What Women Want:

Suffrage, Gender Gaps in Voter Preferences and Government Expenditures

Patricia Funk

SITE - Stockholm School of Economics

Christina Gathmann

Stanford University

This Draft: July 2006

Abstract

This paper combines unique individual-level information on ballot votes with state-level data onexpenditures to provide new evidence on how women suffrage has affected government spending. Usingdata from the last country in Europe to adopt suffrage, Switzerland, we demonstrate two main results.First, women suffrage has changed the scope of government much more than its size. Women are morelikely to support expenditures for public goods like environment and public transport, but opposedefense spending and subsidies for agriculture. Second, the political gender gap has shifted over time.While women were equally likely than men to support publicly provided health and welfare servicesshortly after suffrage adoption, their demand for these services has increased over the past two decades.We calculate that ten years after women suffrage, total expenditures are around 7 percent lower thanprior to adoption, while welfare expenditures are 10 percent higher.

Keywords: Women Suffrage, Fiscal Policy, Voter Preferences, Switzerland

*Correspondence: Patricia Funk, Stockholm Institute for Transition Economics (SITE), Stockholm Schoolof Economics, Email: Patricia.Funk@hhs.se; Christina Gathmann, Department of Economics and StanfordCenter for International Development, Stanford University, Email: cgathman@stanford.edu. We thank ReneeAdams, Ulf Axelson, Erik Bergloef, Doug Bernheim, Francine Blau, Tore Ellingsen, Daniel Ferreira, MariassuntaGianetti, Henning Hillmann, Helena Svaleryd, Michele Tertilt, seminar participants of the Stockholm Instituteof Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, University of Uppsala, University of St. Gallen,Stanford University and the Midwest Political Science Association for useful comments and suggestions. Weare grateful to Werner Seitz, Magdalena Schneider and Elisabeth Willen from the Swiss Bureau of Statistics,Andreas Ladner, Klaus Armingeon, Hans Hirter and Christian Bolliger from the University of Berne and FrancoisLoretan from SIDOS for invaluable help in collecting the data. Patricia Funk gratefully acknowledges financialsupport from the Swedish Research Council Vetenskapsradet.

1 Introduction

A dramatic expansion of the electorate occurred when women received the right to vote. Since women

suffrage roughly doubled the size of the electorate, we would expect government to take quite a different

form, if women have different policy preferences than men.1 Proponents of the anti-suffrage movement

even argued that suffrage would destroy families, decline the quality of elected politicians or have a

negative influence on the business climate (see Jones, 1991 and Banaszak, 1996).

Despite these drastic predictions, surprisingly little is known about the actual policy response to

women suffrage. For the United States, Lott and Kenny (1999) report that women suffrage caused a

substantial increase in the size of government between 1870 and 1940. In sharp contrast, Aidt et al.

(2006) find that female franchise had little effect on expenditures in several European countries in the

late 19th and early 20th century. All previous studies rely on aggregate national or state-level data,

and cover time periods with limited data availability.

This paper makes use of individual voting choices to analyze differences in political preferences

between men and women directly. The richness of the data allow us to distinguish between political

gender gaps in different policy areas, for example preferences for unemployment insurance from pref-

erences for agricultural subsidies. We combine our individual-level evidence with a detailed aggregate

analysis of the fiscal policy responses to women suffrage. This allows us to check the consistency of

our results using two very different data sources and assess potential concerns of omitted variables in

the aggregate data.

Our empirical analysis focuses on Switzerland, which provides a unique empirical setting to analyze

voter preferences and the effects of women suffrage.2 While Switzerland was one of the first countries1Gender has been found to matter in India: female policy makers invested in projects directly relevant to the needs

of their own genders. Depending on the regional area, female leaders allocated resources to drinking water and roadsdifferently than men; see Chattophadhyay and Duflo (2004).

2Previous studies on Switzerland have also found conflicting results. While Abrams and Settle (1999) document anincrease in federal welfare spending in Switzerland after 1971, Stutzer and Kienast (2005) find a negative correlationbetween women suffrage and cantonal spending.

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to extend the economic franchise (1848), it was the last country in Europe to extend the franchise

to women. Women suffrage was introduced at the federal level in 1971, more than half a century

later than in the United States and many European countries. Switzerland also has wide-ranging

possibilities for direct democratic participation through voter initiatives and mandatory or optional

referendums. Both late adoption and its strong direct democratic tradition provide us with rich data

to study political preferences and fiscal policy effects of women suffrage.

To analyze gender gaps in voter preferences, we use novel survey data on voting behavior in almost

200 ballots since 1981 covering policy areas like health care, unemployment insurance, defense or

subsidies for public transport. The data allow us to study actual voter support for policy projects

with predictable and often sizeable financial consequences.

Our results suggest that women are more supportive of government intervention in some areas,

but oppose them in others. Women consistently support higher expenditures for the environment and

public transport, but oppose spending for defense or subsidies for agriculture. We also document a

shift in voter preferences over the past three decades: while women are more conservative than men

in the 1970s, women turn more left-wing and men more conservative during the 1980s.3 This shift

in preferences has lead to an increase in women’s demand for government in the areas of health and

welfare.

While female political preferences had a strong influence on the types of expenditures supported

by the electorate, their effect on the size of government is small: between 1981 and 2003, women were

two percent more likely to support more government spending. Focusing on the ballots where women

actually changed the results, we calculate that women preferences increased government spending by3In the United States, women voted more conservative than men at least until the presidential election of 1964.

Berman (1993) also provides evidence that women in Arizona were less supportive of a progressive labor package andthe abolishment of the death penalty, but more supportive of the prohibition in 1914 to 1916. A reversal in the politicalgender gap started to appear in the 1980s when women were much more likely to support Democratic candidates in theUnited States. A similar shift has been observed in Europe where women became more likely to support left-wing partiesin Europe than men since the 1980s (see Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2004; Edlund and Pande, 2002; Seltzer et al., 1997 forthe United States. Inglehart and Norris, 2003 and Norris, 2003 for evidence from other countries).

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just 1.1 percent over that period.

We complement our analysis on voter preferences with state-level data set on government spend-

ing and canton characteristics from 1950 to 2000. In line with our evidence that women are more

conservative upon adoption, we find that spending at the canton level decreased by about 3 percent

after women suffrage was introduced. The negative adoption effect is particularly large for welfare,

health and education expenditures. We also show that the long-run effect of women suffrage is con-

sistent with our documented change in political preferences. While social expenditures decline upon

adoption, they increase with the number of years since women suffrage adoption. Even twenty years

after women suffrage was adopted, overall expenditures are lower than prior to adoption.

We perform several specification tests to demonstrate the robustness of our results. First, we show

that the negative adoption effects are not driven by endogeneity bias. An analysis of the adoption

decision at the canton level reveals that support for women suffrage is driven by a combination of time-

invariant cultural differences and an aggregate upward trend in favor of women suffrage. We provide

additional evidence that neither differential trends in male preferences nor government spending prior

to adoption can explain support for suffrage among the male electorate. In addition, we show that

our results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables and changes in female turnout

behavior over time.

The paper makes several contributions to the literature. We show that the fiscal policy effects of

women suffrage are closely tied to the evolution of aggregate voter preferences. Both data demonstrate

that women suffrage affected the scope of government much more than its size. We also for the first

time provide evidence that suffrage resulted first in a negative and later a positive effect on health

and welfare expenditures.4

We contribute to the literature on the political gender gap in two ways. First, we provide evidence4Edlund and Pande (2002) trace women’s shift to the left to increasing divorce rates. Their model implies dynamic

suffrage effects that are consistent with our empirical evidence.

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that women and men systematically differ in which government expenditures they support. Our focus

on actual policies with direct financial consequences allows us to link revealed preferences to actual

spending patterns at the state level. In contrast, the literature on political gender gaps largely focuses

on hypothetical questions from opinion polls, which makes it difficult to assess the actual consequences

of changes in electoral rules like women suffrage.5

Second, our results on the reversal of the gender gap in recent decades confirms similar findings for

other countries. However, previous studies have focused on the political gender gap measured along a

single left-right scale or as the relative support for Democratic presidential candidates. We go beyond

this literature in providing evidence that the shift in preferences has mostly affected the demand for

health and welfare expenditures with little change in other policy areas like agriculture, transport or

environment.

The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides some background information on the

introduction of women suffrage in Switzerland. Section 3 analyzes male and female voter preferences

for the size and scope of government using data on federal ballots. The results of women suffrage on

fiscal policy in the cantons are reported in Section 4. Section 5 shows that the canton-level results

are robust to concerns about endogeneity, the inclusion of additional controls and changes in female

turnout behavior over time, while Section 6 concludes.

2 The Long Road to Women Suffrage

Switzerland was among the last countries in Europe to introduce voting rights for women. Women

suffrage at the federal level was granted in 1971, half a century later than in the United States and

many European countries.6 A first attempt to introduce suffrage at the national level was undertaken5Studies on the potential sources and determinants of the political gender gap include Alvarez and McCaffery (2003),

Conover (1988), Gidengil (1995), Inglehart and Norris (2003), Norrander (1999), Schlesinger and Heldman (2001), Shapiroand Mahajan (1986) and the papers in Mueller (1988).

6For example, women suffrage was adopted in Finland in 1906, in Denmark in 1915, in 1918 in Germany; Austria,Poland and Russia. Spain and Portugal followed in 1931. France and Italy adopted suffrage in 1945.

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in 1929, when a petition signed by 250,000 citizens was sent to the federal parliament. However,

neither the government nor the parliament reacted to the petition in support of suffrage.

Since an extension of the franchise required a change in the Swiss constitution, the male electorate

had to approve it in a referendum. The first national referendum on the introduction of women suffrage

in Switzerland was held in 1959. It failed as just one out of three men voted for the adoption of women

suffrage. The second national referendum in 1971 in contrast passed with almost two-thirds voting in

favor of it. Still, in eight out of the twenty-five cantons, less than fifty percent of men voted for its

introduction.

There was also substantial heterogeneity in the adoption of women suffrage at the canton level.

First attempts to introduce women suffrage at the cantonal level failed in Neuchatel, Basle City,

Glarus, Zurich, Geneva and St. Gallen in 1920/21. The first column in Table 1 shows that women

suffrage was adopted earlier in the French-speaking parts of Switzerland. In contrast, the two German-

speaking cantons (Appenzell-Ausserrhoden and Appenzell-Innerrhoden) introduced suffrage almost 30

years later. In contrast to the United States, the male electorate in Switzerland also had to approve

suffrage in each canton independently of adoption at the federal level. Overall, nine cantons adopted

women suffrage in their canton before or when it was introduced at the federal level. Adoption was

voluntary in all but the last one (Appenzell-Innerrhoden), where women suffrage was mandated by

the Supreme Court in 1990.

— insert Table 1 about here —

As shown in columns (2) and (3) of Table 1, cantons that adopted suffrage earlier at the canton

level were also more likely to support voting rights for women in the two federal referendums. This

congruence is important since our empirical analysis relies on data both at the federal and cantonal

level.

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A comparison of column (2) and (3) shows that a canton’s ranking in supporting women suffrage

was roughly stable over time. The approval of women suffrage in 1971 was therefore a consequence

of increasing voter support in each canton, not by changes in a few cantons. As we will demonstrate

below, the timing of adoption at the canton level can largely be explained by a combination of time-

invariant cultural differences across cantons and a common upward trend in the support for women

suffrage in the whole country.

One explanation for the aggregate increase in voter support is that the Swiss Government wanted

to sign the European Human Rights Convention, but would do so only with restrictions (”Vorbehalt”)

because women did not have the right to vote. This resulted in a lot of media attention and ultimately

political pressure in favor of women suffrage.7

3 Political Preferences of Men and Women

3.1 Data on Voting Behavior in Federal Propositions

To study political gender gaps, we exploit the fact that Switzerland has wide-ranging possibilities for

direct democratic participation. In Switzerland, citizens may propose initiatives to change the federal

constitution or request a referendum about all laws issued by the federal government if 50,000 eligible

voters or 8 cantons require it within 100 days after their official publication. In addition, a voter

referendum is mandatory for all changes to the constitution and joining international organizations.

Our analysis uses surveys of voting behavior in 197 of the 202 federal propositions between 1981

and 2003 for a representative sample of Swiss citizens. The data have a number of advantages over

other measures of preferences: first, the votes cover a wide range of political issues, such as health

policy, changes in unemployment insurance, new environmental policies, subsidies for agriculture or

membership in international organizations. Second, we use information on voting behavior with real7See Seitz (2004) and Banaszak (1996) for more details on the political struggle for women suffrage in Switzerland.

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political and financial consequences instead of relying on opinions polls about political issues. Finally,

we identify differential preferences that are representative for the whole population as individuals in

all cantons vote on the same proposition.8

The data set is a repeated cross-sectional survey of 500 to 1,000 respondents between 1981 and

2003.9 It contains detailed information on the respondent’s demographics, economic situation, canton

of residence, political attitudes as well as voting decisions in the ballots. We dropped all respondents

under the age of 21, who were not eligible to vote until March of 1991, and under 18 thereafter. We

further restrict our sample to respondents that actually voted in the federal ballot.

Table 2 reports summary statistics of the survey data separately for men and women over the

sample period. The table reflects the more traditional position of women in Swiss society: women

are on average less educated than men and have lower income available to them. The female labor

force participation rate is low compared to the United States as is the fraction of divorced people and

single parent households. Women are also more likely to live in urban areas and in the French- and

Italian-speaking cantons of Switzerland.

With respect to political preferences, women position themselves somewhat more on the left than

men during the 1980s and 1990s. Women are also on average 7 percent less likely to vote in federal

propositions than men.

— insert Table 2 about here —

A first look at the propositions with the largest gender gap shows that women were 18 percent more

likely to support an initiative for a reduction in tobacco consumption (see Table A1 in the appendix

for a list of those propositions). Not surprisingly, women were also more likely to support votes for the8With suffrage, women also gain access to other sources of political influence such as the right to sign or propose voter

initiatives. We analyze the responsiveness of different political instruments after the adoption of women in more detailin related work.

9Even though women received the right to vote at the federal level in 1971, surveys have been conducted only since1981.

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equal representation of women in the federal government, equal rights for men and women in general

and a reform of marital law. In addition, women were more supportive of anti-discrimination policies

in the military, environmental policy and government subsidies for disabled people.

While suggestive, the summary statistics show that men and women also differ along many other

dimensions like labor force participation or educational attainment. To address this, we now turn to

a systematic analysis of political gender gaps conditional on observable characteristics.

3.2 Political Gender Gaps across Policy Areas

We focus our analysis on seven policy areas, where we expect the largest effect on expenditures, and

discuss the other votes in footnotes. Three areas cover public goods (environment, transportation

and defense), two the public provision of a private good (education, health), and two transfers and

redistributive issues (agricultural subsidies, social security provisions). Within each category, the

propositions are defined in such a way that it always propagates either more or less of a certain

policy.10 The model we estimate is

Yesij = α + βjFemalei + γ′Xit + εij (1)

where Yes ij is a binary variable equal to one if respondent i supported a vote in policy area j and zero

otherwise. Xit includes all other characteristics of the respondent such as demographics, economic

position or political preferences.

Table 3 reports marginal effects from a probit model of the voting decision in each policy area.

All specifications include year and canton of residence fixed effects. The first row includes only a

female dummy. Women vote more in favor of protecting the environment, support for the elderly and

the disabled, the use of public instead of private transportation and a reduction of military spending10For instance, all votes on agricultural policy concerned a reduction in agricultural subsidies. See Table A2 in the

Appendix for further information on the votes in each policy area.

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(see also Longchamp and Bieri, 2001). In contrast, they oppose subsidies for agriculture, a nuclear

based energy policy, a further construction of roads and a relaxation of speed limits (last three votes

not reported). Men, on the other hand, are more likely to support a reform of the unemployment

insurance, which included reductions in benefits. Women and men are equally likely to support free

secondary education.

Row (2) adds controls for demographics, employment status and household income to the spec-

ification. Since women are less educated and have lower labor force attachment, gender differences

should disappear if education or employment are driving political gender gaps. However, differences

in demographic or economic characteristics only affect voting behavior on health insurance, a reduc-

tion in unemployment insurance and support for road infrastructure. Most gender gaps cannot be

explained by differences in either demographic or economic characteristics.

— insert Table 3 about here —

The bottom panel of Table 3 tests whether political gender gaps can be accounted for by a one-

dimensional measure of political ideology. Row (4) therefore adds a measure for party ideology to the

specification in row (2). Party ideology is measured as the respondent’s self-reported position on a

left-right scale from 0 to 10, with ten being conservative and zero being left-wing. Since a respondent’s

political ideology is only available after 1987, row (3) reports estimates for the second specification

with the sample restricted to the period 1988 to 2003.

The results in the third row show that gender gaps are more pronounced in the later sample period.

Controlling for the left-right position of the respondent, the gender gap disappears for subsidies for

health insurance, two redistributive issues (“reduce unemployment benefits”, “longer maternity leave”)

and a reduction in the military. However, a one-dimensional “left-right”indicator cannot capture

gender gaps in the area of environmental policy, transportation, agricultural policy or social security.11

11Using the same specification, we also find the largest gender gap in votes on equal rights for men and women (11

10

Our findings are consistent with previous evidence from public opinion surveys in other European

countries. In Sweden for example, women were more in favor of publicly provided medical care,

environmental protection and gender equality than men (Eduards, 1982). Similarly, Norris (1988)

found that women in several European countries were more supportive of unemployment benefits

and less in favor of defense spending. In the US, opinion polls report similar gender gaps in the

areas of environmental care, force and violence, and compassion issues (Shapiro and Mahajan (1986)).

However, opinion polls include the whole citizenship, and not only the voting population, and can be

bad predictors for later voting behavior (Matsusaka and McCarty, 2001).

3.3 Political Gender Gaps and Government Expenditures

While gender gaps in policy issues are informative, they do not tell us whether and how women

have changed the size or scope of government. To address this, we select the ballots that would

unambiguously increase or decrease government spending. To calculate the fiscal consequences of a

ballot, we rely on detailed comments, which are published by the federal government for each initiative,

new law and executive orders. These documents include the implied expenditures and taxes in the

case of voter approval and are common knowledge before the ballot.12

We are able to identify 71 propositions, where the fiscal consequences were either an unambiguous

increase or decrease in government expenditures, taxes or subsidies. Note that the set of propositions

we analyze contains both ballots that were approved and therefore actually increased government

spending as well as ballots that were not successful. This ensures that we get a representative picture

of preferred spending for men and women, which is not affected by the ballot’s actual success. However,

we will also analyze women’s role as pivotal voters.

percent). Women are also 7 percent more likely to support public spending on culture, 6 percent less likely to supportgentechnology and 5 percent more likely to support a more liberal immigration policy. In contrast, no significant gendergaps exist for votes on joining international organizations, regulation of the housing market and on illegal drug policy.

12All documents by the federal council and parliamentary resolutions can be accessed online athttp://www.ads.bar.admin.ch/ADS. The comments including the financial assessment for each proposition aresent by mail to each household prior to the vote. Table A3 in the Appendix contains a detailed list of the 71 votes withpredictable financial consequences.

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Table 4 shows marginal effects from a probit model whether a respondent voted yes on a proposition

that would increase (column (1)) or decrease (column (2)) government spending, taxes, subsidies or

debt. The first column shows that women are 2.7 percent more likely to support projects that would

increase overall government spending. As shown in the lower part of the table, the gender gap changes

little with the inclusion of additional control variables.

— insert Table 4 about here —

However, as shown in the last section, political gender gaps vary a lot depending on the policy area

involved. Columns (3)-(9) of Table 4 therefore distinguishes propositions with increasing or decreasing

expenditures in the seven policy areas.

The coefficients show that women are more likely to support higher spending for environmental

protection, public transport or welfare, but oppose expenditures for the military or agricultural subsi-

dies. In fact, the gender gap is particularly high for spending on environmental policy (14.3 percent).

The gender gaps are somewhat smaller for social expenditures, security, agricultural spending and

education.13

The results in Table 3 and 4 suggest that female voters have had a bigger impact on the scope

than the size of government. However, the estimates in Table 4 do not allow us to directly measure

how women voters changed actual federal spending. The latter is only affected if the proposition is

approved by the voters, and women changed the final outcome.

Among the fifteen federal votes where men and women had approved different outcomes, women

changed the result in their favor in four cases or about two percent of the 202 propositions over that

period.14 Based on the information provided by the federal government before the vote, we can get13The significant gender gap in the area of education is particularly driven by one vote, where women opposed a

reduction of federal subsidies for primary school.14Table A4 shows a list of those votes where men and women had accepted different outcomes. The lower support of

women for an “ecological and modern agriculture” as well as “easier access to real estate for foreigners” appears to be in

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a good estimate of the financial consequences for two votes. Women’s opposition to a reduction in

unemployment benefits raised federal spending of about 70 million Swiss Francs per year. Women were

however also in favor of abolishing subsidies for parking spaces, which saved the federal government

about 20 million Swiss Francs per year.

Relative to the 46 billion federal expenditures in 1999, the change in voting outcomes by women

adds up to a mere 1.1 percent increase in federal spending. The evidence from voter preferences in

federal propositions thus suggests that the impact of women on the size of government has been small.

3.4 Changes in Voter Preferences over Time

Our results thus far show that women support government spending in some policy areas, but not in

others. Since several studies have documented changes in the political gender gap in recent decades, our

findings for 1981 to 2003 might not be representative of political preferences in the years immediately

following women suffrage.

To check for possible changes in political gender gaps over time, we use data from a survey in

1975 that included questions about four of our seven policy areas: environment, health, education

and welfare. The data was part of a cross-national survey (Political Action Study) to study voting

behavior and political attitudes for a representative sample of the adult population above 16.

For each of the four policy areas, we know how much the respondent thinks that it is an important

problem and to which degree he considers it a government responsibility. The response categories

in each area ranges from 1 (absolutely unimportant problem / no government responsibility at all)

to 4 (very important problem / an essential government responsibility). For welfare, we have two

response items: whether the government should redistribute income (column (4)) and care for the

elderly (column (5)).

contrast to our previous findings. A detailed analysis of these votes however shows that the opponents of the first votethought the reform did not go far enough, while environmental concerns of new construction played a major role in thesecond vote. See http://www.polittrends.ch/vox-analysen for a further discussion of these votes.

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Table 5 shows the results. As in the last section, our main parameter of interest is the coefficient

on the gender dummy. The specifications of control variables are the same as in Table 4. Without

controlling for any differences in observable characteristics, the first row shows that women consider

care for the elderly, providing health care and protecting the environment as more important prob-

lems than men. However, the significance decreases as controls are added. As for the government’s

responsibility, the lower part of the panel shows that there were no statistically significant gender gaps

in any of the four policy areas. Even though women consider protecting the environment, providing

or caring for the elderly as important problems, they do not necessarily think that it is a government

responsibility.

Adding controls for individual demographics, employment status and income, changes the picture

somewhat. Women are now less likely to consider the government responsible for the care of the elderly.

In contrast, women are now also more likely to consider education a government responsibility. The

political gender gap for publicly provided education appears to be driven by differences in household

income with more wealthy households supporting publicly provided education.

— insert Table 5 about here —

Comparing the results from Table 4 and 5 shows that women were consistently more likely to

support government activity for the environment and education both in 1975 and after 1981. In

contrast, women were less likely in 1975 to support government intervention in health care and welfare

provisions than after 1981. This suggests an increase in their demand for government in the areas of

health and welfare between the 1970s and 1980s.

However, the observed changes in preferences could be an artefact of differences in survey questions

or some other factor. We therefore turn to an analysis of the political position along a left-right

scale, which can be measured consistently over time. Figure 1 shows the fraction of women and men

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supporting leftist parties in the federal elections since 1971. Two facts are noteworthy. First, women

were less supportive of left parties than men throughout the first decade after suffrage was introduced

at the federal level.

Second, the figure also shows that there was reversal in the political support for left parties over

time: women became more supportive of left-wing parties during the 1980s, while men became more

conservative. The documented reversal in preferences is similar to observed changes in the politi-

cal gender gap in other countries (see Edlund and Pande, 2002; Norrander, 1999; Schlesinger and

Heldmann, 2001 for the United States; Inglehart and Norris, 2003 for other developed countries).

— insert Figure 1 about here —

Since there are other factors affecting political positions over time, Table 6 analyzes the political

position of men and women along a left-right scale for two points in time: 1975 and 1995. The

dependent variable ranges from zero (very left-wing) to ten (very right-wing). Columns (1) to (4)

show the results for 1975 and columns (5) to (8) for 1995.15

In 1975, women were indeed much more conservative than men in all specifications. The gender

gap increases if we control for differences in education and other demographics and decreases once we

include employment status and household income. The fourth column adds various interaction effects

to allow for different effects of women by employment and marital status. Unemployed women are

more likely to be left-wing, but marital status has no effect on the political gender gap.

— insert Table 6 about here —

The picture in 1995 looks completely different: women are now much more left-wing than men

and the gender differences become even stronger once we control for demographics, employment status15The data for 1975 are again taken from the Political Action Study. The data for 1995 come from the Selects Study,

which is a post-electoral survey of more than 5,000 Swiss citizens. The sample is representative of the Swiss population.

15

and income. The final column again adds various interaction effects to see if the results are driven by

a subgroup of women. Indeed, the shift to the left was concentrated among women in the labor force

and those with children.16

In sum, women were more conservative and less supportive of government intervention immediately

after women suffrage. While women are more likely to oppose spending for national defense and

agricultural subsidies, they are however more likely to support public goods such as protecting the

environment, public transport and the public provision of education. The shift to the left among

women in the 1980s and 1990s has increased their demand for government, mostly in the areas of

health care and welfare provisions.

4 Women Suffrage and Cantonal Spending Patterns

This section analyzes how women suffrage affected actual spending on the canton level.

4.1 Canton-Level Panel Data

The government sector in Switzerland is with 34 percent of GDP (1996) relatively small, far below

the average of the European Union. Cantons play a dominant role in providing public goods and

services as the constitution states that all responsibilities retain with the cantons unless they were

ceded to the federal government in a referendum.17 In 1998, 33 percent of total government spending

was undertaken by the federal government, 40 percent on the cantonal level and 27 percent on the

local level.

This decentralized structure leaves cantons with a lot of autonomy for redistribution and the

provision of public services. For example, cantons decide autonomously on resources for secondary16In contrast to previous results from the United States, we could not find evidence that divorced women in general

or those with medium income are more left-wing than other women.17While the federal government has increased its scope of operation over time, the expansion has been limited by

the fact that each redistribution of political responsibilities requires a change in the constitution and is thus subject tomandatory referendum.

16

education, which accounts for 25 percent of all cantonal expenditures, the provision of health care

(around 18 percent of expenditures) and social security (16 percent).18 The distribution of revenues

between federal and cantonal levels is similarly decentralized. Cantons have the authority to tax labor

and capital income which account for roughly 50 percent of canton revenues. This produces substantial

variation in the tax burden and tax revenues across cantons.

To quantify the effects of women suffrage on fiscal policy, we collected a comprehensive dataset

on cantonal expenditures and revenues, demographic and economic characteristics as well as political

institutions of the 25 cantons from 1950 to 2000.19

Table 7 shows summary statistics for the canton panel data over the whole period. To analyze the

effect of women suffrage on expenditure patterns and compare it to our results on voter preferences,

we classified spending into seven policy areas: environment, transport, security, agriculture as well as

welfare, education and health. On the revenue side, we analyze overall revenues and public deficits.

As can be seen from the last two columns, there is a lot of variation on both the spending and revenue

side across cantons and also over time.

— insert Table 7 about here —

In line with our survey data in the last section, the demographic characteristics show that the

share of divorcees in the adult population, the fraction of single parents and the female labor force

participation rate are low compared to the United States or other European countries. Unemployment

rates have also traditionally been below five percent.

The education level in each canton is measured as the fraction with a university degree. The18Shared responsibilities between canton and federal level exist in agricultural policy, civil and criminal law and taxes.

The federal level has the sole responsibility in international relations, defense, customs and currency, atomic energy,media, postal service, telecommunication as well railways and air traffic. In the areas of environmental policy, socialsecurity system, roads and industrial and labor regulation, the federal government provides the legal basis while Cantonsexecute the federal laws.

19See Appendix A for a more detailed description of the data sources and variables. Our analysis excludes the cantonJura, which was founded in 1977.

17

average is only 9 percent with the share ranging from zero percent to almost one-third of the adult

population. The language indicator is a dummy variable equal to one if the dominant language in a

canton is French or Italian and zero if it is German. About one-third of the cantons are dominantly

French- or Italian-speaking.

The share of seats in cantonal parliaments occupied by left parties averages 20 percent. While some

cantons have no left parties in their parliaments, other cantons have a majority of their seats held by

left parties. Finally, Swiss citizens have access to several direct democratic instruments on the canton

level. All cantons in Switzerland allow citizens to put a voter initiative on the ballot. The signature

requirement for an initiative varies from 0.01 percent to 17.4 percent of the eligible population. In

addition, 64 percent of the cantons have a mandatory budget referendum in place over the period,

which requires the electorate to approve projects exceeding a certain threshold. Also, 56 percent allow

for a mandatory law referendum, which requires approval of new laws and executive orders.

4.2 Suffrage Adoption Decreases Expenditures in Many Areas

To determine the effect of voting rights for women on expenditures, we estimate the following model

Yst = αs + γt + β · WSst + δ′Xst + ust (2)

where Yst denotes total (real per capita) annual expenditures, revenues or deficits or expenditures in

a certain policy area in canton s and year t. The variable WSst is a dummy variable equal to one if

suffrage was adopted in canton s in year t and zero otherwise. The dependent variable is measured

in logs for all categories except cantonal deficit, which can take on negative values and is therefore

measured in levels. All specifications include canton and time fixed effects. These pick up aggregate

trends in canton expenditures over time as well as all time-invariant heterogeneity in spending across

cantons. The effect of women suffrage on government spending is therefore identified from cantons

18

introducing women suffrage in a specific year.

Since expenditures and revenues are affected by other time-varying factors, we also include a large

number of control variables Xst for each canton. Variables like the age structure of the canton measured

by five age categories, the unemployment rate, the fraction of individuals with higher education, the

share of commuters in the canton, the percentage of divorced people and single parents as well as the

female labor force participation rate control for differences in the demand for government like public

transport, social welfare or health care.

To control for economies of scale in the provision of public goods, we also add the average population

density in the canton. The share in federal revenues and the amount of federal subsidies adjusts

for differences in resources available to the cantons. Finally, we also include the percentage of the

population that is Catholic as a rough measure of the political ideology in a canton.

Table 8 reports the results from regression (2). The estimates show that adopting women suffrage

has a negative effect on canton expenditures, revenues and deficit though only the first one is statisti-

cally significant. The coefficient suggests that expenditures decrease by 3.3 percent. This implies that

suffrage had an economically significant negative effect on the size of government.

— insert Table 8 about here —

As shown in the last section, women are in favor of some expenditures more than others. The right-

hand side of Table 8 therefore shows the effect of suffrage on the scope of government. The results

imply that women suffrage has negative effects of canton expenditures for agriculture, security as well

as welfare, education and health. At the same time, suffrage increase canton expenditures for public

goods such as public transport and environmental protection though the latter is not statistically

significant.

Most coefficients on the controls are reasonable. A higher share of federal revenues or subsidies

induce canton governments to spend more as does a higher unemployment rate. The fact that higher

19

population density is associated with lower expenditures suggests that there are significant economies

of scale in the provision of public goods and services. Also, cantons with a higher fraction of Catholics

spend slightly less, which is consistent with the idea that these cantons are more fiscally conservative.

The share of single parents has a positive effect on expenditures, while female labor force participation

and the percentage of divorced people has a negative effect on spending.

The effect of adopting suffrage on spending patterns is broadly consistent with our evidence on

preferences in the last section. Women are more supportive of expenditures in the area of public

transport and environmental policy, but less in favor of expenditures for agricultural subsidies or

security. The negative effect on government size and strong negative effects on expenditures for

welfare and health also confirms that women were indeed more fiscally conservative than men when

women suffrage was adopted.

4.3 The Dynamic Effect of Women Suffrage on Fiscal Policy

Since women’s preferences shifted over time, the long-run effects of women suffrage might differ from its

short-run effect. Given our evidence in the last section, we expect this to affect primarily expenditures

on health and welfare. To capture the dynamic effect of women suffrage, we estimate the same model

as in (2) where now the variable for women suffrage are the years since adoption. The control variables

and expenditure categories are the same as before.

Table 9 shows the results. The top panel includes a linear and quadratic term for the years since

adoption. The bottom panel allows for a more flexible specification by including dummy variables for

each 5 years since adoption. The coefficients suggest that the long-run effect of women suffrage on the

size of government is negative. Suffrage not only decrease expenditures, but also canton revenues and

deficit. For example, the estimates imply that ten years after the adoption of women suffrage, overall

expenditures are 7 percent lower than prior to adoption. The bottom part of the table shows that the

negative effect dominates even 20 years after suffrage adoption.

20

Looking at the individual expenditure categories on the right-hand side shows that suffrage de-

creased subsidies to agriculture also in the long-run. In contrast, there are no long-run effects on

spending for the public goods environment, transport and security.

— insert Table 9 about here —

As predicted by our evidence on voter preferences, the largest shift between adoption and over time

occurs for welfare and health expenditures: while welfare spending for example declines by 5 percent

upon adoption, it is about 8 percent higher 10 years after suffrage relative to the pre-adoption period.

Similarly, we find that health expenditures decrease by almost 10 percent upon adoption, but increase

by 15 percent in the 10 years after adoption. The bottom part of the table shows that most of the

increase in social expenditures occur more than a decade after women suffrage. Finally, expenditures

for secondary education decline by a statistically significant 6.3 percent upon suffrage adoption. It is

only twenty years after adoption that education expenditures are by 0.5 percent higher than before

adoption.

5 Robustness Analysis

5.1 Endogeneity of Adoption

One important concern is that the negative effect of suffrage might be driven by omitted variables

affecting both expenditures and the adoption decision. In the absence of a good instrument for suffrage

adoption, we present several pieces of evidence showing that omitted variable bias cannot explain our

results.

Since men in each canton had to approve the extension of the franchise to women in a mandatory

referendum, the prime candidate for omitted variables is the preferences of the male electorate prior

21

to adoption. Suppose cantons differ in a one-dimensional preference parameter where higher values

indicate a more liberal attitude both towards government spending and extending the franchise.

If fiscally liberal cantons are both more likely to adopt women suffrage and have a higher demand

for government, our estimate of the adoption effect will be an upper bound and thus an over-estimation

of the true effect of women suffrage. Since all our specifications include canton fixed effects, any time-

invariant differences in voter preferences across cantons will be absorbed by canton dummies. The

only source of bias can therefore arise from time-varying heterogeneity across cantons not captured by

our observable canton characteristics.

To check for time-varying trends in male preferences prior to adoption, we again use our data on

voting behavior in federal propositions prior to 1971. As in Section 3, we select all propositions that

would have implied an increase in federal expenditures, and use the average support for costly projects

in each canton and decade as our proxy for male preferences before suffrage adoption.20

The first column in Table 10 reports the result of regressing canton fiscal preferences on an indicator

whether a canton introduced suffrage early and decade dummies. Early adopters are cantons that

adopted suffrage before it was adopted on a federal level (votes before or at the same day of the

national referendum).

The results show that cantons that introduce suffrage earlier are indeed fiscally less conservative

than late introducers. This difference in preferences will however be absorbed by canton fixed effects.

To see whether early introducers also have a different trend in male voter preferences, we add in

column (2) a linear time trend and an interaction term between the time trend and the time of

adoption. While there is an upward trend in the overall support for higher expenditures among men,

there is no differential trend in male fiscal preferences between early and late introducing cantons.

— insert Table 10 about here —20As discussed in a related paper, preferences measured from federal voting data are a good proxy for voter preferences

at the canton level (see Funk and Gathmann, 2005). Note that we cannot simply add voter preferences into theexpenditure regressions as the timing of adoption differed between federal and cantonal level.

22

Since cantons adopt suffrage at different points in time, it could however be the case that canton

expenditures prior to adoption influence the adoption decision, for example because they might affect

male preferences in that canton. We address this by testing whether early and late introducing

cantons had the same growth rates in expenditures prior to adopting women suffrage. The annual

growth rate in expenditures is 0.069 (0.055) percent for early introducers and 0.073 (0.067) percent

for late introducers in the ten (five) years prior to adoption at the canton level with a T-statistic of

0.38 (0.91). Though early introducers have higher expenditure overall, there is no difference in the

growth rate prior to adoption.21

What then determined the decision to adopt women suffrage? The right-hand side of Table 10

provides evidence that support for women suffrage is largely driven by the combination of time-

invariant cultural differences across cantons and a common upward trend, the latter possibly reflecting

social change. The dependent variable in the regression is the share of voters supporting women

suffrage in the two federal referendums in 1959 and 1971.22 We first test for omitted variable bias by

including our proxy for voter preferences. Column (3) shows that cantons favoring higher expenditures

at the federal level are also more likely to support women suffrage. The coefficient implies that a ten

percent increase in the support for more spending is associated with a nearly six percent increase in

the support for women suffrage. This suggests that there is indeed a component of political preferences

that drives both demand for government and extension of the franchise.

To capture the general upward trend in the support of women suffrage over time, we also include an

indicator for the referendum in 1971. Conditional on the other controls, support for suffrage was more

than 30 percent higher in the second national referendum. Our control variables are the population

density as a proxy for the degree of urbanization, the age structure of the population to capture cohort21Results are very similar if we first take out a common linear trend or year dummies and then test for differences in

the residual across cantons. There are also no differences in the growth rate of expenditures if we compare cantons inthe same time window, for example the 5 years prior to the federal referendums in 1959 or 1971.

22We analyzed voting behavior in federal referendums in order to use our preference measure constructed from federalballots. However, we find similar results to the ones reported if we use data on the adoption decision at the canton levelinstead.

23

effects and the share of university educated people in a canton. We also include whether the canton is

located at the border and the number of tourists per capita to capture exposure to outside influences

in favor of women suffrage. The results show that only the share of highly educated has a significant,

positive effect on adopting women suffrage.

Column (4) adds as control whether the dominant language in a canton is German, French or

Italian. The results show that language and cultural background is an important determinant of the

adoption decision. French- or Italian-speaking cantons (Fribourg, Geneva, Neuchatel, Ticino, Vaud

and Valais) are on average 17.1 percent more likely to support women suffrage. The preferences for

federal spending are no longer statistically significant once the language variable is included.23

The last two columns uses the same approach to test whether the growth rate of expenditures affects

adoption, which would suggest a reverse causality problem. Column (5) uses the same specification as

in column (3) where the main independent variable is now the growth rate in canton expenditures in

the five years prior to the ballot. The coefficient implies that a higher expansion of canton spending

is associated with larger support for suffrage.

Column (6) again adds the dominant language of a canton. As in the case with voter preferences,

the coefficient on the growth in canton expenditures declines. As in column (4), the language of a

canton has a strong and persistent effect on the adoption decision with French- and Italian-speaking

being again 17 percent more likely to support women suffrage.

Our evidence therefore suggests that neither male preferences nor expenditures exhibit a differential

trend prior to adoption. We also find that the adoption decision is strongly influenced by time-invariant

cultural factors together with a common upward trend in the support for women suffrage. Since time-

invariant variation is absorbed by canton fixed effects, we conclude that concerns of omitted variable

bias are small. Furthermore, any endogeneity bias would lead us to underestimate the effect of suffrage23Evidence from individual-level data in 1972 supports this finding at the canton level. The survey asks about the

voting behavior of Swiss men in the federal referendum on women suffrage in 1971. Our results showed that languageand thus cultural background is the strongest predictor for voting behavior with non-german speaking men being 12percent more likely to support women suffrage.

24

adoption on canton expenditures and revenues.

5.2 Additional Controls

It could however be the case that other omitted variables bias our expenditure results. For example,

the long-run effect on expenditures might be driven by an upward trend in the demand or supply

of government independently of suffrage. To address this, we add several variables that control for

potential sources of rising demand for government services to the specification in Table 9.

Table 11 reports the results for overall expenditures (columns (1)-(3)) as well as welfare expen-

ditures (columns (4)-(6)). The top part of the table shows the result of suffrage adoption, while the

bottom part reports the coefficient for years since adoption. The first specification (columns (1) and

(4)) adds mean cantonal income to control for rising wealth and its effect on the demand for gov-

ernment. The variable is available since 1965. For total expenditures, the negative adoption effect

remains negative but is no longer statistically significant. The dynamic effect in contrast is now even

more negative and statistically significant. The adoption effect for welfare expenditures is slightly

larger than in the baseline, while the dynamic effect is no longer statistically significant. This suggests

that some of the increase in welfare expenditures is driven by income effects.

Our second specification adds the share of seats in cantonal parliaments held by left parties to

control for other factors that might have increased the demand for government services or redistribu-

tion. The negative adoption effect for overall expenditures becomes even stronger, while the dynamic

effect is now somewhat weaker. For welfare expenditures, the negative adoption effect is now much

weaker and no longer statistically significant, while the dynamic effect is positive and much stronger

than in the baseline specification. Even controlling for the strength of left parties, women suffrage has

a positive long-run effect on welfare expenditures.

We also test whether changes in direct democratic instruments could account for our results. Since

the signature requirements for putting an initiative on the ballot was not adjusted in many cantons,

25

women suffrage facilitates the collection of the necessary number of signatures. In addition, several

cantons switched the provisions for budget or law referendums. This might have an effect on canton

expenditures even in the absence of women suffrage.

Columns (3) and (6) therefore add the signature requirement in percent of the eligible population

as well as indicator variables whether a canton has a mandatory budget or law referendum in place

in a given year. The results imply that this actually makes the negative adoption effect even stronger

for both overall and welfare expenditures. The dynamic effect remains unchanged in both cases. We

conclude that our results are not very sensitive to the inclusion of controls for other potential changes

in the demand for government.

5.3 Political Turnout Behavior

An alternative explanation for the difference between long- and short-term effect of women suffrage

on expenditures could be changing participation behavior of women. If women participate more in

the years following women suffrage, the long-term effect will be larger than the short-term effect. If

in addition the initial non-voters are less fiscally conservative than voters, this could explain why we

see an expansion in health or welfare expenditures over time. We address each of these arguments in

turn.

Our data suggest that the adaptation of turnout between men and women occurred quite rapidly.

Figure 2 shows the evolution of the turnout gap calculated as male turnout minus female turnout

in federal ballots from 1977 to 2003. While the gender gap in political participation is 8 percent on

average, the turnout gap has been steadily declining from 16 percent in 1977 to about 2 percent in

2003.24

To analyze whether the dynamic suffrage effects might be driven by turnout behavior, we need a

measure for male and female cantonal turnout. Since data on female turnout in cantonal elections24In 1977, political turnout of women in federal ballots was only 40 percent and increased to 55 percent in 2003.

Separate turnout data for men and women are unfortunately not available prior to 1977.

26

are not directly available, we estimate them from overall turnout rates in cantonal elections. The

basic intuition is that we should see overall turnout rates drop sharply with suffrage if women did not

participate in elections. Under the assumption that the male propensity to vote was unaffected by the

introduction of suffrage, we can then estimate female participation rates from a regression of overall

turnout on the introduction of women suffrage.

The first column in Table 12 shows the result of women suffrage on turnout. Overall turnout

drops immediately after suffrage by more than ten percent. Over the next ten years, voter turnout

is still lower than before suffrage, but no significant effects are found after the first decade. From

these estimates, we calculate the evolution of female participation overall (column (2)) and relative to

men (column (3)).25 The estimated turnout in canton elections confirm that adjustment of political

participation occurred rapidly following a very similar adjustment pattern than turnout in federal

ballots.

— insert Table 12 about here —

We then reestimate the effect of women suffrage on cantonal expenditure where our main inde-

pendent variable is our predicted female political representation to control for turnout behavior. The

specification otherwise is the same as in the first column of Table 8. Columns (4)-(7) in Table 12

shows the results for total expenditures as well as expenditures for health, education and welfare.

Total expenditures decline for about fifteen years after adoption and then start reversing. Even

more than two decades after adoption, total expenditures are not higher than when women were given

the right to vote. Health and welfare expenditures show little change initially and then start rising25After suffrage, turnout (defined as the number of voters relative to the number of eligible voters) is Turnoutct =

(1 − sharect) ∗ Malect + sharect ∗ Femalect where share denotes the share of females in the electorate, Malect maleturnout measured prior to adoption (on average 62.2 percent). Under the assumption that male turnout does not changewith women suffrage, this allows us to calculate female turnout in canton c and time t, Femalect. The last step is tocalculate the relative female representation. Define the variable RelativeTurnoutct = sharect∗Femalect

(1−sharect)∗Malect, which is equal

to zero before suffrage adoption and equal to one if women are equally represented than men. Note that if the overalldecline in turnout was in part due to falling male turnout, our estimate of female representation provides a lower boundof the actual political influence of women.

27

about 15 years after adoption. Education expenditures in contrast show a decline for the first 15 years

following adoption and then a slight reversal thereafter.

We conclude from this that rising female participation rates cannot explain the positive effect of

suffrage on social expenditures over time. However, if female non-voters have different political pref-

erences for government than voters, increased participation could still have an effect on expenditures.

To address this, we compare the self-reported political position of voters and non-voters shortly after

suffrage (in 1975) and two decades later (in 1995). The measure of political position ranges from zero

to ten with higher values indicating a more left-wing position.

In 1975, voters were not more or less left-wing than nonvoters. While voters had on average a

value of 4.96 and nonvoters a value of 4.98, the difference is not statistically significant (T-statistic:

0.08). The pattern is different in 1995: voters now report a value of 4.77 and non-voters 5.06 with a

T-statistic of 3.7. This implies female voters have actually become more conservative over time, while

female non-voters more left-wing. We would however require the opposite pattern in order to explain

the increasing effect of suffrage on expenditures over time.

6 Conclusion

This paper demonstrates how direct evidence on political preferences can be used to study the fiscal

effects of women suffrage. Both our analyses of voter preferences and state-level expenditures show

that women suffrage affects the scope of government much more than its size. While women are more

supportive of government intervention and spending for public goods like the environment, public

transport and education, they oppose spending for the military and agricultural subsidies. Our result

that women suffrage has little effect on the overall size of government is in line with cross-country

correlations of fiscal spending and women suffrage for other European countries.

We also show that the shift in the political gender gap in recent decades has lead to an increase

28

in women’s demand for publicly provided health and welfare provisions. Though Switzerland is a

more traditional society with low female labor force participation and low divorce rates, shifts in the

electoral gender gap similar to the one in Switzerland have been found in other developed countries.

This suggests that our results are valid beyond the specific Swiss setting.

Since female voter preferences have opposing effects on different expenditure categories, overall

expenditures can only provide limited insight in the effects of women’s political participation. Stepping

back and asking “What women want” helps us better understand the changes following the inclusion

of women in the political process. It would be interesting to extend our analysis as to whether and

how women suffrage has affected health and educational outcomes among children. For example, we

might expect that infant mortality to decline in countries and states that adopted women suffrage

relatively early. We leave this question for future research.

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A Canton-Level Panel Data

The data on canton expenditures and revenues are taken from the annual collections on public finances

of Switzerland (Federal Department of Finance, various years). Data are available on paper before

1980 and electronically after that. We calculate real per capita expenditures (in 1,000 Swiss Francs

and 2000 prices) for the following categories: total cantonal expenditures, security, education, wel-

fare, health, transportation, environment, and agriculture. For the years 1967 and 1968, no separate

expenditure data for Cantons and communities are available, but only expenditures for Cantons and

their communities together. Values for these years are obtained by linear interpolation. Expenditures

for environmental protection are only available since 1970.

Total revenue data are available for all years except the years 1968 and 1969. Cantonal shares from

federal revenues are unavailable for the years 1968, 1969 and 1990-1993. As for federal subsidies, data

are not available for the years 1950-1952, 1968-1977 and 1990-1993. The missing values after 1952 are

obtained by linear interpolation.

For the canton characteristics, most variables are from the decennial population census with in-

termediate values interpolated. Data for the population in rural and urban areas is only available

32

since 1970. The education variable is measured as the share of high-school graduates in percentage

of the 19 year-old population. Data on average per capita income in the cantons is available since

1965. The unemployment rate is calculated as the number of registered unemployed relative to the

active population from the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs after 1975 and as the number of

unemployed in percentage of employed persons from the population census before 1975. Population

density is measured as the log of the number of people (in 1,000) per square kilometer. Variables of the

household structure are again from the population census and include: the percentage of single-parent

households, the share of married people in the group older than 20, the group of divorced people in the

same age group. Also from the population census are data on the percentage of foreigners in the total

population, the share of Catholics and citizens in different age classes (i.e. between 0 and 19, between

20 and 39, between 40 and 64, between 65 and 79, older than 80). Female labor force participation is

measured as the share of women older than 15 who work.

Information on the existence of a mandatory budget referendum is taken from Trechsel and Serduelt

(1999), who systematically collected information for cantons without a town-meeting from 1970 to

1996. For earlier years and the town-meeting cantons, we gather data from the Public Record Offices

of all cantons and supplemented any missing information using old canton laws and constitutions.

33

Women Suffrage Yes Votes in Yes Votes inCanton Adopted in Federal Referendum Federal Referendum

Canton (Year) of 1959 (%) of 1971 (%)

Neuchatel (NE) 1959 51,3 83,9Vaud (VD) 1959 52,2 82,0Geneva (GE) 1960 60,0 91,9Basle-City (BS) 1966 46,8 82,2Basle-County (BL) 1968 37,3 79,9Ticino (TI) 1969 37,1 75,3Zurich (ZH) 1970 36,2 66,8Valais (VS) 1970 30,5 79,9Lucerne (LU) 1970 21,3 62,7

Zug (ZG) 1971 29,8 71,1Fribourg (FR) 1971 24,3 59,9Schaffhausen (SH) 1971 31,9 56,7Aargau (AG) 1971 22,8 50,2Berne (BE) 1971 35,5 66,5Glarus (GL) 1971 19,1 41,3Solothum (SO) 1971 30,0 64,1Thurgau (TG) 1971 19,9 44,1

St. Gallen (SG) 1972 19,3 46,5Uri (UR) 1972 14,6 36,3Schwyz (SZ) 1972 14,2 42,2Graisons (GR) 1972 22,4 54,8Nidwalden (NW) 1972 19,5 55,8Obwalden (OW) 1972 14,3 46,7Jura (JU) 1977 N/A N/AAppenzell Aussenrhoden (AR) 1989 15,5 39,9Appenzell Innerrhoden (AI) 1990 4,9 28,9

Table 1: Introduction of Women Suffrage in Swiss Cantons

Notes : The table reports the year women were given the right to vote at the cantonal level and the fraction of voting men that supported theintroduction of women suffrage in the two federal referendums 1959 and 1971. Since the canton Jura separated from Bern only in 1977 tobecome an independent canton, no separate results for the federal referendums are available. Adoption of women suffrage was voluntary inall cantons except one. Appenzell-Innerhoden was forced to adopt women suffrage by the Swiss Supreme Court in 1990.

T StatisticMean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Difference

DemographicsAge 48,39 16,38 49,98 17,41 14,92Protestant 0,47 0,50 0,47 0,50 -1,08Have Kids 0,41 0,49 0,33 0,47 -13,74Single 0,19 0,39 0,23 0,42 15,57Married 0,66 0,47 0,71 0,45 16,14Divorced 0,05 0,21 0,03 0,17 -12,02

Education, Work and IncomeEducation: Compulsory 0,19 0,40 0,10 0,30 -44,52Education: Apprentice/Spec Schools 0,74 0,44 0,77 0,42 13,54Education: University 0,07 0,26 0,13 0,34 31,86Employed 0,51 0,50 0,69 0,46 57,72Income 1,76 0,82 2,21 1,06 13,34House Ownership 0,46 0,50 0,50 0,50 9,88

Region of ResidenceUrban 0,66 0,47 0,64 0,48 -6,77Nongerman 0,26 0,44 0,24 0,43 -4,53

Political Position and ParticipationSelf-Placement Left-Right (0-10) 4,79 1,77 5,09 1,89 22,38Turnout 54,35 49,81 62,02 48,53 32,72

MenWomen

Table 2: Summary Statistics, VOX-Data

Notes: The summary statistics are based on the sample of voters. Education measures the highest degree, which is either compulsaryschool, vocational school or university (all dummy variables). Employed is a dummy variable capturing the employment status, andincome measures household income in 5 income-classes. House Ownership is a dummy variable whether the person's householdowns a house. Married, single and divorced are dummy variables describing the civil status of the respondent. Age is measured inyears, protestant, have kids, urban area and non-german speaking area are all dummy-variables. Party-Ideology is measured on a 0-10left-right scale, where higher number indicate a more right-wing political position. The turnout variable whether the respondent voted infederal parliamentary elections. The last column shows the T-test statistic for differences in means between men and women.

Environment Transport Military Agriculture Education HealthProtecting Against Less Against Free Subsidies Reduce Decrease Support Longer

the further Road Military Subsidizing Education Health Unemployment Retirement for the MaternityEnvironment Construction Agriculture Insurance Benefits Age Disabled Leave

(1) Female Dummy 0,086 0,044 0,042 0,098 0,068 0,065 -0,053 0,063 0,146 0,062(0.015)*** (0.022)** (0.020)** (0.035)*** (0,059) (0.029)** (0.032)* (0.019)*** (0.045)*** (0.025)**

(2) Add Income, Job 0,075 0,023 0,05 0,118 0,001 0,029 -0,045 0,05 0,118 0,049Marriage, Demographics (0.016)*** (0,024) (0.025)** (0.038)*** (0,069) (0,032) (0,035) (0.021)** (0.048)** (0.029)*

Observations 4838 1969 2089 688 251 949 952 2500 508 1450Log-Likelihood -2975 -1156 -1182 -412 -137 -521 -507 -1490 -320 -847

(3) Sample 1988-2003 0,078 0,092 0,058 0,192 0,025 -0,063 0,052 0,153 0,086(0.017)*** (0.030)*** (0.027)** (0.047)*** (0,035) (0.037)* (0.022)** (0.051)*** (0.049)*

(4) Add Party Ideology 0,049 0,082 0,02 0,18 0,008 -0,046 0,044 0,116 0,053(0.018)*** (0.030)*** (0,028) (0.047)*** (0,035) (0,038) (0.023)* (0.054)** (0,053)

Observations 3849 1487 1854 438 801 848 2189 461 558Log-Likelihood -2222 -808 -956 -237 -413 -423 -1228 -261 -251

Notes: The table reports estimates from a probit model, with marginal coefficients of the female dummy being displayed. The dependent variable is the voting decision, which is equal to one if the respondent supported the proposition andzero otherwise for the propositions shown at the top. The table reports the coefficient on the female dummy. All specifications (rows (1)-(4)) include canton and year fixed effects. The first specification displays the coefficient on the genderdummy without individual controls. The second specification adds the demographics age, education, religion, language and urban area as well as income, civil status and employment measures. Income is proxied by a dummy for house-ownership. The employment and civil status variables are binary variables equal to one 1 if the individual is employed or married respectively, and zero otherwise. The fourth specification adds the party ideology, which captures self-placementon a left-right scale, with values from 0-10 and 10 being maximally right. Since party-ideology is only reported since 1988, specification (3) estimates the second specification for the 1988-2003 period. Since the vote on free education was in1986, no data on the left-right position is available. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

Table 3: Voting Behavior of Men and Women in Federal Propositions

Welfare

More Less More More More More More More MoreGovernment Debt Environment Transport Defense Agriculture Education Health Welfare

Female Dummy 0,027 -0,025 0,143 0,032 -0,061 -0,056 0,066 0,075 0,071(0.007)*** (0,018) (0.025)*** (0.020)* (0.018)*** (0.023)** (0,051) (0.022)*** (0.015)***

Add Controls 0,024 -0,028 0,093 0,03 -0,065 -0,077 0,126 0,046 0,059(0.008)*** (0,020) (0.028)*** (0,021) (0.023)*** (0.027)*** (0.060)** (0.026)* (0.016)***

Year and Canton Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 19449 2121 1529 2429 2116 1531 353 1593 4412Log Likelihood -12861,6 -1080,9 -921,4 -1371,7 -1250,1 -875,5 -224,2 -921,3 -2787,9

Notes : The table resports the marginal effects from a probit model whether the respondent supported a proposition, which would have increased government spending in the respective policy area or opposed it.The classification of the financial consequences of the propositions was done using official documents of the Swiss government. Table A3 shows a list of the federal propositions underlying each column. The tableresports the coefficient on the female dummy variable in each row. The specifications (1)-(4) are the same as in Table 3. See notes to Table 3 for further details. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 4: Voting in Favor of More Government in Federal Propositions

Size of Government Scope of Government

How Important is the Protect the Provide Provide Redistribute Care for Problem? Environment Health Care Education Income Elderly

Female Dummy 0,0608 0,0763 -0,0304 -0,0237 0,1305(0.0301)** (0.0291)*** (0,0329) (0,0417) (0.0294)***

Add Controls 0,0353 0,0195 -0,0156 -0,0865 0,0862(0,0395) (0,0385) (0,0448) (0,0527) (0.0382)**

Mean Value 3,70 3,72 3,65 3,29 3,63Canton Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 1226 1230 1231 1226 1233R Squared 0,06 0,07 0,06 0,1 0,07

Is it a Government Responsibility?

Female Dummy 0,0375 0,0376 0,054 0,0487 -0,0435(0,0363) (0,0415) (0,0394) (0,0471) (0,0361)

Add Controls 0,03 -0,0148 0,1001 -0,0263 -0,0803(0,0463) (0,0550) (0.0463)** (0,0591) (0.0452)*

Mean Value 3,49 3,32 3,34 3,02 3,28Canton Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 1222 1229 1227 1223 1231R Squared 0,05 0,1 0,08 0,09 0,08

Source : Political Action Study, 1975

Table 5: Gender Gaps in 1975

Notes : The dependent variable in the upper part is whether the respondent thinks it is an important problem. Theresponses range from 1 (absolutely unimportant) to 4 (very important). The dependent variable in the lower part iswhether the government is considered responsible for providing the services shown in the respective columns. Theresponse ranges from 1 (no responsibility) to 4 (very essential responsibility). The first rows contains only thefemale dummy as well as canton dummies. The second rows adds controls for demographics (age, education,language spoken, religion, divorced, single), employment and household income to the specification. Robuststandard errors are reported in parentheses.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

Female Dummy 0,364 0,409 0,298 0,418 -0,177 -0,238 -0,261 0,014(0.127)*** (0.127)*** (0.153)* (0,264) (0.052)** (0.053)** (0.054)** (0,106)

Medium Education 0,24 0,264 0,271 -0,05 -0,014 0,006(0.131)* (0.133)** (0.133)** (0,088) (0,090) (0,090)

Higher Education -0,362 -0,274 -0,232 -0,118 -0,118 -0,103(0,245) (0,248) (0,250) (0,096) (0,099) (0,099)

Age 0,018 0,011 0,012 0,022 0,02 0,018(0.004)*** (0.004)** (0.005)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)**

Divorced 0,036 -0,134 -0,141 -0,131 -0,083 -0,105(0,382) (0,390) (0,443) (0,096) (0,098) (0,149)

Single 0,059 -0,098 -0,079 -0,275 -0,277 -0,322(0,160) (0,161) (0,202) (0.067)** (0.068)** (0.102)**

Katholic 0,114 0,115 0,12 0,138 0,14 0,139(0,143) (0,140) (0,139) (0.058)* (0.058)* (0.058)*

French-Speaking -0,233 -0,217 -0,216 0,027 0,022 0,027(0,302) (0,294) (0,293) (0,161) (0,161) (0,161)

Employed -0,067 0,04 -0,174 -0,041(0,168) (0,250) (0.063)** (0,094)

Unemployed -1,209 -0,529 -0,207 0,018(0.488)** (0,754) (0,198) (0,296)

Medium Income -0,765 -0,762 -0,128 -0,112(0.170)*** (0.172)*** (0.065)* (0,065)

High Income -0,69 -0,688 0,027 0,046(0.182)*** (0.184)*** (0,080) (0,080)

Refuse Answer Income -0,567 -0,562 0,496 0,51(0.236)** (0.237)** (0.110)** (0.110)**

Have Children 0,036(0,085)

Female*Divorced 0,127 0,075(0,838) (0,198)

Female*Single -0,043 0,006(0,350) (0,129)

Female*Employed -0,152 -0,279(0,329) (0.118)*

Female*Unemployed -1,473 -0,428(0.823)* (0,393)

Female*Have Children -0,303(0.113)**

Mean Left-Right Position 5,84 5,84 5,84 5,84 5,22 5,22 5,22 5,22

Canton Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 1014 974 974 974 6595 6530 6530 6530R Squared 0,05 0,08 0,10 0,11 0,01 0,06 0,06 0,06

Source : Political Action Study (1975); Selects Study (1995)

Left-Right Position in 1975 Left-Right Position in 1995

Table 6: Women Become more Left-Wing Over Time

Notes : The table reports coefficients from a regression where the dependent variable is the respondent's left-right position ranging from 0 (very left-wing) to 10 (veryright-wing). Column (1)-(4) shows the result for the sample in 1975, while columns (5)-(8) for the sample in 1995. The first specification (columns (1) and (5)) containsonly the gender variable and canton dummies. The second specification (columns (2) and (6)) adds individual demographics (age, education, religion, language), whilethe third specification (columns (3) and (7)) also includes controls for employment status and household income. The missing group of the employment status isretired/housewife. The final specification (columns (4) and (8)) add interaction terms between female and employment status, female and marital status as well asbetween female and having children [available in 1995 only]. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Observations Mean Std. Dev Min Max

Expenditures Per Capita (in 2000 SFr)Overall 1247 5086 3296 597 19227Environment 801 224 169 0 1445Transport 1124 944 1112 0 12309Security 1251 452 273 0 1717Agriculture 1174 478 465 0 3642Welfare 1247 581 562 35 3602Education 1247 1064 828 40 4646Health 1247 751 782 15 5140

Revenues and Deficit Per Capita (in 2000 SFr)Overall 1246 4939 3212 374 20392Federal Subsidies 868 748 823 50 6129Shares on Federal Revenues 1143 302 244 0 4457Deficit 1296 -62 608 -2983 9473

Control VariablesAge 0 to 19 (%) 1297 29,3 5,4 15,7 40,5Age 20 to 39 (%) 1297 29,4 2,4 23,1 35,3Age 40 to 64 (%) 1297 28,7 2,5 23,2 36,5Age 65 to 79 (%) 1297 10,0 1,8 6,2 15,680 and Older (%) 1297 2,5 1,1 0,8 6,3Population Density (per Km2) 1297 431 1094 19 6350Unemployment Rate (%) 1297 0,9 1,4 0,0 7,8Foreigners (%) 1297 13,6 6,6 2,5 38,1Catholics (%) 1297 58,5 25,6 8,1 96,2Single Parents (%) 1297 5,7 1,2 3,8 11,6Divorced (%) 1297 3,3 2,1 0,4 9,6Female Labor Force Participation (%) 1297 41,4 6,9 24,3 57,8Education 1297 9,2 5,8 0,0 32,7Share Commuters (%) 1297 4,6 4,6 0 23,2Language: Nongerman 1297 0,3 0,4 0,0 1,0

Additional Controls (Robustness)Rural (%) 797 38,7 31,2 0,0 100,0Mean Annual Income 896 7392 10282 82 78174Signature Requirement Initiative 1265 3,8 3,6 0,0 17,4Mandatory Budget Referendum 1297 0,64 0,48 0,0 1,0Mandatory Law Referendum 1297 0,56 0,50 0,0 1,0Share of Left Parties in Parliament 1195 21,5 12,4 0,0 51,0

Table 7: Summary Statistics for Canton-Level Data

Notes: The table reports summary statistics over the whole sample period (1950-2000). The unit is a canton-year observation. Allexpenditures, revenues and mean cantonal income are deflated to 2000 Swiss Francs. The dummy for the mandatory budgetreferendum measures whether the Canton has mandatory referendum on (ordinary) expenditures exceeding a certain threshold level.Education is measured as the percentage of the population with a tertiary education. Nongerman denotes the fraction of cantons wherethe dominant language is any language other than German (Italian, French).

Expenditures Revenues Deficit Environment Transport Security Agriculture Education Health Welfare

Women Suffrage -0,033 0,001 -0,032 0,25 0,087 -0,037 -0,055 -0,063 -0,092 -0,049(0.019)* (0,032) (0,059) (0,195) (0.051)* (0.019)* (0,059) (0.023)*** (0.045)** (0.029)*

Unemployment Rate 0,016 0,004 -0,071 0,079 0,073 -0,012 0,004 -0,033 0 0(0.007)** (0,010) (0.030)** (0.027)*** (0.023)*** (0.007)* (0,018) (0.009)*** (0,019) (0,011)

Log Population Density -0,462 -0,554 -1,019 1,348 0,012 -0,321 -2,122 0,213 1,176 -0,337(0.089)*** (0.117)*** (0.557)* (0,996) (0,265) (0.092)*** (0.230)*** (0.108)** (0.261)*** (0.154)**

% with Higher Education -0,004 0 0,004 0,025 -0,017 -0,001 -0,018 -0,01 0,006 0,012(0.002)** (0,003) (0,008) (0.013)** (0.006)*** (0,002) (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0,006) (0.003)***

% Commuters -0,01 -0,006 0,029 -0,087 -0,035 -0,016 0,004 -0,004 0,014 -0,016(0.003)*** (0,004) (0.015)* (0.023)*** (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0,008) (0,004) (0,009) (0.005)***

% Single Parents 0,025 0,035 0,015 -0,333 0,007 0,011 0,056 -0,038 0,086 -0,003(0.012)** (0.018)* (0,071) (0.126)*** (0,040) (0,012) (0.034)* (0.015)** (0.030)*** (0,019)

% Divorced -0,119 -0,094 -0,004 -0,788 -0,194 -0,141 -0,19 -0,149 -0,484 0,009(0.023)*** (0.030)*** (0,089) (0.125)*** (0.054)*** (0.015)*** (0.047)*** (0.025)*** (0.060)*** (0,031)

Female Labor Force Participation -0,009 -0,015 0,006 -0,031 -0,015 0,000 0,020 -0,004 -0,055 0,001(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0,011) (0,030) (0.009)* (0,003) (0.008)** (0,003) (0.007)*** (0,005)

% Katholic -0,008 -0,01 -0,008 -0,002 -0,002 -0,006 -0,017 -0,003 0,016 -0,009(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0,007) (0,012) (0,005) (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0,002) (0.004)*** (0.003)***

Share Federal Revenues 0,001 0,019 0,102 0,027 -0,03 0,001 -0,006 0,058 0,081 0,041(0,016) (0,029) (0.055)* (0,081) (0,031) (0,008) (0,062) (0,036) (0.048)* (0.013)***

Federal Subsidies 0,126 0,141 0,03 0,236 0,346 -0,029 0,104 0,07 0,108 0,001(0.020)*** (0.022)*** (0,078) (0.075)*** (0.059)*** (0.014)** (0.038)*** (0.018)*** (0.037)*** (0,022)

Age-Classes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCanton-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesTime-Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Observations 1200 1200 1200 775 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200R-squared 0,97 0,92 0,55 0,7 0,81 0,97 0,9 0,97 0,93 0,97

Notes: The dependent variable is the log of real per capita expenditures in the respective category. The only exception is the deficit in column (3), which is measured in levels. All expenditures are measured in 1000 SwissFranks at 2000 prices. Environmental expenditures are only available since 1970. The main independent variable "Women Suffrage" is equal to one if women suffrage has been introduced in the canton and zero otherwise.Population density is measured as the log of the number of people (in 1000) per square kilometer. The unemployment rate, the share of highly educated, the share of divorced people, the share of single parents, the femalelabor force participation rate and the fraction of katholics are all measured in percentage of the respective population. All specifications include canton and year fixed effects as well as controls for the age structure of thepopulation. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 8: Women Suffrage Adoption and Fiscal Policy

Size of Government Scope of Government

Expenditures Revenues Deficit Environment Transport Security Agriculture Health Education Welfare

Years since Adoption -0,0113 -0,0146 -0,0106 -0,0262 -0,0124 -0,0034 -0,0512 0,0193 -0,0049 0,0082(0.0028)*** (0.0046)*** -0,0118 -0,0233 (0.0074)* -0,0028 (0.0079)*** (0.0073)*** -0,0039 (0.0050)*

Years Squared 0,0003 0,0001 -0,0006 0,0001 0,0005 0,0001 0,0009 0,0005 0,0003 0,0002(0.0001)*** (0,000) (0.0003)** -0,0004 (0.0002)*** -0,0001 (0.0002)*** (0.0002)** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)**

R Squared 0,97 0,92 0,56 0,7 0,81 0,97 0,91 0,93 0,97 0,97

Years 1 to 5 -0,013 -0,005 -0,077 0,028 0,102 -0,014 -0,056 -0,019 -0,035 -0,012(0,022) (0,026) (0,062) (0,143) (0.061)* (0,021) (0,069) (0,048) (0,026) (0,031)

Years 6 to 10 -0,076 -0,027 -0,054 -0,064 -0,004 -0,038 -0,335 -0,008 -0,062 0,021(0.024)*** (0,057) (0,087) (0,157) (0,062) (0.023)* (0.069)*** (0,065) (0.032)* (0,039)

Years 11 to 15 -0,102 -0,097 -0,092 0,01 -0,077 -0,036 -0,362 0,055 -0,074 0,037(0.030)*** (0.041)** (0,113) (0,186) (0,077) (0,027) (0.083)*** (0,082) (0.042)* (0,052)

Years 16 to 20 -0,111 -0,131 -0,084 -0,058 -0,156 -0,027 -0,4 0,155 -0,037 0,064(0.036)*** (0.057)** (0,143) (0,212) (0.095)* (0,036) (0.098)*** (0,096) (0,047) (0,058)

More than 21 Years -0,058 -0,094 -0,204 -0,11 0,019 0 -0,428 0,333 0,053 0,202(0,046) (0,061) (0,181) (0,247) (0,126) (0,041) (0.115)*** (0.122)*** (0,057) (0.073)***

Canton Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCanton Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesYear Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 1200 1200 1200 775 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200 1200R Squared 0,97 0,92 0,55 0,7 0,81 0,97 0,91 0,93 0,97 0,97F-Test Year Dummies 7,19 2,41 0,72 0,61 4,39 2,02 6,4 3,76 6,27 5,05P-value (0,000) (0,035) (0,612) (0,690) (0,001) (0,074) (0,000) (0,002) (0,000) (0,000)

Table 9: Dynamic Effects of Women Suffrage

Size of Government Scope of Government

Notes: The table shows results of a regression of per capita canton expenditures in a given year and policy area on the years since suffrage and years squared (top panel) or 5-years dummyvariables to allow for nonlinear effects of women suffrage on expenditures (bottom panel). The other control variables included are the same as in Table 8. All specifications include canton andyear fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. See notes to Table 8 for a description of the variables.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Early Adopters 0,072 0,071(0.018)*** (0.028)**

Linear Trend 0,001(0,023)

Trend*Early Adopters 0,002(0,037)

Indicator 1971 0,371 0,339 0,289 0,357(0.052)*** (0.042)*** (0.085)*** (0.069)***

Voter Preferences 0,562 0,014(0.258)** (0,219)

Growth Rate Expenditures 0,027 -0,016(0,067) (0,052)

Language Nongerman 0,171 0,174(0.031)*** (0.025)***

Border Canton 0,007 -0,011 0,007 -0,012(0,032) (0,026) (0,034) (0,026)

Population Density -0,015 0,03 -0,026 0,031(0,020) (0.014)** (0,020) (0.014)**

Foreign Tourists per Capita -0,002 0,004 -0,002 0,005(0,004) (0,003) (0,005) (0,003)

Fraction Higher Education 0,009 0 0,01 0(0.005)** (0,003) (0.005)** (0,003)

Age Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Decade Dummies Yes Yes No No No NoObservations 50 50 50 50 50 50R-squared 0,25 0,25 0,89 0,94 0,87 0,94

Table 10: Voter Preferences and the Adoption of Women Suffrage

Voter Preferences Suffrage Adoption

Notes : Column (1)-(2) report results from a regression, where the dependent variable is support for increased government spending in a decade.Column (1) only contains a time dummy and whether the canton adopted women suffrage before or in 1971 ("Early Adopters"). Column (2)includes an interaction term between the linear trend and early adoption. Columns (3)-(6) report results from a regression, where the dependentvariable is voter support for women suffrage in the federal referendums in 1959 and 1971. All specifications include whether the canton is on theborder, number of foreign tourists per capita, population density, fraction with university education and controls for the age structure. Changes overtime in the propensity to support suffrage are captured by a dummy for the 1971 ballot ("Indicator 1971"). Column (3) includes average support forhigher government spending in federal propositions ("Voter Preferences"), while column (4) adds the dominant language in a canton. Column (5)tests for reverse causality by including the average growth rate in canton expenditures, while column (6) again adds the language variable. Robuststandard errors are reported in parentheses.

Income Left Party Direct Income Left Party Direct(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Suffrage Adoption -0,024 -0,061 -0,07 -0,0558 -0,0255 -0,102(0,019) (0.026)** (0.020)*** (0.0328)* (0,027) (0.0275)***

Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesYear Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCanton Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 875 1173 1200 875 1173 1243R Squared 0,94 0,97 0,97 0,96 0,97 0,97

Years Since Adoption -0,018 -0,005 -0,01 0,0084 0,0232 -0,0046(0.003)*** (0,004) (0.003)*** (0,006) (0.0048)*** (0,004)

Years Squared 0,0002 0,0005 0,0004 0,0001 0,0003 0,0004(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0,000) (0.0001)*** (0.0001)***

Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesYear Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesCanton Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 875 1173 1200 875 1173 1200R Squared 0,94 0,97 0,97 0,96 0,98 0,97

Welfare ExpendituresExpenditures

Notes : The table reports results of a regression where the dependent variable is canton expenditures (Columns (1)-(3)) and welfareexpenditures (columns (4)-(6)) respectively. The top part shows the coefficients on suffrage adoption (as in Table 8), while the bottompart shows the coefficient of years since adoption (as in Table 9). Columns (1) and (5) adds mean cantonal income, which isavailable since 1965. Columns (2) and (6) add the percent of left-party seats in the cantonal parliament. Columns (3) and (7) includethree measures of direct democratic instruments: whether the canton has a mandatory budget or law referendum and the signaturerequirements in percent of eligible voters of the voter initiative. All specifications include canton and year fixed effects as well as thesame controls as in Table 8. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.

Table 11: Robustness to Inclusion of Additional Controls

Overall Female Relative Overall Welfare Health EducationTurnout Turnout Turnout Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

Years 1 to 5 -10,507 0,517 0,868 -0,027 -0,021 -0,053 -0,044(1.53)*** (0,023) (0,036) (0,053) (0,028)

Years 6 to 10 -8,061 0,542 0,914 -0,092 0,017 -0,034 -0,071(2.01)*** (0.026)*** (0,045) (0,076) (0.036)**

Years 11 to 15 -6,275 0,559 0,944 -0,108 0,027 0,041 -0,082(2,659) (0.032)*** (0,057) (0,092) (0.046)*

Years 16 to 20 -4,037 0,582 0,977 -0,114 0,05 0,141 -0,043(3,099) (0.038)*** (0,062) (0,102) (0,050)

More than 21 Years -3,878 0,583 0,995 -0,061 0,184 0,322 0,047(3,949) (0,047) (0.076)*** (0.128)** (0,060)

Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes YesObservations 920 1200 1200 1200 1200R Squared 0,99 0,97 0,97 0,93 0,97

Notes : The table analyzes turnout behavior in cantonal elections and its effect for the evolution of expenditures. Column (1) regresses aggregate turnout in cantonelections on 5-year dummies for years since suffrage adoption and the same controls as in Table 8. The next two columns show the evolution of estimated femaleparticipation (column (2)) and relative turnout rates (column (3)) based on the estimates from column (1). See Section 6.3. on the details of calculation. Relativeturnout rates vary from zero prior to adoption to slightly above one (as the percentage of women in the eligible population is 51.4 percent). The right-hand side of thetable reports the effect of estimated relative turnout on overall expenditures (column (4)) as well as welfare, health and education expenditures (columns (5)-(8)).The control variables are the same as in Table 8 and include canton and time fixed effects. Standard errors in (4) to (8) are bootstrapped to account for first-stageestimation of relative female turnout.

Table 12: Political Turnout Behavior Cannot Account for Dynamic Suffrage Effect

Source : Kueffer (2004)

Notes : The party reports the percentage of men and women voting for a left party in federal elections. Since theparty system in Switzerland is fragmented with many small and regional parties, voting for a left party includes any ofthe following parties: Social Democratic Party of Switzerland (SPS), Labor Party (PdA), Socialist Party (PSA),Progressive Organisations of Switzerland (POCH), Feminist and Green-Alternative Associations (FGA), Green Partyof Switzerland (GPS), Green Alliance of Switzerland (GBS) and the Solidarities.

Figure 1: Political Gender Gap in Federal Elections, 1971 - 2003

20

22,5

25

27,5

30

32,5

35

1971 1979 1987 1995 2003Year of Federal Election

Per

cent

age

Left

Par

ties

Women Men

Source : VOX Surveys, 1977-2003

Figure 2: Turnout Gap in Federal Propositions

0

0,02

0,04

0,06

0,08

0,1

0,12

0,14

0,16

0,18

0,2

1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001Year

Mal

e Tu

rnou

t Rat

e - F

emal

e Tu

rnou

t Rat

e

Title of Proposition Vote Year of Vote Gender GapNumber (percentage)

Initiative for Reducing Tobacco Consumption 404 1993 0,177Equal Representation of Women in Federal Government 461 2000 0,175Change in Marital Law 336 1985 0,170Against Racial Discrimination in the Military 414 1994 0,168Against Subsidizing Corn Production 413 1994 0,156Initiative for Reducing Alcohol Consumption 403 1993 0,155For Saving the Waters 381 1992 0,153For a Car-Free Sunday per Quarter 498 2003 0,149For Abandoning Nuclear Energy 365 1990 0,147For Equal Rights of the Disabled 500 2003 0,146Initiative for Equal Rights of Men and Women 306 1981 0,145

Source: VOX Surveys, 1981-2003, Sample of Voters.

Table A1: Federal Propositions with the Largest Gender Gap

Notes : The first column reports the official number of the vote, the second column the year the vote was held. The final column shows the gender gap, the percentage ofwomen approving the proposition minus the percentage of men. Positive numbers imply that women were more supportive of the proposition than men.

Policy Areas and Title of Proposition No. Year Result Policy Areas and Title of Proposition No. Year Result

Environmental and Nuclear Policy Social SecurityFor Environmental Protection Longer Maternity Leave

For Protection of the Moor 349 1987 Yes For Protecting Motherhood 323 1984 NoFor Protecting the Waters 377 1992 Yes Law on Maternity Insurance 458 1999 No

For Saving the Waters 381 1992 No Reducing Unemployment BenefitsFor Protecting the Alpine Area 408 1994 Yes Measures for Unemployment Insurance 398 1993 Yes

For Reducing Traffic 463 2000 No Financing Unemployment Insurance 437 1997 YesMore Money for Solar Energy 465 2000 No For Decreasing Retirement AgeEnergy-Environment Initiative 466 2000 Yes For Reform of Public Pension System 444 1998 No

For Taxing Energy instead of Labor 481 2001 No For a more Flexible Public Pension System 469 2000 NoFor a Car-Free Sunday per quarter 498 2003 No Flexible Retirement Age of 62 for Women and Men 470 2000 No

Against Nuclear Energy Supporting the DisabledFor a Future without Nuclear Power Plants 321 1984 No Equal Rights for the Disabled 500 2003 No

For Abandoning Nuclear Energy 365 1990 NoStop New Nuclear Power Plants 366 1990 Yes Health

For Electricity without Nuclear Energy 501 2003 No For an Affordable Health Insurance 373 1992 NoStop New Nuclear Power Plants 502 2003 No Initiative for Financially Sustainable Health Insurance 416 1994 No

Health Initiative 499 2003 NoTransport Policy

Against further Road Construction Defense SpendingStop Road Construction 359 1990 No Less Military

Against A Freeway from Murten to Yverdon 360 1990 No For a Switzerland without Army 357 1989 NoAgainst Freeway in the "Knonauer Amt" 361 1990 No Against Purchasing Fighter Planes 393 1993 No

Pretcting the Landscape near River "Aare" 362 1990 No Reduce Military Spending 471 2000 NoFor Public Transport For Switzerland without Army 482 2001 No

Promoting Public Transport 370 1991 No Change Military Law 495 2003 YesFor a Railway though the Alps 382 1992 YesFor Improving Public Transport 445 1998 Yes Agricultural Policy

Against subsidizing Parking Space Against Subsidizing AcricultureAgainst Subsidizing Parking at Train Stations 429 1996 Yes Abolish Subsidizing Wheat Price 333 1985 Yes

Relax Speed Limit Abolish Reduction of Wheat Price 413 1994 YesRelax Speed Limit to 130/100 358 1989 No For Liberalizing Agriculture

For an Ecological and Competitive Agriculture 418 1995 NoEducation Resolution on Dairy Farming 419 1995 No

For free Education Resolution on Agriculture 420 1995 NoGuaranteed Education and Retraining 340 1986 No For a new Corn Article 446 1998 Yes

Table A2: Titles of Federal Propositions by Policy Area

Notes: The table reports all federal votes between 1981 and 2003, which fall into one of the following seven broad categories: Environmental Politics and Nuclear Policy,Transportation Politics, Agricultural Policy, Social Security, Education, Health and Military Policy. Results of the federal votes can be found athttp://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/index.html.

No. Increase Expenditures Result No. Increase Subsidies/Grants Result No. Decrease Federal Debt Result313 Energy Article No 333 Self-Supply with Corn (A) Yes 400 For healthy Federal Finances Yes323 Protection Motherhood (W) No 335 Risk Guarantee for Small/Medium Enterprises No 421 For Controlling Expenditures Yes339 Culture Initiative No 341 For Domestic Sugar Production (A) No 439 For Budget Balancing Yes340 Guarantee Vocational Retraining (Edu) No 425 Revision Language Article Yes 480 For Controlling Debt Yes348 Railway 2000 (T) Yes349 Protection Moor (Env) Yes Increase Taxes Decrease Subsidies/Grants350 Change Health Insurance (H) No 308 Improving Federal Budget Yes 326 Against Contributions for Primary School (Edu) Yes363 Vine Cultivation (A) No 312 New Regulation Fuel Taxes Yes 327 Against Federal Contributions for Health (H) Yes367 Energy Article Yes 316 For Taxing Heavy Traffic Yes 328 Resolutions on Contributions on Education (Edu) No370 Promoting Public Transport (T) No 317 Fees for Road Use Yes 413 Against Corn Subsidies (A) Yes373 For Stable Finances of Health Insurance (H) No 324 Law on Radio and TV Yes 428 Against Duty on Schnaps Purchases Yes377 Protection of Waters (Env) Yes 331 Against Cantonal Share in Federal Stamp Duty Yes 429 Against Federal Contributions for Parking Space Yes381 Saving the Waters (Env) No 332 Distribution of Revenues from Alcohol Yes 436 Against "Pulverregal" Yes382 Construction of Railway through the Alps (T) Yes 371 For Reorganizing Federal Finances No 437 Financing Unemployment Insurance (W) No386 Salary Parliamentary Members No 389 For Increasing Fuel Charges Yes 446 New Corn Article (A) Yes387 Improve Infrastructure Members of Parliament No 399 Resolution on Federal Finances Yes410 Promoting Cultural Activities No 400 For healthy Federal Finances Yes Decrease Taxes416 For a new Health Insurance (H) No 401 Pro healthy Social Insurance Yes 384 Change Law on Stamp Duty Yes423 Securing Invalidity/Age Insurance (W) No 405 For Fee on Road Use Yes430 Counter-Initiative: For Ecological Agriculture Yes 406 For Fees on Heavy Traffic Yes Decrease Expenditures431 Re-Organisation Administration No 407 Introducing Fees for Heavy Traffic Yes 346 Vote on Military Expenditures (Def) No444 Revision Age Insurance (W) No 442 Law on Fees for Heavy Traffic Yes 393 Against Fighter Planes (Def) No445 Infrastructure for Public Transportation (T) Yes 465 For a Solar Energy Tax No 421 Resolution on Slowing Expenditures Yes458 Law on Motherhood Insurance (W) No 484 For a Capital Gains Tax No 422 Change on Pension and Disability Laws (W) Yes469 For a flexible Age Insurance (W) No 427 Cantonal Responsibility for Military Equipment (Def) No470 For flexible Retirement Age (W) No 357 For Switzerland without Army (Def) No500 Equal Rights for the Disabled (W) No 471 Saving at the Military (Def) No

482 For Switzerland without Army (Def) No

Table A3: Propositions with Predictable Financial Consequences

Notes: The table lists all federal propositions between 1981 and 2003, which either led to an increase in federal expenditures, taxes, subsidies and grants, or a decrease in expenditures, taxes or public debt. Theinformation is taken from publications of the federal government, which publishes the fiscal consequences for each new law and executive order. These are available online at http://www.ads.bar.admin.ch/ADS.Expenditures in individual policy areas are constructed from the respective votes. These are marked after the title using the following abbreviations: (A) for agriculture, (T) for public transport, (Env) for environment,(Def) for Defense, (W) for welfare, (H) for health and (Edu) for education.

Title of Proposition Year of Vote Yes Women Yes Men Decision

Ecological and Modern Agriculture 1995 0,44 0,50 NoEasier Access to Swiss Real Estate for Non-Residents 1995 0,43 0,55 NoAbolish Subsidies for Parking Spaces at Train Stations 1996 0,52 0,41 YesFor a Sustainable Unemployment Insurance 1997 0,39 0,52 No

New Regulation Fuel Tariffs 1983 0,48 0,57 YesIntroduction of Civil Service 1984 0,52 0,45 NoReduce Property Sales, especially to Non-Residents 1984 0,51 0,48 NoStop Construction of Nuclear Power Plants 1984 0,54 0,48 NoStop Use of Nuclear Energy 1990 0,58 0,43 NoReducing Animal Testing 1992 0,55 0,42 NoFor an Ecological Military 1993 0,51 0,43 NoAgainst Fighter Planes 1993 0,52 0,43 NoFlexible Retirement Age 62 for Men and Women 2000 0,50 0,44 NoFor Equal Rights of the Disabled 2003 0,55 0,40 NoStop Construction of Nuclear Power Plants 2003 0,50 0,44 No

Source : VOX Surveys, 1981-2003.

Table A4: Propositions where Men and Women had accepted Different Outcomes

Notes : The second (third) column shows the percentage of women (men) voting in favor of the proposition. The last column shows theofficial outcome of the federal proposition. The first four rows show the votes where women changed the result. The other rows report thevotes, in which men were decisive.