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When sanctions cause When sanctions cause non-cooperative behavior non-cooperative behavior in a social dilemma situation: in a social dilemma situation: a study using the “Industrial a study using the “Industrial Waste Waste Illegal Dumping Game”Illegal Dumping Game”
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas, Kyoto, JAPAN, August 20-24, 2009.Session 2: Structural Solution. August 21, 2009
Susumu OHNUMADepartment of Behavioral Science, Hokkaido University
e-mail: [email protected]
2
Implementation of surveillance and penalty in social dilemma
• Naïve economic theory says– Sanctions like surveillance and penalty would reduce
non-cooperative behavior as they change incentive, i,e, non-cooperative behavior become less profitable
– Only the cost for introducing sanctions is the issue in the second order dilemma
• Some social psychological studies in social dilemma say
– Surveillance and penalty are not always effective in reducing non-cooperative behavior
– Communication and sharing information are more important for cooperation (Dawes, et al, 1990; Orbell et al, 1988)
– However, few studies have shown sanctions decrease cooperative behaviorThis study demonstrates that penalty and surveillance
reduce cooperative behavior even when the cost is not taken into consideration
3
What is “Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game” (IWID-G) ?
• Simulated the problem of illegal dumping about industrial waste management in real world
–Some key social structures are evoked in IWID-G, e.g. responsibility to producing industries, obligation of management sheet, one way flow of waste etc.
• Explicitly inserted social dilemma structure–Every player is required to maximize own benefit, though there are
five different types of player and payoffs are different by the type–Every player can choose to be cooperative or non-cooperative,
though not the choice between one of the two but continuous function, and non zero sum• C: Appropriate process of industrial waste, paying enough commission
money• Non-C: Illegal dumping, not paying enough commission
–Time lag of the consequence of non-C• All players have to pay for environmental restoration expense according
to the amount of illegal dumping after all sessions have finished
Rule of the IWID Game (1)types of players and roles
Every player has to pay commission to the next player
The first management sheet The second management sheet
Money
waste
Money
waste
Money
waste
money
waste
Producing Industry The second carrierThe first carrier
Terminal Industry
Mid-process Industry
produce money and waste
Carry waste from producing industry to mid-process industryCan reduce waste
Carry waste from mid-process industry to terminal industry reclaim waste
in landfill
reclaim waste in landfill, but need
cost for it
Can reduce the waste, but need
cost for the reduction
Flow of bargaining of Waste
The first carrier The second carrierProducing industry
Mid-process industry
Terminal industry
waste
money
The first management sheet
The second management sheet
Appropriate process
The only player who can amass
capital in the game
Every player does not know about the payoffs of any other types of player each other.
Players who can move around are only carriers. Three types of industry cannot move around.
Flow of bargaining of Waste Illegal dumping
Anyone can do illegal dumping.Nobody knows that who did and how many have done the illegal dumping.
Illegal dumping is more profitable than following appropriate process for every individual in short term, but the more the
illegal dumping, the less the profit it brings to all players overall
Rule of the IWID Game (2)Social Dilemma Structure
Illegal dumping have impact on environment.All players have to pay for environmental restoration expense according to the amount of illegal dumping after all sessions have finished
Producing Industry The second carrierThe first carrier
Terminal Industry
Mid-process Industry
Rule of the IWID Game (3)producing industry
The first management sheet The second management sheet
Producer industry is fined much money if she/he fails to
obtain one of the first and second management sheets
Producing industry has to take on four times of environmental
restoration expense compare to the other players by illegal dumping
Producing Industry
The second carrierThe first carrierTerminal Industry
Mid-process Industry
The only player who can amass capital in the
game
responsible for responsible for managementmanagement
Experiment 1: manipulation of Experiment 1: manipulation of surveillancesurveillance
Three conditions are set to compare the effect of Three conditions are set to compare the effect of surveillancesurveillance
producer surveillance condition:producer surveillance condition:players of producing industry, who are the most responsible for managing the waste, could watch other players, keeping in touch with management sheets （ producers have incentive to reduce illegal dumping because they have to take on more expense for illegal dumping ）
G-men condition:G-men condition:a person called G-men, who are outside the industries, was watching around the players （ The reward of G-men is decided by the amount of illegal dumping, so that they have incentive to reduce illegal dumping ）
Control condition:Control condition:No surveillanceNo surveillance
9
Exp.1
10
Methods
• 3 games for each condition, 9 games in total, were conducted– 111 students participated in total
• 10 - 15 people participated per game– There are at least two persons in one type of
player, so as to have choices to hold a contract of commission
• all players are requested to maximize their property (received rewards based on the property after finished the game), except for G-men.
Exp.1
0
50
100
150
200
250
producerSurveillance
G-mensurveillance
control (nosurveillance)
amou
nt o
f ille
gal d
umpi
ng p
erpr
oduc
tion
unit
t（）
Result 1: amount of illegal Result 1: amount of illegal dumpingdumping
Illegal dumping was the most in producing industry surveillance condition
Exp.1
11
Results 2Results 2 ： ： change in illegal change in illegal dumping rate by session dumping rate by session
Rate of illegal dumping decreased accross session in all conditions, however, the decrease was lesser in producer surveillance condition
Exp.1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1 2 3 4 5 6
rate
of ille
gal dum
pin
g (%)
producer surveiilance G- men control
12
Results 3: earned commission by types of player
Earned commission money (s/10t) was less in producer surveillance condition, which indicates that players did not pay enough money for doing appropriate process to the next players
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1st carrer Mid-process I. 2nd carrier Terminal I.
rate
of c
omm
issi
on m
oney
per
10t
s（）
producer surveilance G-men control
Exp.1
13
payoff of producing industry
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0 1 2 3 4 5 session
rate
of in
form
atio
n re
cogn
itio
n (%
)
producer surveillance G- men control
payoff of mid-process industry
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0 1 2 3 4 5 session
rate
of in
form
atio
n r
ecogn
itio
n(%
)
producer surveillance G-men control
payoff of terminal industry
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0 1 2 3 4 5 session
rate
of re
cogn
itio
n(%)
producer surveillance G- men control
Information about industries was progressively shared accross session in all conditions, however, less shared in producer surveillance condition
Results 4: pattern of shared information process
Exp.1
14
“I fully touched base with other players”
4.13
4.62
5.11
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
producer surveillan G- men control (F=4.00,p<
(F=4.00, p<.05)
Results ： Questionnaire after game (average by 7-point scale)
“I behaved with considering environment”
3.34
4.62 4.72
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
producersurveillance
G-men control
(F=5.75, p<.01)
“I may do illegal dumping if it is not ill-disguised”
4.03
3.65
3.11
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
producersurveillance
G-men control
(F=2.82,p<.10)
“I’ d better to obtain the gain with illegaldumping, if I have to pay for environmental
restoration expense at all”
4.00
3.56
3.00
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
producersurveillance
G- men control
(F=3.04,p<.10)
Exp.1
Players had negative attitude toward cooperation in producer surveillance condition
Summary of Experiment 1Summary of Experiment 1
• We succeeded in demonstrating that surveillance does not decrease non-cooperative behavior, rather it brings negative effect
Prevention of mutual cooperation
Spiral of non-cooperation
If responsible person for management conduct surveillance
– Did not pay enough money– Did not share information– Focused on own benefit, not
on all players
We can interpret that surveillance frames players into self-focusing, i, e, players consider the situation as non-cooperation is default
Exp.1
16
CounterargumentCounterargument
In experiment 2, both surveillance and penalty are In experiment 2, both surveillance and penalty are implementedimplemented
To demonstrate that clearer penalty causes tragedy, To demonstrate that clearer penalty causes tragedy, spiral of non-cooperation spiral of non-cooperation
You may claim that surveillance had negative effect You may claim that surveillance had negative effect because there was no penalty which leads to because there was no penalty which leads to insufficient incentive. If there is strong penalty with insufficient incentive. If there is strong penalty with surveillance, who would do non-cooperative behavior?!surveillance, who would do non-cooperative behavior?!
Actually, it was observed that those who were Actually, it was observed that those who were detected having illegal dumping were left out of detected having illegal dumping were left out of business, which is regarded as a kind of penalty business, which is regarded as a kind of penalty
ButBut
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Experiment 2Experiment 2 ： ： implementation of implementation of penaltypenalty Three conditions are set to compare the effect of Three conditions are set to compare the effect of
surveillance and penaltysurveillance and penaltyPenalty condition:Penalty condition:
G-men who are outside of the industries was watching around the players. If G-men witness illegal dumping, the detected player was levied on a fine with 2S per 5t.
Surveillance only condition:Surveillance only condition:G-men who are outside of the industries was watching around the players. Even if G-men witness illegal dumping, the detected player does not levied on a fine (but will be reported to other players and may be left out of business)
Control condition:Control condition:There is no G-men, no person to watch around. If someone witnesses illegal dumping, the detected player does not levied on a fine
18
Exp.2
• 3 games for each condition, 9 games in total, were conducted– 121 students participated in total
• 11 - 15 people participated per game– There are at least two persons in one type of
player, so as to have choices to hold a contract of commission
• all players are requested to maximize their property (received rewards based on the property after finished the game), except for G-men.
Methods
19
Exp.2
100
125
150
175
200
225
250
penalty surveillance control
amount
of
illega
l du
mpi
ng
per
produ
ction (
t)
Results 1: amount of illegal Results 1: amount of illegal dumpingdumping
Illegal dumping was the most in penalty condition
Exp.2
20
Results 2: change in illegal Results 2: change in illegal dumping rate by sessiondumping rate by session
Illegal dumping did not reduce across session in penalty condition
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 1 2 3 4 session
amou
nt o
f ille
gal d
umpi
ng p
er p
rodu
ctio
n(t)
penalty
surveillance only
control
Exp.2
21
control condition
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1 2 3 4 session
amou
nt o
f ill
egal
dum
ping
(t)
Term. I.2nd Carr.Mid-P I.1st. Carr.Poroduce I.
Result 3: illegal dumping by types Result 3: illegal dumping by types of playerof player
penalty condition
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1 2 3 4 session
amou
nt o
f ill
egal
dum
ping
(t)
Term. I.2nd. Carr.Mid-P I1st. Carr.Produce I.
surveillance condition
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1 2 3 4 session
amou
nt o
f ill
egal
dum
ping
(t) Term. I.
2nd Carr.Mid-P I.1st. Carr.Produce I.
Producing Industry and First Producing Industry and First carrier did much illegal carrier did much illegal dumping in penalty conditiondumping in penalty condition
If you don’t trust the next If you don’t trust the next player, you’d better do illegal player, you’d better do illegal dumping by your own!dumping by your own!
Exp.2
22
Results 4: efforts to get Results 4: efforts to get information information (questionnaire after game)(questionnaire after game)
2
3
4
5
6
penalty surveillance control
"I tried to get sharing information abouttoher players payoff"
Total (G- men excluded)
Produce I.
Producing industry did not try to share information about the other players’ payoff in penalty condition
Many players, especially producing industry, tried to share information in control condition, which has no surveillance and no penalty
Exp.2
23
Summary of Experiment 2Summary of Experiment 2
• We succeeded in demonstrating that penalty is not necessarily reduce non-cooperative behavior, rather it brings about negative effects
If players are imposed on fine with surveillance
–Don’t pay enough money to next players
–Do illegal dumping by themselves, instead of commission
–Don’t make efforts to share information
It is interpreted that penalty frames the game as a distrust situation and reduces motivation for cooperation, especially for producing industry who has to trust all other types of player
If no penalty, such things do not take place
Exp.2
24
Spiral of non-cooperationdestruction of whole
system
ConclusionConclusion
25
We succeeded in demonstrating that penalty and surveillance reduce cooperative behavior even when the cost can be ignored
Thank you for your kind attention
Rule of the IWID Game (3)Mid-process and terminal industry
Appropriate process of reduction of waste and landfill give much less impact on
the environment than illegal dumping
Producing Industry The second carrierThe first carrier
Terminal Industry
Mid-process Industry
Mid-process industry can reduce the waste appropriately
but it takes cost for the appropriate reduction
Terminal industry can reclaim waste in landfill
appropriately but it takes cost for the appropriate landfill
Relation between appropriate mid-process reduction and landfill and profit for all players
010
2030
4050
6070
8090
1000
50
100
- 3000
- 2000
- 1000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
社会全体の利益
(
万円
)
埋立量( )トン
中間処理量( )トン
The more people follow appropriate process, the more profit all players
Sum
mat
ion
of p
rofit
for
all
play
ers
Amount of mid-process reduction
Amount of landfill
Rule of the IWID Game (5)mobility
Carriers are easy to obtain Carriers are easy to obtain information about other players’ information about other players’ payoff, while industries are difficult payoff, while industries are difficult to obtain such informationto obtain such information
Three industries cannot go to other
players’ area
The first and second carrier can move around everywhere in the room
Producing Industry The second carrierThe first carrier
Terminal Industry
Mid-process Industry
Waste
Money
The first manageme
nt sheet
The second managemen
t sheet
producer surveillance condition
Producing Industry
The second carrierThe first carrierTerminal Industry
Mid-process Industry
Producing industry can conduct surveillance by chasing management sheets
G
G-men condition
Producing Industry
The second carrierThe first carrier Mid-process Industry
Terminal Industry
Results: amount of illegal dumping by types of players
The second carrier and terminal industry in producer surveillance condition tend to do more illegal dumping because they received less money for appropriate process
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Produce I. 1st Carr. Mid- P I. 2nd Carr Term. I.amou
nt o
f ille
gal d
umpi
ng b
y pr
oduc
tion
unit
t（）
producer surveillance G- men surveillance control (no surveillance)
32
Exp.1
Results 5: self reported Results 5: self reported cooperationcooperation(questionnaire after game)(questionnaire after game)
2
3
4
5
6
penalty surveillance controlI cooperated with same type of
players
total (G-men excluded)Produce I.
Producing industry cooperated with neither same type nor other types of players in penalty condition
2
3
4
5
6
penalty surveillance controlI cooperated with other types of players
total (G- men excluded)Produce I.
Exp.2
33
