctions in order to isolate Boko Haram by designating

members of their organizations as terrorists. They specifically singled out the group’s official

leader, Abubakar Shekau, and are offering up to $7 million for information that may lead to his

capture.10 In addition to this isolating the group, the designation of Boko Haram as a Foreign

Terrorist Organization allows US Law enforcement to pursue them. Also, the United States was

able to push the issue at an international level by persuading the UN Security Council to

designate the group as a terrorist organization.11

4 Open source intelligence is intelligence that has already been collected and analyzed. This is different that raw intelligence because raw intelligence has not yet gone through the process of being analyzed and interpreted for meaning.5Richard Sisk, “US Restricts Intel from Nigeria on Missing Girls,” military.com news (May 13th, 2014). http://www. military.com/daily-news/2014/05/13/us-restricts-intel-from-nigeria-on-missing-girls.html6Jesse Sloman, “How Can U.S. Intel Training Help Fight Boko Haram?’ Council on Foreign Relations (November 13th, 2014) http://blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2014/11/13/how-can-u-s-intel-training-help-fight-boko-haram/7The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government in its Fight against Boko Haram,” (October 14th, 2014). http://www.whitehouse.gov/the -press-office/2014/10/14/fact-sheet-us-efforts-assist-nigerian-government-its-fight-against-boko-.8The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government”.9The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government”.10The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government”.11The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government”.

Continued Engagement

The United States continues to engage the Nigerian government through programs aimed at

capacity building in certain sectors of law enforcement, military action, and citizen engagement.

There are three specific actions that have been taken on the part of the United States to combat

Boko Haram: the launch of the Global Security Contingency Fund, creating the Trans-Sahara

Counterterrorism Partnership, and the recent announcement of the Security Governance

Initiative.12

The intentions of the US State Department when launching the Global Security Contingency

Fund (GSCF) was to provide funding to assist in security and counterterrorism training, as well

as rule of law programs.13 In striving to observe its goals, the GSCF has pledged $40 million14 to

specific activities it believes will strengthen the resolve to combat terrorism in the countries

receiving the funds. One of these activities is intended to enhance military and security

capabilities regarding border and maritime security, internal security, and counterterrorism

efforts. Under this section the funds will be used to assist the government agencies that are

responsible for the aforementioned forces.15 The funds will also go to support Nigeria in any

operations that are consistent with US foreign policy regarding military action, actions aimed at

stability, and developing peace.16 Finally, the GSCF will fund ‘rule of law’ programs and

stabilizing efforts should the US determine that the capacity of citizens to adhere to the legal

constructs is challenged to instability or conflict.17

Nigeria is also part of the US-led Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism partnership (TSCTP). The

purpose of the (TSCTP) is to counter violent extremism by building up marginalized

communities so they can better resist radicalization and terror recruitment, as well as to combat

terrorism.18 Their current program is divided into 6 specialized areas: military capacity building,

law enforcement anti-terrorism capacity building, justice sector, public diplomacy, community

12 The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government”.13 Nina Serafino, “Global Security Contingency Fund: Summary and Issue Overview,” Congressional Research Service (April 44th, 2014). http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42641.pdf14 The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government”.15 Serafino, “Global Security Contingency Fund,” 4.16 Serafino, “Global Security Contingency Fund,” 4.17 Serafino, “Global Security Contingency Fund,” 4.18 Lesley Anne Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership: Building Partner Capacity to Counter Terrorism and Violent Extremism,” CNA Analysis and Solutions (March 2014), 1. http:// www. cna.org/ sites/default/files/research/CRM-2014-U-007203-Final.pdf

engagement, and vocational training.19 Military capacity building is intended to improve basic

skills military skills and communication as well as assisting to facilitate communication between

partner nations.20 Law enforcement anti-terrorism capacity building aims at building the local

law enforcement’s investigative capacity, improving their response to crisis situations, and

strengthening their ability to protect critical infrastructure and regions.21

The TSCTP focus on the Justice Sector hopes to strengthen counterterrorism legislation, counter

transnational organized crime, improve prison management, and increase partner’s judicial and

legislative capacity to deal with terrorists.22 For example, there is currently an effort in Nigeria to

establish a counter terrorist financing unit that will assist law enforcement.23 Public diplomacy is

used to conduct information operations that “promote moderation and tolerance, counter violent

extremist ideology, and encourage populations to report security threats to local law enforcement

agencies and the military.”24 Currently, military information support teams are working with the

Nigerian Army, current Nigerian policy, and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency to

educate the local populace about illegal activities and are encouraging them to report such

activities to local law enforcement.25

Community engagement through TSCTP works to involve many members of the Nigerian

society to work towards a shared goal of peace.26 USAID has created a program called Training

of Leaders for Religious and National Co-Existence (TOLERANCE). They hope this program

will work to enhance interfaith understanding and build trust between citizens within Nigeria.27

In Nigeria, USAID is also working on a project called Conflict Mitigation and Management

Regional Councils that will bring together influential citizens within religion, government, and

civil society in hopes of strengthening the collaboration between these groups in order to reduce

tensions.28 Finally, the TSCTP will provide vocational training in order to assist people in finding

jobs rather than having to turn to terrorist organizations to get by.29

19 Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership.”20 Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership,” 36-37.21 Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership,” 38.22 Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership,” 41.23 Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership,” 41.24 Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership,” 43.25 Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership,” 44-45.26 Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership,” 46.27 Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership,” 47.28 Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership,” 48.29 Warner, “The Trans Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership,” 48.

The most recent advancement of US policy in Nigeria is the announcement of the Security

Governance Initiative (SGI) at an African Leaders Summit meeting in August 2014.30 This

initiative will involve multi-year funding to assist in improving the current security sector

institutions within the state of Nigeria.31 It also has a goal of assisting in economic development

by continuing to strengthen security.32

Population Support

Support to the population is mainly provided by USAID. Currently, they are providing trauma

counseling to survivors to Boko Haram attacks. The role of the social workers involved in this

counseling is to sensitize the community in order to prevent a stigma against those who were

kidnapped.33 USAID is also working on launching the Nigeria Regional Transition Initiative

which aims to stabilize and strengthen democracy in Northern Nigeria where Boko Haram is

most prevalent.34 This effort works to build the capacity of communities who may be vulnerable

to extremist groups in their fight to resist the influence of groups such as Boko Haram. They plan

to do this by increasing dialogue between the government and citizens, assisting in providing

more credible information to the public, and providing support that will reduce the vulnerability

of youth towards extremist organizations.35

Critique of Current Policy

It has now been over a year since Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of

emergency in Nigeria. However it has shown little effect on limiting the Islamist insurgency of

Boko Haram. Boko Haram has instead increased its acts by attacking several military bases, 30 The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government”.31 The White House Office of the Press Secretary “FACT SHEET: Security Governance Initiative,” (August 6th, 2014). http://www.whitehouse.gov/the -press-office/ 2014/08/06/ fact-sheet-security-governance-initiative.32 Rob Prince, “AFRICOM – Lite: The Obama Administration’s Security Governance Initiative for Africa,” Foreign Policy in Focus (September 2nd, 2014) http://fpif.org/africom-lite-obama -administrations-security-governance-initiative-africa/.33 The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government”.34 The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government”.35 The White House, “FACT SHEET: U.S. Efforts to Assist the Nigerian Government”.

bombing public areas such as bus terminals and most publicly known, the kidnapping of more

than 200 school girls from Chibok. Therefore, policies need to be critiqued, re-evaluated and re-

implemented to achieve a high success rate.

Nigerian Army - Lack trust, equipment, training and motivation

Nigerian military and Civilian Joint Task Force (CJFT) has been has been noted on many

occasions for its corruption and human rights abuses. Recent images include military members

slitting throats of men one by one into a mass graves. This is not the image the military, who

should be protecting its citizens, to be sending to an already terrified public. It is also important

that the state of emergency that Boko Haram has caused does not give way to a state of

lawlessness. There needs to be a systematic reform to the Nigerian army in order to rebuild trust

with the Nigerian people.

Nigeria has had “decades of mismanagement resulting from military rule and corruption” which

Boko Haram used to grow a movement. We know is an adaptable state as it has thrived in a

constant state of flux. For supplies and weapons, the group relies on the Nigerian Army and local

extortion. It is evident that Nigeria could use more support and advice on managing a military.36

In addition to mismanagement, here are also divisions within the Nigerian military which could

have aided the development of Boko Haram; competition between the army chiefs and security

personnel. President Jonathan has admitted for the first time that mistakes have been made by

Nigeria in response to Boko Haram. Because of such divides and mistakes, Boko Haram has

been able to attack the Air Force base of Maiduguri, destroy the heart of Nigeria’s military

might, two helicopters. A united front needs to be created. No one part of the Nigerian army will

be able to tackle this program, it is a common threat and should be treated as such.37

Other areas which could use improvement include motivation and increased security on high risk

days for violence. Motivation in the military is also a large problem that should be addressed.

Salaries for the military are low and should be addressed. In addition, increased security on

public holidays and Christian holidays needs to be addressed, as more attacks seem to happen

during those times. For example, a prison break was carried out in Bauchi during Ramadan and

36 See http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140901BokoHaramPerousedeMontclos_0.pdf. 37 See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-25978785

two days before Eid al-Fitr in September 2010, the bombing of a church on the outskirts of

Abuja on Christmas Day in 2011, and a bomb attack in Kaduna during Easter 2012.

Nigerian security agencies do not have a track record of protecting civilians or informants and

Nigeria does not have witness protection programs. Local Muslim clerics no longer dare to

condemn the movement because they risk being killed. The upward trend in violence suggests

that the more security forces have intervened, the worse the crisis has become. The purpose of

the presence of the armed forces needs to change: the only sustainable way to combat Boko

Haram is to protect civilians. Without a reordering of priorities and visible efforts to regain the

trust of communities, Nigeria’s military will be caught fighting an interminable insurgency and

international contribution to combating Boko Haram will not be effective.

Economic Sanctions

Economic Sanctions will have little effect on curbing Boko Haram as their funding is mainly

internal. Boko Haram is funded mostly by bank robberies, extortion, other Al Qaeda groups and

ransom payments. Current economic sanctions could be kept in place, it is important to note that

they should be by no means the primary way to defeat Boko Haram. Again, the best way to

prevent Boko Haram from getting funds is to strengthen internal institutions like banks.38

Media: Boko Haram and Terrorist Classification

Although it is understood that classifying Boko Haram as a terrorist organization allows for a

broader variety of actions, legally, it may also be making matters worse. As a terrorist

organization, the attention they are getting in the media internationally in turn is causing them to

accelerate their efforts. They are getting an increased perception of power which is legitimizing

them, and making them more of a fear. It has been noted that Nigerian government armies are

afraid to venture into Boko Haram territory.

Boko Haram and Islam

It is important to discredit Boko Haram as a movement

38 See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27529566

- Boko Haram is ultimately aims at “bad Muslims.” Religious leaders worldwide should be

encouraged to be public that this is an incorrect interpretation of Islam. The actions of

Nigeria’s security forces have been a significant determinant in the trajectory of the

crisis. Since the July 2009 repression, continued massacres, extra-judicial killings and

arrests without trial have widened the gap between communities and the armed forces, to

the point where some civilians have sought the protection of Boko Haram, even if they

did not initially sympathize with, support or subscribe to the actions and doctrine of the

movement. As result of repression and forced conscription, the sect has allegedly grown

from 4,000 members in 2009 to between 6,000 and 8,000 in 2014, against 15,000 soldiers

deployed in Borno state.23

Summing up, Boko Haram is skilled at exploiting state institutional weaknesses; demoralized

and deficient security presence. However, any external actors seeking a more active engagement

in the crisis, for whatever reason, risk becoming entangled in what is ultimately a Nigerian crisis.

There, more management and governmental advice, support and training from the US can

increase effectiveness of Nigeria’s response to Boko Haram. The Nigerian army needs

strengthening by eliminating competition between military branches, eliminating corruption and

restoring a positive relationship with citizens. The Nigerian government needs to address

corruption within its state as addressing the reasons Boko Haram first started; a feeling of

injustice and hopelessness among its people.

Policy Recommendations

Boko Haram remains a national and regional insurgency and should be treated as such. It does

not pose a direct threat to the West and the US should thus maintain its policy of supporting and

advising the Nigerian government. In addition, any foreign military involvement is likely to

worsen the conflict since Boko Haram has strong resentments against the west. US boots on the

ground can thus be excluded as a reaction to Boko Haram on a short-term as well as on a long-

term basis.

US policies should be tailored towards five goals: First, they should provide immediate support

to the government in offering relief to victims of Boko Haram and tracking the kidnapped

children. The US government and its development agency USAID should for example assist the

Nigerian government in giving support to the displaced that fled over the Nigerian borders into

Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. USAID could further offer its expertise in coordinating

humanitarian agencies in the northern region in order to deliver aid effectively to those in need

(cf. Campbell 2014b, 21-22).

Second, the US should specifically support the Nigerian government in preventing future

kidnappings by implementing documentation tools.. One mechanisms would be to create a

committee which focuses on interviewing girls found from the previous captures. They will be

able to get an insider story and learn for the future how to combat these types of situations, and

what really was happening on the inside. Time will pass before some of the girls will escape and

be able to tell their story, however it is important to document the tragedies that have occurred to

prevent future ones from happening.

Third, policies should focus on strengthening the Nigerian government by re-establishing its

monopoly of force. The re-establishment of the monopoly of force can only be achieved when

the Nigerian security institutions are strengthened and regain both the trust of the population and

accountability with Boko Haram. The US administration should attempt to hold Nigeria

accountable for human rights violations committed by security forces (cf. Campbell 2014b, 20f.).

The US-Nigeria Binational Commission can be utilized as a forum for dialogue about human

rights issues and offers a diplomatic forum for the US to demonstrate that it is not only muslim

but also Christian human rights violations - as committed by the Nigerian government - that need

to be addressed publicly. These policies should be accompanied by long-term endeavors to

establish security service accountability. The US should encourage the Nigerian government to

stimulate public dialogue about military and police accountability and should advocate for

including NGOs in this debate. The US should lend its financial support to organizations such as

the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies in Kuru and the Center for Peace Studies at

Usman Danfodio University in Sokoto, which both do valuable work in this regard -8cf.

Campbell 2014b, 25). The US should further intensify its efforts to support the training of the

Nigerian security forces. Since corruption in the Nigerian military is high, the US should

consider advising the Nigerian government on starting to build up a new security force that could

be trained in the US. It would be imperative to pay them higher wages to increase their loyalty

and to prevent dissertation. Border security is another important aspect in the regaining of the

monopoly of force. Further, the US government is advised to keep up the provision of expertise

in the intelligence sector. The US should integrate Chad, Cameroon and Niger in efforts of

securing Nigeria’s borders, thereby preventing further spillovers in the region.

Fourth, although an ambitious aim, the US should campaign for “free, fair, and credible

elections” (Campbell 2014b, 21) in Nigeria and encourage NGOs to oversee the elections. The

US embassy in Abuja and the consulate in Lagos shall observe the usage of religious and ethnic

appeals in election campaigning in order to be able to predict the occurrence of potential

electoral violence.

Fifth, the US government should refrain from publicly comparing Boko Haram to ISIS or

relating the group to Al-Qaeda. The group has proven to be very flexible and adaptable to its

environment, which indicates that it does not follow a clear-cut agenda. Labelling them as a

terrorist organization might have pushed them towards more violent action and giving them too

much recognition and international attention might constitute a further motivating factor for their

actions.

Sixth, and most importantly, long-term development policies should be a focus, in order to tackle

the underlying causes of the emergence of Boko Haram. Economic inequality, corruption,

misgovernment, and religious tensions have brought about Boko Haram and its appeal of radical

thought. The international community has to adapt its ‘one-size-fits-all’ counter-terrorism

strategy and address the individual drivers behind the emergence of a radical group. The case of

Boko Haram and its unique development from a political movement to an insurgency requires

customized policies that include a high degree of local ownership in order to be successful (cf.

Campbell 2014a). A long term goal would be to eradication of corruption on all levels of

government. Since corruption traverses the whole administrative and political body, it is essential

to engage civil society and NGOs in anti-corruption efforts. The US should support these

organizations financially and invest in education programs, so that change is locally owned in the

maximum way.

References

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Graph Sources

Graph 1: Perouse de Monclos, AM (2014)

Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis, Chatham

House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Page 3

Graph 2: Perouse de Monclos, AM (2014)

Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis, Chatham

House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. Page 16