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What Needs to be Changed based on Lessons Learned from
Chernobyl. V.N. Abramova
Professor of Psychology
Obninsk
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz International Conference on Human and Organizational Aspects of
Assuring Nuclear Safety Exploring 30 Years of Safety Culture
IAEA, Vienna, Austria 22–26 February 2016
• Obninsk Institute for Nuclear Power Engineering (OINPE) in National Research Nuclear University (NRNU) of Moscow Engineering Physics Institute («MEPhI»)
• Scientific Research Center (SRC) “PROGNOZ”,
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
Fig.1 The presentation of safety culture (INSAG-4)
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
DEFINITION OF RESPONSIBILITIES
DEFINITION AND CONTROL OF SAFETY
PRACTICES
QUALIFICATIONS AND TRANING
REWARDS AND SANCTIONS
AUDIT, REVIEW AND COMPARISON
MANAGERS' COMMITMENT
COMMUNICATION
ARIGOROUS AND PRUDENT
APPROACH
QUESTIONING ATTITUDE
SAFETY CULTURE
INDIVIDUALS’ COMMITMENT
POLICY LEVEL COMMITMENT
SELF-REGULATION
RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES
STATEMENT OF SAFETY POLICY
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Fig. 2. Psychological aspects of the safety culture
Safety culture
Individuals’ commitment
A rigorous and prudent approach
Managers' commitment
Policy level commitment
Statement of safety policy
Management structures
Resources of qualitative personnel
Self-regulation, business activity in high quality organizational
culture ensuring
Efficient definition of authority and responsibility
Implementation control
Personnel training and assessment of competence
and responsibility
There is the effective encourage and sanctions system on Best Practice
encouragement
The work and procedure improvement, aimed at safety culture
improvement
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
Questioning attitude
Communication, technical documents
keeping
Fig. 3. The «lesson» concept
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
Acknowledgement of negative event
Understanding: what has happened, how it has happened and effort to understand why negative events are taking place
Organizational factors of industrial environment; Safety culture; Human values in work environment; Person psychology Psychophysiology features
Learning a lesson from an incident:
Forming taboo attitude - prohibition to do (repeat) incorrect operation in future.
Fig. 4. A directions of activities an lessons learning from
Chernobyl catastrophe
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Technical shortcomings
reactor constructional
defect correcting in
Chernobyl and its NPP analogous.
The concept and methodology instruments of safety culture forming. Practical activities for safety culture enhancement.
Enhancement of NPP
equipment safety. Quality
enhancement of NPP
personal education.
The lowering of social attention for Chernobyl
lessons. The work in
NPP for analysis and reduction of low level significance
breach.
The experience of widely adopted conception and methodology instruments of safety culture in NPP. The assessment of experience.
1986
1987 - 1993
1994-2000 2001-2008 2009-2016
Fig. 5 . Systematic approach to manage nuclear power plant human resources
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Control actions of external environment
System of activities on HR management
Success enhancement of staff activities and NPP reliability
Programs on solving individual problems of employee personal professional development in nuclear industry
Programs on solving problems of social management in changing conditions of the market and social security
Ensuring professional and psychological readiness, self-control, discipline and commitment at every employee level. Development of labor motivation and safety.
Elaboration and implementation of social security policy and ensuring high living standards of staff. Boosting effectiveness of organizational measures.
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
Fig.6. The Lessons Learned from Chernobyl, Human Factor’s role.
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
“… in general the Chernobyl NPP 1986 staff is described as quite ordinary, mature, well-formed, consisting of qualified specialists at the level recognized in the country as satisfactory. The staff was no better, yet no worse than other NPPs teams. These conclusions indicate that failures and errors were made by the staff not because the Chernobyl NPP employees had some “outstanding” characteristics » [INSAG-7, p.39]).
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
The Chernobyl accident in 1986 resulted from the overlap of many circumstances, from politics and decision-making at the governmental level to reactor design drawbacks and wrong actions of the staff due to gaps in professional training programs and regulations.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
L F K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
"эталон оперативного персонала АЭС" оперативнй персонал ЧАЭС
L, F, K scales evaluate reliability of results. Norm – 50 т-points
[1] health concerns.
[2] tension, depression level.
[3] ostentation, desire to impress.
[4] inclination to neglect social norms.
[5] masculinity, ascendance, inclination to leadership.
[6] persistence, determination, suspiciousness.
[7] hypochondria, self-doubt.
[8] identity, emotional coldness and aloofness.
[9] level of activeness, optimism, carelessness.
[0] desire to control and limit contacts with public.
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
Fig. 7. Comparison of average data in MMPI test sampling «NPP operating personnel reference» (78 people, 1986) and the Chernobyl NPP operating personnel sampling (19 people) in pre-accident period
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
A B C E F G H I L M N O Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 MD
"эталон оперативного персонала АЭС" оперативнй персонал ЧАЭС
[А] emotions, sociability, responsiveness. [B] maturity, activeness of thinking. [C] emotional stability, self-control. [E] independence, ascendance. [F] relaxed behavior, activity. [G] scrupulosity, commitment to sense of duty, responsibility. [H] inclination to risk, fearlessness, vigor. [ I] gentleness, sentimentality, sensitivity [L] elevated self-assessment, lack of trust, coldness.
[M] pragmatic attitude, realism, earthiness of interests. [N] reserve, ethics, gallantry of manners. [O] anxiety, tension,sensitivity . [Q1] flexibility of thinking, easy change of opinions. [Q2] autonomy, independence from the group.
[Q3] behavior self-control, discipline, accounting for public
opinion. [Q4] dissatisfaction, anxiety, tension. [MD] need for approval, desire to look better.
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
Fig. 8. Comparison of average data on R. Cattell16-ФЛО, «С» form, «NPP
operating personnel» sampling (78 people , 1986) and the Chernobyl NPP operating personnel sampling (19 people, prior to the accident)
Fig.9. The Lessons of global and national importance
At the state level and the industry executive level the activities of specialists and executives having safety-priority competences to provide correctly legal support of the industry companies, to guarantee competent, scientifically-based decision-making regarding nuclear power development strategy in the country are envisaged. At this level of activities the requirements to feasible selection of sites for new NPP power units and construction quality are high. Special attention is paid to identifying preferences in the choice of the safest and most economical nuclear reactors for new projects viewing science and technology evolution within the future decades.
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
Рис. 10. The Lessons of individual importance level
Accident lessons have the following stages for every person: • Getting information on accident event; • Assessment of importance, role of accident event in production
activities; • Assessment of personality meaning regarding the accident event in
further activities; • Drawing up a psychological prohibition (taboo) to repeat conditions
or actions resulting in accidents of this or other type; • Memorizing and practical utilization of rules prohibiting to repeat
conditions or actions resulting in accidents of similar or other type; • Only actions elaborated on the basis of acquired lesson are allowed.
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
Fig. 11. Factors influencing the processes of taboo formation on execution improper actions in personnel behavior.
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Health Emotions
HUMAN VALUES
Happiness Health High job results Family, Home, Children; Interesting job
Safety; Taboo to repeated error Comfortable work environment; Favorable climate; Career…
Psychological attitudes:
Management of personnel success (knowledge, principles, laws, rules, instructions, standards, guidelines, regulations ...)
Social attitude
Meaning attitude
Situation attitude
Goal set
(readiness )
Executive set (readiness)
Motives
Performance, Act
Functional condition (state)
of person
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Fig. 12. 30 years later: what should be changed
Accepting Strategies on Safety Culture and Organizational Factors Enhancement are urgent into two major strategic areas: retrospective and perspective. In retrospective area positive achievements and negative experience – disorders in plant operation are studied. The main instrument in this activity is disorders analysis, as precursor events and factors in events. Direct (immediate) and root causes for disorders, corrective actions to prevent their re-occurrence and to prevent them in further on are identified.
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Fig. 13. 30 years later: what should be changed
In retrospective area, negative experience manifests in disorders of a NPP operation due to technology, procedures or human factors deficiencies. However, any disorders in technology or procedures deficiencies are results from errors made either by NPP personnel directly, or people maintaining technology, procedures at the previous stages. Human factor is a part of all disorders. The scale of disorders depends on time coincidence or on aligning a logical chain of objective conditions and facts regarding wrong actions, or manifestations of human error consequences (wrong decisions or actions) at previous stages.
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Fig.14. 30 years later: what should be changed
In retrospective area, in the sense of organizational culture and safety culture human factor role is determined and maintained at every stage of life-cycle and creation /implementation of development policy and industry functioning. The following packages of works or stages can be singled out: - providing for scientific studies and feasibility study of economic and technical development in the industry, - analysis of human resources for the industry needs, - setting forth development strategy, staff training, - decision-making regarding the industry development, identifying tactic steps in its policy and strategy, adoption of programs on the industry development,
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
- identifying geographic locations for new industry facilities taking into account seismic, engineering-geological and demographic conditions, - construction of the industry facilities, - scientific theoretic development, equipment calculations and designing to ensure safe and high-performance operation of the industry facilities, - equipment installation, adjustment and start-up, commissioning, - operation, repairs and upgrade of facilities, - extension of operating period, decommissioning of facilities.
Fig. 15. 30 years later: what should be changed Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
In perspective area it is important to organize and to implement proper development projects for the whole industry development projects, and every company functioning projects on technical level and human behavior level. To organize production it is necessary to create optimum models of successfully operating technology and people, and rules on following those models with due regard to the accumulated experience in strategic and short-term (tactical) industry development plans. Human behavior at all levels of responsibility represents the biggest modeling (or designing) difficulty. Methodology base of designing human behavior is constituted by the human sciences: psychology, sociology, ergonomics, economics and, of course, technical sciences, defining the contents and the essence of personnel activities, their role as a participant of technological process.
Fig. 16. 30 years later: what should be changed Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Fig. 17. 30 years later: Global Projects
Currently under the conditions of social and political instability in the world, development of the project on providing high organizational and safety culture in the nuclear industry worldwide is relevant. The project should include the following: - concept elaboration and creation of scientific-methodical complex to manage human factor risks in the nuclear power industry; - development of educational complex on formation of professional competences in human factor area, staff activities reliability, safety culture and organizational culture for higher education institutions training nuclear industry staff for and/or providing continued advanced training; - setting up a system of knowledge regarding personnel psychology to be applied in professional activities of equipment designers, specialists on technology operation and staff management at all stages of life-cycle in nuclear organizations;
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Fig. 18. Global Projects
-organizing educational-training complexes to form psychological readiness to work by every graduate in universities training staff for nuclear power organizations, to train and correct professionally important qualities - such as responsible work attitude, stress resistance, self-control, functional state self-regulation, other psychological professionally important personality traits and psychophysiological specifics; - outfitting educational organizations, training centers with high-performance equipment, including usage of noncontact methods to obtain bio data aimed at training functional state self-regulation and self-control under stress circumstances.
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Global Projects
Correction of professional and educational standards is required to train specialists and engineers for NPPs aimed at achieving adequate ratio between these standards and staff training with due account for technical progress and safety culture: - enhancement of professional training quality regarding future technical personnel within the academic period at universities/institutes to ensure high level of safety culture and organizational culture of production in the nuclear power organizations; - enhancement of human resources management quality in the nuclear industry by means of improving professional training quality in higher-education institutions. -setting up scientific-methodology base for advanced training departments in the system of post-graduate training, in training divisions of organizations and companies, in other organizations
having potentially hazardous technologies.
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
22
Fig.19. The logical structure of risk management concept .
NPP Sources of risk
Equipment, technology
Human Factor Procedure
Human resources
Human resources management
Risk management
Human resources and Human
Factors Management
In normal operation
conditions
In accident management
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Fig.20. The management of Human Factors Risks in concept of Safety culture enhancement of Nuclear Industry (generalization of many researchers opinions)
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
Human performance assessment
Personnel development
Human factor risk
management
Personnel selection
Safety culture enhancement
Personnel stimulation
Social security and
psychological support for personnel
Work with personnel
on job places
Organization designing and costs
optimization
Knowledge management
FSUE VO “Safety”of
Russia
Concern
“Rosenergoatom”
GC “Rosatom”
HR Department
Minhelpsocdevelop. of
Russia
Federal Medical- Biophysical Agency
Department Safety and Extreme
Situations
Obninsk Research Center “Prognoz”
Research Lab MEPhI, RMC, others
Federal Medicine- Biophysical Centre
Regional Medicine Centre
Socially psychology
work, The
Conflicts Settlement
Participation in the work of Commissions
on Investigation
Failures
Ergonomic examination of the workers places and rules
Psychological Rehabilita-
tion, Correction
Conducting Databases
Inspections of
personnel
Psycho-physiological
control before work, Inspections
of Personnel
Medical Psycho-
physiological
professional selection
Fig.2. TASKS DIRECTIONS of PSYCHOLOGICAL MAINTENANCE LABORATORIES of the ENTERPRISES BRANCHES
MEPhI
Y
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Fig. 21. Sources of risks to repeat failure events in NPP operation
The most frequent reasons for repeated similar failures are such circumstances as
• Deficiencies in organizing NPP operation and management • Inadequate employee motivation
No smaller are the risks to repeat failures due to • Hidden construction and installation errors • Ergonomic and technology drawbacks of procedures,
regulatory documents. Deficiencies of professional training as well as professionally
important personal qualities, functional state and ergonomic drawbacks of job places are most often the reasons for single failures.
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
Fig.22. Organization-functional structure, objectives and tasks of human factor risk management system.
Risk management system: Ensuring high organizational culture and safety culture
On designing stage Ensuring high quality and successful operation of people and technology: Calculations. Documentation. Designing. Physics. Ergonomics. Technologies. Installation. Adjustments. Acceptance. Elaboration of operational procedures, Technical regulatory documentation, Rules, Instructions.
On operation stage: Activities, electrical power generation Ensuring success
Failure prevention: High and low importance failure conditions and risks control. Measures on risk reduction.
Failure reasons analysis. Prevention of failure re-occurrence, corrective actions.
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
Self-actualization of craft
Human competence fulfillment.
Real achievements
Achievements more than
expenditure
Motivation of advance is
actualize
Prognosis of success is to be
borne out
Personality characteristics,
health are normal
Development of career, of
person, social protection
Compliance with the
requirements
of technology and safety culture
Recognition of person
achievements by
environment
Fig.23. The structure of performance professional successfulness of worker
Working efficiency
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Performance success
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
CONCEPTS
2. Concept of professional competences
1. Concept of job analysis
3. Concept of professional standards
Словарь профессиональных компетенций
Словарь профессиональных компетенций
Professional capacity dictionary
Банк профессиограмм
Банк профессиональных стандартов
Professiogram профессиограмм Professiogram data bank
Professional профессиональных стандартов Professional standards bank
Measuring and pattern matching system of Professional standards for individual data
The form of Professional capacity distribution
Tasks of human resources management in NPP
Assessment of personal successfulness
Optimization of labour organization and work remuneration from position of valuable proportionality.
Enhancement of organizational and safety culture
Fig.24. An infrastructure and components of Success Management Concept In production activity at atomic
facilities 4. Success
Management Concept of
professional activity
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
Fig. 25. Principle scheme of professional reliability and successfulness maintenance of NPP personnel management
system (generalization of trade researchers opinions).
OPERATING
SUBSYSTEMS
«Rosenergoatom»
Concern and its
branches
PERSONNEL
PROFESSIONAL
RELIABILITY
NPP SAFETY AND
EFFECTIVE
OPERATION
NPP OPERATION
PROVIDING
SUBSYSTEMS
Management,
services
Adverse factors
(Organizational factors,
social-psychological
climate, ergonomics)
social safety, ecology,
external relations, welfare
Support of psychological
readiness and motivation
Support of physical
endurance
Psychophysiological
support
Risks of
Performance
Design ,
Personnel
training
Ergonomic
support
INTERNAL FACTORS
Professional
qualifications
Job relevant
individual
traits
Safety Culture Phisycal state ,
Health,
Psychophysiology
Medical
support
Social security
Job
implementation
Risks of
declinations
of external
conditions
Risks of
discrepancy to
work requirements
Personnel professional SUCCESSFULNESS
Feedback. Risks of a feedback absence
SUPPORT SUBSYSTEMS for CORRECTION and ACCIDENT PREVENTION
EXTERNAL FACTORS
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Fig. 26. Why are important social security and NPP staff fare?
Whipping up the situation in communities of staff, the formation of protest motivations, aspirations to defend their rights
Errors in the work of the staff
The increase in the number of diseases, decreased performance and working capacity, abnormalities in attention, memory, thinking,
coordination of movements.
Socio-economic, socio-political upheavals, crises, the threat of unemployment, recession, lowering the standard of living and quality of life.
The deterioration of the socio-psychological climate, decrease of psycho-emotional state, psychosomatic disorders among employees.
Breach of order in the job places
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Fig.27. The amendments in educational standards for NPP personnel preparation.
Whipping up the situation in communities of staff, the formation of protest motivations, aspirations to defend their rights
The increase in the number of diseases, decreased performance and working capacity, abnormalities in attention, memory, thinking,
coordination of movements.
Higher-education institutions curriculum and programs training staff for the nuclear power industry must have disciplines on psychological training, as well as on basic psychology application skills in further production activities. Educational standards must be adequate to professional personnel standards at particular departments and positions of the nuclear power companies and must contain educational materials of the following levels: -level of motives and psychological sets for safety priority in future NPP personnel system of values (creation of safety culture); - level of professional knowledge regarding psychology and psychophysiology, work capacity of a working person as an object in designing man-machine systems in future professional activity of a student;
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Fig.28. The amendments in educational standards
- level of professional psychological knowledge of a person as a member of working team (regarding management, leadership, group consolidation, group interaction, personnel success management, psychological climate and other issues); - ergonomic level of job places, level of equipment and technologies, technical documentation (instructions, labor regulations, orders and others). Within the human factor educational disciplines in NPP safety practical studies on organizational culture development, safety culture should be included, as well as basic psycho emotional state self-regulation trainings, self-control and success self-assessment for students.
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
33
1. Professiogram analysis of NPP staff positions;
2. Development of professional competences for OAO «Energoatom» positions;
3. Development of professional standards;
4. Elaboration of staff success management methods for ОАО «Energoatom».
5. Enhancement of analytical methods regarding staff wrong actions based on the developed professional standards
Objectives:
• Characteristics of labor costs and job requirements to the subjects of activities in NPP staff positions;
• Vocabulary of professional competences to enhance quality of job places for OAO «Energoatom» positions;
• Reference positions and professional standards in labor organization at NPP job places;
• Regulations, scales and methods to assess and stimulate success for optimization of ОАО «Energoatom» labor remuneration system.
• Quality enhancement of psychologists activities in commissions investigating NPP failure reasons.
Action Plan:
Enhancement of NPP Management System and Staff Success Assessment
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
Fig.29. Determination of error type in the level of psychological assessment in causal analysis of operational events
The errors of personnel as a cause of operational NPP event
Intention - conscious infringement of NPP
operation
Intention – unconscious
error
«Simplification of task»
«Rationalization»
Flagrant error, Violation
Mistake: Lack of competence
Slip
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
Motivation; 32,0%
Organizational factors; 28,7%Functional state; 8,2%
Professional competence; 4,1%
Characteristics of thinking, memory,
attention; 3,3%
The latent ergonomic errors of the project
and installation; 5,7%
Ergonomic characteristics of the
operational documentation; 8,2%
Ergonomic characteristics of a
workplace; 4,1%
Mode of work and rest; 3,3%
Ergonomic defects of technology; 1,6%
Сonflict; 0,8%
Fig.30. Some results of analysis of wrong personnel actions as causes in events of infringements in
work on the NPP
35 V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture
Conference 3/10/2016
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
А) Based on the international experience and national experience from every country under the conference resolution: 1) To single out the learned lessons given in INSAGs 2) To identify positive experience of certain countries to be shared by other countries 3) To identify the experience that needs up-date. To prepare (propose) action plan. 4) To set up a working group to make proposals on
- organizing psychological support of NPP staff and nuclear
facilities staff (trade psychological service) - methodology of activities on NPP organizational and safety culture.
Lessons. Things to Be Done (proposals) Sharing Experience.
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
1) Recommendations to national leaders of the IAEA member states to support scientific development and practical advancements regarding human reliability and success in nuclear industry 2) To address the IAEA executives for approval to set up a permanent IAEA division (group) on human factor 3) To address the IAEA executives for support to open international projects on: - psychology and ergonomics issues in setting forth professional standards for NPP jobs - training of engineering and technical staff for NPP, elaboration and approval of educational standards and training programs including disciplines on staff reliability, -- development of methods and up-to-date techniques iп training NPP operators to the required psychological qualities including non-contact biotechnologies.
Lessons. Things to Be Changed B) It is necessary to draft:
Y OINPE MEPhI OSRC
“Prognoz
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
REFERENCES [1] DAHLGREN, K., Enhancing Safety Culture and Management Systems. http://www.sepr.es/html/recursos/descargables/Int-cult-seg-PG-sist-gest.pdf [2] HAAGE, M. IAEA Approach to Safety Culture, Leadership and Management for Safety // "The safety of nuclear technologies: safety culture at nuclear energy use facilities"//8-th International Nuclear forum 9-13 September 2013, St. Petersburg, 2013. [3] IAEA SAFETY SERIES NO.75-INSAG-7 The Chernobyl accident: Updating of INSAG-1, VIENNA, 1993. [4] IAEA SAFETY SERIES NO.75-INSAG-21 Strengthening the Global Nuclear Safety Regime, IAEA, VIENNA, 2006. [5] IAEA SAFETY SERIES NO.75- INSAG-23: Improving the International System for Operating Experience Feedback. VIENNA, 2008. [6] IAEA SAFETY SERIES NO.75- INSAG-25: A Framework for an Integrated Risk informed Decision making process. VIENNA, 2011. [7] Identification and Assessment of Organisational Factors Related to the safety of NPPs. State-of-the-Art Report// Nuclear Safety EA/CSNI/R(98)17 Feb. 1999 Expanded Task Force on Human Factors Principal Working Group No. 1 Volum 1 - 2. 2000.
V. Abramova 2016 IAEA Safety Culture Conference
[8] Risk Assessment Activities for the Cold War Facilities and Environmental Legacies // NATO Advanced Study Institute, Bourgas, Bulgaria, 2 to 11 May 2000. [9] ABRAMOVA V.N. Organizational Psychology, Organizational Culture and Safety Culture in Nuclear Power Industry. Part 1: Psychology and Organizational Culture and Safety Culture Assessment Methods at Nuclear Plants. Obninsk: RG-SOCIS, 2009. [10] ABRAMOVA V.N. Organizational Psychology, Organizational Culture and Safety Culture in Nuclear Power Industry. Part 2: Psychology of Formation and Improvement of Organizational Culture and Safety Culture at Nuclear Plants. Obninsk: RG-SOCIS, 2011. [11] ABRAMOVA, V.N., FRISCHKNECHT, A., TOLSTYKH, V., Study of Unusual Events in Nuclear Power Plants by Psychological Means./ International Symposium on Reviewing The Safety of Existing Nuclear Power Plants. IAEA - NEA OECD, 8-11 October 1996, IAEA-SM-342/35, Vienna, (1997) [12] KOPCHINSKY,G.А., STEYNBERG, N.А., The Safety of Nuclear Power Plants/ Chernobyl recurrences to the past, with the present situation and about future times. “Osnova-Print”, Kiiv, U ( 2011). [13] MALYSHEV, V.P., Lessons to Overcome the Chernobyl Accident Consequences: 25 years Later //«Risk Analysis Problems», vol.8, 2011, No.2.